

CHAPTER V

EL SALVADOR
—A Case Study
of the Incipient Phase

In July 1979 the Sandinista victory in Nicaragua sent political shock waves through Latin America. Despite what many Americans believed, the defeat and ouster of President Anastasio Somoza was viewed by both conservatives and liberals in many Latin American nations as proof of the decline of United States power and prestige. Whatever your political preference, the fact is that by not intervening decisively, either overtly or covertly, to bring about a more orderly transition of power in Nicaragua, we showed conclusively that we had no stomach to protect what Latin Americans see as important U.S. interests in Central America. Our impotence confused the left, frightened the right,

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and bred a new unstable political climate in Central America.

But the impact was not felt in Latin America alone. Signals were received in faraway places. In the Middle East the PLO—always to be counted on as an ally in such “wars of liberation”—threw its support behind the Sandinistas in return for recognition once the struggle was won. Operating from their base in Kingston, Jamaica, they actually sent fedayeen advisers to assist the guerrillas, as well as trained Sandinista cadres in Palestinian camps. From around the world, terrorist organizations and Communist supporters alike arrived like hyenas to feed on the carcass.

Cuba, never one to look a gift horse in the mouth, took appropriate note of this new reality. Fidel Castro quickly reshaped his concepts of how to export revolution to Central America and the Caribbean in the 1980s. Previously Havana had paid more attention to Nicaragua, Guatemala, and Honduras than to El Salvador. Having been satisfied with inches, he now took yards. During 1979 the insurgency in El Salvador rocketed from the cadre to the incipient phase. By February that year approximately fifty members of the urban terrorist organization Farabundo Martí Popular Liberation Forces (FPL) slipped into Cuba for guerrilla warfare training. Upon completion of this course, they returned home to form the core and leadership of a “Popular Militia” force under the FPL.

The FPL's namesake—Farabundo Martí—was a Communist killed by security forces in a 1932 peas-

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ant revolt. But the FPL itself, an offshoot of the Salvador Revolutionary Action Party, was not born until 1972. Its founder and leader, Salvador Cayetano Carpio, was a former secretary-general of the Communist Party of El Salvador (PCES). But because the party rejected terrorism, he broke from it and struck out on his own. Under his firebrand leadership the FPL trumpets a revolutionary Marxist creed. Hardly news, its villains are “foreign imperialists”; its goals, the overthrow of existing order and the establishment of a communist society.

By 1976 the FPL was bombing such targets as the offices of the National Conciliation Party (PCN), National Guard posts, and commercial properties. For funds it kidnapped people for ransom. Alarmed, the El Salvador government hit back and succeeded in rounding up key cadres. The FPL went to ground to lick its wounds, which, while serious, were not fatal. It concentrated on rebuilding itself. In the countryside, as it gathered strength, there was a surge in rural terrorism: attacks on isolated police posts, kidnappings, intimidations.

On the whole, FPL personnel were busily training in the Soviet Union, Mexico, Guatemala, and Costa Rica as well as in Cuba. And this time there would be no mistakes, no overreaching. Those trained abroad in turn trained others back in El Salvador. Today's estimates of the FPL's manpower vary, but a strength of 800 to 1,000 combat-ready guerrillas is not farfetched. What's more, this hard core is backed up by some 2,500 tacit supporters. Leadership of the insurgency has tightened up. The FPL is directed by

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a tough, central group which, through harsh discipline and revamped security procedures, has had remarkable success in foiling penetration since the 1976 debacle. As a result, much is unknown about the actual size of its central command and its makeup.

Available facts suggest the FPL is organized into four regional committees based in the cities of San Salvador, San Miguel, Santa Ana, and Aguilares. The *Aguilares* most important regional organization is buried deep within the capital of San Salvador. The regional organizations are subdivided into local committees which use classic cell structures to limit exposure of the cadres one to the other. This improves security and may explain why FPL action teams have been so successful in abduction and assassination operations.

Financing has been no problem. For example, one knowledgeable Mexican banking official estimated that from 1976 to 1978 the FPL gained more than \$9 million in ransoms alone. A year later, a risk assessment expert, working out of London for an insurance company, concluded that in the first three quarters of 1979 the FPL had accumulated more than \$4 million through kidnappings. This same individual also acquired fragmentary evidence that the Soviet Embassy in Costa Rica is a conduit for funds going to the FPL. Indeed, the FPL is so comfortably in the black it could not only sustain its own operations but grubstake the Sandinista National Liberation Front of Nicaragua as well. In addition,

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reports from American businessmen working in El Salvador suggest that the FPL has given seed money to the revolutionary group in Guatemala known as the Army of the Poor (EGP).

Like its healthy cash flow, arms are rarely in short supply. The FPL has acquired an assortment of weapons through familiar insurgent methods—stealing from the Salvadorian forces, buying on the black market, and smuggling from abroad.

But the picture is even gloomier still. The FPL is not alone in El Salvador. Other insurgent groups are also in touch with Cuba. As it has noted increasing violence in El Salvador, political polarization, and U.S. timidity, Havana has become more willing to take political risks. Officials from Cuban embassies in Costa Rica and Mexico have dealt with a second Salvadorian terrorist outfit, the Armed Forces National Resistance (FARN), which probably numbers between 600 and 800 men. In addition, some of the leaders of the FARN, like Eduardo Sancho Castaneda, have visited Cuba for strategy discussions. During these sessions the Cubans have urged increased cooperation between the various insurgent groups and the Communist Party of El Salvador. Prior to events in Nicaragua, such advice went unheeded because of differences between the Communist Party and insurgents about when and how to stage the revolution.

As cadres in El Salvador studied the causes and consequences of Somoza's defeat, they realized that El Salvador is too small (2,400 kilometers) and too

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densely populated (4,515,000) to be a stage for a rural, Nicaraguan type of revolution. Instead, they elected to return to urban insurgency, using the vehicles of labor agitation and terrorism. With improved security, a trained combat force of 800 to 1,000 men, and a hodgepodge ideology of Marxism-Leninism and Maoism, the FPL was ready to try once again. It became bolder as this confidence grew. Assassinations were added to the wave of kidnappings. The unified Popular Liberation Army (FPLP) was hatched from cadre cells and guerrilla bands. Growth of their mass military power, according to FPL thinking, depended directly on how soon the Sandinistas in Nicaragua consolidate themselves and are then able to supply them with weapons on a large scale. Previously the FPL set no timetable for victory. But buoyed by the Nicaraguan experience, individual cadres have predicted the fall of the government by the end of 1980.

El Salvador, headed by President Carlos Humberto Romero, appeared in mid-1979 to recognize that social discontent has made open revolution less a possibility and more a certainty. But his government did little, if anything, to cope with political chaos. For want of a better policy, the president simply decided to hold free municipal legislative elections in March 1980 under international supervision. Political exiles were told they could return home to participate in this "democratization" process. The hope was that a civilian would become the next president and allow military leaders to return to the barracks.

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This wishful thinking was challenged by those in the military who believed that such steps were only placebos and as effective in stopping social or political unrest as a BB gun might be in bringing down a rampaging elephant. As a result, even tourists in El Salvador during the summer of 1979 could not help overhearing rumors of a pending coup. Sure enough, their ears had not deceived them. With kidnappings, assassinations, and bombings by leftist organizations multiplying, there was a corresponding increase in lawlessness by the right. Anarchy was perceived by the military to be just one or two more murders away. A two-man junta decided to correct the situation. On October 15, 1979 it announced President Romero's ouster.

