

21 August 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Ambassador Peter H. Dailey  
FROM: DCI  
SUBJECT: Leaks

After Labor Day we will have to address the leak problem and I would appreciate your getting up to speed so you can provide advice.

I am sending you copies of two talks I made--one to the American Society of Newspaper Editors and the other to the American Jewish Committee. Also attached is an interview I gave to the WASHINGTON JOURNALISM REVIEW.

I'd appreciate your critiquing a draft on intelligence and the media which was put together here for a comprehensive article which the WASHINGTONIAN has agreed to publish. I think it is important as a basis for a campaign to interest the Congress in this issue in the next session. We should get this kind of information out during the fall months. I find this draft falling in the tone and not quite as good as that of my two talks on this subject. I do think this statement needs to be longer and stronger. Still, it can use some reorganization and editorial polish.

Also attached are a letter that George Lauder wrote to USA TODAY, a roundup of the issue in a NATIONAL JOURNAL article, and a copy of an op-ed piece by Ben Bradlee in the WASHINGTON POST.

William J. Casey

Attachments

REMARKS OF WILLIAM J. CASEY

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

BEFORE THE

AMERICAN SOCIETY OF NEWSPAPER EDITORS

WEDNESDAY, 9 APRIL 1986

J. W. MARRIOTT HOTEL

WASHINGTON, D. C.

GOOD AFTERNOON. IT IS A PRIVILEGE AND A PLEASURE FOR ME TO BE WITH YOU TODAY TO DISCUSS NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE MEDIA. NATIONAL SECURITY HAS MANY DIMENSIONS BUT I WILL FOCUS ON ONE ELEMENT -- INTELLIGENCE -- WHICH IMPACTS MILITARY FORCES AND WEAPONS ACQUISITION, TERRORISM AND REGIONAL CONFLICTS, DIPLOMACY AND ARMS CONTROL, AND VIRTUALLY EVERY OTHER ASPECT OF OUR FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICIES.

THE WORK OF THE AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IS MUCH LIKE YOURS. WE BOTH WORK AT THE COLLECTION AND PROPER PRESENTATION OF ACCURATE INFORMATION THAT LEADS TO INFORMED JUDGMENTS. OUR OFFICERS OVERSEAS, LIKE YOUR CORRESPONDENTS, WORK DAY AND NIGHT TO OBTAIN VITAL INFORMATION. LIKE MANY SKILLED JOURNALISTS, CIA ANALYSTS SPEND HOURS PORING OVER REPORTS FROM MANY DIFFERENT SOURCES IN ORDER TO PRESENT FACTS IN THE CONTEXT OF BROADER EVENTS AND ISSUES.

NEITHER YOU NOR THE CIA CAN DO ITS JOB WITHOUT HAVING SOURCES AND METHODS OF COLLECTING INFORMATION WHICH OFTEN MUST REMAIN UNIDENTIFIED TO THE PUBLIC. I AM REQUIRED BY LAW TO PROTECT THE SOURCES AND METHODS BY WHICH WE COLLECT INTELLIGENCE. THIS IS A SERIOUS RESPONSIBILITY AND ONE I DO NOT TAKE LIGHTLY. YOU IN JOURNALISM TAKE JUST AS SERIOUSLY THE CONFIDENTIALITY AND PROTECTION OF YOUR SOURCES.

OUR COUNTRY HAS INVESTED TIME, EFFORT, AND TALENT OVER MANY YEARS AND SPENT MANY BILLIONS OF DOLLARS TO DEVELOP METHODS OF COLLECTING THE INFORMATION NEEDED TO ASSESS MISSILES AND OTHER WEAPONS AIMED AT US, TO DETERMINE THE INTENTIONS AND VULNERABILITIES OF OUR ADVERSARIES SO THAT WE CAN DEVELOP EFFECTIVE DEFENSES AND COUNTERMEASURES, TO PROTECT OUR CITIZENS AND INSTALLATIONS AROUND THE WORLD FROM TERRORIST ATTACKS, AND TO ASSIST OUR DIPLOMATS. GOOD INTELLIGENCE SOURCES ARE CRITICAL TO OUR NATIONAL SECURITY, INCLUDING OUR HOPES OF EFFECTIVE ARMS CONTROL AND THE SAFETY OF AND LIBERTY OF OUR CITIZENS. SECRECY AND CONFIDENTIALITY AS TO HOW AND THROUGH WHOM WE COLLECT INFORMATION IS ESSENTIAL TO OUR EFFECTIVENESS.

WE MUST CLASSIFY AND RESTRICT THE CIRCULATION OF INFORMATION ABOUT HOW AND WHERE WE COLLECT INTELLIGENCE AND OF THE REPORTS AND ASSESSMENTS BASED ON THAT INTELLIGENCE IF THEY MIGHT REVEAL OR COMPROMISE OUR SOURCES OR METHODS. THE KGB AND OTHER HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES SPEND BILLIONS OF DOLLARS EACH YEAR IN AN EFFORT TO ACQUIRE THIS INFORMATION. AND THE UNAUTHORIZED PUBLICATION OF THIS RESTRICTED INFORMATION HANDS TO OUR ADVERSARIES ON A SILVER PLATTER INFORMATION THAT THEIR SPIES, THEIR RESEARCHERS, AND THEIR SATELLITES ARE WORKING 24 HOURS A DAY TO UNCOVER AND USE AGAINST US.

IN RECENT YEARS, PUBLICATION OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION BY THE MEDIA HAS DESTROYED OR SERIOUSLY DAMAGED INTELLIGENCE SOURCES OF THE HIGHEST VALUE. EVERY METHOD WE HAVE OF ACQUIRING INTELLIGENCE -- OUR AGENTS, OUR RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER SECURITY SERVICES, OUR PHOTOGRAPHIC AND ELECTRONIC CAPABILITIES, THE INFORMATION WE GET FROM COMMUNICATIONS -- HAS BEEN DAMAGED BY THE PUBLICATION OF UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES.

STORIES IN BOTH THE PRINT AND ELECTRONIC MEDIA HAVE SHOWN, SOMETIMES IN GREAT DETAIL, HOW TO COUNTER CAPABILITIES IN WHICH WE HAVE INVESTED BILLIONS OF DOLLARS AND MANY YEARS OF CREATIVE TALENT AND EFFORT. THIS, TIME AND TIME AGAIN, HAS ENABLED THOSE HOSTILE TO US TO ABORT HUGE INVESTMENTS, TO CONCEAL AND OTHERWISE DENY US INFORMATION CRITICAL TO OUR DEFENSE, AND TO DEPRIVE US OF THE ABILITY TO PROTECT OUR CITIZENS FROM TERRORIST ATTACK. LEAKERS ARE COSTING THE TAXPAYERS MILLIONS AND EVEN BILLIONS OF DOLLARS -- AND, MORE IMPORTANT, PUTTING AMERICANS ABROAD AS WELL AS OUR COUNTRY ITSELF AT RISK.

APART FROM OUR NEED TO PROTECT OUR SOURCES AND METHODS, WE DO NOT WISH TO LIMIT YOU IN ANY WAY FROM GETTING THE INFORMATION THE PUBLIC NEEDS AND SHOULD HAVE. I BELIEVE WE ARE ALL WORKING TOWARD THE SAME GOAL -- MAINTAINING THE BEST AND MOST FREE COUNTRY IN THE WORLD. WE FULLY SUPPORT AND ADMIRE YOUR COMMITMENT TO INFORM THE PUBLIC AND THE DEDICATION AND INGENUITY WITH WHICH YOU MEET THAT COMMITMENT.

BUT I DO BELIEVE WE ALL HAVE RESPONSIBILITIES WE MUST BALANCE. IT'S A VERY DELICATE AND DIFFICULT BALANCE TO STRIKE. I THINK MRS. KATHARINE GRAHAM GOT IT RIGHT IN A VERY THOUGHTFUL AND CONSTRUCTIVE SPEECH SHE MADE ON TERRORISM AND THE MEDIA AT THE GUILDHALL IN LONDON LAST DECEMBER.

SHE TOLD HOW A TELEVISION NETWORK AND A COLUMNIST HAD OBTAINED INFORMATION THAT WE WERE READING THE MESSAGES OF PEOPLE ARRANGING THE BOMBING OF THE U.S. EMBASSY IN BEIRUT. SHORTLY AFTER THIS PUBLIC DISCLOSURE, THAT TRAFFIC STOPPED. THIS UNDERMINED OUR EFFORTS TO CAPTURE THE TERRORIST LEADERS AND ELIMINATED A SOURCE OF INFORMATION ABOUT FUTURE ATTACKS.

MRS. GRAHAM WENT ON TO SAY: "THIS KIND OF RESULT, ALBEIT UNINTENTIONAL, POINTS UP THE NECESSITY FOR FULL COOPERATION WHEREVER POSSIBLE BETWEEN THE MEDIA AND THE AUTHORITIES. WHEN THE MEDIA OBTAINS ESPECIALLY SENSITIVE INFORMATION, WE ARE WILLING TO TELL THE AUTHORITIES WHAT WE HAVE LEARNED AND WHAT WE PLAN TO REPORT. AND WHILE RESERVING THE RIGHT TO MAKE THE FINAL DECISION OURSELVES, WE ARE ANXIOUS TO LISTEN TO ARGUMENTS ABOUT WHY INFORMATION SHOULD NOT BE AIRED. [THE MEDIA] WANT TO DO NOTHING THAT WOULD ENDANGER HUMAN LIFE OR NATIONAL SECURITY. WE ARE WILLING TO COOPERATE WITH THE AUTHORITIES IN WITHHOLDING INFORMATION THAT COULD HAVE THOSE CONSEQUENCES."

I SUBMIT THESE PRINCIPLES APPLY WITH THE SAME FORCE TO COSTLY INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES AS THEY DO TO TARGETS THREATENED BY TERRORISM.

I HAVE WITNESSED ADMIRABLE RESTRAINT AND JUDGMENT BY JOURNALISTS. I HAVE BEEN GRATIFIED BY THE READINESS OF MANY OF YOU TO CAREFULLY CONSIDER SOMETIMES WITHHOLDING PUBLICATION OF INFORMATION WHICH COULD JEOPARDIZE NATIONAL INTERESTS OR TO TREAT OR PRESENT A STORY IN A MANNER WHICH MEETS THE PUBLIC NEED, YET MINIMIZES POTENTIAL DAMAGE TO INTELLIGENCE SOURCES. THE TRICK IS TO RECOGNIZE THE POTENTIAL FOR DAMAGE AND TO CONSULT ON HOW IT MIGHT BE MINIMIZED. WE ARE ALWAYS READY AND AVAILABLE ON SHORT NOTICE TO HELP ON THAT.

I HASTEN TO ADD, HOWEVER, THAT THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY OF PREVENTING THESE TYPES OF LEAKS IS TO INCREASE DISCIPLINE WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT. THE INABILITY TO CONTROL SENSITIVE INFORMATION IS DESTRUCTIVE OF THE MORALE OF PEOPLE WHO DO KEEP SECRETS, AS WELL AS DAMAGING TO OUR SECURITY. DURING THE LAST SEVERAL YEARS, THE PRESIDENT HAS EMPHASIZED THE SPECIAL OBLIGATION FEDERAL WORKERS HAVE TO PROTECT THE CLASSIFIED INFORMATION WITH WHICH THEY ARE ENTRUSTED. WE HAVE INCREASED OUR EFFORTS TO UNCOVER THOSE WHO VIOLATE THIS TRUST. WE ARE STUDYING WHETHER NEW LAWS ARE NEEDED TO DEAL WITH FEDERAL EMPLOYEES WHO DECIDE ON THEIR OWN TO DISCLOSE CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.

WHEN OUR INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS REACH THE MEDIA, WHETHER AUTHORIZED OR NOT, WE ARE FREQUENTLY ASKED TO PRODUCE THE EVIDENCE WHICH SUPPORTS OUR JUDGMENTS. SOMETIMES WE CAN, BUT MUCH MORE OFTEN WE CANNOT WITHOUT JEOPARDIZING OUR SOURCES OR TEACHING OUR ADVERSARIES HOW TO DENY US NEEDED INFORMATION IN THE FUTURE.

IF WE CAN'T REVEAL OUR EVIDENCE OR DISCLOSE OUR SOURCES, WHY SHOULD THE POLICYMAKERS OR THE PUBLIC TRUST INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS? OUR PRIMARY CREDIBILITY COMES FROM THE ACCURACY AND RELIABILITY OF OUR PAST ASSESSMENTS AND FROM THE CONTINUED DEDICATION OF THE PEOPLE AND THE INTEGRITY OF THE PROCESS BY WHICH THEY ARE PRODUCED. OUR INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTS ARE THE WORK OF CAREER PROFESSIONALS BASED ON INFORMATION FROM A WIDE VARIETY OF SOURCES AND THE MOST SOPHISTICATED AND ADVANCED INTELLIGENCE TECHNOLOGY WHICH EXISTS IN THE WORLD -- PHOTOGRAPHY, SPACE SATELLITES, ELECTRONICS, ACOUSTICS, COMMUNICATIONS COLLECTORS, SEISMIC AND OTHER SENSORS.

OUR NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES ARE THE RESULT OF LONG HOURS OF PREPARATION AND DEBATE BY ANALYSTS FROM THE DIA, CIA, NSA, ARMY, NAVY, MARINES, AND AIR FORCE INTELLIGENCE AND OTHER COMPONENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. THEIR WORK IS REVIEWED BY THE CHIEFS OF EACH OF THESE COMPONENTS SITTING AS THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD AND CHARGED



WITH SEEING THAT THE RELEVANT INFORMATION AND JUDGMENTS HELD BY THEIR ORGANIZATIONS ARE AVAILABLE. AS THE BOARD'S CHAIRMAN, I SEE THAT ANY SUBSTANTIATED DISSENTING OR ALTERNATIVE VIEW IS REFLECTED SO THAT POLICYMAKERS HAVE THE BENEFIT OF THE FULL RANGE OF OPINION IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

IN A WORLD WHERE THE SOVIET BLOC SPENDS LAVISHLY ON NEW WEAPONS AND WORKS AGGRESSIVELY TO EXPAND ITS CONTROL AND INFLUENCE AT THE EXPENSE OF FREE NATIONS AND WHERE SOVEREIGN STATES, LIKE LIBYA, USE TERRORISM AS AN INSTRUMENT OF FOREIGN POLICY, IT IS INCREASINGLY ESSENTIAL THAT THE PUBLIC LEARN WHAT SORTS OF CHALLENGES HIS GOVERNMENT IS FACING.

WE MAKE EXTRAORDINARY EFFORTS TO RESPOND TO REQUESTS FROM BOTH THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCHES TO SANITIZE OR DECLASSIFY INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION AND ASSESSMENTS IN ORDER TO MAKE THEM AVAILABLE TO THE PUBLIC. PERHAPS THE BEST EXAMPLE OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE PUBLIC DEBATE ON IMPORTANT ISSUES OF NATIONAL SECURITY HAS BEEN DIA'S ANNUAL PUBLICATION, SOVIET MILITARY POWER, WHICH IS CLOSELY COORDINATED BY CIA. LAST SUMMER THE COMMUNITY AT THE REQUEST OF THE WHITE HOUSE AND CONGRESS SANITIZED AND PRESENTED IN OPEN TESTIMONY OUR ASSESSMENT OF SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCES.

MORE FREQUENTLY, HOWEVER, CIA MATERIAL IS DECLASSIFIED FOR USE IN OTHER GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS, SUCH AS STATE'S WHITE PAPERS ON TERRORISM AND TWO PUBLICATIONS DISTRIBUTED BY THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT OVER THE PAST FEW YEARS ON SOVIET ACQUISITION OF WESTERN TECHNOLOGY. WHENEVER INTELLIGENCE IS USED AS THE SOURCE FOR UNCLASSIFIED PUBLICATIONS, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE STAY WITHIN THE EVIDENCE TO MAINTAIN OUR INTEGRITY AND TO PROTECT THE POLICYMAKER.

THIS ORDERLY AND CAUTIOUS APPROACH TO THE PUBLIC USE OF INTELLIGENCE IS GUIDED BY THE HIGHEST GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES AND INVOLVES THE CLOSE PARTICIPATION OF INTELLIGENCE PROFESSIONALS. WHEN WE PROMISE OUR SOURCES CONFIDENTIALITY, WE IN MANY CASES LITERALLY HOLD THEIR LIVES IN OUR HANDS. AS WE RESPECT THE RIGHT OF THE PRESS TO GATHER AND PUBLISH NEWS AND APPLAUD YOUR EXPOSURE OF WASTE, CORRUPTION, AND OTHER MISCONDUCT, I HOPE YOU WILL RESPECT OUR RIGHT AND DUTY TO KEEP THE NATION'S LEGITIMATE SECRETS. AMONG THE THOUSANDS OF EDITORIALS ABOUT THE FAILINGS AND SHORTCOMINGS OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, I CAN RECALL FEW, IF ANY, THAT TOOK A PUBLIC SERVANT TO TASK FOR REVEALING CLASSIFIED INFORMATION. YET CLASSIFIED LEAKS ARE AT LEAST AS DAMAGING AS THE COST OVERRUNS, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST, AND OTHER TYPES OF MALFEASANCE SO PROPERLY CRITICIZED BY THE PRESS.

WE ARE EAGER TO DEVELOP BETTER UNDERSTANDING AND CLOSER COOPERATION BETWEEN YOU IN THE WORKING PRESS, WHO PERFORM SUCH A VITAL FUNCTION IN OUR SOCIETY, AND THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, WHICH PLAYS AN ESSENTIAL ROLE IN PROTECTING THIS NATION. AMERICA NEEDS A FREE, VIGOROUS PRESS AND IT NEEDS A SUPERIOR INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. WE ARE BOTH SERVING OUR COUNTRY IN VITAL AND FUNDAMENTAL MATTERS.

THANK YOU.

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REMARKS OF WILLIAM J. CASEY

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

BEFORE

THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

THURSDAY, 15 MAY 1986

J. W. MARRIOTT HOTEL

WASHINGTON, D. C.

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, IT'S A GREAT PRIVILEGE FOR ME TO BE SPEAKING BEFORE THE 80TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE. THIS AFTERNOON I HAVE BEEN ASKED TO SPEAK TO THE PROBLEM OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM--A SCOURGE THAT INCREASINGLY IS BEGINNING TO DOMINATE OUR LIVES AND TIMES. BUT BEFORE I BEGIN, LET ME SAY THAT IT IS A SPECIAL PRIVILEGE TO APPEAR BEFORE A GROUP THAT HAS DONE SO MUCH ITSELF TO FIGHT THIS EPIDEMIC OF VIOLENCE. I KNOW THAT RABBI TANENBAUM AND THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE HAVE BEEN AT THE FOREFRONT OF THE EFFORT TO MOBILIZE A BROAD NATIONAL CONSTITUENCY IN THIS COUNTRY IN SUPPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATION. LET ME TELL YOU THAT THOSE OF US INSIDE GOVERNMENT NEED YOUR HELP AND APPRECIATE YOUR EFFORTS. TERRORISM IS A CANCER THAT IS SPREADING. IN 1983 WE RECORDED ABOUT 500 INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST INCIDENTS; LAST YEAR THE NUMBER ROSE TO ABOUT 800. THE UNITED STATES AND ITS FRIENDS AND ALLIES CONTINUE TO BE THE PRIMARY TARGETS. THE NUMBER OF PERSONS KILLED OR INJURED IN 1985 EXCEEDED 2,200--MORE THAN ANY OTHER YEAR, MORE EVEN THAN THE TERRIBLE TOLL IN 1983 WHEN THE US AND FRENCH CONTINGENTS OF THE PEACEKEEPING FORCE IN LEBANON WERE BOMBED. THE RISING CASUALTY RATE REFLECTS THE INCREASED USE OF LARGE BOMBS BY TERRORISTS AS WELL AS GREATER WILLINGNESS TO HARM INNOCENT BYSTANDERS THROUGH INDISCRIMINATE ATTACKS.

