

STAT

Page Denied

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE **A**NEW YORK TIMES
12 October 1985

U.S. Heads Off the Hijackers: How the Operation Unfolded

By FRANCIS X. CLINES

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 11 — Shortly after noon Thursday, Eastern daylight time, President Reagan conferred in a private office at a cake factory near Chicago and, after weighing the risks, decided to try to intercept an Egyptian civilian jet with United States fighter aircraft.

Mr. Reagan was told that intelligence experts expected that the plane would soon be flying from Cairo with the four hijackers of the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro, and the President decided to try and force them away from a safe haven and into a court of justice. His order was racing through Pentagon channels by 1:30 P.M.

The bold plan for an airborne operation to seize some initiative from international terrorists was conceived and presented to the President early Thursday morning, according to White House officials.

No Hint of the Operation

After he gave initial approval by midday in Illinois, F-14 fighter planes were scrambled from the American aircraft carrier Saratoga and were flying in place over the Mediterranean at 2:15 P.M. Eastern time — it was already evening in Europe — to await his final order.

At 4:37 P.M., as he returned to Washington on Air Force One after his visit to the Chicago area, the President received confirmation that the Egyptian plane had taken off 22 minutes earlier, and he issued his final instruction to have the armed fighters carry out the interception plan.

Mr. Reagan gave no hint of the risky operation as he traveled from Washington to Chicago on Thursday morning for a speech on tax reform. He told jokes to Representatives Henry J. Hyde and Lynn Martin, Republicans of Illinois, as they flew west aboard Air Force One.

But the attractiveness of the plan already was clear to him, according to aides, and he summarized that today in explaining his decision to proceed despite the attendant risks.

"Here was a clear-cut case where we could lay our hands on the terrorists," he said, after five years of frustration over a series of bombings and kidnap-

pings directed at United States citizens in the Middle East.

"We did this all by our little selves," Mr. Reagan said rather proudly. His advisers concurred, exultantly describing the seizure of the terrorists as a singular success for American intelligence and military planners, and as a tribute to the President's quiet decisiveness.

At the President's side in Illinois monitoring the word from Cairo was his national security adviser, Robert C. McFarlane, a soft-spoken combat veteran who said today that Mr. Reagan had expressed "very prudent regard" for the risks and had several times asked "what if" questions as he went over final details of the plan during a break on his tour of the Sara Lee Kitchens cake factory in Deerfield, Ill.

"It never reached the point where the risks exceeded the potential gains," Mr. McFarlane said.

Memory of Failed Mission

But as the time approached for the President's final order, various officials knew of the operation and could appreciate the risks, recalling the failed attempt by President Jimmy Carter to use military force to rescue the hostages in Iran in 1980.

"Those four people will be brought to justice," a cryptic but unusually confident Senator Dave Durenberger, Republican of Minnesota, told reporters Thursday at 4 P.M., shortly after he was briefed about the plan.

"Or whoever is still living at the time they can be brought to justice," Mr. Durenberger, chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, quickly added, since the plan was still far from certain success.

When the cruise ship hijacking began on Monday, the Administration put into effect standing plans to have a military assault force prepare for a possible boarding action. But Wednesday was the earliest opportunity for the nighttime raid — too late to capture the terrorists, who had by then surrendered to Egyptian authorities and been promised safe passage from Cairo.

While the boarding raid was a known option of the Administration's anti-terrorist contingency plans, the idea of intercepting the Egyptian airliner was not. Even as he was ordering the interception plan, the President was telling a Chicago crowd of his "gorge" of frustration at the incident, in which an invalid passenger from New York reportedly was shot in the head by the terrorists and thrown overboard.

As the President ordered the interceptors to proceed, he was operating with what Mr. McFarlane said was an unusually high quality of intelligence

information from various sources, including the Central Intelligence Agency. He would not elaborate, but other Administration officials hinted there might have been sources who had the Egyptian plane, a Boeing 737, under visual surveillance as the takeoff was awaited.

In contrast to the joke-telling session on the trip to Chicago, Mr. Reagan did not visit his guests on the return trip aboard Air Force One, after he had issued his initial order and details were being received about the scrambling of the F-14's. "He was quieter, less ebullient," a Presidential aide recalled of the flight back to Washington.

The aircraft that took off from the Saratoga included four F-14 fighters that had rehearsed their close-winged approach to the civilian jetliner, as well as three additional F-14's, an E-2C radar intelligence plane, and tanker planes to refuel the force during its five hours of action. It was being closely tracked by a team of Administration officials working in the Situation Room in the White House basement under the direction of Mr. McFarlane's deputy, Vice Adm. John M. Poindexter.

The Saratoga had been cruising at night near the Peloponnese when the President's initial order arrived and had to come about into the wind for the aircraft launch. In formation above the Mediterranean, the planes were ordered to operate "in total darkness, in total silence," according to Navy Secretary John F. Lehman Jr.

After waiting more than three hours, the planes, aided by extensive radar information, spotted the Egyptian 737 visually at 5:30 P.M. Eastern time at 34.25 degrees north latitude and 25 degrees east longitude. This was 80 miles south of Crete.

They trailed it without announcing themselves, and the jetliner gave no indication that it was aware of the surveillance, according to Pentagon officials.

Order to Intercept Is Given

The F-14 force monitored radio transmissions as the jetliner sought and was denied permission to land at Tunis, then Athens. Finally, the order was passed to the fighters to turn on their running lights and confront the jetliner by radio and shepherd it to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization base at Sigonella in Sicily.

One crucial question that Administration officials would not answer definitively today was whether the planes had been prepared to fire on the jetliner if the order were resisted.

"That's for them to go to bed every night wondering," Mr. Reagan said today, speaking of the incident as a lesson for any potential future terrorists.

The jetliner and its escort landed at the Sicily base at 6:45 P.M. Eastern time. It was instantly surrounded by troops from the base, which is near the city of Catania.

Continued

A period of confusion followed involving American and Italian officials, according to Administration officials. Heavy air cover could be seen, with planes circling the field, according to one officer on duty at the time, and from time to time the jetliner was towed from one point to another, as if to protect against potentially unfriendly interlopers.

Shortly after 11 P.M. Thursday in Washington, the White House confirmed the mission and said it had achieved the President's goal: to see the terrorists brought to custody in order to face charges for the hijacking of the cruise ship.

Larry Speakes, the President's spokesman, summarized the mission and Mr. Reagan's role in it. "He approved the escalation of it as events warranted," Mr. Speakes said. "It was just the right application of U.S. force."

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 1 **A**NEW YORK TIMES
11 October 1985

OFFICIALS SAY C.I.A. DID NOT TELL F.B.I. OF SPY CASE MOVES

The following article is based on reporting by Stephen Engelberg and Joel Brinkley and was written by Mr. Brinkley.

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 10 — The Central-Intelligence Agency failed to notify the Federal Bureau of Investigation after it learned more than a year ago that Edward L. Howard was considering becoming a Soviet spy, Government officials said today.

According to court records, Mr. Howard told two agency employees in September 1984 that he was thinking of disclosing classified information to the Soviet Union.

Soviet Defector Was the Key

The bureau has sole responsibility for domestic espionage investigations and, under Federal law, the intelligence agency and all other Government agencies are supposed to report suspected espionage to the F.B.I. It is illegal for the C.I.A. or any other Federal agency to carry out surveillance or other actions within the United States to stop potential spies.

Mr. Howard, 33 years old, a former intelligence agency officer who is now a fugitive, has been charged with espionage, accused of giving Soviet officials details of American intelligence operations in Moscow. Federal officials have called the disclosures serious and damaging.

'Bad Mistake,' Senator Says

Federal officials said the C.I.A. told the F.B.I. nothing about Mr. Howard until after the bureau began an investigation this fall based on information from a Soviet defector, Vitaly Yurchenko, who had been a senior official of the K.G.B., the Soviet intelligence agency.

The bureau began surveillance of Mr. Howard last month, but he slipped out of his home at night and is believed to have fled the country.

Senator Patrick J. Leahy, the Vermont Democrat who is vice chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence, said today: "If the C.I.A. did not give the F.B.I. adequate information about this person, that's a bad mistake. It shows very, very serious problems within the C.I.A."

In the last few weeks the C.I.A. transferred the chief of its office of security, William Kotopiah, to a new job at a level of equivalent seniority, but an official said the move had been planned "for some time" and was not related to the Howard case.

Mr. Howard worked for the agency from 1981 to 1983. He was told of classified American intelligence operations in Moscow because the agency was planning to assign him there, officials have said.

According to a criminal complaint on file in Federal District Court in Albuquerque, N.M., Mr. Howard told two current employees of the intelligence agency a year ago last month that he had "spent hours in the vicinity of the Soviet Embassy trying to decide whether to enter the embassy and disclose classified information."

An F.B.I. affidavit says the conversation was held Sept. 24, 1984. Four days before that, the Government contends, Mr. Howard gave his information to Soviet officials in St. Anton, Austria.

George Lauder, a C.I.A. spokesman, said today that as a result of that conversation "action was taken" within the agency "and it seemed to be reasonable action at the time." He would not say what the action was, although an official said the agency kept in contact with Mr. Howard after his conversation with the two C.I.A. operatives. Mr. Howard lived in New Mexico at the time.

'A Few Blatant Cases'

The Senate and House intelligence committees are investigating the handling of the Howard case. A key issue in the study, committee members said, will be how the C.I.A. and other agencies deal with employees who leave Government service with detailed, classified knowledge about sensitive programs.

Another element of the investigations will be several recent espionage cases in which Government officials failed to heed warning signs that a current or former employee was planning to spy or was spying, committee members said.

"We've had a few blatant cases where we just didn't follow through, even with alarm bells going off," said Representative Dave McCurdy, Democrat of Oklahoma, chairman of the House committee's Subcommittee on Oversight and Evaluation.

In the Howard case, a senior F.B.I. official said Mr. Howard's conversation with the two C.I.A. officers would have been sufficient to warrant an investigation.

"Anytime we get information that someone has considered such an act, we would take some action," said Philip A. Parker, deputy assistant director of the bureau's intelligence division.

An intelligence official said the C.I.A.'s decision to handle the matter internally rather than report it to the F.B.I. was "a judgment call," adding, "If you reported every fantasy that people have, you'd have everyone under surveillance."

Law Bars C.I.A. Moves in U.S.

The C.I.A. would not say whether it undertook any form of inquiry after Mr. Howard told the two C.I.A. employees he had considered becoming a Soviet spy. But Federal law and a Presidential executive order prohibit the agency from taking any steps inside the United States to investigate possible cases of espionage.

Mr. Howard was one of tens of thousands of people who retire from Government or industry each year after holding positions that gave them access to classified materials. More than 4.3 million people in government and industry associated with government now have clearances to use classified information.

Asked what procedures the Central Intelligence Agency uses to monitor former employees who have knowledge of classified programs, Mr. Lauder, the agency spokesman, said: "We haven't got any procedures. Once a person leaves here, he is John Q. Citizen, just like you and me. We don't keep a string on them. It's strictly an F.B.I. matter."

Dave Durenberger, the Minnesota Republican who is chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, said his panel would also examine the problem presented by military officers who retire with knowledge of classified materials.

Most people with security clearances work for the Pentagon. At the Defense Department, L. Britt Snider, director of counterintelligence and security policy, said: "We don't have any jurisdiction of any kind over former employees, whether or not they had clearances. It's strictly the F.B.I."

At the F.B.I., Mr. Parker said, "We are not concerned about Americans who have had clearances. We don't look at these people unless we detect an individual involved in espionage."

