

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

Routing Slip

DCI

TO:		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	D/ICS		X		
4	DD/NFA		X		
5	DD/A		X		
6	DD/O		X		
7	DD/S&T		X		
8	GC		X		
9	LC				
10	IG		X		
11	Compt				
12	D/PA				
13	D/EEO				
14	D/Pers				
15	D/ExStf				
16	AO/DCI				
17	C/CCS/ICS		X		
18	Chm/NIC		X		
19	C/EAS/OPP		X		
20					
21					
22					
SUSPENSE		_____ Date			

Remarks:

DIA review completed.

Executive Secretary

16 Oct 81

Date

3637 (12-77)

25X1

CONFIDENTIAL
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

81-2589



16 OCT 1981

C-11,004/DT-1

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: DIA Efforts to Curb the Flow of Technology to the Soviets (U)

The attached paper describing DIA's efforts in technology transfer is provided for your use.

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "James A. Williams".

JAMES A. WILLIAMS
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Director

Enclosure
DIA Efforts to Curb
the Flow of Technology
Transfer to the Soviets
(C) 1 Cy

DOWNGRADED TO UNCLASSIFIED
UPON REMOVAL OF ENCLOSURE(S)

CONFIDENTIAL

DIA review completed.

CONFIDENTIAL

DIA/DT-1
15 Oct 81

DIA Efforts to Curb the Flow of Technology to the Soviets (U)

(U) DIA's efforts in technology transfer by and large are focused in its Directorate for Scientific and Technical Intelligence and have been ongoing for the past four years. A summary of its activities is given below:

1. (U) In support of the Strategic Trade Control Program, DIA provides intelligence assessments to the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (USDRE) as requested, from an initial caseload numbering about 40 per year in 1979 to the current workload of 100-120 cases per month.

2. (U) In April 1980, USDRE requested DIA comment on known potential military relationships of the end users of items being exported under Department of Commerce license. The current caseload numbers 100-125 cases per month.

3. (C) The Committee on Exchanges (COMEX) requires assessments on selected Soviet, other Warsaw Pact and Chinese visitors. DIA has provided comments on 300 requests per year.

4. (U) Through its intelligence production management responsibilities, DIA required the Service S&T production agencies to include technology transfer as part of their analysis. This tasking applies in over 200 tasks dealing with threat weapon systems and associated technologies.

5. (U) A new area of responsibility is to review cases being looked at by the National Disclosure Policy Committee (NDPC).

6. (U) Presentation of awareness briefings regarding the scope and complexity of the technology transfer problem. These briefings have been given over 180 times to audiences varying from the Congressional level to the Military R&D Community.

7. (U) Contributed to the "Military Critical Technology List" (MCTL) resulting from the 1979 Export Administration Act.

8. (U) USDRE has recently requested that DIA initiate follow-on foreign availability studies against the entire MCTL. This will be accomplished using both in house and contractual resources.

9. (U) Active participation on the various committees/working groups concerning technology transfer.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

10. (U) Provides specific support in response to high level requests to expose, identify and assess problems in technology transfer. Responses have taken the form of briefings to Congress as well as initiatives to stem the flow of technology that were prepared for and at the request of the Secretary of Defense. DIA was also a major element in the debriefing that took place in the attempt to determine the type and implications of the technology transfer to the Soviets by the Swedish Firm DATA SAAB as a result of their sale of an air traffic control system.

11. (C) DIA's Counterintelligence Division has had a significant involvement in technology transfer issues through its publications that were designed to warn and alert key DoD policymakers to Soviet mechanisms of technology transfer, provide an awareness of the hostile intelligence threat in this area and furnish an assessment of the U.S. technological loss.

12. (U) DIA is currently reprogramming personnel from in house resources to meet the increased work loads due to technology transfer. Budget cycle programming for FY 83 and 84 also reflect the increase in resources required.

CONFIDENTIAL