THE CAPABILITY OF THE TERRORIST TO KILL, MAIM, KIDNAP, AND TORTURE HIS VICTIMS HAS BEEN ENORMOUSLY ENHANCED BY STATE SPONSORSHIP. LIBYA, SYRIA, AND IRAN USE TERRORISM AS AN INSTRUMENT OF FOREIGN POLICY. THEY HIRE AND SUPPORT ESTABLISHED TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS, OF WHICH THERE ARE MANY AROUND THE WORLD. THESE COUNTRIES MAKE THEIR OFFICIALS, THEIR EMBASSIES, THEIR DIPLOMATIC POUCHES, THEIR COMMUNICATIONS CHANNELS, AND THEIR TERRITORY AS SAFEHAVEN FOR THESE CRIMINALS AVAILABLE TO PLAN, DIRECT AND EXECUTE BOMBINGS, ASSASSINATIONS, KIDNAPPINGS AND OTHER TERRORIST OPERATIONS.

THEY HAVE OPERATED LARGELY IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND IN EUROPE. TODAY THEY ARE NOW SPREADING THEIR WINGS INTO THIS HEMISPHERE. THE THREAT TO US FACILITIES, PERSONNEL, AND INTERESTS IS PARTICULARLY HIGH IN COLOMBIA, ECUADOR, AND PERU WHERE STRONGLY ANTI-US TERRORIST GROUPS ARE ACTIVE.

THE LINK BETWEEN LIBYAN- AND CUBAN-SPONSORED TERRORISM AND NICARAGUAN-SPONSORED TERRORISM IS LARGE AND GROWING LARGER. FOR SOME YEARS, THE LIBYANS HAVE BEEN SUPPORTING THE SANDINISTA GOVERNMENT IN NICARAGUA WITH SOMETHING LIKE \$100 MILLION DOLLARS A YEAR. YOU'LL REMEMBER HOW NICARAGUAN-SUPPORTED INSURGENTS IN EL SALVADOR KILLED OUR MARINES AT A CAFE IN THE CAPITAL OF THAT COUNTRY.

WE NOW SEE NICARAGUA TRAINING YOUNG MEN FOR VIOLENCE AND SUBVERSION, SENDING THEM INTO SOUTH AMERICA--INTO COLOMBIA FOR THE ATTACK ON THE PALACE OF JUSTICE IN BOGOTA AND AS FAR SOUTH AS CHILE. YOUNG MEN FROM LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES ARE BEING SENT TO LIBYA FOR TRAINING IN THE TERRORIST CAMPS THERE AND THEN BROUGHT BACK TO BE PLANTED AMONG THE POPULATION IN CENTRAL AMERICA, IN VENEZUELA, IN ECUADOR. IF THE SANDINISTA REGIME CONSOLIDATES ITSELF, WE CAN EXPECT MANAGUA TO BECOME THE BEIRUT OF THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE.

THERE IS A SOVIET CONNECTION AND SUPPORT FOR ALL THIS. WHILE SOME REFER TO THAT CONNECTION AS SHADOWY, IT SEEMS VERY REAL TO ME. THE STATES I HAVE JUST MENTIONED ARE NOT NECESSARILY CLOSE ALLIES TO MOSCOW, BUT THEY SHARE A FUNDAMENTAL HOSTILITY TO THE WEST. THE SOVIETS, WHO HOLD NO MORAL OBJECTIONS TO THE USE OF TERRORISM AND SEE MUCH OF THE UNREST IT CREATES AS ULTIMATELY BENEFICIAL TO THEIR FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES, DO NOT PARTICIPATE IN ANY INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO BLOCK TERRORISM OR TO JOIN IN MULTILATERAL EFFORTS TO COMBAT IT. IN BACKING REVOLUTIONARY CAUSES AGAINST ESTABLISHED GOVERNMENTS, IT IS LARGELY A MATTER OF INDIFFERENCE TO THE SOVIETS WHETHER TERRORIST TACTICS ARE USED AS LONG AS THE GROUPS THAT COMMIT THESE ACTS ATTACK NON-SOVIET OR NON-BLOC TARGETS. AND SOVIET SUPPORT FOR INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM COMES PACKAGED IN A VARIETY OF WAYS RANGING FROM DIRECT TRAINING OF TERRORIST PERSONNEL TO POLITICAL BACKING AND FUNDING FOR STATES ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN SPONSORING TERRORISM.

THE EAST EUROPEANS, ALMOST CERTAINLY WITH SOVIET KNOWLEDGE AND SUPPORT, PROVIDE SAFEHAVEN, TRANSIT PRIVILEGES AND MOVEMENT OF WEAPONS BOMBS FOR TERRORISTS. BULGARIA'S STATE TRADING ORGANIZATION KINTEX--WHICH IS ESSENTIALLY A STATE SMUGGLING OPERATION--AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA'S COMPARABLE ORGANIZATION OMNIPOL ARE AMONG THE MOST PROMINENT COMPANIES WHOSE WEAPONS EVENTUALLY HAVE APPEARED IN TERRORIST HANDS.

LET ME NOW TURN TO THE PROBLEMS US INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS AND COUNTERTERRORISM POLICYMAKERS AS THEY SEEK TO TACKLE THE PROBLEM OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. YOU'VE ALL HEARD AN ENDLESS STREAM OF COMMENTARY CALLING FOR A MUCH GREATER INTELLIGENCE EFFORT AGAINST TERRORISM. I COULDN'T AGREE MORE. BUT IT IS ALSO IMPORTANT FOR YOU TO KNOW THAT WE HAVE MADE A REMARKABLE AMOUNT OF PROGRESS OVER THE PAST FEW YEARS.

IN ORDER TO PREVENT TERRORIST PLANS OR DISRUPT THEIR ACTIVITIES, WE NEED INFORMATION ABOUT THEM. BUT THE VERY NATURE OF TERRORIST GROUPS AND THEIR ACTIVITIES MAKES THIS TASK EXTREMELY COMPLICATED. TERRORIST GROUPS ARE VERY SMALL, MAKING PENETRATION A VERY DIFFICULT TASK FOR POLICE OR INTELLIGENCE AGENTS. MOREOVER, THE OPERATING LIFE OF ANY SINGLE GROUP OF TERRORISTS IS OFTEN NO MORE THAN A FEW YEARS. LIKEWISE, TYPICAL TERRORIST LEADERS HAVE A RELATIVELY SHORT BUSINESS LIFE.



SO HOW DO WE GO ABOUT IT? FIRST, WE ARE ACQUIRING AS MUCH INFORMATION AS WE CAN ABOUT TERRORIST GROUPS INCLUDING MODUS OPERANDI, ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE, PERSONNEL SUPPORT, FINANCIAL AND COMMUNICATIONS ARRANGEMENTS, AND THEIR RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER GROUPS OR STATE SPONSORS. MUCH OF THIS IS JUST HARD RESEARCH, COMPILING A LARGE DATA BASE AND ATTEMPTING TO FILL IN THE GAPS. IT IS NOT VERY GLAMOROUS AND PEOPLE WHO DO IT DO NOT CAPTURE THE HEADLINES. BUT IT IS THE FOUNDATION UPON WHICH THE US COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORT RESTS. CONTINUING COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS ENABLES US TO IMPROVE OUR ABILITY TO DETECT TRENDS IN TERRORISM OPERATIONS, UPGRADE SECURITY IN AREAS MOST LIKELY AT RISK, AND DETERMINE VULNERABILITIES OF TERRORIST GROUPS. WE HAVE PUT IN PLACE A SYSTEM OF RAPID COMMUNICATIONS TO GATHER ASSESSMENTS, HAVE REPORTS TESTED BY EXPERTS THROUGHOUT OUR GOVERNMENT, AND PASS CONCLUSIONS AND WARNINGS QUICKLY TO THE POINT OF THE THREAT.

ACTION BASED ON OUR INTELLIGENCE, ALONG WITH THAT OF OTHER FRIENDLY COUNTRIES INCLUDING MODERATE ARAB GOVERNMENTS, HAS BEEN TAKEN TO PREVENT A GREAT MANY PLANNED TERRORIST ATTACKS AROUND THE WORLD. THE RATE OF EFFECTIVE WARNING IS INCREASING, RISING TO 26 DURING THE MONTH OF APRIL THIS YEAR.

SOMETIMES WE FALL JUST HEART-BREAKINGLY SHORT OF SUCCESS AS WAS THE CASE WITH THE BERLIN NIGHTCLUB BOMBING LAST MONTH.

YOU HAVE HEARD THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT OUTLINING THE EVIDENCE FOR THE LIBYAN COMPLICITY IN THE BERLIN BOMBING. WE ALSO HAVE COMPELLING EVIDENCE OF LIBYAN INVOLVEMENT IN ATTEMPTS TO ATTACK OTHER US TARGETS, SEVERAL OF WHICH WERE DESIGNED TO CAUSE MAXIMUM CASUALTIES SIMILAR TO THE BERLIN BOMBING.

-- FRANCE EXPELLED TWO MEMBERS OF THE LIBYAN PEOPLE'S BUREAU IN PARIS FOR THEIR INVOLVEMENT IN A PLANNED ATTACK ON VISA APPLICANTS WAITING IN LINE AT THE US EMBASSY.

-- FRANCE SUBSEQUENTLY EXPELLED TWO DISGRUNTLED FATAH FORCE 17 MEMBERS RECRUITED BY LIBYA TO CONDUCT ANOTHER OPERATION AGAINST THE UNITED STATES IN PARIS.

-- IN EARLY APRIL A LIBYAN-INSPIRED PLOT TO ATTACK THE US EMBASSY IN BEIRUT WAS ABORTED WHEN THE 107 MM ROCKET EXPLODED ON LAUNCH.

-- TURKISH POLICE IN LATE MARCH ARRESTED TWO TUNISIANS IN ISTANBUL WHO CLAIMED THEY WERE PLANNING ON BEHALF OF THE LIBYANS TO USE EXPLOSIVES AGAINST A US TARGET IN TURKEY; THE OPERATION WAS PLANNED TO INFLICT HEAVY CASUALTIES.

ALL IN ALL, NEARLY 50 LIBYAN DIPLOMATS HAVE BEEN EXPELLED RECENTLY FROM SPAIN, ITALY, FRANCE AND WEST GERMANY. IN FACT, SO FAR THIS YEAR WE HAVE REPORTS OF WELL OVER 35 LIBYAN-ASSOCIATED THREATS, INCLUDING SURVEILLANCE OF PLANNED ATTACKS AGAINST US PERSONNEL AND FACILITIES IN EUROPE, AFRICA AND ASIA.

TOGETHER WITH THE INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY SERVICES OF FRIENDLY COUNTRIES, WE HAVE DEVELOPED A WORLDWIDE COUNTER-TERRORIST NETWORK WHICH FUNCTIONS THROUGH INTELLIGENCE EXCHANGES, TRAINING AND TECHNICAL SUPPORT AND JOINT OPERATIONS. THE TERRORISTS ARE EVERYWHERE, MOVING SILENTLY ACROSS BORDERS AND STRIKING WITH AS MUCH STEALTH AND SURPRISE AS THEY CAN MANAGE. THIS APPARATUS MUST BE ABLE TO FOLLOW THEM, PASS WORD ON THEIR MOVEMENTS, PICK THEM UP OR ABORT THEIR PLANS, OR OTHERWISE DEFEND AGAINST THEM.

WE HAVE BECOME INCREASINGLY EFFECTIVE IN THIS AND OUR CAPABILITIES ARE IMPROVING. I TAKE THIS OCCASION TO FURTHER A NECESSARY DIALOGUE ON HOW WE CAN OVERCOME WHAT I CONSIDER THE GREATEST SINGLE IMPEDIMENT TO PROTECTING OUR INTERESTS AND OUR CITIZENS FROM THE SCOURGE OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM.

IN RECENT YEARS, PUBLICATION OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION BY THE MEDIA HAS DESTROYED OR SERIOUSLY DAMAGED INTELLIGENCE SOURCES OF THE HIGHEST VALUE. EVERY METHOD WE HAVE OF ACQUIRING INTELLIGENCE--OUR AGENTS, OUR RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER SECURITY SERVICES, OUR PHOTOGRAPHIC AND ELECTRONIC CAPABILITIES, THE INFORMATION WE GET FROM COMMUNICATIONS--HAS BEEN DAMAGED BY THE PUBLICATION OF UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES.

IN RECENT WEEKS AND MONTHS, A FLOOD OF INFORMATION AND MISINFORMATION HAS APPEARED IN PRINT AND ON THE AIR WAVES.

YOU'VE ALL SEEN IT. BEFORE THE PRESIDENT SPOKE TO OUR PEOPLE AND TOLD THEM ABOUT THE CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE THAT WE HAD ABOUT LIBYAN DIRECTION OF THE ATTACK ON ALLIED SOLDIERS IN THE BERLIN NIGHTCLUB, MAJOR NEWSPAPERS AND NEWS MAGAZINES PUBLISHED THAT LIBYAN COMMUNICATIONS WERE BEING READ. THE LIBYANS STOPPED USING THOSE COMMUNICATIONS AND THIS IS BOUND TO PUT OTHER PEACEFUL CITIZENS IN JEOPARDY. THIS IS A SEVERE PROBLEM WE MUST ADDRESS IF OUR FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM IS TO SUCCEED.

THIS IS A DELICATE AND CRITICAL PROBLEM, AND I WANT TO BE VERY CAREFUL AND PRECISE IN ADDRESSING IT. LET ME FIRST SAY THAT I YIELD TO NO ONE IN MY RESPECT FOR THE MEDIA AND THE PEOPLE WHO WORK FOR IT AND FOR THEIR FUNCTION IN OUR SOCIETY. IT HAS BEEN MY OWN PERSONAL ACTIVITY IN NEWSPAPERS, BOOKS, MAGAZINES AND ELECTRONIC BROADCASTING THAT HAS GIVEN ME THE CAPITAL TO RUN A PERSONAL DEFICIT FOR MORE THAN TEN YEARS IN ORDER TO SERVE OUR COUNTRY. I RESPECT THE DILIGENCE AND INGENUITY OF THE WORKING PRESS IN GATHERING AND PUBLISHING NEWS AND APPLAUD ITS EXPOSURE OF WASTE, INEFFICIENCY, CORRUPTION AND OTHER MISCONDUCT. IN SHORT, I SPEAK FROM 30 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE AS A FRIEND, PARTICIPANT AND SUPPORTER OF THE MEDIA.

I HAVE TWO POINTS THAT I FEEL I MUST MAKE AT THIS TIME IN ORDER TO DISCHARGE THE OBLIGATION SPECIFICALLY PLACED ON ME BY THE LAW OF OUR LAND TO PROTECT INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS.

PUT VERY SIMPLY, THEY ARE FIRST THAT THE MEDIA LIKE EVERYONE ELSE MUST ADHERE TO THE LAW. SECOND, ALL OF US HAVE RESPONSIBILITIES TO BALANCE IN CARRYING OUT ITS MISSION. IN THE FACE OF THE NEW DANGEROUS THREATS THAT WE FACE FROM INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, NOW IS THE TIME TO MUTUALLY ADDRESS THOSE RESPONSIBILITIES TOGETHER IN A SERIOUS AND MEASURED WAY. CONGRESS, SHORTLY AFTER IT ESTABLISHED THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY TO GATHER SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE, IN 1950 ENACTED A LAW WHICH PROHIBITS THE PUBLICATION OF INFORMATION ABOUT COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE. THERE HAS BEEN WIDESPREAD VIOLATION OF THAT LAW OVER RECENT WEEKS AND MONTHS. MUCH DAMAGE HAS BEEN DONE. KAY GRAHAM, THE PUBLISHER OF THE WASHINGTON POST, IN A RECENT VERY THOUGHTFUL AND CONSTRUCTIVE SPEECH CITED THE KIND OF DAMAGE WHICH WE HAVE SUSTAINED. SHE TOLD HOW A TELEVISION NETWORK AND A COLUMNIST HAD OBTAINED INFORMATION THAT WE WERE READING THE MESSAGES OF PEOPLE ARRANGING THE BOMBING OF THE U.S. EMBASSY IN BEIRUT. SHORTLY AFTER THIS PUBLIC DISCLOSURE, THAT TRAFFIC STOPPED. THIS UNDERMINED OUR EFFORTS TO CAPTURE THE TERRORIST LEADERS AND ELIMINATED A SOURCE OF INFORMATION ABOUT FUTURE ATTACKS.

WHERE THERE ALREADY HAS BEEN PUBLIC DISCLOSURE ABOUT COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE, THE LAW HAS BEEN VIOLATED BUT THE MILK HAS BEEN SPILLED. I WOULD NOT, THEREFORE, AT THIS TIME FAVOR ACTION FOR THESE PAST OFFENSES. BUT I STRONGLY BELIEVE THAT IF WE ARE TO PROTECT OUR SECURITY AS A NATION

AND THE SAFETY OF OUR CITIZENS IN THIS AGE OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND INTERCONTINENTAL MISSILES, THE LAW NOW ON THE BOOKS TO PROTECT A VERY NARROW SEGMENT OF INFORMATION, THAT DEALING WITH COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE, MUST NOW BE ENFORCED.

THERE ARE OTHER LARGE AREAS OF INFORMATION ABOUT OUR INTELLIGENCE, OUR NATIONAL SECURITY AND OUR RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER NATIONS WHICH CAN AND FREQUENTLY SHOULD BE PUBLISHED WITHOUT VIOLATING ANY LAW. BUT THERE ARE SITUATIONS IN WHICH MANY OF US BELIEVE THERE IS A RESPONSIBILITY, BEFORE RUSHING INTO PRINT OR ONTO THE AIR WAVES, TO WEIGH AND CONSIDER THE DANGER TO LIFE AND LIMB OF OUR CITIZENS AND OTHERS AND TO THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS AND THE REPUTATION FOR RELIABILITY OF OUR NATION.

