

NEW YORK TIMES
27 January 1986

write
✓

Lawmaker Declines To Confirm Reports Of K.G.B. Defector

By PHILIP SHENON

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 26 — The vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee declined to comment today on reports that a high-ranking official of the K.G.B. had defected to the United States and was living here under an assumed name.

Congressional sources said Saturday that the K.G.B. official fled last year and was providing American intelligence officers with valuable information about the K.G.B., the Soviet intelligence and security agency.

The lawmaker, Senator Patrick J. Leahy, Democrat of Vermont, said that the Central Intelligence Agency had told him that there was no such Soviet official. But Mr. Leahy would not comment when asked if he has learned of the defector from others.

A Congressional source today confirmed reports that the defector had fled the Soviet Union last year.

But Mr. Leahy said in an interview today: "I have been told by the C.I.A. that no such defector exists. If you asked me whether I believe that, I would say, in light of Mr. Casey's public statement of reluctance to follow the procedures of oversight, then I will have no comment."

Congressional Oversight

He was referring to William J. Casey, the Director of Central Intelligence, who has been involved in a public battle with the Senate Intelligence Committee over Congressional oversight of the C.I.A.

Lawmakers have complained that the agency has failed to inform them fully of important information about intelligence activities.

In a letter to the committee last November, Mr. Casey charged that oversight of intelligence agencies "had gone seriously awry." The letter appeared to have been prompted partly by mounting criticism of the agency and its handling of Vitaly S. Yurchenko, a Soviet intelligence agent who returned to Moscow after defecting to the West last year.

CLASSIFIED
SECRET B7

WASHINGTON POST
17 November 1985

—The CIA and Its Critics—

Last week, it was reported that Sen. Dave Durenberger had criticized the Central Intelligence Agency and its director, William Casey. Mr. Casey responded with an open letter to the senator. We asked the senator for his reaction. We print it below, along with the text of the Casey letter.

Dave Durenberger

The Public Must Know That It Works

Careful reflection on the content of CIA Director William Casey's open letter to me as chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee raises a very troubling issue for the American people. Casey's clear message is that, independent of the factual accuracy or inaccuracy of the Post article [Nov. 14] concerning my comments on the CIA, public criticism of the performance of the CIA compromises sources, damages morale and undermines our overall intelligence capability.

In Casey's view, the cost of public discussion is simply too high, and therefore the public has no right to know how effectively the CIA does its job as part of the oversight process. Quite the contrary, he feels that oversight must be confined to discussion between the Intelligence Committee and the director behind the closed doors of our hearing room. Otherwise, we are told, there is repeated compromise of sources and methods.

Clearly, we all oppose the irresponsible use of one's knowledge of intelligence. Disclosure of certain facts can reveal the source of those facts. Careful, formal procedures must be followed in disclosing classified information. Discussion of any intelligence matters for political support or personal publicity is irresponsible. The Intelligence Committee is the first to condemn such public discussions, whether they occur in Congress or in the administration.

But public discussion of intelligence does not necessarily mean disclosure of sensitive sources and methods.

There is no question that all public officials—in Congress as well as in the executive branch—who are provided sensitive intelligence bear a heavy burden. Their public statements on any foreign policy, economic or national security issue about which they have special knowledge must be delicately constructed to protect that information.

But this is not to say that those who have this information cannot or should not speak out on these issues. Intelligence is no exception. It is a subject of public knowledge and public discussion. Those of us who are part of that process can, and

should, speak openly on the subject of intelligence, as Casey did recently in Time magazine on terrorism and intelligence, without compromising security.

The real issue with Casey is not that there were public statements, but that those statements were reported as critical. Casey would not have written that letter if the headline had been "CIA, Casey Praised by Hill Chairman." Public praise of the operations or analytical product evokes no public condemnation or charges of compromising sources and methods.

In short, the head of the U.S. intelligence community does not feel that the intelligence agencies should be accountable to the American people. It is exactly this attitude that has led to the past abuses and resulted in the institution of the oversight process within Congress. Whether Casey likes it or not, the public does hold the CIA accountable and the public must know the oversight process works.

It is encouraging to hear that Casey is pleased with the intelligence product and is satisfied with his long-range planning process. We on the Intelligence Committee have had many good things to say both publicly and privately on both of these subjects. Nevertheless, we also have concerns in both areas—concerns that are not the result of "off-the cuff," unsubstantiated conclusions. They are concerns based on four months of testimony before our committee by the policy makers and military officers who use national intelligence.

Intelligence is not an end in itself whose usefulness is based on self-evaluation. The ultimate judgment must rest with those who use the product. National intelligence is a service organization, and the director should welcome constructive comments designed to improve that service.

The intelligence agencies are also accountable for the conduct of their operations. They cannot simply invoke "sources and methods" to make Congress remain silent in the face of extensive public discussion—often fueled by executive branch disclosures—of allegations of mismanagement, as in both the Edward Lee Howard and Vitaly Yurchenko cases. If the American people are to know that the oversight process is working, they must be kept informed. Indeed, when one stifles the disclosure of things that can safely be said in public, the result is often an outpouring of leaks that are infinitely more damaging to U.S. intelligence than is a bit of criticism.

Although the Intelligence Committee does much in complete secrecy, we also speak publicly. We do it when necessary. When we do, we are careful in our statements, measured in our criticism, generous in our praise, protective of sensitive information but mindful of our responsibility to the American people. We intend to continue this policy.

The writer, a Republican senator from Minnesota, is chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee.



UNCLASSIFIED
 CONFIDENTIAL 4-A

PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER
 16 November 1985

CIA's Casey is assailed as foe of Congress' scrutiny

By James McGregor
 Inquirer Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — The continuing spat between CIA director William J. Casey and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence went public again yesterday as Sen. Patrick J. Leahy (D., Vt.), the panel's vice chairman, accused Casey of wanting to "return to the good old days" when there was no congressional oversight of the CIA.

In an unusual move Thursday, Casey had released the contents of a letter he had sent to committee chairman David Durenberger (R., Minn.). In it, he asserted that Durenberger's "off the cuff" public comments about intelligence matters had led to "the repeated compromise of sensitive intelligence sources and methods."

Though Casey cited no examples, he is known to believe that "the Hill [Congress] leaks everything" about sensitive or covert intelligence operations.

The CIA director also accused Durenberger of undercutting the morale of CIA officers around the world and added:

"It is time to acknowledge that the [congressional oversight] process has gone seriously awry."

Casey was apparently irritated by an account in the Washington Post of a luncheon meeting Durenberger had with reporters on Wednesday. The paper said the senator — alternately criticizing and praising Casey — alleged that the CIA lacked "a sense of direction" and an adequate knowledge of long-range trends in the Soviet Union.

Among Durenberger's chief criticisms of the agency's leadership, the Post said, was an allegation that CIA analysts "aren't being told what it is we need [to know] about the Soviet Union." He also criticized the agency's assessment of the South African situation, saying there was a "vacuum" of independent information and that the agency was relying too heavily on State Department views, the Post reported.

Yesterday, Durenberger left it to Leahy to respond to Casey's criticism.

"It does not help the process if the director of the CIA wants to publicly say in effect that we shouldn't have

an oversight procedure, and that is what he is saying," Leahy said. "... If the intelligence agencies could be sure they could do away with congressional oversight, they could always use secrecy to hide their mistakes."

In defense of his colleague, Leahy said: "I think Sen. Durenberger has been very, very supportive of a strong and effective intelligence service in this country. ... I think it is unfortunate for the director of the CIA to attack him and imply otherwise."

CIA spokesman George Lauder said the agency would have no comment on Leahy's remarks or Casey's letter.

Durenberger's aides termed the dispute a tempest in a teapot stemming from an inaccuracy in the Post's report of Durenberger's Wednesday remarks. The newspaper said yesterday that it "incorrectly quoted" Durenberger as saying he would recommend legislation to restrict the CIA director to professional intelligence work with no policy-making role.

In a letter Thursday to the Post, Durenberger said that the article

tee" because "statements of mine were used entirely out of context."

Ever since he rated Casey "2 on a scale of 10" last year, Durenberger has muted his criticism of the CIA director. In March, he said that his opinion of Casey had improved because "Bill is now doing what he is told."

"It does not help the process if the director of the CIA wants to publicly say in effect that we shouldn't have an oversight procedure, and that is what he is saying," Leahy said. "... If the intelligence agencies could be sure they could do away with congressional oversight, they could always use secrecy to hide their mistakes."

On Wednesday, Durenberger said Casey was a "professional" and "a darn good guy in that job."

Leahy said that he believed Casey's sharply worded letter was an "over-reaction" that reflected the bruising of the CIA director's ego as a result of the case of Vitaly Yurchenko, a top KGB operative who defected to the United States in August but returned home last week.

"I got the impression that he is not a happy man, period," Leahy said about Casey.

This week's episode followed earlier disputes between Casey and Congress over Casey's reluctance to keep House and Senate oversight committees informed of agency operations, such as the mining of harbors in Nicaragua and the alleged training of counterterrorists in the Middle East.



William J. Casey
 Sensitive to leaks

created the mistaken impression of "deep, irreconcilable differences between the director and the commit-

WASHINGTON POST
16 November 1985

Leahy Joins Durenberger in Criticizing CIA

By David B. Ottaway
Washington Post Staff Writer

Sen. Patrick J. Leahy (Vt.), ranking Democrat on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, accused the Central Intelligence Agency yesterday of "yearning to go back to the good old days" when Congress had no oversight of CIA covert operations and the United States had made "some of the most colossal failures, intelligence failures, ever."

Leahy's comments were the latest salvo in an acerbic exchange this week between Senate intelligence committee leaders and CIA Director William J. Casey.

On Wednesday, Sen. David F. Durenberger (R-Minn.) criticized Casey for not providing the CIA with a "sense of direction."

Casey, in turn, accused Durenberger on Thursday of conducting intelligence oversight in an "off the cuff" manner that had involved "repeated compromise of sensitive intelligence sources and methods."

The unusual public acrimony reflects a crisis of confidence between the Reagan administration and the Congress over who is to blame for a recent spate of unauthorized intelligence disclosures.

It also has raised the thorny issue—which has surfaced in at least the past three administrations—of the media's responsibility toward the public and government in reporting on delicate, often divisive intelligence and foreign policy matters in the administration. "I hear people yearning to go back to the good old days," Leahy said at a news briefing yesterday. "Well, the good old days are the Bay of Pigs and Salvador Allende and Patrice Lumumba and a lot of other failures."

Leahy told a news briefing that he was not accusing the CIA of "wanting to pull another Bay of Pigs," the aborted U.S.-backed invasion of Cuba in 1961, but he said that "when you had no congressional oversight" the agency had become embroiled in such adventures as attempts to poison Cuban leader

Fidel Castro, the bloody coup against leftist Chilean president Allende in 1973 and the support of murder plots against Lumumba, a leftist premier of what is now Zaire assassinated in 1961.

Leahy yesterday also supported Durenberger's charges that the administration was guilty of "selective leaking." The Vermont Democrat said the Reagan administration was "the worst ever" compared with those of presidents Gerald R. Ford or Jimmy Carter. He added that "there are a whole lot" of U.S. secrets that members of the intelligence committee learned of "first in the press."

The debate seems likely to persist, partly because of increasing CIA activity around the world under the Reagan administration and partly because Congress is sharply divided, though not strictly along party lines, on the issue of its oversight role of intelligence operations and the making of foreign policy.

The public exchanges this week have highlighted the sharp differences of opinion. Durenberger has said he wants to change "the definition of oversight" of intelligence operations and to "open that process up a little bit more so it isn't just their [the administration's] mistakes that become a problem."

Rep. Lee H. Hamilton (D-Ind.), chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, said he endorsed Durenberger's idea of a larger public debate on general intelligence policy but was leery of open discussions of operations that risk "damage being done to our interests."

The two most recent examples of the confidence crisis have been reporting on the short-lived defection of the Soviet KGB official, Vitaly Yurchenko, and an administration decision to authorize a CIA plan to seek to undermine the regime of Libyan leader Col. Muammar Qaddafi.

Many administration officials were furious at a Nov. 3 front-page article in The Washington Post about the CIA plan to help Libya's neighbors or opponents topple Qaddafi; President Reagan has ordered an investigation of the disclosure. Hamilton said he regards it "as a very serious leak of a different magnitude than the others."

Several senior U.S. officials have questioned the wisdom of The Post's decision to publish the article, a decision that they say has compromised U.S. diplomacy and seriously embarrassed the opposition to Qaddafi and its Arab backers.

In response to the article, Egypt and Algeria—two neighboring states at odds with Qaddafi—have said they will have nothing to do with any CIA "plot" against another Arab leader. The National Front for the Salvation of Libya, the main Libyan group within the badly fragmented Libyan opposition, said in a statement from London that the article was "liable to discredit and undermine the genuine Libyan strength and preempt any national action that might be carried out against Qaddafi."

Leonard Downie Jr., managing editor of The Washington Post, in defending the newspaper's decision to publish the article, said the CIA plan was being "widely and hotly debated" inside the agency and between the CIA and the congressional committees responsible for oversight of such operations.

The debate was "significant," Downie said, and "the whole question of what kinds of covert operations the CIA should engage in is one suitable for public scrutiny."

Critics of the plan, he said, were even questioning whether the operation was "legal" because it might have ended in the assassination of Qaddafi, who has long been accused of supporting international terrorism. A longstanding executive order signed by Reagan forbids the CIA or any other U.S. agency from direct or indirect involvement in any assassination plan.

Continued

Downie said The Post article had disclosed no precise details of what the CIA was planning to do, "which we should not and did not do." He also said that the reporter involved, Bob Woodward, interviewed a number of knowledgeable government sources in reporting the article and that neither before nor after publication had any of them called to suggest that disclosure of the plan might endanger national security or U.S. lives.