Ex-Intelligence Chief's Moves

Senator Leahy said: "I don't think anyone expects the F.B.I. to maintain surveillance on the several hundred thousand people who leave the Government each year with security clearances. But there are a certain number of people in extremely sensitive positions, a handful of them, that we ought to do more with."

Mr. Leahy said Mr. Howard "certainly would have been one of those" because he held highly sensitive information and was being dismissed following a polygraph examination that indicated drug use and petty thievery, according to Federal officials.

Continued

When Adm. Stansfield M. Turner was Director of Central Intelligence in the Carter Administration, he dismissed, transferred or forced to retire nearly 200 C.I.A. officers who held highly sensitive positions.

In an interview this week, he said that others in the agency had warned him that "we ran the risk of some of them selling their information to the other side." He said he had disagreed when it was suggested that some should be given other jobs, and proceeded with his original plans.

But he said of Mr. Howard: "I don't think my rule should be totally rigid. If this guy had just been briefed, I'd say let's stick him in the Dominican Republic or someplace like that for a couple of years, until the information isn't valuable anymore."

Senator Leahy said: "We may need some sort of turkey farm for some of these former employees. Make them translate cables or something like that for a couple of years."

Admiral Turner said he thought C.I.A. officers ought to be required to agree when they are hired that "for three years or so after they leave, they will be subject to the same rules of intrusion as applied when they were in government. Make them come back for random polygraph examinations. That would give them one more thing to worry about before they turn."

A C.I.A. official said "it's conceivable" that that idea would work, adding that finding solutions to the problem "is certainly something we're thinking about now."

LEVEL 1 - 3 OF 41 STORIES

Proprietary to the United Press International 1985

October 11, 1985, Friday, BC cycle

SECTION: Regional News

DISTRIBUTION: Minnesota

LENGTH: 128 words

DATELINE: FAIRMONT, Minn.

KEYWORD: Durenberger

BODY:

Sen. David Durenberger, R-Minn., said today the capture of the Palestinian sea pirates by the United States shows the Reagan administration policy toward terrorism is working.

Durenberger, the chairman the Senate Intelligence Committee, said the capacity of the United States to work counter terrorism and counter intelligence "is much stronger than the country's political mistakes."

LEXIS

LEXIS NEX

DECLASSIFIED
DATE 11-11-83 BY 3-A



WASHINGTON TIMES
9 October 1985

Probe set by Senate on agent who fled

By Bill Gertz
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

The Senate Intelligence Committee yesterday launched an investigation into the case of former CIA operative Edward Howard, a suspected Soviet agent who disappeared two weeks ago and is believed to have fled the United States.

"The apparent defection of former CIA employee Edward Howard raises serious questions about management, personnel and security procedures at the Central Intelligence Agency and the FBI," Intelligence Committee chairman Dave Durenberger, Minnesota Republican, and vice chairman Patrick Leahy, Vermont Democrat, said in a statement.

Howard two weeks ago eluded an FBI surveillance net around his house outside Santa Fe, N.M. An arrest warrant was issued by the FBI last Wednesday charging Howard with passing U.S. defense secrets to a foreign power, believed to be the Soviet Union.

Howard reportedly met with officials of the Soviet KGB intelligence service in Vienna last year and is suspected of selling secret CIA operational data to the KGB.

The staff inquiry will examine the agency's decision to hire Howard, his assignment and activities in the CIA, his dismissal and his actions from the time he left the agency in June 1983 until his disappearance in New Mexico Sept. 21, the statement said.

A committee spokesman said the probe was limited to the Howard case and would not examine another reported case of a former CIA employee suspected of spying for the Soviets.

Both Howard and the unidentified former CIA official are believed to have been identified as Soviet agents by former senior KGB official Vitaly Yuchenko, who defected in Rome Aug. 1.

The committee leaders said the investigation was ordered under the authority of the Intelligence Committee's oversight function and would not "prejudge" the case or jeopardize the FBI investigation into the suspected espionage activities of the two former CIA operations officers.

Intelligence sources said Howard, who was convicted of aggravated battery last year following a shooting incident in New Mexico, was fired by the CIA in June 1983 after it was alleged he had used illegal drugs and stolen agency funds.

He reportedly turned to the Soviets with details of CIA operations as a means of taking revenge against the CIA and is believed to have helped the Soviets uncover a Moscow agent who worked for the CIA.

An FBI affidavit said Howard left behind a note in New Mexico that hinted that he planned to turn over CIA secrets to the Soviets during his flight. Officials believe Howard may have fled to Europe or Mexico.

Intelligence Committee spokesman Dave Holiday said the investigation would begin immediately and might lead to hearings.

He said the inquiry grew out of questions about how Howard was hired by the CIA in the first place.

Mr. Holiday also said the committee had completed a staff report on reorganizing the U.S. intelligence community's counterspying capabilities and would hold closed hearings on the subject this month.

LEVEL 1 - 5 OF 28 STORIES

Proprietary to the United Press International 1985

October 9, 1985, Wednesday, PM cycle

SECTION: Washington News

LENGTH: 289 words

DATELINE: WASHINGTON

KEYWORD: Cia

BODY:

Intelligence committees of the Senate and House, expressing concern about procedures at the CIA and FBI, have begun inquiries about a former agent who may have provided secret information to the Soviets.

The probe was launched following the disappearance of Edward Howard, who was forced to resign from the CIA in 1983, and who recently disappeared.

Howard was identified as a Soviet agent by Vitaly Yurchenko, a senior KGB official who recently defected to the West, reports said. Officials say Howard

Proprietary to the United Press International, October 9, 1985

may have fled to the Soviet Union after he was questioned by the FBI last month.

A statement issued by Sens. David Durenberger, R-Minn., and Patrick Leahy, D-Vt., chairman and vice chairman of the Senate intelligence committee, said the apparent defection "raises serious questions about management, personnel and security procedures" at the CIA and the FBI.

They said the committee was "initiating an inquiry into the circumstances of the hiring of Mr. Howard, his assignments while an employee of the CIA, his activities while an employee, the reasons for and manner of his separation from the agency, and, in so far as they can be determined, his actions and those of the appropriate agencies from the time of his separation until his disappearance."

"We will listen to anything, anyone in or out of government has to tell us relative to this incident," Durenberger and Leahy said.

Rep. Dave McCurdy, D-Okla., chairman of the House intelligence subcommittee on oversight and investigation, said earlier this week his panel also was looking into the case.

IS LEXIS NEXIS LEXIS NE

The Associated Press, October 8, 1985

SECTION: Washington Dateline

LENGTH: 295 words

HEADLINE: Senate Panel Probes CIA Security Breach

DATELINE: WASHINGTON

KEYWORD: CIA-Defector

BODY:

The Senate Intelligence Committee today launched an inquiry into the CIA's handling of a former employee who allegedly passed information to the Soviet Union.

"The committee feels that the apparent defection of former CIA employee Edward Howard raises serious questions about management, personnel and security procedures at the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation," said Sens. David Durenberger, R-Minn., the chairman, and Patrick Leahy, D-Vt., the vice chairman.

The Associated Press, October 8, 1985

According to government sources, Howard, 33, was identified by a high-level Soviet defector as having sold sensitive information on U.S. intelligence gathering in the Soviet Union to the KGB. Howard, who was forced to resign from the CIA in 1983 after failing a polygraph exam, is believed to have fled the United States while under FBI surveillance.

In a statement released by the intelligence committee, Durenberger and Leahy said the review would focus on:

The circumstances of Howard's hiring.

His assignments while a CIA employee.

The reason and manner of his dismissal from the agency.

His actions after leaving the CIA in 1983.

"We are not prejudging any aspect of the case and intend to do nothing to jeopardize or prejudge either the ongoing investigation or any subsequent adjudication that may follow," the two senators said.

LEXIS NEXIS LEXIS NEXIS

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE **A-1**WASHINGTON POST
5 October 1985

Affidavit Says Ex-CIA Agent Met High-Level KGB Officers

By Patrick E. Tyler
Washington Post Staff Writer

Fugitive former CIA officer Edward Lee Howard met with senior Soviet intelligence officers a year ago in Austria and agreed to provide them with classified information about sources and methods of U.S. intelligence operatives, according to an FBI affidavit based on information from a high-level Soviet defector.

The affidavit, unsealed yesterday in Albuquerque, said Howard received an undisclosed amount of money, and it provides the first details about his alleged spying activity.

Howard, fired from his Central Intelligence Agency post in the

clandestine service in June 1983, is believed to have fled the country Sept. 21, the day after FBI agents confronted him with allegations of spying for the Soviets.

He eluded FBI surveillance of his home outside Santa Fe, and an arrest warrant charging him with espionage was issued Sept. 23.

CBS News, quoting unnamed sources, reported last night that, based on information given to the Soviets by Howard, a "high-level" Soviet official was executed. No time or place was mentioned in the CBS report.

CBS said that the executed official had provided information to U.S. intelligence and that several other persons providing the United States with Soviet intelligence in-



EDWARD LEE HOWARD
... believed to have fled the country

formation have not been heard from.

Neither the CIA nor Sen. David F. Durenberger (R-Minn.), chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, would comment on the CBS report.

The Albuquerque affidavit said Howard met with two current CIA employees on Sept. 24, 1984, also in Austria, and told them that he had considered providing information to the Soviets after the CIA fired him.

Howard told the CIA officials that, in October 1983, he "spent hours in the vicinity of the Soviet Embassy [in Washington] trying to decide whether to enter the embassy and disclose classified information." He told the two that he decided against entering.

After meeting with the two, Howard met clandestinely with the high-level KGB officials and made his espionage pact, according to the affidavit. Last July, Howard returned to Europe, met again with Soviet intelligence officials and sold additional information, the affidavit said, citing as its authority a confidential informant interviewed by the FBI a week ago Thursday.

The document also said Howard apparently alluded to espionage activity in his resignation letter to his boss at the Legislative Finance Committee of New Mexico's state Legislature when he wrote: "Well, I'm going, and maybe I'll give them what they think I already gave them."

Before Howard fled his home in Santa Fe, he left a note for his wife, Mary, instructing her to "sell the house, Jeep, etc. and move [in] with one of our parents and be happy." He asked his wife to tell their 2-year-old son goodbye, adding, "I think of him and you each day until I die."

The FBI said its affidavit was based largely on "a confidential source with intimate knowledge of Soviet intelligence matters."

A Senate intelligence panel spokesman said it is safe to assume that the confidential source is Vitaly Yurchenko, whom U.S. officials have identified as one of the most senior officers of the Soviet Committee for State Security, commonly referred to as the KGB.

Yurchenko defected to the West in early August and is undergoing debriefing by CIA officials at an undisclosed location near Washington.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A15NEW YORK TIMES
4 October 1985

Suspect Is Believed to Have Told Soviet of U.S. Spying in Moscow

By **STEPHEN ENGELBERG**

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 3 — Edward L. Howard, a former Central Intelligence Agency officer, is believed to have given the Soviet Union significant secret information about the methods the United States uses to gather intelligence in Moscow, Congressional sources said tonight.

The sources said Mr. Howard, who is being sought, had been trained in the secret techniques as he was prepared to be sent to Moscow as an operational officer for the C.I.A.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation has said Mr. Howard, who is 33 years old, served in the C.I.A. from January 1981 to June 1983. One official said today that he left the agency after failing to pass a routine polygraph, or lie-detector, test and had not served in Moscow.

The official would not characterize the type of problem found by the polygraph but indicated that it apparently was not related to espionage. Another official said a test result suggesting espionage by an employee would have started a wide-ranging criminal investigation.

