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CURRENTS

'The sins of the fathers'



Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres pays homage January 27 at memorial to World War II Holocaust victims at Bergen-Belsen concentration camp. Peres became the first Israeli head of government to visit Berlin, assuring young

Germans: "The Bible tells us not to charge children with the sins of the fathers. They should not be accused because they did not do it and they would not have wanted it to happen."

Photo by Agence France Presse

NOTES OF THE WEEK

Spy-spooked on the Potomac

Official Washington loves nothing so much as a spy story—and in late January there surfaced a new one to chew on, a story that U.S. government spokesmen called fiction and *U.S. News & World Report* and the *New York Times* called fact. A miniwar of denials and confirmations ensued—

January 25: The news media receive the February 3 issue of *U.S. News*, which reports that the U.S. helicoptered a high-level Soviet intelligence agent out of East Germany last spring, hid him at a U.S. base to prevent the upstaging of the Geneva summit and then brought the defector to America in late November. The story says the CIA wants to keep secret the defection of a fifth top Soviet-bloc spy in 1985. The defector

wants it that way, the CIA is under fire for mishandling defectors and "another Yurchenko" is feared. KGB Col. Vitaly Yurchenko fled to the U.S. last year, then redefected.

January 26: The Sunday *New York Times* says on its front page that sources in Congress confirm the *U.S. News* account and that the defector "may be the most valuable... in recent years." News agencies say unnamed CIA officials scoffed at the report.

January 27: The *New York Times* quotes Vice Chairman Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) of the Senate Intelligence Committee: "I have been told by the CIA that no such defector exists. If you asked me whether I believe that, I would say, in light of [CIA Director William Casey's] public statement of reluctance to follow the procedures of oversight, then I will have no comment." At the White House, Larry Speakes says accounts of a fifth defector are "baseless." Asked whether he denies all or part of the story, he replies, "The whole story."

January 28: The *New York Times* says again that its "congressional sources confirm the reports" of the defection. The *Washington Post* quotes a spokesman for *U.S. News*: "We reported the story from multiple sources over several weeks. Based on the reputations and numbers of these sources, we believe our story is correct. We were warned by more than one of our sources that we could expect denials from the CIA and possibly other government agencies."

The *Washington Times* quotes Senator Chic Hecht (R-Nev.), an Intelligence Committee member: "Where there's smoke, there's fire... There's been too many leaks and here's another." He says the defector accounts are correct. The senator later repeats this to *U.S. News*, which did not interview him for its original article. As to the denials, he declares: "Of course they're denying it. What did you expect them to do?" The same afternoon, the White House again denies the story. ■

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RADIO TV REPORTS, INC.

4701 WILLARD AVENUE, CHEVY CHASE, MARYLAND 20815 (301) 656-4068

FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

PROGRAM CBS Morning News STATION WDVM-TV
CBS Network

DATE October 11, 1985 7:00 A.M. CITY Washington, D.C.

SUBJECT Senator Leahy/Achille Lauro's Hijacking

MARIA SHRIVER: Well, the so-called hijacking of the hijackers was the subject of overnight briefings for certain members of Congress, including Senator Patrick Leahy, the ranking Democrat on the Intelligence Committee. Senator Leahy's joining us right now in our Washington bureau.

Can you bring us up to date? Exactly what were you told last evening about the hijacking?

SENATOR PATRICK LEAHY: Well, we were kept informed as we went along everything that was happening. I don't think many of us got much sleep last night because of the phone calls. But for once, at least, the calls were all positive.

This is a case where we had a lot of things that if they all work right, we get the result we did. They all worked right. And it's a major triumph for the United States.

SHRIVER: What were you told about what went into this decision, how it was brought about?

SENATOR LEAHY: We knew that when Mr. Mubarak went on the news yesterday morning and said that the hijackers had left Egypt, we knew that wasn't so. And it was a case where we knew they were in Egypt. Intelligence was very, very good. When they left, we knew that and were able to send the planes out to intercept the hijackers' plane -- no small feat, in and of itself -- and locating the plane, and then in requiring it to land in Italy.

It's a case where here we are the most powerful nation in the world and we've been frustrated by hijackers and by

2

terrorists because often we didn't know where they were or how to reach them or who to bring our military power to bear on. And this was a case where our intelligence was superb, worked very, very well, and allowed the United States to use the options available to it as a superpower.

SHRIVER: What do you think the reaction of your colleagues will be to the decision by President Reagan and the Pentagon?

SENATOR LEAHY: Well, it should be a positive one, and it shouldn't be any kind of a partisan thing. I think this is a case where I would hope there will not be dissenting voices in the Congress. I hope that we say very clearly that the American people support the President on this, because you want to send a signal to future hijackers or future terrorists that we will find them. We'll look for them, we'll identify them, and we'll go after them and we'll bring them to justice. And that's exactly what's happening in this case.

And that is the only way we are going to put any kind of a dent in terrorism. And I support the President's action very, very strongly.

SHRIVER: Okay. Thank you very much, Senator Leahy, for joining us this morning to bring us up to date on this story.

RADIO TV REPORTS, INC.

4701 WILLARD AVENUE, CHEVY CHASE, MARYLAND 20815 (301) 656-4068

FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

PROGRAM The Today Show STATION WRC-TV
NBC Network

DATE October 11, 1985 7:00 A.M. CITY Washington, D.C.

SUBJECT Senator Leahy/Achille Lauro's Hijacking

BRYANT GUMBEL: Senator Patrick Leahy is the ranking Democrat on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. He has been critical in the past of America's ability to gather intelligence information in the Mideast. He's joined us this morning from our bureau in Washington.

Are you a satisfied Senator this morning?

SENATOR PATRICK LEAHY: I'm a very happy Senator this morning. I didn't mind the calls half the night or the very, very early briefing over at the CIA this morning. This is a case of success.

I've said, in fact, in interviews with you before that if we're going to use the vast power that this country has to go after terrorists, we've got to have far better intelligence and information than we've had. This is a case where the intelligence worked, worked very, very well, even to the extent of knowing when the Egyptian President said that the hijackers had left, we knew they hadn't. We knew they were in Egypt. And we were able to track them and follow them all the way through. It was a superb use of intelligence and connecting it up with our military assets.

GUMBEL: If all that's correct, aren't you a little bit bothered that the Egyptians lied to us?

SENATOR LEAHY: I'm extremely bothered that they did. I can't guess what their reasons might have been. I think that has to be a demonstration that the United States is going to be in a position to make its own judgment on what people tell us, and not have to take anything on faith.

2

GUMBEL: Well, what do we do, then, in reaction to what the Egyptians did? I mean certainly in this case I think you'd have to agree they did not act in a manner befitting a strong ally.

SENATOR LEAHY: No. And I think that there's going to be some real strains as a result of this. They will of course be angry at us for forcing their airplane down. I think our reactions would be, "Don't even talk to us about that. If you've got hijackers, especially those who've murdered an American, you're harboring them, you're just going to have to assume that we're going to come and go after them."

And I think that message has to go to virtually every country, that we want people who have attacked Americans to be brought to justice, wherever it might be. And if it's necessary, we'll go and get them.

GUMBEL: In this case, brought to justice may mean Italian justice. Is that fine by you?

SENATOR LEAHY: I don't have a problem with that because I think that the Italian courts work very well, and it was an Italian-flag ship. But I think eventually I want to see them extradited back here to the United States and tried also in a U.S. court. The Italians have a perfect right to try them, and should and can. But eventually I want to see them tried here in the United States.

GUMBEL: What would be served by that?

SENATOR LEAHY: I think it serves to demonstrate to the world that the United States will watch out for its interests, wherever it might be, and that eventually people will be brought to justice here.

GUMBEL: Whether or not they ever do make it to these shores, is there any move afoot to have these hijackers interrogated by American officials? Is that important to you?

SENATOR LEAHY: It's very important to us. And there are things that will be done very soon. We're going to make sure that we have people who were witnesses positively identify these people, make sure that there hasn't been any switch, that we have the right people.

GUMBEL: To the best of your knowledge -- I mean it seems fairly certain what kind of fate awaits the four hijackers. What about the other two PLO officials who were on board? What's going to happen to them?

SENATOR LEAHY: Well, we're going to have to look at

whether we have cases that can be brought against them, either as accessories or otherwise.

I think the most important thing, though, is that we've demonstrated that our intelligence is getting better and that we know who these people are and where they are, and it really is not going to do them any good to seek safe harbor in any country. We'll go after them.

GUMBEL: As we talk about how strongly the U.S. reacted, you were in on the CIA briefings on this, as you noted at the top of this interview. Were we prepared to shoot that craft down if they had ignored our signals to land?

SENATOR LEAHY: I agree with Secretary Shultz that that's something that we can not and should not go into. I think that it leaves our options open. And quite frankly, I'd just soon have, if there are going to be future terrorists or hijackers, that they now know exactly what our options are.

GUMBEL: Senator Patrick Leahy, you look like a happy man this morning.

SENATOR LEAHY: I'm very happy, and I'm very proud of the President in this case.

GUMBEL: Thank you very much, sir.

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ON PAGE 1 **A**

NEW YORK TIMES
11 October 1985

OFFICIALS SAY C.I.A. DID NOT TELL F.B.I. OF SPY CASE MOVES

The following article is based on reporting by Stephen Engelberg and Joel Brinkley and was written by Mr. Brinkley.

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 10 — The Central Intelligence Agency failed to notify the Federal Bureau of Investigation after it learned more than a year ago that Edward L. Howard was considering becoming a Soviet spy, Government officials said today.

According to court records, Mr. Howard told two agency employees in September 1984 that he was thinking of disclosing classified information to the Soviet Union.

Soviet Defector Was the Key

The bureau has sole responsibility for domestic espionage investigations and, under Federal law, the intelligence agency and all other Government agencies are supposed to report suspected espionage to the F.B.I. It is illegal for the C.I.A. or any other Federal agency to carry out surveillance or other actions within the United States to stop potential spies.

Mr. Howard, 33 years old, a former intelligence agency officer who is now a fugitive, has been charged with espionage, accused of giving Soviet officials details of American intelligence operations in Moscow. Federal officials have called the disclosures serious and damaging.

'Bad Mistake,' Senator Says

Federal officials said the C.I.A. told the F.B.I. nothing about Mr. Howard until after the bureau began an investigation this fall based on information from a Soviet defector, Vitaly Yurchenko, who had been a senior official of the K.G.B., the Soviet intelligence agency.

The bureau began surveillance of Mr. Howard last month, but he slipped out of his home at night and is believed to have fled the country.

Senator Patrick J. Leahy, the Vermont Democrat who is vice chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence, said today: "If the C.I.A. did not give the F.B.I. adequate information about this person, that's a bad mistake. It should have been a problem."

In the last few weeks the C.I.A. transferred the chief of its office of security, William Kotopish, to a new job at a level of equivalent seniority, but an official said the move had been planned "for some time" and was not related to the Howard case.

Mr. Howard worked for the agency from 1981 to 1983. He was told of classified American intelligence operations in Moscow because the agency was planning to assign him there, officials have said.

According to a criminal complaint to file in Federal District Court in Albuquerque, N.M., Mr. Howard told two current employees of the intelligence agency a year ago last month that he had "spent hours in the vicinity of the Soviet Embassy trying to decide whether to enter the embassy and disclose classified information."

An F.B.I. affidavit says the conversation was held Sept. 24, 1984. Four days before that, the Government contends, Mr. Howard gave his information to Soviet officials in St. Anton, Austria.

George Lauder, a C.I.A. spokesman, said today that as a result of that conversation "action was taken" within the agency "and it seemed to be reasonable action at the time." He would not say what the action was, although an official said the agency kept in contact with Mr. Howard after his conversation with the two C.I.A. operatives. Mr. Howard lived in New Mexico at the time.

'A Few Blatant Cases'

The Senate and House intelligence committees are investigating the handling of the Howard case. A key issue in the study, committee members said, will be how the C.I.A. and other agencies deal with employees who leave Government service with detailed, classified knowledge about sensitive programs.

Another element of the investigations will be several recent espionage cases in which Government officials failed to heed warning signs that a current or former employee was planning to spy or was spying, committee members said.

"We've had a few blatant cases where we just didn't follow through, even with alarm bells going off," said Representative Dave McCurdy, Democrat of Oklahoma, chairman of the House committee's Subcommittee on Oversight and Evaluation.

In the Howard case, a senior F.B.I. official said Mr. Howard's conversation with the two C.I.A. officers would have been sufficient to warrant an investigation.

"Anytime we get information that someone has considered such an act, we would take some action," said Philip A. Parker, deputy assistant director

An intelligence official said the C.I.A.'s decision to handle the matter internally rather than report it to the F.B.I. was "a judgment call," adding, "If you reported every fantasy that people have, you'd have everyone under surveillance."

Law Bars C.I.A. Moves in U.S.

The C.I.A. would not say whether it undertook any form of inquiry after Mr. Howard told the two C.I.A. employees he had considered becoming a Soviet spy. But Federal law and a Presidential executive order prohibit the agency from taking any steps inside the United States to investigate possible cases of espionage.

Mr. Howard was one of tens of thousands of people who retire from Government or industry each year after holding positions that gave them access to classified materials. More than 4.3 million people in government and industry associated with government now have clearances to use classified information.

Asked what procedures the Central Intelligence Agency uses to monitor former employees who have knowledge of classified programs, Mr. Lauder, the agency spokesman, said: "We haven't got any procedures. Once a person leaves here, he is John Q. Citizen, just like you and me. We don't keep a string on them. It's strictly an F.B.I. matter."

Dave Durenberger, the Minnesota Republican who is chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, said his panel would also examine the problem presented by military officers who retire with knowledge of classified materials.

Most people with security clearances work for the Pentagon. At the Defense Department, L. Britt Snider, director of counterintelligence and security policy, said: "We don't have any jurisdiction of any kind over former employees, whether or not they had clearances. It's strictly the F.B.I."

At the F.B.I., Mr. Parker said, "We are not concerned about Americans who have had clearances. We don't look at these people unless we detect an individual involved in espionage."

Ex-Intelligence Chief's Moves

Senator Leahy said: "I don't think anyone expects the F.B.I. to maintain surveillance on the several hundred thousand people who leave the Government each year with security clearances. But there are a certain number of people in extremely sensitive positions, a handful of them, that we ought to do more with."

Mr. Leahy said Mr. Howard "certainly would have been one of those" because he held highly sensitive information and was being dismissed following a polygraph examination that indicated drug use and petty thievery, according to Federal officials.

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When Adm. Stansfield M. Turner was Director of Central Intelligence in the Carter Administration, he dismissed, transferred or forced to retire nearly 200 C.I.A. officers who held highly sensitive positions.

In an interview this week, he said that others in the agency had warned him that "we ran the risk of some of them selling their information to the other side." He said he had disagreed when it was suggested that some should be given other jobs, and proceeded with his original plans.

But he said of Mr. Howard: "I don't think my rule should be totally rigid. If this guy had just been briefed, I'd say let's stick him in the Dominican Republic or someplace like that for a couple of years, until the information isn't valuable anymore."

Senator Leahy said: "We may need some sort of turkey farm for some of these former employees. Make them translate cables or something like that for a couple of years."

Admiral Turner said he thought C.I.A. officers ought to be required to agree when they are hired that "for three years or so after they leave, they will be subject to the same rules of intrusion as applied when they were in government. Make them come back for random polygraph examinations. That would give them one more thing to worry about before they turn."

A C.I.A. official said "it's conceivable" that that idea would work, adding that finding solutions to the problem "is certainly something we're thinking about now."

NEW YORK TIMES
8 October 1985

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A12

Spy Charge Spurs Questions About Procedures of C.I.A.

By STEPHEN ENGELBERG

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 7 — Members of the Senate and House intelligence committees say espionage allegations against a former Central Intelligence Agency officer raise serious questions about the agency's procedures for dealing with disgruntled employees.

The legislators say their committees are conducting a detailed examination of the career of Edward L. Howard, a former officer of the agency who, according to Administration officials, was identified by a defector as having sold the Soviet Union highly secret information.

Mr. Howard was forced to resign from the C.I.A. in 1983; the agency was dissatisfied with his answers in a polygraph, or lie detector, examination that was apparently unrelated to espionage charges. Officials have said they suspect it was a desire for revenge that led Mr. Howard, who is believed to have fled the country, to provide secrets to the Soviet Union.

"The C.I.A. has good security procedures but they're not perfect and they're going to have to get better," Senator Patrick J. Leahy, the Vermont Democrat who is the vice chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, said in an interview. "They're going to have to figure out what to do with a disgruntled or potentially disgruntled employee who has a lot of knowledge because that's where a lot of breaches have occurred in the past."

C.I.A. Briefs Committees

Representative Dave McCurdy of Oklahoma, the chairman of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Evaluation of the House Intelligence Committee, said: "I think there are a lot of questions yet to be answered. I'm not sure anyone's comfortable with what we've seen so far."

In an interview today, Mr. McCurdy would not discuss the specifics of the Howard case but said that he and some other members of the committee had been briefed by the C.I.A. Members of the Senate committee have had similar briefings by the agency.

According to members of the two committees and their aides, the panels are concerned about a broad range of issues stemming from the agency's handling of Mr. Howard, who was within the C.I.A.'s three-year probation period when he was asked to resign.

Questions Raised With C.I.A.

Among the questions the two committees are raising with the agency are these:

¶ Why was Mr. Howard, a junior official, given access to such sensitive material at an early stage in his career?

¶ Why did the agency choose to dismiss him while the information he had learned in training for a posting to Moscow was still of value?

¶ What steps were taken to keep track of Mr. Howard's movements after he left the C.I.A., both in this country and abroad, where the Federal Bureau of Investigation has charged that he met with Soviet intelligence agents?

¶ Was there sufficient coordination between the C.I.A. and the F.B.I., the other major Federal agency responsible for counterintelligence work?

Administration officials say Mr. Howard was identified as an agent of the Soviet Union by Vitaly Yurchenko, a senior official in the K.G.B., the Soviet intelligence agency. He defected to the West in July. Mr. Yurchenko, the officials have said, is undergoing extensive questioning at an undisclosed location in the United States:

• Trip to Austria in '84

Mr. Howard, who is now 33 years old, was employed by the Central Intelligence Agency from January 1981 to June 1983, according to an F.B.I. affidavit filed in Federal District Court in New Mexico. The document charged that he traveled to Austria in 1984 where he made contact with agent of the K.G.B. and was paid money for "classified information relating to U.S. intelligence sources and methods."

Intelligence sources say that the information involved related to American operations in Moscow. They have said Mr. Howard was trained for a post in Russia that would have involved managing agents or other means of intelligence collection.

Intelligence sources say, however, that he was not sent to Moscow and was instead asked to leave the agency after

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WASHINGTON POST
15 November 1985

Casey Accuses Durenberger Of Compromising CIA

By Patrick E. Tyler
and David B. Ottaway
Washington Post Staff Writers

CIA Director William J. Casey issued a public letter last night attacking the chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence for conducting intelligence oversight "off the cuff" in a manner that has resulted in the "repeated compromise of sensitive intelligence sources and methods."

The letter, addressed to Sen. David F. Durenberger (R-Minn.), said, "It is time to acknowledge that the [oversight] process has gone seriously awry" and accused Durenberger of undercutting the morale of CIA officers around the world. "What are they to think when the chairman of the Senate Select Committee offhandedly, publicly and inaccurately disparages their work?" Casey asked.

Casey's letter referred to a report in yesterday's Washington Post in which Durenberger was quoted as charging that the CIA lacked "a sense of direction" and an adequate knowledge of long-range trends in the Soviet Union.

"I can only wonder," Casey said, "at the contrast between what you say to us privately and what you say to the news media."

In response to Casey's letter, Durenberger said last night, "An issue has been created where none exists. I continue to fully support Director Casey and the intelligence community, both privately and publicly, and I'm confident that we can continue working toward our long-range goals, to achieve both effective congressional oversight and a comprehensive national intelligence strategy."

At a meeting with reporters Wednesday, Durenberger both praised and criticized Casey and the CIA in extended remarks. Though there was no discussion of the sensitive sources and methods Casey complained of, Casey has contended that the "the Hill leaks everything" about sensitive and covert intelligence operations proposed or underway.

Among Durenberger's chief criticisms of the agency's leadership was an allegation that CIA analysts "aren't being told what it is we need [to know] about the Soviet Union." He also criticized the agency's assessment of the South African situation, saying there was a "vacuum" of independent information and that the agency was relying too heavily on State Department views.

Durenberger claimed the intelligence process prevented CIA analysts from "look[ing] five years down the road" or taking into account brewing problems such as Shiite fundamentalism in the Middle East and political deterioration in the Philippines.

Casey called these criticisms of the agency he has headed for five years "tragically wrong."

"Your remarks betray a lack of familiarity with the many intelligence studies in the [committee's] vault," Casey said.

The CIA chief added, "The intelligence community has produced an enormous number of long-range studies over the last six years or more and where we have been far out in front."

Earlier in the day, Durenberger, in a letter and a meeting with wire service reporters, sought to clarify his Wednesday remarks, which had included an off-hand prediction that support for Casey among senators on the committee would divide 8 to 7 if put to a vote.

"I think Bill is as good a DCI [director of central intelligence] as we've had in a long time, and that forgives a whole lot of things by saying that," Durenberger said to reporters Wednesday, adding, "It

would be an 8-to-7 vote on the committee if I put it to a vote."

The committee consists of eight Republicans and seven Democrats.

In Durenberger's clarifying letter yesterday, he said, "Our committee has no plans for such a vote nor, to my knowledge, are we split on any issue strictly along party lines."

Durenberger was incorrectly quoted in The Washington Post Wednesday as saying that he would recommend "legislation" downgrading Casey's job. Durenberger actually said he would consider a "recommendation" that restricted Casey to professional intelligence work with no policy formulation role.

"I did not state that the Intelligence Committee is considering recommending legislation which would substantially downgrade the CIA director's role. Our committee is not considering such legislation," Durenberger said.

Casey, noting that Durenberger had made attempts to clarify his remarks during the day, said last night, "That's not the point."

"Public discussion of sensitive information and views revealed in a closed session of an oversight committee is always damaging and inadvisable," Casey said. "As we have discussed many times, if the oversight process is to work at all, it cannot do so on the front pages of American newspapers. The cost in compromise of sources, damaged morale and the effect on our overall capabilities is simply too high."

*"Public discussion
of sensitive
information ... is
always damaging."*

—CIA Director William J. Casey

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ON PAGE 11ANEW YORK TIMES
16 November 1985

Intelligence: The Times Are Touchy

By **STEPHEN ENGELBERG**

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 15 — The relationship between the Central Intelligence Agency and its Congressional oversight committees has been, at best, a marriage of convenience, a clash of cultures never far from rancorous discord.

Intelligence officers view their successes and failures as matters of great secrecy, some of which must be hidden "from inception to eternity." Members of Congress, tending toward spirited public debate, are inclined to point out mistakes, sometimes none too gently, when a Government agency errs.

Congress sees itself as an open advocate of the people and a watchdog over agencies that spend the people's tax money. The C.I.A., by contrast, believes that Congress has gone beyond its oversight role and has begun exposing agency secrets to further political ends.

Both sides confirm that under the Reagan Administration, relations between Capitol Hill and the intelligence agencies have become so tense that the Administration has at times declined to undertake covert operations because Congressional disclosure was viewed as a virtual certainty.

Casey's Open Letter

The inherent contradictions bound up by Congressional oversight burst into the open Thursday night when William J. Casey, the Director of Central Intelligence, said in an open letter that the process had gone "seriously awry."

To Mr. Casey, Congressional oversight has become characterized by "off the cuff" comments that damage morale and disclose intelligence sources.

"It is time to acknowledge," Mr. Casey wrote, "that the process has gone seriously awry." He added: "If the oversight process is to work at all, it cannot do so on the front pages of American newspapers."

Senator Patrick Leahy, the deputy chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, called the Casey letter "unfortunate" and said today that it had inflamed an already delicate situation.

"On the one hand, you have the C.I.A. rejecting oversight," Mr. Leahy said. "And the Congress is saying, 'We'll get Casey for these comments.'"

Elected officials, to function as advocates for the public, say they must be permitted wide access to the inner workings of a secret agency that has been guilty of abuses. To Mr. Leahy, there is no support for a return to the "good old days" when, he said, the C.I.A., acting under little oversight,



Sygnia / Diego Goldberg
William J. Casey



The New York Times
Senator Patrick Leahy



The New York Times
Senator Dave Durenberger

became involved in such failed operations as the Bay of Pigs invasion.