The apparent leaders of the coup were a colonel Jaime Abdul Gutierrez and Colonel Adolfo Arnoldo Majano. They quickly expanded the junta to a five-man body that included three civilians. But it soon became clear that the coup was really the handiwork of more junior officers who had organized themselves into a clandestine Military Youth Council. Predictably, the change of government did little to slacken the tensions. The militant left, including the FPL, lost no time in denouncing the coup as a maneuver designed to disguise the former government in sheep's clothing. Nothing, they said, had changed. Worse, many believed them.

In the first quarter of 1980 El Salvador was still in the incipient phase of insurgency, but the "war of national liberation" has since been nourished. In the coming months it is sure to expand. Much depends

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technology have found eager markets in our hemisphere. Together, we should persuade the junta to develop a coherent program of reform. Some examples:

- A date for free elections.
- Unrestricted return of exiles to participate in politics.
- A church-state dialogue to enhance human rights and the social well-being of the populace.
- Financial pump-priming for urban and rural reform. This could be obtained from foundations, trade unions, or business interests in West Germany, Japan, and the United States.

Most immediately, the United States should assist Salvadorian authorities by applying tourniquets to arms-smuggling arteries from Nicaragua and Cuba. The two countries should also cooperate to penetrate terrorist groups, rendering them less effective. We have the tools and know-how. Time must be bought with which to accomplish social, economic, and political goals. A viable democratic center might emerge in the less violent atmosphere which would be created by reforms. If it did, extremism of both the left and the right could be contained and then reduced.

It is unlikely that El Salvadorian leaders, alone and unaided, can derail the revolutionary locomotive now gathering momentum. They must have U.S. help. From my own experience it is possible to

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on the will of those who are now in power to meet the continuing challenges of change. Leaders favoring a democratic approach to the future face formidable odds in attempting to save the country from civil war, anarchy, and eventual Communist control. A full-scale Marxist revolution can engulf El Salvador at any time as the insurgency mushrooms out of the incipient phase.

What can be done to help El Salvador stay out of the Communist orbit? First, the government of El Salvador must field sufficient quick reaction forces to check the current wave of terrorism. Nothing can be accomplished without meaningful security. Yet, ominously, visitors note there is rarely a visible sign of authority when violence takes place. This impression of helplessness must be eliminated by the deployment of police and military personnel into potential troublesome areas. The stutter of submachine gunfire and the crack of explosives cannot go unanswered. Police and military communications desperately need improvement. Prompt grants of such equipment by the United States would be one way of helping a neighbor in need.

But muscle *must* be accompanied by an improvement of the country's political climate. Colonels and majors are not likely to accept democratic reforms and a true civilian rule until they see progress toward security and stability. The United States must accept this reality. But it should not act alone. Other interests are at stake here—for example, those of West Germany and Japan whose products and

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estimate that the cost to the U.S. would not exceed \$5 million a year. As for staff, no more than five intelligence professionals assigned full time would be needed. By anyone's measuring stick, this is a bargain. Consider the alternatives.

If, despite aggressive countermeasures, an insurgency is able to grow to multiple bands of twenty or more men in a single district or province, the movement has escalated to the next and most violent of all stages. Now the insurgency threatens the survival of the government itself.

In the operational phase, guerrillas surface to confront security forces in open combat. Their tactics are now more hit than run. The risk is often worth the gain. If they have accurately calculated their strengths—and government weaknesses—they can drive out security forces to the point at which authority must abandon the region, leaving guerrillas in sole possession of the population. If this falls short

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WESTERN SAHARA
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vantages will vanish. The guerrillas will cover their tracks quickly once they discover the loss of either a cadre member or documents. Interrogation specialists must be both flexible and mobile. They must be prepared to move to where the prisoners are first brought in at a moment's notice. As time passes, the nucleus of expertise created in this phase can become a foundation on which to build a series of provincial interrogation centers that will support the government forces most heavily engaged in counterinsurgency operations.

This approach has been successfully utilized in Venezuela, Colombia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. It is essential for any serious commander of a professional counterinsurgency effort.

Few Americans know or care much about the guerrilla war that persists like flies in the forbidding, faraway deserts of the Western Sahara in northern Africa. Yet this forgotten insurgency today confronts our citizens with a serious challenge to their worldwide interest. Leaders in the Far East, the Middle East, Latin America, and, surely, the Kremlin are watching to see if, or how, we respond. Our response, or lack of it, will be interpreted as another indicator of what to expect from the United States in the 1980s.

The evolution of this particular guerrilla war illustrates why a great power cannot afford to remain oblivious to events in the rest of the world, no matter how much the power might wish to ignore them.

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discovered that the insurgents were deadly foes. The Polisario was able to field a force of between 3,000 and 5,000 guerrillas, composed mainly of the tough tribesmen and experienced veterans of service as Spanish territorials. Using Land-Rovers to increase mobility, they struck at Moroccan patrols, ambushed convoys, and mined supply lines. The net result: Thirty to fifty Moroccans were killed each month. But against the weaker Mauritians, they mounted battalion-size offenses. In May 1977 they struck into Mauritania itself, besieging the town of Zouerate and damaging its ore-mining facilities.

But individual Moroccan troops also fought well, and when provided tactical air support by Mirage fighters, they hurt the guerrillas badly. By the middle of 1978 it seemed doubtful that the Polisario could graduate beyond the operational phase of insurgency, as a result of its limited manpower reserves and dependence on external supplies. Although they could not eliminate the insurgency, the Moroccans and their Mauritanian allies had contained it, albeit at the price of significant manpower and economic resources. The war became a standoff.

In July 1978 the scales tipped when a new government in Mauritania committed itself to ending the war. Not long after, its troops were ordered to abandon the Western Sahara. This allowed the Polisario forthwith to move in, set up new bases, and improve its logistic system. It also left Morocco holding the bag.

Morocco responded aggressively by withdrawing

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The assaults continued and inflicted painful casualties on the Spanish for the next two years.

Meanwhile, Morocco claimed that the Spanish Sahara belonged to its territory by historic right. It pressed the claim because of rich phosphate, uranium, and oil shale deposits known to be buried in the desert. Spain acknowledged that Morocco might have a valid claim to part of the Western Sahara, but not all. On November 14, 1975, prolonged negotiations culminated in a Spanish agreement to transfer joint sovereignty over the Western Sahara to Morocco and Mauritania. However, when Spain formally abdicated control and withdrew its troops in February 1976, it insisted that the Saharian people should have the right of self-determination. In other words, who was to rule whom?

Morocco argued that the right of self-determination was exercised that same month, when a majority of the Saharian Territorial Assembly voted to integrate the Western Sahara into Mauritania and Morocco. Accordingly, in April 1976, the two adjoining nations formally divided up the Western Sahara by announcing new boundaries. Morocco acquired the northern two-thirds of the Sahara, containing most of the mineral reserves, and Mauritania took the southern third.

But in this game of geopolitical monopoly, no one had included the reality of the Polisario. Its forces swiftly moved into the vacuum created by the departing Spanish. They were soon locked in combat with both Moroccan and Mauritanian troops, who

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troops stationed on reserve in Mauritania, annexing the southern third of the Sahara, and dispatching 15,000 to 20,000 men to hold it.

By now, however, the Polisario was given new life by the advantages of having to fight only a one-front war. Morocco stood alone. The guerrillas took the offensive. On January 28, 1979, they overran a sizable Moroccan population center for the first time—the town of Tantan. In August they routed the garrison of Lebuirate in southern Morocco and occupied that town. A Moroccan relief column managed to dislodge them within twenty-four hours. Nevertheless, attacks of this magnitude unveiled a new threshold of guerrilla capability—and a grave danger to the Moroccan government under King Hassan II.