Senator Expresses Concern

CBS News tonight quoted Senator Dave Durenberger, chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence, as saying that the security breach caused by Mr. Howard could be as "serious as anything this country has seen in the past." Mr. Durenberger said that the suspect might have provided details of how the United States got sensitive information from the Soviet Union.

The intelligence committee has been briefed on the potential damage said to have been caused by Mr. Howard. Officials say he is one of two American intelligence officers identified as Soviet recruits by a Soviet defector, Vitaly Yurchenko, a senior member of the K.G.B., the Soviet intelligence agency.

Government officials said today that the second suspect had been identified in the course of investigating the defector's statements.

National Security Role Hinted

The officials would not say what agency of the Government had employed the second suspect, although one intelligence source indicated it was the National Security Agency, which deals with this nation's most secret codes and communications.

One intelligence source said the second suspect had access to details about secret United States electronic and satellite surveillance of communications. "Let's just say he was part of the intelligence community," that source said.

The C.I.A. refused to say whether it had ever employed the individual in question.

Officials have said Mr. Howard fled the country sometime on the weekend of Sept. 21, shortly after his friends and co-workers had been questioned by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Mr. Yurchenko is being questioned at an undisclosed location in the United States.

Only Americans Under Scrutiny

One official said Mr. Howard and the second former intelligence employee were the only Americans under investigation as a result of information provided by Mr. Yurchenko, who defected to the West in July while he was in Italy.

Officials said Mr. Howard worked in the clandestine service of the C.I.A. He was charged on Sept. 23 with conspiring to provide national defense information to a foreign power.

Officials have said Mr. Howard eluded the Federal authorities and fled his home in Santa Fe, N.M. He had been employed by the New Mexico Legislature since 1983 as an economic analyst.

An intelligence source said Mr. Howard, "a disgruntled employee," approached the Russians with an offer to provide secret information. Various officials offered conflicting accounts on whether Mr. Howard began working with Soviet intelligence agents before or after he left the C.I.A.

Denial by State Department

A Reagan Administration official said Mr. Howard left the agency after he was assigned to a post in Moscow. The State Department, denying published reports, said today that Mr. Howard had never served in the American Embassy in Moscow. The Agency

for International Development, which administers foreign aid abroad, hired him as an intern in Washington in September 1976. He was later assigned to Peru as an assistant project development officer and resigned from the agency in March 1979.

In mid-August, the Italian press published brief articles reporting that Mr. Yurchenko had disappeared and that inquiries were being made by the Soviet Embassy. But it was not until Aug. 30 that the Milan newspaper Corriere Della Sera reported that he was a defector.

One former C.I.A. officer said it would be unusual to assign an inexperienced officer like Mr. Howard to Moscow, one of the agency's most demanding posts. But he added that that Mr. Howard's supposed role as a member of the State Department might have been more convincing to the Russians because he had not served in jobs usually associated with the Central Intelligence Agency. A Congressional source said Mr. Howard held an "operational" job in the intelligence agency.

The former C.I.A. officer said this would mean that Mr. Howard had been responsible for coordinating information-gathering clandestinely. He would thus have access, the former officer went on, to a limited number of names of agents as well as the location of other sources of information such as electronic listening posts — but an agent in an operational job would not know about the networks of agents run by others in similar posts.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-8

WASHINGTON POST

4 October 1985

Ex-CIA Agent Suspected of Spying Seemed Unexceptional to Associates

Young New Mexico Economist Lived Quietly, Conventionally

By T.R. Reid

Washington Post Staff Writer

SANTE FE, N.M., Oct. 3—To friends and colleagues here, Edward Lee Howard seemed a standard Santa Fe-style yuppie: a respected \$32,000-a-year economic analyst with the state government who commuted in a bright red Jeep to his brown adobe house in a middle-income development south of town.

Neighbors said he was a dutiful husband to his wife, Mary, a dental assistant in Santa Fe, and a devoted father to his 2-year-old son.

He enjoyed flying radio-controlled model aircraft and target-shooting at a local gun club—hardly remarkable pastimes for a young professional in the Southwest.

"He did good work," said Steven Arias, clerk of the New Mexico Legislature, where Howard was employed as a natural-resources economist with the Legislative Finance Committee.

He did good work through the afternoon of Sept. 20, when he briefed legislators at a budget-analysis meeting in the state capitol, then slipped quietly away and vanished.

In Washington today, a Senate staff official described Howard as a low-level officer in the CIA's clandestine service who was fired by the agency in 1983 for undisclosed reasons and apparently took sensitive material with him, perhaps to sell it to Soviet intelligence agents.

David Holliday of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence also said that, based on briefings received by the panel, he "would not discourage" speculation that high-level Soviet intelligence defector Vitaly Yurchenko had identified Howard as a spy.

Yurchenko, a former ranking member of the KGB who defected two months ago, is being debriefed by the Central Intelligence Agency at an undisclosed location near Washington.

Holliday said he could not identify what Howard may have taken when he left the agency. But a warrant used here to search Howard's home and car indicated that federal officials were seeking coding materials,

transmitting and recording equipment, and business cards carrying microdots.

A second former CIA employe is reportedly under surveillance as a possible Soviet agent, apparently also based on information from Yurchenko, a federal official said today in Washington.

Two days after Howard slipped away, a passenger listed as "Edward Howard" took an American Airlines flight from Albuquerque to Dallas. The next morning, Sept. 23, the Federal Bureau of Investigation issued an arrest warrant for the fugitive analyst but, by then, he was gone.

News that this quiet, generally mild-mannered young economist might have been a U.S. agent working for the KGB stunned and electrified his coworkers here. Equally surprised, evidently, was Howard's wife.

Philip Baca, Howard's boss in the state government, said he came into his office on the night of Sept. 22 and found a letter of resignation from Howard. In it, Howard asked coworkers to clean out his desk and said he hoped "some day to be able to explain this to you and the rest of the staff."

Baca said he immediately called Howard's home and reached Mary Howard. He said she expressed astonishment that her husband had quit his job and seemed to have no idea of his whereabouts.

Federal officials here declined to discuss how long they had been watching Howard and why he was able to leave Santa Fe before an arrest warrant was issued.

Coworkers and neighbors said FBI agents were in Santa Fe asking questions about Howard in the days before he fled. They said he must have known this by the day he left work early and disappeared.

Federal law enforcement officials say Howard fled Sept. 21. He was able to escape, a federal official in Washington said, because the FBI maintained a limited surveillance until an arrest warrant was issued.

Federal agents have staked out Howard's home and begun trailing his wife on her daily commute from home to the orthodontist's office where she works.

Howard was born in Alamogordo, N.M., in 1951, son of a career Air Force sergeant. The family moved frequently during his boyhood, and he acquired a proficiency in Spanish and German.

After graduating from the University of Texas in 1972, he spent most of the next four years with the Peace Corps in South America and the United States. From 1976 to 1979, he worked in Peru for the Agency for International Development, according to the State Department.

After earning a master's degree in business administration from American University, he went to work for the CIA, where he was employed from 1981 until spring 1983.

In June 1983, he moved to Santa Fe. His coworkers said they did not know what prompted the move.

He applied for a job as an analyst with the state Legislative Finance Committee, a joint budget-planning body serving both chambers of the legislature. He told his bosses that he had been employed by the State Department but left State because he and his wife did not want to accept an imminent posting to Moscow.

It is fairly common for CIA covert operatives to work under diplomatic cover for the State Department.

As an analyst in the Capitol building here, Howard seemed to coworkers to be a solid, serious young man.

The only stain on his record here came in February 1984 when he was arrested for brandishing a .44-cal. pistol at three men in downtown Santa Fe. He told police that he had been distraught after a family argument and had too many drinks at a bar. In a plea bargain, he pleaded guilty to an assault charge and was sentenced to probation.

As part of the bargain, Howard obtained letters of support from several government officials here and in Washington. All described him as a reliable, serious individual.

"He is a dedicated, honest and truthful individual," wrote then-state Sen. Frank Papen, chairman of the committee for which Howard worked.



WASHINGTON POST
13 September 1985

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-33

Windfall Seen for Western Agencies

Soviet Defector Might Expose KGB Identities and Operations

By Don Oberdorfer
Washington Post Staff Writer

The defection of the chief of Soviet KGB intelligence in Britain could provide valuable assistance to counterspies in the United States and other countries by revealing Soviet techniques and possibly agents in many countries, according to Sen. David F. Durenberger (R-Minn.), chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

Durenberger, briefed about 10 days ago on the defection of Oleg A. Gordievski, the KGB chief in the Soviet Embassy in London, called it "a very good thing" for the West.

Despite a report from Denmark indicating that Gordievski may have been a double agent since the 1970s, Durenberger said his information is that the defector has "no past relationship" with western intelligence.

The motive for the defection, according to the senator, was described by U.S. officials as the attraction of "Western values." Gordievski "got tired; he couldn't live the facade any more," Durenberger said.

A variety of Western intelligence agencies, including those of the United States, may obtain valuable information on KGB operational methods and possibly identities of other espionage agents from the senior defector, according to Durenberger.

Former Central Intelligence Agency director Stansfield Turner called the development "a very nice coup for British intelligence."

He added, "It should do a great deal to dampen spying against Great Britain" because of the likelihood "it could disrupt the whole system" there. "We can assume they [British authorities] have the names of traitors there. Some might be Americans," Turner said.

Benefits for the United States from the defection include the possibility that "it could help us understand techniques" used in Soviet espionage, especially if the latest sophisticated methods are in use in Britain, he said.

It is also possible, he said, that Gordievski could provide information on "vulnerabilities," including personal weaknesses, of KGB agents with whom he had worked in other countries.

But Turner said that, due to "compartmentalization" of information practiced by Soviet and other

intelligence agencies, it is unlikely that Gordievski would have current information on Soviet espionage activities outside of his field of direct responsibility.

Even "small pieces of the puzzle" can prove to be valuable when fitted into information already known or suspected, Turner said.

Ray Cline, a former CIA deputy director and former head of the State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research, called the defection "a great break" for the west and "one of the rare breakdowns in the elaborate Soviet system of international espionage in democratic countries."

"Most people don't realize how valuable it is when we get a defection like this . . . He can tell you things about how the system works that confirm other data and research and analysis" which are done without certain knowledge, Cline said.

According to a State Department report issued last January, at least 230 Soviet nationals were expelled in 1981-84 for "inappropriate activities," mostly spying, from countries around the world.

One of the largest expulsions was of 47 Soviet diplomats, journalists and others from France in 1983. But the British seem to have set the record for espionage expulsions in 1971 when 90 Soviet citizens were expelled and 15 others prevented from returning to Britain after defection of a KGB official in London.

A State Department official said it is unlikely that the new developments will affect "the fall agenda" of East-West arms talks and summit meetings.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE **A-1B**WASHINGTON POST
6 September 1985

2 Senators Briefed on Contra Links

By Charles R. Babcock
Washington Post Staff Writer

Leaders of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence said yesterday that national security affairs adviser Robert C. McFarlane assured them that members of his staff did not violate a congressional ban by giving military and fund-raising advice to Nicaraguan insurgents.

Sens. David F. Durenberger (R-Minn.) and Patrick J. Leahy (D-Vt.), after an hour-long briefing by McFarlane, told reporters that President Reagan had directed the White House staff to comply with the so-called Boland amendment cutting off Central Intelligence Agency aid to the insurgents.

Contacts between White House officials and the insurgents, known as contras, were limited to "what they felt was a normal moralization effort, if you will, to keep up the spirits of the opposition," Durenberger said.

