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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

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*Memo
Churo*

18 July 1985

The Honorable Donald T. Regan
Chief of Staff and Assistant to
the President
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Don,

This is something you will find interesting
and possibly useful on some of the questions
concerning us. Also, the President might find it
interesting weekend reading.

Yours,



William J. Casey

Enclosure:
NIC 03568-85, dtd 16 July 1985

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
18 July 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President
The Vice President
Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Soviet Opportunities in the Middle East (S)

1. Our recent assessments of Gorbachev have focused on his energetic and innovative approach to domestic affairs in the Soviet Union--particularly the economy, where some of his actions and statements suggest potential for some change. He has yet, in our view, to turn his attention in the same way to foreign affairs, where he will confront both problems and opportunities. (S/NF)

2. Many of the problems the Soviets have in foreign policy are of their own making, often due simply to ideological blinders or ham-handed tactics. One of the areas in which a more innovative approach could bring the Soviets significant potential gains is the Middle East. In the attached paper, the National Intelligence Officer for the Middle East, using the technique of creating a fictitious memorandum to Gorbachev, lays out some of the opportunities that might await Moscow in that region from the perspective of the new Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. While lacking foreign policy experience, Shevardnadze, as a Georgian, is familiar with Islam and the Middle East. While the purported Shevardnadze memo is long, it is uncommonly well written and both interesting and intriguing. I suggest it for weekend reading. It shows how troublesome a creative Soviet approach to the Middle East could be. (S/NF)


William J. Casey

Attachment:
NIC 03568-85, dtd 16 July 1985

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC 03568-85
16 July 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: Graham E. Fuller
National Intelligence Officer for NESA

SUBJECT: What Eduard Shevardnadze Might Tell Gorbachev about the
Middle East

"Dear Comrade General Secretary,

"You have asked me to review our policies in the Middle East with a view towards being more imaginative, flexible, and activist. You may get more than you bargained for. You know I am just a simple Georgian with little foreign policy background. But I have been living down in Georgia on the border with these rug merchants all my life. I know them. And I've talked with our MFA specialists and KGB experts to get more input. They are unhappy with things. Far be it from me to criticize the wise leadership of my long-time predecessor--I leave that to you. But I would like to suggest a number of new ways of thinking--perhaps less of the old thunder and a little more lightning.

"I must frankly state that there are many major opportunities for the USSR in this region which we have severely neglected over the past decades. A bolder, more flexible and more imaginative policy could bring us significant gains in the region vis-a-vis the US. Some of this calls for greater confidence in our own society, our strengths, steadfastness, and the role of our own minorities. It also calls for a greater ideological flexibility to counter the buffeting winds of ideological change around the world. Soviet power is the critical backdrop to all that we do. But let's not be so muscle-bound that we can't play effectively at the subtle and fast-moving Middle East game.

"We Marxists pride ourselves on sensitivities of the flow of history, the convergence and correlation of historical forces. The Middle East is currently undergoing a major shift of sociological, religious, and

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ideological forces in the resurgence of Islam. We must be alert to this trend, roll with it and exploit it rather than passing ideological judgment upon it.

"An old Georgian proverb says: "God created back and front positions but either way makes the same baby." The road to Soviet success in the Middle East can come from espousing both front and back ways to gaining influence. Marxism-Leninism offers great potential as a guide to establishing and securing power. Marxist-Leninist ruling parties represent the ultimate political accomplishment--but we should not remain bound to this ideology as the only vehicle for moving to influence and power. Marxism will attract the progressive-minded--but the Middle East is by and large hardly progressive-minded. As we say in Tbilisi, "If the pig likes swill, don't waste time giving it peacock and brandy." If Islam is what turns the rag-heads on, don't deny it to them. Let's recognize the power of Islam--however much it falls short of the perfection of Moscow society.

"We have lived with Islam, with Muslims, in our own Soviet Union and Imperialist Russia for many centuries. We understand them and can use them. We can always keep up support for progressive socialist and Communist movements. But let's not limit ourselves to one approach. Let's exploit Islam more effectively. Defeat of the Western position comes before the ultimate triumph of Communism.

"I would summarize my major recommendations as follows. Don't reject them out of hand but read what I have to say later in the paper.

