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8 June 84

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8 June 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
 FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
 SUBJECT: KGB

1. Pursuant to our discussion this morning, I'd like to ask for drafts of two statements. One would be on what we face in the KGB and the satellite agency that it controls. That subject is dealt with quite well in an article which I attach by [redacted] writing in the Strategic Review of Winter 1983. I also attach an intelligence report on the Cuban apparatus. I would like [redacted] group and the NIO to see what they can add in additional and updated information as well as any additional ideas. The basic theme of this statement was expressed in a report I sent to the President in January from which I extract the following:

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Special Activities

CIA is the organization in the free world most capable of following and dealing effectively with the enormous apparatus for propaganda, political destabilization and insurgency which is in place around the world through the combined and coordinated efforts of the KGB, some 70 non-governing communist parties, the many peace and friendship organizations directed from Moscow, plus the associated and coordinated capabilities of the East German, Cuban, Polish, Czechoslovakian and Bulgarian and other hostile intelligence services as well as the people to people movements sponsored by their governments. Add it all together and it's awesome and skillfully directed. Based on the best available information, our conservative estimate of the current overseas personnel

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A recent study of Castro's propaganda apparatus shows tiny Cuba, with its ten million people and impoverished economy, running a news service operating 36 offices around the world, transmitting stories in four languages, and publishing a variety of magazines and news periodicals that are disseminated to readers in numerous Western and Third World nations. Cuba's broadcast facilities include eight transmitters on the island and two transmitters in the Soviet Union. Shortwave broadcasting alone exceeds 400 hours weekly in eight languages to Europe, Africa, and the Western Hemisphere, Cuba sponsors 113 friendship organizations throughout the world, not to mention sophisticated

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cultural institutions, convention facilities, publishing houses turning out books and pamphlets distributed in more than 60 countries. The Salvadoran insurgents, with some 10,000 fighters and minimal popular support in their own small country, have some 60 representatives developing support and propaganda in other countries around the world. The Soviet Union has a much, though not proportionately, larger worldwide operation. As an example, it spends more money jamming US informational broadcasts than we spend originating and transmitting them.

2. The second thing I want is an elaboration of the above in terms of propaganda, active measures, destabilization, and support of insurgents. You could also build and elaborate on the material under the heading "Soviet Domination in Covert Action" beginning on page 26 of the attached article on "The Clandestine Battlefield."



William J. Casey

Attachments:

- (1) Winter 1983 Strategic Review article, "The Clandestine Battlefield: Trenches and Trends," by Donald Jameson

(2)



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STRATEGIC REVIEW - WINTER 1983

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THE CLANDESTINE BATTLEFIELD: TRENCHES AND TRENDS

DONALD JAMESON



THE AUTHOR: Mr. Jameson is Vice President of Research Associates International, Ltd., a risk-assessment and political analysis firm. Some years ago he retired from the Central Intelligence Agency, where he specialized in Soviet affairs during two decades of service. He has lectured widely on Soviet politics, history, culture and intelligence organizations, and is the author of "Soviet Covert Action" in *Intelligence Requirements for the 1980s*, published by the National Strategy Information Center (1982).

IN BRIEF

The rise of Yuri Andropov and other KGB career officers to the peak of leadership in Moscow has placed a new spotlight on the question of comparative Soviet and U.S. capabilities in the critical arena of intelligence and covert operations. A "net assessment" of this arena is prohibited not only by paucity of available data but also by incomparables: e.g., those inherent in the KGB's role and sanctified status in Soviet society and policy and in the tightly closed shutters of the Soviet system. There is no question that in terms of sheer volume of intelligence harvest the Soviets, and the satellite services controlled by them, hold massive advantages over their Western counterparts. These advantages are redressed somewhat by U.S. proficiency in technical intelligence and, probably, by better analysis of the overall intelligence yield. As recent events have dramatized, however, the most pronounced Soviet edge lies in the area of covert action—an area in which, moreover, the United States still labors under self-inflicted damage.

The remarkable ascent by Yuri Andropov from Chairman of the Committee on Security (KGB) to Central Committee Secretary and thence to General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) has put new emphasis on some old questions regarding the real place of the KGB in Soviet society. The answer to the questions becomes somewhat obvious, at least in the current context, when we observe that in addition to Andropov a career KGB officer has now been promoted to First Deputy Premier and yet an-

other to Minister of Internal Affairs. These developments hold incalculable implications for Soviet evolution and for the future of the U.S.-Soviet relationship. In the first instance, however, they direct attention to a particular arena of that relationship: the murky battlefield of intelligence and covert operations.