This included "encouraging them to take their case to a broader public, to travel more, to make speeches," he said.

But the senators said they will look further into press reports that Lt. Col. Oliver North of the National Security Council staff also advised insurgent leaders on military tactics and steered contributors to them. A key fund-raiser for the contras, retired Army major general John K. Singlaub, has said he frequently talked to North about his fundraising efforts.

Leahy said he and Durenberger told McFarlane they would consider fund solicitation by an NSC official a violation of the letter and spirit of



BY JAMES K.W. ATHERTON—THE WASHINGTON POST

Sens. Durenberger and Leahy tell news conference about McFarlane meeting.

the congressional ban. McFarlane assured them North had done nothing beyond directing callers to the public offices of the contras.

"You can say that Bud McFarlane told us the truth as he understands it," Durenberger said. "I can't be 100 percent confident that that's all that really went on . . . We're continuing an inquiry."

The senators also said they want to know more about the future relationship between the NSC and CIA and the contras now that Congress has approved \$27 million in humanitarian aid for the troops fighting the Sandinista government of Nicaragua.

"We're not satisfied we know the

ground rules under which the CIA will operate" whenever the ban ends, Durenberger said.

"We need to know what are the rules the CIA's going to live by. Are they going to go out there talking to the Singlaubs and so forth, and if so under what circumstances?" he added. "And what is the role of the NSC going to be?"

Durenberger said the Senate committee was starting out. "a little more suspicious than maybe we ought to be, but appropriately so because at various places in the administration, policy has been implemented on an individual basis rather than on some kind of institutional basis."

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A3NEW YORK TIMES
6 September 1985

McFarlane Denies Illegal Ties to Contras

By JONATHAN FUERBRINGER

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 5 — President Reagan's national security adviser told the leaders of the Senate intelligence committee today that no one on the National Security Council had violated the law by assisting anti-Government rebels in Nicaragua.

But the chairman and deputy chairman of the committee said they still had serious concerns about the council's involvement and were not fully satisfied with the Administration explanation. The two Senators would not say, however, that the Administration had violated the law.

The chairman, Senator Dave Durenburger, Republican of Minnesota, said he saw no need now for hearings on the matter. The chairman of the House intelligence committee has scheduled hearings to begin Sept. 17.

Senator Durenburger and Senator Patrick J. Leahy, Democrat of Vermont and the deputy chairman of the Senate committee, both said Robert C. McFarlane, the national security adviser, had agreed with them that any effort to solicit or help raise private funds for the Nicaraguan rebels would violate the so-called Boland amendment, which prohibited such activity.

'You Can't Be Satisfied'

"So we came away from the meeting feeling that from Bud McFarlane we're getting what he believes to be the situation with regard to his staff," Mr. Durenburger said. "Are we satisfied that this sort of concludes the matter and that no one was in any way involved in directing the effort? No, you can't be satisfied.

"You can be satisfied with Bud McFarlane telling you the truth as he perceives it," he added. "But you can't be satisfied that you know all the factors."

Administration officials have acknowledged that a ranking member of the National Security Council, Lieut. Col. Oliver L. North, helped raise private funds for the rebels and had been involved in some rebel activities during the time the Boland amendment was in effect.

An Administration official who is familiar with Colonel North's activities said in a recent interview that the colonel had never on his own solicited money for the rebels. But when people asked him about helping them, as happened often, he would tell them where they might want to go and with whom they should talk. Another official said Colonel North had made many speeches and given briefings on the rebels and would, when asked, tell people how they could help them.

When asked in a separate interview about an official's giving speeches and offering advice on how to help the rebels when asked, Mr. Durenberger said that if this was a "pattern" it would be a solicitation and would violate the law. "I would be really bothered by that," he said.

But the committee chairman said that in the hourlong meeting with Mr. McFarlane, the security adviser did not give the impression that Colonel North had followed such a pattern.

"An isolated phone call here and there," Mr. Durenberger said, "that's the sort of impression I got from McFarlane that was going on."

Then he added, referring to Colonel North and his speeches, "I didn't get the sense that he told McFarlane that's what he was doing."

"I'm satisfied that Mr. McFarlane told us what he had been told," Mr. Leahy said. "I am also satisfied that if the law has been broken either in spirit or in fact, it will come out."

The chairman of the House intelligence committee, Representative Lee H. Hamilton, Democrat of Indiana, said Wednesday that Colonel North might have broken the law because the expenditure of funds for his travels on behalf of the rebels would violate the Boland amendment's prohibition on the expenditure of funds by an intelligence agency "supporting, directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations" of the rebels in Nicaragua.

Since the first reports of Colonel North's activities, the President and senior Administration officials have said that Colonel North neither broke the law nor violated the spirit of the law.

The Boland amendment, which was

approved last fall, was effective for fiscal year 1985, which ends Sept. 30. There is some doubt if it is still in effect because Congress has approved and the President has signed a bill for \$27 million of nonmilitary aid to the rebels.

WASHINGTON TIMES

6 September 1985

ARTICLE APPEARED

ON PAGE 7A

Senate panel drops NSC Contra role inquiry

By Thomas D. Brandt
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

Two leaders of the Senate Intelligence Committee yesterday said they haven't been told everything about the National Security Council's involvement in aiding groups seeking to overthrow the Nicaraguan government, but they won't pursue the matter further.

Sen. David F. Durenberger, R-Minn., chairman of the panel, said he was convinced after meeting with National Security Advisor Robert C. McFarlane at the White House that he was "telling the truth as he sees it."

"Are we satisfied this concludes the matter, that no one was involved in directing this matter? No, we can't be satisfied," Mr. Durenberger said.

Mr. Durenberger and Sen. Patrick J. Leahy, D-Vt., the ranking Democrat on the committee, said they were uncertain if all the facts are known about the role of Lt. Col. Oliver North, who is on the NSC staff, though they plan no further action on the issue.

A main accomplishment of the meeting, according to Mr. Leahy, was that they and the White House now "all understand what the ground rules are" on assisting private groups.

The House and Senate intelligence committees are responsible for oversight of the CIA and other government agencies involved in intelligence gathering and covert actions. The allegations against Mr. North were that he violated a law prohibiting any "direct or indirect aid" to the rebels.

Mr. Durenberger said his panel will begin a review of what guidelines should be applied in the future since Congress has approved \$27 million in non-lethal assistance for the rebels and the restrictions in the Boland Amendment will expire Sept. 30.

Mr. Durenberger said he expects to hear soon from CIA Director Wil-

liam Casey on what the CIA plans to do in Nicaragua after expiration of the Boland Amendment, which applies to U.S. intelligence agencies.

The United States should not supply direct tactical assistance or intelligence to the rebels, Mr. Durenberger said, but should provide aid only to the unified political arms of the rebel factions.

The House intelligence panel plans to review the allegations about Mr. North while the House Foreign Affairs subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere plans a hearing.

Yesterday's meeting with the Senate Intelligence Committee leaders was requested by Mr. McFarlane, according to the committee, but also came after the lobbying group Common Cause asked the panel to investigate press accounts that Mr. North had helped private groups in the United States raise funds for the rebels, and also provided them with military advice.

An intelligence committee press release quoted Mr. McFarlane as saying that, "No NSC staff member either personally assisted the resistance or solicited outside assistance on their behalf. At no time did anyone act as a go-between or focal point for such aid."

The next paragraph said, "Nevertheless, the senators [Durenberger and Leahy] stated that they continue to have concern about the potential for the NSC to fill the gap when Congress had prohibited a different branch of government from a specific activity."

The press accounts of Mr. North's activities involving private groups raising funds for the rebels, known as "Contras" or counterrevolutionaries, alleged that his activities may have violated the Boland Amendment, which bans "direct or

indirect" U.S. support.

The amendment, added to the fiscal 1985 authorization bill for the CIA and other U.S. intelligence agencies, did not take effect until Oct. 1, 1984, and officially expires Sept. 30.

"You can certainly do your best to keep [up] the morale of our friends — the Nicaraguan opposition — until we can change the position of the Congress," Mr. Durenberger said in explaining the administration's position.

He added that Col. North "did not deny responding to phone calls [from people who] would call and say, 'I'd like to . . . help these guys out, and he would say, in effect, 'You know who they are, but we can't tell you what to do.'"

This summer, Congress continued a ban on lethal military aid to the Nicaraguan rebels but approved \$27 million in non-lethal aid and agreed to permit the CIA to share intelligence information with the rebels.

Prior to the latest appropriation, the United States provided more than \$80 million to the rebels who are operating out of bases in Honduras and Costa Rica.

FILE ONLY

NICARAGUA-WHITE HOUSE
BY ROBERT PARRY
WASHINGTON

President Reagan's national security adviser Thursday assured two key senators that White House officials neither gave military advice to Nicaraguan rebels nor solicited private aid after last year's congressional ban on "direct or indirect" U.S. support.

Sens. Dave Durenberger, R-Minn., Senate Intelligence Committee chairman, and Patrick Leahy, D-Vt., the panel's vice chairman, said they received that assurance from national security adviser Robert McFarlane during a one-hour meeting.

McFarlane was responding to published reports that Lt. Col. Oliver North, a staff aide to Reagan's National Security Council, had helped the Nicaraguan rebels raise money from outside sources and provided some military advice.

In a statement, the two senators quoted McFarlane as saying: "No NSC staff member either personally assisted the (Nicaraguan) resistance or solicited outside assistance on their behalf.

"At no time did anyone act as a go-between or focal point for such aid," they quoted him as saying.

Durenberger and Leahy, however, said the intelligence committee would conduct a review of the issue and voiced "concern about the potential for the NSC to fill the gap when Congress had prohibited a different branch of government from a specific activity."

The House Intelligence Committee and a subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee are also conducting reviews.

The Associated Press reported last June that White House officials, including North, advised private groups that were trying in the spring of 1984 to set up fund-raising efforts to support the rebels fighting to oust Nicaragua's leftist government.

However, the strict ban against "direct or indirect" aid to the rebels from the CIA or other U.S. agencies involved in intelligence did not take effect until Oct. 1, 1984 and officially expires on Sept. 30.

Other published reports have claimed that North has been involved in some rebel activities and assisted in some private fund raising, but administration officials have consistently denied any violation of the congressional ban.

Durenberger and Leahy said McFarlane agreed that the congressional ban would have applied to the NSC staff. But the NSC adviser said Reagan had specifically directed the White House staff to comply with the prohibition, the senators said.

"We were assured there was no intent to circumvent restrictions Congress placed on aid to the Nicaraguan resistance," the senators said.

Continued

Durenberger added that McFarlane had said that "neither he nor anyone else had in any way initiated the collecting of funds, the collecting of arms or had helped to channel any of these things in any specific direction."

But Durenberger said North did maintain contacts with Americans who wished to assist the rebels and with the rebels themselves.

"You can certainly do your best to keep (up) the morale of our friends _ the Nicaraguan opposition _ until we can change the position of the Congress," the senator said, explaining the administration's position.

Durenberger said North "did not deny responding to phone calls (from people who) would call and say, 'I'd like to ... help these guys out, and he would say, in effect, 'You know who they are, but we can't tell you what to do.'"

This summer, Congress continued a ban on lethal military aid to the Nicaraguan rebels but approved \$27 million in non-lethal aid and agreed to permit the CIA to share intelligence information with the rebels.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 1-AWASHINGTON TIMES
23 August 1985

U.S. wants no dust on Geneva talks

By Dave Doubrava
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

The administration said yesterday it hopes the Soviet Union's use of chemical agents against U.S. diplomatic personnel won't scuttle the November summit meeting or routine U.S.-Soviet bilateral relations.