- Accept the reality that Islam is on the rise in the Muslim world. Reorder our interpretation of it, stressing that it is progressive, emphasizing its anti-Western, anti-libertarian, anti-colonialist social revolutionary aspects. We were very good at this in the early 1920's. Be confident that in most cases radical Islam will pave the way to the destruction of pro-Western bourgeois forces and provide ultimate opportunities for organized Marxist parties to pick up the pieces. Have confidence that our own Muslims will not be enticed away by the dubious charms of life in the contemporary Islamic world.
- Provide covert Soviet support for Islamic fundamentalism in selected pro-Western moderate Islamic countries, especially Egypt, Jordan and Morocco.
- Drop our current ideological hostility to the Iranian Revolution and attempt to align ourselves with it, positioning ourselves for its ultimate collapse.

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- Reestablish diplomatic relations with Israel.
- Work for reunification of the PLO overriding Syrian objections.
- Induce a change in the leadership of the PDRY to restore its support to a variety of leftist national liberation movements in the Gulf.
- Breathe new life into the moribund Tripartite Alliance between Libya, Ethiopia and PDRY.
- Be prepared to face a new long-range strategic shift in the subcontinent in which we gain Afghanistan and Pakistan, but lose India. Over the longer run we may be compelled to weaken Indian strength and stability.
- Provide covert support to a Pan-Kurdish movement--with good ties to Armenian ASALA--in order to weaken Turkey and Iran.
- Put the USSR at the head of the Middle East peace process with our own active plans designed to upstage and overshadow any US peace initiative.
- Enable Soviet Muslim scholars, scientists and technicians to play a far more active role in Middle East contacts including bilateral contacts between the Soviet Muslim Republics and the Muslim World.
- Use mutual concern for falling oil revenues as a basis to establish a working relationship with OPEC and as a foot in the door to regular contacts with Gulf oil states where we now lack diplomatic ties. Reinforce the concept that the West is orchestrating the collapse of Third World oil-producing states.

"Our hopes for major ideological influence in the 50's and 60's seem to have diminished greatly as bourgeois nationalists, military, or religious elements have taken charge in most countries. The monarchies have been rather more enduring than we anticipated. In those few countries where a revolutionary situation might be developing we see small chance that these upheavals would move in pro-Soviet directions in the foreseeable future.

- Many of these revolutionary situations are in fact being exploited by right wing reactionary Islamic fundamentalist movements. While these fundamentalist movements can be dangerous and are unquestionably hostile to Communism, at the very least they stand a good chance of overthrowing entrenched

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Western--and especially US--interests in the region. As such they are objectively progressive and will harm the US more than they will harm us. Over the longer run these religious regimes will have feet of clay and will ultimately spark a mass public reaction against themselves. Such an overthrow of clerical regimes will offer opportunities to leftist parties--especially once the fundamentalists have already largely destroyed the pro-Western elite.

- Our single greatest opportunity continues to lie in exploiting the near total US identification with Israel in the Muslim world. We must move to preempt the US peace initiative with initiatives of our own. We must exploit growing US Congressional opposition to US arms sales to moderate Arab states to enter those some markets ourselves.
- The greatest opportunities for major improvements in our position lie in Iran and Pakistan.
- We must revitalize the ties among the radical states and attempt to direct them in a more coordinated fashion against the US without becoming involved in the more adventuristic policies which could lead to unnecessary confrontation with the West.

"Iran. This country is our gut concern. We have been concerned for decades with our southern underbelly of Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey. We Georgians more than once have felt their sting--before being rescued by our Russian elder brothers. With the neutralization of Afghanistan only two northern tier countries remain unsympathetic to Soviet positions--Iran and Turkey. Turkey will be a much harder nut to crack, but Iran is moving toward a period of crisis. The clerical regime is losing support and is becoming increasingly discredited. Bourgeois pro-Western forces have been largely eliminated within the country, leaving opportunities for both the Tudeh and the more native leftist movement--the Mujahedin-e-Khalq--in a potential position to strike out for power. We need to employ both public carrots and covert sticks with Iran. Either way we must move swiftly to take advantage of the rare window of opportunity we now have--where the US has no cards at all to play there.