The past four decades of U.S.-Soviet struggle have generated many comparisons of "ours" and "theirs": military power, economic strength, educational systems and even competence at basketball. Don Quixote was not the first to say

that comparisons are odious; nevertheless the temptation to make them endures.

In the field of intelligence, comparisons between the Soviet services and those of the West have been adduced more or less as asides in books and articles devoted to particular cases or topics. Efforts at overall comparisons or "net assessments" are rare. Perhaps that is so because many aspects of intelligence work in the United States and in the Soviet Union are simply incommensurable, and others require for an informed judgment data that, very probably, are beyond the reach of any one person anywhere. Before essaying a comparison, therefore, we must discuss the incomparable.

Milieu and Missions of the KGB

The Committee on State Security (KGB) of the Soviet Union comprises the Soviet equivalents, in large part, of the following organizations in the United States: the Immigration Service, the Secret Service, the FBI, the investigative organs of state and local police systems, the military counter-intelligence and security services, large elements of NSA and much of the CIA. The KGB's missions include those of all of these U.S. organizations.

Even this contrast misses the key point. The KGB is the "sword of the Revolution," the coercive force of last resort in the preservation and expansion of a vast imperial despotism. Stalin called the Communist Party machine the "gears" of the system. The KGB is the foundation upon which it rests.

Besides Andropov and the Deputy Prime Minister, one full and one candidate member of the Politburo, the fourteen-man ruling body of the CPSU, and three of the top leaders of union republics have been career "*chekisti*," or served in the equivalent elements of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Three Soviet Supreme Court justices in recent years have been ex-State Security officers, as have the deputy chairmen of the Chamber of Commerce and the Soviet office for the protection of copyrights and patents.

There is no public discussion in the Soviet Union of the budget of the KGB, nor of its activities, except for its own press handouts and stories planted in Soviet journals by its own staff of writers and their friends. Foreign media critical of the KGB are not allowed in the Soviet

Union. Shortly after the passage of legislation restricting the CIA's scope of operation and the executive orders curbing the collection of information on American citizens, the Soviet Union promulgated a law that made it the legal duty of all organizations and individuals in the USSR to fulfill any request of the representatives of the KGB or others engaged in investigations. Although it is perhaps redundant in view of the other means of coercion available, this law makes it a criminal offense to refuse to inform on friends and relatives.

Beyond the direct concerns of the KGB itself, there is the rest of Soviet society, in which every official act—indeed every notable event—is considered secret unless declassified. Fires in buildings, for example—even those in Moscow and witnessed by foreigners—have been classified. The same applies to airplane crashes. Most ordinary government records are not available to the public. Detailed budgets and population statistics and even good road maps are state secrets.

Finally, there is the leadership of the Communist Party: the Politburo and its administrative staff, and the apparatus of the Central Committee. The International Department of this staff directly runs many of the international front organizations and supervises Soviet involvement in terrorist and insurgent groups, in addition to communist parties around the world. The KGB is thus relieved of the task of managing and funding these enormous organizations. Much of the horde of newspapers, magazines and radio stations that serve Soviet purposes around the world receives support that originates with the Central Committee apparatus and wends its way through fronts, and fronts of fronts, to the groups and media at the end of the line. And in all of this the KGB plays only a monitoring role.

Organization for Foreign Operations

Within this huge machine, the KGB alone has some 500,000 members, most of them border guards. The majority of the rest are engaged in the domestic operations of the "Committee": seeking out foreign agents, harassing dissidents and religious believers, investigating major cases of bribery and embezzlement, checking on the military, etc. Only relatively few are dedicated to foreign operations: these are

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mainly in the First Chief Directorate, which directs the activities of agents abroad. The total personnel of the First Chief Directorate probably numbers less than 10,000, or 2 per cent of the whole.