It denied Soviet charges that the disclosure that the Soviets have used

potentially dangerous chemical substances to track American diplomats was timed to fuel "a propaganda war before the summit."

White House spokesman Larry Speakes, in California with the vacationing president, said the Soviet charges are "not true."

"Our first objective is to stop the Soviets from using this chemical against U.S. personnel. We expect it

will stop," he said.

The Soviet Union yesterday called the disclosures "absurd allegations" intended to sabotage upcoming high-level U.S.-Soviet talks.

In a protest note to the State Department, published yesterday in the official Soviet news agency Tass, the Soviet Union denied ever using such substances and called the accusations "totally unacceptable."

The administration stuck by its charges.

"Everything we said [Wednesday] is perfectly true," State Department deputy spokesman Charles E. Redman said. "The evidence is there.

Everything we described, happened."

The department charged it has evidence a powder was used by the KGB to dust doorknobs and other objects to trace movements and contacts of American diplomats and private citizens based in Moscow.

The powder was described as a mutagen, potentially capable of causing cancer, although that has yet to be proven by medical tests.

Mr. Redman said that, to his knowledge, no other foreign governments have notified the United States that they have found similar substances used against their personnel.

Mr. Redman and White House spokesman Larry Speakes have said that because of the matter's seriousness, it likely would be raised by President Reagan and Secretary of State George P. Shultz when they meet their Soviet counterparts in Washington and Geneva this fall.

But Mr. Redman suggested yesterday that because of the importance of the superpower summit meeting and regular bilateral talks, the chemical tracking case should not be allowed to sour East-West relations.

He noted that Agriculture Secretary John Block, with White House approval, will leave today for Moscow for scheduled talks on grain sales.

"We have sought to increase mutually beneficial cooperation with the Soviets in a number of areas," he said. "Those contacts, that cooperation, is important. We simply hope the Soviets won't jeopardize that cooperation."

Mr. Redman faced stiff questioning from reporters on the disclosure's timing. Asked whether he was denying it was intended to counter an expected Soviet propaganda blitz before the Nov. 23 sum-

mit meeting in Geneva between President Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, Mr. Redman said, "I am, categorically."

"The timing of the whole thing was driven by the humanitarian health concern for our personnel in Moscow," he said.

In a formal protest note from the Soviet Embassy in Washington to the State Department, the Soviets said they deny "the absurd inventions that some chemical agents are used on the staff of U.S. agencies in the U.S.S.R."

"It is outrageous that the American side has decided it is possible to use such a gross falsehood, which pursues ends far removed from the interests of improving relations," the note said.

The note denied that Soviet authorities were using, or had ever used, chemicals to track American diplomats in Moscow.

Several key legislators, meanwhile, called for retaliation — either closing the U.S. Embassy in Moscow or expelling Soviet diplomats and intelligence agents from this country.

Sen. David Durenberger, R-Minn., chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, called the U.S. protest an "insufficient expression of the seriousness with which the American people view this direct and official Soviet attack on our citizens."

He called for expulsion of all Soviet citizens "affiliated with intelligence."

Sen. Patrick Leahy, D-Vt., said the administration should immediately implement legislation to reduce the Soviet diplomatic contingent here "even if it means the State Department has to expel some KGB agents who are masquerading as Russian diplomats."

Sen. Strom Thurmond, R-S.C., said, "I would go so far as to say if they are going to put chemicals on our people over there, subject them to cancer, that we close the embassy entirely if necessary."

He called the action inhuman and

barbarous, and said he will raise the issue with Mr. Gorbachev when he and seven other senators visit Moscow at the end of the month.

Malcolm Toon, a former U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union, today called Mr. Thurmond's suggestion to close the embassy "totally irresponsible."

"I think no matter how badly the Soviets misbehave and no matter how much distaste we have for their leadership . . . we've got to maintain a relationship with Moscow," Mr. Toon said in an interview on the NBC "Today" show.

Rep. Dave McCurdy, D-Okla., chairman of the House Intelligence Committee's subcommittee on oversight, said, "This is one more example of Soviet paranoia and harassment of American diplomats. It is time for the United States to re-evaluate its attitude toward Soviet citizens in the United States."

Continued

2.

Rep. James A. Courter, R-N.J., asked the president yesterday to order Mr. Shultz to stop hiring Soviet citizens to work in U.S. diplomatic posts in the Soviet Union.

"Protection of our personnel is impossible to achieve ... when we employ over 200 Soviet citizens as service and maintenance employees in our Moscow embassy and the Leningrad consulate," Mr. Courter said in a letter to the president.

The congressman noted that an amendment to the State Department authorization bill he sponsored would have barred hiring of Soviet citizens in such jobs. The amendment passed the House, but was dropped from the bill in a conference committee.

"I respectfully suggest that you direct the Secretary of State to stop the employment of Soviets in our diplomatic posts within one year," Mr. Courter told the president. "This may not solve the entire problem, but it is clearly impossible to solve it without taking this necessary step."

The State Department had no comment on the calls for action against the Soviets.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE ALNEW YORK TIMES
23 August 1985

U.S. Asserts Its Protest Is Not Aimed At Talks

By STEPHEN ENGELBERG

Special to The New-York Times

WASHINGTON, Aug. 22 — The United States said today that its protest over the Soviet Union's purported use of a possibly hazardous chemical to track the movements of Americans in Moscow was not intended to "sabotage" the summit meeting scheduled in November between President Reagan and Mikhail S. Gorbachev.

When they made the accusation on Wednesday, United States officials said there is a possibility that the chemical could cause cancer. The substance is nitrophenylpentadienal, a little-known substance also referred to as NPPD.

Reagan Administration officials asserted today that the accusation about the yellow powder was not deliberately timed to coincide with the announcement this week of American plans to test an anti-satellite weapon.

The Soviet Union, according to the Soviet press agency Tass, handed the State Department a protest that dismissed the charges as a ploy to further undermine United States-Soviet relations.

'We Intend to Proceed'

Charles Redman, a State Department spokesman, said "there is absolutely no United States attempt in any way to sabotage prospects for the Geneva meeting."

"We intend to proceed with that meeting," he said. "We intend to address the serious and far-reaching issues that exist between us and the Soviet Union."

The Soviet Union denied that it had used chemical agents on the staff of American agencies in the Soviet Union. It said the charge had been made as part of a plan for "poisoning the atmosphere in relations between our countries."

A senior State Department official said the United States would be monitoring to assure that use of the powder has been discontinued. The official said it was unclear whether the substance had been used in Leningrad as well as Moscow. He said American diplomats in both cities had been briefed on its possible dangers.

'Orchestrating' Is Denied

A State Department official who restated the accusations today said there was no link between the timing of the American announcements this week.

"These things were proceeding along several different tracks at the same time," he said. "There's a sensitivity that the Administration is putting on the boxing gloves when that isn't the case. We're not really capable of orchestrating something like this."

The series of statements on Soviet policy began Monday in a speech by Robert C. McFarlane, the President's national security adviser, to civic groups in Santa Barbara, Calif. He criticized the Soviet Union's arguments on arms control a "masterpiece ofchutzpah" and said warmer relations would not be possible without major changes in Moscow's policies.

The next day, the United States said it would proceed with the first American test of an anti-satellite weapon against an object in space, a move to which the Soviet Union objects.

Protest on Powder

Wednesday, the Reagan Administration said it was protesting the use of the powder "in strongest terms" and described the substance as one that has been found to cause genetic change and that therefore might be capable of causing cancer.

Today Mr. Redman reasserted the charge that the Russians have been using the substance, saying: "The evidence is there. We have absolutely no doubts in our minds that what we have described as happening has been happening."

But he said that "mutually beneficial" cooperation between the United States and Soviet Union was continuing and noted that John Block, the Agriculture Secretary, will leave Friday for a one-week trip to the Soviet Union. A spokesman for Mr. Block said the trip will involve talks about grain sales.

Malcolm Toon, the American Ambassador to the Soviet Union from 1976 to 1979, said today that during his tenure he had not been told of the use of the powder.

Senator David Durenberger, a Minnesota Republican who is chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, said Wednesday that the United States has known of the powder since 1976 but had only recently learned of the possible health hazards from it.

Mr. Toon said that American officials had promised while he was Ambassador that he would be notified if there were any change in the "environment" surrounding the embassy.

During his tenure, he said, the Soviet Union bathed the American Embassy in microwaves in an apparent attempt to eavesdrop on conversations.

"I felt strongly that as Ambassador, I had to know everything that was going on," he said. "If this was going on and they didn't tell me, then I'm pretty mad about it."

A former official of the Central Intelligence Agency, George Carver, said that the Russians' use of the powder could have helped them track meetings of Americans with dissidents or agents. But he said that in the late 1970's, the powder was considered of less concern than the microwave radiation.

"When a guy's beating you over the head with a shovel, you haven't got time to worry about being stuck with a needle," he said.

Dissidents Cited

Mr. Carver said the use of the powder could have reduced the number of people the Russians needed to maintain surveillance over American personnel in Russia.

"We have a lot of evidence of harassing of dissidents," he said, adding that "It could well be some of them were packed off because of evidence they had engaged in meetings with Americans they had been told to stay away from."

Late this afternoon, the American Foreign Service Association, the labor union that represents career Foreign Service employees in the State Department and the Agency for International Development, sent a letter to the State Department asking that the hardship pay for those serving in Moscow and Leningrad be raised to the highest level available.

Diplomats in Leningrad and Moscow presently receive a hardship-pay supplement equivalent to 20 percent of their normal pay. The supplement can be as high as 25 percent.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGENEW YORK TIMES
22 August 1985

U.S. ASSERTS SOVIET IS USING CHEMICAL TO MONITOR ALIENS

By SHIRLEY CHRISTIAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Aug. 21 — The United States accused the Soviet Union today of using a mysterious powdery substance as an aid in tracking the movements of Americans and possibly other foreigners in Moscow.

"We have protested the practice in strongest terms and demanded that it be terminated immediately," a State Department spokesman said.

Officials said the United States was more concerned about a possible health risk from the substance than about espionage questions.

Information in U.S. Is Classified

A State Department spokesman, Charles Redman, raised the possibility that the chemical might have the potential to cause cancer. He said one agent, apparently developed by the Russians for tracking purposes, was a mutagen known as nitrophenylpentadienol. A mutagen is a substance that is known to cause genetic change.

The chemical is so little known that it does not appear in standard chemical reference books. Interviews with chemists disclosed that nearly everything known about the substance in the United States was secret. [Page A8.]

In Moscow, the 500 American residents were informed about the situation in unusual briefings at the residence of the United States Ambassador. They were told that the yellowish powder was being used by the K.G.B., the Soviet internal security agency, to keep track of the movements of foreigners. [Page A8.]

U.S. Knew of Powder Since 1976

In Washington, Senator Dave Durenberger, a Minnesota Republican who is chairman of the Intelligence Committee, said the Russians tracked people who came in contact with the powder either by lifting samples off their clothes or by illuminating them with ultraviolet light, making them glow.

He said the United States had known of the powder since 1976 but did not know of its potential health dangers until recently.

"When we had the scientific conclusions in hand," he said, "We had to tell the embassy staff."

Statements by officials left many questions unanswered, including where or how the use of the substance had been discovered, why an alarm was being raised now, and why the use of tracking agents had not been previously examined since the United States Embassy had been aware of them for several years.

Officials said it was "entirely possible" that President Reagan would raise the issue when he meets with Mikhail S. Gorbachev in Geneva on Nov. 19-20.