- We must not sacrifice our major investment in Iraq until we are fairly confident we are gaining significant ground in Iran. But we should not worry about Iraq much. Iraq will still critically need us for major military supplies even if we improve our relations with Iran. In a sense Iraq has nowhere else to go. And Iraq has been of decreasing value to us for a decade. I would ask how it contributes to Soviet foreign policy goals now.

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- There is reason to believe increasing military and economic desperation in Iran will move it toward a position of greater flexibility toward us. Let's not play too hard-ass if we can make some major gains--especially in the area of major strategic arms sales. We can always influence Iranian usage of these weapons through military trainers and advisors--and state publicly our goal is to work to wind down the war.
- Let Iran also know clearly only we can turn off the major military pipeline to Iraq and only we can rebuild a major military force in Iran after the war.
- We must remain alert to exploit opportunities in southern (Iranian) Azerbaijan. This is the province we possess major leverage over with our own northern Azerbaijan cadres. (Between myself and Gaidar Aliev there is considerable expertise within the Politburo on Iranian-Caucasus links.) Work must be devoted to our contacts with other Iranian minorities represented within the USSR as well: Kurds, Turkmens, etc.

"Afghanistan. No real improvement in our situation can come about until aid to the rebels is terminated. Pakistan is the key to the problem. Right now Zia is strong and enjoys major political support from the US. Recommended actions:

- Maintain our strong military presence in Afghanistan.
- Continue the negotiation process with Pakistan in the hopes of gaining unilateral concessions.
- Continue or increase border pressures against Pakistan to maintain the level of tension.
- Work among left wing, intellectual, and elite classes in Pakistan--much of which are anti-US--to weaken Zia's pro-US stance while suggesting that the risk to Pakistan in supporting the rebels remains high.
- Husband our major resources in Pakistan until such time as Zia weakens internally. He is bound to face both economic problems, due to dwindling foreign revenues, and political problems stemming from demands for greater political party participation in the system. Once he falters badly we can move hard politically.
- Continue to develop capabilities among Pakistan ethnic elements especially in Baluchistan and the Sind.

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- Play up the threat of Pakistan's nuclear developments. This both upsets India and creates concern within the US Government and Congress which could lead to a cutoff of US aid to Pakistan. Play on potential lack of US staying power in Pakistan.
- Continue to encourage Indian fears about Pakistan. Developments are in fact moving against us in India since the departure of Indira, but we must work to convince Rajiv that Pakistan is the biggest immediate danger to India and presents such a danger because of US support. India could pull our chestnuts out of the fire in Afghanistan by taking on Pakistan--if it is willing. We need to foster Indian willingness to do so.

"India. A fundamental geopolitical change may be coming about in this region following the liberation of Afghanistan--whether we like it or not. In 30 years we may have ended up Sovietizing Afghanistan and successfully neutralizing Pakistan. Pakistan will have by necessity swung out of the US orbit and into the sphere of Soviet influence, pushing India closer to the US. If India gets too close to the US we may need to completely revise our thinking about Indian power and stability. A pro-Western India may need to be kept weak and internally divided. I advocate no policy changes now--but let's think about the way this geopolitical game is moving.

"As noted above, developments in India have not been encouraging in the last six months.

- Rajiv is likely to maintain his quest for Western hi-tech support, but will be consumed with internal problems as well. It may well be he will be a negative element for Soviet interests over the long run. We may need to consider how he might be removed.
- The Sikh crisis in the Punjab is a major threat to his power and could lead to his demise. While it is too dangerous for us to support the Sikh movement, we should certainly focus Indian attention on the external roots of the Sikh problems--particularly in Pakistan, the US, the UK, and Canada.
- We must encourage all elements in Indian society which look for statist solutions to Indian problems to weaken free enterprise, pro-Western elements. Chinese economic experiments must be painted as failures. Any possible Sino-Indian rapprochement based on more liberalized economies pose a major geostrategic risk to us.

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"Syria. Syria still remains our most important card in the Arab world since the loss of our position in Egypt in 1971. As long as we supply Assad with major arms items we can count on the fact that he will strongly oppose US and Israeli interests in the region. This investment is a valuable one. A few cautionary notes, however.