The First's efforts are supplemented, however, by those of others. Within the KGB, personnel of the Second Chief Directorate, which is basically dedicated to counter-intelligence, put much energy into the recruiting of foreigners in the Soviet Union. Since World War II, French and Canadian ambassadors, among others, have been compromised; foreign newsmen by the score have succumbed; tourists and businessmen by the hundreds have also felt the arm of the Second Chief Directorate. When such recruited foreign nationals leave the USSR, their direction is assumed by the First.

The Fifth Chief Directorate, which deals with religious and political dissent, has also been involved in operations involving the cooption of foreigners. Beyond that, there is a directorate for communications intelligence, equivalent to a part of the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA). Finally, the GRU, the Chief Intelligence Directorate of the Soviet Armed Forces, conducts its own foreign operations, parallel to those of the KGB. The GRU alone is larger than any Western intelligence service except the CIA.

When we add all this up, we can begin to grasp that the KGB is remarkably different from the CIA or other Western intelligence services. In the Soviet Union it is second only to the Communist Party in authority and has been hailed as the Party's political arm. It is not significantly restrained by law, although the Soviet passion for bureaucratic procedures (red tape in the U.S. vernacular) infests it along with the rest of Soviet society. Critics of the KGB are usually jailed, often harassed, sometimes murdered and always silenced. The idea of a Soviet citizen bringing suit against the KGB for violation of civil rights is tantamount to subversion in the Soviet legal sense of the term.

Soviet leaders, who boast decades of experience in running the country, are always close to the KGB leadership and think in operational terms. Thus, Khrushchev played a direct, personal role in building up the reputation of the recruited Canadian ambassador in the hope that, upon returning to Ottawa, the latter would receive a high post in the Foreign Ministry. Key

Politburo members probably have a better knowledge of the KGB than any of the non-career Directors of Central Intelligence in the United States have ever acquired of the CIA.

More facts could be cited, but the basic point is crystal-clear. The KGB is comparable to Western intelligence organizations in only a very limited way, even with respect to foreign operations. The raccoon and the Kodiak bear may be related, but they are not of the same genus.

Milieu and Missions of Western Intelligence Organizations

Western intelligence organizations entered the postwar era with reputations of glamor and prestige derived from the exploits, real or fabricated, of the OSS and other derring-do outfits. Even though it had little to do with internal security, exercised no police powers and was entrusted with basically a defensive mission, the CIA had elan under the directorships of Bedell Smith, Allen Dulles and John A. McCone—that is, from the Korean War to the end of the Kennedy Administration.

In that early decade the CIA was an exciting environment, enjoyed high social status in Washington, disposed over ample treasure and suffused the capital with a sense of tough-minded dedication to enlightenment and patriotism. People were proud to be "there," and their friends envied them. On matters that really counted, however, CIA directors and their agency carried little political influence beyond immediate intelligence concerns. (My impression is that CIA directors then—and since—rarely sought a larger role. In any event, they rarely played one. By way of contrast, note the ambitions and careers of Beriya, Shelepin and Andropov.) It is one of the sharper ironies of history that Soviet propagandists over the years have portrayed the CIA largely as the sinister octopus the KGB actually is, and in time much of the Western world has come to believe this deception.

Intelligence Personnel East and West

Especially in the late Truman and early Eisenhower Administrations, many able and ambitious men—and some women—were attracted to the Agency to serve with the OSS holdovers, sharing with the latter pretty much the

same style and background. There were few in either category, however, who had serious experience in peacetime espionage and covert action operations. With the rapid expansion of the service in those days, many from both these "generations" rose quickly to senior positions, learning as they went.

Continuity in the Soviet services was curtailed when Stalin killed off most of the great intelligence officers from the Comintern generation during the purges of the late 1930s. The CIA had no continuity to interrupt. Perhaps because of that lack of tradition and of an established place in society, the CIA used to be prone to self-advertisement, ultimately with tragic results. When the tide of public opinion turned against it, beginning in the late 1960s, its leaders were often ill-prepared to defend the Agency and themselves. Had the Agency stayed out of the limelight all along, the anti-CIA campaign might have exacted less disabling consequences.

The visibility that the CIA acquired in the 1950s and 1960s made it a tempting target for the press and a focus for envy in some elements of the federal bureaucracy that resented the large appropriations for, rapid promotions in, and glamorous reputation of the Agency. The consequences of the attacks were most obvious in the restrictions on operational activities that placed certain categories of people (e.g., clergy and journalists) beyond reach of recruitment or even discussion, marked certain countries off-limits for covert action and required a clearance procedure for others that virtually assured that any serious plans would be exposed in the press before their execution.