The issue was heightened this year when the leadership of the Senate intelligence committee changed, with Senator Dave Durenberger, Republican of Minnesota, replacing Senator Barry Goldwater as chairman, and Senator Leahy, Democrat of Vermont, replacing Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan as deputy chairman.

From the beginning, both Senators Durenberger and Leahy said they favored greater public discussion of intelligence issues.

Accordingly, the committee staff has a press officer who responds to inquiries from journalists, and Mr. Durenberger and Mr. Leahy are fre-

received a secret briefing on an intelligence case.

Nevertheless, this year's ferment in the intelligence world has provided the Senators with plenty of grist for their preference for public debate.

For example, members of Congress have strenuously questioned the cases of Vitaly S. Yurchenko, the reputed senior K.G.B. officer who reportedly had defected to the West, and of Edward Lee Howard, a former C.I.A. officer who Mr. Yurchenko said had given the Russians important information about American intelligence gathering in Moscow.

Congressional criticism of the report about Mr. Howard had barely subsided when Mr. Yurchenko announced that he wanted to return to the Soviet Union. Members of Congress were immediately critical of the C.I.A.'s dealings with Mr. Yurchenko. Some viewed him as a Soviet plant who fooled the agency, and others said he was emotionally overwrought and had changed his mind, perhaps because of mistakes by his handlers in the agency.

In another spy case, both House and Senate members have criticized Navy security procedures involving John A. Walker Jr. And both Congress and the Administration are trying to learn who disclosed that the C.I.A. had a plan to undermine the Libyan leader, Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi, and that both intelligence committees had expressed reservations about it.

A Requirement to Inform

Under laws passed in the 1970's after Congressional investigations of C.I.A. abuses, the Administration must inform Congress of any significant anticipated intelligence activity.

In a speech several months ago, Mr. Durenberger said the Reagan Administration had in several instances chosen not to initiate a covert action that was otherwise deemed to be appropriate because it could not trust Congress to keep it secret.

Indeed, he said, a lesser option was chosen. And Administration officials confirmed this assessment.

"The Administration," he told the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, "may prefer to do the wrong thing in secret, rather than doing the right thing in public."

The oversight process cannot work 'on the front pages of American newspapers.'

William J. Casey

quently available for interviews and have discussed a wide range of intelligence issues. Indeed, Mr. Casey said his letter was prompted by public comments from Mr. Durenberger regarding the agency's performance.

By contrast, the Democrat-controlled House intelligence committee has been less public.

Its chairman, Representative Lee H. Hamilton of Indiana rarely criticizes the agency's performance in his press interviews.

According to members of the committee, Mr. Hamilton prefers to work out differences with the C.I.A. in private.

The committee staff seldom responds to even routine inquiries from the press. In one instance, top committee aides refused to return calls asking whether the committee had

WASHINGTON POST
16 November 1985

Leahy Joins Durenberger in Criticizing CIA

By David B. Ottaway
Washington Post Staff Writer

Sen. Patrick J. Leahy (Vt.), ranking Democrat on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, accused the Central Intelligence Agency yesterday of "yearning to go back to the good old days" when Congress had no oversight of CIA covert operations and the United States had made "some of the most colossal failures, intelligence failures, ever."

Leahy's comments were the latest salvo in an acerbic exchange this week between Senate intelligence committee leaders and CIA Director William J. Casey.

On Wednesday, Sen. David F. Durenberger (R-Minn.) criticized Casey for not providing the CIA with a "sense of direction."

Casey, in turn, accused Durenberger on Thursday of conducting intelligence oversight in an "off the cuff" manner that had involved "repeated compromise of sensitive intelligence sources and methods."

The unusual public acrimony reflects a crisis of confidence between the Reagan administration and the Congress over who is to blame for a recent spate of unauthorized intelligence disclosures.

It also has raised the thorny issue—which has surfaced in at least the past three administrations—of the media's responsibility toward the public and government in reporting on delicate, often divisive intelligence and foreign policy matters in the administration. "I hear people yearning to go back to the good old days," Leahy said at a news briefing yesterday. "Well, the good old days are the Bay of Pigs and Salvador Allende and Patrice Lumumba and a lot of other failures."

Leahy told a news briefing that he was not accusing the CIA of "wanting to pull another Bay of Pigs," the aborted U.S.-backed invasion of Cuba in 1961, but he said that "when you had no congressional oversight" the agency had become embroiled in such adventures as attempts to poison Cuban leader

Fidel Castro, the bloody coup against leftist Chilean president Allende in 1973 and the support of murder plots against Lumumba, a leftist premier of what is now Zaire assassinated in 1961.

Leahy yesterday also supported Durenberger's charges that the administration was guilty of "selective leaking." The Vermont Democrat said the Reagan administration was "the worst ever" compared with those of presidents Gerald R. Ford or Jimmy Carter. He added that "there are a whole lot" of U.S. secrets that members of the intelligence committee learned of "first in the press."

The debate seems likely to persist, partly because of increasing CIA activity around the world under the Reagan administration and partly because Congress is sharply divided, though not strictly along party lines, on the issue of its oversight role of intelligence operations and the making of foreign policy.

The public exchanges this week have highlighted the sharp differences of opinion. Durenberger has said he wants to change "the definition of oversight" of intelligence operations and to "open that process up a little bit more so it isn't just their [the administration's] mistakes that become a problem."

Rep. Lee H. Hamilton (D-Ind.), chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, said he endorsed Durenberger's idea of a larger public debate on general intelligence policy but was leery of open discussions of operations that risk "damage being done to our interests."

The two most recent examples of the confidence crisis have been reporting on the short-lived defection of the Soviet KGB official, Vitaly Yurchenko, and an administration decision to authorize a CIA plan to seek to undermine the regime of Libyan leader Col. Muammar Qaddafi.

Many administration officials were furious at a Nov. 3 front-page article in The Washington Post about the CIA plan to help Libya's neighbors or opponents topple Qaddafi; President Reagan has ordered an investigation of the disclosure. Hamilton said he regards it "as a very serious leak of a different magnitude than the others."

Several senior U.S. officials have questioned the wisdom of The Post's decision to publish the article, a decision that they say has compromised U.S. diplomacy and seriously embarrassed the opposition to Qaddafi and its Arab backers.

In response to the article, Egypt and Algeria—two neighboring states at odds with Qaddafi—have said they will have nothing to do with any CIA "plot" against another Arab leader. The National Front for the Salvation of Libya, the main Libyan group within the badly fragmented Libyan opposition, said in a statement from London that the article was "liable to discredit and undermine the genuine Libyan strength and preempt any national action that might be carried out against Qaddafi."

Leonard Downie Jr., managing editor of The Washington Post, in defending the newspaper's decision to publish the article, said the CIA plan was being "widely and hotly debated" inside the agency and between the CIA and the congressional committees responsible for oversight of such operations.

The debate was "significant," Downie said, and "the whole question of what kinds of covert operations the CIA should engage in is one suitable for public scrutiny."

Critics of the plan, he said, were even questioning whether the operation was "legal" because it might have ended in the assassination of Qaddafi, who has long been accused of supporting international terrorism. A longstanding executive order signed by Reagan forbids the CIA or any other U.S. agency from direct or indirect involvement in any assassination plan.

Continued

Downie said The Post article had disclosed no precise details of what the CIA was planning to do, "which we should not and did not do." He also said that the reporter involved, Bob Woodward, interviewed a number of knowledgeable government sources in reporting the article and that neither before nor after publication had any of them called to suggest that disclosure of the plan might endanger national security or U.S. lives.

Qaddafi has used the article to rally renewed support at home and in the Arab world for his embattled regime, picturing himself as a target of "the great American Satan," as one U.S. analyst put it.

The analyst was highly critical of any CIA anti-Qaddafi plan relying on Libyan opposition figures, describing them as "nobodies, klutzes and incompetents" lacking internal support.

In the Yurchenko situation, the defector, who returned to Moscow earlier this month after three months in CIA custody, has said that information leaked to the press about his defection had upset him and some observers have suggested that it may have affected his thinking about remaining in the United States.

Durenberger told a group of reporters Wednesday that he felt the CIA probably should have said less about Yurchenko, although he also acknowledged that the CIA feels

the same way about members of his committee.

In discussing the administration's "selective leaking" of secrets, Durenberger added, "All of you know that with regard to Central America in particular they have leaked classified information about arms flow at various times." This was apparently a reference to Soviet and Cuban arms shipments to the Sandinista government in Nicaragua.

Ironically, many of the disclosures about Yurchenko's defection—the fact that he had defected, his alleged ranking as No. 5 in the KGB, and his alleged role in triggering other defections—were printed in the Italian press a month

or more before they surfaced in the United States.

As early as Aug. 8, the state-run Italian radio reported Yurchenko's disappearance in Rome and probable defection.

By Aug. 31, it was a front-page article in *Corriere della Sera* containing many of the details, assumptions and speculation about who he was that were to appear later in the American press.

Corriere, in its Sept. 1 edition, identified Yurchenko in a front-page article as "the No. 5 in the KGB," a sensational bit of news that took the U.S. media more than three weeks to report on the basis of "leaked" information here.

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WASHINGTON POST
 17 November 1985

—The CIA and Its Critics—

Last week, it was reported that Sen. Dave Durenberger had criticized the Central Intelligence Agency and its director, William Casey. Mr. Casey responded with an open letter to the senator. We asked the senator for his reaction. We print it below, along with the text of the Casey letter.

Dave Durenberger

The Public Must Know That It Works

Careful reflection on the content of CIA Director William Casey's open letter to me as chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee raises a very troubling issue for the American people. Casey's clear message is that, independent of the factual accuracy or inaccuracy of the Post article [Nov. 14] concerning my comments on the CIA, public criticism of the performance of the CIA compromises sources, damages morale and undermines our overall intelligence capability.

In Casey's view, the cost of public discussion is simply too high, and therefore the public has no right to know how effectively the CIA does its job as part of the oversight process. Quite the contrary, he feels that oversight must be confined to discussion between the Intelligence Committee and the director behind the closed doors of our hearing room. Otherwise, we are told, there is repeated compromise of sources and methods.

Clearly, we all oppose the irresponsible use of one's knowledge of intelligence. Disclosure of certain facts can reveal the source of those facts. Careful, formal procedures must be followed in disclosing classified information. Discussion of any intelligence matters for political support or personal publicity is irresponsible. The Intelligence Committee is the first to condemn such public discussions, whether they occur in Congress or in the administration.

But public discussion of intelligence does not necessarily mean disclosure of sensitive sources and methods.

There is no question that all public officials—in Congress as well as in the executive branch—who are provided sensitive intelligence bear a heavy burden. Their public statements on any foreign policy, economic or national security issue about which they have special knowledge must be delicately constructed to protect that information.

But this is not to say that those who have this information cannot or should not speak out on these issues. Intelligence is no exception. It is a subject of public knowledge and public discussion. Those of us who are part of that process can, and

should, speak openly on the subject of intelligence, as Casey did recently in Time magazine on terrorism and intelligence, without compromising security.

The real issue with Casey is not that there were public statements, but that those statements were reported as critical. Casey would not have written that letter if the headline had been "CIA, Casey Praised by Hill Chairman." Public praise of the operations or analytical product evokes no public condemnation or charges of compromising sources and methods.

In short, the head of the U.S. intelligence community does not feel that the intelligence agencies should be accountable to the American people. It is exactly this attitude that has led to the past abuses and resulted in the institution of the oversight process within Congress. Whether Casey likes it or not, the public does hold the CIA accountable and the public must know the oversight process works.

It is encouraging to hear that Casey is pleased with the intelligence product and is satisfied with his long-range planning process. We on the Intelligence Committee have had many good things to say both publicly and privately on both of these subjects. Nevertheless, we also have concerns in both areas—concerns that are not the result of "off-the cuff," unsubstantiated conclusions. They are concerns based on four months of testimony before our committee by the policy makers and military officers who use national intelligence.

Intelligence is not an end in itself whose usefulness is based on self-evaluation. The ultimate judgment must rest with those who use the product. National intelligence is a service organization, and the director should welcome constructive comments designed to improve that service.

The intelligence agencies are also accountable for the conduct of their operations. They cannot simply invoke "sources and methods" to make Congress remain silent in the face of extensive public discussion—often fueled by executive branch disclosures—of allegations of mismanagement, as in both the Edward Lee Howard and Vitaly Yurchenko cases. If the American people are to know that the oversight process is working, they must be kept informed. Indeed, when one stifles the disclosure of things that can safely be said in public, the result is often an outpouring of leaks that are infinitely more damaging to U.S. intelligence than is a bit of criticism.

Although the Intelligence Committee does much in complete secrecy, we also speak publicly. We do it when necessary. When we do, we are careful in our statements, measured in our criticism, generous in our praise, protective of sensitive information but mindful of our responsibility to the American people. We intend to continue this policy.

The writer, a Republican senator from Minnesota, is chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee.



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NEW YORK TIMES
27 January 1986

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Lawmaker Declines To Confirm Reports Of K.G.B. Defector

By PHILIP SHENON

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 26 — The vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee declined to comment today on reports that a high-ranking official of the K.G.B. had defected to the United States and was living here under an assumed name.

Congressional sources said Saturday that the K.G.B. official fled last year and was providing American intelligence officers with valuable information about the K.G.B., the Soviet intelligence and security agency.

The lawmaker, Senator Patrick J. Leahy, Democrat of Vermont, said that the Central Intelligence Agency had told him that there was no such Soviet official. But Mr. Leahy would not comment when asked if he has learned of the defector from others.

A Congressional source today confirmed reports that the defector had fled the Soviet Union last year.

But Mr. Leahy said in an interview today: "I have been told by the C.I.A. that no such defector exists. If you asked me whether I believe that, I would say, in light of Mr. Casey's public statement of reluctance to follow the procedures of oversight, then I will have no comment."

Congressional Oversight

He was referring to William J. Casey, the Director of Central Intelligence, who has been involved in a public battle with the Senate Intelligence Committee over Congressional oversight of the C.I.A.

Lawmakers have complained that the agency has failed to inform them fully of important information about intelligence activities.

In a letter to the committee last November, Mr. Casey charged that oversight of intelligence agencies "had gone seriously awry." The letter appeared to have been prompted partly by mounting criticism of the agency and its handling of Vitaly S. Yurchenko, a Soviet intelligence agent who returned to Moscow after defecting to the West last year.

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CURRENTS

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Photo by Agence France Presse

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January 25: The news media receive the February 3 issue of *U.S. News*, which reports that the U.S. helicoptered a high-level Soviet intelligence agent out of East Germany last spring, hid him at a U.S. base to prevent the upstaging of the Geneva summit and then brought the defector to America in late November. The story says the CIA wants to keep secret the defection of a fifth top Soviet-bloc spy in 1985. The defector

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January 28: The *New York Times* says again that its "congressional sources confirm the reports" of the defection. The *Washington Post* quotes a spokesman for *U.S. News*: "We reported the story from multiple sources over several weeks. Based on the reputations and numbers of these sources, we believe our story is correct. We were warned by more than one of our sources that we could expect denials from the CIA and possibly other government agencies."

The *Washington Times* quotes Senator Chic Hecht (R-Nev.), an Intelligence Committee member: "Where there's smoke, there's fire. . . . There's been too many leaks and here's another." He says the defector accounts are correct. The senator later repeats this to *U.S. News*, which did not interview him for its original article. As to the denials, he declares: "Of course they're denying it. What did you expect them to do?" The same afternoon, the White House again denies the story. ■

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Next 14 Page(s) In Document Denied

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ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 1 **A**NEW YORK TIMES
11 October 1985

OFFICIALS SAY C.I.A. DID NOT TELL F.B.I. OF SPY CASE MOVES

The following article is based on reporting by Stephen Engelberg and Joel Brinkley and was written by Mr. Brinkley.

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 10 — The Central Intelligence Agency failed to notify the Federal Bureau of Investigation after it learned more than a year ago that Edward L. Howard was considering becoming a Soviet spy, Government officials said today.

According to court records, Mr. Howard told two agency employees in September 1984 that he was thinking of disclosing classified information to the Soviet Union.

Soviet Defector Was the Key

The bureau has sole responsibility for domestic espionage investigations and, under Federal law, the intelligence agency and all other Government agencies are supposed to report suspected espionage to the F.B.I. It is illegal for the C.I.A. or any other Federal agency to carry out surveillance or other actions within the United States to stop potential spies.

Mr. Howard, 33 years old, a former intelligence agency officer who is now a fugitive, has been charged with espionage, accused of giving Soviet officials details of American intelligence operations in Moscow. Federal officials have called the disclosures serious and damaging.

'Bad Mistake,' Senator Says

Federal officials said the C.I.A. told the F.B.I. nothing about Mr. Howard until after the bureau began an investigation this fall based on information from a Soviet defector, Vitaly Yurchenko, who had been a senior official of the K.G.B., the Soviet intelligence agency.

The bureau began surveillance of Mr. Howard last month, but he slipped out of his home at night and is believed to have fled the country.

Senator Patrick J. Leahy, the Vermont Democrat who is vice chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence, said today: "If the C.I.A. did not give the F.B.I. adequate information about this person, that's a bad mistake. It shows very, very serious problems within

In the last few weeks the C.I.A. transferred the chief of its office of security, William Kotopish, to a new job at a level of equivalent seniority, but an official said the move had been planned "for some time" and was not related to the Howard case.

Mr. Howard worked for the agency from 1981 to 1983. He was told of classified American intelligence operations in Moscow because the agency was planning to assign him there, officials have said.

According to a criminal complaint on file in Federal District Court in Albuquerque, N.M., Mr. Howard told two current employees of the intelligence agency a year ago last month that he had "spent hours in the vicinity of the Soviet Embassy trying to decide whether to enter the embassy and disclose classified information."

An F.B.I. affidavit says the conversation was held Sept. 24, 1984. Four days before that, the Government contends, Mr. Howard gave his information to Soviet officials in St. Anton, Austria.

George Lauder, a C.I.A. spokesman, said today that as a result of that conversation "action was taken" within the agency "and it seemed to be reasonable action at the time." He would not say what the action was, although an official said the agency kept in contact with Mr. Howard after his conversation with the two C.I.A. operatives. Mr. Howard lived in New Mexico at the time.

'A Few Blatant Cases'

The Senate and House intelligence committees are investigating the handling of the Howard case. A key issue in the study, committee members said, will be how the C.I.A. and other agencies deal with employees who leave Government service with detailed, classified knowledge about sensitive programs.

Another element of the investigations will be several recent espionage cases in which Government officials failed to heed warning signs that a current or former employee was planning to spy or was spying, committee members said.

"We've had a few blatant cases where we just didn't follow through, even with alarm bells going off," said Representative Dave McCurdy, Democrat of Oklahoma, chairman of the House committee's Subcommittee on Oversight and Evaluation.

In the Howard case, a senior F.B.I. official said Mr. Howard's conversation with the two C.I.A. officers would have been sufficient to warrant an investigation.

"Anytime we get information that someone has considered such an act, we would take some action," said Philip A. Parker, deputy assistant director of the bureau's intelligence division.

An intelligence official said the C.I.A.'s decision to handle the matter internally rather than report it to the F.B.I. was "a judgment call," adding, "If you reported every fantasy that people have, you'd have everyone under surveillance."

Law Bars C.I.A. Moves in U.S.

The C.I.A. would not say whether it undertook any form of inquiry after Mr. Howard told the two C.I.A. employees he had considered becoming a Soviet spy. But Federal law and a Presidential executive order prohibit the agency from taking any steps inside the United States to investigate possible cases of espionage.

Mr. Howard was one of tens of thousands of people who retire from Government or industry each year after holding positions that gave them access to classified materials. More than 4.3 million people in government and industry associated with government now have clearances to use classified information.

Asked what procedures the Central Intelligence Agency uses to monitor former employees who have knowledge of classified programs, Mr. Lauder, the agency spokesman, said: "We haven't got any procedures. Once a person leaves here, he is John Q. Citizen, just like you and me. We don't keep a string on them. It's strictly an F.B.I. matter."

Dave Durenberger, the Minnesota Republican who is chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, said his panel would also examine the problem presented by military officers who retire with knowledge of classified materials.

Most people with security clearances work for the Pentagon. At the Defense Department, L. Britt Snider, director of counterintelligence and security

policy, said: "We don't have any jurisdiction of any kind over former employees, whether or not they had clearances. It's strictly the F.B.I."

At the F.B.I., Mr. Parker said, "We are not concerned about Americans who have had clearances. We don't look at these people unless we detect an individual involved in espionage."

Ex-Intelligence Chief's Moves

Senator Leahy said: "I don't think anyone expects the F.B.I. to maintain surveillance on the several hundred thousand people who leave the Government each year with security clearances. But there are a certain number of people in extremely sensitive positions, a handful of them, that we ought to do more with."

Mr. Leahy said Mr. Howard "certainly would have been one of those" because he held highly sensitive information and was being dismissed following a polygraph examination that indicated drug use and petty thievery, according to Federal officials.

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When Adm. Stansfield M. Turner was Director of Central Intelligence in the Carter Administration, he dismissed, transferred or forced to retire nearly 200 C.I.A. officers who held highly sensitive positions.

In an interview this week, he said that others in the agency had warned him that "we ran the risk of some of them selling their information to the other side." He said he had disagreed when it was suggested that some should be given other jobs, and proceeded with his original plans.

But he said of Mr. Howard: "I don't think my rule should be totally rigid. If this guy had just been briefed, I'd say let's stick him in the Dominican Republic or someplace like that for a couple of years, until the information isn't valuable anymore."

Senator Leahy said: "We may need some sort of turkey farm for some of these former employees. Make them translate cables or something like that for a couple of years."

Admiral Turner said he thought C.I.A. officers ought to be required to agree when they are hired that "for three years or so after they leave, they will be subject to the same rules of intrusion as applied when they were in government. Make them come back for random polygraph examinations. That would give them one more thing to worry about before they turn."

A C.I.A. official said "it's conceivable" that that idea would work, adding that finding solutions to the problem "is certainly something we're thinking about now."

NEW YORK TIMES
8 October 1985

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ON PAGE A12

Spy Charge Spurs Questions About Procedures of C.I.A.

By STEPHEN ENGELBERG

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 7 — Members of the Senate and House intelligence committees say espionage allegations against a former Central Intelligence Agency officer raise serious questions about the agency's procedures for dealing with disgruntled employees.

The legislators say their committees are conducting a detailed examination of the career of Edward L. Howard, a former officer of the agency who, according to Administration officials, was identified by a defector as having sold the Soviet Union highly secret information.

Mr. Howard was forced to resign from the C.I.A. in 1983; the agency was dissatisfied with his answers in a polygraph, or lie detector, examination that was apparently unrelated to espionage charges. Officials have said they suspect it was a desire for revenge that led Mr. Howard, who is believed to have fled the country, to provide secrets to the Soviet Union.

"The C.I.A. has good security procedures but they're not perfect and they're going to have to get better," Senator Patrick J. Leahy, the Vermont Democrat who is the vice chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, said in an interview. "They're going to have to figure out what to do with a disgruntled or potentially disgruntled employee who has a lot of knowledge because that's where a lot of breaches have occurred in the past."

C.I.A. Briefs Committees

Representative Dave McCurdy of Oklahoma, the chairman of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Evaluation of the House Intelligence Committee, said: "I think there are a lot of questions yet to be answered. I'm not sure anyone's comfortable with what we've seen so far."

In an interview today, Mr. McCurdy would not discuss the specifics of the Howard case but said that he and some other members of the committee had been briefed by the C.I.A. Members of the Senate committee have had similar briefings by the agency.

According to members of the two committees and their aides, the panels are concerned about a broad range of issues stemming from the agency's handling of Mr. Howard, who was within the C.I.A.'s three-year probation period when he was asked to resign.

Questions Raised With C.I.A.

Among the questions the two committees are raising with the agency are these:

¶ Why was Mr. Howard, a junior official, given access to such sensitive material at an early stage in his career?

¶ Why did the agency choose to dismiss him while the information he had learned in training for a posting to Moscow was still of value?

¶ What steps were taken to keep track of Mr. Howard's movements after he left the C.I.A., both in this country and abroad, where the Federal Bureau of Investigation has charged that he met with Soviet intelligence agents?