In Santa Barbara, Calif., the White House spokesman, Larry Speakes, said:

"We will certainly discuss, in various forums, the serious dangers to the relationship caused by the actions of the Soviet military and security services, which seem to act as if they were under no control by the political authorities."

He said President Reagan was informed of the situation on Monday and had directed the American response.

The American accusation is the latest in a series of pointed gestures toward the Soviet Union this week. On Monday, the White House said the Soviet Union was hampering arms control talks, and the following day, the United States announced that it would proceed with a test of an anti-satellite weapon against an object in space.

Not Necessarily a Carcinogen

In the State Department, Mr. Redman, in discussing the possibility that the chemical tracking agent could cause cancer, said "mutagens can be, but are not always, carcinogens in human beings."

He added that the United States had no proof that the substance is absorbed into the blood. Extensive testing will be necessary, he said, to determine whether it poses a cancer threat or any other kind of health hazard. He said no one had fallen ill as a result of exposure, which he described as very low.

A special task force under the National Institutes of Health and the Environmental Protection Agency will go to Moscow and conduct an investigation, Mr. Redman said.

Use of Substance Described

An Administration official who declined to be identified said the substance was believed to have been deposited in places that embassy personnel frequently touch, "on your car seat, steering wheel, door knobs, literally anywhere."

"The embassy employee comes in contact with it," he continued. "It is a very persistent agent so that it does not disappear from him wherever he happens to have touched it. He then, in theory, transfers this substance to anything he may come in contact with."

The official would not say how the Russians traced the deposits left by the substances, saying that he could not talk about the "operational aspect."

"We have known of the general use or existence of such sorts of chemical tracking agencies since the 1970's," he said. "Their use, however, was very sporadic, infrequent, to the best that we could determine. In fact, we believed that the Soviets had terminated using such agents, even in these limited

amounts that we had detected, in 1982. We simply did not detect any use between 1982 and the resurgence of more widespread appearances in the spring and summer of this year."

Potential Harm Found in 1984

Last year, a laboratory test known as the Ames Test found that the substance might be harmful, he said, and this spring and summer the United States found evidence that its use was more widespread than previously thought. He said the United States regularly "runs all kinds of tests for various kinds of activities which may be mounted against us."

The United States has found during various periods since 1976 that the Soviet Union has beamed microwave signals at the American Embassy in Moscow. Officials said it was for the purpose of activating bugging devices inside the nine-story building or to interfere with the United States' own surveillance devices on the roof. The last such use of microwaves was reported in late 1983 by Ambassador Arthur A. Hartman.

The official who discussed the tracking substance said a study on microwaves conducted at Johns Hopkins University in the 1970's had concluded that the "level of signals did not present a health hazard." He said the State Department believed the microwaves were no longer being used.

The official said the United States did not use tracking substances to monitor the movements of foreigners, but he did not rule out the use of nonchemical agents to track criminal activities.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-1WASHINGTON POST
22 August 1985

Soviets Said To Imperil Diplomats

'Potentially Harmful' Tracking Chemical Used, U.S. Charges

By Don Oberdorfer
Washington Post Staff Writer

The United States charged yesterday that Soviet secret police have employed "potentially harmful" chemical dust to track the movements and contacts of U.S. diplomats in Moscow and Lenin-grad, and demanded that the practice be stopped.

The surprise disclosure, in White House and State Department news briefings and U.S. Embassy sessions in Moscow for diplomats, their families and other Americans who might have been exposed, brought to the fore a new, bizarre and emotion-laden problem in U.S.-Soviet relations just three months before the scheduled summit meeting of President Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev.

Official sources said the chemical dust—said to be odorless, colorless and with no visible residue when properly sprayed—was placed on steering wheels of diplomatic cars and other places where U.S. attaches would come into contact with it. The diplomats unknowingly would then leave tiny amounts of the long-lasting chemical on the hands, clothing or possessions of Soviet citizens with whom they met—telltale traces that could be identified by the KGB, or secret police.

A few reports of use of such "tracking chemicals"—fewer than 10 in a decade—are said to have been in the files of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow before 1982, when their use was believed to have been stopped. No announcement of these "very sporadic" incidents was made, officials said.

Two new elements brought the problem to high level of concern, according to State Department accounts.

One was the result of a biological screening test applied in a U.S. laboratory for the first time last year to samples of the obscure compound. The Ames test, named for a professor at the University of California at Berkeley, determined that the most extensively used tracking chemical, which the State Department identified as NPPD, produced mutations in genes. Substances that cause such mutations can, but do not always, cause cancers, the department said.

Additional "extensive testing will be necessary to determine whether NPPD and other compounds used by the Soviets pose a threat to health, as well as to determine the extent of the embassy community's exposure to these chemicals," the department's announcement said.

"Any danger is far from proved," Dr. Charles Brodine of the State Department told Americans in Moscow at an embassy briefing last night, according to Washington Post correspondent Celestine Bohlen. Brodine added that initial tests "all argue that the level of risk is fairly low."

The other new element was information that Soviet use of the tracking chemicals had resumed this spring and summer on a "much more widespread basis," a department official said. Official sources said an incident in which an apparent "overdose" of the chemical left a highly visible powder, which was noticed by a U.S. aide, alerted officials to the extensiveness of the problem.

Tracking chemicals were also used once by the Soviets in the United States, said a State Department official, who would give no details.

Following heavy press questioning about the timing of the announcement, the third U.S. statement this week likely to bring a harsh reaction from Moscow, a State Department official said that "only in the last several weeks" had the internal investigation produced "conclusive" results about use of the tracking chemicals.

A U.S. plan for diplomatic action, internal briefings and public announcements was drawn up Friday and presented to President Reagan

for approval in a detailed paper Monday, officials said.

The department said the United States "protested the practice in the strongest terms" in diplomatic exchanges with the Soviet Union here Monday and in Moscow early Tuesday, "and demanded that it be terminated immediately."

There was no immediate comment from the Soviet Union, whose press organs continued to give heavy play to attacks on the White House announcement Tuesday of an impending U.S. antisatellite test against a target in space.

In Santa Barbara, Calif., White House spokesman Larry Speakes said it is "entirely possible" that Reagan will raise the chemical-dust issue when he meets with Gorbachev in Geneva Nov. 19 and 20.

"We will certainly discuss in various quarters the serious danger to the [U.S.-Soviet] relationship caused by the actions of the Soviet military and security services, which seem to act as if they are under no control by the political authorities," Speakes said.

It is "entirely possible" that tracking chemicals were used against U.S. diplomats without the knowledge of Soviet political leaders, Speakes said. He added, though, that "whatever the KGB has done, certainly the political leadership is responsible for the conduct of their security services."

Members of Congress who were reached for comment called for strong U.S. action.

The chairman and vice chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Sens. David F. Durenberger (R-Minn.) and Patrick J. Leahy (D-Vt.), called in separate statements for expulsion of KGB agents under diplomatic cover from the United States. Durenberger, who described himself as "still mad" 24 hours after being informed of the U.S. charges, said he had recommended that all KGB agents or suspected agents be expelled within 48 hours.

Staff writers David Hoffman and Joanne Omang contributed to this report.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE L-A

PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER

22 August 1985

U.S. alleges KGB use of spy chemical

By Gregory Spears
Inquirer Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — The KGB has for years used a chemical tracking agent to monitor the movements of U.S. diplomats in the Soviet Union, and the chemical has the potential to cause genetic mutations and possibly cancer, the State Department said yesterday.

State Department spokesman Charles Redman said he knows how the KGB got a sample of contact with the powdery chemical, which he said might have been picked up from doorknobs, steering wheels or seats dusted with the substance.

Soviet intelligence agents could learn who had had contact with U.S. Embassy employees by testing people for traces of the chemical, which could be passed along in a handshake, said another State Department spokesman, who asked not to be identified.

Over the last several years, U.S. agents have occasionally detected the tracking chemical, known as nitro phenyl pentadiene aldehyde, or NPPD, but its use greatly increased this spring and summer, according to the spokesman. He said recent biological tests showed that NPPD is a mutagen, which means it can increase the occurrence of mutation in offspring. Some mutagens cause cancer in humans.

"The United States deplors the Soviet Union's use of chemical substances against its diplomatic representatives in the U.S.S.R.," Redman told reporters. "We have protested the practice in the strongest terms and demanded that its use be terminated immediately."

In California, where President Reagan is on vacation, White House spokesman Larry Speakes said yesterday that Reagan might raise the issue at his summit meeting with Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachov in November, or at a preliminary meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard A. Shevardnadze in September.

Speakes added that while it is possible that the KGB conducted the chemical surveillance without the knowledge of Kremlin leaders, "whatever the KGB has done, certainly the political leadership of the Soviet Union is responsible for the conduct of its security services."

Speakes denied that yesterday's disclosure was calculated to undermine Soviet efforts to portray the United States as the belligerent superpower at the Geneva arms talks.

The chairman of the Senate intelligence committee, Sen. David Durenberger (R., Minn.), urged that all suspected Soviet intelligence agents be expelled from the United States in retaliation for the use of the chemical. "This is clearly a criminal violation of the personal rights and human dignity of our diplomatic representatives," he said in a prepared statement.

Sen. Strom Thurmond (R., S.C.), the Senate's president pro tem and chairman of the Judiciary Committee, said the U.S. Embassy in Moscow should be shut down if necessary.

"I would go so far as to say if they are going to put chemicals on our people over there, subject them to cancer, that we close the embassy entirely, if necessary," Thurmond said. "It's inhuman, it's barbarous, it's unreal and in my opinion a step Americans cannot accept under any circumstances."

The controversy injected a sudden note of drama yesterday into the relatively placid summer existence of the American community in Moscow.

In the course of the day, every embassy staffer as well as all American correspondents and business representatives in the Soviet capital were contacted and told to come with their spouses to Spaso House, the ambassadorial residence, for what turned out to be briefings on the potential hazard of NPPD.

While stressing that nothing definitive could be said until further study is done, the officials conducting the briefings sought to minimize the health risk. Even if carcinogenic, they said, the substance was being used in relatively small amounts and appeared to break down into something less harmful when absorbed through the skin.

"There is certainly no immediate cause for alarm," Richard E. Combe Jr., the American charge d'affaires in Moscow, said at the briefing for non-embassy personnel.

One correspondent's wife asked whether the risk was such that she should consider leaving Moscow with her young child. Dr. Charles

Brodine, an official with the State Department's Office of Medical Services, told her that "based on what I know, if I were living in Moscow right now and I had a wife and children, I would not have great concern."

Combs said the embassy did not know at this point how widely NPPD had been used and whether news correspondents, who also attract considerable KGB attention, also were targets.

He said a task force of specialists from the National Institutes of Health and the Environmental Protection Agency is due to arrive in Moscow in about 10 days to do detailed research into the matter.

The only advice Combs or Brodine had for those who might have contact with NPPD was to wash with alcohol as well as soap.

Combs said the State Department had known about Soviet use of NPPD for years but became increasingly concerned in recent months that the substance was being used far more widely than before.

But he acknowledged that he first learned of the problem in a late-night phone call last weekend. Brodine said that he, too, only learned of

NPPD over the weekend and that he needed a two-day crash course to prepare for the briefings.

In Washington, a State Department spokesman said the chemical had been detected in Moscow, Leningrad and once in the United States at a location he did not disclose. He said the chemical was formulated specifically for surveillance, and had no other known purpose.

Rep. Daniel A. Mica (D., Fla.), a member of the House intelligence committee, said yesterday that the committee was briefed last year on a chemical with properties similar to those attributed to NPPD. He said that chemical was visible under infrared light and would not wash off in normal bathing.