Perhaps the most significant of the consequences, however, was in the change in personnel. Many of the leaders of the preceding twenty years left the Agency in early retirement; others, to some degree, retired in place. The shift from accolade to opprobrium, from broad authority and confidence to rigid restrictions and bureaucratic management, made the game no longer worth playing. The extent of the expertise as well as elan that left with that exodus is a question still to be reckoned.

In the KGB, meanwhile, personnel procurement and training have followed a consistent pattern since the end of World War II. The Institute of International Affairs in Moscow, and from time to time other schools, have been

the service academies for young, and usually well-connected, Soviet citizens aspiring to careers involving long assignments abroad in the diplomatic corps, foreign trade, journalism, the KGB, etc. Intensive area and language training has been part of this system since the beginning. Students are assessed during the five-year program by the organizations that expect to hire them, and each is normally earmarked by one of the organizations in his second year.

The system provides a steady, consistent harvest of young talent for all its clients. The KGB's First Chief Directorate receives the cream of the crop: young men from the families of high officials who feel as part of a self-conscious and self-perpetuating elite dedicated to strengthening the communist system—and enjoying the delights of the capitalist world while doing so. They are cynics, by and large, bereft of idealism, but loyal and capable in advancing the cause, not perhaps with the flare of a Richard Sorge or an Ignatz Reiss, but effective nevertheless.

Strengths and Weaknesses: Technical Intelligence

Having touched on the fundamental differences and the qualities of personnel in the KGB and CIA, we come to the areas of intelligence activities that are comparable to an extent.

Judging by what is openly said and printed on the subject, U.S. technology in the critical fields of overhead reconnaissance and signal interception remains superior to that of the Soviets. The commanding American lead in computers and micro-miniaturization, among other fields, should be reflected in image-enhancement, system reliability and many other key aspects of technical intelligence collection and analysis.

In the Soviet Union the strong operational tradition of the Soviet services that has put such great emphasis on spies has, until recently, probably fostered a relative neglect of technical intelligence systems. The CIA (and other U.S. intelligence organizations) appear to have profited in this respect by their lack of experience in agent-handling. Another goad for advanced technical operations on the part of the United States has been the enormous difficulties involved in running spies in a totally controlled

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state such as the Soviet Union. Conversely, the very accessibility of the United States and Western Europe to conventional intelligence-gathering techniques may well have held back Soviet development of technical innovations.

Relative Prowess in Analysis

The other principal field in which U.S. intelligence agencies probably enjoy a lead is analysis. Again, Soviet tradition and continuity, combined with the abundance of fresh information available on the United States and its allies, apparently inhibit the development of refined analytical and estimative processes in the KGB—and even, it appears, in the Central Committee apparatus. The Soviet managers are accustomed to demanding hard facts, preferably in documentary form; someone's informed guess about, say, developments in Washington is not nearly so interesting. The nature of the Soviet system is hostile to speculation, as well as to an objective weighing of the evidence. Prediction of the opponent's behavior, which is what estimating boils down to, seems to be the prerogative of Politburo members.

In June 1941 Stalin had the facts concerning an impending German invasion, but he did not analyze them accurately. In 1967, the available facts in Moscow apparently did not embrace the possibility of a preemptive Israeli air strike against Egypt. The U.S. Government has thousands of analysts and estimators who are striving not only to foresee political and diplomatic developments, but also to explore the possible significance of each scrap of technical data received. The Soviets obviously conduct technical analysis as well. Given the vastly greater amount of information on the U.S. system available to them than vice-versa, they must know more about us than we do about them. Yet, in those cases—and they may be among the most crucial—where the hard information will take one only so far, the U.S. apparatus probably does a better job at extrapolating from the facts.

The KGB lacked, and probably still does, an equivalent of the CIA's Intelligence Directorate, where the analysis and estimation are conducted. The First Chief Directorate receives reports from its agents, evaluates their reliability, writes them over in clear form and sends them off to the Central Committee and Politburo.