- We cannot control to any degree Assad's regional policies--and he is sometimes inclined toward adventurism. We must nonetheless strengthen him militarily wherever possible. We must disabuse Washington of any notion that our commitment to Assad is limited. While we can write no blank checks to Assad, Washington and Tel Aviv must be given far more doubts about what red lines we draw in permitting attacks on Syria.
- We must be wary of allowing Assad to provide Israel with an excuse to attack Syria once again. We cannot provide a blank check for Syrian defense under those circumstances--especially if Assad has provoked it.
- We must not allow Syria to be our sole vehicle for Soviet ambitions in the region. Assad has already attempted to swallow up the PLO--with whom we have had a long and close association--and has virtually pushed Arafat into the US camp. He has already preempted much of an independent Soviet role in Lebanon.

Recommendations:

- Maintain arms supplies to Syria. Syrian regional steadfastness is essential.
- Support Syrian diplomatic efforts to wreck any US-sponsored peace process.
- Attempt to reunite the PLO under Arafat--over Syrian objections.
- Establish an independent Soviet capability in Lebanon for the future. Syria's game in Lebanon is the maintenance of Syrian power. Our goal is to create an infrastructure of progressive forces which can grow over the years and which will hopefully come to dominate nationalist and bourgeois groups. Extremist religious activities are of dwindling value once they have succeeded in weakening the US and Israeli presence. We must now be looking to the next and higher stage: strengthening of progressive forces. Amal must remain a key Soviet target of influence for the USSR--even if it displeases the Syrians--because of its potential dominant role in Lebanon.

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- Build long-term leftist influence within Syria. Right now there are no significant progressive pro-Soviet elements within the government. We face very few opportunities when Assad dies and run the risk of a possible reversion to a more nationalist group. We must base our position in Syria on a long-term cooperation with nationalist and military elements until other alternatives emerge.

"The Gulf. The Gulf war has been largely a disaster for Soviet interests:

- Our two major allies--Syria and Iraq--are now totally hostile, rendering any cooperation on anti-Western goals nearly out of the question.
- Iraq has drifted toward the Western camp and no longer supports any progressive pro-Soviet causes in the region. Saddam flirts with Washington, Arafat, Hussein and Mubarak. This is an ally?
- Iraqi revolutionary influence down the Gulf has been diminished.
- The Gulf states have formed a defensive alliance in the GCC and basically have turned to the US for support.
- The war has distracted Arab state attention from the Arab-Israeli issue--our strong card.

Yet I see no major opportunities for the USSR to bring the war to a close. But I do know that if the US tactic is to choke off Iran, we should not be party to that goal. There is almost no opportunity for leftist revolution in the Gulf. Such revolutionary movements as exist are primarily fundamentalist in nature. This nonetheless possesses some positive elements for Soviet interests since these movements may yet be able to dislodge pro-Western governments and monarchies--a major goal. We cannot look for any other positive opportunities for the USSR in the Gulf for sometime to come, however. Recommendations:

- Encourage Iraq to expand its influence down the Gulf in the form of Ba'th party cells--which will at least ensure some organized alternative opposition to fundamentalist movements.
- Stimulate PDRY support of leftist movement in the Gulf--which it used to do in the 1970's.
- Seek opportunities for the USSR to serve as broker in the Gulf war--especially if we can gain a position of influence in Iran.

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- Let Iran know that Soviet support to Iraq can effectively prevent Iran from ever winning the war, but that it lies within Soviet power to greatly strengthen the Iranian military after the war.
- Engage the USSR in support of OPEC price and production problems as a means of entree into the conservative Gulf states--while retaining some independence of action in the oil market. OPEC has frequently sought our support--and we have been unimaginative enough to turn them down.
- Encourage the Gulf states to establish diplomatic relations with the USSR. Stress that they are vulnerable to fundamentalist and leftist radical groups as long as their foreign ties are unbalanced and pro-US.
- Devote major efforts to opening up arms relations with these states. The US is likely to diminish its arms sales to the Gulf in the near future due to Congressional opposition. This provides major opportunity for Soviet arms ties. We would then be competing primarily against Western Europe. The arms relationship is the major key to establishing an important Soviet presence and working ties with the elite and the military of these countries.
- The weak Gulf states must perceive that Soviet ties can serve to legitimize and protect them--even from leftist Iraqi or Syrian pressures--given Soviet influence in those states.