A respected European political analyst calculated that by August 1979 the war was costing Morocco \$350 million a year, minus its casualties. With neither a negotiated settlement nor victory in sight, Moroccan public opinion turned against the struggle. Such unrest could inevitably lead to the overthrow of King Hassan by a military coup.

By summer 1979 Washington policy makers, who had considered any exercise of American power in the Western Sahara unthinkable, began to think about it. The reasons were compelling.

In addition to being a man of great personal integrity, King Hassan is one of the most steadfast of Western friends. He is also loyally regarded by our few remaining allies on the African continent—not to mention Saudi Arabia. ~~That~~ ^{That} is due to the fact that

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he has repeatedly demonstrated his convictions by courageous stands against more militant neighbors. His personal diplomacy, goodwill, and imagination were largely responsible for creating the climate for the secret Egyptian-Israeli dialogue which led to President Anwar Sadat's historic 1977 visit to Jerusalem and the subsequent Camp David accords. In April 1978, when former Katangan radicals invaded Zaïre and endangered its copper mines and sovereignty, King Hassan sent Moroccan troops.* Their aid was decisive in repelling the invaders. In other ways which cannot be disclosed, Hassan's statesmanship and bravery have significantly benefited the United States and the West.

All this aside, King Hassan has steered his nation to democracy as rapidly as culture, tradition, resources, and political realities allow. In comparison with other regimes of the region, his has stood as a beacon of stability, progress, and hope. This does not mean additional reforms are not needed. Indeed, they are, and the United States should play a role in urging that they take place. His ouster would, however, leave the Moroccan people—as well as our own—with an uncertain and less promising future.

Although Hassan is not a puppet of the United States, or anybody else, he is correctly perceived as a leader who, because of his own beliefs and views about what is best for his people, has irrevocably cast his lot with the West. Should the United States fail to help him and his nation, we would be seen,

*So did the French—a clear lesson to a confused America of how to act when one's interests are at stake.

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East than West. On occasion it serves as a Soviet proxy, mostly to beard the lion in its own dep—i.e., the West.

Support of the insurgency costs the ^{Algerians} Algerians comparatively little and gives them no cause to fear retaliation from the West. Thus, they see no reason to withdraw their support from the Polisario.

Similarly, Libya has learned that it can breed international terrorism and foment revolution as far away as the Philippines, the Caribbean, and Central America with impunity. So it, too, continues to provide Soviet arms and its own oil profits to the Polisario Front.

Morocco has charged that Cuba actively aids the insurgents. It is probably right. Evidence indicates that a group of approximately twenty-five guerrillas traveled via Paris to Havana for training in October 1976. Moroccan claims that Cuban advisers train Polisario members in Algeria and sometimes accompany them on combat missions in the Western Sahara have not been independently substantiated, so far as this writer knows. But as of late 1979 at least fifteen Cuban diplomatic and thirty-five medical personnel were known to be in Algeria. The presence of such an abnormally large Cuban contingent is certainly suspicious—unless, of course, there are a lot of sick Cubans in Algeria.

Indisputably Cuba has provided the Polisario Front with vigorous political and propaganda support in the non-aligned movement. Yet, while exhorting everybody else to recognize the Polisario's political front—the Saharan Democratic Arab Re-

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correctly, as having forsaken yet another loyal friend in time of crisis.

These were only some of the considerations that caused alarm in Washington. And they still do.

The insurgency in the Western Sahara and its threat to Western interests could not continue without substantial foreign assistance. The Polisario insurgents will have no incentive to negotiate meaningfully as long as they can rely on this assistance—unless of course the United States elects to give Morocco the means of defeating the insurgents.

Most of the military equipment and munitions obtained by the Polisario flow from Algerian depots kept well stocked by the Soviet bloc without restrictions on usage. Additionally, Algeria affords the insurgents sanctuaries, and training sites and allows them to maintain a major base near the border city of Tindouf, where thousands of Saharian refugees congregate. They form a pool from which the guerrillas can replenish their manpower and strengthen their support mechanisms.

Algerian motives for providing this assistance are threefold. First, to exploit iron ore deposits in the Tindouf area, they wish to secure port facilities on the Atlantic by controlling the Western Sahara through a Polisario victory. Secondly, should Hassan's forces successfully absorb the Western Sahara and exploit its mineral reserves, they fear that Morocco would become a powerful rival. Finally, there is ideological animosity between pro-Western Morocco and Algeria. Though wary of falling into the Soviet orbit, Algeria is more inclined toward

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public--Cuba has stopped short of granting such recognition itself. For although Castro desires to polish his image as revolutionary *extraordinaire*, he does not want to go so far as to lose the millions of dollars Cuba annually earns from sugar sales to Morocco.

The United States had three obvious choices as it muddled through its policy toward Morocco: It could remain passive and indifferent, thereby shunning an ally in peril and risking the fall of another strategic territory, it could use its good offices and those of its allies to try to promote a negotiated settlement between Morocco and Algeria, it could give Morocco the wherewithal to defeat the Polisario by providing it with professional counterinsurgency advice and equipment.

After the Mauritanian withdrawal in 1978 some of us in the U.S. intelligence community saw a need to protect Moroccan and our own interests. A debate of sorts ensued between strategists, mostly in the National Security Council and the Defense Department, who believed we should not risk offending the third world through any exercise of power, however indirect. Ambassador Andrew Young was a leading proponent of the latter view.

In a rather timid test of political waters, the Carter administration attempted to determine what the attitude of Congress would be toward sale of attack helicopters and reconnaissance aircraft to Morocco. Congressional attitude in 1978 was sharply negative. Rather than try to explain to Congress what was at stake, the administration shelved the idea of helping Morocco. Nothing was done.

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However, the developments of 1979 raised the issue anew and forced a reassessment which showed clearly that the restrictive arms policy had not benefited the United States. Harold H. Saunders, assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern and South Asian affairs, told the House Foreign Affairs Committee in July: "The Polisario's decision to increase the scope and intensity of the fighting had made it difficult for us to maintain Moroccan understanding for a U.S. arms policy of great restraint."

Still, the administration dithered in indecision until prodded by our Arab friends in September 1979. President Sadat publicly announced that Egypt was prepared to supply arms and aid to Morocco in the war against the Polisario. The Moroccan government, two days later, replied with a circumspcctly worded expression of gratitude to Sadat and the fraternal Egyptian people.

American and other Western analysts read a deeper meaning into these diplomatic tea leaves. Their conclusion: Saudi Arabia--Egypt's bankers--had decided no longer to oppose aid to Morocco, even if such aid was American and was transferred through Egypt. A worried ally was sending a message to Washington: "Stand by your friends." Anxious to soothe the Saudis, who were both alarmed and disgusted by repeated displays of American impotence, the administration finally made a decision in October 1979.

It was to assist Morocco in achieving a negotiated settlement, rather than a military victory. Given this objective, the administration ruled out the dispatch

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ferred in the eyes of its own people and the rest of the world. For the United States dramatically demonstrated that it was incapable of projecting power conventionally, or covertly, to rescue hostages held by a fanatical terrorist group. It was reduced to going ignominiously from one farcically, ineffective international body to another, hat in hand, begging that someone else solve our problems for us. Even a gasoline station operator like Billy Carter became a go-between.