Qaddafi has used the article to rally renewed support at home and in the Arab world for his embattled regime, picturing himself as a target of "the great American Satan," as one U.S. analyst put it.

The analyst was highly critical of any CIA anti-Qaddafi plan relying on Libyan opposition figures, describing them as "nobodies, klutzes and incompetents" lacking internal support.

In the Yurchenko situation, the defector, who returned to Moscow earlier this month after three months in CIA custody, has said that information leaked to the press about his defection had upset him and some observers have suggested that it may have affected his thinking about remaining in the United States.

Durenberger told a group of reporters Wednesday that he felt the CIA probably should have said less about Yurchenko, although he also acknowledged that the CIA feels

the same way about members of his committee.

In discussing the administration's "selective leaking" of secrets, Durenberger added, "All of you know that with regard to Central America in particular they have leaked classified information about arms flow at various times." This was apparently a reference to Soviet and Cuban arms shipments to the Sandinista government in Nicaragua.

Ironically, many of the disclosures about Yurchenko's defection—the fact that he had defected, his alleged ranking as No. 5 in the KGB, and his alleged role in triggering other defections—were printed in the Italian press a month

or more before they surfaced in the United States.

As early as Aug. 8, the state-run Italian radio reported Yurchenko's disappearance in Rome and probable defection.

By Aug. 31, it was a front-page article in *Corriere della Sera* containing many of the details, assumptions and speculation about who he was that were to appear later in the American press.

Corriere, in its Sept. 1 edition, identified Yurchenko in a front-page article as "the No. 5 in the KGB," a sensational bit of news that took the U.S. media more than three weeks to report on the basis of "leaked" information here.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE B16NEW YORK TIMES
15 November 1985

Chief of C.I.A. Assails Congress Over Security

By STEPHEN ENGELBERG

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 13 — William J. Casey, the Director of Central Intelligence, asserted tonight that comments by members of Congress had caused "the repeated compromise of sensitive intelligence sources and methods."

In a strongly worded letter to the chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Mr. Casey contended that the Congressional oversight of intelligence agencies "has gone seriously awry." He said that some Congressional attacks on the agency's performance had been "inaccurate," "off the cuff" or "unfounded."

A spokesman for the Central Intelligence Agency would not elaborate on what specific breaches of security might have been caused by members of Congress.

Mr. Casey's letter was released tonight after several weeks of mounting criticism of the Central Intelligence Agency by some members of Congress. The Congressmen have questioned the handling of the cases of Vitaly S. Yurchenko, a Soviet intelligence officer, and of Edward Lee Howard, a former C.I.A. officer accused of spying for the Soviet Union.

Mr. Casey said his letter was prompted by newspaper accounts of criticism of the agency by the intelligence committee chairman, Dave Durenberger, a Minnesota Republican,

at a luncheon meeting with reporters on Wednesday.

Mr. Durenberger has asserted that he was misquoted in some accounts. But Mr. Casey's letter was clearly aimed at the broader issue of whether it was appropriate to have public discussion of certain sensitive issues overseen by the intelligence committees in the House and Senate.

Mr. Durenberger, in a letter to The Washington Post, said the newspaper had "done a great disservice" in its reporting of the luncheon. He said his comments were taken "entirely out of context" and he called the report by The Post "factually incorrect." Mr. Durenberger wrote. "As I am certain other correspondents at the press luncheon would agree, the thrust of my remarks was positive."

At the session, Mr. Durenberger praised Mr. Casey and the work of the agency.

A spokesman for Mr. Durenberger said tonight that he could not be reached immediately for comment.

Mr. Casey's letter makes reference to the account carried by The Post "and other newspapers."

Robert Kaiser, assistant managing editor/national news of The Post, said the account contained two errors which had been inserted by editors, but he said, "We stand by the thrust of the story."

Alluding to statements by Mr. Durenberger's staff that he had been misquoted, Mr. Casey wrote: "That is not the point. Public discussion of sensitive information and views revealed in a closed session of an oversight committee is always damaging and inadvisable. As we have discussed many times, if the oversight process is to work at all, it cannot do so on the front page of American newspapers.

"The cost in compromised sources, damaged morale and the effect on overall capabilities is simply too high."

Mr. Durenberger and Senator Patrick J. Leahy, the Vermont Democrat who is vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, have both argued for fuller public discussion of intelligence issues.

At a speech this year to the John Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, Mr. Durenberger suggested that intelligence agencies sometimes used secrecy as a means of hiding embarrassing mistakes.

In his letter, Mr. Casey took particular issue with what he said were Mr. Durenberger's comments Wednesday to reporters that the agency had failed to understand the Soviet Union and had not produced long-range evaluations of such issues as the rise of Shiite fundamentalism, the insurgency in the Philippines, or the energy crisis.

Mr. Casey called this assertion "tragically wrong," saying, "These are all areas where the intelligence community has produced an enormous number of long-range studies over the last six years or more and where we have been far out front."

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 26APHILADELPHIA INQUIRER
14 November 1985

How to lose defectors

The bungling of the cases of two very different Soviet defectors leaves a raw trail of lessons — some painfully obvious — to be learned for the future.

Destroying a defector

No American can quickly erase the haunting image of Ukrainian seaman Miroslav Medvid. After twice jumping into the Mississippi to escape his Soviet grain freighter, he beat his head against the rocks as a Soviet sailor and two American shipping agents subdued him with handcuffs served up by a helpful U.S. Border Patrol agent.

Commissioner of Immigration and Nationalization Allan C. Nelson has conceded that the two Border Patrol agents who returned Mr. Medvid to his ship blundered substantially. INS regulations specify that when an East bloc national appears to be seeking political asylum an agent must immediately inform his or her superiors, who then contact the State Department.

That's how things were handled in Jacksonville, Fla., even as the Medvid drama was in progress. A Romanian seaman who defected there on Nov. 6 was granted asylum on Nov. 7, and by Nov. 8 had a job as a maintenance mechanic at a metal recycling plant.

Why Mr. Medvid was brutally denied his chance at the American dream remains a mystery. The two INS agents who betrayed him contend that they didn't know he wanted to defect. Even if his desperate head bashing wasn't enough, the woman who translated for Mr. Medvid insists he made his wants clear. In such a sensitive case, contact with superiors was called for — obviously. Congressional sources say that INS officials told them that one of the agents in question was "one of their worst" but that he could not be fired because of Civil Service regulations.

Clearly the Medvid case dictates a hard look by the INS at the quality of its agents and at the thoroughness of their training. Civil Service regulations should not bar the firing of incompetents.

Tragically, once Mr. Medvid had been handed over to Soviet threats and intimidation, the State Department, by then aware of the situation, was limited in its remedies. He was interviewed five times. He was taken ashore to a naval hospital, allowed a night's sleep to alleviate his tension and dull the aftereffects of suspected drugs, and then examined by a physician and psychiatrist.

He insisted on returning to the ship. A Soviet official was always present, but Mr. Medvid appeared competent and could not be held against his will. He signed a statement in Russian that he wanted to leave.

Sen. Jesse Helms' unsuccessful move to have the ship held until there was a third interview may appeal to American heartstrings. But Mr. Medvid's mind appeared made up. His unhappy choice was molded by the INS's original blunder. The knowledge of the fate that awaits him should goad the INS to ensure that such an outrage is not repeated.

Embarrassing the CIA

And then there is the amazing case of top KGB defector Vitaly Sergeyevich Yurchenko, who redefected to the Soviet Union after three months in the hands of the CIA. His lurid press conference last week in the Soviet Embassy in Washington, with its tales of being drugged and held captive by U.S. intelligence agents, is seen as proof by some that he was a plant sent to embarrass America on the eve of the U.S.-Soviet summit meeting.

Maybe so. If that was the case — and it may never be proved — obvious changes in intelligence gathering are necessary to prevent such CIA mortification in the future.

But whether Mr. Yurchenko was a plant or got cold feet, the careless, unprofessional handling of his stay in the United States suggests the CIA badly needs to improve its approach to such sensitive guests.

The CIA seemed anxious to blab to the press the information the Soviet spy was revealing even though he had been promised his defection would be kept secret. Even a private dinner he had with CIA Director William J. Casey was reported in *Newsweek* magazine. Such crowing offers little encouragement to future Soviet defectors who want to stay low-key to shield family members left behind. It also makes inevitable the highly embarrassing publicity now attending the loss of such a highly touted defector.

Experts say Mr. Yurchenko should have been provided with a Russian-speaking "babysitter" during lengthy interrogation sessions, someone with whom he could discuss the depression that usually affects defectors.

Hardest to understand is how such an important, and presumably vulnerable, Soviet spy could have been taken to dine in a crowded Georgetown restaurant with only a young, inexperienced CIA agent for company. (He walked from that last supper back into the arms of the Soviet Embassy.)

Even those who don't read spy novels have heard of Bulgarian agents downing defectors with a thrust from a poisoned umbrella. Had the Soviets been seeking to dispatch Mr. Yurchenko it seems they would have had ample opportunity. If the CIA wants to hold onto defectors in future, it had better boast less and protect more.

RECEIVED
AL

WASHINGTON POST
15 November 1985

Casey Accuses Durenberger Of Compromising CIA

By Patrick E. Tyler
and David B. Ottaway
Washington Post Staff Writers

CIA Director William J. Casey issued a public letter last night attacking the chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence for conducting intelligence oversight "off the cuff" in a manner that has resulted in the "repeated compromise of sensitive intelligence sources and methods."

The letter, addressed to Sen. David F. Durenberger (R-Minn.), said, "It is time to acknowledge that the [oversight] process has gone seriously awry" and accused Durenberger of undercutting the morale of CIA officers around the world. "What are they to think when the chairman of the Senate Select Committee offhandedly, publicly and inaccurately disparages their work?" Casey asked.

Casey's letter referred to a report in yesterday's Washington Post in which Durenberger was quoted as charging that the CIA lacked "a sense of direction" and an adequate knowledge of long-range trends in the Soviet Union.

"I can only wonder," Casey said, "at the contrast between what you say to us privately and what you say to the news media."

In response to Casey's letter, Durenberger said last night, "An issue has been created where none exists. I continue to fully support Director Casey and the intelligence community, both privately and publicly, and I'm confident that we can continue working toward our long-range goals, to achieve both effective congressional oversight and a comprehensive national intelligence strategy."

At a meeting with reporters Wednesday, Durenberger both praised and criticized Casey and the CIA in extended remarks. Though there was no discussion of the sensitive sources and methods Casey complained of, Casey has contended that the "the Hill leaks everything" about sensitive and covert intelligence operations proposed or underway.

Among Durenberger's chief criticisms of the agency's leadership was an allegation that CIA analysts "aren't being told what it is we need [to know] about the Soviet Union." He also criticized the agency's assessment of the South African situation, saying there was a "vacuum" of independent information and that the agency was relying too heavily on State Department views.

Durenberger claimed the intelligence process prevented CIA analysts from "look[ing] five years down the road" or taking into account brewing problems such as Shiite fundamentalism in the Middle East and political deterioration in the Philippines.

Casey called these criticisms of the agency he has headed for five years "tragically wrong."

"Your remarks betray a lack of familiarity with the many intelligence studies in the [committee's] vault," Casey said.

The CIA chief added, "The intelligence community has produced an enormous number of long-range studies over the last six years or more and where we have been far out in front."

Earlier in the day, Durenberger, in a letter and a meeting with wire service reporters, sought to clarify his Wednesday remarks, which had included an off-hand prediction that support for Casey among senators on the committee would divide 8 to 7 if put to a vote.

"I think Bill is as good a DCI [director of central intelligence] as we've had in a long time, and that forgives a whole lot of things by saying that," Durenberger said to reporters Wednesday, adding, "It

would be an 8-to-7 vote on the committee if I put it to a vote."

The committee consists of eight Republicans and seven Democrats.

In Durenberger's clarifying letter yesterday, he said, "Our committee has no plans for such a vote nor, to my knowledge, are we split on any issue strictly along party lines."

Durenberger was incorrectly quoted in The Washington Post Wednesday as saying that he would recommend "legislation" downgrading Casey's job. Durenberger actually said he would consider a "recommendation" that restricted Casey to professional intelligence work with no policy formulation role.

"I did not state that the Intelligence Committee is considering recommending legislation which would substantially downgrade the CIA director's role. Our committee is not considering such legislation," Durenberger said.

Casey, noting that Durenberger had made attempts to clarify his remarks during the day, said last night, "That's not the point."

"Public discussion of sensitive information and views revealed in a closed session of an oversight committee is always damaging and inadvisable," Casey said. "As we have discussed many times, if the oversight process is to work at all, it cannot do so on the front pages of American newspapers. The cost in compromise of sources, damaged morale and the effect on our overall capabilities is simply too high."

*"Public discussion
of sensitive
information ... is
always damaging."*

—CIA Director William J. Casey

ARTICLE APPEARED IN
PAGE AI

WASHINGTON POST
14 November 1985

CIA, Casey Criticized by Hill Chairman

By David B. Ottaway
Washington Post Staff Writer

Sen. David F. Durenberger (R-Minn.), chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence, yesterday criticized the Central Intelligence Agency and its director, William J. Casey, for lacking a "sense of direction" and particularly for failure to understand the Soviet Union.

Durenberger said his committee will consider recommending legislation that would substantially downgrade the CIA director's role and make the president's national security affairs adviser responsible for evaluating intelligence in the policy-making process.

His criticisms notwithstanding, Durenberger also defended Casey as a "professional" and "a darn good guy in that job" who deserved to continue as director.