¶ Was there sufficient coordination between the C.I.A. and the F.B.I., the other major Federal agency responsible for counterintelligence work?

Administration officials say Mr. Howard was identified as an agent of the Soviet Union by Vitaly Yurchenko, a senior official in the K.G.B., the Soviet intelligence agency. He defected to the West in July. Mr. Yurchenko, the officials have said, is undergoing extensive questioning at an undisclosed location in the United States:

• Trip to Austria in '84

Mr. Howard, who is now 33 years old, was employed by the Central Intelligence Agency from January 1981 to June 1983, according to an F.B.I. affidavit filed in Federal District Court in New Mexico. The document charged that he traveled to Austria in 1984 where he made contact with agent of the K.G.B. and was paid money for "classified information relating to U.S. intelligence sources and methods."

Intelligence sources say that the information involved related to American operations in Moscow. They have said Mr. Howard was trained for a post in Russia that would have involved managing agents or other means of intelligence collection.

Intelligence sources say, however, that he was not sent to Moscow and was instead asked to leave the agency after the polygraph test suggested use of illegal drugs and petty theft of Govern-

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4701 WILLARD AVENUE, CHEVY CHASE, MARYLAND 20815 (301) 656-4068

FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

PROGRAM The Today Show STATION WRC-TV
NBC Network

DATE October 11, 1985 7:00 A.M. CITY Washington, D.C.

SUBJECT Senator Leahy/Achille Lauro's Hijacking

BRYANT GUMBEL: Senator Patrick Leahy is the ranking Democrat on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. He has been critical in the past of America's ability to gather intelligence information in the Mideast. He's joined us this morning from our bureau in Washington.

Are you a satisfied Senator this morning?

SENATOR PATRICK LEAHY: I'm a very happy Senator this morning. I didn't mind the calls half the night or the very, very early briefing over at the CIA this morning. This is a case of success.

I've said, in fact, in interviews with you before that if we're going to use the vast power that this country has to go after terrorists, we've got to have far better intelligence and information than we've had. This is a case where the intelligence worked, worked very, very well, even to the extent of knowing when the Egyptian President said that the hijackers had left, we knew they hadn't. We knew they were in Egypt. And we were able to track them and follow them all the way through. It was a superb use of intelligence and connecting it up with our military assets.

GUMBEL: If all that's correct, aren't you a little bit bothered that the Egyptians lied to us?

SENATOR LEAHY: I'm extremely bothered that they did. I can't guess what their reasons might have been. I think that has to be a demonstration that the United States is going to be in a position to make its own judgment on what people tell us, and not have to take anything on faith.

GUMBEL: Well, what do we do, then, in reaction to what the Egyptians did? I mean certainly in this case I think you'd have to agree they did not act in a manner befitting a strong ally.

SENATOR LEAHY: No. And I think that there's going to be some real strains as a result of this. They will of course be angry at us for forcing their airplane down. I think our reactions would be, "Don't even talk to us about that. If you've got hijackers, especially those who've murdered an American, you're harboring them, you're just going to have to assume that we're going to come and go after them."

And I think that message has to go to virtually every country, that we want people who have attacked Americans to be brought to justice, wherever it might be. And if it's necessary, we'll go and get them.

GUMBEL: In this case, brought to justice may mean Italian justice. Is that fine by you?

SENATOR LEAHY: I don't have a problem with that because I think that the Italian courts work very well, and it was an Italian-flag ship. But I think eventually I want to see them extradited back here to the United States and tried also in a U.S. court. The Italians have a perfect right to try them, and should and can. But eventually I want to see them tried here in the United States.

GUMBEL: What would be served by that?

SENATOR LEAHY: I think it serves to demonstrate to the world that the United States will watch out for its interests, wherever it might be, and that eventually people will be brought to justice here.

GUMBEL: Whether or not they ever do make it to these shores, is there any move afoot to have these hijackers interrogated by American officials? Is that important to you?

SENATOR LEAHY: It's very important to us. And there are things that will be done very soon. We're going to make sure that we have people who were witnesses positively identify these people, make sure that there hasn't been any switch, that we have the right people.

GUMBEL: To the best of your knowledge -- I mean it seems fairly certain what kind of fate awaits the four hijackers. What about the other two PLO officials who were on board? What's going to happen to them?

SENATOR LEAHY: Well, we're going to have to look at

whether we have cases that can be brought against them, either as accessories or otherwise.

I think the most important thing, though, is that we've demonstrated that our intelligence is getting better and that we know who these people are and where they are, and it really is not going to do them any good to seek safe harbor in any country. We'll go after them.

GUMBEL: As we talk about how strongly the U.S. reacted, you were in on the CIA briefings on this, as you noted at the top of this interview. Were we prepared to shoot that craft down if they had ignored our signals to land?

SENATOR LEAHY: I agree with Secretary Shultz that that's something that we can not and should not go into. I think that it leaves our options open. And quite frankly, I'd just soon have, if there are going to be future terrorists or hijackers, that they now know exactly what our options are.

GUMBEL: Senator Patrick Leahy, you look like a happy man this morning.

SENATOR LEAHY: I'm very happy, and I'm very proud of the President in this case.

GUMBEL: Thank you very much, sir.

RADIO TV REPORTS, INC.

4701 WILLARD AVENUE, CHEVY CHASE, MARYLAND 20815 (301) 656-4068

FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

PROGRAM CBS Morning News STATION WDVM-TV
CBS Network

DATE October 11, 1985 7:00 A.M. CITY Washington, D.C.

SUBJECT Senator Leahy/Achille Lauro's Hijacking

MARIA SHRIVER: Well, the so-called hijacking of the hijackers was the subject of overnight briefings for certain members of Congress, including Senator Patrick Leahy, the ranking Democrat on the Intelligence Committee. Senator Leahy's joining us right now in our Washington bureau.

Can you bring us up to date? Exactly what were you told last evening about the hijacking?

SENATOR PATRICK LEAHY: Well, we were kept informed as we went along everything that was happening. I don't think many of us got much sleep last night because of the phone calls. But for once, at least, the calls were all positive.

This is a case where we had a lot of things that if they all work right, we get the result we did. They all worked right. And it's a major triumph for the United States.

SHRIVER: What were you told about what went into this decision, how it was brought about?

SENATOR LEAHY: We knew that when Mr. Mubarak went on the news yesterday morning and said that the hijackers had left Egypt, we knew that wasn't so. And it was a case where we knew they were in Egypt. Intelligence was very, very good. When they left, we knew that and were able to send the planes out to intercept the hijackers' plane -- no small feat, in and of itself -- and locating the plane, and then in requiring it to land in Italy.

It's a case where here we are the most powerful nation in the world and we've been frustrated by hijackers and by

terrorists because often we didn't know where they were or how to reach them or who to bring our military power to bear on. And this was a case where our intelligence was superb, worked very, very well, and allowed the United States to use the options available to it as a superpower.

SHRIVER: What do you think the reaction of your colleagues will be to the decision by President Reagan and the Pentagon?

SENATOR LEAHY: Well, it should be a positive one, and it shouldn't be any kind of a partisan thing. I think this is a case where I would hope there will not be dissenting voices in the Congress. I hope that we say very clearly that the American people support the President on this, because you want to send a signal to future hijackers or future terrorists that we will find them. We'll look for them, we'll identify them, and we'll go after them and we'll bring them to justice. And that's exactly what's happening in this case.

And that is the only way we are going to put any kind of a dent in terrorism. And I support the President's action very, very strongly.

SHRIVER: Okay. Thank you very much, Senator Leahy, for joining us this morning to bring us up to date on this story.

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NEW YORK TIMES
11 October 1985

OFFICIALS SAY C.I.A. DID NOT TELL F.B.I. OF SPY CASE MOVES

The following article is based on reporting by Stephen Engelberg and Joel Brinkley and was written by Mr. Brinkley.

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 10 — The Central-Intelligence Agency failed to notify the Federal Bureau of Investigation after it learned more than a year ago that Edward L. Howard was considering becoming a Soviet spy, Government officials said today.

According to court records, Mr. Howard told two agency employees in September 1984 that he was thinking of disclosing classified information to the Soviet Union.

Soviet Defector Was the Key

The bureau has sole responsibility for domestic espionage investigations and, under Federal law, the intelligence agency and all other Government agencies are supposed to report suspected espionage to the F.B.I. It is illegal for the C.I.A. or any other Federal agency to carry out surveillance or other actions within the United States to stop potential spies.

Mr. Howard, 33 years old, a former intelligence agency officer who is now a fugitive, has been charged with espionage, accused of giving Soviet officials details of American intelligence operations in Moscow. Federal officials have called the disclosures serious and damaging.

'Bad Mistake,' Senator Says

Federal officials said the C.I.A. told the F.B.I. nothing about Mr. Howard until after the bureau began an investigation this fall based on information from a Soviet defector, Vitaly Yurchenko, who had been a senior official of the K.G.B., the Soviet intelligence agency.

The bureau began surveillance of Mr. Howard last month, but he slipped out of his home at night and is believed to have fled the country.

Senator Patrick J. Leahy, the Vermont Democrat who is vice chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence, said today: "If the C.I.A. did not give the F.B.I. adequate information about this person, that's a bad mistake. It shows very, very serious problems within the C.I.A."

In the last few weeks the C.I.A. transferred the chief of its office of security, William Kotopish, to a new job at a level of equivalent seniority, but an official said the move had been planned "for some time" and was not related to the Howard case.

Mr. Howard worked for the agency from 1981 to 1983. He was told of classified American intelligence operations in Moscow because the agency was planning to assign him there, officials have said.

According to a criminal complaint on file in Federal District Court in Albuquerque, N.M., Mr. Howard told two current employees of the intelligence agency a year ago last month that he had "spent hours in the vicinity of the Soviet Embassy trying to decide whether to enter the embassy and disclose classified information."

An F.B.I. affidavit says the conversation was held Sept. 24, 1984. Four days before that, the Government contends, Mr. Howard gave his information to Soviet officials in St. Anton, Austria.

George Lauder, a C.I.A. spokesman, said today that as a result of that conversation "action was taken" within the agency "and it seemed to be reasonable action at the time." He would not say what the action was, although an official said the agency kept in contact with Mr. Howard after his conversation with the two C.I.A. operatives. Mr. Howard lived in New Mexico at the time.

'A Few Blatant Cases'

The Senate and House intelligence committees are investigating the handling of the Howard case. A key issue in the study, committee members said, will be how the C.I.A. and other agencies deal with employees who leave Government service with detailed, classified knowledge about sensitive programs.

Another element of the investigations will be several recent espionage cases in which Government officials failed to heed warning signs that a current or former employee was planning to spy or was spying, committee members said.

"We've had a few blatant cases where we just didn't follow through, even with alarm bells going off," said Representative Dave McCurdy, Democrat of Oklahoma, chairman of the House committee's Subcommittee on Oversight and Evaluation.

In the Howard case, a senior F.B.I. official said Mr. Howard's conversation with the two C.I.A. officers would have been sufficient to warrant an investigation.

"Anytime we get information that someone has considered such an act, we would take some action," said Philip A. Parker, deputy assistant director of the bureau's intelligence division.

An intelligence official said the C.I.A.'s decision to handle the matter internally rather than report it to the F.B.I. was "a judgment call," adding, "If you reported every fantasy that people have, you'd have everyone under surveillance."

Law Bars C.I.A. Moves in U.S.

The C.I.A. would not say whether it undertook any form of inquiry after Mr. Howard told the two C.I.A. employees he had considered becoming a Soviet spy. But Federal law and a Presidential executive order prohibit the agency from taking any steps inside the United States to investigate possible cases of espionage.

Mr. Howard was one of tens of thousands of people who retire from Government or industry each year after holding positions that gave them access to classified materials. More than 4.3 million people in government and industry associated with government now have clearances to use classified information.

Asked what procedures the Central Intelligence Agency uses to monitor former employees who have knowledge of classified programs, Mr. Lauder, the agency spokesman, said: "We haven't got any procedures. Once a person leaves here, he is John Q. Citizen, just like you and me. We don't keep a string on them. It's strictly an F.B.I. matter."

Dave Durenberger, the Minnesota Republican who is chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, said his panel would also examine the problem presented by military officers who retire with knowledge of classified materials.

Most people with security clearances work for the Pentagon. At the Defense Department, L. Britt Snider, director of counterintelligence and security

policy, said: "We don't have any jurisdiction of any kind over former employees, whether or not they had clearances. It's strictly the F.B.I."

At the F.B.I., Mr. Parker said, "We are not concerned about Americans who have had clearances. We don't look at these people unless we detect an individual involved in espionage."

Ex-Intelligence Chief's Moves

Senator Leahy said: "I don't think anyone expects the F.B.I. to maintain surveillance on the several hundred thousand people who leave the Government each year with security clearances. But there are a certain number of people in extremely sensitive positions, a handful of them, that we ought to do more with."

Mr. Leahy said Mr. Howard "certainly would have been one of those" because he held highly sensitive information and was being dismissed following a polygraph examination that indicated drug use and petty thievery, according to Federal officials.

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When Adm. Stansfield M. Turner was Director of Central Intelligence in the Carter Administration, he dismissed, transferred or forced to retire nearly 200 C.I.A. officers who held highly sensitive positions.

In an interview this week, he said that others in the agency had warned him that "we ran the risk of some of them selling their information to the other side." He said he had disagreed when it was suggested that some should be given other jobs, and proceeded with his original plans.

But he said of Mr. Howard: "I don't think my rule should be totally rigid. If this guy had just been briefed, I'd say let's stick him in the Dominican Republic or someplace like that for a couple of years, until the information isn't valuable anymore."

Senator Leahy said: "We may need some sort of turkey farm for some of these former employees. Make them translate cables or something like that for a couple of years."

Admiral Turner said he thought C.I.A. officers ought to be required to agree when they are hired that "for three years or so after they leave, they will be subject to the same rules of intrusion as applied when they were in government. Make them come back for random polygraph examinations. That would give them one more thing to worry about before they turn."

A C.I.A. official said "it's conceivable" that that idea would work, adding that finding solutions to the problem "is certainly something we're thinking about now."

NEW YORK TIMES
8 October 1985

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Spy Charge Spurs Questions About Procedures of C.I.A.

By STEPHEN ENGELBERG

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 7 — Members of the Senate and House intelligence committees say espionage allegations against a former Central Intelligence Agency officer raise serious questions about the agency's procedures for dealing with disgruntled employees.

The legislators say their committees are conducting a detailed examination of the career of Edward L. Howard, a former officer of the agency who, according to Administration officials, was identified by a defector as having sold the Soviet Union highly secret information.

Mr. Howard was forced to resign from the C.I.A. in 1983; the agency was dissatisfied with his answers in a polygraph, or lie detector, examination that was apparently unrelated to espionage charges. Officials have said they suspect it was a desire for revenge that led Mr. Howard, who is believed to have fled the country, to provide secrets to the Soviet Union.

"The C.I.A. has good security procedures but they're not perfect and they're going to have to get better," Senator Patrick J. Leahy, the Vermont Democrat who is the vice chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, said in an interview. "They're going to have to figure out what to do with a disgruntled or potentially disgruntled employee who has a lot of knowledge because that's where a lot of breaches have occurred in the past."

C.I.A. Briefs Committees

Representative Dave McCurdy of Oklahoma, the chairman of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Evaluation of the House Intelligence Committee, said: "I think there are a lot of questions yet to be answered. I'm not sure anyone's comfortable with what we've seen so far."

In an interview today, Mr. McCurdy would not discuss the specifics of the Howard case but said that he and some other members of the committee had been briefed by the C.I.A. Members of the Senate committee have had similar briefings by the agency.

According to members of the two committees and their aides, the panels are concerned about a broad range of issues stemming from the agency's handling of Mr. Howard, who was within the C.I.A.'s three-year probation period when he was asked to resign.

Questions Raised With C.I.A.

Among the questions the two committees are raising with the agency are these:

¶ Why was Mr. Howard, a junior official, given access to such sensitive material at an early stage in his career?

¶ Why did the agency choose to dismiss him while the information he had learned in training for a posting to Moscow was still of value?

¶ What steps were taken to keep track of Mr. Howard's movements after he left the C.I.A., both in this country and abroad, where the Federal Bureau of Investigation has charged that he met with Soviet intelligence agents?

¶ Was there sufficient coordination between the C.I.A. and the F.B.I., the other major Federal agency responsible for counterintelligence work?

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• Trip to Austria in '84

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Mr. Howard, who had been working

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WASHINGTON POST
19 May 1986

THE CIA IN TRANSITION

New Era of Mistrust Marks Congress' Role

By David B. Ottaway
and Patrick E. Tyler
Washington Post Staff Writers

Ten years ago today, 72 senators voted to assert a stronger role for Congress in overseeing the vast U.S. intelligence apparatus in the wake of painful disclosures, scandals and abuses at the Central Intelligence Agency and the collection of secretive federal agencies known as the U.S. intelligence "community."

The hope was to end an era of suspicion, to narrow the number of congressional committees that had jurisdiction over the intelligence budget, to cut down on leaks of classified information and to set up a strong, permanent monitoring body to restore integrity and confidence in America's intelligence-gathering capabilities.

But after a decade, a new era of mistrust has dawned.

The Reagan administration is virtually at war with the two committees that were established to oversee the U.S. intelligence arm. Each side has accused the other of endangering the nation's most sensitive intelligence systems and jeopardizing covert operations in the Third World through unauthorized leaks to the news media.

Sen. David F. Durenberger (R-Minn.), chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence, said in an interview for this article that "a lot of those people [in the administration] don't want oversight." He charged that the administration has "screwed up" its covert attempt to change the Marxist government in Nicaragua and that every one of the CIA's covert paramilitary operations "is a problem."

In addition, Durenberger asserted that special interest groups and "right-wing senators" have been

driving the administration's secret diplomacy in Afghanistan and Angola; that Secretary of State George P. Shultz has allowed himself to be intimidated by these groups while CIA Director William J. Casey has shown a hypersensitivity to criticism. Durenberger said his own well-publicized marital troubles have been spotlighted by conservative Reagan supporters as a means of attacking his credibility as Senate oversight chairman.

The feud has grown so acrimonious that administration officials are suggesting it could soon endanger the future of the oversight process. Already, some top officials are charging that oversight is out of control. A few have suggested privately that the House and Senate intelligence panels be abolished and their responsibilities consolidated in one tightly controlled joint committee.

President Reagan, in a classified letter to Durenberger, warned a few months ago that the oversight process was seriously "at risk" and blamed Congress for a hemorrhage of national security data to the news media.

The Senate oversight leadership in turn has charged that the Reagan administration has systematically disclosed highly classified intelligence information to influence public debate and to bully Congress into supporting its overseas adventures.

At the core of the dispute are the far deeper divisions between Congress and the White House over what has emerged as a key feature of the administration's foreign policy—the so-called Reagan Doctrine, which by nature is carried out behind a cloak of secrecy provided by the CIA.

The doctrine has never been defined by Reagan personally and its outline has been most extensively shaped by the conservative cadres that seek to frame the Reagan foreign policy agenda. But if Reagan

has not embraced its name, he has embraced its cause: the support of Third World anticommunist guerrilla forces—"freedom fighters"—in their quest to roll back Soviet influence and dismantle Marxist regimes.

In the past five years under the Reagan Doctrine, the United States has fielded and supplied more paramilitary forces against Soviet surrogates in the Third World than at any time since the Vietnam war. CIA paramilitary experts-run guns, train guerrillas, outfit them with communications equipment and provide them with battlefield intelligence. As the fighting has steadily escalated in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Nicaragua and now Angola, questions in Congress have grown steadily louder.

The president is now seeking \$100 million in new aid for counter-revolutionary, or contra, guerrillas in Nicaragua. The CIA is involved in operations to destabilize Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi and in low-level support to antigovernment paramilitary forces in Ethiopia, according to intelligence sources.

The administration's attack on oversight, according to congressional leaders, must be weighed against the phenomenal budgetary support the congressional oversight committees have marshalled for the intelligence community. The intelligence budget of about \$10 billion in 1979 has more than doubled to \$24 billion this year and is projected to triple by 1990. This support has allowed the Carter and Reagan administrations to rapidly build up the most sophisticated, high-technology intelligence apparatus in the world.

Still, the frustrations are deep and bitter in this "partnership," largely because the intelligence buildup has restored a formidable and lethal capability in the CIA's directorate of operations to mount covert paramilitary operations over which Congress has little control. It was inevitable, according to some senators, that once the CIA had this capability, it would find new "opportunities" to justify using its most controversial instrument.

The president is required to send only a secret notification to the intelligence oversight committees that such operations are under way.

Congressional leaders have complained that there is no opportunity to debate these sensitive and dangerous adventures, though they may involve significant commitments of U.S. prestige and military resources and may involve equally significant risks whose consequences are borne by all Americans.

As House intelligence oversight Chairman Lee H. Hamilton (D-Ind.) lamented recently, the CIA's covert operations in support of President Reagan's "freedom fighters" are among the most important foreign policy issues before Congress—"and I can't talk about them!"

A decade ago, when intelligence oversight began in earnest, CIA covert operations were largely in disrepute. CIA paramilitary experts were disparaged as the "knuckle draggers" of the agency and there was a consensus to pump massive resources into high-technology spy systems.

Former senator Birch Bayh (D-Ind.), who chaired the Senate committee during the Carter administration, said in an interview that the oversight process was founded on a healthy mistrust between the executive and legislative branches.

"The reservations about oversight in the Carter administration were based on a sincere concern about security: Can 17 U.S. senators keep a secret? We found out they could. The present reservation," Bayh continued, "is a sort of arrogant attitude that it's just none of your damned business, as if the Senate were a foreign body."

It is not clear where the seeds of the new mistrust were sown. It may have been in the jungles of Nicaragua, where a rogue commander of CIA-backed forces got out of control; or in the Nicaraguan port of Corinto, where CIA contract agents mined the harbor without clear congressional notification; or in Beirut, where a team dispatched by CIA-backed Lebanese security forces killed—without CIA authorization—75 people with a car bomb.

But the effect of the frequent eruptions over the management and oversight of CIA covert operations has grown to the point where Reagan and his national security affairs advisers are hinting at the need to dismantle the decade-old oversight system that took shape in Senate Resolution 400.

That resolution passed 72 to 22 on May 19, 1976, reducing the number of Senate committees with jurisdiction over the intelligence

community from four to one, with 15 regular members. Ford administration officials and conservatives in Congress hoped that by limiting oversight to two committees, the risk of leaks of classified information from Congress would be sharply reduced.

A year later, the House merged the oversight function of four committees into a single panel of 17 members.

Recriminations between the oversight panels and successive administrations have characterized the relationship from the beginning. During the debates over the Panama Canal treaties and the SALT II strategic arms negotiations with the Soviet Union, Bayh said, a series of disclosures of highly classified information infuriated the intelligence community.

Bayh said it appeared to him at the time that rival groups in the Pentagon, State Department and White House were behind most of these disclosures, although a group of Senate aides, who referred to themselves as the "Madison Group," were reputed to have waged a disclosure campaign to block the SALT II treaty.

Interviews with congressional leaders in both parties suggest that the current attack on the oversight process cannot be explained simply by the recurring recriminations over national security leaks.

Instead, many of these leaders said they believe the attacks stem from the frustration of Reagan's senior advisers, who have been unsuccessful in winning broad support for their rapidly expanding program of covert paramilitary operations around the world.

Reagan, Shultz and Casey all complain that the Republican-controlled Senate intelligence committee has not supported Reagan's secret diplomacy.

"It is my considered judgment," said Sen. Patrick J. Leahy (D-Vt.), vice chairman of the oversight committee, "that the new reliance on covert military action as a normal instrument of foreign policy—even as a substitute for foreign policy—has strained the current oversight process to the breaking point."

Speaking to former intelligence officers recently, Leahy said the Reagan Doctrine of covert action in the Third World poses a basic question:

"Can a democracy like the United States engage in large-scale, so-

called 'covert paramilitary operations,' using our intelligence agencies as instruments in waging proxy wars against the Soviet Union or its clients?"

Leahy and other congressional leaders said they believe the Reagan administration is orchestrating a campaign to dismantle congressional oversight or at least to severely limit the authority of the House and Senate panels.

Durenberger agrees and said he thinks the real issue is the administration's controversial secret diplomacy: "Nicaragua, we screwed up," he said, adding, "Every one of these [covert paramilitary involvements] is a problem."

