

~~SECRET~~

23 Apr 86

ALA/MC/N  
INCOMING

/46/

~~SECRET~~  
IMMEDIATE

FRP: .2, .4, . . .

STATE



25X1

(42/W)

86 0663342 SSO

PAGE 001  
TOR: 241031Z APR 86

NC 0663342  
MONTEV 02429

OO RUEAIIB  
ZNY SSSSS ZOC STATE ZZH  
UTS1529  
OO RUEHC RUEHLL  
DE RUEHMN #2429/01 1132014  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
O 232006Z APR 86  
FM AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7584  
INFO RUEHLL/CONTADORA COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE  
BT

~~SECRET~~ MONTEVIDEO 02429

EXDIS/CONTRA. FOR EXDIS/CONTRA DISTRIBUTION

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR  
TAGS: PREL, XK, AR  
SUBJ: HABIB VISIT: MEETING WITH PRESIDENT ALFONSIN,  
- APRIL 22

- 1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)
- 2. SUMMARY AND COMMENT:

-----  
-  
AMBASSADOR ORTIZ AND I MET FOR TWO HOURS WITH PRESIDENT ALFONSIN AND FOREIGN MINISTER CAPUTO. ALFONSIN SAID THAT WHETHER OR NOT A TREATY WAS SIGNED BY JUNE 6 DEPENDED TO A GREAT EXTENT ON THE U.S. HE SAW MY LETTER TO CONGRESSMAN SLATTERY AS OFFERING "NEW HOPE." ALFONSIN PROPOSED THAT WE ISSUE A MORE FORMAL DECLARATION OF OUR INTENT TO HALT AID TO THE CONTRAS SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE SIGNING OF THE CONTADORA ACTA BY THE FIVE CENTRAL AMERICAN GOVERNMENTS. HE SUGGESTED THIS COULD BE DONE IN THE FORM OF A PRESIDENTIAL LETTER OR A USG STATEMENT DIRECTED TO THE EIGHT CONTADORA AND SUPPORT GROUP GOVERNMENTS. I RESPONDED THAT THIS SUGGESTION WAS "NOT INCONCEIVABLE" BUT WOULD REQUIRE CAREFUL CONSIDERATION IN WASHINGTON. I NOTED THAT WE WERE BEING ASKED TO MAKE A PRE-COMMITMENT TO A TREATY TEXT WHICH WAS NOT COMPLETE ALFONSIN APPEARED UNAWARE THAT SEVERAL KEY ISSUES STILL HAD NOT BEEN RESOLVED IN THE CONTADORA NEGOTIATIONS. BY THE END OF THE DISCUSSION, HE SEEMED TO ACCEPT THAT MUCH WORK REMAINED. I WAS REASSURED BY HIS AGREEMENT WITH OUR POSITION ON THE NEED FOR A COMPREHENSIVE, SIMULTANEOUS AND VERIFIABLE ACCORD. THE GOA'S PRESS STATEMENT ON OUR MEETING EXPLICITLY ENDORSED THESE THREE CRITERIA. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT.

3. AMBASSADOR ORTIZ AND I MET FOR TWO HOURS ON APRIL 22 WITH PRESIDENT ALFONSIN AND FOREIGN MINISTER CAPUTO. VICE FOREIGN MINISTER ALCONADA AND NSC STAFF MEMBER BURGHARDT ALSO PARTICIPATED. I BEGAN BY STATING THAT MY INSTRUCTIONS WERE TO SEE IF A PEACEFUL SOLUTION WAS POSSIBLE, TO SEE IF DIPLOMACY COULD BE ACCELERATED. WE CONTINUED TO SUPPORT THE CONTADORA PROCESS -- AS ORIGINALLY DEFINED -- TO SEEK A COMPREHENSIVE, SIMUL-

~~SECRET~~

**SECRET**

26 0663342

SSO

PAGE 002

TOR: 241031Z APR 86

NC 0663342

MONTEV 02429

TANECUS AND VERIFIABLE AGREEMENT BASED ON ALL 21 OBJECTIVES. I STRESSED THAT IN OUR VIEW CONTADORA WAS NOT DIVISIBLE INTO PIECEMEAL SETTLEMENTS. I ASKED THE ARGENTINES FOR THEIR VIEWS ON WHERE THE PROCESS WAS GOING AND WHETHER THE JUNE 6 DEADLINE HAD ANY REAL MEANING. I NOTED OUR PERCEPTION THAT THE SANDINISTAS WERE USING PROTRACTED CONTADORA NEGOTIATIONS AS A COVER BEHIND WHICH THEY COULD CONSOLIDATE THEIR REVOLUTION. THIS VIEW WAS SHARED BY THE PRESIDENTS OF THE CENTRAL AMERICAN DEMOCRACIES. I EXPLAINED TO ALFONSIN THE CONTRA AID SITUATION IN CONGRESS, WHILE NOTING THAT THE PURPOSE OF MY VISIT DID NOT INCLUDE DEBATING HIM IN THAT SUBJECT.