Some have alleged that the task of political analysis is conducted in the Soviet Union by academic institutions such as the Institute for the Study of the United States and Canada and the Institute of World Economics and International Politics. Those best informed among former Soviet officials known to this author maintain that the principal function of these institutions is to assert influence in the outside world. While esteemed by the leadership as excellent channels for influencing foreigners, they are given scant attention as contributors to the formation of Soviet policy. The International Department of the Central Committee staff, a group of perhaps two hundred people, is probably the focus of such political analysis as is carried on—that and the Foreign Ministry staff that does Gromyko's homework.

Before leaving this topic, one must note that tenure in office among the leaders of the Soviet Union is so much longer than it is in the United States or Western Europe—and the amount of time available really to focus on the issues each day is so much greater—that the Soviet command level probably needs much less detailed briefing. They have learned the game over decades, not years, and they do not need to be informed of the same thing over and over again.

Agents in Place

When we turn to clandestine operations—espionage, counterespionage and covert action—we come to a subject where the data necessary for an accurate assessment do not exist. Presumably nobody on either side knows how many agents of what quality both sides command. We can talk about individual cases that have come to light, and we can compare sizes of effort to a degree, but we will never know (nor should we) how this part of the struggle is unfolding.

In terms of numbers, the West is outmanned by large proportions. The total Soviet official presence in the United States amounts to some 1,200 people. Experience over the years has shown that something more than half of that total are intelligence officers in the KGB or the GRU—more numerous, by a substantial margin, than the FBI surveillance squads that keep track of them. In many other countries the same numbers, proportionately adjusted, apply. To this one must add the officers of satellite services

from Eastern Europe and Cuba: in the case of the United States, these would amount to on the order of 800. The total numbers thus look overwhelming—to both the local security services which must maintain tabs on the intruders and to the tiny bands in the Western services that try to run spies against the Soviet Union.

This "legal" presence of overt Soviet officials, moreover, is supplemented by a cadre of "illegals": Soviet intelligence officers who pose as natives of the countries in which they operate or of other benign, non-communist nations. Counter-intelligence services never know even what to look for with respect to "illegals." Guesses by former Soviet intelligence personnel about the number of "illegals" infiltrated into the United States every year have ranged from ten upward. No accessible source has known the figure with any degree of accuracy, but it could be in the hundreds.

If, as I presume, there are U.S. operational intelligence officers stationed in the USSR, their number at any given time must be less than one-hundredth of the number of Soviet intelligence personnel positioned in the United States. The U.S. officers may be one hundred times abler than their Soviet counterparts; nevertheless the circumstances favor the latter. Soviet intelligence officers can move around Washington at will, under only slight surveillance. In the Soviet Union the teams of watchers outnumber the watched by as much as a thousand-to-one. Although each nation restricts the other's diplomatic personnel in travel, Soviet intelligence officers on the U.N. staff in New York are hampered by no such limitations.

But then the matter of travel restrictions for Western intelligence operators in Moscow may be somewhat academic, because they cannot expect to carry on a meaningful conversation with a Soviet citizen without it being observed and action against the Soviet citizen being taken by the authorities. Recruitment of spies is extremely difficult under these circumstances. Actually, judging from the cases in which U.S. officials have been expelled from the USSR for serious reasons, our personnel there appear to serve only as communication links, relaying messages, films and other material to and from "dead drops" for agents who were recruited in other countries. Needless to say, the United States has no "illegals" in the Soviet Union to perform these types of missions.

Add to all of this the secure base of the KGB, Moscow—untroubled by investigative journalists, Congressional committees, Internal Revenue Service regulations, leaking bureaucrats, bank inspectors or TV paparazzi—and the inherent advantages of the totalitarian state over a democracy in marshalling resources for clandestine operations become monumentally evident. The first article of the real, but unwritten, Soviet bill of rights is that nothing shall inhibit the state in the pursuit of its enemies, authentic or imagined. When a society sacrifices everything to state security, it certainly can make spying against itself more difficult. The consequences of this obsession with security need not be imagined; they are seen in the stultified life of the average Soviet citizen.

The Pivotal Variable of Access

The ultimate factor in the value of agent operations, however, is not numbers but access. As an agent, a colonel on the general staff may be worth a hundred, perhaps a thousand, privates. The CIA and British MI6 shared such a colonel twenty years ago. If there is another colonel in harness today, I can see no evidence of it. The CIA also had coopted a Soviet Military Intelligence major as a spy, in the 1950s, as has been revealed in William Hood's recent book, *Mole*. Both these men were great sources of military, technical and political intelligence. Of a certainty, they were not the only agents of Western intelligence services in the USSR.