THE TEMPTATION TO GO BEYOND THE FACTS AND PIECE TOGETHER AND STRETCH FRAGMENTS OF INFORMATION IN ORDER TO MAKE A PUBLISHABLE STORY AND SOMETIMES IN ORDER TO SENSATIONALIZE IS A DANGEROUS THING. IT CAN AND HAS COST LIVES. IT CAN WRONGLY IMPAIR REPUTATIONS AND DISRUPT RELATIONSHIPS CRITICAL TO OUR NATIONAL INTEREST. LET ME ILLUSTRATE WITH A TRUE STORY. DURING 1985, A WELL-KNOWN REPORTER CALLED THE INFORMATION OFFICER AT THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND TOLD HIM HE HAD A STORY THAT WE HAD HELPED THE SECURITY SERVICE OF A FRIENDLY NATION STAGE A CAR BOMBING OF THE HEADQUARTERS OF A TERRORIST ORGANIZATION WHICH HAD RESULTED IN DEATH OR INJURY TO A LARGE

NUMBER OF RESIDENTS AND PASSERS-BY IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD. OUR OFFICER TOLD THE REPORTER THAT HIS INFORMATION WAS INCORRECT AND THAT THE CIA HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF AND NO INVOLVEMENT, DIRECT OR INDIRECT, IN THE ATTACK. HE WAS ALSO TOLD THAT IF HE CHARGED US INVOLVEMENT, HE MIGHT WIND UP WITH BLOOD ON HIS HANDS. THE STORY WAS RUN IN HIS NEWSPAPER. IT GOT AROUND THE WORLD AND CREATED A FALSE IMPRESSION OF US INVOLVEMENT IN THE BOMBING.

THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATED THE MATTER AND CONCLUDED THAT "NO COMPLICITY OF DIRECT OR INDIRECT INVOLVEMENT CAN BE ESTABLISHED WITH RESPECT TO THE MARCH 8 BOMBING IN BEIRUT." BUT THIS CAME TOO LATE! A MONTH AFTER THE MISLEADING STORY WAS PUBLISHED TO THE WORLD, TERRORISTS HIJACKED A TWA PLANE AND ITS 153 PASSENGERS AND TOOK THEM TO BEIRUT. WHEN THE HIJACKERS SHOT AND KILLED AN AMERICAN SERVICEMAN, THEY CLAIMED IT TO BE IN RETALIATION FOR THE BOMBING IN BEIRUT IN WHICH THE REPORTER HAD INVOLVED THE CIA AFTER THE CIA'S SPOKESMAN HAD DENIED TO HIM ANY INVOLVEMENT, DIRECT OR INDIRECT, IN THE BOMBING.

IN PUTTING THIS STORY TOGETHER, THE REPORTERS HAD TALKS WITH OFFICIALS IN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH AND MEMBERS AND STAFFERS OF THE CONGRESS ABOUT COLLATERAL MATTERS INCLUDING OUR LONG-TERM PRACTICE OF PROVIDING TRAINING AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO THE SECURITY SERVICES OF OTHER COUNTRIES IN ORDER TO IMPROVE OUR CAPABILITIES AND COOPERATION ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND COUNTER-TERRORISM.

THIS KIND OF ASSISTANCE GOES BACK MANY YEARS. WE ARE DOING MORE OF THIS TO COPE WITH TODAY'S INTENSIFIED TERRORIST THREAT. THIS DOES NOT MAKE US RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CONSEQUENCES OF LAW ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES IN OTHER COUNTRIES.

THE REPORTER JUSTIFIED PUBLISHING THEIR STORY BY TAKING THE VIEW THAT THIS LONGSTANDING TRAINING SOMEHOW MADE US RESPONSIBLE FOR A PARTICULAR ACTION OF THE ORGANIZATION EVEN THOUGH WE HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF THE ACTION AND NO CONTACT WITH THOSE WHO CARRIED IT OUT.

THIS IS A TRAGIC STORY. THERE IS ENOUGH BLAME FOR EVERYONE INVOLVED TO SHARE. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS TALKED MORE THAN THE RULES PERMIT ON CLASSIFIED MATTERS. THE REPORTERS IGNORED ACCURATE INFORMATION WITH WHICH THEY WERE CAREFULLY, CLEARLY, AND HONESTLY PROVIDED. THEY STRETCHED THE IMPLICATIONS OF SCRAPS OF INFORMATION THEY GATHERED. WE AT THE CIA EITHER DID NOT HAVE TIME OR WERE NOT FAST ENOUGH IN BRINGING THE MATTER TO THE ATTENTION OF MANAGEMENT AT THE NEWSPAPER.

WE ALL MUST DO BETTER. THIS IS A DANGEROUS AND UNPREDICTABLE WORLD IN WHICH ALL OF US MUST MOVE WITH CAUTION AND RESPONSIBILITY. CERTAINLY ANY RESPONSIBLE PERSON WOULD WANT TO EXERCISE SPECIAL CARE TO AVOID SETTING IN MOTION THIS KIND OF SEQUENCE OF EVENTS.



AS WE SEE IT, MRS. GRAHAM STATED CORRECTLY THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE MEDIA IN SUCH MATTERS IN HER RECENT TALK. SHE CALLED FOR "...FULL COOPERATION WHEREVER POSSIBLE BETWEEN THE MEDIA AND THE AUTHORITIES. WHEN THE MEDIA OBTAINS ESPECIALLY SENSITIVE INFORMATION, WE ARE WILLING TO TELL THE AUTHORITIES WHAT WE HAVE LEARNED AND WHAT WE PLAN TO REPORT. AND WHILE RESERVING THE RIGHT TO MAKE THE FINAL DECISION OURSELVES, WE ARE ANXIOUS TO LISTEN TO ARGUMENTS ABOUT WHY INFORMATION SHOULD NOT BE AIRED. [THE MEDIA] WANT TO DO NOTHING THAT WOULD ENDANGER HUMAN LIFE OR NATIONAL SECURITY. WE ARE WILLING TO COOPERATE WITH THE AUTHORITIES IN WITHHOLDING INFORMATION THAT COULD HAVE THOSE CONSEQUENCES."

WE HAVE BEEN GRATIFIED BY THE READINESS OF MANY REPORTERS AND EDITORS TO CAREFULLY CONSIDER SOMETIMES WITHHOLDING PUBLICATION OF INFORMATION WHICH COULD JEOPARDIZE NATIONAL INTERESTS OR TO TREAT OR PRESENT A STORY IN A MANNER WHICH MEETS THE PUBLIC NEED, YET MINIMIZES POTENTIAL DAMAGE TO INTELLIGENCE SOURCES. THE TRICK IS TO RECOGNIZE THE POTENTIAL FOR DAMAGE AND TO CONSULT ON HOW IT MIGHT BE MINIMIZED. WE ARE ALWAYS READY AND AVAILABLE ON SHORT NOTICE TO HELP ON THAT.

I HASTEN TO ADD, HOWEVER, THAT THE FIRST LINE OF DEFENSE AND THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY OF PREVENTING THESE TYPES OF LEAKS IS TO INCREASE DISCIPLINE WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT ITSELF.

THE INABILITY TO CONTROL SENSITIVE INFORMATION IS DESTRUCTIVE OF THE MORALE OF PEOPLE WHO DO KEEP SECRETS, AS WELL AS DAMAGING TO OUR SECURITY. DURING THE LAST SEVERAL YEARS, THE PRESIDENT HAS EMPHASIZED THE SPECIAL OBLIGATION FEDERAL WORKERS HAVE TO PROTECT THE CLASSIFIED INFORMATION WITH WHICH THEY ARE ENTRUSTED. WE HAVE INCREASED AND MUST INTENSIFY OUR EFFORTS TO UNCOVER THOSE WHO VIOLATE THIS TRUST. WE ARE STUDYING PROCEDURES AND POSSIBLY NEW LAWS NEEDED TO DEAL WITH FEDERAL EMPLOYEES WHO DECIDE ON THEIR OWN TO DISCLOSE CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.

IN CONCLUSION, I WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE THAT ALL OF US HAVE A VERY SERIOUS CHALLENGE IN COPING WITH A RAPIDLY GROWING TERRORIST THREAT. WE ARE EAGER TO DEVELOP BETTER UNDERSTANDING AND CLOSER COOPERATION WITH ORGANIZATIONS LIKE YOURS AND OTHERS IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR WHO CAN MAKE A CONTRIBUTION TO DEVELOPING POLICIES AND EDUCATING OUR PEOPLE ABOUT THIS DANGEROUS DEVELOPMENT.

I PARTICULARLY APPLAUD AND ENCOURAGE THE INTEREST AND EFFORTS OF MY GOOD FRIEND RABBI TANENBAUM AND OF THIS ORGANIZATION TO IMPLEMENT THE PUBLIC EDUCATION ASPECTS OF VICE PRESIDENT BUSH'S TASK FORCE REPORT ON COMBATTING TERRORISM.

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# National Security And the Press

## *An Interview with CIA Chief William Casey*

*The Pelton spy trial has triggered the harshest confrontation between the government and the press since the publication of the Pentagon Papers. In an interview with WJR Editor Katherine Winton Evans, William Casey, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, gives the administration's side of the conflict over national security and the press.*

**WJR:** Mr. Casey, what worries you most about the American press?

**CASEY:** I worry about the propensity of the American press to publish classified information, which destroys and jeopardizes intelligence sources and methods. As director of Central Intelligence, I am obligated under the National Security Act to protect those sources and methods.

**WJR:** What do you mean by a "propensity on the part of the press to publish classified information"?

**CASEY:** There's been a vast divulging of sensitive information at an unprecedented tempo in recent months. We've seen it destroy our ability to follow terrorists in specific instances. We've seen very important capabilities to understand and follow Soviet military plans and the development of their weapons jeopardized and diminished. It seems to be happening more frequently, more quickly and at an increasing tempo and is doing more damage than we can tolerate.

**WJR:** Do you think there's a changing attitude or standard in the press about what

constitutes a threat to national security?

**CASEY:** I think there's not a very good general understanding of why we need to protect the intelligence sources and methods that are the basis of our national security. I am trying to correct that situation. All of us in the intelligence community have an obligation to sensitize the people in the media to this problem. We believe that fundamentally we all have the interests of our nation at heart. Nobody wants to hurt our national security, nobody wants to impair our intelligence capabilities, but we may not have done as good a job as we might have in sensitizing the media to the damage that is being done to our sources and methods. We're just now trying to do it in a more systematic and aggressive way.

**WJR:** Quiet diplomacy has been the traditional way for directors of the CIA to deal with the press on sensitive information. Do you regret that you chose a noisy confrontation with the press when you announced, for example, that you were asking the Justice Department to consider prosecuting news organizations for intercept disclosures and when you threatened to prosecute the *Washington Post* if it published details of the Pelton case?

**CASEY:** I was not alone in that. Many of us thought it was necessary to warn the media and ask the Justice Department to consider applying to the *Washington Post* the 1950 law prohibiting intercept disclosures. We do not see how, in fairness to the media, or in the discharge of our own

obligations, we could permit the media to violate the law, which flatly prohibits the publication of communications intelligence, without apprising them that they were doing so and putting them on notice. That's what I did. I told people who were about to publish things that I thought they ought to know that if they published that kind of stuff they would be in violation of a flat prohibition the Congress has enacted. I don't think I threatened. I said I'm not threatening, but I think I ought to tell you you have this problem. I and others have notified and will continue to notify the Justice Department that it should look into this violation of law, or apparent violation of law. I don't think I was all that noisy. It was a private warning. It was the press that publicized my warning and made it public.

**WJR:** Why get tough now? NBC's Jim Polk reported on the operation Pelton revealed to the Soviets back in November and the *New York Times* wrote about the operation years ago. Why didn't you react then?

**CASEY:** I can't answer that. I wasn't here years ago when the *New York Times* wrote about it. There's always a weighing, a balancing of equities. Sometimes you take action and you in effect bring more attention to the matter. But we have all agreed that the tempo and number of unauthorized disclosures over the last several months has been such that we've found it necessary to deal with the problem more actively, more aggressively and to use all

the legal authorities we have to deter further damage to our national security and our intelligence capabilities.

**WJR:** Why did you react so strongly and publicly over the press reporting of the operations Pelton revealed to the Soviets when the Soviets obviously already knew about them?

***"It's just intellectually shallow to say that we can publish anything because the Soviets know about it. The media neither have the capability nor the authority to make that determination."***

**CASEY:** How do the media know what the Soviets know about intelligence operations? How do they know how much the Soviets know? How do they know at what level he received attention? How do they know what this will tell other countries? It's just intellectually shallow to say that we can publish anything because the Soviets know about it. The media neither have the capability nor the authority to make that determination, particularly when there are statutes that prohibit publication.

**WJR:** How are news organizations and reporters to know what is and what is not damaging to the national security?

**CASEY:** We must have closer cooperation and closer understanding about that. I think they know that publishing certain information can jeopardize lives and can jeopardize capabilities. There is a fairly wide understanding of that. We should work to make the media's understanding wider and deeper and fuller. And clearly the media—as all other citizens—are responsible for knowing the law of the land.

**WJR:** You seem to be looking for a way for news organizations, reporters and broadcasters to practice self-censorship, but how can they do that? You're not suggesting putting a CIA official in every newsroom?

**CASEY:** Of course not. That's a silly suggestion.

**WJR:** How will they know where the line is?

**CASEY:** They have a responsibility. People ought to know their responsibilities. People ought to know when they're near the line. We'd like to have them discuss the matter with us when they think they may be close to that line. You can't do much more than that. I'm gratified when the media have brought potentially dam-

aging stories to our attention that were questionable and we've discussed them. Sometimes the press has decided that the information was not that important to publish because the likely damage outweighed the worth of getting the information out. In other instances, the media, reporters and others, have been willing to mitigate the damage by taking out particularly sensitive details that weren't necessary to the conveying of the broad story. We're always available to help on that. Anybody who is uncertain or has questions, all they have to do is pick up the phone and call here. [Director of Public Affairs] George Lauder will try to help them work it out.

**WJR:** Did the *Washington Post* behave in a responsible way after you asked them not to reveal the details of what Pelton had given the Soviets, and they trimmed their story?

**CASEY:** Well, the *Washington Post* certainly considered the whole matter in a very responsible way. I'm not really going to comment on whether some of the things that they published were not authorized to be released in the Pelton trial or whether they should have been published or whether they shouldn't have been published. I think on the whole the conduct of the *Washington Post* was responsible.

**WJR:** On CBS' "Face the Nation" on June 1, Bob Woodward of the *Post* said, "We're going to cover intelligence. We're going to write about it and the administration is not going to like where we draw the line." Mr. Casey, can reporters draw the line themselves?

**CASEY:** Some of them can. Some of them understand quite well and are rather careful. There are some who are in a rush to publish and are not particularly sensitive to national security and intelligence capabilities considerations.

**WJR:** Can you give me some examples?

**CASEY:** No, I'm not going to name names.

**WJR:** Who should be the final judge of what is the national security? The administration, the press or the courts?


**CASEY:** It depends on the circumstances. If there is a law or a statute, as there is

with respect to communications intelligence, the courts would be the ultimate determiners. As to what the requirements of national security are, the elected government has the authority under the Constitution to protect the national security. And they need to make the judgment as to what it requires to maintain that security. It's a free country; the press may not always agree with the government. We recognize that. But the press has a responsibility and the press has a stake in the national security and that, we think, should cause them to proceed cautiously and carefully, to hear our point of view and to arrive at measured decisions as to what is appropriate and what is not appropriate for publication.

**WJR:** When you deal with the media, do you find a difference between television executives and newspaper editors in their understanding of, and sensitivity to, national security considerations?

**CASEY:** When you deal with a newspaper editor, you usually have more time to think about the situation. When you deal with a broadcast person, the deadline sometimes makes it difficult to give the matter adequate consideration. On the other hand, there are occasions when broadcast people will hold back and devote the time to thinking about the intelligence equities and understanding our concerns. We'd like that to happen more frequently.

**WJR:** Has coverage of the Pelton trial been responsible on the whole, do you think?



LESLIE CASHE

***“There are quite a few bits of sensitive information that have appeared in certain reporting about the Pelton trial that did not come out of the court proceedings . . . . We are concerned about that.”***

**CASEY:** I think coverage of the Pelton trial has been responsible on the whole. We do know, however, that there are quite a few bits of sensitive information that have appeared in certain reporting about the Pelton trial that did not come out of the court proceedings, or were not authorized to be released in the Pelton trial. We are concerned about that.

**WJR:** Critics are saying that the administration is going after the press to divert attention from the disarray of our intelligence operations, meaning spies on the payroll and secrets walking out the door. How do you answer that criticism?

**CASEY:** I simply say that is not true. We're concerned about protecting our intelligence capabilities. We caught a lot of spies. That's the work of the intelligence community—like the FBI and others. So we have no great apology. It's too bad we have had these spies and it's too bad we didn't catch them earlier, but we've had quite a good degree of success at catching people who are passing along information to other governments.

**WJR:** Could you give me just a couple of examples of when the press has endangered national security?

**CASEY:** When I do that, I simply tell the world, including our adversaries, more than I want to tell them about our intelligence priorities and capabilities. But I can say that it's well and widely known that we lost access to terrorist communications in recent months by virtue of press reporting of communications intelligence, which probably is in violation of a federal statute.

**WJR:** Are you talking about the Libyan intercept?

**CASEY:** Information about communications that might have alerted us to the bombings of the embassy and the Marine barracks in Beirut appeared in the press and those communications disappeared. The same thing happened to our knowledge of Libyan communications that alerted us to Libyan-planned attacks on Western installations.

**WJR:** But the communication between Libya and its bureau in East Germany, President Reagan talked about himself.

**CASEY:** President Reagan did not talk about it first. When he talked about it, he did so very carefully. He disclosed no sources. In the second place, one reason he was able to talk about it at all was that some explicit information had appeared in the media two weeks earlier. It was at that time that the communications were turned off. Get that distinction very clearly, because everybody's talking about President Reagan. That information was previously disclosed by the media before President Reagan talked about it.

**WJR:** Is the administration—or are you—intending to intimidate the press but not to prosecute? Is your threat to prosecute serious?

**CASEY:** We're all obligated to enforce the laws. I think everybody takes that seriously. And if those laws are violated to the detriment of our national security, we're obligated to enforce the law. There are judgments to be made. Sometimes we don't prosecute because the damage might be too serious. You want to get a case you are going to win. That's a decision that the Justice Department will have to make. But everybody feels the same obligation to apply and enforce the laws.

**WJR:** Do you think your frontal approach with the press has worked?

**CASEY:** I think I've gotten the attention of the press on this problem. I think that's a good thing. You're going to help me get more attention. The public has to understand that this is a problem. It has to be a sober, careful presentation of the problem. You call it a frontal approach. I can't get people's attention if I keep quiet. The leaders of the intelligence community believe we have an obligation to make the problem an issue and to explain what harm can result from loose handling of classified information, how it can damage our national security, our defense and the protection of our citizens against terrorism. If I just kept quiet, I wouldn't be doing my job.

**WJR:** Are there too many secrets? Would declassifying less important intelligence material make it easier to secure the rest?

**CASEY:** I think so. That's something we ought to work at. Don't think I'm blaming this whole problem on the media. The media is one element. We must have greater discipline within the government. People have to feel less free to talk, they have to realize that there is a penalty for violating their obligation to maintain the secrecy of classified information. We should work to make sure that the information that is classified really has to be classified. We can reduce the body of classified information, but that can't be done overnight and will take time. One of the considerations that is likely to be applied in enforcing the law is how sensitive and how critical the violation is. How damaging is it to our national security and to our intelligence capabilities? So in all

these things I support focusing on the really damaging and critical disclosures.