"There is no question," he said, "that the administration is having a hell of a time driving the policy in Angola or in Afghanistan." In Angola, he asserted, policy is "being

driven by little meetings of right-wing senators with the secretary of state. [They are] telling him what he's supposed to do and if he doesn't, they are going to bring [Angolan rebel leader] Jonas Savimbi over here in order to conduct a crusade."

The senator was referring to private discussions in early March between Shultz and a group of conservative senators led by Majority Leader Robert J. Dole (R-Kan.). The group insisted that Shultz and Casey send sophisticated U.S. Stinger antiaircraft missiles to Savimbi. Within a week of these discussions, Reagan gave secret authorization to send them.

In Afghanistan, "Nobody likes the way [Rep.] Charlie Wilson [D-Tex.] was running policy," Durenberger said, referring to Wilson's leading role—as an influential House member who does not sit on the intelligence panel—in advocating budget increases to fund opposition to Soviet invasion forces.

Durenberger said he feels that his loyal opposition to Reagan administration policy has drawn for him a series of calculated personal attacks—from Casey and particularly from the right wing of the Republican Party.

For example, last November, after Durenberger had criticized some aspects of Casey's direction of the agency, Casey fired off a public letter accusing Durenberger of "the repeated compromise of sensitive intelligence sources and methods" and of conducting oversight in an "off-the-cuff" manner.

"It is time to acknowledge that the process has gone seriously awry," Casey concluded.

Durenberger refers to that dispute as the "Casey-(expletive)-on-Durenberger days," and attributes Casey's outburst to his sensitivity to criticism. "Bill Casey can't control his temper very long. He's Irish by nature and all that sort of thing."

The chairman said he has since tried to repair the damaged relationship, but still believes the administration, and particularly its supporters in the right wing, are out to discredit him. After criticizing the CIA's latest Angolan campaign, Durenberger was blasted as a "rogue chairman" in right-wing columns.

"This is the way you operate," the senator said. "You take Durenberger's personal life to the cleaners in The Washington Times as a way to reverse Angola policy. It's endemic in this administration to do a certain amount of that."

Still, Durenberger's style of running the committee and his well-publicized marital problems have prompted concern among his colleagues that the committee's credibility has suffered and left the oversight process more vulnerable to administration attacks.

One committee insider said the first priority of Sens. William S.

Cohen (R-Maine) and David L. Boren (D-Okla.), who are scheduled to take over the committee next January, will be reestablishing the prestige of the panel within the Senate. "The consensus view is that Durenberger has seriously eroded the committee's credibility," the source said.

Durenberger detects the outline of an administration plan to gut the oversight process from recent comments by administration loyalists such as Rep. Henry J. Hyde (R-Ill.), a member of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

"Henry Hyde doesn't want oversight," Durenberger said. "Henry Hyde wants a situation in which a few buddies in the community are informed and that takes care of Congress and the public."

"They want to destroy the two committees," Durenberger said. The administration, he said, would prefer a joint House-Senate committee with members firmly under the control of a chairman faithful to the White House and sympathetic to the CIA.

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WASHINGTON POST
19 May 1986

THE CIA IN TRANSITION

New Era of Mistrust Marks Congress' Role

By David B. Ottaway
and Patrick E. Tyler
Washington Post Staff Writers

Ten years ago today, 72 senators voted to assert a stronger role for Congress in overseeing the vast U.S. intelligence apparatus in the wake of painful disclosures, scandals and abuses at the Central Intelligence Agency and the collection of secretive federal agencies known as the U.S. intelligence "community."

The hope was to end an era of suspicion, to narrow the number of congressional committees that had jurisdiction over the intelligence budget, to cut down on leaks of classified information and to set up a strong, permanent monitoring body to restore integrity and confidence in America's intelligence-gathering capabilities.

But after a decade, a new era of mistrust has dawned.

The Reagan administration is virtually at war with the two committees that were established to oversee the U.S. intelligence arm. Each side has accused the other of endangering the nation's most sensitive intelligence systems and jeopardizing covert operations in the Third World through unauthorized leaks to the news media.

Sen. David F. Durenberger (R-Minn.), chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence, said in an interview for this article that "a lot of those people [in the administration] don't want oversight." He charged that the administration has "screwed up" its covert attempt to change the Marxist government in Nicaragua and that every one of the CIA's covert paramilitary operations "is a problem."

In addition, Durenberger asserted that special interest groups and "right-wing senators" have been

driving the administration's secret diplomacy in Afghanistan and Angola; that Secretary of State George P. Shultz has allowed himself to be intimidated by these groups while CIA Director William J. Casey has shown a hypersensitivity to criticism. Durenberger said his own well-publicized marital troubles have been spotlighted by conservative Reagan supporters as a means of attacking his credibility as Senate oversight chairman.

The feud has grown so acrimonious that administration officials are suggesting it could soon endanger the future of the oversight process. Already, some top officials are charging that oversight is out of control. A few have suggested privately that the House and Senate intelligence panels be abolished and their responsibilities consolidated in one tightly controlled joint committee.

President Reagan, in a classified letter to Durenberger, warned a few months ago that the oversight process was seriously "at risk" and blamed Congress for a hemorrhage of national security data to the news media.

The Senate oversight leadership in turn has charged that the Reagan administration has systematically disclosed highly classified intelligence information to influence public debate and to bully Congress into supporting its overseas adventures.

At the core of the dispute are the far deeper divisions between Congress and the White House over what has emerged as a key feature of the administration's foreign policy—the so-called Reagan Doctrine, which by nature is carried out behind a cloak of secrecy provided by the CIA.

The doctrine has never been defined by Reagan personally and its outline has been most extensively shaped by the conservative cadres that seek to frame the Reagan foreign policy agenda. But if Reagan

has not embraced its name, he has embraced its cause: the support of Third World anticommunist guerrilla forces—"freedom fighters"—in their quest to roll back Soviet influence and dismantle Marxist regimes.

In the past five years under the Reagan Doctrine, the United States has fielded and supplied more paramilitary forces against Soviet surrogates in the Third World than at any time since the Vietnam war. CIA paramilitary experts-run guns, train guerrillas, outfit them with communications equipment and provide them with battlefield intelligence. As the fighting has steadily escalated in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Nicaragua and now Angola, questions in Congress have grown steadily louder.

The president is now seeking \$100 million in new aid for counter-revolutionary, or contra, guerrillas in Nicaragua. The CIA is involved in operations to destabilize Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi and in low-level support to antigovernment paramilitary forces in Ethiopia, according to intelligence sources.

The administration's attack on oversight, according to congressional leaders, must be weighed against the phenomenal budgetary support the congressional oversight committees have marshalled for the intelligence community. The intelligence budget of about \$10 billion in 1979 has more than doubled to \$24 billion this year and is projected to triple by 1990. This support has allowed the Carter and Reagan administrations to rapidly build up the most sophisticated, high-technology intelligence apparatus in the world.

Still, the frustrations are deep and bitter in this "partnership," largely because the intelligence buildup has restored a formidable and lethal capability in the CIA's directorate of operations to mount covert paramilitary operations over which Congress has little control. It was inevitable, according to some senators, that once the CIA had this capability, it would find new "opportunities" to justify using its most controversial instrument.

The president is required to send only a secret notification to the intelligence oversight committees that such operations are under way.

Congressional leaders have complained that there is no opportunity to debate these sensitive and dangerous adventures, though they may involve significant commitments of U.S. prestige and military resources and may involve equally significant risks whose consequences are borne by all Americans.

As House intelligence oversight Chairman Lee H. Hamilton (D-Ind.) lamented recently, the CIA's covert operations in support of President Reagan's "freedom fighters" are among the most important foreign policy issues before Congress—"and I can't talk about them!"

A decade ago, when intelligence oversight began in earnest, CIA covert operations were largely in disrepute. CIA paramilitary experts were disparaged as the "knuckle draggers" of the agency and there was a consensus to pump massive resources into high-technology spy systems.

Former senator Birch Bayh (D-Ind.), who chaired the Senate committee during the Carter administration, said in an interview that the oversight process was founded on a healthy mistrust between the executive and legislative branches.

"The reservations about oversight in the Carter administration were based on a sincere concern about security: Can 17 U.S. senators keep a secret? We found out they could. The present reservation," Bayh continued, "is a sort of arrogant attitude that it's just none of your damned business, as if the Senate were a foreign body."

It is not clear where the seeds of the new mistrust were sown. It may have been in the jungles of Nicaragua, where a rogue commander of CIA-backed forces got out of control; or in the Nicaraguan port of Corinto, where CIA contract agents mined the harbor without clear congressional notification; or in Beirut, where a team dispatched by CIA-backed Lebanese security forces killed—without CIA authorization—75 people with a car bomb.

But the effect of the frequent eruptions over the management and oversight of CIA covert operations has grown to the point where Reagan and his national security affairs advisers are hinting at the need to dismantle the decade-old oversight system that took shape in Senate Resolution 400.

That resolution passed 72 to 22 on May 19, 1976, reducing the number of Senate committees with jurisdiction over the intelligence

community from four to one, with 15 regular members. Ford administration officials and conservatives in Congress hoped that by limiting oversight to two committees, the risk of leaks of classified information from Congress would be sharply reduced.

A year later, the House merged the oversight function of four committees into a single panel of 17 members.

Recriminations between the oversight panels and successive administrations have characterized the relationship from the beginning. During the debates over the Panama Canal treaties and the SALT II strategic arms negotiations with the Soviet Union, Bayh said, a series of disclosures of highly classified information infuriated the intelligence community.

Bayh said it appeared to him at the time that rival groups in the Pentagon, State Department and White House were behind most of these disclosures, although a group of Senate aides, who referred to themselves as the "Madison Group," were reputed to have waged a disclosure campaign to block the SALT II treaty.

Interviews with congressional leaders in both parties suggest that the current attack on the oversight process cannot be explained simply by the recurring recriminations over national security leaks.

Instead, many of these leaders said they believe the attacks stem from the frustration of Reagan's senior advisers, who have been unsuccessful in winning broad support for their rapidly expanding program of covert paramilitary operations around the world.

Reagan, Shultz and Casey all complain that the Republican-controlled Senate intelligence committee has not supported Reagan's secret diplomacy.

"It is my considered judgment," said Sen. Patrick J. Leahy (D-Vt.), vice chairman of the oversight committee, "that the new reliance on covert military action as a normal instrument of foreign policy—even as a substitute for foreign policy—has strained the current oversight process to the breaking point."

Speaking to former intelligence officers recently, Leahy said the Reagan Doctrine of covert action in the Third World poses a basic question:

"Can a democracy like the United States engage in large-scale, so-

called 'covert paramilitary operations,' using our intelligence agencies as instruments in waging proxy wars against the Soviet Union or its clients?"

Leahy and other congressional leaders said they believe the Reagan administration is orchestrating a campaign to dismantle congressional oversight or at least to severely limit the authority of the House and Senate panels.

Durenberger agrees and said he thinks the real issue is the administration's controversial secret diplomacy: "Nicaragua, we screwed up," he said, adding, "Every one of these [covert paramilitary involvements] is a problem."

"There is no question," he said, "that the administration is having a hell of a time driving the policy in Angola or in Afghanistan." In Angola, he asserted, policy is "being

driven by little meetings of right-wing senators with the secretary of state. [They are] telling him what he's supposed to do and if he doesn't, they are going to bring [Angolan rebel leader] Jonas Savimbi over here in order to conduct a crusade."

The senator was referring to private discussions in early March between Shultz and a group of conservative senators led by Majority Leader Robert J. Dole (R-Kan.). The group insisted that Shultz and Casey send sophisticated U.S. Stinger anti-aircraft missiles to Savimbi. Within a week of these discussions, Reagan gave secret authorization to send them.

In Afghanistan, "Nobody likes the way [Rep.] Charlie Wilson [D-Tex.] was running policy," Durenberger said, referring to Wilson's leading role—as an influential House member who does not sit on the intelligence panel—in advocating budget increases to fund opposition to Soviet invasion forces.

Durenberger said he feels that his loyal opposition to Reagan administration policy has drawn for him a series of calculated personal attacks—from Casey and particularly from the right wing of the Republican Party.

For example, last November, after Durenberger had criticized some aspects of Casey's direction of the agency, Casey fired off a public letter accusing Durenberger of "the repeated compromise of sensitive intelligence sources and methods" and of conducting oversight in an "off-the-cuff" manner.

"It is time to acknowledge that the process has gone seriously awry," Casey concluded.

Durenberger refers to that dispute as the "Casey-(expletive)-on-Durenberger days," and attributes Casey's outburst to his sensitivity to criticism. "Bill Casey can't control his temper very long. He's Irish by nature and all that sort of thing."

The chairman said he has since tried to repair the damaged relationship, but still believes the administration, and particularly its supporters in the right wing, are out to discredit him. After criticizing the CIA's latest Angolan campaign, Durenberger was blasted as a "rogue chairman" in right-wing columns.

"This is the way you operate," the senator said. "You take Durenberger's personal life to the cleaners in The Washington Times as a way to reverse Angola policy. It's endemic in this administration to do a certain amount of that."

Still, Durenberger's style of running the committee and his well-publicized marital problems have prompted concern among his colleagues that the committee's credibility has suffered and left the oversight process more vulnerable to administration attacks.

One committee insider said the first priority of Sens. William S.

Cohen (R-Maine) and David L. Boren (D-Okla.), who are scheduled to take over the committee next January, will be reestablishing the prestige of the panel within the Senate. "The consensus view is that Durenberger has seriously eroded the committee's credibility," the source said.

Durenberger detects the outline of an administration plan to gut the oversight process from recent comments by administration loyalists such as Rep. Henry J. Hyde (R-Ill.), a member of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

"Henry Hyde doesn't want oversight," Durenberger said. "Henry Hyde wants a situation in which a few buddies in the community are informed and that takes care of Congress and the public."

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PERISCOPE

Journal of the Association of Former Intelligence Officers

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LEAHY SLAMS ADMINISTRATION ON LEAKS; URGES GREATER COMPLIANCE ON OVERSIGHT

By Harris Greene

Speaking before an attentive audience of more than 400 members at AFIO's April 21 luncheon at the Officers Club, Fort Myer, Virginia, Senator Patrick Leahy (D/VT), vice-chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) made a spirited attack on "key Intelligence Community leaders" who fail to work cooperatively with the two congressional committees.

A situation has resulted, he said, of "somewhat strained, and unnecessarily so" relations between these Committees and "elements of the Intelligence Community." He did not name names, but was unmistakably referring to personalities such as CIA director William Casey. Senator Leahy, who took pains to repeat that he understood and sympathized with the problems of U.S. intelligence, pointed out that "well over 90 percent" of the time, the SSCI has voted unanimously to support intelligence community initiatives, thus smoothing the way for full Senate support of specific intelligence projects and programs.

The problem arises, he said, from "growing disagreement over the (Reagan) administration's clear determination to make ever greater use of covert paramilitary operations as part of what is now being called the 'Reagan doctrine.'" There are areas, he stated, in which CIA should definitely be involved, "but *not* a substitute for U.S. foreign policy."

Leahy lauded the Congress for reducing intelligence oversight committees in 1976 from eight committees to two, one in the Senate and the other in the House of Representatives. That system, in his view, is working well. It was made law by the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980, which formalized the requirement that the oversight committees are to be kept fully and currently informed of all intelligence programs, including "significantly anticipated intelligence activities." He outlined three serious problems in the oversight process:

- who is responsible for leaks, and the significance of the "leak" problem;
- timeliness of notification by the Intelligence Community of *significant* intelligence activities;
- covert action programs, especially covert paramilitary programs.

Senator Leahy objected strongly to those who blame



Senator Leahy

the Congress, without justification he insisted, for allegedly leaking sensitive intelligence information to the press. "Far too often," he said, "in the last year or so, we on the (SSCI) have learned first of significant intelligence matters from the press, followed quickly by a breathless call from the legislative liaison Officers at CIA, DIA or elsewhere, trying to head off our (SSCI) angry reaction." He has heard a large number of complaints "from both sides of the aisle" in the Senate about such executive branch leaks.

Leahy jocularly suggested that the *New York Times* and *Washington Post* be classified each morning and sent to his committee as briefing papers in order to get information on intelligence activities quickly, "and also get a good crossword puzzle to work on at the same time." As a result of executive branch leaks, he said, the protection of having only two congressional committees, one in each house, protecting important security information, is eroding. Other congressional committees are beginning to express more interest in intelligence projects. He bluntly accused "parts of the Intelligence Community" of going directly to these other congressional committees "in an effort to circumvent opposition in the (Senate) Intelligence Committee." Leahy unhesitatingly placed primary blame for leaks on the White

(continued on page 2)

Let's Get Serious About Pamphlets

In 1982, the AFIO Board approved a project to produce a series of pamphlets to provide material for seminars at the college level. **The Intelligence Professional Series** resulted and, after a very slow start, produced three pamphlets.

Number One in the series, *The Clandestine Service of the Central Intelligence Agency*, by Hans Moses, published in 1983, while initially opposed by many in the CIA, has turned out to be a recruiting vehicle for them. In fact, due to the purchase made by the CIA, it is the only financially successful one of the series.

Number Two, *National Security and The First Amendment*, by John Warner, published in 1984, turns out to be the least called for because of its very specialized audience, but the one most nearly fitting the original concept. It is a true scholarly paper in every sense of the word—thoroughly researched and fully documented.

Number Three, *The KGB, An Instrument of Soviet Power*, by Thomas Polgar, also published in 1984, achieved its goal of informing the reader about the nature and operational activities of the KGB, but, like our first pamphlet, addressed a subject difficult to document in the academic sense.

Since then, we have not published and, indeed, have no manuscripts in work. We have prospects for one on secrecy and another on warning intelligence, but they are still only concepts. I believe there have been some prepared and submitted, one particularly on Science and Technology, but they have somehow gotten lost in the shuffle. This is unfortunate, and should not happen.

Nonetheless, the facts are that as of this time we are without a future program. So, let's get serious about the issue.

The concept was to produce two scholarly papers each year. Each would be about ten thousand words in length and treat a unique intelligence subject. Papers would be fully researched and documented — no war stories and recollections here.

In addition to the paper, each pamphlet would contain a seminar outline and a suggested reading list. These would complete what a teacher needs to develop a three hour, college level seminar.

So far, our subject matter has been a bit limited—the KGB, the law, and the clandestine service. There are a number of subjects which could be covered by this concept. Many of our members are experts in a particular aspect of intelligence activity which needs to be presented. Many have long wished for an opportunity to expound on their own concepts of an aspect of intelligence in which they have been involved over the years. In retirement, many of us could, and should, take a long objective look at our own conceptions of our life's work, do some in-depth research, then produce a definitive short work on the subject.

Faced with the requirements to produce a convincing, scholarly work on a pet subject could well result in some changes in attitudes but, surely, would produce pamphlets which would serve our purposes in education and contribute to developing our profession.

The Executive Committee will present a number of fresh ideas to the full Board in April about revitalizing this effort. The ideas to be presented to the Board include:

- Establish firm policies for the program to regularize how manuscripts are to be solicited, accepted or rejected, published, and disseminated (perhaps an editorial board?);
- Provide guidelines on subject matter, documentation, and format;
- Offer substantial honoraria to authors, recognizing that it takes time and money to do the kind of research we are expecting; and
- Develop a prize program to attract scholars, students, and AFIO members with, again, substantial stipends attached to the recognition.

Of course, members who wish to donate talent, as we have in the past, will still be the most welcome. Perhaps, if we decide to offer honoraria, we will have a basis of certifying tax deductions for donated work, if "tax simplification" will allow in the future.

In the mean time, those of you who have a yen to present a case about an aspect of the intelligence profession which could be used in educating college students (and others) of our work, take pen in hand and produce. If you have previously submitted a paper or idea and have heard nothing, resubmit. We will respond immediately to recognize your submission.

We are interested in your reactions to these ideas. Please let the Executive Committee hear from you.

—Capt Richard W. Bates (USN-Ret)

Leahy (continued from page 1)

House and intelligence agencies. "I believe," he averred, "nearly all leaks of sensitive information come from the Executive Branch. This tendency to conduct policy debate or advance political interests through leaking classified information existed in the Ford and Carter administration. But in my nearly 12 years in Congress, I have never seen it on the scale practiced by government officials under the present (Reagan) administration. This is not a partisan viewpoint but a fact."

He sought to explain why this situation exists. "The many leaks about recent espionage and defection cases appear to stem primarily from jockeying among intelligence and law enforcement officials trying to protect their reputations in the face of public outrage over possible mishandling (of a case). Who can leak first is the current criterion (of the executive agencies involved)." He also blamed critics of congressional oversight for attacking the oversight committees on leaks to the press, and the executive branch for the public expres-

(continued on page 16)

New Life Members

Mr. Kenneth K. ADDICOTT
Carmel, California

Mr. Ben F. ALBITZ
Potomac, Maryland

Major George L. COLBY, USAF(Ret.)
St. Cloud, Florida

Mr. Richard Turner CORSA
Walnut Creek, California

Mr. Charles M. COSNER
Springfield, Virginia

CAPT John Q. EDWARDS, USN(Ret.)
Norfolk, Virginia

Mr. Vasia C. GMIRKIN
Sedona, Arizona

Mr. John J. GRAHAM
Rochester, New York

Mrs. Anne Mary INGRAHAM
Alexandria, Virginia

Major Paul G. JONES, USAF(Ret.)
Springfield, Virginia

Mrs. Mary L. Green MADIGAN
Tallahassee, Florida

Mr. Eugene P. MONDANI
Colorado Springs, Colorado

LtCol Alden C. PETERSON, USAF(Ret.)
Camp Spring, Maryland

Mr. Henry N. SCHLADT
Colorado Springs, Colorado

Mr. Edward J. SCHOENWETTER
Mount Dora, Florida

Colonel Landgrave T. SMITH, Jr. USAF(Ret.)
Oakton, Virginia

Mr. Michael F. SPEERS
Weston, Vermont

Honora F. THOMPSON
Washington, D.C.

COL G.R. (Russell) WILEY, USAR
San Francisco, California

Mr. Ernest J. ZELLMER
Satellite Beach, Florida

Notes from National

We certainly appreciate the response from our members in converting to Life Membership. Since our fiscal year began on September 1, 1985, we have received a total of fifty-five conversions and new life members. This number equals the total for twelve months of the previous fiscal year. We are very pleased at this response and wish to remind those who might consider converting to life membership that it can be done on the installment plan so long as the full amount of \$250.00 is paid in twelve months. Since AFIO is a tax exempt organization under IRS 501(c) 3, the dues are deductible as a charitable deduction on your federal tax return. Life memberships make nice birthday presents!

We are all pleased that the inflation rate has remained low; however, you should understand that the US Postal Service raised the rates for 3rd Class mail 31% on March 1, 1986. This has been quite a financial burden to absorb. Since we must continue to use 3rd Class, we again ask our members to keep us posted on their current mailing address to ensure receipt of AFIO publications. The Postal Service will not forward 3rd Class mail.

For those chapters whose members have the opportunity to provide speakers to organizations which are able to pay honorariums we would like to offer a suggestion. If the sponsor wishes to take a tax deduction for the honorarium, they may make the check payable to AFIO. AFIO would then pay that amount to the chapter. This came to our attention when I was asked to speak again at the Brookings Institution's Seminar at Williamsburg, Virginia and they were very generous and sent a \$400.00 check payable to AFIO as an honorarium.

We would again like to remind our members that we do have very nice lapel pins which we will be glad to mail to you if you send us \$5.00. Lest there be some confusion between AFIO and other organizations, AFIO's annual dues of \$25.00 are paid for twelve months. You do receive a notice from Headquarters when your dues are payable. This does not apply to life members who only pay the \$250.00 one time.

Things are beginning to take shape for the AFIO 1986 Convention in Orlando, Florida on October 17 and 18, 1986. We have made arrangements with Piedmont Airlines to provide special air fares and we will be sending more information with the next issue of *Periscope*.

John K. Greaney

WHOOPS!