Redman said some of the U.S. testing, in which animals will be exposed to the chemical, could take years to complete.

This is not the first time the United States has protested Soviet surveillance of its personnel in Moscow. In 1983 the U.S. government said the Soviets were beaming low-level microwave signals at the embassy that, according to press accounts, could interfere or intercept embassy communications.

The transmissions stopped after the protest, and a Johns Hopkins University medical study concluded that the signals were not harmful.

Inquirer staff writer Donald Kimelman in Moscow contributed to this

LOS ANGELES TIMES
22 August 1985

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 1 part 1

Soviets Accused of Chemical Spying

U.S. Says Potentially Dangerous Dust Is Used to Determine Envoys' Contacts

By NORMAN KEMPSTER, *Times Staff Writer*

WASHINGTON—The U.S. government accused the Soviet secret police Wednesday of planting a potentially cancer-causing chemical dust on American diplomats in Moscow to help track their movements and discover their contacts among Soviet citizens.

State Department spokesman Charles Redman said the United States "protested the practice in the strongest terms" to Soviet authorities, describing it as a blatant violation of diplomatic practice and a potential danger to the health of U.S. personnel.

In Santa Barbara, White House spokesman Larry Speakes said that "it's entirely possible" President Reagan will raise the issue when he meets Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev in Geneva in November. But Speakes said the meeting should not be disrupted as a result of the incidents.

Nevertheless, the dispute certainly will chill the atmosphere of the meeting, the first between a U.S. President and a Soviet Communist Party general secretary since President Jimmy Carter met President Leonid I. Brezhnev in Vienna in 1979. Speakes said that Reagan was informed of the incidents Monday.

Increased Usage

The Soviets have used chemical tracking techniques at least since the mid-1970s in Moscow and elsewhere, including at least one incident in the United States, a State Department official said. He said Washington decided to protest the practice now, instead of 10 years ago, because the use of the chemical was increased sharply this spring.

U.S. officials said they first learned of the potential health risks of the chemical, identified as nitrophenylpentadiene, or NPPD, within the last few weeks.

The prime targets for the chemical espionage apparently are Soviet dissidents and other who meet clandestinely with U.S. diplomats. The Soviet secret police, known as the KGB, presumably could consider the presence of the chemical on the person or property of a Soviet citizen to be evidence of a secret contact with a U.S. diplomat. Those found to bear traces of the chemical, which experts said could be fluorescent, could then be interrogated.

Dissidents Checked

The State Department would not say how suspects are chosen to be examined for traces of the chemical. However, observers here said all dissidents taken into custody for whatever reason might be routinely checked for its presence.

The State Department official said that the chemical is dusted on doorknobs, auto steering wheels and other places U.S. diplomats are likely to touch. Once a person is contaminated with the chemical, it is difficult to remove completely, he added, and KGB chemical tests can detect very small amounts of the substance.

The official said Washington "assumes" that the chemical also has been used against private American citizens, including journalists, and against other Western diplomats. However, proof has

Continued... been obtained... use against U.S. Embassy... el.

He said the United States is concerned about the political implications of tracking and about the potential health risks. But he made it clear that Washington decided to go public only after learning of the health aspects. Presumably, the United States kept quiet at first to avoid letting the KGB know what the United States knew about the Soviet technique.

The official declined to speculate on why the chemical's use coincided with Gorbachev's selection as top Soviet leader and added that the timing of Wednesday's announcement was not related to the November summit.

Not a Counterattack

Speakes insisted that the U.S. announcement was not part of a public relations counterattack against a Soviet propaganda blitz before the summit.

The usual relaxation of tensions that precedes summits had been notably missing even before the chemical dusting case broke because of a dispute over testing of anti-satellite and nuclear weapons. The Soviets called for a moratorium on testing but the Reagan Administration refused, arguing that the Soviets were ahead in both areas. The United States announced new anti-satellite and nuclear tests this week.

Speakes also said that Wednesday's announcement was not timed to detract from the announcement of the coming anti-satellite weapon test. "No connection whatsoever," he declared. "You're reading more into it than exists. We simply, once we got the facts in hand, felt that it was important that we proceed with protecting our personnel and

Continued

informing them of the exposure."

Redman said that NPPD "has been determined through biological testing" to cause mutations, or genetic changes. Chemicals that cause mutations in any organism often—but not always—cause cancer in humans. Redman said extensive tests, possibly lasting years, would be necessary to determine if the chemical is a carcinogen.

Could Cause Cancer

The State Department official said that NPPD is a "designer" chemical produced by the KGB especially for its use as a tracking agent. He added that there were no available testing data until U.S. scientists duplicated the agent to provide enough of it to be tested.

In Moscow, on Wednesday a State Department doctor briefed American Embassy staff members and U.S. citizens on the potential hazards of the chemical.

Although Congress is in recess, key lawmakers reacted angrily to the Soviet activity.

Sen. Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.), the Senate's senior Republican member, said: "I would go so far as to say if they are going to put chemicals on our people over there, subject them to cancer, that we close the embassy entirely if necessary. It's inhuman, it's barbarous, it's unreal."

Soviet Expulsions Urged

And Sen. David Durenberger (R-Minn.), chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, urged expulsion from the United States of all Soviet citizens "affiliated with intelligence."

"It is a step too far in the point-counterpoint between intelligence and counterintelligence activity," Durenberger said. "It reflects a cynical disregard of acceptable civilized behavior."

Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.), the Intelligence Committee's vice chairman, called the Soviet use of the chemical "outrageous and totally unacceptable." He urged the State Department to retaliate by "expelling some KGB agents who are masquerading as Russian diplomats."

Soviet 'Spy Dust' Called a Simple Compound

From a Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON—The Soviet "spy dust" used to track American diplomats may sound like material from a James Bond movie, but the compound identified as nitrophenylpentadiene, or NPPD, actually is so simple that "you could have undergraduates prepare it in a high school lab," one national expert on such substances said Wednesday.

Nicholas J. Turro, an organic photochemist at Columbia University in New York City, said the chemical is a straightforward variant of retinal, an organic chemical involved in human vision, with a chain of five carbon atoms attached to one end. The substance is very likely fluorescent, Turro said, and it almost certainly is a solid at room temperature.

The carbon atoms also probably make the chemical stick to fat molecules in the skin, said Turro and Robert Michaels, a scientist with the Natural Resources Defense Council in New York.

"The same proteins that latch on to retinal to make it important in vision could react with this . . . to make it stick to you," Turro said. "You could put it on the bottom of someone's shoe, and as they walk around they'd leave a little bit of it. It's like Hansel and Gretel, but instead of throwing around bread crumbs, you throw around this chemical."

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 2AWASHINGTON TIMES
8 August 1985

CIA and oversight groups reaching amicable terms

The third in an occasional series on congressional oversight of intelligence activities.

By Bill Gertz
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

Cooperation has improved between congressional oversight committees and the Central Intelligence Agency after a period of "tenuous relations" with CIA Director William Casey over the issue of covert CIA support for Nicaraguan resistance forces.

Following press disclosures in the spring of 1982 about CIA-supported operations, the House of Representatives passed legislation prohibiting support for anyone trying to overthrow the Sandinista regime. Later disclosures caused congressional support for the operations to evaporate.

Then, earlier this year Congress approved a \$27 million non-military aid package, but the CIA and Pentagon were barred from distributing the funds to the rebels.

Sen. Dave Durenberger, R-Minn., chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, said the Nicaragua episode from roughly 1981 to 1984 disrupted a long period of improved relations between Congress and the CIA. Beginning in 1981, trust between the Senate oversight committee and the CIA soured after the disclosures about Nicaraguan covert operations.

"That period of time was unfortunately characterized by the sort of tenuous relationship between the DCI [Director of Central Intelligence] and the Congress of the United States," Mr. Durenberger said in an interview in his Senate office.

He said the problem was that "Bill [Casey] was charged with running an overt, covert action and there was no way he could make a success of it."

"He treated us like we didn't know what were doing and we treated him like he didn't know what he was doing — it was not very good oversight," he added.

Sen. Durenberger characterized Senate oversight of the CIA during the early 1980s as "bring us your findings, covert action, your budget and when you get in hot water we're gonna have you in here and beat up on you," he said during a recent interview in his Senate office.

Since then, Mr. Casey and Sen. Durenberger have come to terms. After a series of conversations "about [Mr. Casey's] attitude, more than anything else, toward the process" of oversight, the Senate committee chairman feels a renewed "trust relationship" has been established.

Rep. Lee Hamilton, D-Ind., Sen. Durenberger's counterpart on the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, also agrees relations have improved since the public revelations of the Nicaraguan operations which he described as atypical of oversight.

Mr. Hamilton said the CIA failed to inform the House committee of "a number of things," but did not charge the agency with "bad faith" or of trying to deceive the panel because its members have a responsibility to "ask the right questions."

"If we don't ask the right questions, we don't get the right answers," he said.

He also believes the problem surrounding poor relations with the CIA over the Nicaraguan case was "attitudinal."

"The thing that frustrated the Nicaraguan problem so greatly was that we kept getting information from the media that we had not had from the Central Intelligence Agency," Rep. Hamilton said, recalling the rocky period of 1983 and 1984.

After checking news reports with the CIA, the agency would confirm details of the leaks to the House committee, he said.

"So," Rep. Hamilton said, "there developed a pattern of distrust, or a lack of confidence that they were in fact reporting to us all significant intelligence information."

The CIA's role in supporting rebels who planted mines in Nicaraguan harbors was a case in point, he said.

Under current U.S. law, the CIA is required to inform the two intelligence committees about all significant intelligence activity. Problems in the Nicaraguan affair arose over what was considered significant.

"Does the mining of a harbor constitute a significant intelligence activity? Does the publication of a manual which runs contrary to American policy constitute it? It does in my view — maybe it doesn't in somebody else's," Mr. Hamilton said.

Sen. Durenberger also mentioned the mining of the Nicaragua's harbors as one problem that caused partisan divisions on the normally non-partisan committee.

"There are no politics on this committee, except when nobody is told we are going to mine harbors," the senator said. "Then its every senator for himself."

The key to effective oversight is to develop a confident relationship between the CIA and Congress on the flow of information between the two entities, Mr. Hamilton said. Congress, for its part needs to back off the idea that everything the CIA does is "nefarious," while

the agency must overcome its reluctance to report to Congress unless arms are twisted, he contended.

Rep. Hamilton dispelled the notion that Mr. Casey created a "personality problem" blocking effective congressional oversight, as other congressmen have charged.

"I personally have a good relationship with Bill Casey and I think he has tried to keep the committee and me well informed," Mr. Hamilton said.

Herb Romerstein, a House Intelligence Committee staff member during the controversy over Nicaraguan covert aid, said the leaks about Nicaragua resulted in "considerable bad blood" between congressional oversight staff members and CIA officers.

One example is provided by Mr. Romerstein in a forthcoming paper on intelligence oversight. He writes that in 1983 the New York Times, quoting an unnamed Democrat on the House Intelligence Committee, falsely reported the CIA planned to march on the Nicaraguan capital and overthrow the Sandinista regime. The plot was allegedly revealed by Mr. Casey in a secret briefing.

The Times reporter corrected the story a day later saying the revelation did not come out of a briefing, but was mentioned by Mr. Casey as he left a briefing.

"This version was also false," Mr. Romerstein states. "This writer left the room behind Mr. Casey and no such conversation took place," he writes in the forthcoming book "Intelligence Requirements for the 1980s: Intelligence and Policy."

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 5-AWASHINGTON TIMES
30 July 1985

Hill oversight of intelligence shifts focus to effectiveness

This article is the second in an occasional series on intelligence oversight.