Durenberger said, however, that a vote today in his Republican-dominated committee over whether to recommend Casey's dismissal in the wake of the CIA's handling of the Soviet defector Vitaly Yurchenko would be 8 to 7 in support of the director, a vote reflecting party lines.

Yurchenko defected to the West in August, but three months later apparently changed his mind and publicly denounced the CIA as kidnapers and torturers before returning to Moscow last week.

Durenberger's comments during a luncheon with reporters indicated that the Yurchenko affair has brought to a head serious differences between Congress and the CIA over the performance of both bodies in a series of recent disclosures of classified information.

He also acknowledged that his own attempt to redefine his committee's oversight role to encourage the public release of more information had created "an uncomfortable feeling" in Congress and "other places" about the wisdom of "that kind of course of action."

Durenberger centered his criticisms of the CIA's leadership on what he called its failure to provide overall guidelines to employees in gathering and analyzing information, particularly data regarding the Soviet Union.

"They aren't getting any sense of direction. They aren't being told what it is in the long run we need [to know] about the Soviet Union," he said.

Durenberger said he was not faulting the quality of CIA personnel or the agency's resources. Rather, he lambasted "a process that doesn't let them look five years down the road" or allow the agency to consider in their longer-range evaluations such brewing crises as the Philippines, the rise of Shiite Moslem fundamentalism in the Middle East or what he called "the energy factor."


He faulted the absence of any "sense of a national intelligence strategy," a problem he said his committee was hoping to remedy by providing additional CIA funds beginning this fiscal year.

Durenberger said another problem facing the intelligence community is a redefinition of the respective roles of the CIA and the National Security Council.

The Senate intelligence committee probably will recommend before the end of 1986 that the president's national security affairs adviser "ought to be really the person who is responsible for the linkage between intelligence and policy," while the CIA director is restricted to "professional intelligence work." Casey, who was Reagan's campaign director in 1980, has been a close adviser to the president.

The senator also disclosed that he is drafting a letter to Casey in the wake of Yurchenko asking for information on how the defection was handled, what the CIA and others have learned from the affair and who in the agency is accountable.

Durenberger said that 50 percent of past Soviet defectors had returned home as Yurchenko did in a "relatively short period of time." The senator said it was important for the CIA and the Congress to un-



SEN. DAVID F. DURENBERGER
... defends Casey as "professional"

derstand the phenomenon if the United States hoped to encourage other Soviets to defect.

The senator also defended Congress against administration charges that it had been responsible for various "leaks" about Yurchenko's defection. He said the administration had been guilty of "selective leaking" during the three months Yurchenko was in U.S. custody.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE **A19**NEW YORK TIMES
14 November 1985

Casey Is Reported to Fault C.I.A. For Its Disclosures on Yurchenko

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 13 — William J. Casey, Director of Central Intelligence, has said the C.I.A. gave Congress too much information about the defection of Vitaly S. Yurchenko, the chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence said today.

Senator Dave Durenberger, the chairman, quoted Mr. Casey as telling the committee recently: "We shouldn't have told you guys as much as we did."

Some members of Congress, such as Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Democrat of New York, have criticized the agency for allowing publicity about Mr. Yurchenko's defection, which Administration officials initially portrayed as an intelligence coup.

"The proposition is very simple," said Senator Moynihan, former Vice Chairman of the Senate committee. "The successes of diplomacy and intelligence are events that just don't happen." Noting that the State Department at one point issued a statement that described Mr. Yurchenko's rank in the K.G.B., the Soviet intelligence agency, he said, "this was just self-promotion."

At a luncheon meeting with reporters, Mr. Durenberger also said that about 50 percent of the people who defect to the United States return to their homeland.

Mr. Durenberger, a Minnesota Republican, is one of several members of Congress and former intelligence officials who have been questioning the C.I.A.'s procedures for defectors as the Reagan Administration begins to examine why Mr. Yurchenko returned to the Soviet Union.

Last week, after three months in the hands of the C.I.A., Mr. Yurchenko appeared at a press conference to an-

nounce that he had been kidnapped and drugged, charges the State Department quickly denied.

"From what we've learned about defectors," said Mr. Durenberger, "50 percent go home in a relatively short period of time. In this case, there are some questions about whether he was handled right."

Mr. Durenberger said the C.I.A. has ordered its inspector general to prepare a report on the case, and that the inspector general will be looking into the agency's handling of Edward Lee Howard, a former C.I.A. officer who has been accused of helping Soviet intelligence identify American agents in Moscow.

A committee spokesman said the F.B.I. will also be asked to prepare a written report on its handling of Mr. Yurchenko.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE C-11NEW YORK DAILY NEWS
14 November 1985

Casey wouldn't bat?



**Casey's staying
at CIA.**

Have the skids been greased for CIA Director William Casey because of the way his agency handled the flap over on-again, off-again Russian defector Vitaly Yurchenko? No way, says Sen. David Durenberger (R-Minn.), chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee. Durenberger said over lunch with insiders in Washington's Ritz-Carlton yesterday that Casey, a former New York lawyer and GOP fund-raiser, will keep his post with White House approval.

"He's as good a CIA director as we have ever had," said Durenberger, but added with a grin, "and that forgives a lot of things." With tongue in cheek, Durenberger said if Casey's case came up for a confidence vote before his 15-member committee, the senators would vote Republicans 8, Democrats 7.

ARTICLE APPROVED
 CHAIRMAN 8 (Part I)

LOS ANGELES TIMES
 14 November 1985

Panel Likely to Seek to Reduce Casey's Policy-Setting Role

Proposal Would Dilute CIA Director's White House Influence and Broaden Powers of McFarlane

By MICHAEL WINES, Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON—The Senate Intelligence Committee is likely to recommend next year that President Reagan reduce the CIA director's role in setting policy and instead limit his duties to "professional intelligence work," Sen. Dave Durenberger (R-Minn.), the committee chairman, said Wednesday.

In a lengthy luncheon session with reporters, Durenberger suggested that the job of recommending policy changes such as secret operations against other governments should rest with the President's national security adviser, while the director of central intelligence should carry out the changes.

The proposal apparently would dilute the White House role of Reagan's close friend and political strategist, CIA Director William J. Casey, and broaden the powers of National Security Adviser Robert C. McFarlane. It was revealed against a background of growing criticism of the way top CIA officials handled Vitaly Yurchenko, the Soviet KGB officer whose much-touted defection to CIA hands embarrassingly backfired last week.

"One of the things we ought to be sorting out," Durenberger said, "is whether or not maybe effectively in the present situation, McFarlane shouldn't be the President's right hand on intelligence input through policy and Casey ought to be the pro who runs the organization."

Although the senator said that Casey had sought to make the CIA a policy-setting agency early in his tenure—citing the agency's advocacy of top-secret operations in Central America such as the mining of Nicaraguan harbors—he added that Casey has "matured" in the top CIA post and strongly praised his management of the organization.

A Senate intelligence aide downplayed the thrust of Durenberger's remarks late Wednesday, saying the committee does not intend to recommend that the President shift any of Casey's current duties to McFarlane. Instead, he said, the panel hopes only to force McFarlane and other "consumers" of the

CIA's intelligence to specify their needs so that the intelligence agency knows what type of information to gather.

The aide said that Casey occasionally "may give some personal advice to the President" but exercises no major policy powers. The Senate panel's proposal envisions "no fundamental role change, just an exercise over the reinvigoration of the way the system should be operating," he said.

Durenberger's proposal, he said, calls for "more clarification of the current responsibilities" of the CIA director and policy-makers "and acceptance on both sides of those responsibilities."

"It's not that Bill Casey doesn't do that now, but it's not done in a very well organized and orchestrated way," he said. He said the proposal has been in the works for several months and is unrelated to criticism of the agency stemming from the Yurchenko affair.

However, Durenberger's remarks appeared to suggest a lessening of the White House role now played by Casey, the only director of central intelligence to hold a post in a President's Cabinet.

Casey, widely regarded as the most powerful intelligence chief since the post was created in 1947, is credited by some with helping devise the Reagan Administration's strategy of covert operations against Nicaragua and in support of struggling Central American nations on its borders.

Durenberger strongly praised Casey's "professionalism" and said that he is responsible for a general improvement in the agency's morale.

"I'm giving him a plus on the job, despite all the things I've got to swallow ... to do that," he said.

However, some senators on the intelligence panel believe "that the national security adviser to the President ought to really be the person responsible ... for the linkage between intelligence and policy, and the (director of central intelligence) ought to be a person who does professional intelligence work."

Some intelligence experts said Wednesday that the adoption of


Durenberger's proposal might have little effect on either Casey or federal intelligence policy, partly because Casey's central role in White House intelligence affairs is based on his close personal links to Reagan.

Additionally, the director of central intelligence—who not only heads the CIA but also oversees some duties of the National Security Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency—has budgetary and advisory powers that could not be diluted without Congress's permission. And Durenberger suggested no changes in law.

While Durenberger did not directly criticize Casey on Wednesday, he voiced concern about the agency's performance in some key areas, including intelligence assessments of the Soviet Union and South Africa.

He also sharply criticized the agency's assessments of the future of the South Africa government, saying there is a "vacuum" of independent and unbiased information about the country's problems.

UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL
13 November 1985



SENATE INTELLIGENCE CHAIRMAN LAUDS CIA CHIEF
BY BENJAMIN SHORE, COPELY NEWS SERVICE
WASHINGTON

THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE WEDNESDAY CALLED CIA DIRECTOR WILLIAM CASEY, DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, A "DARN GOOD GUY IN THAT JOB," DESPITE THE REDEFECTION OF A KGB OFFICIAL TO THE SOVIET UNION.

SEN. DAVE DURENBERGER, R-MINN., TOLD REPORTERS THAT CASEY "KNOWS THE (INTELLIGENCE) CRAFT AND THE POLITICS INVOLVED."

OTHER MEMBERS OF CONGRESS HAVE SHARPLY CRITIZED CASEY AND THE CIA FOR LETTING VITALY YURCHENKO, ALLEGEDLY A TOP KGB OFFICIAL, SLIP AWAY FROM HIS CIA ESCORTS NOV. 2.

SOME CALLED FOR CASEY'S RESIGNATION AFTER YURCHENKO, DURING A PRESS CONFERENCE AT THE SOVIET EMBASSY HERE, CLAIMED HE WAS KIDNAPPED, DRUGGED AND OTHERWISE MISTREATED BY THE CIA.

ON ANOTHER ISSUE, DURENBERGER SAID THE CIA HAS BEEN LAX IN PROVIDING LONG-RANGE INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES OF SUCH EVOLVING ISSUES AS AMERICAN-SOVIET RELATIONS, PHILIPPINES UNREST AND GLOBAL ENERGY SUPPLIES.

WHILE THE CIA HAS PROFICIENT ANALYSTS, HE SAID, "THE PROCESS DOESN'T LET THEM LOOK FIVE YEARS DOWN THE ROAD..."

"WE MUST MOVE TO A STRATEGY FOR A NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE: TO HELP GUIDE AMERICAN POLICY MAKERS, DURENBERGER SAID.

DURENBERGER SAID HIS COMMITTEE, WHICH, LIKE ITS HOUSE COUNTERPART, HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE CIA, IS AWAITING A REPORT FROM THE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ON WHY YURCHENKO DECIDED TO RETURN TO MOSCOW AFTER THREE MONTHS IN CIA CUSTODY.

"WE ALSO WANT TO KNOW WHERE THE BUCK STOPS" IN SUCH CASES, DURENBERGER SAID, REFERRING TO CRITISM THAT CIA OFFICIALS, INCLUDING CASEY, DID NOT HANDLE YURCHENKO WITH SENSITIVITY.

THE SENATOR SAID 50 PERCENT OF RUSSIAN OFFICIALS WHO DEFECT TO THE UNITED STATES RETURN TO THE SOVIET UNION BECAUSE OF HOMESICKNESS, A HIGHER PERCENTAGE THAN ANY OTHER NATIONALITY.

BUT DURENBERGER, WHO SAID THE CIA TOLD HIM OF YURCHENKO'S DEFECTION TWO MONTHS AGO, SAID HE DID NOT KNOW WHY THE CIA FAILED WITH YURCHENKO.

"THE MAIN HURT IS EMBARRASSMENT" TO THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION, DURENBERGER SAID.

A CIA AND CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW OF THE CASE MAY RESULT IN CHANGES IN CIA POLICY TO ENCOURAGE MORE DEFECTIONS AS PART OF A COUNTERINTELLIGENCE STRATEGY, HE ADDED.

SOVIET OFFICIALS ARE EXPECTED TO PUBLICIZE YURCHENKO'S CASE TO DISCOURAGE INTELLIGENCE AND OTHER OFFICIALS FROM DEFECTING.

YURCHENKO CLAIMED THAT THE REASON HE DECIDED TO REDEFECT WAS THE PUBLICITY THAT HE CLAIMED THE CIA HAD BEGUN GENERATING ABOUT THE SECRETS HE WAS REVEALING.

SOURCES HAVE SAID THAT YURCHENKO HAD HOPED TO LIVE IN OBSCURITY IN THE UNITED STATES.

DURENBERGER SAID THAT WHILE THE CIA "PROBABLY SHOULD HAVE SAID LESS ABOUT HAVING YURCHENKO," PUBLICITY OF SOME U.S. INTELLIGENCE COUPS WOULD LEAD THE AMERICAN PUBLIC TO FORGIVE SOME MISTAKES."

IN DEFENDING CASEY, DURENBERGER SAID THE 72 YEAR OLD FORMER LAWYER, BUSINESSMAN, WORLD WAR II SPY, AUTHOR AND POLITICIAN APPOINTED TO THE CIA POST BY MR. REAGAN IN 1981 HAD "MATURED" IN THE JOB.