Yet, Soviet intelligence coups in the United States in earlier periods clearly were more significant. The Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs, an Assistant to the President and a senior official in the Department of State simultaneously working as Soviet spies make for quite a trio, and they were far from alone in that metier in Washington before and during World War II. All three were believers in a communist world order. Since then, the Americans discovered to have been recruited as Soviet agents are of a different type. Every one of them sought money, some plied personal grudges or conceits, but none, it appears, has cared about the World Revolution, the triumph of social justice, the defeat of imperialism or other great causes. Nevertheless they have supplied Moscow at one time or another with the most sensitive documents on war

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plans and related matters for the defense of Europe, data on the operations of the communications interception and code-breaking efforts of NSA, performance specifications and technical data on U.S. overhead reconnaissance vehicles, the identities of hundreds of CIA agents and personnel under cover, and many other subjects.

A Systemic Soviet Weakness: Defection

Judging by the available evidence, the greatest vulnerability of the Soviet security system to being breached is through the defection of Soviet officials and those from satellite countries. The KGB probably has the best security in the world, but it cannot stop its officers abroad from deciding not to go home. Over the past thirty-plus years, KGB officers in important posts in other countries regularly have sought refuge in Western countries, mostly the United States and Britain. In addition, senior Soviet officials and diplomats, scientists and other major intelligence sources have changed sides, bringing with them a wealth of information. In the eyes of its secret agents, the Soviet Union may be a great place for which to spy, but not in which to live. Poor Colonel "Kim" Philby of the KGB must sometimes yearn for life again in a decently civilized society.

The defection rate of Soviet intelligence officers and agents mirrors a broader vulnerability. Repression provokes resentment. The attraction of a rich, open society for those from nations steeped in oppression and poverty is great, even among the oppressors themselves. In my opinion, the most cost-effective operational program the CIA could adopt now would be a better system for handling defectors, including improvements in the long-term planning and assistance of new careers in the West. More problems are involved in defector handling than would appear to the inexperienced, but a more comprehensive, sustained program should yield high rewards.

Albeit in the absence of precise knowledge, I suspect that on balance the West, and the CIA in particular, are not as far behind the Soviet opposition as the factors of numbers and environments would indicate. The massive size of the Soviet efforts surely means a greater harvest of information, much of it undoubtedly of first-rate quality. Yet, in terms of the infor-

mation's utility to Soviet policymakers two problems obtrude. First, if the analytical aspect of their work is (as I believe it to be) neglected, the full significance of much of the intelligence harvest may be lost through lack of adequate machinery to fit all the pieces of the puzzle together and fathom their significance. Second, the very size of the effort may engender preoccupation with quantity of reporting, a curse in all intelligence-gathering organizations. Perhaps the better quality of Western intelligence analysis redresses somewhat the imbalance, but there is no question that in sheer volumes of relative intelligence flows the West is clearly outclassed.

Allied Services: Cooperation Versus Control

There remain two areas of intelligence operations in which some comparisons can be made. The first of these is the use of allied or subservient services. NATO and other international arrangements provide channels for liaison, cooperation and even joint operations between American and certain foreign intelligence organizations. At times these relations have proved of great value, but they have always been between independent services, no matter how close the ties.

The Soviet KGB, by contrast, runs the services of the Eastern European countries and Cuba directly as, in effect, separate branches of the KGB. Soviet officers sit in key positions; all major decisions are taken by the KGB. Thus, for example, a KGB general is the chief of the Cuban *Direccion General de Inteligencia*—an arrangement that adds greatly to the reach of the KGB. Amazingly so in light of the record of twenty years, Cubans still tend to be regarded in much of the world as independent of Soviet control. They can approach targets for recruitment, without raising undue suspicion, in New York, Paris, Rio de Janeiro and many other parts of the world. The DGI's principal missions are not concerned with liberation wars, revolution or the Third World: rather, its central task is to garner military and political information on the United States, with the exact requirements written in Moscow and passed on to Cuba for execution. Cuba does have some latitude in the type of support given to guerrilla groups, terrorists and the like in Latin America, but the men in Moscow reserve ultimate authority for themselves.