In the last issue of *Periscope*, the proofreader's eye was not as sharp as usual. We assure readers it was carelessness, not a Freudian slip, that referred in the first sentence on page 14 to the "Soviet Select Committee on Intelligence." And, if the Committee was not slighted enough, numbered paragraph (1) of the quotation from Sen. Dave Durenburger should refer to the "Intelligence Community," not the "Intelligence Committee," which provides impartial information and analysis and in certain circumstances serves as the instrument of US policy in the conduct of special activities (covert action). Finally, in the caption to the picture of the former DCI's and DDCI's who were guests at the CIA Headquarters expansion, of course—as many readers reminded us—former DCIs Richard Helms and William E. Colby well deserve the distinction of "Honorable."

Intelligence Issues

Task Force Urges Intelligence Efforts to Combat Terrorism

"Success in combatting terrorism," states a recent report of the Vice President's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism, "is predicated on the availability of timely and accurate intelligence." One approach to assuring timely information in thwarting terrorists, the report states, involves "conventional human and technical intelligence capabilities that penetrate terrorist groups and their support systems, including a sponsoring state's activities."

The Task Force, chaired by Vice President George Bush, released an unclassified version of its report in February. The public report also stresses the importance of police investigative efforts: "Collecting tactical police intelligence aids in monitoring terrorists' activities and may be crucial to tracking subnational groups or small terrorist bands. The national intelligence effort relies heavily on collection and liaison arrangements that exist with many foreign governments. This effort must be augmented with the results of investigative police work and law enforcement liaison arrangements, which are currently being expanded."

Continued the report, "Long-term intelligence programs to combat terrorism involve collection and analysis that address regional history, culture, religion, politics, psychology, security conditions, law enforcement and diplomatic relationships. The requirement for accurate analysis applies both to long-term threat assessments and to support incident management. All terrorism-related intelligence collection and analysis must be directed toward production and dissemination of clear, concise and accurate threat warnings and assessments to decision-makers in time for them to take necessary action."

Among the Task force's many recommendations, an intelligence agenda is proposed which:

- Would establish a Consolidated Intelligence Center on Terrorism. "Intelligence gathering, analysis and dissemination play a pivotal role in combatting terrorism. Currently, while several federal departments and agencies process intelligence within their own facilities, there is no consolidated center that collects and analyzes all-source information from those agencies participating in anti-terrorist activities. The addition of such a central facility would improve our capability to understand and anticipate future terrorist threats, support national crisis management and provide a common database readily accessible to individual agencies. Potentially, this center could be the focus for developing a cadre of interagency intelligence analysts specializing in the subject of terrorism."
- Would increase collection of human intelligence. "U.S. intelligence gathered by technical means is adequate and pursued appropriately. At the same time, there is clear need for certain information that can only be gained by individuals. An increase in human intelligence gathering is essential to penetrate terrorist groups and their support systems."
- Would exchange intelligence between governments. "The national intelligence effort relies heavily on collection and liaison arrangements that exist with many friendly governments." Such exchanges with like-minded nations and international law enforcement organizations have been highly useful and should be expanded to support our own intelligence efforts."

Included in the recommendations is a proposal to form a Joint Committee on Intelligence: "Procedures that the Executive Branch must follow to keep the Select Intelligence Committees informed of intelligence need streamlining. Adoption of a Joint Resolution introduced last year by Congressman Hyde would create a Joint Committee on Intelligence. This Resolution would reduce the number of people who have access to sensitive information and provide a single secure repository of classified material. The Department of Justice should lead an Administration effort to secure passage of the Hyde proposal."

Other recommendations include establishing incentives (rewards, immunity from prosecution, U.S. citizenship) for those who provide information about terrorists' identity or location; close loopholes in the Freedom of Information Act which have permitted members of terrorist groups to identify FBI informants, frustrate federal investigation and tie up government resources in responding to FOIA requests; establish a full-time NSC position, with support staff, to strengthen coordination of the national program; close extradition loopholes; impose sanctions against governments which offer safehaven for terrorists or as caches

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- Dr. Walter L. Pforzheimer Vice President
- Robert J. Novak Treasurer
- Charlotta P. Engrav Secretary
- John K. Greaney Executive Director
- Edward F. Sayle Editor of PERISCOPE

Purpose

AFIO was organized in 1975 by former intelligence personnel from the Federal military and civilian intelligence and security agencies. Its purpose is to promote public understanding of, and support for, a strong and responsible national intelligence establishment.

AFIO believes that effective intelligence is the nation's first line of defense against surprise from abroad, subversion at home and possibly dangerous miscalculation by our national leaders in the conduct of foreign and defense policy. AFIO therefore holds that reliable intelligence is essential to the cause of peace.

In pursuing its objectives, AFIO

- Works closely with appropriate committees of the Congress regarding legislation affecting the intelligence agencies, responds to congressional requests for its views and information on intelligence matters, and is frequently called upon to testify on specific legislative proposals.
- Through its network of local chapters across the nation, provides speakers for discussion of national security issues before civic, academic and professional groups.
- Promotes educational programs explaining the role and importance of intelligence.
- Provides participants for network and local TV and radio programs on national security issues.
- Is frequently consulted by scholars, authors, journalists and TV producers on intelligence matters.
- Monitors media treatment of intelligence and security issues and, where inaccuracies and distortions occur, attempts to set the record straight.
- Distributes to its members a quarterly publication with news, views and book reviews relating to intelligence, and a quarterly digest of current news commentary.

for their material; evaluate and strengthen airport, port and diplomatic mission security; make murder of US citizens outside the country a federal crime; establish a death penalty for hostage murders; prohibit mercenary training camps in the United States; and determine if it should be made illegal for individuals and companies to enrich terrorist coffers by paying ransom for return of kidnapped employees or stolen property.

[Public Report of the Vice President's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism, Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1986. May be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents, Washington, D.C. 20402.]

Editor's Note: We are pleased to report that AFIO's Tom Polgar served as a consultant to the Vice President's Task Force.

On the Intelligence Bookshelf . . .

Editor's Note: In late 1985, an important book dealing with the development of US Naval Intelligence from the 1920's through World War II, particularly the secret war of the ether, was published. In his *memoirs*, the late RADM Edwin T. Layton has, at last, permitted those of the intelligence profession to look with public pride at the unsung heroes in language, mathematics, cryptography and intelligence whose vital contributions often must be overlooked because of the need for continuing protection of certain sources and methods. Because of the significance of RADM Layton's work, the following review is being published concurrently by *Periscope* and the *Naval Intelligence Quarterly*, a classified Naval Reserve publication. AFIO wishes to thank RADM William Studeman, USN, the Director of Naval Intelligence, and CAPT Stephen S. Roberts, USNR, Editor-in-Chief of the *Naval Intelligence Quarterly*, for their cooperation in making this concurrent publication possible. Our particular appreciation to LT David A. Rosenberg USNR, a distinguished intelligence historian and lecturer, who wrote the review.

Breaking the Secrets

LAYTON, Edwin T. Layton, RADM, USN (Ret), with CAPT Roger Pineau, USNR (Ret) and John Costello. *And I Was There: Pearl Harbor and Midway—Breaking the Secrets*. New York: William Morrow, 1985. 596 pp.

When dealing with intelligence organizations, history is elusive. Conducted out of necessity in great secrecy, intelligence activities, be they covert military operations, clandestine intelligence gathering, or classified military analysis, are generally difficult to reconstruct publicly because of the sensitivity of sources and methods. Yet intelligence professionals need to know history—not only that of foreign intelligence operations as background for analysis, but also the history of their own nation's intelligence organizations. Such history is important for the establishment and maintenance of traditions and organizational esprit. It provides valuable contrasts between intelligence work in the past and intelligence today, occasionally recalling approaches and insights that time had eroded. Such history can even guard against mistakes in assessment and analysis by providing a firm base from which to judge whether misleading "mirror-imaging" of enemies is based not just on erroneous assumptions about foreign nations' actions, but on a faulty understanding of our own nation's past actions as well. Finally, such history can warn against practices which in the past have undermined the effectiveness of intelligence activities and exposed the nation to peril, and which could do so again.

Quality intelligence history may be rare, but occasionally a book will appear that fills the bill. *And I Was There* is such a book. RADM Edwin T. Layton's memoir is the most revealing account published to date of the major events, trends, and personalities in the development of United States naval intelligence from the 1920s through World War II. The book not only offers valuable insights into the intelligence process itself, particularly codebreaking and communications intelligence, but also describes the broader context of decisions and decision makers at the highest levels of the Navy and the nation from December 1940 to the Guadalcanal campaign in the fall of 1942. Much of this story has been told before, in books such as CAPT W. J. Holmes' *Double Edged Secrets* (1979), and Ronald Lewin's *The American Magic* (1982), but Layton's book is not mere repetition. His unique vantage point as the Pacific Fleet intelligence officer from 1940 to 1945, combined with the diligent research of his collaborators, has resulted in a combination memoir and history that weaves a rich tapestry of narrative and detail. Although the thoroughness of the authors makes it difficult to read this book quickly, naval intelligence

personnel seeking to understand the roots of their craft will find a careful reading both personally satisfying and professionally rewarding.

Edwin Layton graduated from the Naval Academy in 1924, and, after five years of sea duty, entered into intelligence work as a Japanese language officer in training in Japan in 1929. In 1932-1933, he was assistant naval attache in Beijing, then returned to sea duty until 1936, when he was assigned as officer in charge of the Japanese translation section of the cryptanalytic section of the office of naval communications. From 1937 to 1939, he was assistant naval attache in Tokyo. Following a year commanding a destroyer-minesweeper, he reported on 7 December 1940 as the first fleet intelligence officer on the staff of ADM J.O. Richardson, Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet. He stayed in to serve ADM Husband Kimmel in a similar capacity, and subsequently Pacific Fleet Commander ADM Chester E. Nimitz from 1941 through 1946. It was Nimitz who told Layton in the fall of 1942 that "as my intelligence officer you are more valuable to me than any division of cruisers." Layton continued his career as a naval intelligence professional after the war, and in 1948 founded the Naval Intelligence School. As a flag officer, he served as assistant director for intelligence for the Joint Chiefs of Staff and assistant chief of staff for intelligence to Commander in Chief Pacific until his retirement in 1959. At the time of his death in 1984, Layton had completed most of the first draft of this memoir through the Battle of Midway. The manuscript was completed, at the request of Mrs. Layton, by CAPT Roger Pineau, a World War II Japanese language intelligence officer and assistant to Samuel Eliot Morison on the 15-volume *History of U.S. Naval Operations in World War II*, and John Costello, a former BBC producer who has written a number of books on World War II, both of whom had been assisting Layton with his research.

Layton's intention in writing this book was to set the record straight as to why American intelligence failed to provide warning of the impending attack on Pearl Harbor. Frustrated by the books published from the 1940s through the 1970s about the Pearl Harbor attack, which charged his boss, Admiral Kimmel, with negligence, Layton nevertheless continued to abide by his oath of secrecy until, in the 1980s, the National Security Agency began declassifying relevant original source materials. Using newly declassified histories, directives, and the actual intercepted and decrypted Japanese diplomatic and naval messages, Layton was able to begin reconstructing a detailed, unclassified record of American intelligence activities before and after the Pearl Harbor attack. With the assistance of Pineau and Costello, he tracked down and incorporated into his own reminiscences thousands of pages of documents being released by the U.S., British, Australian and Dutch governments relating to the 1940-1942 period, as well as the official Japanese account of the Pacific War, which Layton himself had worked at translating.

Since *And I Was There* is essentially Edwin Layton's memoir, it begins with his own experience and perspectives, but expands to fill in information which then-Lieutenant Commander Layton had no access to at the time of Pearl Harbor. The result is not just a personal reminiscence, but a broad chronicle of the events leading up to the attack on Pearl Harbor, and the subsequent first year of the Pacific War. Readers who are not familiar with the debate surrounding who was responsible for America being taken by surprise at Pearl Harbor will find the book a useful, up to date, if not entirely objective, introduction to the major points of controversy. Specific events and military strategy, including U.S.-British relations, President Roosevelt's relationship with Prime Minister Churchill, and, thanks to the language expertise of Layton and Pineau, Japanese plans and decisions leading to war as well.

One particularly interesting contribution is the discussion and analysis of the shift in U.S. Pacific strategy in the fall of 1941 away from long held plans to leave U.S. forces in the Philippines on their own to defend against the Japanese in the event of war. Following agreement with the British at the Argentina, Newfoundland, summit between Roosevelt and Churchill, the top leadership of the War and Navy Departments decided to extend the U.S. defensive perimeter through the Philippines as a deterrent to Japanese southern expansion, emphasizing the use of long range strategic bombers not only to defend the Philippines, but to launch an offensive against Japan itself if the necessary buildup of planes and material could be achieved in time. Other historians in recent years have discussed this strategic shift, but Layton and company make clear an important point: when the decision was made in Washington to revise Pacific strategy, Admiral Kimmel, the Pacific Fleet Commander, was not adequately informed of the change, a significant oversight which clearly did not contribute to fleet readiness to implement national strategy.

(continued on page 6)

Breaking Secrets . . .

At the heart of Layton's story is the nature of the intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination process within the U.S. Government and particularly the Navy Department. Layton and his coauthors flesh out the details of the history of Navy radio intelligence from the 1920s onward, utilizing memory and declassified Top Secret Ultra histories to provide as explicit and precise an understanding of U.S. codebreaking processes and capabilities as is ever likely to be published. The array of codes available to the Japanese, the changes those codes underwent, U.S. capabilities to intercept and decrypt messages, and the fate of these decrypts are all described.

The most revealing part of Layton's story relates to the intradepartmental conflicts over the control and dissemination of radio intelligence, initially between the Office of Naval Communications and the Office of Naval Intelligence, and then between RADM R.K. Turner's war plans division and ONI. Allocation of code breaking assignments among stations in Washington, the Philippines, and Pearl Harbor left commander Joseph Rochefort's codebreakers in Hawaii boxed in, working at decrypting the extremely difficult Japanese Navy flag officers' code and conducting less than complete traffic analysis. The all important work of attacking the JN-25B navy operations code was assigned to others, despite the fact that the Navy's best cryptanalysts were at Pearl Harbor, and were in a better position to exploit the results of any breakthrough. Simultaneously, Rochefort, Layton and Kimmel were denied access by Turner to most daily code breaking results, including "Magic" decrypts of the Japanese diplomatic code, the JN-25B code, and J-19 code keys used by the Japanese Consulate at Pearl Harbor. "Magic" and consular code decrypts in September and October 1941 indicating a Japanese focus on Pearl Harbor were not sent to Kimmel. The Pacific Fleet was consistently cut off, as a result of fears of security leaks, from vital intelligence that would have alerted Pearl to the growing possibility of a Japanese attack on Hawaii.

The period from Pearl Harbor through the Battle of Midway was also fraught with internecine wrangling between Washington and Hawaii. Layton details the role radio intelligence played in planning the initial Pacific Fleet offensive operations, including the way operational task force commanders used or ignored intelligence information. The struggle to convince Washington's intelligence establishment and Admiral Ernest J. King of what Admiral Nimitz had become convinced, namely that Japan was going to move eastward against Midway in June 1942, is laid bare in heretofore undisclosed detail. The story of political squabbles and technical subterfuge during this critical period is frustrating but valuable reading, and provides strong warnings about the dangers of putting personalities and personal rivalries ahead of intelligence professionalism. Layton pays particular attention to Joseph Rochefort's role in making possible the Midway battle, and the subsequent shake-up of his command, including Rochefort's own ignominious transfer to lesser duties and reorganization of the Navy's radio intelligence effort under CAPT Joseph Redman at the Office of Naval Communications. This story has been told before, but Layton provides clear evidence that Rochefort's transfer was the result of a personal vendetta on the part of jealous Washington rivals.

And I Was There is by no means detached history. Layton is intent on discrediting those who scapegoated Admiral Kimmel and neutralized Joseph Rochefort. Pineau and Costello have an equally strong commitment to refuting charges made by the late Gordon Prange, General MacArthur's former official historian, in his best selling *At Dawn We Slept*, which they believe to be unsound and lacking in scholarly integrity. Although it is necessary to keep these biases in mind, they do not diminish the contribution made by this book. *And I Was There* is fascinating reading for anyone with an interest in naval intelligence, and presents much new and valuable information.

In addition, this book offers important warnings for naval intelligence personnel. Two in particular stand out:

— It is difficult enough under the best of circumstances to get good intelligence accepted and relied on by operational commanders. Internecine bureaucratic strife and personal rivalry among intelligence officers only serves to undermine credibility and diminish the prospects that intelligence will be properly and fully utilized.

— Intelligence only has value if put in the right hands. Denying pertinent intelligence to on-scene commanders because of excessive security consciousness or political considerations is a recipe for potential disaster.

Naval intelligence professionals know these problems well, but it never hurts to be graphically reminded of the costs of failure to heed such warnings. *And I Was There* is an excellent vehicle for reviewing

these timeless tenets. It is certainly better to study them by reliving the mistakes of the past, than by repeating the same mistakes in the future.

LT David A. Rosenberg

[LT David A. Rosenberg USNR, is on the faculty of the Strategy Department, US Naval War College, Newport, RI. He holds a PhD from the University of Chicago, and writes extensively on strategy and long-range planning. Presently he is working on a biography of ADM Arleigh Burke.]

On Her Majesty's Secret Service

Andrew, Christopher *Her Majesty's Secret Service: The Making of the British Intelligence Community*. New York: Elisabeth Sifton Books/Viking, 1986. xviii +619 pages. \$25.00

Christopher Andrew, a professional British historian, has written a superb book which should become a classic of its rare genre: a serious study of secret Intelligence services in that most secretive of democratic Western States: Great Britain. Praise is due for virtually every aspect of this substantial but not heavy tome: in writing style, organization, coverage, objectivity of analysis and judgement and in the study of available sources in a manner which is exhaustive.

One important virtue of this often entertaining, but true, work is that it will benefit both the general reader and the specialist, those who may or may not have served in intelligence. As a writer, Andrew possesses an admirably clear and economical style; more, he has a mischievous but balanced sense of humor, knows a good story and has an eye for comic moments. As a scholar of intelligence studies of the Western powers, especially Britain and France, Andrew has paid his dues in many government archives, from Kew and London to Paris and Washington, D.C. and has mastered key portions of the Intelligence-related documents open to the public in archives such as the Public Record Office, etc. He has another advantage as a student of this field; he is a senior scholar of French (and British) imperial studies of modern times and has studied French diplomatic (and secret intelligence) history of the period since 1860. Such a background forms a fortunate asset for students of intelligence, since one of the major sources of the growth of intelligence activities in modern nation-states in the West is precisely in overseas imperial activities, including colonial rule, and in the increasingly complex world of foreign diplomacy.

For the serious American reader, this book is important for at least three reasons: one, the subject of British intelligence is significant on its own, for its own reasons of both achievements and failures during the period of most detailed analysis, 1860-1960; two, British intelligence services have had an important, and sometimes, lasting, impact and influence on U.S. intelligence during the years, 1914-1950; three, the fact that British intelligence services have had an influence on the intelligence services of scores of other nations in the Commonwealth, the former British Empire, and in other international organizations. British intelligence structures, methods and "doctrine," to some extent, have at one time or another been adopted and adapted by the intelligence services in nations as diverse as Iraq, Ghana, India, and island states of the Caribbean. Moreover, both active and retired British intelligence officers in other countries, including, say, South Africa some time ago, have done influential "consulting work on the side". Despite the formal disappearance of the British Empire and the waning of British power in the world, the "sun has never set" (finally) on the enduring, if sometimes ephemeral, influence of "The British Secret Service."

(continued on page 7)

Secret Service . . .

The reader may well wonder, with the notorious scarcity of reliable sources on the subject of secret intelligence, how did the author manage to put together more than 600 pages of material? The author is frank in explaining his difficulties in doing so, from the first sentence which is succinctly candid: "Whitehall has done what it can to discourage serious study of the making of the British intelligence community," (xv) He notes with wry amusement that while the Government has released to public archives some intelligence records of World War II, it has refused to release similar documents on pre-1917 history on "the dotty grounds that intelligence gathering before the war must remain more secret than during the war." Even so, Andrew was able to consult documents in some number since some were not "weeded" out of all files but only out of some. The government and private papers consulted included: archives at Birmingham University; Churchill College Archives Centre, Cambridge University (UK); House of Lords Records Office; Intelligence Corps Museum, Ashford, Kent (UK); India Office Library and Records, London; Imperial War Museum, London; Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King's College, London; National Archives, Washington, D.C.; National Maritime Museum, Greenwich (UK); and, finally, and most important: Public Record Office, Kew. His study of published memoirs, newspapers and journals and other printed sources is equally thorough and careful.

The book focuses mainly on the history of British secret intelligence services (mainly MI-6 and MI-5) and less on armed services intelligence, though, as he admits, the lines between the two are sometimes blurred. He favors, as well, the analysis of strategic, rather than tactical intelligence and most detail is in the period, 1890-1945. For students of pre-World War II intelligence studies, it is delightful to note that there is much material on the period, 1900 to 1930—an often neglected era—a period in which Andrew is a specialist on this and other topics, with World War I as a kind of centerpiece. Ten of the fifteen chapters, in fact, cover 1890-1929 or nearly 338 out of 506 pages of text.

Andrew, Fellow and Senior Tutor in History at Corpus Christi College, Cambridge University (UK), clearly shows that the history of intelligence services' work can no longer be as neglected as it has been in the past. It is, a "missing dimension" of political and diplomatic history, as well as of military history, but the author demonstrates that if one uses resourcefulness and diligence, something cogent can be reconstructed. His discussion of communications intelligence in World War I's Room 40, of the Division of Naval Intelligence, is masterful; at that time Britain began a systematic interception of other governments' communications. He might have added that such interception did not begin in 1914, but can be traced to several cases of British interception of telegraphic communications of Boer soldiers and diplomats during the Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902) in South Africa, a fact carefully kept secret until late in World War II.

His Majesty's Secret Service may not discuss much military tactical intelligence during the two World Wars and later, but its discussion of high level strategic intelligence, including gathering of information, analysis, inter-service thinking and connections, and basic facts of operations is brilliant and thorough. While several, earlier books on British Intelligence have been published by Nigel West,* they have been too much of a kind of British intelligence social register, with some reasonably accurate anecdotes, but no secure documentation or confirmation of same. Andrew's work is full of material on wartime and peacetime analysis and operations; his biographical portraits of the leading, sometimes bizarre, secret service personalities are full, witty and definitive. Here there are unforgettable portraits of the lives of Admiral Reginald Hall (head of Naval Intelligence, WWI), Valentine Vivian (no. 2 in MI-6 in World War II), Maxwell Knight (no. 2 in MI-5 before 1945), Sir Stewart Menzies, and the first officer to be known as "C", Sir Mansfield Cumming, head of MI-6, 1909-1923. One wonders where he obtained some of his biographical material, for some of the facts appear to have come from unusual interviews, not documents. The thumbnail sketch of Colonel (later Sir) Claude Dansey wartime assistant chief of SIS (MI-6), World War II, who has been described by another Cambridge historian, Sir Hugh Trevor-Roper (Lord Dacre) as "an utter shit, corrupt, incompetent, but with a certain low cunning," is enthralling. Dansey was an important player in the British secret wars between the wars and to 1945. His background and his influence on methods of recruitment in these services—he opposed recruiting university-trained officers, on principal—suggest that vital but neglected aspects of this history are the personal makeup of the leadership and psychology of intelligence work.

"Dansey had a notably disturbed late Victorian childhood which he

managed to conceal from his SIS colleagues. After being taken away from Wellington College because of trouble with the drains which led to the death of two boys from suspected diphtheria, he was sent to a school in Belgium where he was seduced by Oscar Wilde's first male lover, Robert Ross." (p. 357)

After reading Andrew's spare but pithy biographies of the leaders of British secret service, this reviewer had some unanswered questions in mind. Even in the context of the time and the British class system, how did some of these character ever get recruited? Or, as important, how did they last? And, with these confirmed real life facts of the business (hard acts to follow, even in non-fiction), not a little espionage fiction, and some of its characters, suddenly appears dull. With his multi-faceted approach to the material, Andrew has demonstrated that in the history of British intelligence, as in other really creative analyses of history, the truth is more interesting than fiction and life appears to imitate art.

Besides the striking personal portraits of the decision-makers in and near Whitehall, Andrew is also especially adept at clarifying the way the British government interacted with intelligence at several levels over historic epochs. While there is no 'simplified' chart of "power flows" and "decision-making patterns" in the complex British intelligence system, 1914-1945, Andrew's text lays out admirably the major aspects of this process and its evolution. At the beginning of the book, the reader will find very helpful the author's complete list of abbreviations/acronyms.