Pressures brought to bear by this degradation, coupled with alarm within the administration, compelled yet another reappraisal of basic foreign policy objectives. Moreover, the national psyche began to shed some of the self-imposed mental limitations that had so strongly influenced—some might say enfeebled—foreign policy ever since the Vietnam War. The administration pronounced a need to establish a mobile U.S. strike force, to reinstate draft registration, to prepare contingency support bases in Somalia, Oman, and Kenya, and to repeal or modify legislation which, in practice, had made major covert actions impossible. All these reflected a new awareness that it might be necessary to exercise power abroad. And one even heard expressions of the novel opinion, novel at least during the past decade, that should the United States exercise this power, conventionally or covertly, it ought to do so with a resolve to win.

Within this refreshing climate there exists the possibility that we may recognize that we ought to do much more to help Morocco promptly terminate the

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of badly needed American advisers. President Carter, though, announced on October 22, 1979, that the United States would sell the Moroccans *limited* quantities of counterinsurgency hardware, principally Cobra helicopter gunships and armed reconnaissance aircraft, OV-10 Broncos.

By keeping to the middle of the highway, the President was run over by traffic both going and coming. The compromise satisfied neither those who favored decisive use of counterinsurgency skills nor those who opposed any intervention. Typical of the latter was Representative Stephen J. Solarz, chairman of the House Subcommittee on Africa, who declared the President's decision was "compatible with neither our principles nor our interests." Proponents of counterinsurgency were pleased at least to see a dawning awareness within the administration that tools, other than sledgehammers or opiates of self-delusion, are available to perform complex foreign policy tasks. They also welcomed the immediate relief the modest assistance will afford the Moroccans. However, they feared the decision will result not in an equitable negotiated settlement, but rather in a prolonged and ever more costly stalemate.

Still, at the beginning of 1980 it appeared that the United States may yet elect to do much more.

The Iranian revolution, with its resultant chaos and near anarchy, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan altered the strategic balance of power in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean regions against the United States. More important was the national and international humiliation the United States suf-

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insurgency—either by outright victory or by forcing the insurgents to negotiate. This must be a national decision made not be intelligence or counter-insurgency professionals, but by elected leaders. This decision will no doubt be affected by the outcome of the 1980 presidential election. But policy makers should know that if a decision is made to assist Morocco meaningfully, the resources and professional techniques needed to implement this decision will need to be refurbished. Here are some timely steps:

- First of all, the United States should conceive and coordinate among all relevant government departments a comprehensive assistance program which integrates military, economic, and political considerations. This effort should have as a primary goal the creation of a climate of confidence in Rabat which would permit political, social and economic reforms to take place in a more timely manner.
 - The United States should persuade Saudi Arabia to advance Morocco some \$350 million for the purchase of an appropriate mix of American OV-10 reconnaissance aircraft, F-5 fighter-bombers, C-130 cargo planes, and attack helicopters. This combination of airpower would enable Morocco to search out the Polisario and inflict costly casualties. It also would deprive the Polisario of the ability to mass forces for attacks on Moroccan population centers.
- Given aircraft that almost ideally meet counter-insurgency requirements, Morocco could provide

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better tactical air support to ground units, thereby enhancing both their defensive and offensive capability. The cargo planes would permit better logistical and medical support to combat personnel. This, in turn, would measurably improve the morale of troops by assuring them better rations, frequent rotation out of combat areas, and, most important, lifesaving evacuation by air if wounded.

- With the goodwill that it would acquire through broader support of Morocco, the United States should persuade King Hassan to modernize the chain of command in his military establishment. Decentralization means commanders have more freedom to act quickly and flexibly. Air power, communications, and intelligence must be better coordinated. Collection and exploitation of intelligence must be improved. Photographic intelligence from tactical aircraft, use of infrared devices to find Polisario camps in the desert at night, and creation of relay centers to speed the flow of assembled intelligence to commanders in the field would be a great help.
- The Moroccans need foreign advisers to assist them in using new equipment and applying new counterinsurgency concepts. If the United States remains unwilling to lend American advisers, it should help covertly assemble qualified instructors from elsewhere.
- America should promote formation of an international consortium composed of France, Spain, Saudi Arabia, and itself to finance development of

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Morocco's phosphate, uranium, and oil shale deposits. But in a display of evenhandedness, the consortium should make arrangements for Algerian iron ore to be transported freely through Morocco to an Atlantic port for export to world markets at favorable prices.

America should concentrate upon persuading Algeria that continuation of the proxy war against Morocco is not in its national and strategic interests. Algerian concern over Libyan meddling in neighboring Tunisia, coupled with new incentives offered by the West, might make continuation of the insurgency difficult, if not impossible.

The foregoing program would cost money and manpower, although they would not have to be borne solely by the United States. The fundamental question policy makers must ask is whether the costs of doing nothing might not be far more.

Some mystery surrounds what point an insurgency shifts into top gear, its covert war phase. Like the tide coming in, the changes can be blurred, subtle. It creeps forward. Then, at once, you are in it over your head. The time has come for action—that is, if the United States wishes to have any say at all in the outcome. In any reading of the danger signals, there are several new characteristics to look for.

In the covert war phase the insurgents begin to coordinate their attacks in battalion strength, simultaneously in two or more large regions. Not always do they strike as a battalion, however. Often companies from these battalions will appear in different locations to harass government forces, to police the

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with small, elite antiguerrilla units. Use booby traps.

- Maintain population controls to read the movement of people and commodities, both in and out of guerrilla-held areas.
- Further strengthen local self-defense forces.
- Plan more combined operations in which the conventional forces continue to coordinate with elite antiguerrilla units.
- Intensify raids on insurgent supply depots across the border in neighboring countries which support guerrilla operations.

As in the earlier phases, success or failure will determine if the insurgency moves on to the next and final phase.

ANGOLA—*A Case Study*
of the Covert War Phase
—or the Shoe
on the other Foot

Survival of the government depends on foreign mercenaries, 18,000 of them. Foreign technicians and administrators run almost all of the economy—the part of it that still functions. Foreign police and intelligence officers control security. The nation's ports, both sea and air, are operated by foreigners. The one real income producer, oil, is administered by one set of foreigners and protected by another whose nation also shares in the revenues. Yet this massive foreign intervention has not managed to maintain even minimal standards of living. Shops are bare; factories are shut down; roads revert to muddy trails; railroads are silent, motionless. In the bush beyond the cities and towns the countryside belongs to the guerrillas.

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This is the reality of Angola today. It is the same reality Angolans knew seven years ago, except then they were economically better off. Only the roles have changed. Now the foreign troops surrounded in fortified enclaves and towns are Cubans, not Portuguese. As before, foreigners occupy the best housing. The only imported goods and food are from Cuba, East Germany, and the Soviet Union. Dissent and insurgency grow. The frightened government—now missing its former leader, Agostinho Neto, who died in a Moscow hospital last year—depends more and more on Communist cadres from abroad.

During the colonial era the Portuguese ran things and took the privileges. But then the country worked, and there was some degree of tolerance. To many Angolans it must seem that history has come full circle—with a vengeance. Yet there is one striking difference between 1974 and today. The group that presently rules Angola, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), received powerful external backing when it was an insurgency. But today's anti-Communist insurgents have no significant support from abroad. While the Portuguese faced guerrilla forces supported by the Communists and others, the Communist-sponsored government of Angola faces strictly indigenous movements which must rely on their own resources.