In 1981 a Polish intelligence officer was arrested in the United States for running a net engaged in stealing technical information in California. His mission was very helpful to the Soviet military, but had nothing really to offer his own country.

Most recently we have witnessed the appalling spectacle of an attempt to kill the Pope under the direction of the Bulgarian service. The Bulgarians have experimented with certain ingenious weapons for the covert assassination of hapless emigres from their unhappy land, weapons that I suspect were designed in Moscow. Now we must face what so far the Western press, and Western governments, have avoided facing: namely that Sofia has no plausible interest in killing the Pope, but Moscow surely does. The advantages of having a satellite willing, or compelled, to do the dirtiest work are substantial.

Soviet Dominance in Covert Action

Finally we come to the area where the Soviets, through the KGB and many other means, clearly surpass the CIA, all other parts of the U.S. Government, and equivalent institutions, public and private, in the Western world: the area of covert action.

The Soviet regime began as a covert action operation, and it has continued to resort to that approach whenever possible. As E.H. Carr suggested in *The Bolshevik Revolution*, propaganda and other forms of opinion-influencing, most of them covert action in one form or another, probably saved the revolution from destruction in its early days. The entire Soviet effort, from overt propaganda to the most subtle agent of influence, must cost much more than the entire budget of the CIA's Operations Directorate: the Soviet effort is estimated at about three billion dollars annually. If one includes all the outlays for USIA, Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe along with the CIA funds for covert action (if there are any still), one could hardly find one billion dollars among them.

The Soviet covert action program is not only the KGB's creature; in fact, the direction is mainly in the hands of the Central Committee's International Department, with the KGB as one of many instruments for its execution. The Central Committee directs and funds the front groups, and the broadcast and print media. The

KGB infiltrates these organizations to use the opportunities they offer for contacting agents and targets for recruitment. It also monitors the personnel to identify hostile penetrations and other improprieties.

In addition, the KGB runs a large stable of agents of influence, persons who can affect policy or opinion in their own countries, without their connection to the Soviets being perceived. Such agents are active in almost every country on the globe. Ministers, parliamentarians, military officers, writers, journalists, clergymen, businessmen and many others have served in the ranks of the covert fellow-travelers. Often the agent of influence is not required to collect intelligence, but some in key positions have combined the two functions. Soviet agents, for example, may have played critical roles in the beginning of the war between Japan and the United States triggered at Pearl Harbor. As John Barron pointed out in the September 1982 issue of *Reader's Digest*, giving names and instances, the current campaign for a nuclear freeze and the parallel movement for disarmament are significantly infiltrated by the KGB and manipulated through other Soviet channels. It is an effort, partly overt and partly clandestine, that is unique in history. The only comparable campaign was that waged by the Nazis in Europe before World War II. Fortunately their campaign was in the beginning stages when war cut it short.

Open societies are not equipped to undertake programs of this scope. The United States did a fair job in countering some of the major prongs of the Soviet covert offensive until the late 1960s. Unfortunately, in 1967 the whole mechanism was exposed in the press, mainly by a magazine whose editor allegedly received financial support from Czechoslovakia. As a consequence, the effort to maintain organizations to oppose the major communist fronts was abandoned. Since then Congressional opposition and a hostile press have rendered the recreation of such countering forces virtually impossible.

The full complexity and ramifications of the Soviet covert action program would require far more space than is available here. One aspect, however, is worth a final note. Beginning with the attacks on the CIA in the 1960s, which are documented in Ladislav Bittman's book, *The Deception Game*, Soviet covert action, allied

with some critics of Western intelligence organizations, has waged a disturbingly successful campaign against the CIA, the FBI and foreign services in Canada, Australia, Great Britain and elsewhere. There have been counter-exposures, of course, that have succeeded in making the threat of the KGB better understood in the West. It is noteworthy, however, that virtually all these efforts have been independent, non-governmental initiatives. In any event (and almost needless to say), the legal and operational restrictions that have been imposed on Western services in the wake of the attacks on them have found no counterpart in limitations on the KGB and its subsidiaries.

Comparative Capabilities in Perspective

The KGB and its allied services represent an enormously more massive intelligence effort than that of the Western services. It is worth pointing out that Cuba, for example, hosts a larger intelligence establishment than does any European NATO power. The only area featuring an approximate equality of effort is in the acquisition of intelligence through technical means. The communist system is also weaker, but to an unknown degree, in the fields of intelligence analysis and estimation.

In the operational aspect of intelligence work, the tradition of Soviet intelligence that goes back to the Comintern and prerevolutionary underground political and terrorist organizations has led the Soviet Union to dedicate a much greater proportion of its resources to intelligence than would be acceptable in the West. The obsession of the totalitarian state with security has also led to this hypertrophy of operations and manpower which provides a uniquely protected base for the whole clandestine network. Some commentators trace the origins of Soviet intelligence to the Tsarist *Okhrana*, but this is absurd when one looks at the revolutionary organs that emerged immediately after 1917.

Leninist tradition places political conspiracy and other aspects of covert action at the front of techniques to solve any problem, domestic or foreign. From its inception the Soviet Union has relied on such methods to deceive, confuse and thus weaken its opponents in preference to seeking genuine agreement through negotiation. Marxism-Leninism is a universal creed,

and the network of communist parties and allied organizations, combined with the secure base from which to operate, provide for the Soviet leadership a uniquely powerful and effective apparatus for covert action in all its aspects.

Despite the disparity in size and scope, Western organizations—some public, some private—have at times been able to counter certain Soviet actions effectively. The CIA used to run a program that limited the influence the Soviet Union has sought to assert, but much of the Western counter-effort appears to have been dissipated in the past twelve or so years.

Admiral Bobby Inman, recently retired as a Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, estimates that since 1965 the United States intelligence effort has been reduced by 40 per cent. One factor in this decline clearly has been the attacks on the intelligence community and the ensuant restrictions placed upon it. The Agent Identities Protection Act of 1982 and the serious attention being given by Congress to revision of other hampering legislation provide hope that things may improve. Modification of the Tort Claims Act to provide better protection to government employees against damage suits for actions performed in their official capacities and the removal of certain categories of documents from those accessible under the Freedom of Information Act are among the goals of legislative proposals now in Congress. These actions evince encouraging trends that may lead to the growth of a real concern among the voters that the cost to national security of weak intelligence organizations is too high to pay.

Meanwhile, the greatest advantage of the West on the clandestine battlefield relates not so much to its own inherent capabilities as to the other side of the Soviet system's strength. To achieve the control it has established and must sustain in the interest of its survival, the Soviet leadership has stifled ambition, dedication and idealism to the point where its own personnel—particularly those professionals with available windows to Western life-styles—pose the greatest danger to the system.

Beyond that, the skills and experience accumulated by Western intelligence services, notwithstanding past debilitations, should make it possible to maintain a level of awareness of Soviet intelligence operations sufficient to prevent truly vital damage to our security. The greatest threat they pose must, however, be constantly

borne in mind: that is, a vast and able apparatus for clandestine action in all of its forms that is considered in Moscow the first echelon

of attack and the first line of defense for an empire still dedicated to the goal of global hegemony.

A NOTE ON SOURCES

The best work available on the KGB is *KGB* by John Barron (New York: Reader's Digest Press, 1974). Barron's articles in the March 1982, and September 1982, *Reader's Digest* on KGB illegals and covert action are parts of a forthcoming book on the Service.

The closest Soviet equivalent is *Ts.R.U. Protiv S.S.S.R. (CIA versus the USSR)* by N.N. Yakovlev (Moscow: 1981), an interesting volume that makes wide use of almost everything written on the CIA in the United States in the past twenty years. Perhaps I missed them by reading too rapidly, but I found no references to the KGB anywhere in the book.

Soviet Covert Action, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the House Intelligence Committee, February 6 and 19, 1980, is a most informative document.

The Role of Cuba in International Terrorism and Subversion, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism of the Senate Judiciary Committee, February 26, March 4, 11 and 12, 1982, is the best source I know on the Cubans.

The five-volume series, *Intelligence Requirements for the 1980's*, edited by Roy Godson and published by the National Strategy Information Center, Inc., New York, is an indispensable source of fact and opinion on all aspects of intelligence work. The articles on Soviet Counterintelligence in Volume Three are of particular interest. My remarks in this article on Soviet covert action are largely a condensation of my contribution on the subject in Volume Four.



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