

## EYES ONLY

1 February 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy Director for Intelligence  
Chief, Arms Control Intelligence Staff

FROM: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: The "Red Team"

1. I appreciate [ ] very thoughtful review of the options and 25X1 implications in setting up a "Red Team." I have signed approval to indicate agreement in principle to move forward on this. There are a lot of implications which could turn on exactly how we proceed and which of the options in the paper are pursued. This has to be explored and tested carefully and we have to do everything we can to avoid duplication of effort and strains on resources that might be directed to more urgent and fundamental needs. In short, [ ] 25X1 memo has lots of food for thought and I congratulate him on that. I leave it to all of you to explore this further and proceed in accordance with whatever you decide.

2. I look forward to going into this further with all of you upon my return.

William J. Casey

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DDI 00468/84  
ACIS 042/84  
27 January 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

-- EYES ONLY --

THROUGH: Deputy Director for Intelligence

FROM: [REDACTED]  
Chief, Arms Control Intelligence Staff

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SUBJECT: The "Red Team" [REDACTED]

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Action Requested

1. Your concurrence with the recommendations below, beginning in paragraph 13. [REDACTED]

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Background

2. NSDD 121 (Tab A) reiterates the President's decision to establish a Red Team to review arms control compliance questions. NSDD 121 states (page 4):

A Red Team review panel will be established to consider and anticipate possible Soviet noncompliance, concealment, and deception activity.

You also need to be aware that NSDD 65, in November 1982, established a Red Team as part of the NSC Verification Committee. NSDD 65 states (page 3):

Creation of a permanent "Red Team" to challenge US verification capabilities, assumptions and policies. This team would anticipate how, in what ways, and for what purposes the Soviets might try to avoid compliance with the provisions of arms control agreements. START and INF should have highest priority.

And the implementing memo for NSDD 65, in July 1983, also dealt with the Red Team concept (page 2) by assigning the following task to the Analysis Group:

Assessment of Soviet concealment and deception activities and "Red Teaming" current and proposed arms control agreements, especially for START, INF, Nuclear Testing, and CBW;

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supervision of the "Red Team" mandated by NSDD 65 when such a team is established.

As you may remember, the Analysis Group is co-chaired by Dr. Eimer of ACDA and myself. [redacted] 25X1

3. My understanding is that in your conversation on 18 January 1983, with National Security Advisor McFarlane, he agreed with you that the Red Team envisaged in NSDD 121 should be under your leadership if not your control. It is clear to me that the purpose of the NSDD 121-Red Team is a variation on the work of US intelligence; intelligence data and intelligence-like work will be the vast majority of the effort. Given the substance of the NSDD 121 mandate, I consider it vital that the DCI have a dominant role. At the same time, it also is apparent that the NSDD-121 Red Team is supposed to affect the Policy Community as well. Consequently, given the history in this Administration of the Red Team (see para 2 above), I believe you should consider allowing or asking ACDA, or State, or the NSC Staff to play a role in overseeing the Red Team. Beyond this, there are a number of fundamental structural and procedural questions which are not answered by NSDD-121 (or any of the other key documents) but which are answered in this memo. [redacted] 25X1

#### Discussion

4. The Red Team, as we envision it, would pull together much of the work from the ostensibly separate fields of compliance and CC&D, and focus that work on the specialized intelligence and policy questions and requirements generated by the arms control process. In my view, the key operative words of NSDD-121 about the Red Team are: " . . . consider and anticipate . . . " Those words encompass more ~~the~~ specific words of NSDD-65, et al. It seems to me that the output of the Red Team ought to be kept as simple and short as possible, preferably memoranda. The one thing which the Executive Branch does not need more of, in the arms control arena, is a big stack of thick, complicated reports which few (if any) key people have time to read or use. [redacted] 25X1

5. There already is a plethora of Intelligence Community and Executive Branch committees, each looking at part of the problem. Within the Intelligence Community, for example, the Red Team likely would have to draw upon existing entities and the new ones which I understand you have agreed to create:

- Several NIOs, especially NIO/SP.
- The Strategic Arms Monitoring Working Group.
- Several DCI committees, such as WSSIC, JAEIC, SIGINT Committee, and COMIREX.
- The new DCI committee on Denial and Deception analysis.

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-- The New NIO for CC&D.

In addition, the special expertise in NSA, NPIC, DIA, and CIA would have to contribute to specific analytical problems. [ ]

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6. Outside the Intelligence Community, there are several Executive Branch committees with overlapping responsibilities, some of which approach those of the Red Team--most importantly:

-- The Analysis Group of the Arms Control Verification Committee.

-- The Consolidated Verification Group of the INF/START Interdepartmental Groups.