**WJR:** Mr. Casey, if a government official who leaks a damaging secret to the Soviets is a traitor, what is a government official who leaks a damaging secret to a reporter?

**CASEY:** Well, he's certainly violated the trust that has been placed in him. He's violated his obligation as a federal employee. There are restrictions against disclosure of classified information and people who violate that obligation should be disciplined in some way. There are occasions where extenuating circumstances exist. Sometimes the violation results in a reprimand, sometimes it's a suspension, sometimes it's a firing. If the leak is deliberate, there may be prosecution. As there has been in one case—Samuel Loring Morison, the Navy intelligence officer.

**WJR:** If a government official leaks a damaging secret to a reporter and the reporter prints it, which one is the more guilty?

**CASEY:** Well, I don't think I want to weigh that. They both violated either an obligation or a responsibility. The government employee has a more immediate obligation; the reporter has a responsibility which he may or may not recognize.

**WJR:** Are the recent firings of officials at the Pentagon and the State Department for allegedly leaking to reporters, and your “get tough” approach all part of a big, overall administration plan to crack down on the press?

***“Foreign powers have clearly been able to benefit greatly from sensitive, secret information they've been able to pick up in the world and the American media.”***

**CASEY:** No. It's not part of any effort to crack down on the press. We have no desire to crack down on the press. I believe in the press. I applaud the work of the press in exposing inefficiency, corruption, all kinds of other waste. I also applaud the media for raising policy questions related to national security. It is essential that those questions be raised in a manner which doesn't violate the classification of material that is secret, that doesn't damage either our national security or our intelligence capabilities. The press has to be able to understand the distinction between providing the public information they need to carry out the self-governing

process, to understand what's happening in the world, and protecting that narrow segment of information which can be damaging to our national security. When Congress made the mere publication of information about communications intelligence a federal crime, they said, this applies only to a very narrow segment of information which is at once critical and vulnerable. That was very carefully done and there is a history behind it. During World War II, we were able to read the communications between the German command and its field commanders, and between Tokyo and its field commanders. One little whisper that we were able to read that and they would have turned it off. We would have lost that capability. We would have lost a lot of additional lives and the war would have lasted a lot longer. With that background, and because of the special vulnerability and sensitivity of communications intelligence, there is a statute that bars publication of such information. The statute hasn't been waived just because it hasn't been applied very actively. It has been used in a number of espionage cases. Also, Justice White said very clearly, in the Pentagon Papers case, that this statute applies to newspapers publishing information about communications intelligence and he would have no difficulty in supporting its use. So it is a very serious law.

**WJR:** But in 35 years, this is the first time it's been used against the press.

**CASEY:** It hasn't been used.

**WJR:** The spectre of using it has been raised.

**CASEY:** We told the press that they had better worry about it. If we hadn't done that, we wouldn't be doing our duty.

**WJR:** Isn't the real problem of leaks—from administration officials to reporters—the officials who leak the stories, not the reporters to whom they leak?

**CASEY:** Well, that is debatable. Certainly, the primary problem comes from the people in the government who leak the stories, and who violate their obligation to protect classified information. When somebody violates that obligation, when they hand out what might be said to be stolen goods, there is certainly some onus on the person receiving those goods. We should not close our eyes to that.

**WJR:** How do you feel about the use of lie-detector tests within the government to plug leaks?

**CASEY:** In order to plug leaks, as you put it, you have to investigate a situation where there is damage by disclosure of classified information. In the course of investigating, the polygraph is a tool we use. It's an effective tool. It is used throughout the government, on occasion, and I think it will continue to be used.

**WJR:** How do you and Secretary [of State] Shultz differ on the use of lie-detector tests of government officials?

**CASEY:** I don't think we differ as much as it is generally perceived. I don't want to speak for him. Neither one of us is in

favor of widespread use of the polygraph. We both are willing to have the polygraph used to make the investigative process more effective when that appears to be appropriate to those who are conducting the investigation. FBI, Justice or whoever.

**WJR:** Would you submit to one?

**CASEY:** Oh, I do. In CIA and NSA, everybody has a polygraph before they come in. I don't think that would be practical government-wide. Nobody's ever recommended that. Although some of the media's discussion of polygraphs appears to assume that. That's another one of those misperceptions. I took the polygraph when I came to the CIA. I knew that everybody else took it, so I ought to take it.

**WJR:** Do you think more legislation is needed to safeguard national security information?

**CASEY:** I think it should be carefully considered.

**WJR:** What kind?

**CASEY:** A lot of people believe that the espionage laws are outdated, are no longer adequate to meet the requirements of protecting sensitive information, because the key prohibition is on directly passing information to a foreign power. Today the intelligence community sees much more information going to foreign powers by the leakage of sensitive information and the immediate broadcast of that information to the world. That's the fastest way to get it to a foreign power. Those foreign powers have clearly been able to benefit greatly from sensitive, secret information they've been able to pick up in the world and the American media.

**WJR:** What kind of new law would you recommend?

**CASEY:** Well, that's under discussion and study. I'm not recommending any particular law at this time. There is quite a bit of interest in the Congress in what kind of legislative steps are called for to protect our national security or intelligence capability more strongly. I suppose the law would apply to the misuse of classified information.

**WJR:** The misuse by the press?

**CASEY:** The misuse by anybody of classified information. And how far that goes or how it's applied within the government or outside the government, I don't have a

judgment on that.

**WJR:** You're talking about a leak of classified information by somebody in the government to a member of the press who prints it.


**CASEY:** To anybody.

**WJR:** Those laws are being considered now by you in the government?

**CASEY:** It's always under consideration. People on the Hill are always talking about it. Just where that process stands, I don't want to comment on that.

**WJR:** Can you sum up your overall concerns?

**CASEY:** There is just too much information that hostile countries can get from the American press. Sometimes by accident, sometimes because people violate their obligation, sometimes because reporters are assiduous and creative and put a lot of information together. We need to get a better control over that whole process. The way to get better control is to tighten up within the government and have a mutual acceptance of responsibility between the media and the government. Many people in the press are concerned and recognize that they have a responsibility too. They have as much interest as we do, certainly, in the security of the country, and the capability of our intelligence organizations to deal with an increasingly dangerous and complicated world. I am encouraged by the willingness among many in the media to face the problem, to understand it, to cooperate and to deal with it. I'm hopeful that will gradually develop and improve. ●



LESLE CASHEN

## INTELLIGENCE AND THE MEDIA

THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ARE FACED TODAY WITH A MOST SERIOUS THREAT TO THE NATION'S SECURITY. IT IS REAL, CURRENT AND GROWING. THERE IS A CONTINUING HEMORRHAGE OF LEAKS OF HIGHLY SENSITIVE, CLASSIFIED INFORMATION TO THE WORLD MEDIA, THE PUBLICATION OF WHICH HAS CAUSED GREAT DAMAGE TO OUR ABILITY TO COLLECT INTELLIGENCE CONCERNING THE INTENTIONS, PLANS AND ACTIVITIES OF OUR ADVERSARIES--BE THEY SOVIETS, TERRORISTS OR DRUG DEALERS. I BELIEVE IT IS VITAL FOR THE PUBLIC TO UNDERSTAND WHAT IS GOING ON, WHY IT IS HAPPENING, AND WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE ABOUT IT.

WE LEARNED THE HARD WAY THAT INTELLIGENCE IS THE NATION'S FIRST LINE OF DEFENSE FROM THE JAPANESE SURPRISE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR. WE COULD HAVE PROTECTED OUR SHIPS. IF WE LEARN THAT THE SOVIET UNION OR SOME OTHER ADVERSARY IS PLANNING SUCH A SURPRISE IN THE FUTURE, WE CAN MOVE TO FORESTALL IT. IF WE CAN IDENTIFY INFORMATION IDENTIFYING HOSTILE SPIES IN OUR MIDST STEALING OUR SECRETS, WE CAN NEUTRALIZE THEM. IT IS THE SAME WITH TERRORISTS, DRUG CZARS, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AND THE OTHER GREAT CHALLENGES THIS NATION IS FACING FROM ABROAD.

THE NATION'S INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, WHICH I HEAD, COLLECTS INFORMATION ON SUCH MATTERS THROUGH AGENTS, THROUGH A VARIETY OF ADVANCED TECHNOLOGICAL SYSTEMS, AND THROUGH THE COOPERATIVE EFFORTS OF OUR ALLIES. IF THE DETAILS OF HOW WE COLLECT INTELLIGENCE THROUGH THESE MEANS IS PUBLICIZED OR CAN BE DEDUCED THROUGH THE INFORMATION THESE SOURCES PROVIDE, THE AGENTS WILL BE ARRESTED AND PERHAPS EXECUTED, OUR ADVERSARIES WILL TAKE STEPS TO NEUTRALIZE OUR TECHNICAL COLLECTION CAPABILITIES, AND OUR ALLIES WILL LOSE CONFIDENCE IN OUR ABILITY TO PROTECT INFORMATION THEY NOW SHARE AND WILL DENY IT TO US.

LEAKING SENSITIVE NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION IS NOTHING NEW. AS A MATTER OF FACT, ONE OF THE FIRST LEAKERS IN U.S. HISTORY WAS NONE OTHER THAN THE POPULAR PATRIOT AND WRITER, THOMAS PAINE. WITHOUT FINANCIAL AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE FROM FRANCE, GEORGE WASHINGTON'S TINY ARMY, DOWN TO SOME 3,000 MEN IN 1777, WOULD NOT, A FEW YEARS LATER, HAVE PUSHED THE BRITISH ARMY, THEN THE MOST POWERFUL IN THE WORLD, OFF THE AMERICAN CONTINENT. IN PLANNING AND PROVIDING THIS ASSISTANCE, THE FRENCH TOOK GREAT PAINS TO KEEP IT COVERT. THEY WORRIED THAT THE BRITISH WOULD HARM FRENCH INTERESTS IF FRENCH AID TO THE AMERICAN REBELS SHOULD BECOME KNOWN. IN SEEKING THE APPROVAL OF THE KING TO HELP THE AMERICAN RESISTANCE, THE FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER SAID: "IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THIS TRANSACTION NOT BE DISCOVERED, OR AT LEAST IMPUTED TO THE GOVERNMENT." WHEN



PAINE WAS FOUND TO HAVE PUBLICLY REVEALED FRANCE'S SECRET AID TO OUR REVOLUTION, HE WAS DISMISSED FROM HIS JOB AS THE SECRETARY TO THE COMMITTEE CHARGED WITH FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND WAS PUBLICLY REBUKED BY A RESOLUTION OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS.

THE VALUE OF INTELLIGENCE AND NEED FOR SECRECY HAS BEEN RECOGNIZED FROM THE EARLIEST MOMENTS OF OUR REPUBLIC. GEORGE WASHINGTON PUT IT WELL IN 1777: "THE NECESSITY OF PROCURING GOOD INTELLIGENCE, IS APPARENT AND NEED NOT BE FURTHER URGED. ALL THAT REMAINS FOR ME TO ADD IS, THAT YOU KEEP THE WHOLE MATTER AS SECRET AS POSSIBLE. FOR UPON SECRECY, SUCCESS DEPENDS IN MOST ENTERPRISES OF THE KIND, AND FOR WANT OF IT, THEY ARE GENERALLY DEFEATED."

SOME TWO HUNDRED YEARS LATER, WE HAVE LOST THE SENSE OF URGENCY IN DENYING OUR ADVERSARIES THE OPPORTUNITY TO USE OUR OWN SENSITIVE INFORMATION AGAINST US. TODAY TERRORIST GROUPS PREY ON INNOCENT AMERICANS TRAVELING ABROAD AND SEEK WAYS TO SPREAD THEIR SENSELESS VIOLENCE TO OUR SHORES. THE SOVIET UNION CONTINUES TO BUILD ITS MILITARY STRENGTH AND THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS INCREASES THE RISK OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT THAT MIGHT DESTROY OUR PLANET. ILLEGAL DRUGS ARE SMUGGLED INTO THE U.S. IN UNPRECEDENTED AMOUNTS.

OUR COUNTRY HAS INVESTED TIME, EFFORT, AND TALENT OVER MANY YEARS AND SPENT MANY BILLIONS OF DOLLARS TO DEVELOP METHODS OF COLLECTING THE INFORMATION NEEDED TO ASSESS MISSILES AND OTHER WEAPONS AIMED AT US, TO DETERMINE THE INTENTIONS AND VULNERABILITIES OF OUR ADVERSARIES SO THAT WE CAN DEVELOP EFFECTIVE DEFENSES AND COUNTERMEASURES, TO PROTECT OUR CITIZENS AND INSTALLATIONS AROUND THE WORLD FROM TERRORIST ATTACKS, AND TO ASSIST OUR DIPLOMATS. GOOD INTELLIGENCE SOURCES ARE CRITICAL TO OUR NATIONAL SECURITY, INCLUDING OUR HOPES OF EFFECTIVE ARMS CONTROL AND THE SAFETY AND LIBERTY OF OUR CITIZENS. SECRECY AND CONFIDENTIALITY AS TO HOW AND THROUGH WHOM WE COLLECT INFORMATION IS ESSENTIAL TO OUR EFFECTIVENESS.

NOT SO MANY YEARS AGO, TECHNICAL COLLECTION PROGRAMS WERE PLANNED AND EXECUTED IN SECRECY. THE INTELLIGENCE WE GATHERED WAS ACCURATE, TIMELY AND HIGHLY RELIABLE. THE COUNTRIES ON WHICH WE COLLECTED INTELLIGENCE TRIED TO LEARN OF OUR COLLECTION SYSTEMS AND THEIR CAPABILITIES THROUGH ESPIONAGE OR PAINSTAKING SCIENTIFIC ANALYSIS. TODAY, THROUGH MEDIA REVELATIONS THEY LEARN OF SYSTEMS THAT ARE STILL ON THE DRAWING BOARDS AND WHICH WILL NOT BECOME OPERATIONAL FOR SEVERAL YEARS. THEY HAVE LITERALLY YEARS OF LEAD TIME TO FIND WAYS TO DEFEAT COLLECTION SYSTEMS COSTING BILLIONS OF DOLLARS ON WHICH WE COUNT TO GUIDE OUR PLANNING FOR THE DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NEXT DECADE OR MORE.

WE MUST CLASSIFY AND RESTRICT THE CIRCULATION OF INFORMATION ABOUT HOW AND WHERE WE COLLECT INTELLIGENCE AND OF THE REPORTS AND ASSESSMENTS BASED ON THAT INTELLIGENCE IF THEY MIGHT REVEAL OR COMPROMISE OUR SOURCES OR METHODS. THE KGB AND OTHER HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES SPEND BILLIONS OF DOLLARS EACH YEAR IN AN EFFORT TO ACQUIRE THIS INFORMATION. AND THE UNAUTHORIZED PUBLICATION OF THIS RESTRICTED INFORMATION HANDS TO OUR ADVERSARIES ON A SILVER PLATTER INFORMATION THAT THEIR SPIES, THEIR RESEARCHERS, AND THEIR SATELLITES ARE WORKING 24 HOURS A DAY TO UNCOVER AND USE AGAINST US.

IN RECENT YEARS, PUBLICATION OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION BY THE MEDIA HAS DESTROYED OR SERIOUSLY DAMAGED INTELLIGENCE SOURCES OF THE HIGHEST VALUE. EVERY METHOD WE HAVE OF ACQUIRING INTELLIGENCE -- OUR AGENTS, OUR RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER SECURITY SERVICES, OUR PHOTOGRAPHIC AND ELECTRONIC CAPABILITIES, THE INFORMATION WE GET FROM COMMUNICATIONS -- HAS BEEN DAMAGED BY THE PUBLICATION OF UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES.

STORIES IN BOTH THE PRINT AND ELECTRONIC MEDIA HAVE SHOWN, SOMETIMES IN GREAT DETAIL, HOW TO COUNTER CAPABILITIES IN WHICH WE HAVE INVESTED BILLIONS OF DOLLARS AND MANY YEARS OF CREATIVE TALENT AND EFFORT. THIS, TIME AND TIME AGAIN, HAS ENABLED THOSE HOSTILE TO US TO ABORT HUGE INVESTMENTS, TO CONCEAL AND OTHERWISE DENY US INFORMATION CRITICAL TO OUR DEFENSE, AND TO DEPRIVE US OF THE ABILITY TO PROTECT OUR

CITIZENS FROM TERRORIST ATTACK. LEAKERS ARE COSTING THE TAXPAYERS MILLIONS AND EVEN BILLIONS OF DOLLARS -- AND, MORE IMPORTANT, PUTTING AMERICANS ABROAD AS WELL AS OUR COUNTRY ITSELF AT RISK.

WE HAVE REACHED THE POINT WHERE WE MUST ADDRESS THE RISK TO OUR FUNDAMENTAL SECURITY. THE WAY TO BEGIN IS TO LAY OUT WHAT IS HAPPENING IN AN UNVARNISHED WAY. IT IS DIFFICULT TO DISCUSS THE SPECIFIC DAMAGE TO THIS NATION'S ABILITY TO PROTECT ITSELF WITHOUT CONFIRMING THE ACCURACY OF INFORMATION WHICH HAS BEEN DELIVERED THROUGH THE MEDIA AND REMOVING ANY DOUBTS THAT MIGHT REMAIN IN THE MINDS OF THE KGB OR THE TERRORISTS. I CAN SAY THAT SOME OF OUR SOURCES HAVE NOT BEEN HEARD FROM AFTER THEIR INFORMATION HAS BEEN PUBLISHED IN THE U.S. PRESS. OTHERS HAVE DECIDED THAT COOPERATING WITH US IS TOO RISKY. LEADERS AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICES OF OUR CLOSEST ALLIES HAVE TOLD US THAT IF WE CAN'T TIGHTEN UP, THEY WILL HAVE TO PULL BACK ON COOPERATION WITH US BECAUSE THEY HAVE HAD ENOUGH OF READING THE INFORMATION THEY PROVIDE IN THE U.S. MEDIA.

WE HAVE LOST THE TECHNICAL CAPABILITY TO MONITOR TERRORIST PLANS AND ACTIVITIES AGAINST U.S. CITIZENS ABROAD. LET ME CITE TWO EXAMPLES.

-- IN 1983, WHILE OUR MARINES WERE GUARDING THE AIRPORT IN BEIRUT, A JOURNALIST REPORTED THAT U.S. INTELLIGENCE HAD INTERCEPTED A SERIES OF CABLES SENT FROM TEHRAN TO DAMASCUS WHICH DISCLOSED USEFUL INFORMATION ON IRANIAN TERRORIST PLANS IN LEBANON, INCLUDING ACTIVITIES DIRECTED AGAINST U.S. FORCES AND INSTALLATIONS IN THAT COUNTRY. WITHIN DAYS OF THIS REVELATION, THE IRANIANS HAD REACTED TO THIS LEAK AND HAD DEPRIVED US OF THIS VITAL SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE.