U.S. POLICY

RM ALFONSIN BEGAN BY RESPONDING TO MY QUESTION ABOUT THE JUNE 6 DEADLINE. HE SAID TIMING DID NOT DEPEND EXCLUSIVELY ON THE CONTADORA AND SUPPORT GROUP COUNTRIES. A MAJOR PROPORTION DEPENDED ON THE U.S. IF THE U.S. ACTED WITH INTELLIGENCE, THE PROCESS WOULD END ON JUNE 6. AT THE PANAMA MEETING, THE SANDINISTAS SAID THEY WOULD NOT SIGN A TREATY AS LONG AS THE U.S. SUPPORTED THE CONTRAS. ALFONSIN SAID MY LETTER TO CONGRESSMAN SLATTERY HAD GIVEN HIM NEW HOPE.

5. ALFONSIN SUGGESTED THAT THE U.S. SHOULD FIND SOME WAY TO REITERATE THE POSITION OF MY LETTER, MAKING CLEAR THAT IF THE CONTADORA ACTA IS SIGNED, AID TO THE CONTRAS WILL SIMULTANEOUSLY END. ALFONSIN THOUGHT ONE POSSIBLE VEHICLE WOULD BE A LETTER FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN TO THE PRESIDENTS OF THE CONTADORA AND SUPPORT GROUP COUNTRIES. THE U.S. WOULD HAVE TO WAIT LESS THAN TWO MONTHS TO SEE WHAT OCCURRED ON JUNE 6. THIS DECLARATION BY THE U.S. WOULD FUNDAMENTALLY CHANGE THE SITUATION AND BE GREETED POSITIVELY THOROUGHOUT LATIN AMERICA.

6. I EXPLAINED THAT MY LETTER WAS INTENDED TO ANSWER THOSE WHO DOUBT THAT THE U.S. WOULD ACCEPT OBLIGATIONS UNDER A CONTADORA TREATY. THERE WAS NOTHING NEW IN THE LETTER. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A COMPREHENSIVE CONTADORA TREATY OBVIOUSLY WOULD REQUIRE US TO STOP SUPPORT FOR THE CONTRAS. THE TREATY WOULD END AID TO ALL INSURGENT FORCES.

S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 03 MONTEVIDEO 02429

EXDIS/CONTRA. FOR EXDIS/CONTRA DISTRIBUTION

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: PREL, XK, AR

SUBJ: HABIB VISIT: MEETING WITH PRESIDENT ALFONSIN,

7. CAPUTO SAID THE INTENTIONS OF THE SANDINISTAS WERE NOT CLEAR TO EITHER LATIN GOVERNMENTS OR LATIN PUBLIC OPINION. NICARAGUA MAINTAINS THAT IT CANNOT SIGN WHILE THE U.S. CARRIES OUT VARIOUS ACTIONS. THIS POSITION SEEMS REASONABLE TO MUCH OF LATIN PUBLIC OPINION. BUT IT IS NOT CLEAR WHETHER NICARAGUA WANTS A TREATY OR EVEN WHETHER IT WANTS AN END TO U.S. AID TO THE CONTRAS. THE SITUATION MUST BE CLARIFIED FOR THE LATIN PUBLIC. IF THE U.S. DECLARES THAT ALL AID TO THE CONTRAS CEASES AT THE MOMENT A TREATY IS SIGNED OR WHEN ITS MECHANISMS GO INTO EFFECT, THE SANDINISTAS WILL BE FORCED TO MAKE THEIR POSITION CLEAR. THE EIGHT COUNTRIES WOULD GO TO THE SANDINISTAS AND SAY, "NOW WHAT?" THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT THEN WOULD BE LIBERATED FROM THE PRESSURE OF ITS OWN PUBLIC OPINION. ALFONSIN ADDED THAT IF NICARAGUA STILL REFUSED TO SIGN, AFTER THE U.S. MADE SUCH A

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

86 0663342 SSO

PAGE 003  
TOR: 241031Z APR 86NC 0663342  
MONTEV 02429

DECLARATION, ALL LATIN AMERICA WOULD BE RESENTFUL AND WOULD "TURN ITS BACK ON THEM." IF NICARAGUA DID SIGN, AND THEN FAILED TO COMPLY, LATIN AMERICA WOULD CONSIDER ITSELF BETRAYED. IN EITHER CASE, THE U.S. WOULD NOT LOSE BY MAKING THE REQUESTED DECLARATION.