CASEY NO LONGER BELIEVES THE CIA SHOULD BE MAKING POLICY, DURENBERGER SAID, REFERRING TO RECENT CIA ACTIVITIES IN CENTRAL AMERICA AS A EXAMPLE. "HE NOW KNOWS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTELLIGENCE AND PUBLIC POLICY," DURENBERGER SAID.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 1-AWASHINGTON TIMES
18 November 1985

Helms says CIA repeatedly underestimates Soviet power

By Bill Gertz
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

The recent congressional barrage against the Central Intelligence Agency and its director, William Casey, has refueled criticism that the agency has consistently underestimated Soviet intentions and capabilities.

Much of the criticism of the agency and its director had been bandied about publicly last week — in comments from the ranking Republican and Democratic members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Those remarks drew a sharply worded reply from Mr. Casey.

But some of the most surprising charges, expressed in a letter to President Reagan last month, have been leveled by Sen. Jesse Helms, North Carolina Republican.

Mr. Helms' letter, a five-page assessment of recent and past CIA analyses, charged the agency with misreading Soviet intentions and underestimating Soviet capabilities.

As a result, CIA Deputy Director for Intelligence Robert Gates has set up a special CIA task force to review the questions posed by Mr. Helms on a possible CIA analytical bias giving the Soviets the benefit of the doubt, according to congressional sources. Mr. Gates served on the National Security Council during the Carter administration.

"The bias of the CIA for underestimating Soviet intentions and capabilities over the last 25 years has already had a deleterious effect on U.S. national security," Mr. Helms said in his letter. "But the recent implications of information resulting from KGB defections suggests that we should inquire further into the problem of this bias."

The Helms letter quotes Mr. Casey, who said in an internal CIA publication that, "The most frequent criticisms of our interpretations and assessments have shown a tendency to be overly optimistic, to place a benign interpretation on information which could be interpreted as indicating danger."

The larger issue of relations between the intelligence agency and Congress came to a head last Wednesday when Sen. David Durenberger, Minnesota Republican, chairman of the select committee, criticized Mr. Casey and the agency during a luncheon meeting with reporters.

Among Mr. Durenberger's charges was the criticism that CIA analysts have failed to adequately understand the Soviet Union and that the agency lacks a sense of direction.

Mr. Durenberger, who this year replaced Sen. Barry Goldwater, Arizona Republican, as chairman of the intelligence panel, also said that if the committee decided to vote on recommending Mr. Casey's dismissal, the vote would be 8-7 in favor of retaining the director.

The senator's remarks prompted an unusual public attack by Mr. Casey.

Mr. Casey said in a letter released Thursday that the oversight process has "gone awry" and has hurt the CIA by compromising intelligence sources, damaging agency morale and hampering overall intelligence efforts.

He said Mr. Durenberger's comments were disturbing because they had a "disheartening impact on our officers overseas and at home."

"What are they to think when the chairman of the Senate Select Committee offhandedly, publicly and inaccurately disparages their work?" Mr. Casey asked.

Mr. Durenberger charged that his remarks, as reported in The Wash-

ington Post, were taken "out of context."

Mr. Casey appeared unmoved by Mr. Durenberger's effort to clarify his position.

"That's not the point," Mr. Casey wrote in his response. "Public discussion of sensitive information and views revealed in a closed session of an oversight committee is always damaging and inadvisable."

Mr. Casey did not specifically respond to charges that the CIA had underestimated the Soviets, but the director did defend his agency's analysis work as a whole.

Mr. Casey said that recent analyses in support of arms control were praised by former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, representing the president's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

In his letter, Mr. Casey pointed to recent CIA analyses of the crisis in the Philippines, Shi'ite Moslem fundamentalism and "the energy problem" as subjects on which the CIA had been "far out in front."

Sen. Patrick Leahy of Vermont, who is the ranking Democrat on the intelligence panel, said the Casey

letter was "unfortunate" and could only make a bad situation worse.

The CIA has been under increasingly intense pressure in the wake of its handling of the case of Soviet KGB official Vitaly Yurchenko, who returned to the Soviet Union after purportedly defecting to the United States. In a highly publicized press conference Nov. 4 at the Soviet Embassy in Washington, Mr. Yurchenko denounced the CIA for kidnapping and drugging him — charges that have been denied by the agency and by Capitol Hill intelligence sources.

Critics claim that whether Mr. Yurchenko was a real defector or a deliberate plant, the CIA was at fault for not handling the case properly. The Senate Intelligence Committee has requested a report from the agency on the affair.

On the question of the agency's analysis of the Soviet Union, Mr. Helms provided details of recent examples he believes indicate a pro-Soviet bias on the part of the CIA. He

2.

charged the agency with downgrading a previous estimate of the range of a Soviet bomber, "negatively reassessing" Soviet biological and chemical warfare treaty violations and attempting to change methods for monitoring Soviet nuclear tests,

thereby altering treaty limits.

He also asserts that the CIA has downgraded its accuracy estimate of the Soviet SS-19 missile, which would have the effect of retroactively altering the findings of a 1978 study of Soviet missile accuracy conducted by a team of experts from outside the agency.

The senator also charges that the agency "is denying the possibility of Soviet mole penetrations and deception in [human intelligence] espionage channels."

In his letter, Mr. Helms requested answers to a series of questions that indicate a CIA bias on Soviet analysis.

Among the questions were the following:

- Does the CIA review its analyses to check for a possible pro-Soviet bias in classified and unclassified analytical products?

- Is there a possible pro-Soviet bias in many CIA products over the past 20 years?

- Does the CIA find any evidence of "pro-Soviet penetrations, moles or bias" in Soviet affairs intelligence in the past 20 years?

- Did CIA underestimates of Soviet ICBM accuracy result in an added five-year period of U.S. vulnerability to Soviet nuclear attack?

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 1ABALTIMORE SUN
18 November 1985

On Casey's Watch

The vice-chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee says Director of Central Intelligence William Casey runs the best intelligence service in the world. The chairman of the committee says Mr. Casey is "a pro" who is doing a good job. But Chairman David Durenberger (R. Minn.) and Patrick Leahy (D. Vt.) know there is something wrong at the Central Intelligence Agency, something the director has to take responsibility for. Mr. Durenberger's question, "Where does the buck stop?" can have only one answer. As Senator Leahy said, "This happened on [Casey's] watch."

Typically, Mr. Casey ignores the compliments and charges publicly that Mr. Durenberger shouldn't talk about him and the agency in public — and further charges that the Senate committee leaks important secrets. It does leak at times, but Senator Leahy is convincing when he says that most leaked intelligence secrets are information the committee hasn't heard about yet.

The controversy over the CIA's handling of the Russian KGB defector Vitaly Yurchenko touched off the Casey-Durenberger fireworks. By letting him walk away from an agent and into the Soviet embassy in Washington, there to charge he was abducted and abused, the CIA has embarrassed itself and the nation. This case strengthens those Casey critics who say he has been so concerned with other aspects of the CIA's mission that the important business of gaining important informa-

tion through such human resources as defectors has suffered.

Mr. Casey has other shortcomings. He does not seem to understand or accept congressional oversight responsibility, as he shows with his response to Mr. Durenberger. And as both an ideologue and a partisan (President Reagan's campaign director in 1980), he has on occasion seemed to let policy affect intelligence. The other way around is, of course, the way it has to be.

Even Mr. Casey's detractors would give him high marks for restoring morale in the CIA, by increasing its budget, adding needed expertise — and by taking its (and his) critics head on. That is sometimes unwise, especially in the present instance, but it does buck up the troops. Mr. Casey has also boosted morale by staying on the job. One reason for the blues at the CIA when Mr. Casey took over was that there had been so much turnover at the top in the previous dozen years. We don't believe the director of intelligence ought to be a long-serving careerist, but stability is helpful.

Mr. Casey aside, the Yurchenko episode and other recent embarrassments, such as the disappearance and presumed defection of a CIA agent, have given the public cause for concern, which in turn makes this a good time for the intelligence committees on the Hill to take a good hard look at what has — and hasn't — happened in the world of intelligence in the past five years.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE E5236CAULKING THE LEAKY SHIP OF
STATE

HON. WM. S. BROOMFIELD

OF MICHIGAN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, November 19, 1985

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Speaker, during the past several weeks, Washington has been awash with leaks that have seriously damaged U.S. intelligence interests. One begins to wonder how many more of these media torpedos the ship of state can absorb before it goes under.

It is with great dismay that I see stories attributed to congressional and administration sources regarding the wisdom and details of various intelligence activities. Such disclosures have made a joke of congressional intelligence oversight while jeopardizing the lives of American intelligence officers and their foreign contacts. It is time to return to the old-fashioned concept of putting America's national security interests first.

When Congress decided in the wake of Vietnam and Watergate to exercise more oversight over the intelligence community, it took on a heavy responsibility with overriding national security implications. As the result of this action, our two intelligence committees are now privy to highly sensitive information and material that must be jealously guarded as precious national resources.

Sometimes what's proposed by the administration does not receive the blessing of everyone on the two intelligence panels. Unfortunately, when disagreement does occur, the nature of the disputed activity is often leaked with the intention of sabotaging it before it gets off the drawing board. Such tactics may be politically clever and effective, but they are dangerously shortsighted and their impact on our intelligence capability is devastating.

Mr. Speaker, with these observations as prologue, I would like to make some recommendations as to how we should address this problem.

First, those in the so-called "intelligence information loop" must stop immediately airing their opinions and differences publicly. This applies not only to Congress, but also the executive branch from whence a number of these egregious leaks have sprung.

Second, we must drastically reduce the number of individuals with access to secrets in both Congress and the executive branch. In this regard, I believe Congress must set an example by establishing a Joint Intelligence Committee which would replace the House and Senate Intelligence Committees. This is not a new idea. In fact, I authored legislation to bring this about 10 years ago. Moreover, I was not alone as such respected colleagues as ED BOLAND, SILVIO CONTE, LEE HAMILTON, BILL FRENZEL, AND DANTE FASCELL sponsored similar bills.

All of these recent disclosures have severely undermined relations between Congress and the intelligence community. For Congress to practice meaningful and responsible oversight over the intelligence agencies, it must first earn the trust of those whose activities it reviews.

That trust is totally lacking now and won't begin to develop until there is some clear-cut assurance that what is said in closed session remains a secret. Chances of that happening are much better when secrets are reported to a very limited group of responsible and senior Representatives and Senators backed by a small group of professional staff experts. Furthermore, under this kind of arrangement with so few in the loop, leakers would be much easier to identify. Presently, there are so many with access to secrets that the FBI and Justice Department seldom, if ever, unmask these anonymous sources who are consistently undercutting our national security.

In short, Mr. Speaker, the time has come to revamp our congressional oversight system with the establishment of a Joint Intelligence Committee along the lines proposed by Congressman HENRY HYDE in House Joint Resolution 7. I urge my colleagues to join me and some 70 other Members in cosponsoring this timely and extremely important initiative that is rapidly gaining widespread bipartisan support.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE H10295

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE
19 November 1985

✓

□ 1600

Mr. BOLAND. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HAMILTON. I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.

Mr. BOLAND. Mr. Speaker, I thank the distinguished chairman of the Permanent House Select Committee for yielding, and I want to compliment the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Hamilton) and also the Members who serve on this committee for the hard work in which they were engaged in in the conference and for its obviously successful outcome.

I want to draw attention particularly to the closing remarks of the distinguished chairman, particularly in reference to his statement about leaks.

During my tenure as chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, I rarely made statements to the press. That was not because I always believed that the intelligence community was right in its judgments or that it was acting appropriately at all times.

However, I did not find it necessary to proclaim publicly every disagreement with the intelligence agencies. It is my judgment that oversight during that same period by the Committee on Intelligence was vigorous and it was effective.

I believe the committee maintained good relations with the intelligence community, even though on occasion it had significant disagreements. I do not believe that it is helpful or appropriate for Members of Congress who sit on oversight committees to regularly or recklessly comment on intelligence matters, either critically or favorably.

The subject matter simply does not lend itself to regular public comment, nor does such comment greatly improve, in my judgment, the oversight of intelligence activities.

I also do not suggest a gag rule. Far from it. Public expressions of dismay following a failure to communicate significant intelligence information to the Congress are sometimes necessary but must always be carefully considered.

I do not believe that much of the discussion in the press of late falls within that category.

Mr. Speaker, the gentleman from Indiana and the other Members who serve on that committee in my view have continued the careful, fair tradition for which the Intelligence Committee on this side of the Congress has been known. He brings to his stewardship of the committee the reputation for thoughtful and honest commentary.

I applaud him for his responsible handling of many recent intelligence issues about which there seems to have been such considerable utterances in other parts of this city.

I believe also his record and the record of that committee in this area is reflective of the excellent security practices for which the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence has always been known.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I want the gentleman from Massachusetts to know how deeply I appreciate his comments. All of us in this House know that he really is Mr. Intelligence of the House of Representatives; because of his distinguished and meritorious service as chairman of the Intelligence Committee.

I thank the gentleman for his comments.

Mr. BOLAND. I thank the gentleman for those remarks.

* * * * *

EXCERPTED

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A20.

WASHINGTON POST
20 November 1985

Sam Zagoria

Durenberger, Casey and The Post

Consider the ingredients: Thirty journalists quizzing the head of the Senate intelligence committee about the Central Intelligence Agency and its fiery director, William J. Casey, at a time when it is a target for the handling of a prize KGB defector and the leakage of plans for toppling Muammar Qaddafi's regime in Libya.

Add to that a speaker, Sen. Dave Durenberger (R-Minn.), who has had his innings with Mr. Casey before, but who is obviously seeking this time to temper criticism with praise. Relaxed by generous food and good company, the Senate chairman takes on inquiries spanning the world and occasionally

Ombudsman

peppers a response with a touch of inside humor.