-- MORE RECENTLY A MAJOR NEWS MAGAZINE, AND THEN LATER TWO NETWORKS AND SOME LEADING NEWSPAPERS, DIVULGED THAT WE HAD BEEN ABLE TO READ LIBYAN COMMUNICATIONS RELATING TO THE BOMBING OF THE DISCO IN BERLIN IN WHICH TWO AMERICANS AND OTHERS LOST THEIR LIVES. AS A RESULT, WE QUICKLY LOST A COUNTERTERRORIST CAPABILITY. WHEN TWO WEEKS LATER THE PRESIDENT DISCLOSED THE EVIDENCE WE HAD OF LIBYAN COMPLICITY IN THE BOMBING, THE MEDIA HAD ALREADY BLOWN OUR SOURCE AND THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENTS WERE CAREFULLY DRAFTED NOT TO FURTHER JEOPARDIZE OUR SOURCES OF INFORMATION.

THE TIME HAS COME FOR THIS NATION TO REGAIN CONTROL OF OUR NATIONAL SECRETS AND TO STOP WASTING THEM IN CHEAP EXPOSES. WE MUST TIGHTEN DISCIPLINE AMONG U.S. GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES WHO USE CLASSIFIED INFORMATION. WE MUST DEVELOP COOPERATION BETWEEN THE MEDIA AND THE GOVERNMENT ON STORIES WHICH PUT INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS AT RISK. WE MUST ESTABLISH

THAT RESTRICTIONS ON THE MISUSE OF SENSITIVE AND PROPERLY CLASSIFIED INFORMATION CANNOT BE VIOLATED WITH IMPUNITY. WE MUST ENFORCE AND PERHAPS TIGHTEN LAWS CONGRESS HAS ENACTED TO PROTECT CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.

THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY OF PREVENTING DAMAGE FROM LEAKS IS TO INCREASE DISCIPLINE WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT. THE INABILITY TO CONTROL SENSITIVE INFORMATION IS DESTRUCTIVE OF THE MORALE OF PEOPLE WHO DO KEEP SECRETS, AS WELL AS DAMAGING TO OUR SECURITY. DURING THE LAST SEVERAL YEARS, THE PRESIDENT HAS EMPHASIZED THE SPECIAL OBLIGATION FEDERAL WORKERS HAVE TO PROTECT THE CLASSIFIED INFORMATION WITH WHICH THEY ARE ENTRUSTED. EFFORTS TO UNCOVER THOSE WHO VIOLATE THIS TRUST NEED TO BE STRENGTHENED. WE MUST DETERMINE WHETHER NEW LAWS ARE NEEDED TO DEAL WITH FEDERAL EMPLOYEES WHO DECIDE ON THEIR OWN TO DISCLOSE CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.

THE GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL, MILITARY OFFICER OR CONTRACTOR EMPLOYEE WHO HAS BEEN CLEARED FOR ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED MATERIAL IS RESPONSIBLE FOR KEEPING THE SECRETS HE IS GIVEN. THERE IS NO ROOM FOR DOUBT ABOUT THIS. EACH PERSON WHO IS CLEARED MUST SIGN A NONDISCLOSURE AGREEMENT WHICH SPELLS OUT HIS OR HER RESPONSIBILITIES IN SIGNIFICANT DETAIL. THOSE WHO ARE APPROVED FOR ACCESS TO SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE PROGRAMS ARE GIVEN DETAILED BRIEFINGS ABOUT THE SENSITIVITIES WHICH MUST BE PROTECTED AND SIGN ADDITIONAL AGREEMENTS FOR EACH SUCH PROGRAM.

WHEN THESE INDIVIDUALS DISCUSS CLASSIFIED INFORMATION WITH UNAUTHORIZED PERSONS, THERE IS LITTLE LIKELIHOOD THAT THEY DO NOT UNDERSTAND WHAT THEY ARE DOING. WHEN THEY PROVIDE COPIES OF CLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS TO PERSONS NOT CLEARED TO RECEIVE THEM, THERE CAN BE NO DOUBT THAT THEY KNOW THEY ARE VIOLATING THE TRUST PLACED IN THEM BY THEIR NATION. STILL, WE HAVE ALLOWED AN ATMOSPHERE TO DEVELOP WHERE MANY BELIEVE THERE IS LITTLE RISK AND NO PENALTY FOR VIOLATING THE OBLIGATION TO MAINTAIN THE SECRECY OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.

IT MAY BE THAT TOO MUCH INFORMATION IS CLASSIFIED. WE SHOULD WORK TO MAKE SURE THAT THE INFORMATION THAT IS CLASSIFIED REALLY HAS TO BE CLASSIFIED. WE CAN REDUCE THE BODY OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION, BUT THAT CAN'T BE DONE OVERNIGHT AND WILL TAKE TIME. THE AMOUNT OF CLASSIFIED MATERIAL THAT EXISTS IS IRRELEVANT TO THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THOSE ENTRUSTED WITH IT MEET THEIR OBLIGATIONS. INDIVIDUALS HAVE ACCESS TO RELATIVELY LIMITED AMOUNTS OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION. FROM THOSE LIMITED AMOUNTS, SOME FEW CLEARED PERSONS DIVULGE INFORMATION THAT IS SPECIFICALLY OR IN THE AGGREGATE DAMAGING TO OUR INTELLIGENCE PROGRAMS OR OTHER NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS. IT WOULD NOT MATTER WHETHER THESE INDIVIDUALS HAD ONE CLASSIFIED DOCUMENT OR A VAULT FULL OF THEM, THEY WOULD, IF IT SUITED THEIR PURPOSES, LEAK THEM TO THE PRESS. STILL, IN ACTING AGAINST UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES WE SHOULD FOCUS ON REALLY DAMAGING AND CRITICAL DISCLOSURES.

WHAT MAKES GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS BETRAY THEIR TRUST BY UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION? SOME DO IT FOR SELF-SERVING PURPOSES. SOME FIND THAT BY PROVIDING THE REPORTER WITH CLASSIFIED INFORMATION THEY CAN OBTAIN FAVORABLE PUBLICITY FOR PROGRAMS THEY FAVOR, GET BAD PRESS FOR PROGRAMS THEY OPPOSE, MAKE THEMSELVES LOOK GOOD IN THE MEDIA, OR SETTLE A SCORE WITH AN ADVERSARY.

LEAKING SENSITIVE NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION, USUALLY ANONYMOUSLY, HAS BECOME A WAY OF LIFE IN BOTH THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCHES OF OUR GOVERNMENT. IT IS WORSE NOW THAN EVER BEFORE IN OUR HISTORY AND THE DAMAGE THE LEAKERS HAVE DONE IS PROPORTIONATELY GREATER.

THE LEAKERS CAN BE GENERALLY CATEGORIZED AS FOLLOWS:

-- THE POLICY ADVOCATE WHO SEEKS TO INFLUENCE POLICY OR PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF POLICY BY SELECTIVELY PROVIDING THE MEDIA WITH INFORMATION THAT HE THINKS SUPPORTS HIS OR HIS LEADERS' OBJECTIVES.

-- THE OPPOSITIONIST WHO IS OPPOSED TO SOME POLICY OR ACTIVELY SEEKS TO NEGATE IT BY PUBLICIZING IT AND BY GAINING ADHERENTS TO HIS POINT OF VIEW THROUGH THE PUBLICITY.

-- THE SELF-PROMOTER WHO SEEKS A GOOD PRESS BY DOING FAVORS FOR THE MEDIA.



-- THE EGO-BUILDER WHO ENHANCES HIS SENSE OF SELF-IMPORTANCE BY SHOWING HE IS "IN THE KNOW" OR A MEMBER OF THE "INNER CIRCLE."

-- THE REVENGE-SEEKER WHO WANTS TO "GET EVEN" WITH AN ORGANIZATION OR INDIVIDUAL FOR SOME REAL OR IMAGINED SLIGHT OR WRONG.

-- THE NAIVE OFFICIAL WHO WANTS TO BE HELPFUL TO A REPORTER AND "SET THE RECORD STRAIGHT."

WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT, THE EFFORT TO STOP AND PENALIZE THE UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF CLASSIFIED INTELLIGENCE HAS BEEN WEAK AND FRAGMENTED. IT NEEDS TO BE TIGHTENED UP AND SPEEDED UP, AND PUBLICATION OF UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES SHOULD BE IDENTIFIED AS THEY APPEAR. INVESTIGATIONS SHOULD BE SWIFT AND THOROUGH. DISCIPLINARY ACTION SHOULD BE APPROPRIATE TO THE VIOLATION AND KNOWN TO OTHERS IN ORDER TO DETER THEM FROM SIMILAR VIOLATIONS, WITTING OR UNWITTING.

LEAKERS ARE ONLY ONE SIDE OF THE EQUATION. THE MEDIA WHICH ACTIVELY CULTIVATES AND EXPLOITS THEM IS THE OTHER. WHILE SOME CLASSIFIED INFORMATION IS CONVEYED BY LEAKERS TO JOURNALISTS THROUGH ANONYMOUS PHONE CALLS AND THE USE OF INTERMEDIARIES AND THROUGH LEAVING BROWN BAGS OF SENSITIVE MATERIAL ON JOURNALISTS' DOORSTEPS, REPORTERS ALSO AGGRESSIVELY SEEK OUT THOSE WHO WILL PROVIDE CLASSIFIED INFORMATION THEY

CAN PUBLISH OR BROADCAST. THE MEDIA HAS RESPONSIBILITIES, TOO, AND MANY IN THE MEDIA RECOGNIZE THAT THEY MUST EXERCISE CARE TO AVOID DAMAGING OUR NATIONAL SECURITY OR THE LIVES OF INNOCENT PEOPLE. THE TASK IS TO STRIKE A VERY DELICATE AND DIFFICULT BALANCE BETWEEN THIS OBLIGATION AND THE OBLIGATION OF THE MEDIA TO PROVIDE THE PUBLIC THE INFORMATION IT NEEDS FOR SELF-GOVERNMENT. THE DEDICATION AND INGENUITY WITH WHICH THE MEDIA AND JOURNALISTS MEET THAT COMMITMENT IS TO BE CHERISHED, ADMIRERD AND SUPPORTED. THE MEDIA MUST RECOGNIZE THAT ONCE THE INFORMATION IS PUBLISHED OR BROADCAST, IT IS IN THE HANDS OF OUR ADVERSARIES, AND THE DAMAGE IS DONE. FORMER PRESIDENT HARRY TRUMAN PUT IT WELL IN A 1951 PRESS CONFERENCE:

“WHETHER IT BE TREASON OR NOT, IT DOES THE U.S. JUST AS MUCH HARM FOR THOSE MILITARY (AND NATIONAL SECURITY) SECRETS TO BE MADE KNOWN TO POTENTIAL ENEMIES THROUGH OPEN PUBLICATION AS IT DOES FOR MILITARY (AND NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE) SECRETS TO BE GIVEN TO AN ENEMY THROUGH THE CLANDESTINE OPERATION OF SPIES.”

HOW TO DRAW THIS VERY DELICATE AND DIFFICULT BALANCE? I THINK MRS. KATHARINE GRAHAM GOT IT RIGHT IN A VERY THOUGHTFUL AND CONSTRUCTIVE SPEECH SHE MADE ON TERRORISM AND THE MEDIA AT THE GUILDHALL IN LONDON LAST DECEMBER.

HE TOLD HOW A TELEVISION NETWORK AND A COLUMNIST HAD OBTAINED INFORMATION THAT WE WERE READING THE MESSAGES OF PEOPLE ARRANGING THE BOMBING OF THE U.S. EMBASSY IN BEIRUT. SHORTLY AFTER THIS PUBLIC DISCLOSURE, THAT TRAFFIC STOPPED. THIS UNDERMINED OUR EFFORTS TO CAPTURE THE TERRORIST LEADERS AND ELIMINATED A SOURCE OF INFORMATION ABOUT FUTURE ATTACKS.

MRS. GRAHAM WENT ON TO SAY: "THIS KIND OF RESULT, ALBEIT UNINTENTIONAL, POINTS UP THE NECESSITY FOR FULL COOPERATION WHEREVER POSSIBLE BETWEEN THE MEDIA AND THE AUTHORITIES. WHEN THE MEDIA OBTAINS ESPECIALLY SENSITIVE INFORMATION, WE ARE WILLING TO TELL THE AUTHORITIES WHAT WE HAVE LEARNED AND WHAT WE PLAN TO REPORT. AND WHILE RESERVING THE RIGHT TO MAKE THE FINAL DECISION OURSELVES, WE ARE ANXIOUS TO LISTEN TO ARGUMENTS ABOUT WHY INFORMATION SHOULD NOT BE AIRED. [THE MEDIA] WANT TO DO NOTHING THAT WOULD ENDANGER HUMAN LIFE OR NATIONAL SECURITY. WE ARE WILLING TO COOPERATE WITH THE AUTHORITIES IN WITHHOLDING INFORMATION THAT COULD HAVE THOSE CONSEQUENCES."

I SUBMIT THESE PRINCIPLES APPLY WITH THE SAME FORCE TO COSTLY INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES AS THEY DO TO TARGETS THREATENED BY TERRORISM.

I HAVE WITNESSED ADMIRABLE RESTRAINT AND JUDGMENT BY JOURNALISTS. I HAVE BEEN GRATIFIED BY THE READINESS OF MANY OF YOU TO CAREFULLY CONSIDER SOMETIMES WITHHOLDING PUBLICATION OF INFORMATION WHICH COULD JEOPARDIZE NATIONAL INTERESTS OR TO TREAT OR PRESENT A STORY IN A MANNER WHICH MEETS THE PUBLIC NEED, YET MINIMIZES POTENTIAL DAMAGE TO INTELLIGENCE SOURCES. THE TRICK IS TO RECOGNIZE THE POTENTIAL FOR DAMAGE AND TO CONSULT ON HOW IT MIGHT BE MINIMIZED. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS ALWAYS SHOULD BE READY AND AVAILABLE ON SHORT NOTICE TO HELP ON THAT.

IT IS CLEAR THAT ALL REPORTERS DON'T JUST WAIT FOR CLASSIFIED INFORMATION TO COME THEIR WAY. SOME OF THEM ACTIVELY SEEK IT, DEVELOPING SOURCES JUST AS A CIA OR KGB OFFICER WOULD--DETERMINE WHO KNOWS THE INFORMATION YOU WANT, BECOME ACQUAINTED WITH THE SOURCE, FIND OUT WHAT MOTIVATES THE SOURCE AND LET IT BE KNOWN THAT YOU CAN BE HELPFUL (IN EXCHANGE FOR THE SOURCE'S COOPERATION, OF COURSE). OFTEN THE SOURCE FINDS THAT BY PROVIDING HIS FRIEND THE REPORTER WITH CLASSIFIED INFORMATION HE CAN OBTAIN FAVORABLE PUBLICITY FOR PROGRAMS HE FAVORS, GET BAD PRESS FOR PROGRAMS HE OPPOSES, MAKE HIMSELF LOOK GOOD IN THE MEDIA, SETTLE A SCORE WITH AN ADVERSARY, OR SIMPLY BASK IN THE REFLECTED GLORY OF THE MEDIA STAR WITH WHOM HE'S COOPERATING. OF ALL THE TYPES OF LEAKS ON THE WASHINGTON SCENE (POLICY LEAKS, TRIAL BALLOON LEAKS,

ANIMUS LEAKS, GOODWILL LEAKS, ETC.) THE EGO LEAK PROBABLY IS THE MOST PREVALENT. IN WASHINGTON, KNOWLEDGE IS POWER, BUT NOBODY KNOWS HOW POWERFUL YOU ARE UNLESS YOU TELL HOW MUCH YOU KNOW.

BY PLAYING UP TO THOSE WHO HAVE A NEED FOR THIS KIND OF RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PRESS, JOURNALISTS PANDER TO PEOPLE WHOSE ACTIONS ARE SOMETIMES FAR MORE DAMAGING THAN WASTE, FRAUD AND CORRUPTION. IN THE THOUSANDS OF COLUMN INCHES DEVOTED TO EDITORIALS CRITICIZING GOVERNMENT ABUSES AND INEFFICIENCIES, ONLY A FEW HAVE EVER CALLED TO TASK THOSE WHO BETRAY CLASSIFIED INFORMATION TO THE MEDIA. THERE IS A DOUBLE STANDARD AT WORK HERE, WHICH SAYS A VIOLATION OF TRUST THAT BENEFITS THE MEDIA IS NOT AS SERIOUS AS ONE WHICH DOES NOT.

FREQUENTLY, GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS ARE DUPED INTO REVEALING INFORMATION THAT THEY WOULD NEVER DREAM OF DIVULGING TO A FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE OFFICER. FORMER WASHINGTON POST REPORTER SCOTT ARMSTRONG HAS SAID THAT THE "VAST MAJORITY OF THE INFORMATION THAT MAKES ITS WAY TO THE NEWSPAPER...COMES FROM MULTIPLE SOURCES...FROM CAREER BUREAUCRATS. IT COMES FROM THOSE PEOPLE WHO THEMSELVES WOULD NOT INITIATE A STORY OR A LEAK BUT WHO WILL, WHEN FACED WITH A SIGNIFICANT DISCLOSURE... CORRECT THE INFORMATION...WILL SAY 'THAT'S REALLY NOT QUITE RIGHT. IT REALLY HAPPENED THIS WAY.'"

THE MEDIA MUST ALSO ACCEPT THAT THE GOVERNMENT AS AN INSTITUTION HAS A RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SECURITY OF THIS NATION. IT CANNOT PRESS THE GOVERNMENT TO RELEASE AS MUCH INFORMATION AS POSSIBLE AND EVEN ENCOURAGE LEAKERS AND THEN ABSOLVE ITSELF WHEN INTELLIGENCE SOURCES ARE DAMAGED, U.S. DIPLOMACY IS HAMSTRUNG, OR THE LIVES OF INNOCENT U.S. CITIZENS LOST. IT CANNOT CRY THAT LEAKERS ARE THE ONES WHO SHOULD BE PROSECUTED, THEN LAMENT THAT THE FIRST AMENDMENT IS THREATENED WHEN WE TAKE ACTION TO INHIBIT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE LEAKERS. THE PRESS CANNOT HAVE IT BOTH WAYS.

EVEN WITH THE STRICTEST DISCIPLINE INSIDE THE GOVERNMENT SOME WILL STILL VIOLATE THEIR TRUST AND INATTENTION OR CARELESSNESS WILL RESULT IN THE DISCLOSURE OF DAMAGING CLASSIFIED INFORMATION. THE GOVERNMENT AND THE MEDIA MUST WORK TOGETHER TO ENSURE THAT SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS ARE NOT PUBLISHED. AT THE VERY LEAST, THE MEDIA SHOULD CEASE SEEKING SECRETS AS AN END IN ITSELF OR AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR DISCOVERING WRONGDOING AND SHOULD EXERCISE CAREFUL JUDGMENT IN PRINTING LEAKED INFORMATION.

I HAVE OVER THE PAST FEW MONTHS IN SPEECHES AND INTERVIEWS APPEALED FOR COOPERATION AND HAVE BEEN GRATIFIED THAT MANY JOURNALISTS TAKE MY PLEA SERIOUSLY. I PARTICULARLY APPRECIATE POST OWNER KATHARINE GRAHAM'S CALL FOR "FULL COOPERATION WHEREVER POSSIBLE BETWEEN THE MEDIA AND THE AUTHORITIES."