Yet the most influential political force in the country is the insurgent movement, while the minority, held together by Soviets and Cubans, proclaims itself the government. This tragicomedy has pre-

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vailed since 1975, when the Portuguese withdrew from Angola and left three guerrilla movements to settle their differences peacefully or otherwise.

The winner to date is the MPLA, originally an anti-Portuguese guerrilla movement, founded in 1956. During its entire history its power has sprung from the support of the 1.7 million strong Kimbundu tribe (about 27 percent of the populace) and the bulk of the country's 120,000 mulattoes (about 2 percent). Combining this with tissue-thin support scattered among the hundred or so other tribes in Angola, one could estimate that about 35 percent of the population are genuine backers of the MPLA. Since 1975 the MPLA has controlled the Kimbundu heartland in the north-central region and the major urban centers.

The second liberation movement, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), formed in 1966 by Jonas Savimbi, wields influence in the southern half of Angola. UNITA's strength is the 2.3 million Ovimbundo tribe and elements of three allied tribes, the Chokwe-Lunda, Xanguela, and Ovombo. UNITA can count on the loyalty of about 45 percent of the total Angolan population.

The third revolutionary group is the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), headed by Holden Roberto. The FNLA has concentrated its activities in the far north, where it is supported by the Bakongo, yet another major tribe. Unlike its two insurgent compatriots, the FNLA can count on little

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strength in other quarters. It represents less than 12 percent of the total population.

Predictably, there was little peace in January 1975, when Portugal turned the country over to a governing body from the three liberation movements that had fought against it. In November 1975, despite rumbles of mass trouble to come, Angola was granted full independence.

Little changed. Tribal and regional support remained the strength of each movement and continues to override either political or economic realities. In hindsight, no one should have been surprised by the fighting which erupted among the three groups in mid-1975.

It has continued primarily because the MPLA, confident of powerful Communist assistance, saw no reason to compromise, even though the other two groups represented a majority of the people. To understand this confidence, one need only look at the Cuban forces that have decisively shaped Angola's political evolution since the Portuguese left. Fidel Castro had at last arrived on stage center.

For more than a decade Castro had hustled the third world, trying to promote revolutionary kinship with movements in hopes they might profit from Cuba's experience and seize power through a rural insurgency. Castro's lessons, learned in the Sierra Maestra, were taught to anyone willing to listen. But Che Guevara's *Götterdämmerung* in Bolivia in 1967 forced Castro to change tactics. He gave more aid to established guerrilla forces and less attention to

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founding his own. Castro had supported the MPLA from 1961 on. But the total force of Cubans advising the movement never exceeded more than a few hundred men. Only limited numbers of light weapons were supplied. MPLA cadres were trained, of course, and Cuban propaganda lionized Neto's struggle. The door swung open in the late spring of 1975. Castro, in consultation with the Soviets, decided in 1975 to expand his involvement in Angola as Portugal's own revolution and retreat from Africa accelerated. But there were two other considerations. First, Castro was convinced that the United States, in a fit of hand wringing caused by the agony of Vietnam, would no more intervene in Angola than it would return to Southeast Asia. Castro probably was aware that the United States was giving some help to the FNLA, but it was not significant enough to concern him. He knew the United States, while still at the table, had folded its hand. Moreover, he was confident he could count on the Soviet Union. Secondly, Castro believed that increased aid to the MPLA would bring it victory, thus dazzling and saying to the world that he could export a successful revolution as far away from home shores as Africa. What he sought most, of course, was an impeccable set of revolutionary credentials. What the Soviets wanted is less clear-cut. But their historical interest in mineral- and oil-rich nations with port facilities is certainly one clue. Another can be found in the strategic location of Angola. Fully three-quarters of the West's imported oil moves south from the Per-

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sian Gulf, rounds South Africa's Cape of Good Hope, then heads north up the West African coast toward Europe. The huge supertankers must pass within easy range of aircraft based in Angola. And it requires no Svengali to venture that such bases might be used to choke off the oil and to divide and disperse further Western naval forces which would have to protect these vital sea lanes. But there is yet another bonus.

Angola shares borders with both Zaire and Zimbabwe. Neither nation is exactly an ocean of calm. Also, from Angola, the Communists can infiltrate and support guerrillas in Namibia, to say nothing of South Africa, farther south. In other words, it is a handy springboard for expanding additional "wars of liberation" through central Africa. Thus, Angola is more than a pawn on the Kremlin's chessboard of geopolitics.

Castro began throwing dirt on the casket before the mourners had even departed. The Cuban military buildup began in September 1975, via air and sea. By late October 2,000 Cuban troops were in Angola—two weeks before Portugal formally granted independence on November 11, 1975.

At the same time Soviet naval forces took up positions from which they could threaten to block Western interference with Cuban supply routes across the South Atlantic from the Caribbean. A Kotlin-class guided-missile destroyer, a large landing ship loaded with naval infantry, and the Soviet navy's largest supply ship steamed into the Gulf of Guinea. Far-

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ther north, a modern cruiser and an oiler lay off the Guinea coast. TU-95 bombers were ferried to the airfield at Conakry, Guinea, from which they could cover the Cuban sealift. Another cruiser and two guided-missile destroyers patrolled farther north near Gibraltar. The navies of the West had no comparable forces in the South Atlantic. *Fail accompli.*

During the period of initial buildup the Cubans suffered heavy losses, so heavy that they were in danger of being overwhelmed by coordinated attacks by the FNLA and UNITA. Then they were routed and badly mauled by a South African thrust into Angola in November 1975. Recognizing an opportunity to punish the Cuban adventure, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger advocated substantial U.S. support to Savimbi and Roberto. But Kissinger's appeal fell on deaf ears in Congress. The recently passed Tunney amendment to the Intelligence Appropriations Bill expressly forbade funding for anything other than intelligence collection in Angola.

Thus assured that the U.S. would not interfere with vulnerable lines of communication and supply, Castro and friends immediately reinforced their expeditionary army. By November a massive air- and sealift landed 20,000 Cubans in Angola. These troops, plus a total U.S. withdrawal, reversed the tide of battle and sealed the doom of the FNLA and UNITA. Spearheaded by thunderous barrages of Soviet-supplied, truck-mounted Katyusha rockets and an umbrella of air support, conventional Cuban forces soon gained control of the battlefield. By Feb-

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down trying to protect it. To date, they have been unable to keep it open.

Elsewhere, Cuban and government counter-insurgency forces have been equally unsuccessful. Despite their best efforts, UNITA is able to maintain a guerrilla force of more than 18,000 men. Nor does it appear to have any problems recruiting more. The main obstacle is a shortage of quality weapons, especially light anti-aircraft missiles. UNITA commanders in the field also need better communications equipment to coordinate operations. Even so, the guerrillas have ~~been~~ managed to deny the Luanda government full control over one-third of the country.

This continuing stalemate has embittered relations between the Cubans and East Europeans on the one hand and the Angolans on the other. By 1977 Cuban arrogance had cost them the respect of their Angolan allies. Their suppression of a coup against Neto in May 1977—they killed thousands of Angolans suspected of participation—scared many members. Indeed, these sauntering revolutionary "heroes" and their *lutimo machismo* are seen more as occupiers than supporters by an increasing percentage of the Angolan population. Just who are the colonials anyway? many ask. In such a charged atmosphere, 18,000 Cuban troops and Soviet tanks and aircraft and other supplies have been unable to help Luanda take ~~an~~ offensive.

The government has to content itself with periodic probing actions designed to keep UNITA off-bal-

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ruary 1976 they had driven their opposition back to the bush.