8. I REPLIED THAT A U.S. DECLARATION THAT WE WOULD HALT AID TO THE CONTRAS PRIOR TO ANY TREATY -- AS A PRECONDITION -- WAS OUT OF THE QUESTION. PRESIDENT REAGAN WOULD NEVER AGREE TO SUCH A DECLARATION. I SUSPECTED THAT IF WE MADE THE DECLARATION ALFONSIN AND CAPUTO HAD SUGGESTED, THE SANDINISTAS WOULD RESPOND THAT WE MUST CUT OFF THE AID TO CONTRAS IN ADVANCE. CAPUTO SAID THAT WOULD NOT BE AN ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE. A SANDINISTA REFUSAL WOULD CHANGE THE ENTIRE SITUATION. THE U.S. COULD NO LONGER BE PORTRAYED AS AN OBSTACLE.

9. BURGHARDT AND I EXPLAINED THAT THE DECLARATION THEY WERE REQUESTING WOULD REITERATE A COMMITMENT WE HAD ALREADY MADE IN OTHER FORMS. THE SENATE VERSION OF THE CONTRA AID BILL, WHICH THE ADMINISTRATION SUPPORTED, STIPULATED THAT CONTRA AID WOULD END IF A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION IS ACHIEVED. AT MANZANILLO, WE HAD MADE THE SAME POINT MANY TIMES AND THE SANDINISTAS APPEARED TO UNDERSTAND IT.

10. ALFONSIN SAID THERE SHOULD BE NO PROBLEM IN THE U.S. SIMPLY REITERATING ITS POSITION. A REITERATION AT THIS SPECIAL, POLITICAL MOMENT WOULD HAVE A DRAMATIC AND POSITIVE IMPACT ON PUBLIC OPINION THROUGHOUT LATIN AMERICA AND EUROPE. THERE WOULD BE GREAT PRESSURE ON MANAGUA. I NOTED THAT THERE WAS ONE PROBLEM: WE WOULD BE MAKING A CONCESSION, A PRE-COMMITMENT, BEFORE WE KNEW WHAT KIND OF A TREATY WE WOULD GET. THE TREATY WAS STILL INCOMPLETE. THERE HAVE BEEN A NUMBER OF PAST EPISODES -- BEFORE THE SUPPORT GROUP GOT INVOLVED -- IN WHICH THE FOUR CENTRAL AMERICAN DEMOCRACIES CAME UNDER GREAT PRESSURE FROM SOME COUNTRIES TO MAKE UNBALANCED CONCESSIONS. I NOTED THAT ONE CENTRAL AMERICAN PRESIDENT HAD TOLD ME HE FEARED THAT THE SUPPORT GROUP WAS IN A RUSH TO GET ANY KIND OF AGREEMENT. THE ARGENTINES, OF COURSE, PROTESTED THAT THIS WAS NOT THE CASE.

11. CAPUTO SAID WE COULD RELY ON THE CORE FOUR TO PROTECT THEIR OWN INTERETS AND PREVENT AN INCOMPLETE TREATY. I SAID WE HAD A GREAT IDENTIFY OF VIEWS WITH THE CORE FOUR, BUT WE ALSO HAD OUR OWN INTERESTS AND VIEWS. BY MAKING THE DECLARATION WHICH ALFONSIN HAD REQUESTED, WE WOULD LEAVE IT TO OTHERS TO DECIDE OUR SECURITY INTERESTS. I NOTED THAT ALFONSIN HAD EARLIER VOLUNTEERED HIS RECOGNITION THAT LEGITIMATE U.S. SECURITY INTERESTS WOULD HAVE TO BE TAKEN ACCOUNT OF.

12. I STRESSED THAT WE HAD AN IMPORTANT COMMITMENT TO THE NICARAGUAN PEOPLE AS WELL AS TO THE CENTRAL AMERICAN DEMOCRACIES. WE COULD NOT LET THEM DOWN, ABANDON THEM TO A POSSIBLE -- BUT STILL UNDEFINED -- SOLUTION. BURGHARDT AND I COMMENTED THAT IT WAS STILL VERY UNCLEAR WHAT WOULD HAPPEN WHEN A TREATY WAS SIGNED. MANY QUESTIONS NEEDED TO BE ANSWERED: WOULD THERE BE A CEASEFIRE? WHAT ELSE WOULD HAPPEN ON THE DAY OF THE SIGNATURE? WHAT HAPPENED BETWEEN SIGNATURE AND RATIFICATION?