The volume ends with a cogent analysis of Winston Churchill's relationship with secret intelligence in the 1930s and during World War II as Prime Minister. Churchill was relatively unique in his grasp of the importance of secret intelligence, if not always correct in his interpretation and use of it. Finally, Andrew in the "Epilogue: War and Peace" (Chapter 15) again shows that his judgments are based on realism, logic and confirmed knowledge, for the most part. When the author must speculate, the reader is informed. He is not guilty of "the infallibility/omnipotence" trap concerning intelligence in war. As he states in the first sentence of this last chapter: "Intelligence did not decide the outcome of the war (WWII)." (p. 487). There follows a brief discussion of some major features of intelligence developments in Britain during the 1950s and 1960s. Consideration of the present situation and a glimpse at the need for future reforms of British Intelligence are not forgotten in the few remaining pages. It is in this material on the need for reform in the current British intelligence community which will be of most immediate, if not to say ironic, interest to many of us who are now concerned about the status of and the problems surrounding the U.S. intelligence community.

Andrew believes that the performance of the British intelligence community today could be improved if the Government faced honestly the need to cease its support for two highly questionable (pre-World War II) constitutional principles: "that intelligence is undiscussable in the public and that parliament surrenders all its powers in intelligence matters to the executive." (p. 500). He argues convincingly that, apart from the complex constitutional issues, these "twin intelligence principles," long accepted as articles of faith by British administrations to this day, actually result in neither efficient administration nor in good security. Various intelligence 'scandals' from the Blunt case, to the Falklands war, to the Prime case, have again raised these issues and the debate over needed reforms continues unabated.

To strengthen his argument on reform needs, the author picks the post-1974 Intelligence oversight system in the United States as a reform model; he proposes that Britain establish a select committee for intelligence oversight in parliament, an idea still resisted by the Thatcher government. He believes that such an oversight mechanism is needed and would work effectively with due security precautions. While he allows for distinct differences between the two political/government systems, despite long-standing intelligence community links and cooperation, he does not take into account the fact that the fledging American intelligence oversight system in Congress is still controversial, has undergone some serious strains in recent years, and is the subject of an ongoing debate in the media, the White House and the Congress, not to mention the Intelligence Community itself, concerning its ultimate effectiveness. In short, Professor Andrew's use of an American model in oversight may be both premature and not altogether con-

(continued on page 8)

Domestic Intelligence . . .

vincing. The American model, in this case, is still in a state of flux. Recent discussions in Congress, for example, about creating a Joint Select Committee on Intelligence are only beginning.

Lessons on this aspect of the complex topic may be that, whatever political similarities and ideological affinities among friendly states, when it comes to the functioning of intelligence systems within governments, reform ideas and models do not necessarily "travel" and that national psychological or even cultural differences are reflected also in how intelligence organizations function.

In conclusion, this magisterial work will render obsolete, and in significant ways inaccurate and incomplete, some standard American analyses of British intelligence in recent times. The chapter on "British Intelligence," (chapt. 8) in Harry Howe Ransom's otherwise respectable study, *The Intelligence Establishment* (1970), is woefully inadequate, for example, (after Andrew's work). An important aspect of Andrew's study is to lay bare not a few failures and problems in this system. Ransom's judgment, even in 1969, that Britain's Secret Service "unlike the CIA, has not become a foreign policy boomerang often returning to embarrass and injure the government" (p. 203) was flawed, if only taking into account pre-1939 weaknesses and the Philby-Burgess-Maclean defections of 1951-1963. In short, *His Majesty's Secret Service* will revise our views of this system's mixed record and sets a stunning example of profound scholarship, pleasantly presented, and clear-headed thinking. This reviewer looks forward to other works from the pen of Dr. Andrew on other aspects of this increasingly important field.

*See Nigel West, *MI5* (1981) and *MI6* (1983) and his more analytical, *Unreliable Witness. Espionage Myths of the Second World War* (1984).

Douglas L. Wheeler

(Professor Douglas L. Wheeler is Professor of Modern History, University of New Hampshire, Durham. He is a Research Associate, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, and 1984-85 was Richard Welch Fellow, CFIA.)

Domestic Intelligence

Godson, Roy (Ed) *Intelligence Requirements for the 1980's: Domestic Intelligence*. Lexington, Mass. Lexington Books, 1985. 282 pages. \$14.95

Dr. Roy Godson, Associate Professor of Government at Georgetown University and consultant to the National Security Council and the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, has demonstrated unique skills in both the academic and intelligence disciplines in presenting the results of a two-day conference on a challenging subject. Between Part I, raising the question of what domestic security is, and the final chapter covering domestic intelligence requirements, this work makes several interesting pit stops: constitutional restraints; collection and organization of information; laws and guidelines; and the Federal loyalty-security program, the flaws of which have been so graphically highlighted by the rash of espionage cases exposed in the past year.

This is the sixth of a seven-volume series that Dr. Godson has edited on the intelligence requirements of this decade, but none is more open to questions and debate than the topic treated in the current volume: Domestic Intelligence.

Frank R. Barnett, president of the National Strategic Information Center, in the Preface to this volume prologizes what may be expected in the ensuing chapters: "In both theory and practice, even the most democratic state must provide for domestic security, but doing so requires thinking seriously about a legion of thorny questions . . . (H)ow shall provisions for domestic security be balanced against guarantees

of individual liberties? . . . Specifically how individual freedoms and rights shall be limited in order to preserve the freedom of the entire political community is the most sensitive issue a free country can raise."

The experts who convened for two days under the Consortium's sponsorship constituted, indeed, an ecumenical body: academics, researchers, media representatives, current and former senior intelligence officers, White House and congressional intelligence specialists, and officials in state and local safety programs.

From the reporting of in-depth discussion of this challenging and tantalizing subject, it is apparent that just as there are no atheists in life-boats—there were no non-believers in First Amendment rights on this trip. There was direct and tacit acknowledgment of the need to respect individual rights while resolving societal rights. The only obvious disagreement, predictably, was the degree of protection to be accorded.

A proposed definition of domestic intelligence was "information useful to controlling political crime" ("controlling" to include not only apprehension and prosecution but also preventive action). Some insisted, however, as Dr. Godson points out in his introduction, "(T)he heart of the internal security problem may lie less in the activities of extremists working beyond or on the fringes of the law, and more with those of leading members of society who, by example, legitimize cooperation with foreign adversaries."

The general feeling was that investigation of "subversion" should not be predicated on a criminal basis and that such activity is not constitutionally protected against inquiry either by the Government or by private individuals. However, the climate which developed in both the bureaucracy and the judiciary indicates that while the criminal standard may not be the law of the land, it might as well be.

There was some criticism of, and little support for, the perceived neglect of the FBI in collecting and analyzing domestic intelligence information. Some interesting opinions were injected as to who, rather than the FBI, should have the authority to monitor individuals involved in domestic subversion and politically-motivated violence.

Two congressional staffers, while having differing views as to where the authority should rest, agreed it should be outside the Executive branch. One contended that while examination and investigation of "bad political thought" should be undertaken, its "robust political debunking" is the duty of the private sector—business, labor, universities and political parties. The other argued that under the Insurrections Clause of Article I of the Constitution, it is Congress which has the power to respond to insurrections, and that the body, as the primary branch of the national government, has the authority to monitor such individuals.

Somewhat surprisingly, no one raised the question whether—if Congress did, indeed, have this authority—it had relinquished it in the 1970's when both Houses abolished internal security committees originally formed to hold hearings on such matters for legislative purposes and for enlightening the private sector as to threats, real and potential. Some conference participants emphasized there is a need for a process to keep the private sector informed in this regard.

There was little disagreement among participants as to the need for revisions of the Freedom of Information Act, the Privacy Act of 1974, and the Federal Tort Claims Act, the latter of importance in protecting investigators against personal liability for acts performed in good faith while carrying out their duties. There was also considerable criticism of restraints on intelligence collection imposed by the "Guidelines for Domestic Security Investigations" issued in 1976 by former Attorney General Edward Levi.

As noted by Dr. Godson in his introduction, the Levi Guidelines were being reviewed even as the Consortium's conference was in progress and several months later (March, 1983) revised guidelines were issued. Dr. Godson observes that, based on the discussion presented in his book, the revisions are far from adequate.

In *Intelligence Requirements for the 1980's: Domestic Intelligence*, the same high standards set previously in the intelligence series are maintained. The Consortium has brought together a cross section of opinions and arguments voiced by a well-informed group of intelligence exponents, each of whom, or perhaps more realistically each group of whom, expounds from its own platform of experiences. In collating their views in this one document and offering a well-reasoned introduction, Dr. Godson has provided a thesaurus having

(continued on page 9)

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In Memoriam

Col. Albert A. ARNHYM, USAF(Ret.)
San Diego, California

Mr. Earl Blake COX
Chevy Chase, Maryland

CWO John A. DeNINO, USN(Ret.)
San Diego, California

LtCol Robert W. FULLER, III
McLean, Virginia

Dr. Joseph F. HOSEY
Silver Spring, Maryland

Mr. Benton S. LOWE
Belleair Bluffs, Florida

LTC Benjamin M. MURRAY, USAR(Ret.)
Lynchburg, Virginia

SSCI Chairman Defends Covert Action Legitimacy

Senator Dave Durenberger, Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, had challenged an academic who described CIA activities as running the gamut from legitimate political analyses "to clearly illegitimate covert operations."

Replying to the "blithe assertion," Sen. Durenberger noted: "Professor Kelman's reference appears to be to covert action operations (more properly called 'special activities') which are in fact undertaken pursuant to Presidential findings required by statute and executive order (22 U.S.C. 2422 and section 3.1 of Executive Order 12333), and which are notified to the Legislative Branch under the Congressional oversight provisions in title V of the National Security Act (50 U.S.C. 413). The Congress, moreover, annually authorizes and appropriates funds for our nation's intelligence activities, including special activities."

Durenberger observed that "Everyone is entitled to oppose any or all intelligence activities. The fact that Professor Kelman may not like certain kinds of operations does not, however, make them illegitimate."

In another press statement, however, Sen. Durenberger was not as enthusiastic about the intelligence process. According to the *Philadelphia Inquirer*, the intelligence committee chairman has said he places little stock in any of the intelligence issuing from Central America. "I'm never satisfied with the intelligence I get," he was quoted. "I don't trust our own agencies."

Domestic Intelligence . . . (continued from page 8)

appeal to all concerned with protection of our country against internal threats. It is of particular value to the movers and shakers responsible for the necessary reforms in the nation's domestic intelligence program.

As noted by one participant, considering the legislative responsibility placed on senior national security officials to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign and military policies, these officials "ought to be able to understand the relationship between domestic terrorists and international groups or between domestic political groups and foreign sponsors." This understanding is in direct proportion to the amount and integrity of the intelligence provided to them.

W. Raymond Wannall

(W. Raymond Wannall, former Assistant Director, FBI (Intelligence Division), is a member of AFIO's Board of Directors and has served as the board's chairman.)

David A. Phillips (and AFIO) Win Retraction in Challenge-Aided Suit

David Atlee Phillips, founder of AFIO, has won a full retraction and financial award in the out-of-court settlement of his malicious libel suit against a group which claimed publicly that Phillips had been involved in the 1976 assassination of former Chilean diplomat Orlando Letelier, and had used the alias of "Maurice Bishop," the alleged CIA case officer for Lee Harvey Oswald. In winning the case, Phillips was afforded financial assistance by Challenge Inc., an intelligence officer's legal action fund based in Bethesda, Md.

The suit had its origins in a press conference given by Donald Freed, Fred Simon Landis, William F. Pepper and John Cummings on June 25, 1980, in Washington. The invited media audience was told that Phillips had headed a conspiracy to cover up the facts concerning the assassination of Letelier, and that Phillips and other ex-intelligence officers were accused of a number of crimes. It was stated further that the Association of Former Intelligence Officers (AFIO), a non-profit organization of ex-intelligence men and women from all intelligence services, was involved as an institution in the crimes attributed to Phillips! The allegations were made orally and in printed material distributed at the press conference.

In October 1980, *Death in Washington*, a non-fiction book co-authored by Freed and Landis, with an introduction by Pepper, repeated and elaborated on the charges against Phillips, other former intelligence officers and AFIO. Not content with the earlier charges, the authors claimed that *after* Phillips' retirement from CIA he had engaged in a few other crimes, to wit: obstruction of justice, accessory before the fact of murder, conspiracy to defame, and acting as an unregistered foreign agent. The authors captioned a photograph of Phillips with "The Other Lee Harvey Oswald."

In the retraction, Freed and Landis withdrew all the allegations they had made against Phillips, and assured that they had no intention of charging or suggesting that Phillips had played any role in the assassination of Letelier, that he was an accessory before or after fact of that murder, or that he had any connection with Lee Harvey Oswald. They told the court that they regret that any such statements had found their way into the press conference or into their book. Joining them in expression of regrets was Lawrence Hill & Co. Publishers, Inc., who has actually published the defamatory charges. As for the other charges made by the authors, Freed and Landis said that because of Phillips' long career with CIA and the secrecy requirements imposed by CIA (and enforced by the courts) it "made it difficult" for them to secure the necessary evidence for their defense against Phillips' counter-charges of malicious libel.

Missing from the retraction and settlement was co-defendant William F. Pepper, who disappeared some five years ago, and of whose whereabouts Freed and Landis claim no knowledge.

CHAPTER ACTIVITIES

Arizona

Arizona Chapter. The chapter held a luncheon on Saturday, January 11th, at the Ramada Inn in Tucson. Eighteen participants were privileged to hear Col. Ed Moore, commander of the Aerospace Maintenance and Regeneration Center, Davis Monthan AFB, describe the mission and functions of his organization.

New officers elected by the chapter are: Ed Barley, president; Jack Masterson and Bob Moy, vice-presidents; and Bob Nugent, secretary-treasurer.

The chapter met at Sierra Vista for a luncheon on Saturday, March 1st. The speaker was Col. Miles Kara of the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School. He spoke of the world-wide responsibility of the School and the new emphasis the U.S. Army is giving the intelligence discipline. There was a turnout of 27 persons, with three becoming new members of the Arizona Chapter. A short business meeting followed.

California

San Diego Chapter. It was a beautiful night aboard the good ship *Berkeley* for the chapter's Christmas party. Along with the Air Force Association, everyone seemed to have had a great time. Don Perry did his usual fabulous auctioneering job, assisted by his wife Yvonne and Helen Echols. Charlie Chaucer entertained with his music and song. Jeff Terzich and his companion Sharon were bartenders extraordinaire. The Top Hat Caterers left no one hungry. Special thanks are due those who made it all possible: Grace Learnard for her part in buying, assisting and in decorating the ballroom; Elizabeth Allison for decorating the boat; and Bill Long and Mike Leaman their special donations.

In late January, Barbara Lowersion represented the chapter at the rededication of the "Freedom Tree," located outside the War Memorial Building. To meet the chapter's obligation to educate all segments of society, it plans to establish a speakers' bureau. Although members such as Lee Echols, Don Perry, Keith Young and Ed Learnard have spoken to diverse groups, the chapter is looking for additional members to carry the word abroad.

Seventy persons, representing the chapter and the Air Force Association, gave a standing ovation to Charles W. Wiley, of Accuracy in Media, who addressed the chapter's January meeting.

Wiley, a veteran journalist, explained that some elements of the media are no longer interested in being objective, preferring to engage in advocacy and adversarial, opinionated writing. Such reporters, he said, inject their own bias into what they write to the point that the truth in their stories is completely distorted. Often, Wiley explained, those reporters find no problem with providing our nation's adversaries with information that should be held secret.

As one example, the speaker cited a January 31st article on the front page of the *Los Angeles Times*. Headlined "CIA to Help Angola Rebels, Congress Reportedly Told," the article went on to say, "The Reagan Administration has formally notified Congress that it intends to give covert CIA aid to Angolan rebels . . . congressional

sources said today. A secret 'finding' on covert support was delivered to the House and Senate intelligence committees last month."

It is ludicrous, said Wiley, to claim that the aid we intend to give the Angolan anti-communists can be "covert" now the secret has been compromised by articles such as this. There is little doubt that there is collusion between anti-Administration members of Congress and anti-Reagan members of the news media, destroying our nation's capability to perform covert actions.

The speaker insisted that every sovereign nation must have the ability to keep its intentions secret from adversaries, and recalled a letter written by George Washington on July 26, 1777:

"The necessity of procuring good Intelligence is apparent & need not be further urged—All that remains for me to add is, that you keep the whole matter as secret as possible. For upon Secrecy, Success depends in Most Enterprizes of the kind, and for want of it, they are generally defeated, however well planned & promising a favourable issue."*

Wiley recalled also, that on November 9, 1775, the Continental Congress adopted its own oath of secrecy, one more stringent than the oaths of secrecy it would require of others in sensitive employment:

"RESOLVED: That every member of this Congress considers himself under the ties of virtue, honour and love of his country, not to divulge, directly or indirectly, any matter or thing agitated or debated in Congress, before the same shall have been determined, without the leave of Congress; nor any matter or thing determined in Congress, which a majority of the Congress shall order to be kept secret. And that if any member shall violate this agreement, he shall be expelled this Congress, and deemed an enemy to the liberties of America, and liable to be treated as such, and that every member signify his consent to this agreement by signing the same."**

It is very doubtful that such an oath could pass in today's Congress, the speaker noted: There are too many Congressmen whose interests are not necessarily in the best interests of the nation. The media, he said, would scream bloody murder and the ACLU would file a suit if such an oath were even suggested. He reminded the audience that the nation's founding fathers knew such an oath for congressman was necessary, but, then, "they were a different breed than those who purportedly serve this nation today."

[*Original in the Pforzheimer Collection of Intelligence Literature, cited in *Intelligence in the War of Independence*, Washington: Central Intelligence Agency, 1976. **Ibid, citing the *Secret Journals of Congress*, 1775. Copies of the publication, which was written by this journal's editor, may be obtained by writing: Public Affairs, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C. 20505, or by calling (703) 351-7676 or (703) 351-2053. Reprints of the text are also available from the Nathan Hale Institute, 422 First Street, S.E., Suite 208A, Washington, D.C. 20003; (202) 546-2293.]

San Francisco Bay Area Chapter. The chapter met January 8th in the Commandant's Room of the Marine Memorial Club, San Francisco. Following a no-host cocktail hour, President Roger McCarthy called the meeting to order and led members and guests in the Pledge of Allegiance. He thanked the nominating committee and its chairman, Al Buckelew, for the proposed slate of candidates for the coming year. On motion from the floor, those nominated by the committee were elected and administered the oath of office. McCarthy also expressed regrets that Col. Ed Rudka had withdrawn as chairman of the program committee.

Bill Green, the new president, introduced Col. Rudka as chairman of the evening's program. Col. Rudka detailed the accomplishments of the evening's speaker, an outstanding scientist and physicist, Dr. William B. Shuler. Dr. Shuler serves currently as Deputy Director for Military Applications, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.

Dr. Shuler spoke of the need for, and the potential which may be accomplished by, President Reagan's proposed Strategic Defense Initiative. He feels it is essential that the nation focus on defense and that we understand the threat which makes such defense measures imperative. He mentioned the expanding number of nations with nuclear capability, noting that further escalation in nuclear weapons and the making of more warheads is no longer a satisfactory solution.

He stated unequivocally that the defenses available to the Soviet Union far exceed anything the United States has developed. Dr. Shuler pointed out that, even if one of our nuclear equipped missiles were to be launched accidentally, we have no provisions to destroy it should the on-board safety devices malfunction. Soviet scientists, he said, are much more advanced in their research than is our scientific community. Some Soviet scientists who reported research in these fields a number of years ago, the speaker noted, have ceased publishing. He is convinced this is because of Soviet use of their discoveries, rather than because they have ceased to work in these fields.

Dr. Shuler believes the Soviets have an intense SDI program which probably leads ours, and he urged the release of more information by our government regarding Soviet research and achievements in the area. He explained that scientific changes and breakthroughs have now made defense against nuclear attack feasible. With the new weapons being studied, such as laser, particle beams, etc., it is possible that if nuclear weapons were fired by the Soviets at the United States across the North Pole, the majority could be destroyed as they left their launch sites. The balance could be put out of commission during the post-boost and midcourse phases. To attempt to destroy them during the "re-entry" phase of their trajectory would be most difficult and the least effective.

The speaker acknowledged that a "leakproof" defense is not possible, but pointed out that even a less-than-perfect defense has great utility in reducing the risks and consequences of nuclear war. For defense to be acceptable, he said, it must meet three criteria: it must work; it must be survivable; and it must be cost effective. In the absence of the "cost" motivation favoring defense, there will be a further proliferation of nuclear weapons, which would argue against such a

program. But, Dr. Shuler believes, SDI can achieve all three criteria.

Dr. Shuler's talk was accompanied by slides and a brief motion picture illustrating the present state of preparedness and the advance which science is making possible. He described the spinoff of benefits for civilian use which he anticipates will grow from the research and development program which the President has proposed, especially in the field of energy. He pointed out that SDI as proposed by the President is "non-nuclear," but the Soviets do not have that same constraint. Thus, the nuclear option available to them provides more and different opportunities for their scientific research.

The argument that SDI will "militarize" space, Dr. Shuler said, is fallacious since space is already militarized. What we need, he urged, is to gain the advantage and to do so defensively. It is too early, however, to think now in terms of eliminating our offensive weapons. He urged those present to accept and support the research program for the Strategic Defense Initiative—a goal which may not be accomplished before the end of this century. In the near term, the SDI is what its name implies, an initiative to conduct research as to the feasibility of instituting development programs along any of several technological routes. The cost during the five years or so it will take to conduct such a research initiative is estimated to be only two or three percent of the total defense budget.

A question and answer period followed Dr. Shuler's talk.

During 1985, chapter members Buckelew, McCarthy and Quesada addressed a wide range of Bay area organizations, including the World Affairs Council, Commonwealth Club, "Great Decisions," Rotary Clubs, Optimist International, Navy League, Special Forces Reserve, Kiwanis Clubs, retired officers organizations, businessmen's clubs and organizations, Decade Club, Republican Womens Clubs and Chambers of Commerce. Each of the named speakers averaged at least one presentation a month. In addition, classes and lectures were given at Golden State University and San Jose State. Topics included national and international terrorism, the role of intelligence in formulating foreign policy, overviews of CIA and the KGB, problems in Central and Latin America, and the threat of Soviet Active Measures and their exploitation of the media.

The February meeting was opened with the Pledge of Allegiance, led by chapter president Bill Green. He invited those in attendance who are not yet members of AFIO to join, and encouraged members to attend meetings regularly. Awards were presented for varying accomplishments, such as coming the greatest distance to attend, for most regular attendance, etc.

Program chairman Ed Rudka greeted the chapter's Soviet guests with a brief salutation in Russian, and then introduced the speaker, Vladimir Lomovtsev, Deputy Consul General, Consulate of the USSR, San Francisco. Lomovtsev a member of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is a graduate of the University of Moscow. During WWII he fought with the Red Army, and was wounded at the Dnieper River crossing when the Red Army pushed back the invading German forces.

Vice Consul Lomovtsev spoke of the complicated and uneasy world in which we live, where the danger of further buildup of nuclear weapons persists. He pointed out that the development of nuclear armament has changed everything in the world except our way of thinking. The traditional way of securing national security—deterring aggression by threats of greater force—needs to be changed in the nuclear age, he said, and an alternative approach must be found.

He said it is the contention of his government that war is not inevitable, and that there is no international dispute which cannot be settled by negotiation. The danger of nuclear catastrophe is a common enemy of both the US and the USSR, he warned. Our two nations, he proposed, must assume responsibility for a build-up of mutual trust, noting that his government wants a suitable relationship with the U.S. which respects each other's interests and the development of the greatest possible trust.

The General Secretary of the Soviet Central Committee of the Communist Party, Mikhail Gorbachev, in discussing Soviet-American relations, has stressed that the USSR has no enmity toward the United States, the speaker said, adding that the Soviet Union has made many proposals to control and prevent the nuclear arms race. He noted that his country has now declared a unilateral moratorium on testing of nuclear weapons. Since it is necessary to perform tests of new weapons, he said, if there is no testing, there can be no new weapons. He insisted that the USSR would never be the first to use nuclear weapons.