Reporters busy with their tape recorders and note pads wonder if there is an underlying message in all of this. Post reporter David Ottaway, long-time foreign correspondent and now national security reporter, decided it all added up to serious criticism of the CIA and Mr. Casey. His front-page story last Thursday kicked off a week-end of attacks and counterattacks, and The Post's reporting was not out of the line of fire.

Sen. Durenberger protested vigorously Thursday that he had been dealt with unfairly and inaccurately, that he had not criticized Mr. Casey nor urged his downgrading. Actually Mr. Ottaway's third paragraph and the accompanying picture caption had noted his defense of Mr. Casey as a "professional" and "a darn good guy in the job."

On Friday, Mr. Ottaway reported Mr. Casey's free-swinging response to the Durenberger story and Mr. Casey's new charges that the senator's oversight activity had resulted in "repeated compromise of sensitive intelligence sources and methods." Tucked way back in the page 1 story, so far back it was in the continuation on page 33, was a correction of a statement about possible CIA legislation which appeared in the first-day report. However, there was no backing away from The Post statements on Durenberger's criticism of CIA and Casey. (Usually corrections appear in a box on page 2 or 3.)

On Saturday, Mr. Ottaway reported that Sen. Patrick Leahy of Vermont, the ranking Democrat on the committee, responding to the Casey counter-attack, felt Mr. Casey was really seeking a return to "the good old days" when there was no congressional oversight of CIA covert operations.

The partial correction Friday left Sen. Durenberger still unhappy. "The paper did the absolute minimum to clarify and correct—despite its admission of error—and I would have expected more." On Sunday, his op-ed page article appeared, putting aside the issue of Post culpability and arguing the case for congressional oversight and public discussion of CIA performance.

When I discussed the brouhaha Friday with Robert Kaiser, assistant managing editor for national news, he said the report was "solid," other than the correction and added that the reporter had taped the luncheon. I listened to the lengthy tape, read a tape transcript, talked with four other reporters who attended, discussed the reports with Mr. Ottaway, and concluded that covering a wide-ranging luncheon with a cautious legislator can be hazardous to journalistic health.

Mr. Ottaway's report could be supported by snips and snaps in the transcript, but Sen. Durenberger's string of compliments for Mr. Casey and the vagueness of his suggestions for possible change by the end of 1986 should have discouraged treating the story so one-sidedly. Sure, the kind words about Mr. Casey were in the third paragraph, but not in the lead, not in the headline.

Leads and headlines have a tendency to simplify and polarize positions, and this happened here. The result has been a four-day battle in The Post, and I doubt that it was intended by the three public officials. What started out as a low-key discussion about relationships between a key senator and an agency escalated into a shouting match, and some of the most surprised were the senator and some of his auditors.

Shadowed in Geneva by CIA's lost find, Yurchenko

ERNEST B. FURGURSON
CHIEF OF THE SUN'S WASHINGTON BUREAU

WASHINGTON — When Mr. Reagan sat down in Geneva with Mikhail Gorbachev, he was either armed with — or disarmed by — the intelligence our agents have gathered about Soviet capabilities and intentions.

Solid information, wisely evaluated, could be an immense advantage to him. Bad information, perhaps even what intelligence professionals call disinformation, could be disastrous.

Until this month, our side had every reason to believe it was well served by the U.S. intelligence system. At the CIA, high officials were celebrating a coup, the acquisition of a key KGB defector.

Then, with the president's summit trip two weeks away, Vitaly Yurchenko, ace of spies, decided to go back to Russia. Washington was thrown into confusion.

The officials who had been chortling over how valuable Mr. Yurchenko was started saying he really never amounted to much. They scoffed at suggestions that he might have been sent here intentionally to create dissension as the president approached Geneva.

Whether he came originally for that purpose or not, he succeeded.

Of course, any Yurchenko specifics that were factored into summit preparations were factored out again. But it is impossible to sift out the uncertainty, the finger-pointing and backbiting that his case has stirred in Washington.

The row is reminiscent of a decade ago, when congressional hearings exposed some of the Central Intelligence Agency's darkest secrets. Soon afterward, a Democratic administration dismissed many of the CIA's clandestine operatives.

Those attacks demoralized the agency. Conservatives blamed liberal Democrats in Congress for seriously damaging U.S. intelligence capability, and have held that grudge ever since.

When Mr. Reagan was elected, he appointed hard-nosed William J. Casey to rebuild the agency. Mr. Casey rehired many of the veteran specialists fired by Jimmy Carter's CIA director, Adm. Stansfield Turner. Morale was on the rise until the Yurchenko case.

Now the agency is under fire from Congress again, but with differ-

ences:

This time the Republican administration and its Republican intelligence chief are getting it from a Republican-controlled Senate — and this time the complaints are not about an excess of zeal, but a shortage of skill.

Of course, Democrats have been heard from, too, but the head-to-head argument has been between Mr. Casey and Minnesota's David Durenberger, who chairs the Select Committee on Intelligence.

The senator lunched with reporters a week ago and said he was drafting a letter to ask Mr. Casey to spell out how Mr. Yurchenko was handled, what was learned from the episode and who is accountable for the whole mess.

But he went beyond the embarrassment of the moment, asserting that the CIA lacked a sense of direction and had no long-range guidance relating to the Soviet Union. He said there was no sense of an ongoing national intelligence strategy.

Mr. Durenberger said his committee probably would recommend that the president's national security adviser, rather than the CIA director, be the chief link between intelligence and policy. His opinion that Mr. Casey was "a professional . . . a darn good guy in that job" got lost in the story.

Not surprisingly, Mr. Casey fired back, issuing a letter that assailed the Senate chairman for offhandedly disparaging the agency. He main-

tained that congressional oversight had gone awry, saying it repeatedly compromised sensitive intelligence information.

There it stood, with others chiming in from the sidelines, until this week. Then came the formidable Jesse Helms of North Carolina, who is not a member of the intelligence committee but who has strong opinions on matters that concern communism.

Mr. Helms anticipated the flap over U.S. intelligence operations, but with a characteristic twist. He wrote a five-page letter to the president last month, citing examples to charge that the CIA has consistently misread Soviet intentions and underestimated Soviet capabilities. When that letter was leaked this week, a new question was introduced into the public debate: Does CIA analysis have a pro-Soviet bias?

We might assume that of all the agencies of government, the CIA would be the least pro-Soviet. But not these days. The agency itself reportedly has put a task force to work investigating the Helms thesis.

No charge is too preposterous to be taken seriously in this atmosphere. Republicans are looking under other Republicans' beds, anti-communists are questioning the biases of other anti-communists, nobody seems sure whom to believe.

In Geneva, they are talking. On Dzerzhinsky Square in Moscow, they are laughing.

NEW YORK TIMES
20 November 1985ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 31**WASHINGTON**
James Reston

Stop That Leak!

Nothing intrigues the performers in this political circus more than a purloined letter from a Cabinet officer to the President, especially if there's a whiff of treachery in the wind.

The hunt is on here for the villain who assisted in the publication of Secretary of Defense Weinberger's don't-give-away-the-store warning to Mr. Reagan just before the summit meeting in Geneva. But don't hold your breath until the culprit is found.

Consider instead the antics of the plumbers who are looking for the leakers. The Defense Investigation Service of the Pentagon has ordered "a thorough, professional investigation" to ferret out any suspicious character on the premises who might have slipped the letter to The New York Times and The Washington Post.

As proof of his integrity, Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard N. Perle, whose enthusiasm for an arms control agreement with the Russians is not excessive, has come forward with an offer to take a lie-detector test to prove his innocence. This will give you an idea of what has happened here to the old notion that a man's word is his bond.

You can bet dollars to rubles, which is fairly long odds, that the villain will not be found in the Pentagon by the in-house cops. So the search will have to reach out to the White House, the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, which were also favored with official copies of Mr. Weinberger's letter.

Here two definitions are relevant. It

is generally agreed in the Washington newspaper corps that an exclusive story is a "scoop" when you get it, and a "leak" when the opposition gets it. There also used to be a theory here that a government was the only vessel that leaked from the top. But that theory of leakage no longer holds.

It was destroyed by the photocopying machine. This infernal invention, now humming and winking in every closet in every department of government, did more to threaten the security of the Republic than all the Communist guerrillas in Central America.

Just let a few copies of Cappy's final advice to the President cross the Potomac in sealed pouches, and before you can say Caspar Willard Weinberger dozens of anonymous bureaucrats will be producing hundreds of copies, dreaming about writing books in retirement and babbling secrets to their sweethearts in the night.

So the mole who came out of the hole is not likely to be found. One can imagine with what zeal Attorney General Meese will investigate his old California buddies at the State and Defense Departments and what help he'll get from Bill Casey at the C.I.A.

There is, however, maybe something more important and interesting than this plumber's game: Not who leaked the letter, but why the Secretary of Defense sent it to the President just before the summit talks.

We have it on the word of the Secretary of State that there was nothing new in the letter, that Mr. Weinberger had said the same thing to the President a dozen times.

Is it conceivable, then, that after months of preparation for the first meeting between the leaders of the two nuclear giants in six years, that the President had still not made up his mind on the SALT II and antibalistic missile questions?

Or could it be that Mr. Weinberger couldn't be sure what the President would say or do in the distracting tumult of Geneva and just couldn't resist reinforcing his warnings before the President took off?

This is, and for a long time has been, the critical question about the conduct or casual misconduct of Mr. Reagan's foreign policy. Especially his best friends wonder what he will say or do strolling along the lake or walking through the woods with Mikhail Gorbachev.

Mr. Weinberger, on the other hand, doubts everybody's judgment but his own. He is a true believer, a patriot of his country, a brilliant advocate who thinks he knows, by God, how to defend the nation from the moral monsters of the Soviet Union.

But at least seen from this corner, he's not a deceitful man who would try to sabotage the Geneva talks with sly leaks to the press. It's just that with relentless conviction, bordering on intellectual arrogance, he has made enemies, some of whom by accident or design may have leaked his letter to embarrass him, which here is called the Al Haig treatment.

Anyway, this is the sort of personal and policy intrigue that fascinates Washington and drives George Shultz up the State Department wall. But behind the letter lies the deeper question of how policy is made, or not made, and this worries even the President's friends and allies more than the care to say in public. □

27

BOSTON GLOBE
21 November 1985



'Since the Yurchenko affair, that's taken on a whole new meaning'

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 8

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
21 November 1985

NATIONAL

CIA attempts to put finger in leaking intelligence dike

By Warren Richey
Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

Can American intelligence agencies operate effectively if their operations are constantly discussed in the press?

Recent disclosures of sensitive government information have brought new life to the longstanding debate over three issues:

- The public's right to be generally aware of the operations of United States intelligence organizations.
- The extent to which public knowledge of US intelligence methods, successes, and failures neutralizes their effectiveness.
- The possibility that intelligence agencies might revert to previous abuses if congressional oversight is constrained.

"There appear to have been so many leaks in the newspapers that it is surprising to me that foreigners still would be willing to work secretly for the United States," says Roy Godson, an intelligence specialist and professor at Georgetown University. "The more leaking, I would have thought, the more difficult to recruit and run agents."

US intelligence has been beset recently by a series of leaks and unauthorized disclosures in American newspapers. They have occurred most recently in the case of Soviet defector Vitaly Yurchenko, the case of former Central Intelligence Agency employee Edward L. Howard, and the apparent release of information about a purported secret US proposal to encourage the overthrow of Libya's leader, Col. Muammar Qaddafi.

The issue came to a head last week when Central Intelligence Agency director William Casey sharply criticized Sen. Dave Durenberger (R) of Minnesota for what Mr. Casey characterized as "off the cuff" comments the senator made during a press luncheon.

"Public discussion of sensitive information and views revealed in a closed session of an oversight committee is always damaging and inadvisable," Casey said in a letter to Senator Durenberger.

He added, "If the oversight process is to work at all, it cannot do so from the front pages of American newspapers."

Durenberger, chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, fired off a return shot of his own in a letter printed verbatim in the Washington Post. "Public discussion of intelligence does not necessarily mean disclosure of sensitive sources and methods," Durenberger said.

He added, "In Casey's view, the cost of public discussion is simply too high, and therefore the public has no right to know how effectively the CIA does its job. . . ."

This heated public exchange is the most recent flare-up in the often fiery relations between Casey and members of the intelligence oversight committees of Congress. By law, the House and Senate intelligence committees monitor the performance of US intelligence. The Casey-Durenberger exchange is unusual because it was apparently triggered by a misunderstanding arising from a news account of a Durenberger press luncheon.

The disagreement comes at a time of widespread frustration and second-guessing in the intelligence community about the handling of Soviet KGB defector Vitaly Yurchenko. It is also a time when officials in Washington are assigning blame and pointing accusatorial fingers at those suspected of security leaks.

While administration officials suspect Congress is fertile ground for journalists seeking publishable secrets, members of Congress are pointing down Pennsylvania Avenue, toward suspected leakers at the White House.

"For them, information is a two-way street," said Durenberger, during his now infamous lunch with reporters. He added, "Most of you know that [administration officials] are capable of selectively leaking. . . . With regard to Central America, in particular, they have leaked classified information about arms flow."

Of the Yurchenko leaks, Durenberger said, "I strongly suspect that some information was provided to the public just to show that when everyone else was losing their [agents through defections] we were in pretty good shape."

Some intelligence officials, including Casey, are reported to be upset that details about Yurchenko found their way into US newspapers. Yurchenko himself was reported to have been concerned about the press coverage his defection received in the US.

In addition, administration and congressional officials are currently investigating the apparent leak of purported secret US plans to encourage the overthrow of Libya's Qaddafi. The original story was published Nov. 3 in the Washington Post. American government officials are forbidden by law to carry out or plot assassinations.