13. I CONCLUDED THIS TOPIC BY SAYING I COULD NOT GIVE AN ANSWER THAT NIGHT. THE IDEA OF A NEW DECLARATION TO THE EIGHT COUNTRIES WAS NOT INCONCEIVABLE. CAPUTO ASKED IF THERE WOULD BE ANY VALUE IN THE GOA CONSULTING WITH THE OTHER SEVEN COUNTRIES TO SEE IF THEY WOULD WELCOME SUCH A DECLARATION. ALFONSIN AND I AGREED THAT THIS WOULD NOT BE NECESSARY.

**SECRET**

# SECRET

96 0663342 SSO

PAGE 004  
TOR: 241031Z APR 86

NC 0663342  
MONTEV 02429

-----  
S E C R E T SECTION 03 OF 03 MONTEVIDEO 02429

EXDIS/CONTRA. FOR EXDIS/CONTRA DISTRIBUTION

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR  
TAGS: PREL, XK, AR  
SUBJ: HABIB VISIT: MEETING WITH PRESIDENT ALFONSIN,

-  
CONTADORA: UNRESOLVED ISSUES:  
-----

-  
14. AT THE BEGINNING OF THE MEETING, IT WAS APPARENT THAT ALFONSIN BELIEVED THAT A DRAFT TREATY WAS READY TO SIGN, WITH NO POINTS REMAINING TO BE NEGOTIATED. WE MADE IT CLEAR THAT NEITHER WE NOR THE CENTRAL AMERICANS CONSIDERED THE TREATY COMPLETE. WORK REMAINED ON ARMS REDUCTION, EXERCISES AND THE VERIFICATION STATUTE. WE EXPLAINED THAT THE LATEST CONTADORA RECOMMENDATION ON ARMS REDUCTION, WHICH WOULD SUSPEND ALL OTHER SECURITY PROVISIONS IF AGREEMENT WAS NOT REACHED IN NINETY DAYS ON ARMS AND FORCE LEVELS, WAS UNACCEPTABLE BECAUSE IT WOULD RESULT IN HALTING AID TO THE CONTRAS WHILE GETTING NOTHING IN RETURN. WE URGED AN EARLY CONVENING OF PLENIPOTENTIARY MEETINGS TO RESOLVE THESE ISSUES. )

-  
15. I TOLD ALFONSIN THAT WE WERE SUSPICIOUS THAT THE SANDINISTAS WERE ADOPTING THE CLASSIC COMMUNIST NEGOTIATING TACTIC OF TAKING AN INTRANSIGENT POSITION IN ORDER TO EXTRACT MAXIMUM CONCESSIONS. THE CORE FOUR WOULD NOT PLAY THIS GAME. THEY WOULD NOT ACCEPT HALF MEASURES. AS NEIGHBORS OF NICARAGUA, THEY FEARED THE SANDINISTA THREAT IN A WAY WHICH ARGENTINA DID NOT. BY THE END OF THIS DISCUSSION, THE ARGENTINES APPEARED TO ACCEPT THE NEED FOR FURTHER WORK ON THE TREATY. ALCONADA ASKED US TO SHARE WITH HIM OUR SPECIFIC COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT ACTA; WE PROMISED TO DO SO.

-  
CONTADORA: POLITICAL ISSUES:  
-----

-  
16. I NOTED THAT THE TREATY DRAFT STILL DID NOT SPECIFY HOW THE POLITICAL COMMITMENTS WOULD BE IMPLEMENTED. THE SANDINISTAS MAINTAINED THAT THEY WOULD DECIDE THEIR CONSTITUTION, WHETHER OPEN MASSES WERE PERMITTED, WHETHER THE PRESS COULD BE FREE, ETC. THE ACTA CONTAINED CLEAR GENERAL PRINCIPLES FOR AN OPEN POLITICAL SYSTEM AND NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. BUT IT NEEDED TO BE CAREFULLY CONSTRUCTED SO THAT IT SPECIFIED WHAT THE SANDINISTAS HAD TO DO. I SAID WE TOOK A POSITIVE VIEW OF THE POLITICAL TIMETABLE PROPOSED BY PRESIDENT-ELECT ARIAS. IT COULD ASSURE THAT THE POLITICAL PROCESS WAS MORE THAN GENERALITIES.

-  
WILKEY

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

# SECRET