WHEN THE MEDIA OBTAINS ESPECIALLY SENSITIVE INFORMATION, WE ARE WILLING TO TELL THE AUTHORITIES WHAT WE HAVE LEARNED AND WHAT WE PLAN TO REPORT."

A GOOD MANY REPORTERS AND EDITORS HAVE BEEN WILLING TO CAREFULLY CONSIDER WITHHOLDING PUBLICATION OF INFORMATION WHICH COULD JEOPARDIZE NATIONAL INTERESTS OR TO PRESENT A STORY IN A WAY WHICH MEETS THE PUBLIC NEED, YET MINIMIZES POTENTIAL DAMAGE AND TO CONSULT ON HOW IT MIGHT BE MINIMIZED. GOVERNMENT SPOKESMEN SHOULD ALWAYS BE READY AND AVAILABLE ON SHORT NOTICE TO HELP ON THAT.

SOME JOURNALISTS DON'T UNDERSTAND, DON'T CARE, OR TURN THEIR HEADS ABOUT THE DAMAGE THEIR STORIES MAY INFLICT ON OUR NATIONAL SECURITY. MAJOR NEWS ORGANIZATIONS HAVE FORMED TEAMS OF REPORTERS INTO "INVESTIGATIVE TEAMS" FOR THE PURPOSE OF ACQUIRING SENSITIVE DATA. THIS PROCESS HAS NOTHING AT ALL TO DO WITH FRAUD OR ABUSE OR ILLEGALITIES OR IMPROPRIETIES OF SOME TYPE. THE OBJECTIVE IS THE ACQUISITION AND PUBLICATION OF SECRET DATA FOR COMPETITIVE AND PERSONAL ADVANTAGE. ONE PRESTIGIOUS NEWSPAPER RECENTLY ESTABLISHED AN "INVESTIGATIVE GROUP" TO COLLECT AND PUBLISH INFORMATION ON NATIONAL SECURITY BECAUSE IT HAD BEEN EMBARRASSED BY ANOTHER NEWSPAPER'S INVESTIGATIVE UNIT WHICH KEPT COMING UP WITH SCOOPS.

THIS CREATES A SPECIAL PROBLEM FOR THOSE OF US CHARGED WITH PROTECTING SENSITIVE INFORMATION. WE ARE PREPARED TO DISCUSS OUR POLICIES AND PROCEDURES SOMETIMES ON THE RECORD, MORE OFTEN ON BACKGROUND, ALWAYS EXCLUDING CLASSIFIED INFORMATION, SOMETIMES INSISTING ON THE RIGHT OF APPROVAL OF QUOTATIONS OR PRE-PUBLICATION REVIEW TO ASSURE THAT NO SENSITIVE DISCLOSURES CAPABLE OF JEOPARDIZING SOURCES HAVE INADVERTENTLY BEEN MADE. THE EMERGENCE OF THE INVESTIGATIVE TEAM SWEEPING THROUGH POLICY AND INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES HAS REQUIRED GREATER CAUTION. WE FIND SOME REPORTERS USING BACKGROUND DISCUSSIONS ON POLICIES AND PROCEDURES BEING USED TO FALSELY CLAIM OR IMPLY TO OTHER POTENTIAL SOURCES THAT IT IS ALL RIGHT TO DISCUSS SENSITIVE MATTERS BECAUSE SOMEONE ELSE HAS ALREADY OPENED THE DOOR. STILL, WE ARE READY TO CONSIDER SPECIFIC QUESTIONS OR POINTS IN AN EFFORT TO HELP, TO THE EXTENT WE CAN, AVOID ERROR OR DAMAGE.

MANY TRICKS OF THE TRADE ARE USED IN ELICITING SENSITIVE INFORMATION. CAREER GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS WHO WOULD NOT DREAM OF DIVULGING CLASSIFIED INFORMATION TO A FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE OR DELIBERATELY INITIATE A LEAK SOMETIMES WILL FALL PREY TO A REPORTER WHO MAY SUGGEST TRUTHFULLY OR FALSELY THAT HE IS WORKING ON A BOOK, ARTICLE OR BROADCAST ABOUT SOME INCIDENT OR PROGRAM. WHEN THE REPORTER SUGGESTS THAT HE JUST WISHES TO HAVE THE BACKGROUND TO BETTER "UNDERSTAND" WHAT IS HAPPENING, IN THE SPIRIT OF MISGUIDED HELPFULNESS THE OFFICIAL WILL RESPOND WITH VERY SENSITIVE INFORMATION.



REPORTERS ALSO MAY SUGGEST THAT THEY HAVE "THE STORY" OR A PART OF IT FROM OTHER SOURCES AND ARE MERELY SEEKING CONFIRMATION OR A MORE AUTHORITATIVE VERSION. BELIEVING THIS, THE OFFICIAL RESPONDS WITH DATA THE REPORTER DID NOT KNOW AND TO WHICH HE IS NOT ENTITLED.

JOURNALISTS ALSO "FLOAT" INTERESTING AND INTENTIONALLY FALSE STORIES SO THAT OFFICIALS WILL RISE TO THE BAIT AND RESPOND, "NO, IT IS NOT THAT WAY. LET ME TELL YOU WHAT THE SITUATION REALLY IS."

CITING ALLEGED APPROVAL FROM THE TARGET OFFICIAL'S SUPERIOR TO DISCUSS CLASSIFIED SUBJECTS OR TO OBTAIN A "FEW FACTS," THE REPORTER MAY GAIN FROM THE MISLEAD OFFICIALS WHAT HE WANTS. OTHER NEWSMEN ATTEMPT TO HIDE THEIR JOURNALIST AFFILIATION AND REFER TO THEMSELVES AS RESEARCHERS OR AUTHORS COLLECTING INFORMATION.

PRESSURE TO COME UP WITH SENSATIONAL STORIES HAS LED TO UNQUESTIONINGLY ACCEPTING THE OUTRAGEOUS CLAIMS OF THOSE WHO SEEK TO EXPLOIT THE SECRECY OF INTELLIGENCE TO COVER THEIR OWN ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES. ABC IN 1984 PROFILED HAWAII CON MAN RONALD REWALD--THEN UNDER A 100-COUNT INDICTMENT FOR FRAUD AND PERJURY--GIVING CREDENCE TO HIS FALSE CLAIMS THAT HE WAS COMMITTING ILLEGAL ACTS FOR THE CIA AND TO ANOTHER MAN WHO

CLAIMED HE HAD BEEN HIRED BY THE CIA TO KILL REWALD. THE STORY WAS SENSATIONAL BUT ABSOLUTELY FALSE AND A DISSERVICE TO U.S. CITIZENS WHO ARE NOT AWARE OF THE LAWS AND CONTROLS GOVERNING THEIR INTELLIGENCE SERVICES.

THE TEMPTATION TO GO BEYOND THE FACTS AND PIECE TOGETHER AND STRETCH FRAGMENTS OF INFORMATION IN ORDER TO MAKE A PUBLISHABLE STORY AND SOMETIMES IN ORDER TO SENSATIONALIZE IS A DANGEROUS THING. IT CAN AND HAS COST LIVES. IT CAN WRONGLY IMPAIR REPUTATIONS AND DISRUPT RELATIONSHIPS CRITICAL TO OUR NATIONAL INTEREST. LET ME ILLUSTRATE WITH A TRUE STORY. DURING 1985, A WELL-KNOWN REPORTER CALLED THE INFORMATION OFFICER AT THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND TOLD HIM HE HAD A STORY THAT WE HAD HELPED THE SECURITY SERVICE OF A FRIENDLY NATION STAGE A CAR BOMBING OF THE HEADQUARTERS OF A TERRORIST ORGANIZATION WHICH HAD RESULTED IN DEATH OR INJURY TO A LARGE NUMBER OF RESIDENTS AND PASSERS-BY IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD. OUR OFFICER TOLD THE REPORTER THAT HIS INFORMATION WAS INCORRECT AND THAT THE CIA HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF AND NO INVOLVEMENT, DIRECT OR INDIRECT, IN THE ATTACK. HE WAS ALSO TOLD THAT IF HE CHARGED U.S. INVOLVEMENT, HE MIGHT WIND UP WITH BLOOD ON HIS HANDS. THE STORY WAS RUN IN HIS NEWSPAPER. IT GOT AROUND THE WORLD AND CREATED A FALSE IMPRESSION OF U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN THE BOMBING.

THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATED THE MATTER AND CONCLUDED THAT "NO COMPLICITY OF DIRECT OR INDIRECT

INVOLVEMENT CAN BE ESTABLISHED WITH RESPECT TO THE MARCH 8 BOMBING IN BEIRUT." BUT THIS CAME TOO LATE! A MONTH AFTER THE MISLEADING STORY WAS PUBLISHED TO THE WORLD, TERRORISTS HIJACKED A TWA PLANE AND ITS 153 PASSENGERS AND TOOK THEM TO BEIRUT. WHEN THE HIJACKERS SHOT AND KILLED AN AMERICAN SERVICEMAN, THEY CLAIMED IT TO BE IN RETALIATION FOR THE BOMBING IN BEIRUT IN WHICH THE REPORTER HAD INVOLVED THE CIA AFTER THE CIA'S SPOKESMAN HAD DENIED TO HIM ANY INVOLVEMENT, DIRECT OR INDIRECT, IN THE BOMBING.

IN PUTTING THIS STORY TOGETHER, THE REPORTERS HAD TALKS WITH OFFICIALS IN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH AND MEMBERS AND STAFFERS OF THE CONGRESS ABOUT COLLATERAL MATTERS INCLUDING OUR LONG-TERM PRACTICE OF PROVIDING TRAINING AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO THE SECURITY SERVICES OF OTHER COUNTRIES IN ORDER TO IMPROVE OUR CAPABILITIES AND COOPERATION ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND COUNTER-TERRORISM. THIS KIND OF ASSISTANCE GOES BACK MANY YEARS. WE ARE DOING MORE OF THIS TO COPE WITH TODAY'S INTENSIFIED TERRORIST THREAT. THIS DOES NOT MAKE US RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CONSEQUENCES OF LAW ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES IN OTHER COUNTRIES.

THIS IS A TRAGIC STORY. THERE IS ENOUGH BLAME FOR EVERYONE INVOLVED TO SHARE. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS TALKED MORE THAN THE RULES PERMIT ON CLASSIFIED MATTERS. THE REPORTERS IGNORED ACCURATE INFORMATION WITH WHICH THEY WERE CAREFULLY, CLEARLY,

AND HONESTLY PROVIDED. THEY STRETCHED THE IMPLICATIONS OF SCRAPS OF INFORMATION THEY GATHERED. WE AT THE CIA EITHER DID NOT HAVE TIME OR WERE NOT FAST ENOUGH IN BRINGING THE MATTER TO THE ATTENTION OF MANAGEMENT AT THE NEWSPAPER.

WE ALL MUST DO BETTER. THIS IS A DANGEROUS AND UNPREDICTABLE WORLD IN WHICH ALL OF US MUST MOVE WITH CAUTION AND RESPONSIBILITY. CERTAINLY ANY RESPONSIBLE PERSON WOULD WANT TO EXERCISE SPECIAL CARE TO AVOID SETTING IN MOTION THIS KIND OF SEQUENCE OF EVENTS.

BEN BRADLEE, IN AN OP-ED PIECE IN THE WASHINGTON POST OF 8 JUNE 1986 SAID: "WE DO CONSULT WITH THE GOVERNMENT REGULARLY ABOUT SENSITIVE STORIES AND WE DO WITHHOLD STORIES FOR NATIONAL SECURITY REASONS, FAR MORE THAN THE PUBLIC MIGHT THINK. THE POST HAS WITHHELD INFORMATION FROM MORE THAN A DOZEN STORIES SO FAR THIS YEAR FOR THESE REASONS." HE THEN WENT ON TO SAY: "WE DON'T ALLOW THE GOVERNMENT--OR ANYONE ELSE-- TO DECIDE WHAT WE SHOULD PRINT. THAT IS OUR JOB."

HE'S RIGHT. IT'S THE PUBLISHER'S RIGHT TO DETERMINE WHAT TO PRINT. NO ONE CAN TELL HIM WHAT HE MUST PRINT. BUT THE MEDIA, LIKE EVERYBODY ELSE, MUST ADHERE TO THE LAW AND CONGRESS HAS SPECIFIED INFORMATION WHICH MAY NOT BE PUBLISHED.

THE MEDIA OFTEN CITES THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION AND "THE PUBLIC'S RIGHT TO KNOW" TO MAKE THE POINT THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO RESTRAINT ON WHAT THE MEDIA CAN PRINT OR BROADCAST AND THAT IT SHOULD BE THE SOLE JUDGE OF WHAT SHOULD OR SHOULD NOT BE PRINTED ON NATIONAL SECURITY MATTERS. MOST OF US KNOW THE FIRST AMENDMENT STATES ONLY THAT CONGRESS SHALL MAKE NO LAW ABRIDGING FREEDOM OF THE PRESS AND, AS THE LATE SUPREME COURT JUSTICE POTTER STEWART COMMENTED A FEW YEARS AGO, NOWHERE IN THE CONSTITUTION CAN ONE FIND ANYTHING ABOUT "THE PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO KNOW."

THE SUPREME COURT HAS CONSISTENTLY VIEWED FIRST AMENDMENT ISSUES DIFFERENTLY WHEN THEY ARE IN THE CONTEXT OF NATIONAL SECURITY RATHER THAN WHEN THEY ARE IN LAW ENFORCEMENT OR OTHER DOMESTIC SETTINGS. IT HAS ALSO ACKNOWLEDGED THE CONSTITUTION'S EMPHASIS ON THE POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT IN THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS ARENA, PARTICULARLY WHEN INTELLIGENCE EQUITIES ARE INVOLVED.

IN THE LANDMARK FIRST AMENDMENT CASE, NEAR V. MINNESOTA, THE SUPREME COURT IN 1931 STRUCK DOWN A STATE LAW PROSCRIBING PUBLICATION OF DEFAMATORY NEWSPAPERS, BUT TOOK GREAT CARE TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THE FIRST AMENDMENT WAS NOT ABSOLUTE AND THAT "THE PROTECTION EVEN AS TO PREVIOUS RESTRAINT IS NOT ABSOLUTELY UNLIMITED."

THE COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE STATUTE WAS PASSED SHORTLY AFTER WORLD WAR II TO PROTECT COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS OR DIRECT INFORMATION ABOUT U.S. CODES AND CIPHERS FROM BEING "KNOWINGLY AND WILLFULLY" PUBLISHED OR IN ANY OTHER WAY MADE AVAILABLE TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON. CONGRESS CAREFULLY LIMITED THE APPLICATION OF THIS PROHIBITION TO INFORMATION ABOUT COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE WHICH IT CALLED "A SMALL DEGREE OF CLASSIFIED MATTER, A CATEGORY WHICH IS BOTH VITAL AND VULNERABLE TO ALMOST A UNIQUE DEGREE." THEY CLEARLY REGARDED COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE AS ONE OF OUR BEST CHANCES TO LEARN ABOUT THE OTHER NATION'S MILITARY PLANS AND WARNINGS OF MILITARY ATTACKS AGAINST US. IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO JUSTIFY CONTINUED FAILURE TO USE A STATUTE PUT ON THE BOOKS TO PROTECT COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE.

JUSTICE BYRON WHITE WROTE IN HIS CONCURRING OPINION ON THE CONTROVERSIAL PENTAGON PAPERS CASE IN 1971 THAT THE STATUTE "IN PRECISE LANGUAGE, PROSCRIBES KNOWING AND WILLFUL PUBLICATION OF ANY CLASSIFIED INFORMATION CONCERNING THE CRYPTOGRAPHIC SYSTEMS OR COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF THE UNITED STATES AS WELL AS ANY INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS...NEWSPAPERS ARE PRESUMABLY NOW ON FULL NOTICE OF THE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES AND MUST FACE THE CONSEQUENCES IF THEY PUBLISH."

OUR LEGAL SYSTEM HAS CLEARLY RECOGNIZED THAT WITHOUT THE  
SECRECY NEEDED TO MAINTAIN OUR NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY, WE MAY  
NOT HAVE FREEDOM OF SPEECH OR THE OTHER FREEDOMS WE ALL ENJOY.  
THE COURT WROTE IN 1963 IN KENNEDY V. MENDOZA-MARTINEZ THAT  
"WHILE THE CONSTITUTION PROTECTS AGAINST INVASION OF INDIVIDUAL  
RIGHTS, IT IS NOT A SUICIDE PACT." WE CAN HAVE BOTH A FREE  
PRESS AND NATIONAL SECURITY, BUT WITHOUT NATIONAL SECURITY  
WE WILL LOSE OUR FREEDOM.



## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

Phone: (703) 351-7676

21 April 1986

Mr. John Seigenthaler  
Editor, Editorial Page  
USA TODAY  
1000 Wilson Boulevard  
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Dear Mr. Seigenthaler:

USA TODAY's 11 April editorial "Too Many Secrets Are Real Security Risk" is disappointing. It dismisses the President and Director Casey's concerns that the disclosure and publication of sensitive information seriously damages the nation's ability to protect its citizens. It also blithely insists that only information provided by this country's traitors to the nation's adversaries is harmful, while the sensitive U.S. national security information the KGB and its cohorts read in the U.S. press is considered to be not damaging. Curious reasoning indeed! The problem is as President Truman put it in a 1951 press conference: "Whether it be treason or not, it does the U.S. just as much harm for those military (and national intelligence) secrets to be made known to potential enemies through open publication as it does for military (and national intelligence) secrets to be given to an enemy through the clandestine operation of spies."

Make no mistake about it, intelligence comes from real people around the world who risk their lives to provide information of benefit to the U.S. and the free world. Intelligence also comes from our allies and from sophisticated technical systems that cost billions of dollars to develop and maintain. Director Casey is charged by law with protecting the identities of these people, the information our allies provide, and the capabilities of our sensitive and expensive technical systems. In most cases that means that the information provided by these sources must be classified, since its publication will enable our adversaries to identify and destroy these assets. In rare instances when source-identifying data can be eliminated or the President deems that it is in the national security interest, intelligence can be officially released and published.

It is unfortunate that USA TODAY cannot differentiate between the very serious damage done to the nation's security through the publication of leaked sensitive intelligence and the need for the American public to possess as much information as possible to make



Mr. John Seigenthaler

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21 April 1986

informed judgments about the conduct of the government's business. Both concerns are real, different, but clearly not mutually exclusive. There can be freedom of the press and a sensitivity by the press to the need to protect military, diplomatic and intelligence activities that defend this nation. The nation can have both freedom and security, but without security it will have no freedom.

While it is obviously desirable for the press to seek out, publish and criticize malfeasance or nonfeasance on the part of individuals or government entities, it is injurious to the nation's interest for the press to attempt deliberately to ferret out and expose the sources and methods used in intelligence collection. It is equally damaging to publish such information provided by leakers without attempting to determine the degree of damage that will result from such exposure.