By Bill Gertz
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

In 1978, a team of intelligence experts with the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board competed with the CIA in analyzing Soviet strategic capabilities. They came to the startling conclusion that the CIA had been underestimating Soviet nuclear capabilities for a decade.

Angelo Codevilla, an intelligence expert with the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence until this year, said the committee's 1978 report on the competitive analysis, produced by the Subcommittee on Collection, Production and Quality, marked the beginning of a new period of congressional oversight.

He believes the findings of this so-called "A Team-B Team" report were an important first step in reorienting the congressional oversight process. Instead of attempting to uncover alleged abuses or place restrictions on intelligence-gathering activities, the oversight committees began to examine the quality of U.S. intelligence.

Mr. Codevilla said in a recent interview that the findings of the president's "B-Team" showed that intelligence quality must be checked. He compared the questioning of CIA estimates by outside experts with the congressional efforts to curb alleged abuses of the CIA in the mid-1970s.

"The greatest abuse that could ever have been perpetrated on the American people is to have them wake up 10 years after an event that profoundly affects their likelihood of staying alive and find that they missed it," Mr. Codevilla said of the B-Team findings of Soviet strategic capabilities.

Mr. Codevilla and other present and former intelligence oversight experts remain divided on how best to improve U.S. intelligence capabilities.

But interviews with congressional intelligence experts reveal that a fundamental shift in emphasis

has taken place in the last 10 years that has led to modest improvements in American intelligence capabilities.

Where congressional committees once sought to "legislate virtue" — as one former intelligence official described oversight — today's intelligence committee chairmen have begun to concentrate on improving the effectiveness of intelligence collection and analysis. In other words, instead of placing curbs on intelligence agencies, Congress today is more concerned with cost effectiveness.

Sen. Dave Durenberger, R-Minn., believes the solution to getting the taxpayers' money's worth out of the untold billions of dollars spent each year on intelligence is to establish a long-range strategy for the intelligence community.

A member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence since 1979, Sen. Durenberger was appointed chairman earlier this year. He does not agree with the prevailing philosophy of past years, which he characterized by the simple formula of telling the intelligence community "make sure you don't screw up."

"I think the best way to do oversight is to agree with the executive branch [on] what intelligence is all about, and [say] this is our long-range plan to build the world's best intelligence organization," Sen. Durenberger said in a recent interview.

Last week Sen. Durenberger's Intelligence Committee held closed-door hearings on what he refers to as long-range intelligence strategy. He hopes the hearings will lead the administration to target goals, objectives and resource investment for a 10-year or longer intelligence policy.

To improve intelligence oversight, Sen. Durenberger wants to prevent

"shifting resources every time the political panic button gets hit [and] you shift billions of dollars in commitment from one part of the world to the other part of the world. That's ridiculous," he said.

On the House side, Rep. Lee Hamilton, D-Ind., sees intelligence oversight as the only mechanism available outside the executive branch to check the administration's use of an enormous intelligence bureaucracy which churns out vast quantities of data.

Rep. Hamilton, chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, does not view the oversight process as a means of correcting abuses. His prescription for improving intelligence is to strengthen the analysis and collection components of intelligence and to do away with military and paramilitary covert operations.

"I look upon it as a means of trying to improve the intelligence product and to provide the executive branch with another set of opinions, if you will, about intelligence operations," Mr. Hamilton said in an interview.

Mr. Hamilton believes one of the "major questions" of oversight is cost effectiveness. He is not satisfied that the intelligence community has performed the best possible job for the amount invested.

"We are spending a very large amount of money, on intelligence, [and] it is not just a question of are you getting the intelligence, but are you getting it to the right people at the right time?" Mr. Hamilton said. "That's really the critical point. It doesn't matter how much mass of intelligence data you produce. The key thing is the analysis of that data and getting it to the policymakers or decision-makers at the right times so that it's timely, in terms of the decision-making process."

"I think we in the intelligence

committees and in the intelligence community have to spend an awful lot more time on the question of cost effectiveness," he said.

Regarding public perceptions of intelligence oversight, Mr. Hamilton said that "the media often mistakes oversight for oversight of covert action."

"Oversight is much broader than that and, if you look at the intelligence budget, only a very, very small portion of it goes for covert action — very small," he said.

The media, he said, tends to view all covert action as military and paramilitary operations, but "that represents a very small part of covert action."

"I'm talking about ... genuine intelligence work, as apart from covert actions, which really are not intelligence in the strictest sense," Mr. Hamilton said.

"If I were present at the creation, in [former Secretary of State Dean] Acheson's phrase, I'm not really sure where I would put covert actions," Mr. Hamilton said.

He feels "uneasy" that covert actions are conducted by the CIA, "but I'd be uneasy if they were conducted by the Defense Department. I don't know where you put them."

A widely respected intelligence expert, Mr. Codevilla believes the efforts of Sen. Malcolm Wallop, R-Wyo., along with Sen. Daniel P. Moynihan, D-N.Y., and others on the intelligence committees, succeeded in initiating some reforms of the agencies' analytical methods and counterintelligence controls.

"They developed an entirely different approach, based on the empirical proposition that the United States does not have a surfeit of intelligence," Mr. Codevilla said in an interview. "We have a variety of shortfalls, and any reforms should meet these shortfalls," he said.

Mr. Codevilla said the congressional and press "attack" on U.S. intelligence agencies during the mid-1970s grew out of internecine bureaucratic conflict within the intelligence community on resource allocation. What was portrayed as a fight over civil liberties was really a struggle between proponents of

detente and cold warriors over the agencies' reliance on technical systems — as opposed to human agents — for collecting and analyzing data.

"We built up our entire arsenal of technical intelligence wholly mindless that they are not working against nature, but against human beings," Mr. Codevilla said.

Mr. Codevilla described the conflict within the intelligence agencies over the integrity of technical intelligence as the "primary issue" dividing factions competing for resources.

"It has less than zero to do with civil liberties," Mr. Codevilla said.

As result of the intelligence community conflict, vast numbers of the most experienced Central Intelligence Agency personnel left the agency through voluntary and forced retirements in what Mr. Codevilla described as a purge of "old boys."

"This transformation of American intelligence occurred between '74 and roughly '78 during which time an estimated three-quarters of all supergrades in the CIA turned over — a huge turnover," Mr. Codevilla said.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 1-AWASHINGTON TIMES
25 July 1985

'Leaky' oversight committees frustrate foreign policy efforts

This is the first of several articles on intelligence oversight.

By Bill Gertz
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

In late 1981, President Reagan authorized covert assistance to the resistance forces in Nicaragua. Within months, the particulars leaked to U.S. newspapers, and a covert operation became overt.

Congressional support evaporated. The Marxist Sandinista government in Managua suddenly was awash in sentiments of solace and goodwill from America and the West.

The propaganda dividends are only just now diminishing.

The leaks surrounding the Nicaragua operation caused "serious divisiveness" between the CIA and the congressional oversight committees, disrupting a period of relative harmony that followed the anti-intelligence hysteria of the mid-1970s.

Gary Schmitt, who was minority staff director for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence until this year, says the Nicaragua leak illustrates the difficulty of conducting covert operations without a clear national consensus of what the nation wants its foreign policy to accomplish.

In particular, Mr. Schmitt sees the Nicaragua case as one example where the congressional oversight of intelligence played a major role in influencing the conduct of foreign affairs.

In essence, "only non-controversial findings remain covert," says Mr. Schmitt in a forthcoming paper on intelligence oversight.

Once public, whether disclosed by the White House or the Congress, congressional support for covert operations inevitably unravels. Under congressional rules, congressmen cannot discuss intelligence matters and are thus left to posture against leaked operations as a means of defense.

The president's freedom to maneuver with a variety of "special activities" — beyond diplomacy but short of sending in the Marines — is thus more limited.

Covert operations that have been blown by leaks include the Nicaragua operation, support for Afghan rebels through Egypt and China after 1979, support for political parties in El Salvador, support for Cambodian rebels after 1980, support of anti-Qaddafi forces in Libya and Chad, and support for anti-Khomeini exiles.

Mr. Schmitt, a former aide to Sen. Daniel P. Moynihan, D-N.Y., says that congressional oversight has, on the whole, been "uneven," and driven by events rather than policy and partisan.

Recently, Sen. Patrick Leahy of Vermont, the Democratic vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, announced that Democrats on the panel would conduct an independent investigation of stories of a CIA counter-terrorist training program in Lebanon among five other CIA operations.

The Leahy announcement was made the day The Washington Post published a report from Lebanon linking the CIA to a "runaway mission" by a Lebanese counter-terrorist unit that had bombed a building in a Beirut suburb. (The House Intelligence Committee later absolved the CIA of any links to terrorism in Lebanon.)

A short time later, Sen. Leahy, after accusing the CIA of not fully informing Congress of its Lebanon program — his suspicions presumably encouraged by the erroneous story in *The Post* — backed away from what had taken on the appearance of an investigation motivated by partisan politics.

Sen. David Durenberger, R-Minn., the chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, says the problem of partisanship in the oversight process only occurs "when covert action becomes overt."

"Pat [Leahy] had a camera in front of him and he had to say something," Sen. Durenberger said in an interview of the vice-chairman's

idea for a Democratic investigation. "He feels strongly about counter-terrorism, so he said it, and he backed off because he was in a little bit over his head."

Mr. Schmitt notes that the anti-intelligence hysteria of the '60s was the inevitable result of a breakdown in the post-World War II foreign policy consensus — a consensus dissolved by the frustrations and disappointments of the Vietnam War and the public disgust with government institutions in the wake of Watergate.

Many analysts trace the beginning of modern intelligence oversight to late December 1974.

In a series of front page articles in that month, *The New York Times* reported that the CIA had engaged in a "huge" domestic intelligence program in violation of CIA regulations against conducting business inside the United States.

The articles, citing "well-placed government sources," touched off a firestorm of congressional investigations. Eight days after the first article appeared, President Gerald Ford signed into law the Hughes-Ryan Amendment, restricting the CIA from conducting any operations without presidential approval — eliminating the reliable intelligence technique of "plausible denial." The intelligence agencies could no longer conduct covert operations that, if unsuccessful, would be denied, leaving the president out of it.

In addition, the law required the CIA to report to "all appropriate committees" — eventually eight legislative bodies. The law all but eliminated covert action operations through unauthorized press disclosures.

Besides the foreign affairs, armed services and defense appropriations subcommittees of both houses, which exercised what Mr. Schmitt called "de minimus" oversight since 1947, the intelligence agencies would also report to the newly created intelligence oversight committees, headed by Rep. Otis Pike and Sen. Frank Church, respectively.

Continued

The Church and Pike committees, formed in January of 1975, spent a year and half investigating the CIA and found evidence of domestic surveillance operations of individuals tied to foreign powers, assassination plans (notably against Fidel Castro and Africa's Patrice Lumumba), mail intercepts from suspected foreign agents, plans to infiltrate groups with foreign ties, and efforts to topple foreign governments.

Sen. Church's widely reported remark that the CIA was "a rogue elephant" set the tone for congressional oversight. In 1976 the Church Committee became the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, with Sen. Church as chairman, and a year later the Pike Committee became the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

Roy Godson, a professor of government at Georgetown University and an expert on intelligence issues, called the oversight of the mid-1970s the anti-intelligence "hysteria period" and described the Church committee "incredibly biased."

No intelligence service in the world has ever been subject to that kind of investigation, Mr. Godson said in an interview. "It had a crazy thesis — that covert action controls the whole of the intelligence community"

Mr. