

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP

Memo checked

TO: *[Signature]*

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SUSPENSE 8 Feb 85
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Remarks 25X1

JAN 1985
Date

Executive Registry
85- 402

26 January 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
 FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
 SUBJECT: Estimates and Net Assessments

Here are some matters I would like to talk to you about.

1. In reviewing the Status of Interagency Work in Process it appears that Gershwin and [redacted] carry the heaviest load by far, with Ermarth, Vickers, Fuller, Nall, Low and Wattering also fairly heavy. Nall has listed four very important Estimates, two of them apparently Estimates and a Memorandum to Holders on the same subject due at the same time. I consider it important to get the ones on Soviet Sciences, Free World Advanced Technologies and an update on Soviet Military Technology on the streets as soon as possible during this year. What contribution are the other NIOs making or planning to make to the estimate program? Do we need to reallocate resources to back up Gershwin, [redacted] and Nall more strongly? I think we can get Fuller going on an evaluation of Qadhafi's position, objectives and vulnerabilities as soon as we can.

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2. I attach a very good memorandum that Hal Ford did on the draft Estimate on Strategic Implications of the Soviet Presence in Afghanistan. I have already commented on that draft which has a lot of good substance but is too wandering and unfocused with the best part at the end and not reflected in the Key Judgments accurately. In light of the attention that Afghanistan is going to get during the coming months it is important to get this Estimate cleanly and sharply done as quickly as possible. It has been around far too long already. Hal seems to be pretty much on target with his suggestions for reorganization. Also, let's be sure that those doing the Afghanistan Estimate will focus on advanced Soviet capabilities in the southern theater or are at least aware of Ermarth's memorandum on that subject (prepared for the NSC) and [redacted] Estimate due in June on Soviet Capabilities for Multitheater War.

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3. Also, I would like to have a discussion on whether we should be undertaking anything else in the area in the way of net assessments. I attach a covering memorandum which I am addressing to you, Gershwin and [redacted]

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 William J. Casey

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Attachments:
As stated

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THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Executive Pages
85- 176/1


National Intelligence Council

15 January 1985

NOTE FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Mr. Casey's Comment (Memo of 14 Jan 85)
on NIE 11/37-85: Strategic Implications
of the Soviet Presence in Afghanistan

I attach, FYI, some suggestions I made in
November re the original draft of this NIE. There
might be something in those suggestions which could
be adapted in revising the present text.


Hal Ford
NIO/AL

1/15/85

14 January 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, National Intelligence Council

FROM: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: NIE 11/37-85: Strategic Implications of the Soviet Presence in Afghanistan

1. I agree that the draft estimate on the strategic implications of the Soviet presence in Afghanistan is an intriguing paper. It is also an impressive piece of work, but its very size minimizes its value. Worse still, the most useful and important part of it, Implications of Soviet Victory in Afghanistan, is stuck at the back and is hardly mentioned in the key judgments. Moreover, I find it somewhat more sanguine as to where a Soviet victory would leave Western interests in the whole area. I also found it more sanguine than my offhand perception of the US ability to deter the Soviets from using a consolidated Afghanistan as a base for further movement.

2. I have made a lot of markings on these questions on pages 79-96. Some of the questions are somewhat answered later on, but not to my full satisfaction. It almost appears as though we have two estimates here with Section VII being able to stand on its own; however, it is hard to disentangle it from other strategic and political implications. Perhaps the way to resolve this dilemma is to make an appendix out of the military analysis but to get its implications and conclusions set out in the key judgments.

3. Throughout the draft, closer editing would probably help a lot.

4. Although in his covering memo the NIO says he spent a lot of time on the SRP comments, I still detect some of what the SRP called the most critical weaknesses in paragraph 3 of their 26 October comments. I still agree with their conclusion that the discussion of US military advantage in the Iranian area is overly reassuring and still written in the context of a radical Islamic government, which perhaps with leverage on two Iranian borders instead of one Iranian border the Soviets may be able to do something about.

5. It is a difficult estimate but its importance requires another crash effort to deal with the difficulties and get it out. It has been around too long.

6. I'd be interested in knowing the degree of coordination it has received. I want comments and suggestions from NIO/USSR and NIO/GPF. The Ermarth memo of last fall on Soviet opportunities in the southern theater struck me as much more trenchantly on the mark. It appears that perhaps there has not been enough input from Soviet and military specialists.

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William J. Casey

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1 November 1984

NOTE FOR: Herb Meyer, [redacted] /Graham Fuller

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FROM: Hal Ford

SUBJECT: Quick Thoughts -- from a Cold Reader -- on 24 October Draft of NIE 11/37-84, Strategic Implications of the Soviet Presence in Afghanistan

1. I agree with much of the SRP's critique. The draft NIE reflects prodigious thought and work. It is well and responsibly done. There is much of great value in it. There are scores of estimates in it. But it is not an Estimate.

2. It should be. The concept of the paper strikes me as sound, and relevant to policymaking needs. The piece should go back to the drawing board for major face-lifting surgery.

3. My major reactions to the present text are, in brief:

a. Nothing stands out sharply as the paper's findings or contributions to policymaking. There is discussion of a maze of interacting forces, but no clear so-what. Everything is talked about, but the reader isn't told how to weigh all these elements. The paper needs a beginning, middle, and end, with certain key themes or findings stressed. A legitimate response of a policymaker to the present text could be that old chestnut: "I'm still confused, but on a higher level." The NIE must do more than that. It must do lots of things simultaneously: (1) uplift knowledge and understanding; (2) clarify and sort out key elements from an extremely complicated strategic situation; and (3) offer the policymaking reader some sense of trends -- those which are inexorable and those subject to remedy -- and (if possible) some sense of handles for US policymaking. At present the paper does lots of (1), but less of (2) and (3).

b. The value of the paper to consumers can be enhanced by somewhat expanding the concept of the paper to include at least some underlying theme of what general Soviet course in Afghanistan seems most likely for the future. This will (1) strengthen the paper's unity/progression of thought; (2) underlie a subsequent discussion in

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the NIE of the likely strategic consequences, short and long range, of such a future; and (3) eliminate the need for the present spate of words, here and there in the draft, about further Soviet military invasions in the region which I assume you (NIO/NESA) consider to be unlikely.

c. Shorten and simplify the paper throughout. At present it is indigestible: the policymaking officers you wish to influence simply do not have the time and energy to plow through the present text's complexities.

d. Lots of the data in the text could be factored out and put at annex. Also, I assume that there will be a lot of helpful maps and graphics in the NIE.

e. The present Key Judgments need the most work: to distill the so-what essence of the good stuff in the text. See my rough draft ideas, below, for revised KJ's. To some extent these KJ's reflect the present text/KJ's; to some extent they simply reflect my own personal (mistaken?) judgments about the NIE's subject matter. In any event, do what you will with my suggestions.

4. See also my marginalia scribbles. Good luck.

Hal Ford

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SUBJECT: Quick Thoughts -- from a Cold Reader -- on 24 October Draft of
NIE 11/37-84, Strategic Implications of the Soviet Presence
in Afghanistan

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Distribution:

- Orig - VC/NIC
- 1 - A/NIO/NESA
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