USA TODAY and many of the press put the blame for the hemorrhage of secrets on the leakers, but the press itself caters to such leakers, encourages their purposes and then absolves itself from the damage that results to the nation's security from its actions. In short, the press often carelessly tosses about the verbal hand grenades that a leaker hands it. When they explode, killing people and inflicting great damage, the press shrugs and says in effect, well, it's a free country. It seems to those of us in the U.S. national security agencies who are endeavoring to protect this nation's security and thereby its freedoms, including the very freedom the press enjoys, that the press cannot have it both ways. The press is outraged when hostile spies are uncovered in the U.S., but happily conveys equally harmful information to our adversaries by printing very damaging leaks. Why aren't the leakers who have betrayed our government's trust condemned by the press at least to the same extent that it chastizes those who spend thousands of dollars for costly aircraft toilet seats? It seems to us there is a good deal of media hypocrisy in all this.

Director Casey asked that the press of this nation work with CIA and the other national security organizations in protecting this nation's legitimate secrets. Some organizations and individual journalists already do. I strongly encourage the other members of the press to do so too. After all, CIA protects this nation, including all of you in the press. By damaging our capabilities you damage yourself. Let us work together as much as we can for the good of our country.

Sincerely,

George V. Lauder  
Director, Public Affairs

86- 1575


12 April 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Public Affairs  
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence  
SUBJECT: Leaks

1. I ran into Kay Graham at dinner last night. She thought our presentation on leaks went very well with the editors. She pointed out that Simons and I were really talking about different things, he about tearing down secrecy which covers up corruption and mismanagement and I about secrecy to protect lives and vital interests. In the discussion, that wasn't brought out as clearly as it might have been. The two of us talked past each other.

2. In this editorial in USA TODAY they decry overclassification in which there is probably room for improvement. They also again try to turn the whole issue on being entitled "to know what our federal government is doing just as we deserve to know how much the school board will pay teachers or whether the city council will raise taxes." That's true, but has nothing to do with protecting lives and national interests.

3. It seems to me we should get a coherent response drafted and use it to respond to editorial comment like this.



William J. Casey

Attachment:  
Page 10A, 11 April 1986 USA TODAY

25X1

SECRET

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE 10-AUSA TODAY  
11 April 1986

# OPINION

## The Debate: THE USA'S SECRETS

Today's debate includes our opinion that too many secrets and spies, not leaks or aggressive reporting, are the real threat to our national security, an opposing view from Rhode Island, other views from Illinois, Wisconsin, and the District of Columbia, and voices from across the USA.

## Too many secrets are real security risk

"The White House," President Reagan says, "is the leakiest place I've ever been in."

The president wasn't talking about the White House roof. In his speech to newspaper editors this week, he deplored a leak most editors love — the disclosure of information. He said it's such a serious problem that planning for U.S. operations off Libya was limited to a "few people."

CIA Director William Casey went further. He said the publication of secrets has destroyed intelligence sources and cost taxpayers "millions and even billions of dollars."

Leaks are nothing new. After all, George Washington leaked the news that the British would surrender at Yorktown to a Philadelphia newspaper.

Today, it's no secret that our government keeps far too many secrets. There are nearly 20 million government records that are classified, and 4 million government employees have clearances to see classified information.

It's ludicrous to think 40 people can keep a secret. How can 4 million? If they were seeing it for the first time, some bureaucrats would classify the Constitution.

Consider some of the "secrets" the media have reported through the years:

■ A report that the space shuttle carried a spy satellite. The Pentagon complained about the leak, but an Air Force official said later little was reported that was not already public information.

■ The Watergate scandal. Without leaks, the public would never have known the extent of White House involvement in the burglary and the subsequent cover-up.

■ The publication of the Pentagon Papers. The government claimed printing the leaked details of how we got into the Vietnam War would endanger U.S. lives. Courts disagreed, and the knowledge we gained may have saved lives later.

Instead of harming us, most disclosures help us better understand what government is up to. We are entitled to know what our federal government is doing, just as we deserve to know how much the school board will pay teachers or whether the city council will raise taxes.

There are those who cry that journalists are unpatriotic. They claim reporters would sacrifice national security for a hot story. That's nonsense. Journalists frequently withhold sensitive information if it would be dangerous or irresponsible to reveal it. Even CIA Director Casey admits that.

The real disclosures that have damaged our national security have not come from the media. No, those disclosures came from quislings and traitors — the Johnny Walkers and the other spies — who sold secrets to the Soviets.

Sure, sometimes leaks embarrass public servants. And they've caused a bureaucratic flap or two. Because we live in freedom, not under the thumb of a totalitarian state, our democracy is messy. And to a great degree, our freedom depends on how much we know about our government.

Yes, the White House leaks. But it would be a mistake to fix it.

ARTICLE APPROVED  
ON PAGE 1712NATIONAL JOURNAL  
12 July 1986

PRESS REPORT

# Muzzling the Media

The Administration's attempts to reduce the flow of information in the name of national security raises fundamental questions about the role of a free press.

BY DOM BONAFEDE

One of the singular anomalies of the contemporary political scene is that Ronald Reagan, universally hailed as the "Great Communicator," presides over an Administration that from all appearances is intent on stemming the free flow of information and muzzling the national news media.

Interested observers, including constitutional lawyers, scholars, prominent journalists and public-interest advocates, widely agree that the Reagan Administration, generally under the cloak of national security, has taken an unprecedentedly narrow view of 1st Amendment rights involving free speech and an unfettered press.

Floyd Abrams, a noted 1st Amendment expert and a partner in the New York law firm of Cahill Gordon & Reindel, maintained that during the past three years, the Administration has taken "a more direct, vocal and far more visible public position in the extreme overbreadth of its definition of national security and its under-evaluation of constitutional values."

Allan Adler, counsel for the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), contended that "this Administration has far surpassed any previous Administration in demonstrating its disdain for the public's right to know what it is doing." Adler added: "Three decades ago, the Communist threat was the avenue to restrict the 1st Amendment and freedom of speech. Now, we're seeing that terrorism and national security are being used the same way."

Adler said that the "public threat" by CIA director William J. Casey to bring criminal charges against news organizations that purportedly violate certain national security laws "clearly changed the

game and indicated a shift by the Administration" in the zealotry with which it pursues government employees and journalists who disclose unauthorized confidential material.

"This Administration is possibly the most restrictive in recent memory in terms of the free dissemination of information," said Jane E. Kirtley, executive director of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press.

She said the committee has compiled a list of 75 actions the Administration has taken that have had a "serious impact" on freedom of the press, "ranging from efforts to eviscerate the Freedom of Information Act to Casey's threats to prosecute news organizations—and that's only the stuff we know about, contrasted to what we don't know."

Others, however, take a more tempered view. Former CIA director William E. Colby said: "All Administrations go through the agony of this problem; President Kennedy did, and I imagine George Washington did. . . . Casey is simply trying to get people to pull up their socks by pointing out there are laws in this area and that these laws are very clear. He has a legal obligation to call attention to possible violations."

Casey, who enjoys a comfortable personal relationship with Reagan and is generally recognized to be the most politically oriented of recent CIA directors, has publicly asserted that the American press fails to fully comprehend and appreciate the need to protect U.S. intelligence sources, capabilities and methods. (See box, p. 1718.)

"I am trying to correct that situation," he declared in an interview in the July *Washington Journalism Review*. "All of us in the intelligence community have an obligation to sensitize the people in the media to this problem.

... We're just now trying to do it in a more systematic and aggressive way."

Casey's critics, however, argue that he seems more interested in systematically and aggressively imposing control over the press than in striking a mutually acceptable balance between press and government. They have a sense that he misunderstands their conflicting roles, with the press conditioned to challenge authority and act as a buffer to extraconstitutional or questionable activities on the part of the government, whose ambition is to get its message out and put its best face forward publicly. Inevitably, the two institutions often clash in pursuit of their goals.

While Casey has thrust himself into the forefront of the controversy, he is, in effect, a creature of the President and is presumably acting if not with the Administration's endorsement, then at least with its acquiescence. In large measure, he has become a personal symbol of an Administration that either out of distrust or institutional caution, has cultivated an arm's-length relationship with the news media and has artfully sought to impose tighter managerial control over government information, or, when conditions are favorable, to circumvent the press entirely.

Thus, a confluence of issues is brought into play, including free speech guarantees under the 1st Amendment, the press's role and responsibility, the need to assure the nation's security, the occasional conflict between civil liberties and ideology, the adversary relationship between press and government and, perhaps most important, the people's right to know as a basic element in the shaping of official policy in a democratic society.

## GOVERNMENT CRACKDOWN

From the beginning, the Administration has consistently taken measures to regulate the flow of government information. These included steps to:

- prohibit an unspecified number of writers, artists and political figures, including prominent Canadian nature writer Farley Mowat and the widow of former Chilean president Salvador Allende, from entering the United States under the 1952 McCarran-Walter Act because of their views and associations.
- require all government employees and contractors who have or seek high-level

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security clearance, including political appointees but not elected officials, to submit to lie detector tests. The apparent purpose of the polygraphs is to trace leaks of information to the press and guard against infiltration by spies.

- expand, as the result of an executive order that Reagan signed, the discretion of federal agencies to classify information for an indefinite period. The order further allows the withholding of information that merely relates to national security or foreign affairs and provides authority to reclassify information already in the public domain.
- mandate that all government officials with access to high-level classified information sign statements that require them for the rest of their lives to submit for official, pre-publication review all articles and books they write for public consumption. A book by former CIA director Stansfield Turner, *Secrecy and Democracy, the CIA in Transition*, was delayed 18 months before being cleared by censors who insisted on almost 100 deletions on security grounds.
- impose a news blackout during the October 1983 invasion of Grenada and threaten to shoot any U.S. reporters who tried to reach the island on their own. Coverage of the initial stages of the assault was selectively provided by the Defense Department's own news service. Later, Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger and then-White House chief of staff James A. Baker III announced that the Administration had the right to exclude the news media from future military operations if it wished to do so.
- seek to broaden existing exemptions in the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) to include the CIA's "operational files," U.S. Secret Service records and the investigatory files of the Securities and Exchange Commission. The CIA acknowledges that it takes an average of 14.5 months for the agency to respond to an FOIA request.

In other actions, the CIA took the unprecedented step of filing a complaint with the Federal Communications Commission charging that ABC News had "engaged in deliberate news distortion" in broadcasts about the alleged connection between the agency and an Hawaii investment banker then under indictment for fraud. And in recent months, two high-level government employees, one from State and the other from Defense, were fired on suspicion of leaking information to the press.

While previous Administrations engaged in some similar actions, none was as blatant and intimidating in its efforts

to manage, if not control, the news—with the notable exception of the Nixon Administration in the Watergate cover-up, the secret bombing of Cambodia and the attempts to block release of the Pentagon Papers that detailed the genesis of the Vietnam war.

### SETTING THE PATTERN

The most highly publicized and contentious incident involving the press and government centered on Casey's disclosure in May that he and other Administration officials had discussed the possibility of prosecuting five news organizations for publishing information about U.S. intelligence-gathering operations, particularly the ability of the National Security Agency (NSA) to intercept and decode messages of other nations. The CIA director indicated that the news organizations had violated a section of the Espionage Act that was enacted in 1950 but has never been applied. Casey, in his warning, identified *The Washington Post*, *The New York Times*, *The Washington Times*, *Newsweek* and *Time* magazine.

Shortly afterward, Casey and Lt. Gen. William E. Odom, the NSA director, "cautioned" reporters "against speculation and reporting details beyond the information actually released" at the espionage trial of accused Soviet spy Ronald W. Pelton in Baltimore.

Although Casey soon moderated his firm warning, he had made his point. Then, in late June, he warned two journalist-authors, Bob Woodward of *The Washington Post* and Seymour M. Hersh of *The New York Times*, as well as their publishers, that they could be violating the law if books each is writing contained secret "communications intelligence." Woodward is writing a book on Casey and the CIA and Hersh is working on a book due to be released in late summer or early fall on the downing of the South Korean passenger jet by the Soviets in 1983.

Clearly, a pattern had been set, with Casey the chief antagonist.

"This Administration has gone top-secret crazy," said Kirtley of the reporters' committee. "The longer an Administration is in office, they have a tendency to take a proprietary interest in information; they shall decide what the public should know."

Attorney Abrams said that "Casey's threats at the very least are an attempt to pressure if not muscle the press into silence in areas he believes should not be discussed. He wants to let them know if they publish or broadcast things he does not believe should be, they'll be in trouble."

Syndicated columnist Jack Anderson, famous for his investigative exposés, con-

ceded that the Administration's series of actions "affect me a little. It scares me, also, to have an Administration conducting wholesale lie detector tests and eavesdropping on their own people. It occurs at the highest level because they're frustrated."

Anderson suggested that Casey's "threats" have already had a "chilling effect" on the news media. He specifically referred to a June 8 article in *The Washington Post* in which Benjamin C. Bradlee, the newspaper's executive editor, emphasized that neither the government nor anyone else is allowed "to decide what we should print" while acknowledging that his newspaper regularly consulted with the government "about sensitive stories, and we do withhold stories for national security reasons, far more than the public might think. The *Post* has withheld information from more than a dozen stories so far this year for these reasons."

Anderson's view of Bradlee's article suggested to him that the newspaper "has been chilled a little. I don't mean they are not doing their job; they are. But they are examining procedures much more closely and being more cautious than before Casey's threat."

*Los Angeles Times* Washington bureau chief Jack Nelson said that the news media have generally been passive in rebutting Administration efforts to restrict the free flow of information. "Certainly, there has not been any strong editorial outcry, maybe with some papers but not many," he said. "Why? For the same reason that people like the President but oppose his policies. The economy is not bad, there is little inflation, people are fairly happy. That feeling permeates the news media."

On the perennial question of government over-classification, Richard K. Betts, a Brookings Institution intelligence specialist and former staff member of the National Security Council and Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, contended that it is not done "out of malevolence or to hide things from people because it would be embarrassing"—an impression widely held among critics. Instead, he said, "there is a tendency when in doubt to err on the side of caution. Sometimes the classification is handled by low-level people who don't know any better. Also, it is being done at so many different places."

Betts suggested that perhaps a "special court" working with Congress might be established to deal with government classifica-

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tion. "I don't know how it would work; it would probably be swamped," he said. "But it might reduce some of the abuses and take the burden off the press."

Meanwhile, Weinberger, writing last October in *Defense*, a Pentagon publication, stated that the role of the news media in U.S. society had to be weighed against competing national security requirements—that depending on national priorities, one constitutional right sometimes superseded another constitutional right. "Freedom of the press has never been universally defined," he said. "We are still debating those 13 simple words written two centuries ago—'Congress shall make no law . . . abridging freedom of speech or of the press'—with regard to what the founding fathers meant by them and how they apply today."

Weinberger argued that while the press is protected by the 1st Amendment, "such protection cannot diminish the other legitimate functions of good government," including "the equally legitimate tradition of the government's need for secrecy, especially in national defense."

But, he added, "unfortunately, some reporters and their editors do not agree. Some act as if they are in an appropriate position to decide for themselves whether information that we have classified should actually be protected."

In so saying, Weinberger articulated the Administration's position, while pointing up the uneasy balance between two legitimate and vital interests.

### THE MORISON AFFAIR

For the past year or so, a rash of espionage cases has become a steady news diet, including those involving retired Navy communications specialist Jerry Alfred Whitworth, former CIA agent Edward Lee Howard, former NSA intelligence official Pelton and ex-Navy chief warrant officer John A. Walker. All involved government employees who had access to top-secret intelligence and who were charged with selling out to the Soviets. Although spiced with drama and intrigue, each of the cases from a constitutional standpoint were mostly cut and dried.

Ironically, the most significant and complicated case was the least publicized—that of Navy intelligence analyst Samuel Loring Morison. A Vietnam veteran, grandson of naval historian Samuel Eliot Morison and a 10-year employee of the Naval Intelligence Support Service, he was accused of taking three KH-11 satellite photographs labeled "secret" of a Black Sea shipyard where a new, nuclear-powered Soviet aircraft carrier was under construction and mailing them to

the British magazine *Jane's Defence Weekly*, for whom he moonlighted, a fact known to his Navy superiors.

For leaking the classified photos to the press, Morison was charged with theft of government property and espionage. It marked only the second time since the Espionage Act was enacted in 1917 that the law was used to prosecute someone for leaking classified information to the press rather than to foreign agents. The earlier case, dismissed by the Supreme Court, involved the prosecution of Daniel Ellsberg and Anthony Russo for releasing the Pentagon Papers.

In effect, said David Wise, who frequently writes on espionage and CIA matters, "the Administration has sought to marry the classification system to the espionage laws."

The ACLU's Adler said that "the Administration's efforts come into sharp focus with the Morison case; they do not distinguish between government employees who leak information to the press and those who engage in espionage. They equate leaking with espionage."

Last October, Morison was convicted and is currently free on bond pending appeal.

The Morison affair, Adler said, "represented a clear turning point for the Administration. They decided to go ahead and try their luck in court. It was a calculated gamble. Their first step was to secure a conviction. When that proved successful, an emboldened Casey went one step further and applied more pressure on the press itself."

Wise similarly saw the Administration's strategy behind the Morison case as a two-part process—"to intimidate officials for unauthorized leaks at one end and intimidate reporters at the other end."

Adler said he was convinced that the Administration went beyond the intent of the Espionage Act in prosecuting Morison for leaking information to the press. "Casey," he said, "did a magnificent job of salesmanship."

During the Morison trial, government prosecutors stressed the undeniable, that he had willfully transmitted photographs and documents related to national defense to someone not entitled to receive them. The critical question of whether the transmitted material could cause damage or injury to the United States or be of potential advantage to a foreign power—a central issue in espionage cases—was never passed upon.

A key witness for the defense was Roland S. Inlow, a retired, 28-year CIA

veteran who formerly directed the agency's operations dealing with photographic satellite reconnaissance.

In his testimony, Inlow said that based on his professional and technical experience, the disclosure of the three satellite photographs in *Jane's* would not cause damage or injury to the security of the United States.

In a lengthy account featured in "First Principles," published by the ACLU's Center for National Security Studies, Inlow wrote, "Morison clearly had committed a misdeed; but what he did was not 'espionage.'"

Inlow testified during the Morison trial that the Soviets had earlier acquired a KH-11 technical manual and that "the photographs, as printed in *Jane's*, would have revealed no technical characteristics about the imaging satellite that the Soviet Union did not already know about in detail. . . . The potential for damage from the disclosure of these three photographs was zero."

He suggested in his written account that the government had decided to "make an example" of Morison. He added that "the guilty verdict in the Morison trial, if upheld on appeal, would establish precedents in more than one direction. It clearly offers a precedent for indicting persons who leak information under many types of circumstances."

### SECRETS AND RIGHTS

Spelling out the differences between the press and government, a *Washington Post* reader wrote in a July 1 letter to the editor: "The intelligence community serves the governmental consumer, employs mostly clandestine sources and protects those sources by means of a legally sanctioned classification system. The information itself is protected largely because it can reveal sources.

"The press, on the other hand, serves the public at large (including those same governmental consumers), employs mostly open sources and, while it protects the sources, serves the wider audience by printing the information."