"The PDRY. We have allowed this country to go from an important and activist role among revolutionary progressive forces in the Gulf in the 1970's to a stinking backwater and showcase for nothing. We draw at present precious little political benefit from the PDRY despite our access to military facilities and PDRY lip service to broader Soviet foreign policy goals. We must work to remove the present President, al-Hasani, and restore the old revolutionary leadership. PDRY must reopen the prospects for radical leftist liberation movements in the Gulf--which are now moribund: the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman, the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Arab Gulf, etc. PDRY can turn up the heat against the YAR. PDRY must play a greater role in a community of radical regional states which it has all but abandoned during the last half decade. We must reinvigorate the Tripartite Alliance between PDRY, Ethiopia and Libya--virtually a dead letter at present.

"The Peace Process. The US peace initiative represents one of the major threats to our overall position in the Middle East.

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- A US-sponsored peaceful settlement would work to diminish the single greatest liability the US faces in the region--the Arab-Israeli conflict.
- Reduced military tensions will partially reduce the options for arms sales to the region--our chief source of access.
- Reduced tensions mean regional countries will turn more towards developmental projects--in which Western countries are clearly at a great advantage over us.
- A Pax Americana will strengthen the moderate states and weaken the position of the radical states.
- A Pax Americana will reinforce the idea that the USSR is a superfluous element in Middle East politics.

Recommendations:

- Support Syria fully in its efforts to defer the peace process. Syria is the single most effective means to combat it; we can be confident Syria will pull out all the stops if necessary to succeed.
- The point must be crystal clear to all in the region that there is no peace settlement without the USSR playing its rightful role. The Arabs must understand that only the USSR can prevent imposition of a humiliating and imposed peace settlement on Israeli terms.
- Reunite the PLO--against Syrian wishes if necessary--to insure that all radical factions are included, thereby insuring it cannot come to terms with US capitulationist peace tactics.
- Continue to develop alternative Soviet peace plans. These peace plans must hold appeal to the moderate Arab states and to Western Europe--keeping alive in the moderate Arab state minds the realization that reasonable alternative plans and processes exist to the present American-Israeli diktat. Such Soviet peace plans need remain only one step more forthcoming toward Palestinian and Arab claims in order to make US plans less attractive. It will also strengthen the idea of Soviet presence at an international conference. And let's get our own peace shuttle going out there. We can only play in the peace game by playing in the peace game.

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- If a US-sponsored peace plan really gains momentum and neither we nor the Syrians can block it, we will need to consider associating ourselves with it in some fashion as a damage-limitation operation. Even if some settlement is reached we can still exploit its shortcomings and regional tensions will not in any case really evaporate.

"Israel. Let's reestablish diplomatic relations with Israel. We possess a powerful bargaining chip with Israel in the presence of Soviet Jews wishing to emigrate. Restored relations with Israel will enable us to play this card better. We can maybe stimulate greater Israeli sensitivities to our own Soviet positions. The existence of ties between ourselves and Israel will also weaken US claims that it alone can negotiate with Israel. Sure the initial Arab reaction will at first be negative--what else? But we can remind the Arabs that normalization of relations over the longer run places us in a position to play a greater role in the Arab-Israeli problem so that we cannot be excluded by anyone. Why shouldn't a superpower have relations with everyone?

"Libya. Qadhafi is dangerous and unpredictable, but is valuable in attacking Western positions around the world. We should strengthen our arms ties to him enabling him to continue acting forcefully in the region. As long as we are not identified with his more irresponsible acts we have little to lose through his activities. Let's encourage Qadhafi to work with PDRY and Ethiopia where possible to resuscitate the Tripartite Alliance. And let's quickly upgrade our formal ties with Libya. Again, no blank checks, but we need to ensure the US worries a lot more about what we will do if Qadhafi is threatened.

"Egypt. I see no major opportunities for us in Egypt in the foreseeable future--by way of creating a pro-Soviet regime. The best we can hope for is the collapse of the Egyptian-Israeli accord and the end to pro-US leadership in Egypt--still major gains. Right wing fundamentalist forces are the major threat to the US position in Egypt. Successful overthrow of pro-Western elements will at least neutralize Egypt--while not necessarily leading to strengthening Soviet ties. Let's strengthen fundamentalism here where we can.