Lomovtsev said his government is reluctant to spend more and more money on the arms buildup when there is economic reason to use the money for other purposes, suggesting that the US has other constructive needs for the money poured into armaments. The world, he said, is at a crossroads and must not fail to avert nuclear catastrophe. The only way to do this, the speaker said, is to freeze nuclear arsenals and reduce existing stockpiles. Neither side, he reminded, could or would reduce armaments while the other side is increasing its arsenal, and, certainly, there is no need for more nuclear weapons.

In discussing the Strategic Defense Initiative under study by the United States, Lomovtsev pointed out that the Soviets do not consider it a research program. Instead, he indicated, it is an ever more dangerous part of the arms race. Although the speaker acknowledged that advocates of SDI say their hope is that the program will provide a shield against nuclear weapons, he views it as "militarizing space." Accusations that the USSR has already done such research, he emphasized, are not true.

Lomovtsev pointed out that it takes trust to get agreement, but that agreement is also the best way to get trust. He referred to the step-by-step process of ridding the earth of nuclear weapons proposed recently by Secretary Gorbachev. Under this proposal, within five to eight years the USSR and the US would reduce by one-half those nuclear weapons capable of reaching each other's territory. This would include elimination of intermediate-range missiles, both ballistic and cruise, in the European zones, thus ridding the European continent of nuclear weapons. In addition, he stated, under



Col. Charles D. Gray (USMC-Ret), President of the Satellite Chapter, presents Chapter plaque to guest speaker Raymond Wannall.

the proposal the two powers would stop all nuclear explosions and call on other nations to join in such a moratorium.

The second stage of the proposal would start no later than 1990 and last five to seven years, the speaker explained. In that phase, other nuclear powers would begin to engage in nuclear disarmament, beginning with a freeze on such weapons and implementing agreement not to have them in the territories of other countries. Lomovtsev discussed further provisions of the proposal, adding that under the terms of the proposal nuclear weapons would be eliminated by 1995. The Soviets, he assured the audience, would be agreeable to verification of the destruction or elimination of such weapons by national technical means, on-site inspection and other verification measures.

Instead of wasting the next ten to fifteen years in developing new weapons in space which have the claimed goal of making nuclear arms useless, he asked if it would not be more sensible to start eliminating those weapons, eventually reducing them to zero. To continue the space race, he insisted, will cost humanity too dearly. What the US envisions as a "space shield," he noted, can be turned into a "space sword," and the nation which possesses it may be unable to resist the temptation to use it.

The speaker summarized the Gorbachev proposal: a freeze as the first stage, followed by a fifty percent reduction, and total elimination of nuclear weapons by all nations as the final stage. He closed by asking for a reasonable approach by both the USSR and the US, stressing that we must prevent the arms race in space and terminate it on earth.

A brief question and answer session followed Lomovtsev's presentation, following which the meeting was adjourned.

Editor's Note: The Soviet negotiating posture does not appear to be as conciliatory as presented by the speaker. Summing up the latest round of MBFR talks which ended in mid-March, Kenneth L. Adelman, Director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, noted:

"Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev raised substantial hopes around the world with his Jan. 15 statement, "Nuclear Disarmament by the Year 2000" . . .

"NATO representatives who composed the Western delegations at the MBFR negotiations drew hopes from Mr. Gorbachev's specific

reference to the need for 'reasonable verification' . . . At face value this pronouncement forecasts a significant shift in the Soviet Union's decades-long minimalist approach to verification. For years the Soviets have advanced verification ideas that sounded good, but in reality had no teeth and were empty of substantive detail. Western negotiators knew from experience that Mr. Gorbachev's words need to be measured against actual arms control proposals advanced by the Soviets and their allies.

"Unfortunately, when it came time for the Soviets to translate Mr. Gorbachev's words into concrete proposals, Allied negotiators were deeply disappointed. An Eastern proposal presented in Vienna on Feb. 20 is quite literally a collection of old, tired Eastern positions repackaged in a draft agreement that fails to move substantively on any of the issues that divide the sides in MBFR. Thus, on the first opportunity to demonstrate the fresh arms control approach signaled by Mr. Gorbachev on Jan. 15, the Soviets have failed utterly. The Eastern proposal in Vienna can only cast doubt on the Soviet's newly proclaimed flexibility on the verification issue. Sad to say, Moscow seems no more willing to accept effective verification now than in the past . . . The East's proposal on on-site inspection is crippled by giving the country to be inspected the right to veto any inspection requests it does not consider 'legitimate' . . .

"In all these efforts, the need for effective verification measures is clear. Thus, the Soviet refusal in Vienna to consider 'reasonable verification,' as Mr. Gorbachev put it, does not present a hopeful sign for the other negotiations . . . The most recent Eastern proposal in Vienna, unfortunately, calls into doubt, again, Moscow's public stance on East-West arms control and raises serious questions about the Soviet government's real objectives not only in Vienna, but in Geneva and Stockholm as well."

Florida

Southwest Florida Chapter. Col. William T. Hornaday of Bonita Springs was elected chapter president at its January 15th meeting. Others elected to serve as officers and members of the executive committee are: Herman O. Bly, Dr. Michael Hansinger, Otto F. Otepka, Col. Donald H. Randell and Robert L. Thomson.

The chapter's 1986 activities got off to a great start with a presentation by W. Raymond Wannall at its February 28th meeting held at the Whiskey Creek Country Club, Fort Myers. Wannall, a member of AFIO's board of directors and former Assistant Director of the FBI, gave an excellent and informative talk on international terrorism. More than 100 persons attending the special luncheon to hear Wannall speak, including chapter members, members of the S.W. Florida chapter of the Society of Former Agents of the FBI, Military Order of the World Wars and the Eagle Foundation.

While Wannall was in Fort Myers, it was arranged for him to make a guest appearance on a popular talk show on radio station WSOR-FM, using a remote telephone hookup from the residence of Herman O. Bly. For an hour on February 28th, he answered pertinent questions on international terrorism posed by station director William Simon. An hour later, Wannall appeared along with General and Mrs. James Dozier in a discussion of international terrorism held at the Edison Community College auditorium; more than 140 attended the program.

The chapter reports that the three appearances by Mr. Wannall gave widespread publicity to S.W. Florida Chapter's activities in regard to national security matters.

Suncoast Chapter. The chapter continues to forge ahead in membership recruiting and a series of outstanding programs. Membership as of mid-March stands at 71, with additional membership anticipated by the group's April meeting.

President Ray Saint-Germain has expressed the chapter's gratitude to the base commander of MacDill AFB for permitting meetings to be held at the base officers' club "The membership is also fortunate that the officers of the US Central Command and the US Readiness Command, along with the base intelligence and security components, have been supporters of AFIO and are frequent guests at our chapter meetings," Saint-Germain said.

Robert W. Butler, Special Agent in Charge of the Tampa Division of the FBI was guest speaker at the chapter's December 3rd meeting. He brought the chapter up to date on some of the more current activities and priorities of the FBI, both regionally and nationally.

During the business portion of the meeting the membership approved several changes in chapter by-laws, bringing them into concert with national by-laws. It was also agreed to raise chapter dues. "The spirit, camaraderie and dedication of the chapter members contributed immeasurably to the success of the meeting," the chapter president said.

The February 18th meeting featured Michael Powers, Resident Agent in Charge of the Tampa office of the US Drug Enforcement Administration. Powers, a veteran of the US Marine Corps, CIA and DEA, provided an outstanding update on the current problems being faced by DEA, particularly in Florida—a key introduction point for narcotics smuggled from abroad. The speaker acknowledged that narcotics interdiction is a monumental task and that no real end to the problem is clearly in sight. Yet, said Powers, the job of the DEA would be absolutely impossible without the splendid cooperation of state and local law enforcement.

During the business meeting it was announced that chapter secretary-treasurer Bradley T. Skeels is recovering "swimmingly" from his recent hip replacement surgery. The chapter's nominating committee, chaired by CWO Ann M. McDonough (USA-Ret.), was charged with presenting a slate of officers for consideration by the membership at the April 22nd meeting.

Chapter president Saint-Germain reminds AFIO members from other areas of the US not to forget there is an AFIO chapter in the west central Florida area. The chapter extends an open invitation to all visiting AFIO members to attend its meetings, which are held on an established basis. For further information contact Roy B. Klager, Jr. 711 Flamingo Drive, Apollo Beach, FL 33570, (813) 645-6639, or Bradley T. Skeels, 473 Kumquat Lane, Port Richey, FL 33568, (813) 868-4447.

Montana

Western Montana Chapter. When the snows come, usually from November through March, the chapter does not schedule formal meetings. But, comes the Spring, they make up for it. Walt Sedoff, a charter member of the chapter, is slated to be the speaker at its April 4th meeting at the Missoula Country Club. AFIO members from Idaho have been invited to the meeting and will be asked to be guests of the chapter at future meetings until they are able to form their own chapter. Also on that day, the losing membership team will host

the winning team to lunch. (to date, it is reported that Bo Foster's "Black Team" has a big lead over the "Grey Team" captained by Bob Ripley.)

In other activities, the Bitter Root Valley high schools are anticipating another lecture this year by Walt Sedoff, who always packs them in and draws many queries on intelligence. He reports that the kids, usually juniors and seniors, are eager listeners and are sharp with their questions. Proof of his popularity is that school administrators call early in the year to ensure Walt's availability. Dick Grant, the chapter president, is also a popular guest speaker. In January, for example, he gave a presentation to the Bitter Root Rotary Club, offering a pot-pourri on intelligence—an explanation of the intelligence cycle, the need for intelligence, the mission of AFIO—supported by charts and photos taken all over the world.

New York

Derek A. Lee Chapter. Derek Lee passed away last Spring. His untimely death created a tremendous void within the chapter. Under the direction of William Hood and the chapter's board of directors, Donald Milton reports, "we have been able to regroup and it looks like we are in good shape for 1986."

The chapter, formerly the Greater New York City chapter, has been renamed in honor of Derek Lee. The chapter's dedication reads:

"Derek Armitage Lee was born in Englewood, NJ, November 16, 1911. His mother was an American; his father was the second-generation head of an English fabric firm, Arthur H. Lee and Sons. He was educated at Ridley College (Ontario) and at Dartmouth. At twenty-one he joined the family firm.

"In 1940, Derek sailed for England to volunteer for military service, only to be refused by the British army, navy, and marines. To gain entry into the British military, Derek went right to the top: Winston Churchill. Arriving at No. 10 Downing Street without an appointment, he


failed to gain an audience with the prime minister, but got action nonetheless by explaining to an assistant that his status was exactly the same as Churchill. Both has an American mother and an English father. The parallel worked, and within three days Derek was a seaman in the Royal Navy. By 1943, he was in command of a destroyer.

"Shortly thereafter, at the request of Generals "Hap" Arnold and "Wild Bill" Donovan, Derek was loaned to the Office of Strategic Services. He spent the next two and a half years behind enemy lines on thirty-two missions, particularly in Burma, Indo-China and Malaya. At one point, he was simultaneously in the service of the Royal Navy, the British 14th Army, the Indian 15th Corps and the US Army. Behind Japanese line in Malaya, Derek came down with malnutrition—hence the walking stick which became so much a part of his image, was hospitalized at war's end and not released until 1946.

"Derek Lee wore a Third Dan degree, black belt, in judo. He instructed such groups as the Ulster Police Force and the Chicago Police homicide squad in its use, and in later years taught judo to the boys of the United Neighborhood Houses.

"When his father died in 1949, Derek took control of Arthur H. Lee and Sons, and continued the firm's steady expansion. The company bought Jofa, Incorporated in 1964. In his three decades as head of the company that became known as Lee-Jofa, Derek Lee was an articulate spokesman for the textile industry. He also rose to the presidency of the British-American Chamber of Commerce. In 1973, in recognition of his work, Queen Elizabeth appointed Lee a Commander (of the Order) of the British Empire."

The chapter plans to hold three meetings in 1986, starting off with a presentation by General William Westmoreland early in the year. The second meeting, April 14th, will feature the Hon. Vernon Walters, US ambassador to the UN and former deputy director of CIA. In November, Admiral Bobby Ray Inman will share his thoughts with the chapter.



Greeting W. Raymond Wannall (center), guest speaker before the Southwest Florida Chapter, are Herman O. Bly, master of ceremonies, and Col. Donald Randell, former chapter president.

Notes from Here and There

Herman O. Bly, of the Southwest Florida chapter, has been awarded the Certificate of Excellence in the category of published works by the Freedoms Foundation of Valley Forge, Pa. The award, determined by a national awards jury chaired by Hon. Edwin J. Peterson, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Oregon, was given for Bly's series of newspaper articles in the *Lee Constitution*, Ft. Myers, Fl. Reprints of the articles may be ordered from the publication (See page 8, Winter issue of *Periscope*).

David Atlee Phillips, according to Arlington (Va.) librarian Jane T. Larsen, gave "one of the most popular workshops we've ever had," when he spoke on "Careers in Intelligence" February 6th. Says Larsen, "that the subject of intelligence careers is popular was evidenced not only by the large, responsive audience, who kept the speaker for an hour after his presentation, but by the number of calls we got afterward. People who missed the program wanted to know when they could see it on TV." (The presentation was video-taped and is slated for repeat showings on Arlington's library channel, cable channel 31.) Summed up Larsen: "Workshops like this, plus Mr. Phillips' splendid book, *Careers in Secret Operations*," should give AFIO's education program a great boost."

Pick Up The Phone; Support Intel Week

AFIO has voiced its support for a congressional resolution to designate June 1 through June 7 as "National Intelligence Community Week." A similar attempt gained Senate passage last year, but failed in the House of Representatives.

This year's effort appears to be doing well in the Senate, But procedures are more difficult in the House. For example, more co-sponsors are needed to discharge such a resolution from the Post Office and Civil Service Committee for a floor vote.

Members who support this move are encouraged to write or call their congressional representatives, or their home district offices, as soon as possible and ask them to co-sponsor the resolution (officially known as H.J. Resolution 527). In addition, members may wish to write or call Rep. Lee Hamilton (D-Ind) and Rep. Bob Stump (R-Ariz), the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, respectively, commend them for their sponsorship of the measure, and urge them to push it along. [Rep. Lee E. Hamilton, 2187 Rayburn Bldg., Washington, D.C. 20515, phone 225-5315; Rep. Bob Stump, 211 CHOB, Washington, D.C. 20515, phone 225-4576.]

Donations

The following members have generously contributed an amount equal to or exceeding one year's annual dues.

Mr. Ralph A. de VORE
Kingwood, Texas

COL James H. DRUM, USA(Ret.)
Washington, D.C.

Mr. Joe Wilson ELLIOTT
Los Angeles, California

Mr. Mike S. GONAKIS
Euclid, Ohio

CDR Ned V. HARRELL
Sun City, California

Mr. William H. HOFFMAN
Fort Pierce, Florida

Mr. James R. McCALL
Hamilton, Montana

Mr. Hayden B. PEAKE
Alexandria, Virginia

Col Herbert J. "Buck" ROGERS, USAF(Ret.)
San Antonio, Texas

Mr. Anthony R. SPADARO
Arlington, Virginia

Mr. Michie F. TILLEY
Greenville, Texas

USAF E&E Reunion Set for May

Members of the Air Force Escape and Evasion Society will host more than forty former members of the European underground organizations at their annual meeting at the Terrace Garden Inn, Atlanta, Georgia, May 21st through the 24th.

The courageous men and women of the resistance will come to Atlanta from Holland, Belgium and France to be with the men who they risked their lives to hide from the Nazi occupiers of their countries. Many of these freedom fighters will be seeing for the first time since the war, the airmen they sheltered. More than twenty members of the Royal Air Force Escaping Society, and its Canadian counterpart, will be in attendance.

American airmen who were shot down over enemy-occupied Europe and evaded capture or escaped from capture are invited to join the reunion. Further information can be obtained by writing: Ralph K. Patton, President, Air Forces Escape and Evasion Society, 720 Valleyview Road, Pittsburgh, PA 15243; (412) 343-8570.

Leahy (continued from page 2)

sion of irritation at congressional "meddling." But the "leak problem", he said, masked a more fundamental problem which strains relations between SSCI and the Administration, which is "... growing disagreement over the Administration's clear determination to make ever greater use of covert paramilitary operations as part of what is now being called the 'Reagan doctrine.' In essence, this is a strategy of seeking to undermine Communist regimes through insurgency whenever possible." Large-scale "covert" paramilitary programs, he urged, "must be debated openly in Congress, with recorded votes, so that members of both Houses can be held accountable by the American people." He urged that the U.S. government not return to the pre-1976 era of eight separate congressional committees, each looking into intelligence activities on an overlapping and highly insecure manner, or to an even earlier system of powerful Senate chairman "with an I-don't-want-to-know" attitude about oversight of intelligence programs present or planned.

Answering questions from the floor, Leahy rejected the concept of a single joint Senate-House intelligence oversight committee, instead of the present two. Contrary to its legend of keeping secrets, he said, the former joint congressional committee on atomic energy actually leaked one of the major secrets in its possession: that of the U.S. possession of the hydrogen bomb. He also noted that if a specific covert action policy fails and the Congress has not supported it, CIA will "catch it" for carrying out such an action as a substitute for U.S. foreign policy. "We are different from the Soviet Union," he responded to another question, "which uses covert action as part of their foreign policy."

Senator Leahy had some bitter words for President Reagan's leaking of intelligence sources and methods "to make his points publicly concerning Libyan terrorists responsibility." The vast percentage of the American population, he said, believes the President, and that he did not have to reveal precise sources and methods to document his case against the Libyans. Continued revelation of sources and methods, he went on, will ruin the intelligence community. "Oversight," he concluded, is here to stay and the best thing for the American people is that congressional oversight works. For it to succeed, "the intelligence community can come and discuss disputed points with the SSCI. Better that than return to the old days."

AFIO SUMMER LUNCHEON

Monday, June 9, 1986
Officers' Club, Ft. Myer, Virginia

Guest Speaker: A former Soviet Official

From the President's Desk



The months of 1986 roll on and intelligence — good intelligence — becomes even more important to the foreign policy process of the United States — its use creeping into the everyday vernacular of America, her Allies and enemies. Sigint played the key role in laying the Berlin terrorist act directly at Qaddafi's doorstep; daily reports of new Soviet missile accomplishments are commonplace in the media; Secretary Weinberger distributes the 5th edition of DIA's "Soviet Military Power" (must reading for AFIO-ers-available at all government bookstores). The United States takes good intelligence for granted. We must assume it stays healthier than that of any other country. It will take great wisdom on the part of everyone in the Administration and on the part of every member of Congress to resist cutting the intelligence budget as though it is just like every other part of the governmental apparatus. *The President's National Foreign Intelligence budget must be fenced — protected — assured. Let your congressmen know how you feel on this issue — Gramm-Rudman-Hollings notwithstanding.*

A.F.I.O. applauds the long and magnificent career and service of John McMahon as he departs CIA for long-deserved alternatives. Thank you John on behalf of all your intelligence family and welcome to A.F.I.O.

I enjoyed a social get together with AFIO-ers in Honolulu this past week. Great to see the likes of Rocky Triantafellu, Orlando Epp and Lloyd Vesey.

Hope all of you are making plans to join us in Orlando, Florida for the big convention in October. Should be the best ever with sufficient drawing cards there to attract everyone. See you there!!

On 11-12 June 1986 NMIA is co-sponsoring, in conjunction with OSD and DIA, an unclassified symposium on "Intelligence Education and Training for the Year 2000". The symposium will be held at the National Defense University, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C.; contact Roy Jonkers at **354-1565** for further details.

All best to each of You!

Gene

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11 October 1985

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"The C.I.A. has good security procedures but they're not perfect and they're going to have to get better," Senator Patrick J. Leahy, the Vermont Democrat who is the vice chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, said in an interview. "They're going to have to figure out what to do with a disgruntled or potentially disgruntled employee who has a lot of knowledge because that's where a lot of breaches have occurred in the past."

C.I.A. Briefs Committees

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According to members of the two committees and their aides, the panels are concerned about a broad range of issues stemming from the agency's handling of Mr. Howard, who was within the C.I.A.'s three-year probation period when he was asked to resign.

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The C.I.A. would not say whether it undertook any form of inquiry after Mr. Howard told the two C.I.A. employees he had considered becoming a Soviet spy. But Federal law and a Presidential executive order prohibit the agency from taking any steps inside the United States to investigate possible cases of espionage.

Mr. Howard was one of tens of thousands of people who retire from Government or industry each year after holding positions that gave them access to classified materials. More than 4.3 million people in government and industry associated with government now have clearances to use classified information.

Asked what procedures the Central Intelligence Agency uses to monitor former employees who have knowledge of classified programs, Mr. Lauder, the agency spokesman, said: "We haven't got any procedures. Once a person leaves here, he is John Q. Citizen, just like you and me. We don't keep a string on them. It's strictly an F.B.I. matter."

Dave Durenberger, the Minnesota Republican who is chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, said his panel would also examine the problem presented by military officers who retire with knowledge of classified materials.

Most people with security clearances work for the Pentagon. At the Defense Department, L. Britt Snider, director of counterintelligence and security

policy, said: "We don't have any jurisdiction of any kind over former employees, whether or not they had clearances. It's strictly the F.B.I."

At the F.B.I., Mr. Parker said, "We are not concerned about Americans who have had clearances. We don't look at these people unless we detect an individual involved in espionage."

Ex-Intelligence Chief's Moves

Senator Leahy said: "I don't think anyone expects the F.B.I. to maintain surveillance on the several hundred thousand people who leave the Government each year with security clearances. But there are a certain number of people in extremely sensitive positions, a handful of them, that we ought to do more with."

Mr. Leahy said Mr. Howard "certainly would have been one of those" because he held highly sensitive information and was being dismissed following a polygraph examination that indicated drug use and petty thievery, according to Federal officials.

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When Adm. Stansfield M. Turner was Director of Central Intelligence in the Carter Administration, he dismissed, transferred or forced to retire nearly 200 C.I.A. officers who held highly sensitive positions.

In an interview this week, he said that others in the agency had warned him that "we ran the risk of some of them selling their information to the other side." He said he had disagreed when it was suggested that some should be given other jobs, and proceeded with his original plans.

But he said of Mr. Howard: "I don't think my rule should be totally rigid. If this guy had just been briefed, I'd say let's stick him in the Dominican Republic or someplace like that for a couple of years, until the information isn't valuable anymore."

Senator Leahy said: "We may need some sort of turkey farm for some of these former employees. Make them translate cables or something like that for a couple of years."

Admiral Turner said he thought C.I.A. officers ought to be required to agree when they are hired that "for three years or so after they leave, they will be subject to the same rules of intrusion as applied when they were in government. Make them come back for random polygraph examinations. That would give them one more thing to worry about before they turn."

A C.I.A. official said "it's conceivable" that that idea would work, adding that finding solutions to the problem "is certainly something we're thinking about now."

NEW YORK TIMES
8 October 1985

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A12

Spy Charge Spurs Questions About Procedures of C.I.A.

By STEPHEN ENGELBERG

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 7 — Members of the Senate and House intelligence committees say espionage allegations against a former Central Intelligence Agency officer raise serious questions about the agency's procedures for dealing with disgruntled employees.

The legislators say their committees are conducting a detailed examination of the career of Edward L. Howard, a former officer of the agency who, according to Administration officials, was identified by a defector as having sold the Soviet Union highly secret information.

Mr. Howard was forced to resign from the C.I.A. in 1983; the agency was dissatisfied with his answers in a polygraph, or lie detector, examination that was apparently unrelated to espionage charges. Officials have said they suspect it was a desire for revenge that led Mr. Howard, who is believed to have fled the country, to provide secrets to the Soviet Union.

"The C.I.A. has good security procedures but they're not perfect and they're going to have to get better," Senator Patrick J. Leahy, the Vermont Democrat who is the vice chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, said in an interview. "They're going to have to figure out what to do with a disgruntled or potentially disgruntled employee who has a lot of knowledge because that's where a lot of breaches have occurred in the past."

C.I.A. Briefs Committees

Representative Dave McCurdy of Oklahoma, the chairman of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Evaluation of the House Intelligence Committee, said: "I think there are a lot of questions yet to be answered. I'm not sure anyone's comfortable with what we've seen so far."

In an interview today, Mr. McCurdy would not discuss the specifics of the Howard case but said that he and some other members of the committee had been briefed by the C.I.A. Members of the Senate committee have had similar briefings by the agency.