Durenberger says that regardless of the accuracy of the story, it has created problems for the Senate Intelligence Committee by angering the administration.

Some intelligence experts maintain that leaks and imprudent public disclosures will always hamper the intelligence process because of the unavoidable conflicts inherent in running a secret intelligence operation in an open society.

But these experts also stress that a total blackout on public information about US intelligence operations would be counterproductive. They say such a blackout could erode public confidence in America's intelligence services and contribute to a revival of the anti-intelligence crusades of the 1970s.



CIA Director William Casey seeks to plug leaks

FILE PHOTO/AP

Continued

"I think it is very important for the informed American public to come to terms with the intelligence capability that the government has chosen to maintain," says John M. Oseth, author of the recently released book "Regulating US Intelligence Operations."

Durenberger observes that it is a paradox of intelligence work that successes are rarely heralded in public. "If the public knew how good their intelligence was, they would forgive some of the mistakes." He adds, "I am trying to open that process up a little bit more, so that it isn't just their mistakes that become a problem."

NEWSWEEK
25 November 1985ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 48

NATIONAL AFFAIRS

Casey Confronts His Critics

The defector's legacy

He faced the assembled crowd of Kremlin correspondents, nervously sipping water and showering insults on his former American hosts at the Central Intelligence Agency. Building on the charges first leveled in Washington a week earlier, the repentant KGB defector talked about being kidnapped, drugged and psychologically brutalized by insensitive CIA personnel. As for CIA Director William J. Casey, with whom he says he was forced to dine, the veteran Soviet spy remembered "an old man—excuse me—with pants unbuttoned."

After a dubious defection lasting all of three months, Vitaly Yurchenko was back in Moscow last week, still casting a harsh spotlight on Bill Casey and his CIA. At home, the case also continued to draw fresh criticism of the agency's performance while adding fuel to longstanding complaints about the CIA. The boiling point was reached when Senate Intelligence Committee chairman Dave Durenberger, a Minnesota Republican, declared that the CIA "is not getting enough direction." Casey slashed back with a public letter that charged Durenberger with "repeated compromise of intelligence sources and methods" and "unsubstantiated appraisals of performance" that had a "disheartening impact on our officers."

That was just the beginning. Next day Durenberger rejected Casey's letter outright, saying, "An issue has been created where none exists. I continue to fully support Director Casey." And Democratic Sen. Patrick J. Leahy of Vermont, the intelligence committee vice chairman, charged that Casey's real motive in "lobbing bombs this way may be to do away with congressional oversight." Some in the administration dream of "the good old days" of total secrecy and CIA independence, Leahy argued. "Well, the good old days are what brought us the Bay of Pigs, the Allende coup and the Patrice Lumumba scandal."

As if to emphasize how far the agency has come since those days, a full post-mortem on the Yurchenko affair—where everyone connected to the defector will be interviewed and changes or disciplinary action



WALLY McNAMEE—NEWSWEEK

Safe, but feeling the heat: CIA chief Casey

may be recommended—seems almost assured. But even after that review is done, the debate over Yurchenko is likely to continue. By last week there was mounting evidence that he was probably not the fifth-ranking KGB official, as he had claimed. Clearly, though, he was someone whose information on Soviet intelligence in general and spying in North America—to the degree it could be corroborated—was potentially quite useful. There were still conflicting theories on whether he provided the data only to set the stage for an embarrassing redefection, or suffered a sincere change of heart.

More clear-cut were deficiencies in Yurchenko's handling by the CIA. Likely to



From Russia with malice: Yurchenko

come under official scrutiny were the decision to keep him so near Washington—and the Soviet Embassy—and the shortage of experienced, Russian-speaking handlers sensitive to his shifting moods. Indeed, it turned out that the CIA had failed to ask several previous Soviet defectors who knew him to help ease Yurchenko's transition. Also, despite Yurchenko's request for anonymity, his story quickly made its way into the media, and back to the increasingly edgy defector himself.

Faulty system: "Somewhere down the line heads are going to roll," says one former intelligence adviser to Ronald Reagan. Some agency critics have also proposed the creation of a more comprehensive service within the CIA to handle all defectors—replacing units in the territorial branches that handle defectors from the nations they cover.*

As for the CIA's basic mission—gathering and analyzing intelligence—there have been lingering complaints that the final product is not what it should be. Recently, says Durenberger, he arranged a series of luncheons with academic experts on Soviet affairs and "got much better information from them than from the agency." The problem, Durenberger says, is that there is a lack of a long-range national intelligence strategy that would help the CIA define its priorities into the 1990s. Some congressional intelligence experts also criticize the agency for failing to develop human as well as technical intelligence sources. They particularly stress the CIA's failure to devote greater resources to cultivating "sleepers"—foreign-born agents—in critical countries, like the Philippines, that might fall to unfriendly hands. "I'm not faulting the people. I'm faulting the system that does not let them look five years down the road," says Durenberger. Indeed, Durenberger may suggest a radical reorganization that would make the president's national security adviser coordinator of all U.S. intelligence operations—reducing the CIA director to "the pro who runs the agency."

In his scathing response, Casey defended CIA analyses by citing Henry Kissinger, who called agency studies on arms control

*The agency's counterintelligence (CI) capabilities also are split among its geographical departments, and similar proposals have been made to reunite them into a single, strong CI branch. But according to one senior intelligence official, a centralized CI service might itself be more vulnerable to KGB penetration. Reagan, meanwhile, has approved steps to thwart Soviet intelligence operations here—including tightening travel restrictions on Soviet-bloc diplomats.

Continued

2.

"far better than anything I saw on the subject when I was in government." To attack the agency for a lack of long-range analyses, wrote Casey, betrays "a lack of familiarity with the many intelligence studies in the [committee] vault." Nonetheless, Casey intends to proceed with his earlier commitment to prepare a national intelligence strategy for the CIA—in part to codify the long-range planning papers that have been guiding the agency for years.

'Cooking the books': Former CIA official George Carver dismissed Durenberger's notion of letting the White House national-security adviser coordinate U.S. intelligence. "The guy who runs the National Security Council has more than enough on his plate," says Carver. "And if you give him this function, too, you're going to have the perception he's cooking the books"—by forcing intelligence analyses to conform to policy goals. He blames the shortage of sleepers on Congress's refusal to pay for years of inactivity. "If you want the interior minister on your payroll, you have to recruit him as a struggling young law student 30 years earlier," Carver says. "But who in this government is willing to pay for that?" Clearly there will be tough questions *for* Congress as well as *from* Congress in the building debate over intelligence.

DAVID M. ALPERN with KIM WILLENSON and
RICHARD SANDZA in Washington

ARTICLE APPEARED
PAGE A26

WASHINGTON POST
21 November 1985



ON PAGE 2-AWASHINGTON TIMES
22 November 1985

Hatch blasts intelligence leaks by his colleagues

By Tom Diaz
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

Sen. Orrin Hatch has ripped into some of his colleagues on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, calling their comments to the press "alarming."

"I am really disgusted by the comments by some of my colleagues," the Utah Republican said in an interview this week.

"There has been far too much public comment by members of both the Senate and House intelligence committees on sensitive matters," he said.

Mr. Hatch also said the Senate committee has completed an internal investigation into the source of a recent article in The Washington Post alleging that the CIA is involved in a plan to destabilize the government of the Libyan strongman Muammar Qaddafi.

"There is plenty of evidence that this did not come from either of the intelligence committees," he said. "There is more evidence that it came from within the administration ... the Senate committee has concluded that it is highly unlikely, but not impossible, that it came from the Senate staff."

He said the Senate committee staff in a report recommended against using lie detectors to monitor staff compliance with secrecy rules.

"But some of us are beginning to examine that option very closely," Mr. Hatch said.

He said the committee probably will propose in a few weeks a number of wide-ranging steps to tighten up security throughout the government.

Other sources said that investigations into the leak of secret information to the Post on the alleged Libyan operation are being pursued vigorously by both intelligence committees and other government investigators.

Mr. Hatch said there would be "no end to the repercussions" for those found responsible for the leaks.

"Although I can't blame them for printing sensational stories leaked from the intelligence community, the press has some responsibility," he said. "In spite of the inaccuracies in the story, it doesn't take any brains to real-



Sen. Orrin Hatch

ize that some people are going to be killed as a result of that article."

Other sources said a number of committee members share Mr. Hatch's concern about the recent tendency of some of their colleagues to discuss intelligence matters in public.

During the interview, the senator waved a stack of newspaper clippings he said he had asked his staff to gather on the recent defection of Soviet KGB agent Vitaly Yurchenko.

"I find that on every day from Nov. 5 through Nov. 11 there was a reference in at least one of the major newspapers to a senator or a senate source talking about the Yurchenko case," he said. "The exception was Nov. 9, which must have been a travel day."

Mr. Hatch declined to name which of his colleagues he was criticizing. But most of the quotes highlighted by his staff in the news clips were from Sen. David Durenberger, the Minnesota Republican who is chairman of the committee, and Sen. Patrick J. Leahy, the Vermont Democrat who is vice chairman.

"I don't think any of these comments should have been made to the press," Mr. Hatch said. "And I don't think they know what the hell they are talking about ... some of the biggest commenters are doing it for public relations — to re-elect themselves."

"After this public discussion, if you were a KGB agent, would you defect?" he asked. "We'll be lucky now to get a truck driver to defect."

ON FILE 1-A

WASHINGTON TIMES
22 November 1985

Relations grow ugly in marriage of CIA, Congress

By Tom Diaz
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

Tension between the Central Intelligence Agency and its congressional oversight committees has taken on the ugly aura of public feuding between partners grimly hanging on to an unhappy marriage.

The situation has become so taut that many observers say the next few months will force a change in the way Congress oversees the intelligence agency. If not, they warn, relations will break down completely, sparking a long, bitter struggle.

"Where things go from here will turn on what happens after the agency files its report on the [Vitaly] Yurchenko affair," one congressional source said of last month's redefinition to Moscow of a top KGB official.

Both sides will be watching the secret report, due in mid-December, for indications of how the embarrassing episode will affect the relationship between the CIA and Capitol Hill.

Senators and congressmen on the intelligence committees will scrutinize the report to see whether the agency is cooperating or holding back. The agency will watch the committees — and the press — to see whether and how quickly aspects of the report become public.

"When congressional oversight

... is conducted off-the-cuff through the news media and involves the repeated compromise of sensitive intelligence sources and methods ... it is time to acknowledge that the process has gone seriously awry," CIA director William J. Casey said last week in an open letter to Sen. David Durenberger, the Minnesota Republican who heads the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

Mr. Casey was responding to news reports that Mr. Durenberger had criticized the agency and its management at a luncheon for reporters.

Beneath the unusual public barbs lies the burr of a long-standing feeling among some in the intelligence community that Mr. Durenberger's style of public oversight — along

with anonymous leaks of intelligence information — has hampered the agency's operations and threatened national security.

"If the oversight process is to work at all," Mr. Casey wrote, "it cannot do so on the front pages of American newspapers."

The spat simmered down by week's end. Beyond the titillating headlines, however, serious questions remain to be answered:

- Is national security hurt by the public back-biting that flares up several times a year between the agency and the committees?

- Who's to blame? Is the feuding caused by the familiar clash of Washington super-egos, or is the fault the system of congressional oversight — a relatively new phenomenon in this country, virtually unheard of anywhere else in the world?

- How long can this go on? Should President Reagan step in? Do Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole, Kansas Republican, and House Speaker Thomas P. O'Neill Jr., Massachusetts Democrat, have a duty to help straighten things out?

All parties agree that the latest tiff was set off when Mr. Yurchenko decided to return to the Soviet Union on the eve of the Geneva summit.

In the super-secret underworld of intelligence, that ordinarily wouldn't, or shouldn't, have been news. Agents have defected and redeffected before, without leaving a ripple on the public pond.

But Mr. Yurchenko's alleged defection had been leaked to the press and gleefully played to the hilt for almost two months. And the Soviet Embassy earlier this month held a spectacular live press conference, with Mr. Yurchenko as the chief attraction, to rub it in.

The turnabout left egg on faces in the agency's headquarters in Langley, Va., the White House, and committee rooms on Capitol Hill. It led ultimately to the public row between Mr. Casey and Mr. Durenberger.

As ugly as it was, the dispute followed a now predictable pattern set by of a string of feuds since 1980, when Congress set up select intelligence committees in each chamber to watch over the agency.

The decision to establish those committees came after almost a decade of revelations — including domestic surveillance, attempts to topple governments and assassinate leaders, and testing drugs on unsuspecting citizens — that rocked public confidence in the agency.

But oversight brought a trail of disputes that typically begin after secret information is leaked to the press.

Most often the leaks have been about covert operations: CIA involvement in mining a Nicaraguan harbor; charges, later proven false, that the agency was involved in a Beirut car bombing, and, most recently, allegations that it has sponsored a plan to "destabilize" the government of Libyan dictator Muammar Qaddafi.

But other leaks have involved intelligence-gathering operations, as in allegations that Mr. Casey ordered changes in an agency analysis of Central America to fit administration political objectives; counter-intelligence operations, as in charges that the CIA let Edward Howard, a former CIA operative suspected of being a Soviet agent, slip through its fingers; and a combination of the two, as in the Yurchenko case.

Whatever the nature of the leak, these events have usually followed:

- For a day or two, operating from the high ground of surprise, the news media "develop" the story by seeking "reaction comment" from congressmen. At this stage, congressmen are armed with more opinion than fact, if they haven't taken the time to read the highly classified summaries of agency programs on file with the intelligence committees.

- The CIA hunkers down in a "no comment" mode, allowing more accusations to fly without detailed rebuttal.

- There are subsidiary leaks and comments from unnamed sources. Some congressmen, often members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, back away from the information, claiming that the CIA either didn't tell them about the matter or wasn't candid if it did.