- We must also work to strengthen Nasserist forces in Egypt. They are latently anti-US, anti-Israeli and anti-imperialist. Egyptian intellectuals love Nasser; let's use it. Call for a more independent Egypt--harking back to the days when Egypt was a power to be feared in the Arab world--with Soviet support. Nasserist forces--combined with the fundamentalists--are in a position to bring down a pro-US Egyptian policy. Any change in Egypt would also strike a major blow to the moderate pro-US bloc in the region. Iraqi-Egyptian and Algerian-Egyptian ties are especially undesirable.

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"North Africa. Some opportunities here. The pro-Western leadership in Morocco is under great pressure and in the next few years could collapse. We should improve ties with Morocco as much as possible now to work toward that day. They can use money and want arms. Like Egypt, a revolution against the Moroccan government is likely to come from the right--which will at least eliminate Morocco's strong pro-Western sympathies.

"Our position in Algeria has been weakening for many years, and there are few near term options for us there other than attempting to keep Algeria from sliding too heavily toward the US. Few things seem more depressing than once radical states working their way back toward moderation.

"Turkey. "When the Turk farts, Tbilisi swoons." We Georgians know them better than we like. Turkey represents the last pro-Western bastion on our southern borders. Ankara can play a serious role in hindering our future options in Iran. Turkey must be weakened and isolated until such time as pro-Western elements there are on the wane.

Recommendations:

- The Kurdish issue is critical to weakening Turkey. We should expand our covert and unattributable support for the Kurdish movement. The strengthening of a pan-Kurdish movement will also have effect on Iraq and Iran; but in the case of Iran, it can only serve to help weaken the central government and strengthen separatist forces alongside of Iranian Azerbaijan. Only in Iraq will it hurt a government with whom we have good relations. Iraq is already drifting westward and the price is affordable. Let the Iraqis worry about it.
- A growing Kurdish movement inside Turkey immediately affects US airbases in Eastern Turkey--the heart of Kurdish territory. Harsh repression by Turkey will only draw down criticism of Turkey in Europe and the US on the human rights level and will compromise Turkey's position in Europe and even the US.
- Kurdish ties with Armenian ASALA will serve to propagandize the Kurdish cause, strengthen its capacity to launch terrorist attacks on Western targets on an international basis for the first time, and publicize Turkey's repressive role.
- Otherwise, Turkish violations of human rights within Turkey should be publicized to lend moral international support to the strong latent left-wing movements in Turkey and to create friction between Turkey and the West.

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"Soviet Muslims. We must be more imaginative in our use of our own minorities, especially Muslim minorities--in the Middle East. While some elements of our respected Central Asian brothers might have passing interest in Islam, one good look at Tehran might cure that.

"Our Muslims have an historic role even in Czarist days of leading the Muslim world in nationalist anti-colonial thinking--especially among Turks and Persians. They currently represent an impressive reservoir of educated and trained cadre able to display Soviet industrial and technological accomplishments to some Muslim countries. Remember that California-educated engineers may not be what heavily Islamic-oriented Middle East countries want in the future. A good Uzbek engineer won't import free love and do-your-own-thing trash values when he goes to Tehran or Saudi Arabia. They can demonstrate the superiority of their own Islamic Soviet culture over the current economic, political and social mess and mayhem that dominates the Muslim world today--and free of corrupting Western values. They are ideally suited to serve as a foot-in-the-door in many conservative Islamic societies where non-Muslims are less trusted. This potential reservoir of influence has been largely neglected until now. Imaginative use of these assets can be of great value to Soviet foreign policy goals--especially in countries under increasingly Islamic regimes.

"Although some of these proposals may fly counter to other policy positions, most of them merit close consideration. Do not forget that comrades such as myself and Gaydor Aliev have lived on the border of these states for a long time, perhaps giving us a special feel for the mentality.

"Not all of these ideas can be immediately implemented, but their time will come. Please accept these ideas in the spirit of youthfulness, imagination, brilliance, and boldness which you bring to your office. Far be it from me to suggest any failings of our previous foreign policy leadership. You know we Georgians are simple and direct people who just like to speak the truth to our Russian elder brothers--with no ambitions for power of our own.

Yours in Revolution

Eduard Shevardnadze
Eduard Shevardnadze"

(This Memo has been shown to NIO/USSR.)

Graham E. Fuller
Graham E. Fuller

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