According to members of the two committees and their aides, the panels are concerned about a broad range of issues stemming from the agency's handling of Mr. Howard, who was within the C.I.A.'s three-year probation period when he was asked to resign.

Questions Raised With C.I.A.

Among the questions the two committees are raising with the agency are these:

¶ Why was Mr. Howard, a junior official, given access to such sensitive material at an early stage in his career?

¶ Why did the agency choose to dismiss him while the information he had learned in training for a posting to Moscow was still of value?

¶ What steps were taken to keep track of Mr. Howard's movements after he left the C.I.A., both in this country and abroad, where the Federal Bureau of Investigation has charged that he met with Soviet intelligence agents?

¶ Was there sufficient coordination between the C.I.A. and the F.B.I., the other major Federal agency responsible for counterintelligence work?

Administration officials say Mr. Howard was identified as an agent of the Soviet Union by Vitaly Yurchenko, a senior official in the K.G.B., the Soviet intelligence agency. He defected to the West in July. Mr. Yurchenko, the officials have said, is undergoing extensive questioning at an undisclosed location in the United States:

• Trip to Austria in '84

Mr. Howard, who is now 33 years old, was employed by the Central Intelligence Agency from January 1981 to June 1983, according to an F.B.I. affidavit filed in Federal District Court in New Mexico. The document charged that he traveled to Austria in 1984 where he made contact with agent of the K.G.B. and was paid money for "classified information relating to U.S. intelligence sources and methods."

Intelligence sources say that the information involved related to American operations in Moscow. They have said Mr. Howard was trained for a post in Russia that would have involved managing agents or other means of intelligence collection.

Intelligence sources say, however, that he was not sent to Moscow and was instead asked to leave the agency after the polygraph test suggested use of illegal drugs and petty theft of Government funds.

Mr. Howard, who had been working for the New Mexico Legislature, dis-

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CURRENTS

'The sins of the fathers'



Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres pays homage January 27 at memorial to World War II Holocaust victims at Bergen-Belsen concentration camp. Peres became the first Israeli head of government to visit Berlin, assuring young

Germans: "The Bible tells us not to charge children with the sins of the fathers. They should not be accused because they did not do it and they would not have wanted it to happen."

Photo by Agence France Presse

NOTES OF THE WEEK

Spy-spooked on the Potomac

Official Washington loves nothing so much as a spy story—and in late January there surfaced a new one to chew on, a story that U.S. government spokesmen called fiction and *U.S. News & World Report* and the *New York Times* called fact. A miniwar of denials and confirmations ensued—

January 25: The news media receive the February 3 issue of *U.S. News*, which reports that the U.S. helicoptered a high-level Soviet intelligence agent out of East Germany last spring, hid him at a U.S. base to prevent the upstaging of the Geneva summit and then brought the defector to America in late November. The story says the CIA wants to keep secret the defection of a fifth top Soviet-bloc spy in 1985. The defector

wants it that way, the CIA is under fire for mishandling defectors and "another Yurchenko" is feared. KGB Col. Vitaly Yurchenko fled to the U.S. last year, then redefected.

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January 27: [The *New York Times* quotes Vice Chairman Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) of the Senate Intelligence Committee: "I have been told by the CIA that no such defector exists. If you asked me whether I believe that, I would say, in light of [CIA Director William Casey's] public statement of reluctance to follow the procedures of oversight, then I will have no comment."] At the White House, Larry Speakes says accounts of a fifth defector are "baseless." Asked whether he denies all or part of the story, he replies, "The whole story."

January 28: The *New York Times* says again that its "congressional sources confirm the reports" of the defection. The *Washington Post* quotes a spokesman for *U.S. News*: "We reported the story from multiple sources over several weeks. Based on the reputations and numbers of these sources, we believe our story is correct. We were warned by more than one of our sources that we could expect denials from the CIA and possibly other government agencies."

The *Washington Times* quotes Senator Chic Hecht (R-Nev.), an Intelligence Committee member: "Where there's smoke, there's fire. . . . There's been too many leaks and here's another." He says the defector accounts are correct. The senator later repeats this to *U.S. News*, which did not interview him for its original article. As to the denials, he declares: "Of course they're denying it. What did you expect them to do?" The same afternoon, the White House again denies the story. ■

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WASHINGTON POST
 17 November 1985

—The CIA and Its Critics—

Last week, it was reported that Sen. Dave Durenberger had criticized the Central Intelligence Agency and its director, William Casey. Mr. Casey responded with an open letter to the senator. We asked the senator for his reaction. We print it below, along with the text of the Casey letter.

Dave Durenberger The Public Must Know That It Works

Careful reflection on the content of CIA Director William Casey's open letter to me as chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee raises a very troubling issue for the American people. Casey's clear message is that, independent of the factual accuracy or inaccuracy of the Post article [Nov. 14] concerning my comments on the CIA, public criticism of the performance of the CIA compromises sources, damages morale and undermines our overall intelligence capability.

In Casey's view, the cost of public discussion is simply too high, and therefore the public has no right to know how effectively the CIA does its job as part of the oversight process. Quite the contrary, he feels that oversight must be confined to discussion between the Intelligence Committee and the director behind the closed doors of our hearing room. Otherwise, we are told, there is repeated compromise of sources and methods.

Clearly, we all oppose the irresponsible use of one's knowledge of intelligence. Disclosure of certain facts can reveal the source of those facts. Careful, formal procedures must be followed in disclosing classified information. Discussion of any intelligence matters for political support or personal publicity is irresponsible. The Intelligence Committee is the first to condemn such public discussions, whether they occur in Congress or in the administration.

But public discussion of intelligence does not necessarily mean disclosure of sensitive sources and methods.

There is no question that all public officials—in Congress as well as in the executive branch—who are provided sensitive intelligence bear a heavy burden. Their public statements on any foreign policy, economic or national security issue about which they have special knowledge must be delicately constructed to protect that information.

But this is not to say that those who have this information cannot or should not speak out on these issues. Intelligence is no exception. It is a subject of public knowledge and public discussion. Those of us who are part of that process can, and

should, speak openly on the subject of intelligence, as Casey did recently in Time magazine on terrorism and intelligence, without compromising security.

The real issue with Casey is not that there were public statements, but that those statements were reported as critical. Casey would not have written that letter if the headline had been "CIA, Casey Praised by Hill Chairman." Public praise of the operations or analytical product evokes no public condemnation or charges of compromising sources and methods.

In short, the head of the U.S. intelligence community does not feel that the intelligence agencies should be accountable to the American people. It is exactly this attitude that has led to the past abuses and resulted in the institution of the oversight process within Congress. Whether Casey likes it or not, the public does hold the CIA accountable and the public must know the oversight process works.

It is encouraging to hear that Casey is pleased with the intelligence product and is satisfied with his long-range planning process. We on the Intelligence Committee have had many good things to say both publicly and privately on both of these subjects. Nevertheless, we also have concerns in both areas—concerns that are not the result of "off-the cuff," unsubstantiated conclusions. They are concerns based on four months of testimony before our committee by the policy makers and military officers who use national intelligence.

Intelligence is not an end in itself whose usefulness is based on self-evaluation. The ultimate judgment must rest with those who use the product. National intelligence is a service organization, and the director should welcome constructive comments designed to improve that service.

The intelligence agencies are also accountable for the conduct of their operations. They cannot simply invoke "sources and methods" to make Congress remain silent in the face of extensive public discussion—often fueled by executive branch disclosures—of allegations of mismanagement, as in both the Edward Lee Howard and Vitaly Yurchenko cases. If the American people are to know that the oversight process is working, they must be kept informed. Indeed, when one stifles the disclosure of things that can safely be said in public, the result is often an outpouring of leaks that are infinitely more damaging to U.S. intelligence than is a bit of criticism.

Although the Intelligence Committee does much in complete secrecy, we also speak publicly. We do it when necessary. When we do, we are careful in our statements, measured in our criticism, generous in our praise, protective of sensitive information but mindful of our responsibility to the American people. We intend to continue this policy.

The writer, a Republican senator from Minnesota, is chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee.



WASHINGTON POST
16 November 1985

Leahy Joins Durenberger in Criticizing CIA

By David B. Ottaway
Washington Post Staff Writer

Sen. Patrick J. Leahy (Vt.), ranking Democrat on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, accused the Central Intelligence Agency yesterday of "yearning to go back to the good old days" when Congress had no oversight of CIA covert operations and the United States had made "some of the most colossal failures, intelligence failures, ever."

Leahy's comments were the latest salvo in an acerbic exchange this week between Senate intelligence committee leaders and CIA Director William J. Casey.

On Wednesday, Sen. David F. Durenberger (R-Minn.) criticized Casey for not providing the CIA with a "sense of direction."

Casey, in turn, accused Durenberger on Thursday of conducting intelligence oversight in an "off the cuff" manner that had involved "repeated compromise of sensitive intelligence sources and methods."

The unusual public acrimony reflects a crisis of confidence between the Reagan administration and the Congress over who is to blame for a recent spate of unauthorized intelligence disclosures.

It also has raised the thorny issue—which has surfaced in at least the past three administrations—of the media's responsibility toward the public and government in reporting on delicate, often divisive intelligence and foreign policy matters in the administration. "I hear people yearning to go back to the good old days," Leahy said at a news briefing yesterday. "Well, the good old days are the Bay of Pigs and Salvador Allende and Patrice Lumumba and a lot of other failures."

Leahy told a news briefing that he was not accusing the CIA of "wanting to pull another Bay of Pigs," the aborted U.S.-backed invasion of Cuba in 1961, but he said that "when you had no congressional oversight" the agency had become embroiled in such adventures as attempts to poison Cuban leader

Fidel Castro, the bloody coup against leftist Chilean president Allende in 1973 and the support of murder plots against Lumumba, a leftist premier of what is now Zaire assassinated in 1961.

Leahy yesterday also supported Durenberger's charges that the administration was guilty of "selective leaking." The Vermont Democrat said the Reagan administration was "the worst ever" compared with those of presidents Gerald R. Ford or Jimmy Carter. He added that "there are a whole lot" of U.S. secrets that members of the intelligence committee learned of "first in the press."

The debate seems likely to persist, partly because of increasing CIA activity around the world under the Reagan administration and partly because Congress is sharply divided, though not strictly along party lines, on the issue of its oversight role of intelligence operations and the making of foreign policy.

The public exchanges this week have highlighted the sharp differences of opinion. Durenberger has said he wants to change "the definition of oversight" of intelligence operations and to "open that process up a little bit more so it isn't just their [the administration's] mistakes that become a problem."

Rep. Lee H. Hamilton (D-Ind.), chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, said he endorsed Durenberger's idea of a larger public debate on general intelligence policy but was leery of open discussions of operations that risk "damage being done to our interests."

The two most recent examples of the confidence crisis have been reporting on the short-lived defection of the Soviet KGB official, Vitaly Yurchenko, and an administration decision to authorize a CIA plan to seek to undermine the regime of Libyan leader Col. Muammar Qaddafi.

Many administration officials were furious at a Nov. 3 front-page article in The Washington Post about the CIA plan to help Libya's neighbors or opponents topple Qaddafi; President Reagan has ordered an investigation of the disclosure. Hamilton said he regards it "as a very serious leak of a different magnitude than the others."

Several senior U.S. officials have questioned the wisdom of The Post's decision to publish the article, a decision that they say has compromised U.S. diplomacy and seriously embarrassed the opposition to Qaddafi and its Arab backers.

In response to the article, Egypt and Algeria—two neighboring states at odds with Qaddafi—have said they will have nothing to do with any CIA "plot" against another Arab leader. The National Front for the Salvation of Libya, the main Libyan group within the badly fragmented Libyan opposition, said in a statement from London that the article was "liable to discredit and undermine the genuine Libyan strength and preempt any national action that might be carried out against Qaddafi."

Leonard Downie Jr., managing editor of The Washington Post, in defending the newspaper's decision to publish the article, said the CIA plan was being "widely and hotly debated" inside the agency and between the CIA and the congressional committees responsible for oversight of such operations.

The debate was "significant," Downie said, and "the whole question of what kinds of covert operations the CIA should engage in is one suitable for public scrutiny."

Critics of the plan, he said, were even questioning whether the operation was "legal" because it might have ended in the assassination of Qaddafi, who has long been accused of supporting international terrorism. A longstanding executive order signed by Reagan forbids the CIA or any other U.S. agency from direct or indirect involvement in any assassination plan.

Continued

Downie said The Post article had disclosed no precise details of what the CIA was planning to do, "which we should not and did not do." He also said that the reporter involved, Bob Woodward, interviewed a number of knowledgeable government sources in reporting the article and that neither before nor after publication had any of them called to suggest that disclosure of the plan might endanger national security or U.S. lives.

Qaddafi has used the article to rally renewed support at home and in the Arab world for his embattled regime, picturing himself as a target of "the great American Satan," as one U.S. analyst put it.

The analyst was highly critical of any CIA anti-Qaddafi plan relying on Libyan opposition figures, describing them as "nobodies, klutzes and incompetents" lacking internal support.

In the Yurchenko situation, the defector, who returned to Moscow earlier this month after three months in CIA custody, has said that information leaked to the press about his defection had upset him and some observers have suggested that it may have affected his thinking about remaining in the United States.

Durenberger told a group of reporters Wednesday that he felt the CIA probably should have said less about Yurchenko, although he also acknowledged that the CIA feels

the same way about members of his committee.

In discussing the administration's "selective leaking" of secrets, Durenberger added, "All of you know that with regard to Central America in particular they have leaked classified information about arms flow at various times." This was apparently a reference to Soviet and Cuban arms shipments to the Sandinista government in Nicaragua.

Ironically, many of the disclosures about Yurchenko's defection—the fact that he had defected, his alleged ranking as No. 5 in the KGB, and his alleged role in triggering other defections—were printed in the Italian press a month

or more before they surfaced in the United States.

As early as Aug. 8, the state-run Italian radio reported Yurchenko's disappearance in Rome and probable defection.

By Aug. 31, it was a front-page article in *Corriere della Sera* containing many of the details, assumptions and speculation about who he was that were to appear later in the American press.

Corriere, in its Sept. 1 edition, identified Yurchenko in a front-page article as "the No. 5 in the KGB," a sensational bit of news that took the U.S. media more than three weeks to report on the basis of "leaked" information here.

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16 November 1985

Intelligence: The Times Are Touchy

By **STEPHEN ENGELBERG**

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 15 — The relationship between the Central Intelligence Agency and its Congressional oversight committees has been, at best, a marriage of convenience, a clash of cultures never far from rancorous discord.

Intelligence officers view their successes and failures as matters of great secrecy, some of which must be hidden "from inception to eternity." Members of Congress, tending toward spirited public debate, are inclined to point out mistakes, sometimes none too gently, when a Government agency errs.

Congress sees itself as an open advocate of the people and a watchdog over agencies that spend the people's tax money. The C.I.A., by contrast, believes that Congress has gone beyond its oversight role and has begun exposing agency secrets to further political ends.

Both sides confirm that under the Reagan Administration, relations between Capitol Hill and the intelligence agencies have become so tense that the Administration has at times declined to undertake covert operations because Congressional disclosure was viewed as a virtual certainty.

Casey's Open Letter

The inherent contradictions bound up by Congressional oversight burst into the open Thursday night when William J. Casey, the Director of Central Intelligence, said in an open letter that the process had gone "seriously awry."

To Mr. Casey, Congressional oversight has become characterized by "off the cuff" comments that damage morale and disclose intelligence sources.

"It is time to acknowledge," Mr. Casey wrote, "that the process has gone seriously awry." He added: "If the oversight process is to work at all, it cannot do so on the front pages of American newspapers."

Senator Patrick Leahy, the deputy chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, called the Casey letter "unfortunate" and said today that it had inflamed an already delicate situation.

"On the one hand, you have the C.I.A. rejecting oversight," Mr. Leahy said. "And the Congress is saying, 'We'll get Casey for these comments.'"

Elected officials, to function as advocates for the public, say they must be permitted wide access to the inner workings of a secret agency that has been guilty of abuses. To Mr. Leahy, there is no support for a return to the "good old days" when, he said, the C.I.A., acting under little oversight,



Sygnia/Diego Goldberg
William J. Casey



The New York Times
Senator Patrick Leahy



The New York Times
Senator Dave Durenberger

became involved in such failed operations as the Bay of Pigs invasion.

The issue was heightened this year when the leadership of the Senate intelligence committee changed, with Senator Dave Durenberger, Republican of Minnesota, replacing Senator Barry Goldwater as chairman, and Senator Leahy, Democrat of Vermont, replacing Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan as deputy chairman.

From the beginning, both Senators Durenberger and Leahy said they favored greater public discussion of intelligence issues.

Accordingly, the committee staff has a press officer who responds to inquiries from journalists, and Mr. Durenberger and Mr. Leahy are fre-

received a secret briefing on an intelligence case.

Nevertheless, this year's ferment in the intelligence world has provided the Senators with plenty of grist for their preference for public debate.

For example, members of Congress have strenuously questioned the cases of Vitaly S. Yurchenko, the reputed senior K.G.B. officer who reportedly had defected to the West, and of Edward Lee Howard, a former C.I.A. officer who Mr. Yurchenko said had given the Russians important information about American intelligence gathering in Moscow.

Congressional criticism of the report about Mr. Howard had barely subsided when Mr. Yurchenko announced that he wanted to return to the Soviet Union. Members of Congress were immediately critical of the C.I.A.'s dealings with Mr. Yurchenko. Some viewed him as a Soviet plant who fooled the agency, and others said he was emotionally overwrought and had changed his mind, perhaps because of mistakes by his handlers in the agency.

In another spy case, both House and Senate members have criticized Navy security procedures involving John A. Walker Jr. And both Congress and the Administration are trying to learn who disclosed that the C.I.A. had a plan to undermine the Libyan leader, Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi, and that both intelligence committees had expressed reservations about it.

A Requirement to Inform

Under laws passed in the 1970's after Congressional investigations of C.I.A. abuses, the Administration must inform Congress of any significant anticipated intelligence activity.

In a speech several months ago, Mr. Durenberger said the Reagan Administration had in several instances chosen not to initiate a covert action that was otherwise deemed to be appropriate because it could not trust Congress to keep it secret.

Indeed, he said, a lesser option was chosen. And Administration officials confirmed this assessment.

"The Administration," he told the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, "may prefer to do the wrong thing in secret, rather than doing the right thing in public."

The oversight process cannot work 'on the front pages of American newspapers.'

William J. Casey

quently available for interviews and have discussed a wide range of intelligence issues. Indeed, Mr. Casey said his letter was prompted by public comments from Mr. Durenberger regarding the agency's performance.

By contrast, the Democrat-controlled House intelligence committee has been less public.

Its chairman, Representative Lee H. Hamilton of Indiana rarely criticizes the agency's performance in his press interviews.

According to members of the committee, Mr. Hamilton prefers to work out differences with the C.I.A. in private.

The committee staff seldom responds to even routine inquiries from the press. In one instance, top committee aides refused to return calls asking whether the committee had

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WASHINGTON POST
 15 November 1985

Casey Accuses Durenberger Of Compromising CIA

By Patrick E. Tyler
 and David B. Ottaway
 Washington Post Staff Writers

CIA Director William J. Casey issued a public letter last night attacking the chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence for conducting intelligence oversight "off the cuff" in a manner that has resulted in the "repeated compromise of sensitive intelligence sources and methods."

The letter, addressed to Sen. David F. Durenberger (R-Minn.), said, "It is time to acknowledge that the [oversight] process has gone seriously awry" and accused Durenberger of undercutting the morale of CIA officers around the world. "What are they to think when the chairman of the Senate Select Committee offhandedly, publicly and inaccurately disparages their work?" Casey asked.

Casey's letter referred to a report in yesterday's Washington Post in which Durenberger was quoted as charging that the CIA lacked "a sense of direction" and an adequate knowledge of long-range trends in the Soviet Union.

"I can only wonder," Casey said, "at the contrast between what you say to us privately and what you say to the news media."

In response to Casey's letter, Durenberger said last night, "An issue has been created where none exists. I continue to fully support Director Casey and the intelligence community, both privately and publicly, and I'm confident that we can continue working toward our long-range goals, to achieve both effective congressional oversight and a comprehensive national intelligence strategy."

At a meeting with reporters Wednesday, Durenberger both praised and criticized Casey and the CIA in extended remarks. Though there was no discussion of the sensitive sources and methods Casey complained of, Casey has contended that the "the Hill leaks everything" about sensitive and covert intelligence operations proposed or underway.

Among Durenberger's chief criticisms of the agency's leadership was an allegation that CIA analysts "aren't being told what it is we need [to know] about the Soviet Union." He also criticized the agency's assessment of the South African situation, saying there was a "vacuum" of independent information and that the agency was relying too heavily on State Department views.

Durenberger claimed the intelligence process prevented CIA analysts from "look[ing] five years down the road" or taking into account brewing problems such as Shiite fundamentalism in the Middle East and political deterioration in the Philippines.

Casey called these criticisms of the agency he has headed for five years "tragically wrong."

"Your remarks betray a lack of familiarity with the many intelligence studies in the [committee's] vault," Casey said.

The CIA chief added, "The intelligence community has produced an enormous number of long-range studies over the last six years or more and where we have been far out in front."

Earlier in the day, Durenberger, in a letter and a meeting with wire service reporters, sought to clarify his Wednesday remarks, which had included an off-hand prediction that support for Casey among senators on the committee would divide 8 to 7 if put to a vote.

"I think Bill is as good a DCI [director of central intelligence] as we've had in a long time, and that forgives a whole lot of things by saying that," Durenberger said to reporters Wednesday, adding, "It

would be an 8-to-7 vote on the committee if I put it to a vote."

The committee consists of eight Republicans and seven Democrats.

In Durenberger's clarifying letter yesterday, he said, "Our committee has no plans for such a vote nor, to my knowledge, are we split on any issue strictly along party lines."

Durenberger was incorrectly quoted in The Washington Post Wednesday as saying that he would recommend "legislation" downgrading Casey's job. Durenberger actually said he would consider a "recommendation" that restricted Casey to professional intelligence work with no policy formulation role.

"I did not state that the Intelligence Committee is considering recommending legislation which would substantially downgrade the CIA director's role. Our committee is not considering such legislation," Durenberger said.

Casey, noting that Durenberger had made attempts to clarify his remarks during the day, said last night, "That's not the point."

"Public discussion of sensitive information and views revealed in a closed session of an oversight committee is always damaging and inadvisable," Casey said. "As we have discussed many times, if the oversight process is to work at all, it cannot do so on the front pages of American newspapers. The cost in compromise of sources, damaged morale and the effect on our overall capabilities is simply too high."

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 of sensitive
 information ... is
 always damaging."*

—CIA Director William J. Casey

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NEW YORK TIMES
27 January 1986

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Lawmaker Declines To Confirm Reports Of K.G.B. Defector

By PHILIP SHENON

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 26 — The vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee declined to comment today on reports that a high-ranking official of the K.G.B. had defected to the United States and was living here under an assumed name.

Congressional sources said Saturday that the K.G.B. official fled last year and was providing American intelligence officers with valuable information about the K.G.B., the Soviet intelligence and security agency.

The lawmaker, Senator Patrick J. Leahy, Democrat of Vermont, said that the Central Intelligence Agency had told him that there was no such Soviet official. But Mr. Leahy would not comment when asked if he has learned of the defector from others.

A Congressional source today confirmed reports that the defector had fled the Soviet Union last year.

But Mr. Leahy said in an interview today: "I have been told by the C.I.A. that no such defector exists. If you asked me whether I believe that, I would say, in light of Mr. Casey's public statement of reluctance to follow the procedures of oversight, then I will have no comment."

Congressional Oversight

He was referring to William J. Casey, the Director of Central Intelligence, who has been involved in a public battle with the Senate Intelligence Committee over Congressional oversight of the C.I.A.

Lawmakers have complained that the agency has failed to inform them fully of important information about intelligence activities.

In a letter to the committee last November, Mr. Casey charged that oversight of intelligence agencies "had gone seriously awry." The letter appeared to have been prompted partly by mounting criticism of the agency and its handling of Vitaly S. Yurchenko, a Soviet intelligence agent who returned to Moscow after defecting to the West last year.

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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C.
(703) 351-7676

George V. Lauder
Director, Public Affairs

30 January 1986

DCI:

Attached is the Leahy item you requested.



George V. Lauder

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