Believing the situation well in hand, Cuba began reducing its forces in Angola between March and August 1976. Castro, it seemed, had gained a cheap victory. But he was in for a rude shock. Without Cuban troops to backbone their own less-than-disciplined forces, the MPLA soon began to lose control over wide areas of Angola. Pro-Western UNITA and FNLA insurgents, encouraged by the inflexible field manual "ready-aim-fire" tactics of government units, quickly reasserted themselves. In our parlance, the struggle—far from over—had only reverted to the covert war phase. By September 1979 Castro had to change pace in mid-stride and reverse the rotation of forces back to Cuba. Despite this—and the continuing help from the Soviet Union—the Angolan government is today no closer to defeating the UNITA insurgency than it was when this phase of the war began in February 1976.

Since the start of the covert war phase, UNITA has reorganized and regrouped. It does not defend fixed positions. Rather, it fights as a guerrilla force, conducting small-unit hit-and-run operations. These tactics are apparent in UNITA's literal control over the vital Benguela Railroad. This lifeline is the principal access from the sea to Angola's interior. It is also the funnel through which both commodities and export materials must move. Guerrilla raids have virtually shut it down. Meanwhile, more than 5,000 Angolan and Cuban troops have been tied

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ance. And it is about as effective as a ~~swimmer~~ ^{SWIMMER} kicking out of their garrison shark. Cuban ground troops venture once did. They have even threatened to kill ten MPLA soldiers for every Cuban killed by the enemy, claiming that the MPLA flee the field, leaving them to die fighting UNITA. This valor in discretion may also be due in part to the caliber of soldiers the Cubans now send to Angola. Formerly most were experienced reservists; now they are raw draftees. But even the reservists, recalled to Angola after already completing one tour of service, had major morale problems. Moreover, the distinction of serving in revolutionary Africa has lost some of its former luster. Too many Cubans have been there. Returning "heroes" are thus greeted less by admiring *señoritas* than by a yawn and a "so what?"

Nobody wants to die in Angola, not anymore. Even the cream of the crop, Cuban combat pilots, is having second thoughts. Rather than scream in at tree level, where napalm, cannon fire, and rockets have their best effect on guerrilla concentrations, they now prefer to deliver such ordinance from increasingly higher altitudes—well out of the range of ground fire. Accuracy, to say the least, is haphazard.

Cuba's manpower losses so far are hard to calculate. UNITA claimed that 1,000 Cubans were killed in combat between September 1975 and July 1977. Cuban estimates, obtained through sources in Miami, place the figure at 600 for the same period. More neutral observers, however, have claimed that

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up to 2,000 Cubans were killed between the fall of 1975 and the fall of 1978. This is the same per capita ball park figure as American casualties in Vietnam. These grim statistics caused some alarm in Cuba, but—unlike Vietnam—neither they nor the financial burden of the war pose a serious threat to Castro's regime. Unlike Presidents Johnson and Nixon, Fidel is not faced with the pressures generated by a free electorate and a skeptical Congress.

Given the control he exerts at home, and the luxury of lavish Soviet logistics, Castro can persist in trying to build the Angolan army, the FAPLA, into a modern force of 30,000 to 50,000 troops. UNITA, although broadly backed by the population, can only continue to fight in the bush. Its weapons and supplies restrict its growth to the covert war phase. Therefore, UNITA struggles on as best it can, hoping it will eventually force Luanda to make major political concessions. On the other hand, Luanda's prospects for a real victory are bleak. A stalemate is likely, since the MPLA and its Communist allies are firmly opposed to any concessions.

The death of Agostinho Neto has, if anything, lessened the chances of serious negotiation. The vacuum of leadership may touch off a new power struggle among his followers but is not likely to change either the MPLA's Marxist orientation or its alliance with the Soviet Union and Cuba.

Neto's successor, Soviet-educated José Eduardo dos Santos, lends an aura of legitimacy to the new regime, because Santos was left in charge of the gov-

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ernment when Neto went to the Soviet Union for cancer surgery in the summer of 1979—never to return. He may temporarily control external jockeying for power, but he will not significantly change MPLA's policies or the determination of UNITA to oppose them.

This stalemate in slaughter deeply affects the future of both central and southern Africa. Zimbabwe, Namibia, and, in fact, all the surrounding nations (which, among other things, are the world's greatest storehouses of critical minerals for the industries of the future) will certainly be influenced by what happens in Angola. If Angola were to expel Communist mercenary forces, the leftist political thrust of whole regions would be fundamentally changed. So we must ask: Should the United States help to resolve the Angola conflict or should we simply accept the status quo? But how could we promote or influence negotiations when we have no leverage? In our dilemma perhaps we could covertly—and decisively—support UNITA with what it needs most: weapons and advice. But this appears unlikely. The Carter administration, through its former UN ambassador and the assistant secretary of state for Africa, endorsed the Cuban presence in Angola as "a stabilizing force" on numerous occasions. As for the White House, the President did not dispute these shocking opinions by his subordinates. Far from it. According to the official view of the State Department, the Cubans protect Angola from South African incursions.

In November 1979 Jonas Savimbi himself visited the United States and told Congress that he was

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winning the war against the Cubans. No one acted. Meanwhile, South Africa suspended its clandestine support to UNITA in 1977 because it saw the insurgents needed more help than it could or should make available. Only France kept its lines open to Savimbi and provided UNITA with limited amounts of weapons and supplies through airlifts from Morocco. That is not enough to change the military balance. Only decisive action by the major Western powers can break the stalemate. Otherwise, Angola will be afflicted by insurgency indefinitely.

Instead of neglecting the festering struggle, we should look to our national interests and those of the majority of the Angolan people and weigh how they may benefit us both. Our support of UNITA and the FNLA might well push the government into serious negotiations. Certainly, nothing else is likely to do so. Beyond that, the covert war in Angola should have one objective: inflicting as many casualties as possible on Cuban forces. If Cuba can be made to pay a painful price in Angola, it might reconsider its role as a cat's-paw for Soviet military ventures in the third world. If that goal were achieved, it would blunt the Soviet plans to isolate the United States in a world which responds only to the Kremlin's wishes.

If they felt assured of a lasting commitment, UNITA and the FNLA would quickly grasp the significance of such a victory. The United States could join with France—were it willing—to provide basic Soviet-made equipment such as AK-47 assault rifles and deadly ground-to-air missiles like the SA-7.

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These would decimate Cuban attack helicopters and thereby immobilize Cuban troops even further. As these weapons are in the Angolan government's inventory, courtesy of the Soviet Union, UNITA and FNLA could obtain spare parts, ammunition and replacements by simply capturing them. This would ease the logistics burden. Providing the insurgents with a modern communications system would improve coordination within guerrilla organizations and help them take the offensive against the MPLA and the Cubans. This covert war support would cost the United States about \$10 million in equipment a year. Its supervision would require the services of only fifteen professional counterinsurgency experts.

At this point the cost of failure would be minimal. But success could reverse the whole course of history in Africa. Imagine a Cuban Dien Bien Phu, Castro's foreign legion surrendering and being escorted as prisoners back to the docks at Luanda. This third option is worth consideration, something to think about when one sees the placards of the Iranian militants on TV, the ones that say, "THE U.S. CANNOT DO ANYTHING."