In essence, the press-government issue revolves around the demand to reconcile national security requirements with constitutional rights.

Casey has asserted that the way to accomplish this is "to tighten up within the government."

Wise interprets that as a move toward the British Official Secrets Act, which imposes strict limitations on the ability of the press to divulge national intelligence information.

The Brookings Institution's Betts questions the absoluteness of the media's constitutional rights. "I'm not sure the press

should be exempt from these questions any more than other institutions," he said. While acknowledging the difficulty involved, he suggested that "there ought to be some other check on the discretion of the press other than the press itself."

Contributing to the dilemma is the climatic condition that prevails between the press and this Administration, underscored in Secretary of State George P. Shultz's comment following the media criticism of the Grenada invasion: "It seems as though the reporters are always against us, . . . always seeking to report something that's going to screw these things up."

Central to the Administration's campaign to contain national intelligence information are its efforts to plug leaks by reducing the number of officials with access to classified documents and imposing stricter security curbs on military and civilian employees who handle secret codes and cryptographic devices.

In former CIA director Colby's view, "the leakage problem has gotten more serious. The general problem is the lack of standards and discipline in society. There are whistle-blowers and inquiring reporters. . . . There is a contempt for security."

Albert R. Hunt, Washington bureau chief of *The Wall Street Journal*, however, offered a different view. Administration officials, he said, typically will "draw a distinction between good and bad leaks. Good leaks are those which help and support their policies; bad leaks are those which don't put them in a good light."

Joseph F. Laitin, a former assistant public affairs secretary at Defense and Treasury and now the ombudsman at *The Washington Post*, said, "While Casey threatens *The Post* and other newspapers, he should look within the Administration for leaks."

James R. Schlesinger, the former Defense Secretary who briefly served as CIA director in 1973, said: "The problem of leakage is generally a problem of the executive branch. I think the press is generally responsible."

Casey, nonetheless, insists he will not retreat from his hard-line position and will seek to prosecute anyone, including members of the press, whom he believes has violated laws covering secret communications intelligence.

Adler, meanwhile, expressed doubt that Reagan would want to go down in history "as the first President since the Alien and Sedition Act to try to prosecute a news organization. . . . The decision to prosecute *The Post* or any of the other newspapers will have to come from the top."

The anomaly, Abrams said, "is not so much Reagan as the 'Great Communicator' but that of an Administration that wants to get government off the backs of people in the economic sphere but is unwilling to take a position like that in the area of 1st Amendment rights." □

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# When Casey's at the Bat

Despite a lifetime on the cutting edge—as a World War II agent in the Office of Strategic Services, as a Wall Street venture capitalist who became a multimillionaire, as chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), as Ronald Reagan's 1980 campaign chairman and finally as CIA director—William J. Casey has remained an enigma.

An unimposing, slightly ruffled man, he does not carry his 73 years lightly. His glowering gaze through thick glasses and his tendency to mumble as he speaks, as though he is conspiring aloud to himself, serve to obscure rather than reveal. Impatient and intimidating, Casey could easily be cast as a worldly, autocratic bishop addressing one of his rustic parishioners.

While he can be courtly among his peers, he is not one to stand on ceremony at other times. Albert R. Hunt, Washington bureau chief of *The Wall Street Journal*, recalled: "I met him at a party one time; he came over and in dark tones asked me if we had ever violated the Agents Identity Act. I told him no."

The puzzling question within the Washington press corps these days is whether Casey is sincere in his threat to prosecute the news media should they disclose classified information that bears on national security or is simply trying to chill the media into paralysis.

"Whether he is bluffing or not, I'm not sure," Hunt said. "But you have to take Casey seriously."

According to syndicated columnist Jack Anderson, "Casey sincerely believes the public and press ought not be shown the secrets of government and that the government ought to operate in the dark. Obviously, you can be more effective operating in the dark—but the cost is too high in terms of freedom and the people's right to know. . . . I think it is his nature. He behaved the same way during the Nixon Administration when he was SEC chairman. He went to elaborate lengths to put documents into safe keeping so they couldn't be subpoenaed. . . . He's a security nut; he believes only those in power should know what's going on. . . . But I don't think they are going to prosecute any newspaper."

Joseph F. Laitin, a former assistant public affairs secretary at the Defense and Treasury Departments and now the ombudsman at The Washington Post, said: "Casey's threat was part bombast and part showboat, with a menacing backdrop to it. He was testing the waters. If it had caught on publicly, the way [former Vice President] Spiro Agnew's attack on the press did [in 1969], there would have been real trouble. But the American public was too smart to buy it."

It is unclear whether Casey is a maverick motivated by personal convictions and prejudices or is acting as a stalking horse for an Administration that wants to see how far it can go in challenging the news media.

"Part of it is ideology," said 1st Amendment legal expert Floyd Abrams of Casey's duel with the press. "He genuinely believes it is wrong and dangerous for the press to say these things [about classified intelligence] and displays a marked insensitivity to 1st Amendment rights. It is still too early to say if the Justice Department and the White House fully support him. To the degree that he is the point man for the attack on the press, or is doing it on his own, the Administration is content to let him take the lead."



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# The Post and Pelton: How The Press Looks At National Security

By Benjamin C. Bradlee

**N**ATIONAL SECURITY means protection or defense of the country against attack, sedition, espionage, or other forms of hostile interference.

It isn't a complicated concept.

It isn't just hard to be against national security; it's inconceivable.

And yet, why is the director of Central Intelligence trying to get various news organizations indicted for the treasonous disclosure of information classified in the interest of national security? Why does the director of the National Security Agency threaten to prosecute news organizations if they publish information he feels threatens the national security? What does the assistant to the president for national security affairs have in mind when he joins the battle with such relish?

Why is the president of the United States himself so concerned that he calls the chairman of the board of this newspaper and asks that information be withheld in the interests of national security?

What's all the fuss about? Do these men really think the people who run this newspaper would betray their country? What reporter and what editor could betray this trust, and look their owner in the eye?

It sounds so simple, but it isn't.

The Washington Post has been at the center of some stormy national security debates in the last 20 years. One of those debates—the Pentagon Papers—went all the way to the Supreme Court in 1971 before it was resolved, in favor of the press.

The most recent, and the most anguishing, of these debates surrounds the story we published late last month about the Ronald Pelton spy case, after eight months of internal discussion and six months of conversations with the highest government officials.

As usual, outsiders seem both fascinated and mystified by how this newspaper handles this kind of story.

The Pelton case illustrates two important points about how The Post deals with national security issues:

■ First, we do consult with the government regularly about sensitive stories and we do

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withhold stories for national security reasons, far more often than the public might think. The Post has withheld information from more than a dozen stories so far this year for these reasons.

■ Second, we don't allow the government—or anyone else—to decide what we should print. That is our job, and doing it responsibly is what a free press is all about.

**T**rouble starts when people try to sweep a lot of garbage under the rug of national security. Even some very highly placed people.

Like President Richard Nixon in 1969, when he described a New York Times exclusive report on the secret bombing of Cambodia as an egregious example of national security violation.

That's right out of Kafka, when you think about it. The Cambodians certainly knew they were being bombed, and since only the United States was then flying bombing missions in Indochina, they certainly knew who was bombing them. If the Cambodians knew, the Vietcong knew. And if the Vietcong knew, their Soviet allies knew immediately. So what was all *that* about? Well, the American people didn't know and, in fact they had been told we would not bomb Cambodia.

Here, national security was used to cover up a national embarrassment: The president had lied to the American people and to the world. But the New York Times story, by reporter William Beecher, was used by the White House to justify creation of the infamous Plumbers unit, ostensibly to plug the leak that produced this dreadful violation of national security.

This led us to Watergate, of course. Is there anyone now alive and kicking in today's national security debate who remembers Nixon looking the world in its television eye and telling us he couldn't tell the world the truth about Watergate because national security was involved?

The worst lie of all.

All of this is not to say that there is no such thing as a legitimate claim of national security. Of course there is. Ever since World War II, a standard example of what not to publish for reasons of national security has been the sailing times of troopships leaving American harbors for foreign battle. But the world doesn't work that way anymore. Another good rule for when not to publish involves the risk of American lives (though that one has been used in cases where the risk was all but impossible to conceive). In any case, this newspaper does keep information out of print for reasons of national security. I can't give you a list without violating the national-security interest that led me to withhold publication.

In addition to stories that are withheld for reasons of national security, there are some close calls—stories that are eventually run, after long discussions where opposing views are vigorously defended.

Such a story appeared in *The Washington Post* on Feb. 18, 1977, under the headline "CIA Paid Millions to Jordan's King Hussein," and under reporter Bob Woodward's byline. Millions of dollars of "walking around money" (as distinct from economic or military aid) had been paid to the king by the CIA under the codeword project name "No Beef."

Jimmy Carter had been president less than a month. He agreed to see Woodward and me, after we sought White House reaction to the story before publication. The president totally disarmed us by admitting the story was true. He said that the payments had been stopped, and then stunned us by saying that he had known nothing about it until *The Post* had sought White House reaction, despite multiple briefings during the preceding months by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and CIA Director George Bush. The president never asked that the story not be printed, although he made clear he hoped it would not. He told us that the story, if printed, would make the progress he hoped for in the Middle East harder to achieve.

The argument over whether to print or not to print was spirited, to understate it. Some of us felt that the national interest would best be served if the world knew that the CIA had a king on its payroll, and that neither the outgoing CIA director nor the outgoing secretary of state felt that fact was important enough to share with the new president. Others felt that anything that might make resolution of the problems of the Middle East more difficult was not worth the candle of publishing.

There are no absolutes in such discussions. Rightness or wrongness lies in the eye of the beholder. Our decision was to publish. Hussein is still king. Bush is the vice president. Carter is the former president.

Under President Reagan, there was only one major point of tension about national security between the White House and this newspaper during the first term. It is hard to say whether this period of comparative detente was the result of the presence in the White House of James Baker as chief of staff and David Gergen as director of communications, both now laboring in different vineyards, or the absence of *Washington Post* interest in national security matters. The latter seems unlikely.

The one incident occurred in the waning days—December 1984—of the first term and involved Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger. The story stemmed from an extraordinary briefing at the Pentagon by Air Force Brig. Gen. Richard F. Abel about

the next Discovery space shuttle mission carrying an intelligence satellite. "Speculation" by news organizations on military aspects of the mission would result in a Defense Department investigation, Abel said.

Reporter Walter Pincus was asked casually by one of his editors, "What the hell is in that satellite, anyway?" He said he would "make a few calls" to find out. Two days and three telephone calls later, a story appeared under his and Mary Thornton's bylines, describing in general terms its signals-intelligence mission.

On that same morning, Weinberger was en route to a CNN early morning talk show interview, where he intended to push the Defense Department budget, which was already under a certain amount of attack from the Congress. He was interrupted by CBS

reporter Reid Collins and asked if *The Post's* story "gave aid and comfort to the enemy" (an odd question, it seemed then and now). Weinberger replied that the story did just that, and the fat was in the fire.

*The Post* issued a statement saying that there was nothing in the Pincus-Thornton story that had not appeared in bits and pieces somewhere else. But the damage was done. More than 4,000 letters to the editor were received. Some of the letters contained threats of bodily harm, even death.

The story would die there, a minor, if scarring skirmish in the battle over national security, were it not for a lecture given at Emory University a few days later by General Abel. The general was asked if *The Post* had violated national security by publishing. He replied that *The Post's* story contained little or no information not on the public record. No *Post* reporter was present at the lecture, but a student called the paper to report both the question and the answer. We smelled a hoax, and asked to listen to a tape. We listened. He said it. We still wanted confirmation from General Abel, and finally got it at 9 p.m., when he returned to his home from Atlanta.

Some time in September 1985, reporter Woodward came into my office, shut the door, and in almost a whisper laid out an amazing top-secret American intelligence capability that emerged in bits and pieces eight months later in the trial of Ronald Pelton. Woodward described in great detail how the communication intercept had worked, where the communications were intercepted, every detail except Pelton's name.

Woodward didn't have Pelton's name because no American knew for sure at that point that a man named Pelton had sold this intelligence gold mine to the Russians five years earlier. That didn't start to surface until well after Vitaly Yurchenko defected last year and fingered Pelton. Yurchenko

had been Pelton's first KGB contact, the man who had arranged for Pelton to spill the beans. Pelton was arrested last Nov. 24.

But without knowledge of Pelton, back last September, The Washington Post had no knowledge that every detail of our story was already known to the Russians. We thought we had the highest national security secret any of us had ever heard. There was never a thought given to publishing any of this information.

At one of our weekly breakfasts, I told publisher Donald E. Graham about the story, and about my concern that while the administration was beating the press upside the head for run-of-the-mill leaks, truly important national security information was floating around town. I wondered out loud to him about trying to get an appointment with President Reagan to inform him of our information and our concern. We scrapped the idea on the grounds that it would inevitably appear to be self-serving and grandstanding.

About that time I did run into the national security adviser, Vice Adm. John Poindexter, at a dinner party, and asked him for an appointment to discuss the same subject. We did meet, and he suggested I talk to Lt. Gen. William Odom, the head of the National Security Agency. General Odom and I first met at his downtown Washington office in the shadow of the Executive Office Building on Dec. 5, 1985. Post managing editor Leonard Downie and two members of Odom's staff also were present. We told the NSA chief the detailed information we had, information we said that the Russians now had as a result of Pelton's treason. We said we felt extremely uncomfortable with this information, but we had it, the Russians had it, and we asked why it should be kept from the American people.

General Odom shook his head in dismay. He said the information was still extremely sensitive. We didn't know exactly what the Russians knew, he said. It was hoped, he said, that Pelton would plead guilty, avoiding any public discussion of the evidence against him. He looked us in the eye and told us that any story about this case would gravely threaten the national security of the United States.

We were to hear that claim many, many times in the next five months, as we tried to frame a story that would tell the American people what the Russians already knew, and only what the Russians already knew.

**W**e were determined not to violate the legitimate security of the nation, but we were equally determined not to be browbeaten by the administration, which has from time to time appeared to relish press-bashing, into not publishing something that our enemies already knew.

The weapons of any administration in this kind of a battle are formidable: presidents, admirals, generals, CIA directors telling you that publication would endanger the nation and the lives of some of its fighters, and ultimately threatening to prosecute you for violating the law.

These are red lights that a newspaper goes through only with a deliberate lack of speed.

The weapons of the press in this kind of battle are generally the reporters themselves and their facts, the First Amendment and common sense.

These are the green lights that make democracy the greatest form of government yet devised.

From the first session with General Odom on December 5 to a final session with CIA Director Casey in the bar of the University Club on Friday afternoon May 2, the issue was joined. There were at least three meetings between Odom and one or more editors of The Post. At least four meetings with Casey. One with Poindexter. One with FBI Director William Webster. (One afternoon Webster and Casey asked to see me urgently, and walked through the city room into my office surrounded by bodyguards, while more than 150 reporters and editors watched in astonishment. The subject was national security, but the area was Central America, not the Soviet Union.)

At each of these meetings, different versions of the Pelton story were discussed with the government officials. In some cases different versions of a written story were shown to them, something this newspaper rarely does in advance of publication. Each time, the officials invoked national security. Each time, the editors felt that national security was not involved, but were not 1,000 percent convinced that the Soviets knew every single detail of The Post's story, and publication was delayed.

(On one occasion on Feb. 20, 1986, aboard Air Force One, a copy of the latest version of The Post's story was passed around between Poindexter, Weinberger, Secretary of State Shultz and White House Chief of Staff Donald Regan, according to reliable sources. These high officials talked about how important it was to keep this version of the story out of the paper, and they felt it would not be published.)

**I**n February, at an editors' conference in Florida, Washington Post editors held a seminar on national security and the press. Former CIA director Richard Helms was present to give us the perspective of an old intelligence hand. Later in a discussion with only four editors, Helms was told the story and asked what were the chances that the Russians did not know the whole story. He felt the chances were slim. He felt specifically that Gorbachev himself might not

know, but he would certainly know if the Post published the story and his reaction as to how leader was hard to predict, and potentially volatile. Helms gave no advice.

In April, former NSA director Admiral Bobby Inman met with an editor of The Post to discuss the story in great detail. He, too, felt it was unlikely the Russians were unaware of anything in the Post's story, but on balance argued against publishing.

On May 1, 1986, over breakfast, General Odom was shown the penultimate version of the story. For the first time, he mentioned that he and others were looking to the possibility of using 18 United States Code 798 to prosecute anyone who published the Pelton story. This law provides for a maximum punishment of 10 years in jail and a \$10,000 fine for anyone who "publishes . . . any classified information . . . concerning . . . the use . . . of any device . . . for communication intelligence purposes . . . ."

This newspaper's lawyers reported that while the government would surely argue that the story was a technical violation of that statute, the fact that the Russians knew the specific classified information made the government's argument more tenuous.

On Friday, May 2, CIA director Casey called me from his car telephone. He said he had heard we were going to run the story on the next Sunday and he wanted to talk. He suggested the bar of the University

Club. Downie and I met him there at 4 p.m. He was shown the story, read it slowly, tossed it aside and said, "There's no way you can run that story without endangering the national security." He then said he didn't mean to threaten anyone, but he would have to consider recommending prosecution of the newspaper if we published the story. "We've already got five absolutely cold violations" of 18 USC 798 against The Washington Post and four other news organizations, Casey said.

Nine days later President Reagan, just back from the Japan summit, called Katharine Graham, chairman of the board of The Washington Post Company, to impress upon her his views that publication of The Post's story would endanger national security.

That was the last red light. The Post withheld the story one more time, and started working immediately on a version of the story that removed all the "wiring diagram" details of the intelligence system, all the details that might be prohibited by the statute.

As a courtesy to the president, in light of his call to Mrs. Graham, White House press secretary Larry Speakes was informed on Tuesday night, May 27, that The Post was going to run its story without the wiring diagram details the next day, unread by any government official.

And it appeared next morning under the bylines of Bob Woodward and Patrick Tyler.

Casey responded that day by saying that the CIA was studying the story to see whether it should be referred to the Justice Department for prosecution. And there the matter lay, until a few days later in the middle of the Pelton trial, Casey and Odom issued a joint statement warning the press against speculating about the Pelton evidence, and implicitly threatening prosecution if they did.

Warnings against speculation are the fabric of a Pravda editor's life. They are anathemas in a free society, and they were greeted as such by the American press on this occasion.

Pelton was convicted last Thursday, after seven days of testimony in a Baltimore courtroom, where the government laid out more information in a public forum about its most secret intelligence gathering capabilities than at any time since World War II. (Some of the testimony produced information that was not in the original Post article.)

**T**he role of a newspaper in a free society is what is at issue here. Governments prefer a press that makes their job easier, a press that allows them to proceed with minimum public accountability, a press that accepts their version of events with minimum questioning, a press that can be led to the greenest pastures of history by persuasion and manipulation.

In moments of stress between government and the press—and these moments have come and gone since Thomas Jefferson—the government looks for ways to control the press, to eliminate or to minimize the press as an obstacle in the implementation of policy, or the solution of problems.

In these moments, especially, the press must continue its mission of publishing information that it—and it alone—determines to be in the public interest, in a useful, timely and responsible manner—serving society, not government.