- Public charges and counter-charges follow. Congressmen say

the CIA isn't cooperating or, as in the Yurchenko case, is downright incompetent. CIA officials say the whole problem is that congressional committees can't keep their collective mouths shut.

• Things bottom out with predictions of doom on both sides.

"The whole system of congressional oversight has broken down," a senior intelligence official was quoted as saying in April 1984, during the heat of the flap over the Nicaraguan harbors. "Right now, there's anarchy."

"When you take the trust out of this relationship, there's not much left," an anonymous senator was reported to have said at the same time.

After a closed-door meeting, however, the parties in the past have kissed and made up, promising to do better next time.

But congressional sources say this time the dispute may have gotten out of hand. The speed with which the Yurchenko spat escalated surprised both sides, they say, and may indicate that resentments on both sides have built up to the bursting point.

Mr. Casey believes the public disputes hurt national security.

"Public discussion of sensitive information and views revealed in a closed session of an oversight committee is always damaging and inadvisable," he said in his public letter.

Sen. Orrin Hatch, a Utah Republican who is a member of the intelligence panel, agrees in part.

"Bill Casey is probably right to some degree ... that [intelligence] sources and methods have been compromised by the public discussion," he said in an interview. "But not as much as he believes."

Nevertheless, Mr. Hatch comes down roughly with Mr. Casey — and against Mr. Durenberger, the committee chairman — on the overall subject of secrecy in oversight.

"This is a top secret committee that examines top secret material and is supposed to keep secrets," Mr. Hatch said in an interview. "Unfortunately, there has been too much public comment. ... The chairman and the vice chairman should say 'No public comment' more often."

But Mr. Durenberger has said "the committee will criticize errors even in public, if appropriate."

And Sen. Patrick Leahy, the Vermont Democrat who is vice chairman of the intelligence panel, was reported to have said recently that CIA officials are "people

yearning to go back to the good old days" of "colossal ... intelligence failures" before Congress tightened up its oversight of the agency and its programs.

Stansfield Turner, the retired admiral who was CIA director under former President Jimmy Carter, is a strong advocate of congressional oversight. But, he said in a recent interview, "It's bound to hurt when the head of the CIA and the person most responsible for oversight are publicly feuding."

Mr. Turner, however, sees some positive aspects to the recent spat.

"The fact that these issues are reaching the public — some of which is unfortunate since they ought to be resolved in secret — at least indicates that there are checks and balances now, whereas for the first 30 years after World War II there were virtually no checks," he said.

Mr. Casey's personality has sometimes been mentioned as a source of the problem, but committee members and aides discount that.

"The director of the CIA is one of those jobs where you end up getting everybody mad at you sooner or later," one said.

"I do believe that Bill Casey believes that intelligence agencies should be held accountable," said Mr. Hatch.

Ray Cline, a former deputy director of the CIA, also sees a problem on the committee side.

"Some people [on the committee] have less of a commitment to the importance of intelligence and more willingness to exploit the committees for their own public relations," Mr. Cline, now a senior associate at Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies, said in an interview. "The temptation for congressmen or even their staff officers — who are briefed in detail on intelligence operations — to focus on some parts of those programs they don't like and talk about it, to resist, to try to organize political opposition, is very strong."

So far, sources say, the White House and congressional leaders have stayed out of the dispute.

But if the two sides can't mend their own fences, they say, the matter may have to be taken to higher authorities.

Glenn Emery contributed to this report.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE **4-B**WASHINGTON TIMES
22 November 1985

Why have conservative voices joined new CIA-bashing?

Doubtless the laughter heard around the Dzerzhinsky Square headquarters of the KGB and in the Kremlin over the Vitaly Yurchenko affair has been amplified by the discovery that some of Washington's leading conservative voices have joined in the opening of a new CIA-hunting season.

During the past decade, the U.S. intelligence community learned to expect that the "liberal" press, led by the Washington and New York papers, could be counted on to exploit to the hilt any and all "leaks" of intelligence operations. Unfortunately, *The Washington Times*, which generally views events more objectively, has joined the attack. No government agency is above criticism; but on Nov. 19, your Page 1 resurrected out-of-date issues criticizing CIA analysis of Soviet affairs during the past 25 years — before the advent of the Reagan administration and CIA Director William Casey — and quoting from a Senate critic's letter that asked questions of the "when did you stop beating your wife" variety.

To suggest, as did that story, that the CIA is not only incompetent but exhibits a deliberately pro-Soviet bias in its analysis and evaluations and is consciously undertaking to subvert the United States, is to promote the most damaging sort of disinformation and paranoia among the public and to undermine the morale of the intelligence community further.

One expected *The Washington Times*, which has an excellent track record and has shown sensitivity to exposing Soviet disinformation themes, to have avoided the trap of attacking the fundamental credibility of the principal agency responsible for providing the president with early warning of the activities of a regime that calls America its "main enemy." The Pathe case in France and the testimony of Soviet and bloc defectors demonstrate that the Soviets promote and make use of such themes whenever possible. Let's not, by inadvertence or inattention, do the KGB's job for them.



William Casey

Clearly the CIA is in for more difficult times. The defection of Vitaly Yurchenko and continuous "leaks" of the "awful revelation" that the U.S. government really is opposed to the barbarian terrorist ruling Libya are being used by those aiming at Mr. Casey. His appointment was applauded by those who recognized the urgency of building a competent, strong foreign intelligence agency. He also is human and had made mistakes and enemies, who, post-Yurchenko, are raising loud cries on Capitol Hill, in certain academic circles, and in the media for a witchhunt in the guise of investigations and inquiries

not to strengthen CIA capabilities, but to grab a few headlines. The reasoned criticism of Malcolm Wallop may be unheard over the shrill complaints of Patrick Leahy.

If the headline hunters, hysterics, and disinformation purveyors are successful, we will shortly see another mass exodus from CIA of capable intelligence officers, which will diminish America's intelligence capability.

JOHN REES
Publisher
Information Digest
Baltimore

Meritorious Doublespeak

Teachers Cite CIA, Philadelphia Officials

Doublespeak is the euphemistic language used by characters in the George Orwell novel "1984."

"These events do not constitute assassinations because as far as we are concerned, assassinations are only those of heads of state," Claridge said. "I leave definitions to the politicians."

WASHINGTON POST
24 November 1985

A24

New Focus on Security Cited for Rash of Cases

But Experts Say Earlier Detection Needed

By Patrick E. Tyler
Washington Post Staff Writer

It has been an extraordinary year marked by defections, arrests and expulsions around the world, with spies of virtually every nationality caught in the snares of friendly and hostile foreign governments, and the United States has been in the thick of the action.

A telephone call last May from a disgruntled ex-wife to the FBI unveiled a decade-old spy ring managed by Navy communications specialist John Anthony Walker Jr. and riveted national attention on international espionage.

Since then, it seems, the problem has only gotten worse, with two more Americans arrested last week on espionage charges.

Experts say the rash of spy cases stems partly from the U.S. intelligence community's increased emphasis on security.

But they say the cases also represent not only a coincidence of random events but also a conspicuous failure of the system to detect earlier persons willing to sell national secrets at a cost of millions of dollars and, perhaps, human lives.

Roy Godson, an intelligence expert and professor of government at Georgetown University, said yesterday that based on published accounts of the cases this year, "It appears there has been very great damage to our national security costing the American taxpayers hundreds of millions of dollars to repair and possibly having led to the loss of life and damaging the reputation of American intelligence by making it more difficult to recruit and run agents in the future."

Godson said he favors requiring U.S. foreign service and intelligence officials who have access to sensitive information to "inform" the Central Intelligence Agency or the State Department security of-

fice each time they go abroad or have contact with foreign officials whose intelligence services are considered hostile to U.S. interests.

But there is a flip side to the revelations of espionage in this country.

"We're getting better [at catching spies] and people are taking it seriously," said Sen. Patrick J. Leahy (D-Vt.), vice chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

But Leahy said that a number of changes pending in Congress and resisted by the Reagan administration could help prevent future intelligence losses.

Leahy made his comments in the wake of the latest espionage arrests, one of a longtime CIA analyst accused of selling information to China and one of a Naval Investigative Service analyst accused of selling classified information to a foreign country, which sources say is believed to be Israel.

In the past, Leahy said, the CIA and FBI have been "weakened . . . because they wouldn't cooperate" in espionage cases. "One thing good that has come out of this rash of spy cases," he said, "is that the CIA and FBI are cooperating extremely well."

Leahy and Sen. William S. Cohen (R-Maine) have written legislation that would reduce the number of foreign intelligence agents in the United States from Soviet bloc countries.

Leahy said yesterday that passage of that legislation would further improve the ability of the FBI and the CIA to detect and monitor foreign intelligence operatives in this country.

Leahy also pointed to the passage in 1982 of the Foreign Missions Act, which, he said, added helpful new tools to monitoring foreign nationals, including a coding system for diplomatic license plates. The system uses red, white and blue as well as a two-letter prefix to denote

which country operates each diplomatic vehicle.

The biggest case this year remains the Walker spy ring, which passed secret Navy codes and communications data to the Soviets.

The arrests in that case were followed by a summer of high-level defections in London, Greece and Rome, where a senior KGB official, Vitaly Yurchenko, walked into the U.S. Embassy.

Yurchenko spent three months with CIA debriefers before walking away from CIA custody. He resurfaced in the Soviet Embassy compound earlier this month to accuse the CIA of kidnaping and drugging him. The CIA repeatedly denied the allegations.

Had it not been for Yurchenko's defection, which now is being analyzed to determine whether it was genuine, U.S. intelligence might never have discovered that former CIA agent Edward L. Howard—drummed out of the clandestine service for his occasional drug use—had traveled secretly to Vienna in late 1984 to meet with senior KGB officials and agree to sell them secrets about how the CIA conducts spy operations in Moscow.

And after they heard about Howard's alleged spying, U.S. intelligence officials learned that Howard's disclosures to the KGB may have caused the arrest and disappearance of a longtime CIA "asset" in Moscow, an aviation researcher identified as A.G. Tolkachev.

Not only had the CIA never detected Howard's spying after he left the agency in 1983, the FBI's surveillance of Howard's New Mexico home failed to stop Howard's flight in late September when—based on Yurchenko's information—FBI officials obtained an arrest warrant for him.

All of these cases have had an impact on U.S. intelligence agencies.

Navy Capt. Brent Baker said yesterday that the revelations about the Walker case "sensitized" Navy officials to security requirements.

Continued

Baker pointed out that several colleagues of Naval Investigative Service analyst Jonathan Jay Pollard had informed security officials that Pollard was taking an extraordinary interest in classified material outside his field. Pollard was arrested Thursday. "These coworkers tipped off the NIS and the NIS brought in

the FBI and away they went," Baker said.

Commenting on the Pollard case, Leahy said yesterday, "If that is so, there has been an attitude shift and people are paying more attention." But Leahy had a warning as well: "We'll see more of these cases in the future."

SPY SUSPECTS ARRESTED THIS YEAR

■ **Larry Wu-Tai Chin**, 63, a retired CIA analyst, arrested on charges that he passed classified national security documents over many years.

■ **Jonathan J. Pollard**, 31, a civilian employe of the Naval Investigative Service, arrested on charges he provided secret documents to a foreign government. **Anne L. Henderson-Pollard**, 25, Pollard's wife, was arrested on charges of possessing unauthorized classified documents. The couple awaits trial.

■ **John Anthony Walker Jr.**, 48, retired Navy communications specialist, masterminded a family spy ring that included his son, **Michael Walker**, 22, a seaman assigned to the aircraft carrier USS Nimitz; **Arthur James Walker**, 51, John Walker's brother and a former Navy officer, and John Walker's friend, **Jerry Whitworth**.

Under an agreement with prosecutors, Walker, who pleaded guilty last month to espionage and conspiracy, could be sentenced to life in prison for selling secrets to the Soviets over a 17-year period. Under the plea-bargaining arrangement, Michael Walker could receive a 25-year sentence.

Arthur Walker was given a life sentence Nov. 12 for his role in the case, and Whitworth, who is charged with receiving \$332,000 for passing military secrets, is scheduled for trial in San Francisco on Jan. 13.

■ **Edward L. Howard**, 33, a former CIA employe who was fired from the agency in 1983, was charged by the FBI on Sept. 23 with selling U.S. intelligence secrets to Soviet KGB officials in Austria a year ago. Howard fled from his home

near Santa Fe, N.M., on Sept. 21. He is believed to have left the United States.

■ **Sharon M. Scranage**, 29, a CIA clerk, was charged July 11 with espionage and leaking secrets to the government of Ghana where she had been working on assignment. Scranage, of King George, Va., was arrested with **Michael Soussoudis**, 39, a relative of Ghana's leader. Scranage has pleaded guilty to disclosing classified information but awaits trial on spying charges. Soussoudis has not gone on trial yet.

■ **Richard M. Miller**, a former FBI agent, faces a second espionage trial after a federal jury in Los Angeles deadlocked in the first trial Nov. 6. Miller, a 20-veteran, was charged with passing classified documents to his Soviet lover in a deal which allegedly included \$65,000 in cash and gold. The lover, Svetlana Ogorodnikova, and her husband, Nikolay, pleaded guilty to espionage charges and are serving jail sentences.

■ **Samuel Loring Morison**, 40, of Crofton, Md., a former Navy intelligence analyst, was convicted Oct. 17 of giving the British military journal, Jane's Defence Weekly, three photographs of a Soviet aircraft carrier under construction. The pictures were taken by a U.S. spy satellite. Morison is scheduled to be sentenced Monday.