-- ACDA's General Advisory Committee.

In addition, PFIAB is trying to get more involved these days both in the intelligence aspects of arms control and in the general subject of concealment, deception, and data denial. [ ]

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Composition, et al

7. A fundamental question here is whether the Red Team membership should be drawn from within the Intelligence Community, from outside the Intelligence Community, or both:

-- A Red Team made up of outside wise men would be a visible sign that the Administration is taking this aspect of arms control seriously. And new blood may generate new ideas on how to approach the problem. But this subject is so complex that such a group probably would not be able to offer more than general guidance.

-- A Red Team made up of intelligence professionals would stand a better chance of providing a useful input to the decisionmaking process, and would be more responsive in fast-breaking situations. Moreover, such a group probably would be less susceptible to political or ideological bias. But, being closer to everyday intelligence analysis, it would be less inclined to be innovative; a "business as usual" approach could be criticized as putting old wine in new bottles.

-- A Red Team made up of insiders and outsiders is an attractive compromise, which would capture some part of the best features of both of the first two approaches, while diluting their disadvantages. [ ]

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8. None of these approaches would prevent the Red Team from drawing upon outside consultants with expertise in specific areas of concern. Moreover, each of the three approaches would impose about the same load on US

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Intelligence for support--although that load probably would be spread out more evenly if the Red Team members were drawn solely from the Intelligence Community. Whatever its composition, the Red Team's most difficult hurdle will be adopting a Soviet-like attitude toward cheating and activities at the edges of treaty provisions. [ ]

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9. Irrespective of the approach, we do not envision a large Red Team. About half a dozen would be a practical upper limit. The requirements for an executive secretary and for dedicated clerical and analytical support would vary, depending on the Red Team's composition and the scope of its duties. [ ]

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10. There are compelling arguments for removing the Red Team from the day-to-day arms control support process. First, the NSDD clearly envisions a separate, independent advisory body. Second, as best we can tell, the concept appears pointed toward brainstorming and thoughtful analysis, activities which would not be possible in the frantic, brushfire, environment generated by this Administration's approach to routine arms control support. Third, the Red Team's charter appears to go considerably beyond the customary limits of day-to-day intelligence (or policy) support to the arms control process. [ ]

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11. Nevertheless, we anticipate a close working relationship between the Red Team and the Intelligence Community's established mechanism for arms control support. Equally close working relationships will have to be developed in the concealment and deception area and with the relevant analytical entities within the Intelligence Community. [ ]

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#### Duties, et al

12. Given the absence of clear guidance in the NSDD, the Red Team's responsibilities can be whatever you want to make them. At one extreme, they could encompass all of the monitoring and compliance work now handled by the Arms Control Intelligence Staff, plus arms control-related deception and denial work. At the other extreme, the Red Team could be swallowed up by existing fiefdoms at the expense of its independence. My general thoughts--subject to your wishes and clarification, if any, from the White House--are, drawing from the past and present:

-- The Red Team should focus on future Soviet activities which could reduce US monitoring confidence or engender US concerns with respect to Soviet arms control compliance--or to breakout, irrespective of compliance or non-compliance. This will require a thorough understanding of:

- Soviet attitudes and intentions with respect to arms control.
- The details of present and projected arms control agreements.
- Intelligence judgments on current and future US capabilities to monitor existing and proposed limitations.

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- Soviet knowledge of, and likely Soviet judgments on, current and future US monitoring capabilities.
  - Present and projected US intelligence collection and analysis capabilities applicable to existing and proposed limitations.
  - Soviet plans for their force modernization.
  - US force modernization plans which might affect Soviet attitudes on compliance or breakout.
  - The history of Soviet concealment, deception, and data denial activities.
- The Red Team should not take over any functions of the Arms Control Intelligence Staff, or of any other existing or soon to be created Intelligence Community body, but should draw upon all relevant Intelligence--and Policy--Community assets.
  - The Red Team should be empowered to suggest lines of enquiry relevant to specialized arms control concerns for pursuit by other intelligence and policy entities.
  - The Red Team should address changing Soviet practices as they apply to all Soviet forces and to all existing arms control agreements, and, upon request, should be prepared to comment on the susceptibility of US negotiating positions under consideration to Soviet cheating and CC&D.
  - The Red Team clearly should focus on the Soviet Union, but should be ready to extend its role as needed to other countries party to multilateral arms control agreements.

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### Recommendations

13. I believe you need to discuss--or at least explain--your plans about the Red Team with Bud McFarlane, with Secretaries Shultz and Weinberger, with Director Adelman, and with Chairman Vessey (in that order) before you implement those plans. They all have interests in the Red Team and, in the case of Director Adelman, my guess (from preliminary discussions with Dr. Eimer) is that Director Adelman thinks he is going to have a major--if not leading--role. [ ]

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14. In any case, the Red Team should (in my view):

- Be an advisory body, independent substantively from other, related intelligence and policy entities, to literally do what NSDD 121 directs.