CHAPTER X

CONVENTIONAL
WAR PHASE

The final phase of a "war of national liberation" is reached when guerrilla forces decide their military strength is sufficient to confront government forces in a decisive battle. By this time there is little point in mourning the spilled milk of what went wrong for the government during the insurgency's earlier stages. The dilemma for the government is very simple: Either it survives, or it does not. It is no longer confronted by bush guerrillas. It must deal with an army. The insurgents now have such luxuries as long-range artillery and antiaircraft weapons. And they know how to use them. Ask the French, who, in 1954, hoped to suck Viet Minh "guerrillas" into a meat grinder called Dien Bien Phu.

CHAPTER XI

THE BOTTOM LINE

Preceding chapters have outlined concepts for dealing with "wars of national liberation" through the timely application of American counterinsurgency techniques. They have been field-tested in the unforgiving school of two decades of practical experience. The counterinsurgency methods presented have also been appraised by a panel of experts I brought together informally after my retirement. In the year that we have met in small groups for seminar types of discussions, these twelve experienced foreign policy experts with extensive service in diplomacy, intelligence, the armed forces, media, academia, national-level politics, and defense-related aspects of

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the private sector have dissected and endorsed all aspects of the concepts outlined in this book.

Emerging from our hours of debate is the suggestion the United States may be ready to shed the paralyzing legacy of Vietnam and the more recent policies of noninvolvement in nations like Angola, Nicaragua, Iran, and Afghanistan. The group concluded that the United States cannot limit national security solely to military and political terms. The challenge and dangers of the 1980s require a great nation to view its national security in terms of the interrelationship among political, economic, and military factors—that is, if it intends to remain a power at all.

It seems to me that the counterinsurgency roles detailed in this book harmonize with what appears to be a reemerging American sense of values concerning the projection of power overseas. If so, then appropriate use of low-cost, high-impact covert actions programs to achieve foreign policy objectives to help friendly nations resist subversion by the Soviet Union, Cuba, or China will receive the support of the American body politic.

But any future use of the third option presumes that the United States will be assured an uninterrupted flow of high-quality timely intelligence. It also assumes that intelligence will be objectively interpreted and analyzed, no matter how unpleasant its implications.

The United States cannot expect adequate intelligence without achieving a better balance in collect-

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ing it. One look at the intelligence budget, however, reveals that collection through satellites and other technical systems has been the centerpiece of recent funding. Indisputably these systems have performed brilliantly and can be expected to be equally rewarding in the future. But the question remains: Is the national collection system in its entirety adequately balanced between technical and human source activities?

Unhappily the answer can be found in the events that led to the 1979 debate in the United States over the presence of a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba. Surveillance satellites and electronic eavesdropping, skillfully employed, spotted the unit and established its capabilities. But these systems could not reveal how the Soviets or Cubans planned to use the brigade. While analysts could fashion scenarios as to why the Soviet brigade was in Cuba, they could not substantiate them. Thus, senior officials lacked critical intelligence on which to make far-reaching foreign policy decisions. The analysts simply lacked sufficient hard facts to decipher Soviet or Cuban intentions. This can come only from human sources—agents “in place” within either the Soviet or Cuban establishments, preferably both. The hue and cry about the Soviet brigade, touched off by disclosures made by former Senator Richard B. Stone of Florida, revealed that such intelligence simply did not exist. There was no such void in October 1962 when agents first revealed the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba—and told us where to look to find

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and photograph them. The result was a national triumph of worth; absence of such intelligence led to a devastating humiliation in 1979.

This recent performance results from a lack of emphasis on human sources during Admiral Turner's stewardship of the Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence community. To see just how low a priority has been assigned to such "assets," Congress needs only to reexamine funds (in constant dollars) and manpower allocated to agent operations. It also should examine the priority assigned Cuba on the national collection scale and study the results. Such a survey would lead Congress to some meaningful conclusions about the pitiful state of American intelligence—conclusions that the most artful or devious politician could not rationalize.

Nor is this all. Future use of the third option also depends upon the existence of a professional, highly motivated organization to undertake covert action and counterinsurgency missions. The CIA's clandestine service once provided just such an organization. But it has largely disintegrated. This deterioration did not take place overnight. It was a slow and painful process. Contributors to the demise were numerous—the media, congressional committees, special interest groups in the Executive branch, and former employees like Philip Agee. The single most crippling blow, however, can be dated October 31, 1977, when Admiral Stansfield Turner, President Carter's newly appointed director of the CIA, ordered the so-called Halloween Massacre, eliminating 820 professional and semiprofessional positions in the clandestine

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service. He ordered the purge to accelerate dismissals and forced retirements, thus achieving his goal of reducing the size of the service. But he threw the baby out with the bath water. He succeeded in destroying employee morale throughout the CIA.

A reasonable case could be made for personnel reductions, given the reduction imposed on collection, counterintelligence, and covert action in the post-Vietnam period. What troubled the CIA's senior managers and employees most, however, was Turner's failure to grasp the significance of the human factor that is such an integral part of a well-balanced intelligence organization. In a professional sense, this is unforgivable. Employees knew that substantial reductions had been taking place in the clandestine service since 1969. But this had been done selectively, while our primary assets were retained. Equally obvious, further reductions, even of the magnitude that Admiral Turner decreed, could just as easily have taken place through a combination of attrition and the weeding out of unproductive personnel by their peers.

Rejecting this compassionate solution, Admiral Turner forfeited the confidence and respect of a large majority of our intelligence officers. A devout Christian Scientist, Turner is a decent man dedicated to serving his country as best he knows how. And surely no one can rise to the rank of full admiral in the U.S. Navy without ability. Yet Turner's actions caused him to be *perceived* in the eyes of the men and women of the CIA as a calculating, impersonal systems analyst who did not comprehend that

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his most vital resource was, is, and will remain *people*.

Whether these perceptions were justified or not, their effect was devastating. They resulted in a mass exodus of critical personnel from the clandestine service. More harmfully, they destroyed the esprit de corps, the traditional can-do spirit of those who stayed. But this was only the beginning.

Far from improving this self-destructive image, Turner only reinforced it. Because of personal differences with an outstanding clandestine service officer who had made some of the most significant intelligence contributions of the past decade, Turner personally denied the man a promotion to which he was indisputably entitled. The officer thereupon requested early retirement, which had been routinely granted to others of far less distinction. Turner denied the request. The officer thereupon quit in disgust. He told me after I had retired that he was unwilling to serve under the Admiral for even 18 months, which would have entitled him to a lifetime of full retirement benefits.

Such incidents appalled not only senior executives but junior officers as well. The youngest reasoned that if men of such standing in the service could be treated this way, so could they. This was further compounded by the admiral's habit of awarding key positions to those who shared one common characteristic with him—a lack of in-depth experience in intelligence.

For example, the deputy director was selected from the ranks of State Department ambassadors. A

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Social Security Administration official was hand-picked to become the agency's chief administrative officer. An elderly professor quit a quiet campus to forge a new Foreign Assessments Center. A retired general from the Army Corp of Engineers was hired to develop an organization to coordinate intelligence collection missions within the intelligence community. These individuals were men of substance and accomplishment in their own fields. But they had little intelligence experience. No organization could accommodate this cumulative infusion of inexperienced talent—unless, of course, our few remaining agents abroad suddenly became instructed in bridge building, getting a doctorate, or filing for an old age pension. These weaknesses, coupled with Turner's own shortcomings, did not create a management team at the CIA equal to the challenge of the late 1970s and early 1980s.

