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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

July 11, 1985


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MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET  
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
THE DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT  
AGENCY

SUBJECT: Strategic Forces Modernization (U)

The President has approved the attached National Security Decision Directive on the Strategic Forces Modernization Program. (S)

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

  
for Robert C. McFarlane

Attachment  
NSDD-178

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July 10, 1985

NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION  
DIRECTIVE 178STRATEGIC FORCES MODERNIZATION (U)

NSDD-12 dated October 1, 1981 outlined the overall U.S. Strategic Modernization Program. NSDD-12 was supplemented by NSDD-91 dated April 19, 1983. The following guidance supersedes both NSDD-12 and NSDD-91, and supplements NSDD-119 which sets out the Strategic Defense Initiative and NSDD-78 which relates U.S. force structure to the START negotiations. (U)

The modernization program outlined in this directive will guide the continued high priority long-term modernization of our strategic forces. The objective of this directive is to ensure that our national technological resources are fully utilized to develop and deploy strategic systems which ensure the endurance of our national strategy to deter nuclear war and to provide for strategic stability. (U)

1. Strategic Communications. The improvement of our strategic command, control and communications continues to be the first priority of our modernization program. Strategic connectivity that can survive and endure before, during and after all conditions of severe stress including nuclear attack is essential. Low-cost, backup systems will be funded and deployed. Particular emphasis should be placed on the development and deployment of warning systems which can provide timely and unambiguous warning to national command authorities of impending strategic attack by ICBMs, SLBMs, air and sea-launched cruise missiles, and manned aircraft. Connectivity to the SLBM force will be modernized as rapidly as practical through the deployment of E-6A aircraft. (S)
2. Bomber Forces. Continue modernization of our bomber force through the development and deployment of the B-1B, the Advanced Technology Bomber (ATB), and the Advanced Cruise Missiles. The B-1B will have the capability to launch both ALCMs and Advanced Cruise Missiles (ACM). One hundred B-1Bs will be deployed with the first squadron to be

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operational in 1986. During the development of the ATB, design options will be preserved to ensure that the ATB could ultimately have the capability in conjunction with other national assets to locate and attack relocatable targets within the Soviet Union and other potential adversaries. Also, the ATB should have the ability to deliver both nuclear and conventional weapons. The numbers of ATBs and Advanced Cruise Missiles to be deployed and their initial operational capability (IOC) dates are set forth in Annex One to this NSDD. The ACM should be produced and deployed on B-52Hs as rapidly as practical. Bomber modifications and rotary launcher schedules should be developed to support this schedule. NSDD-78 established 350 heavy bombers as a lower limit on the bomber force structure for purposes of the START negotiations. Previous force structure projections have not been compatible with this level. The Department of Defense should recommend an appropriate heavy bomber force structure plan to the National Security Council by December 1, 1985. (TS)

3. Sea-Launched Missile Forces. Continue the Trident II (D-5) and Trident submarine programs. The D-5 will be developed and deployed so that the first D-5/Trident SSBN will be deployed no later than 1989. While the final force structure of Tridents and D-5's is not determined at this time, acquisition of Tridents should occur at the rate of at least one every year until a final force structure decision is made. (S)

4. Land-Based Missile Deployment

- a. The Peacekeeper Program--Phase I. Continued development and production of the Peacekeeper missile will be accomplished on a priority basis. Sufficient missiles and associated ground support equipment will be produced to support an operational deployment of 100 missiles. At least 50 of these 100 missiles will be deployed in existing Minuteman silos in Wyoming, supported by Francis E. Warren Air Force Base. Specifically, the first 50 missiles will replace the Minuteman missiles in the 400th Strategic Missile Squadron (SMS). If the second 50 are deployed in Minuteman silos, they will replace Minuteman missiles in the 319th SMS in Wyoming and Nebraska. The IOC of the Peacekeeper missile in this basing plan will be achieved in 1986. The full operational capability of the 100 missiles will be achieved as soon as possible thereafter depending on the basing mode selected for the second 50 Peacekeeper missiles. Full operational capability for the first 50 Peacekeeper missiles in silos will be accomplished by the end of calendar year 1988. The Department of Defense should ensure that the production of Peacekeeper missiles is not

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interrupted until the 100 Peacekeeper missiles and associated test missiles and spares are produced. (S)

- b. The Peacekeeper Program--Phase II. The DOD should develop a plan for determining the best basing mode for the second 50 Peacekeeper missiles. The plan should include an orderly process for identifying a preferred basing mode or modes for the second 50 Peacekeepers as soon as possible based on the military requirement, considering the unique capabilities of both the Peacekeeper and Small ICBM, the technology advancements achieved since the President's Commission on Strategic Forces report in early 1983 and developments in the Soviet ICBM force structure. The plan should include a proposed rationale for developing the consensus necessary to gain required funding for the second 50 Peacekeeper missiles and ground support equipment. The DOD should provide a report on the proposed plan to the President by September 15, 1985 and a progress report on the status of the plan by November 15, 1985. The progress report should be consistent with the assessment of specific actions that could be taken to respond to Soviet noncompliance directed by National Security Decision Directive 173, but should be separate from it. The DOD should ensure that sufficient progress has been made by January 1986 so that the Secretary of Defense can recommend a proposed new basing mode or modes for further research or to enter full scale development, if required, in fiscal year 1987 for the second 50 Peacekeeper missiles. (S)
- c. Small ICBM. Continue the engineering design of a small, single warhead ICBM. Such a missile should be ready for full scale development in 1987 and potential deployment in the early 1990's. Special emphasis will be given to development of low-cost components designed to reduce the life cycle cost of mobile systems. The Department of Defense should establish a baseline program for the small ICBM by July 15, 1986 and should report this baseline with associated cost and progress made to date on low-cost basing concepts for the small ICBM, to the National Security Council. (S)
- d. Survivability Enhancements. Continue programs to resolve uncertainties regarding silo and shelter hardness applicable to Peacekeeper and small missiles, studies of fratricide effects, and investigation of different types of land-based vehicles and launchers, particularly hardened vehicles. Research on Deep Underground Basing will continue because of its application to a secure reserve force, and its potential for survivable C<sup>3</sup>. Particular emphasis

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should be placed on the study of combinations of superhard silos and other survivability enhancements as possible alternative future basing modes for land-based ICBMs. Research should also continue on Ballistic Missile Defense systems compatible with other survivability enhancements for land-based ICBMs. This research should draw from and be closely coordinated with research conducted on the Strategic Defense Initiative program. (S)

5. Strategic Defense. Guidance on the Strategic Defense Initiative program is provided in NSDD-119. Increased attention should be placed on separate research to ensure that defenses against manned aircraft and cruise missiles are developed concurrently with defenses against ballistic missiles being developed by the SDI program. This research should allow for a possible future deployment decision for defenses against advanced low observable air-breathing threats to occur in the same timeframe as a possible deployment decision for defense against ballistic missiles. (S)
6. ICBM/SLBM Penetration Aids. Given the intensity of Soviet development of ABM technologies, a program will be pursued to develop penetration aids, decoys, and maneuverable RVs for U.S. ICBMs and SLBMs. These programs should be structured so as to allow the deployment of penetration aids and decoys by the early 1990s and MARVs as soon as practical thereafter if required. (S)
7. Capability to Attack Relocatable Targets. On an urgent basis, develop a program to provide a capability to attack relocatable targets with U.S. strategic forces. The Department of Defense should recommend to the National Security Council by April 2, 1986 an appropriate program to develop as soon as possible the sensors, C<sup>3</sup>I assets, and strategic force structure required to attack relocatable targets. (S)

Ronald Reagan

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