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- Be a catalyst to bring about analysis in both the Intelligence and Policy Communities regarding the compliance, concealment, and deception areas, but should not do the work itself--consequently it need not be heavily staffed.
- Produce simple, short memoranda for the Executive Branch's senior policy and intelligence officers which they can actually use.
- Consist of six or seven members, with outsiders in the numerical majority but not as a chairman alone, in the following kind of mix:

Insiders

- Two intelligence officials:
  - o The Chairman of the new DCI Committee of Denial and Deception Analysis or
  - o the new NIO for CC&D (if not the same as the above)
  - o The Chairman of the Strategic Arms Monitoring Working Group
- One policy official (depending on your desires), such as:
  - o Assistant Director ACDA for Verification & Intelligence (Dr. Eimer)
  - o Director, Defense Programs and Arms Control/NSC Staff (Dr. Ron Lehman)

Outsiders (the names are illustrative; feel free to add)

- A physical scientist, such as:

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- A senior former official with experience negotiating with the USSR, preferably including compliance issues, such as:

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- A senior former official from the policy/programmatic world, such as:

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- A senior former intelligence officer, such as:

(It might be necessary to forego this type of outsider.)

Avoid at all costs members who are heavy on ideology and fervor but light on reality and practicality.

- the Chairmanship should be joint between either an intelligence official and an outsider, or three-way between an intelligence official, a policy official, and an outsider.

#### Logistics

15. For administrative purposes--most importantly security and logistics--I believe that the Red Team should be attached for oversight to the DDCI. If you felt like doing so, joint oversight by the DDCI and either D/ACDA or Deputy Secretary of State, might be tolerable and achievable. Given that the Red Team is intended to address issues of Soviet behavior relating to compliance, as an intelligence officer who has CIA and Intelligence Community responsibilities simultaneously, I am willing to have the Red Team connected to me on a day-to-day basis, solely for administrative purposes, if you so desire. There can be no doubt that compliance and related issues will be a major element of the arms control process for a long time and whomever you choose to act for your equities has to have a mandate encompassing both CIA and the Intelligence Community.

16. A small secretariat will be needed, consisting of a senior intelligence officer (GS-15/SIS-1 level) with experience in intelligence support to the arms control process and one secretary. My candidate for this officer would be of my staff; other people would be satisfactory too. In my view, the key qualification is a thorough understanding of both the intelligence and the policy aspects of the arms control business. In any case, it so happens that I have space within ACIS for this support team, even if the bilateral strategic arms talks with the USSR resume.

#### Production

17. Whatever else you desire, the Red Team's products should be printed and controlled (in the security sense) by CIA and should be disseminated simultaneously to:

Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Secretary of State

Secretary of Defense

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Secretary of Energy (as appropriate)

Director of Central Intelligence

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Director of the US Arms Control & Disarmament Agency

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#### Resources

18. Since the creation of the Red Team, no matter what else you desire, will impact most heavily on CIA's Arms Control Intelligence Staff and the new NIO for CC&D, each staff should be augmented by one analyst to provide Red Team support. This kind of augmentation ought to be funded easily in the additional bundle of resources for the NFIP which are (in effect) mandated in another portion of NSDD-121 and which were earlier agreed at senior levels within the Executive Branch as necessary.

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#### Implementation

19. Once you have decided what you want to do about consultations with your other key NSC officers, have done that, have made some decisions about members, or--in any case--have given your go-ahead, I am prepared to:

- give you
- make space available in ACIS or create a separate entity.
- negotiate your desires inside the Executive Branch, if appropriate.
- make exploratory phone calls to potential Red Team members, whoever they may be.
- help in any other way you may desire, then or later.

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20. I also believe that you need to know that the material in this memorandum, because of its political sensitivity, has not been coordinated with anyone. This material, however, is based upon the recent talking points we provided you for your meeting with Bud McFarlane and based upon the memo I prepared for you last summer when Director Adelman mentioned the Red Team to you at a NSC meeting on START issues. Thus, we have been consistent.

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21. If there is anything more I may to do assist you here, please call and let me know.

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
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DDI 0468/84  
ACIS 042/84  
27 January 1984

SUBJECT: The "Red Team"

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APPROVED:

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Director of Central Intelligence

\_\_\_\_\_  
Date

DISAPPROVED:

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Director of Central Intelligence

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Date

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DDI 0468/84  
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27 January 1984

SUBJECT: The "Red Team" [REDACTED]

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