Not surprisingly people continue to leave the CIA in droves. They, together with those who had been forced out, represented a priceless national asset—in experience and expertise that cannot soon be replaced. Berlin, during the 1950s, Laos, the Congo and the Caribbean in the 1960s, Vietnam in the 1970s,—all forced a rapid maturing of officers who served there. In many cases, one became a professional—or one became dead. Whatever the case, we accumulated a Midas' treasure of experience. Today young officers have no comparable proving ground on which to gain the field experience that is the basis for both sound judgment and creative innovation.

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The wonder is that the CIA retains as many able people as it does. But if a significant improvement in morale does not take place by late 1980, there will have been more than three years during which intelligence officers have become used to keeping their heads below bureaucratic parapets rather than take the bold risks often required in the collection and action arenas. This may well become the most devastating of Turner's legacies. For as those who follow become better able to judge his stewardship through the passage of time, they may find it necessary to credit him with the single-handed long-term destruction of the agency's spirit. This is something that the Soviets never accomplished, nor did the Church or Pike committees in their ideological and political assault on American intelligence.

The hemorrhage of talent from within the clandestine service has crippled the CIA's once-formidable paramilitary capabilities. Although President Carter approved a Special Coordinating Committee recommendation in November 1977 that the CIA should retain such a capability, Admiral Turner has continued to whittle away at the unit where just these skills exist. Professionals have resisted this steady erosion, fighting to keep on hand a minimum of trained personnel who could provide the expertise required by the third option. Additionally, some efforts have been made to add modestly to stocks of basic infantry weapons and ammunition so that a counterinsurgency could be sustained for at least six months if need be.

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But Admiral Turner was far from comfortable with the presidential decision to maintain our paramilitary capabilities. In an attempt to find a rationale for abandoning it all together, he created scenarios for its use, then ordered subordinates to prepare position papers on how paramilitary skills and supplies would apply to these problems of the future. His scenarios looked at problems such as: Could Yugoslavia be helped via American paramilitary skills to keep the armored might of the Soviet Union out of the country for a prolonged period in a sustained war in the post-Tito era? This, despite the fact that he claimed to understand that Yugoslav guerrillas could not hope to win a war of attrition against a superior Soviet conventional army. Other think pieces dealt with the topics: Could CIA personnel be brought out of the halls of Langley to run a *Guns of Navarone* commando raid on key military targets? It was difficult for the admiral to comprehend that CIA paramilitary experts were not soldiers or commandos. They were skilled organizers of insurgency and counterinsurgency operations to include recruiting, training, and logistics planning. These men always worked through local leaders and did not furnish combat leadership for indigenous troops. The end result was that Turner's scenarios were so far removed from world realities that subordinates concluded he either was obtuse or wanted to convince them to junk the CIA paramilitary capability as unworkable.

Conviction kept the CIA's professionals doing

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what they could to preserve counterinsurgency assets, despite Admiral Turner's lack of support. In an attempt to justify the capability—and the option—decisions were made to use paramilitary officers to provide:

- Antiterrorist training for other agencies, both here and abroad.
- Assistance to the Defense Department in developing its own unconventional warfare capability.
- V. I. P. protection training for third world nations—particularly in Africa and the Middle East.
- Support for intelligence collection tasks where there exists a need to field-test equipment or new delivery techniques.

This life-support system has preserved a limited paramilitary capability on a highly cost-effective basis. But it has *not* saved enough human resources to justify confidence that the United States could exercise the third option. To arm the nation with the capability to invoke that option—and to ensure the flow of intelligence essential for survival in the 1980s—the entire American intelligence community should be restructured.

Here are some positive steps which can be taken at once:

- Order a better balance between technical and human source collection.
- Restore a confidence between the American

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people, the executive branch and Congress, and the intelligence community, on the one hand, and foreign liaison service, on the other.

- Develop new ways of conducting our collection, counterintelligence, and covert action missions to avoid damage by congressional investigations, executive branch malaise, media exposés, leaks, and release of sensitive information through the Freedom of Information Act.
- Convince Congress to create a single joint oversight committee for the intelligence community rather than the present stew of committees and subcommittees. There are eight in all. Obviously secrets are hardly safe—to say nothing about meaningful guidance and oversight when they are placed in escrow with multiple custodians.
- These goals can best be achieved by a Cabinet-level post of director of national intelligence (DNI). This new Cabinet member would be the President's personal intelligence officer, sitting and working in the White House as a coequal of the national security adviser. The DNI would be responsible for establishing collection priorities and requirements. He would also draft the intelligence community budget, defend it before the Office of Management and Budget, sell it to the President, and coordinate its movement through the Congress. He would also manage an Intelligence Community Staff that would coordinate the entire United States intelligence effort. The DNI would not, however, have any command and control

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over the running of CIA operations. He would also have no role in the writing of national estimates.

- Reestablish the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIA) to function as the nation's ombudsman for intelligence.
- Finally, the boldest step of all—do away with the CIA and create a new agency, the Foreign Intelligence Service (FIS). This new organization would retain all the CIA functions that did not pass to the DNI. In brief, it would be the nation's primary center of analysis and would be responsible for preparing coordinated national estimates. It would collect clandestine intelligence abroad and conduct counterintelligence and counterinsurgency operations. It would also be responsible for the protection and debriefing of defectors and the control of deep-penetration agents—or moles, particularly—who have managed to infiltrate adversary governments, military establishments, or secret services. If the new agency is to be effective, its director should be appointed for a six-year term in office, thus spanning two administrations.

The need for this restructuring of American intelligence has been brought about by such diverse factors as:

- Significant expansion of the fiscal and human resources committed to intelligence since the passage of the National Security Act of 1947.

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- Increased complexity of technical systems, such as satellites, microwave intercepts, and U-2 reconnaissance planes, which are needed to collect capabilities intelligence.
- Experience, since 1947, proving that no director of the CIA has ever successfully been the President's personal intelligence officer, the coordinating manager of the Intelligence Community, and the chief executive officer who runs the CIA. In short, the span of control needed to fulfill these three tasks has eluded the grasp of talented men. This is persuasive evidence that the scope of responsibility for this position needs to be reduced.
- History has unfortunately treated the name "CIA" unkindly. A cosmetic change for America's premier service appears in order, therefore, if for no other reason than to shed a name that has served the nation well, but, in so doing, has become tarnished.

The reorganization proposal which I have outlined is not a master plan for the future of American intelligence. It is simply a skeletal framework which shows how counterinsurgency can relate to the broader issues of national interests. What remains to be done is to correlate this framework with the functions and missions of other intelligence agencies, such as the National Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the FBI. In so doing, the nation can create a new intelligence structure for the 1980s. Such issues are beyond the scope of this book.

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Congress has before it, however, the unique opportunity to spark those actions that will give America once again a solid first line of defense through its intelligence apparatus. What is at issue here is the country's survival. Sink or swim. It's as simple as that, really. Stripped of our power to influence events abroad—those, at least, which threaten our critical interests—we remain unprepared for the challenges of the 1980s. We must remember that in the end it is self-interest—not self-expression—that will preserve our great democracy.

In the final analysis, however, the bottom line on the decision to use or ignore the third option will not be based solely on the quality of intelligence, analysis, or organizations. This decision will be made by those who have, or lack, the will to pursue policy goals through techniques that have preserved our interests in diverse areas such as Oman, Malaysia, the Philippines, the Dominican Republic, Venezuela, Bolivia, and Thailand, just to cite a few success stories. That will seem to have been rekindled in the land. Thus, one can conclude that in the 1980s we will see the third option become an integral part of the arrows that are in the nation's quiver of national security options.

Or should the nation settle for war?

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