■ **Thomas Patrick Cavanagh**, 40, a former Northrop Corp. engineer, was sentenced to life in prison May 13 in Los Angeles after confessing that he had tried to sell secret plans for the Stealth bomber to FBI agents posing as Soviet spies.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 03-18-85 BY 3-8

WASHINGTON TIMES
25 November 1985

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Qaddafi vengeful

Libya's Col. Muammar Qaddafi has reacted with rage to U.S. press allegations that the Reagan administration had directed the CIA to support Libyan exiles seeking to overthrow his regime. Intelligence sources report that Qaddafi directed one of his agencies for the export of terrorism, the so-called World Center for the Combat of Imperialism, Zionism, Reaction and Fascism — which styles itself as "leader of the world revolutionary movement and instigator of the world's peoples' popular revolution throughout the world," to proclaim a "counteroffensive against American interests throughout the world, stemming from . . . the principle of self-defense."

According to its statement, the Libyan agency hopes to activate militant "blacks, American Indians and oppressed minorities in the United States so as to transfer the battle into the filthy American arena in order to undermine the regime there from within."

Col. Qaddafi's threats may well be more than just words. One of the leading Palestinian terrorists, Ahmad Jibril, head of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command, said in Tripoli that "thousands of Palestinian fedayeen are ready to fight . . . against the despicable American conspiracies."

Libya may get help in the effort from intelligence services of the Warsaw Pact nations. One of Col. Qaddafi's first actions after the U.S. "leak" was published was to have his foreign ministry summon the ambassadors of Warsaw Pact states and Yugoslavia and demand they assist in tracking down "conspirators." According to the Libyans, these ambassadors confirmed their governments' support for Col. Qaddafi against this "imperialist plot."

Prepared for The Washington Times by Mid-Atlantic Research Associates Inc., publishers of Early Warning. This report appears on Mondays. Inside the Beltway returns tomorrow.

WASHINGTON POST
C8

WASHINGTON POST
24 November 1985

Topic A

The Geneva Outcome



Philip Geyelin

'Linkage' Is Back

A French linguist who interpreted for Kennedy and de Gaulle and a Russian linguist who translated for Kennedy and Khrushchev both told me the same thing: by mutual consent with their opposite numbers, they tore up their notes. The nuances of alien tongues, they said, are too tricky to constitute an objective record of exactly what the great men are trying to convey.

However this was handled at Geneva, the problem remains: one man's word against another's, when they don't speak the same language, is not much help if there are no official witnesses and you are trying to score the encounter on points.

None of the conventional scorecards, for that matter, are of much help. Mikhail Gorbachev's main goal was to knock out Ronald Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative, some say; so he "lost." But if his more realistic aim was to play to European opinion by setting up Reagan's recalcitrance as the stumbling block to arms control, maybe he will "win" in the end. Similarly, Reagan said he wanted "regional conflicts" to be a central issue at Geneva. But, with the exception of Afghanistan, Gorbachev apparently brushed the issue away. So Reagan lost?

One the contrary, by stonewalling on Star Wars while pushing "regional conflicts" and human rights, Reagan managed something, for better or worse, that will be of far more lasting significance than any of the transitory "wins" or "losses." On the anvil of summitry, he has hammered out as a working proposi-

tion for the first time in his presidency what Henry Kissinger would call a "conceptual framework" for the conduct of U.S. relations with the Soviet Union.

The head-knocking at Geneva has given Kissinger's and Richard Nixon's much-maligned and ultimately discarded concept of "linkage" a new lease on life.

What Reagan was telling Gorbachev, in effect, was that he wasn't going to set arms control or SDI aside for special treatment; that he intended to treat U.S.-Soviet relations in their totality; that he wished to start a process that takes into account all the points of conflict.

And that is exactly what Nixon and Kissinger were telling a balky U.S. bureaucracy in early 1969. At his first press briefing, Kissinger introduced the word "linkage" into diplomatic jargon: speaking of "the linkage between the political and the strategic environment," he said Nixon "would like to deal with the problem of peace on the entire front in which peace is challenged and not only on the military one."

This was a sharp shift. Nixon noted in a private letter to his secretaries of state and defense and the CIA director: "The previous administration" had tried to "insulate" particular targets of diplomatic opportunity "as much as possible from the ups and downs of conflicts elsewhere."

Now hear Secretary of State George

Shultz in a speech last month that looks in hindsight more than ever like the blueprint for the administration's summit strategy: "Arms control is not just a technical exercise," Shultz said. "It has to be embedded in a policy and in an environment that reduce our real dangers and make the world safer. . . . Weapons are the symptoms of this [political] struggle, not its cause." Now hear a latter-day Nixon, in this fall's Foreign Affairs magazine: "It is not the existence of arms, but political differences that lead to their use, which leads to war."

The two men are coming down together on one side of a longstanding issue. If Nixon and Kissinger reversed Democratic policy, Jimmy Carter and his secretary of state, Cyrus Vance, turned the policy back again. In their first extended conversation, Vance

The real question is whether this strategy will work any better the second time around.

recalls in his memoirs, "Carter made clear that one of his highest priorities would be to conclude a new SALT agreement, and without linking it to other aspects of U.S.-Soviet relations."

The clear message from Geneva, then, is that "linkage" by whatever name is back in style, not just as something you might read into assorted policy pronouncements, but as a strategy put to hard practice by the president face-to-face with his Soviet counterpart. And the real question from Geneva is not so much who won or lost but whether this strategy will work any better the second time around.

Part of the answer is lost in uncertainties about how the Soviets will respond. Another part is lost in differences of opinion over how well it worked the first time. Kissinger argues that it worked usefully to produce détente—and that détente worked until Nixon was in no condition to make anything work.

But Kissinger also concedes that "linkage . . . is not a natural concept for Americans," that political discontinuity, bureaucratic fragmentation and American pragmatism rob us of "a sense of time or context or the seamless web of reality." If that is indeed our natural state, Ronald Reagan has his work cut out for him. More so than in any administration in recent memory, seamlessness has not been a distinguishing feature of his administration's conduct of foreign policy.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 14-B

PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER
25 November 1985

Letters to the Editor

CIA response

To the Editor:

The Philadelphia Inquirer's Nov. 14 editorial titled "How to lose defectors" claims that the CIA gave information to the press from KGB defector Vitaly S. Yurchenko. This statement is false and is resented deeply by the Central Intelligence Agency.

The CIA has made no information public concerning Mr. Yurchenko, other than Mr. Yurchenko's biography, as journalists in Washington are well aware. Moreover, it is forbidden by presidential Executive Order 12333 from propagandizing or attempting to influence the American public. We adhere to this restriction.

The unfortunate leaks of Mr. Yurchenko's information to the media have come from sources other than the agency. These leaks are under investigation.

George V. Lauder
Director

Public Affairs
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 9-AWASHINGTON TIMES
25 November 1985

Overseeing the overseers

Perhaps we should just skip the middle man and let the Capitol Hill press corps oversee U.S. intelligence activities. Is it possible that our espionage could be carried out in a more public manner?

The current oversight structure was borne out of the Otis Pike-Frank Church investigations of the 1970s, those panels revealing no effective checks on CIA operations. Both houses of Congress then set up oversight committees to monitor intelligence, but now there are nothing but checks. As one expert put it, "The whole system of congressional oversight has broken down. Right now, there's anarchy."

At first, congressional oversight worked tolerably well, but around 1982 the House committee grew radically politicized. The relationship between the CIA and Congress became adversarial, a situation that deteriorated when Sen. David Durenberger's oversight committee became a high-profile fo-

rum. Sen. Durenberger boasts, "The committee will criticize errors even in public, if appropriate." Between politicization in the House and publicization in the Senate, Congress has been able to disrupt the CIA's already quirky operations.

To correct this detrimental situation, Rep. Henry Hyde has suggested merging the two oversight committees, which would reduce the number of congressmen and staff members privy to secret information and presumably reduce the number of leaks. But that is only part of the problem; there will still be those who reduce oversight to partisanship, and there will still be those who, like Mr. Durenberger, use the committee for grandstanding. The real reform in this matter must come from House Speaker Tip O'Neill and Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole. They must set a clear code of ethics for oversight committees, and they must come down on members who act unethically. Nobody is doing that now.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE D15NEW YORK TIMES
25 November 1985

Spy Case Intensifies Security Questions at C.I.A.

By STEPHEN ENGELBERG

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 24 — The arrest of a former Central Intelligence Agency analyst on charges of spying for the Chinese has raised new questions about security at the C.I.A., whose standing in Congress and within the Reagan Administration has been damaged by security breaches and public reverses.

Administration officials said that the analyst, Larry Wu-Tai Chin, had access to relatively low-level classified material in his job at the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, an arm of the C.I.A. But intelligence specialists said the significance of the case was that an employee may have evaded the agency's security procedures — which include regular polygraph, or lie-detector, tests — for three decades.

Additionally, an affidavit filed Saturday by Federal investigators says that Mr. Chin was able to take classified material from his workplace by hiding it in his briefcase and clothing.

William J. Casey, the Director of Central Intelligence, has in recent months been confronted with increasing criticism from Congress and the White House over several well-publicized incidents.

These include a Soviet intelligence officer who defected to the West and then returned to Moscow after holding two news conferences denouncing the agency; a former C.I.A. officer who was charged with spying for the Soviet Union, and a former agency clerk who admitted passing secret information to officials in Ghana.

"There are a lot of strange occurrences here that at least show people were not on the ball," an Administration official, who spoke on the condition that he not be identified, said in a recent interview. "Obviously there's great concern. It's not like the agency is not getting a lot of money and support."

Senator Patrick J. Leahy, the Vermont Democrat who is vice chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, said the string of public em-

barrassments is taking its toll on morale at the C.I.A.

"Some in the agency are reeling from it, and are feeling very, very defensive," Mr. Leahy said. "They shouldn't be. The C.I.A. is still the best intelligence service in the world. They should realize that every major intelligence service is going to have some things go wrong. Unfortunately the things that go right aren't made public."

Mr. Leahy, who has previously called for improvements in the agency's security procedures, said that some of the recent cases against C.I.A. employees had been initiated by the agency.

Failed a Polygraph Test

Administration officials say the charges against Sharon M. Scranage, a C.I.A. clerk who pleaded guilty in September to identifying covert agents in Ghana, arose when she failed a routine polygraph test administered by the agency. Additionally, the C.I.A. was also responsible for initiating the investigation of Mr. Chin, officials said.

"Having been one of those who has pushed for improved counterintelligence," Mr. Leahy said, "I am not going to say: 'You beefed it up, you caught some spies, and now I'm going to beat you about the head and shoulders for that.'"

Mr. Leahy said it was too early to speculate on any possible damage Mr. Chin may have caused. Administration officials said that analysts at the Foreign Broadcast Information Service receive reports from the C.I.A. and other agencies. Such documents, Administration officials said, in the hands of hostile intelligence services, could be useful in understanding general trends in the Government's approach to a country.

The reports do not include the identities of covert agents gathering information, the officials said. But they cautioned that in some instances, a careful reading of a document would allow a hostile intelligence service to deduce that a particular piece of data could only have come from one source.

Investigators have not yet specified what sort of security clearances Mr. Chin held, but the Federal Bureau of Investigation did say in a statement Saturday that he was a naturalized American citizen. According to former C.I.A. officials, it is unlikely that a naturalized American citizen would have been granted one of the higher-level security clearances.

Stansfield M. Turner, President Carter's Director of Central Intelligence, said today he believed the agency's security procedures were lax when he took over the post in 1977. He asserted that "considerable improvements" had been made under the Carter Administration, but said, "I wouldn't want to profess I thought it was where it should be."

Mr. Turner said that the recruitment of an information-service employee by a hostile intelligence service was not an especially serious breach of security.

"F.B.I.S. is not the heart of the C.I.A.," he said. "It is pretty largely an unclassified organization. That is why I take a less than cataclysmic view of this."

But Mr. Turner said it was "terrible" that it took three decades to uncover the case. "Whether the data is significant or not," he said, "anyone who is passing information like this should be caught in less than 30 years."

The C.I.A.'s approach to counterintelligence has long been a matter of concern to some critics in Congress. Senator Malcolm Wallop, a Wyoming Republican, has contended that the agency is insufficiently sensitive to the question of whether a double agent has penetrated upper levels of the agency.

The agency has never ruled out the possibility that such an agent had gained access to its secrets, but its officials have given little credence to Mr. Wallop's assertions.

A senior Administration official said that it was almost inevitable that some hostile intelligence service would succeed in penetrating the agency. "It never occurred to me that there weren't spies in the agency," the official said. "We have propounded this myth, and it has been a useful myth, but it's still a myth, that somehow Americans are not vulnerable."

Noting that thousands of intelligence agents direct their efforts against the United States, the official said, "It shouldn't surprise anyone that there are spies within the United States Government."

The issue is an important one for an intelligence service, former C.I.A. officers say, since the recruitment of agents in the field depends on a guarantee that their identities will be kept secret.

This year's round of espionage cases involving C.I.A. employees began with Miss Scranage, who was a clerk in the agency's station in the Ghanaian capital, Accra. She admitted to the authorities that she had given classified information to her Ghanaian lover. Later this year, a Soviet intelligence officer, Vitaly Yurchenko, defected and helped the F.B.I. develop espionage charges

against Edward Lee Howard, a former C.I.A. officer who had been dismissed.

According to Administration officials, Mr. Howard had helped Soviet intelligence agents uncover an American agent, A. G. Tolkachev, who had been providing the C.I.A. with sensitive details about Soviet weapons research.

Just this month, Mr. Yurchenko, whose defection had been touted by the C.I.A. as a coup, announced his return to the Soviet Union. The Administration is still trying to determine whether he actually defected and then changed his mind or was a Soviet plant. Some former C.I.A. officials have suggested Mr. Yurchenko's case is part of a pattern of mishandling defectors.