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11 July 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Critique of Performance on Soviet Gas Pipeline

1. Helene and her staff did a very good job on the critique of the performance on the Soviet gas pipeline. I attach notes I made on the subject. As discussed with you earlier today, I would like to have the same talents used to take a look at the intelligence judgments preceding significant historical failures like the Castro significance of a year or two before he took power in Havana, the likelihood of North Vietnam intervention in South Vietnam, the likelihood of all-out Soviet support to Hanoi, the prospects of further Soviet intervention in Afghanistan after the first coup in the late 1970s.

2. My purpose in this is to see what we can learn about the proper handling of future possibilities suggested by the suggestion but not strongly supported by any evidence. Coincidentally, the DDCI has been thinking along the same line in other areas. I was asked for a review of thoughts, ways and accuracy to see where we were off on those issues. I believe something of this was done prior to the Team B effort in 1976.

3. This came to me as a result of pondering the current state about the implications of the insurgency in Nicaragua and in presenting the briefing on where Castro is likely to go from here.

4. Once again, as part of this I would like to see the post-mortem



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William J. Casey

Attachment

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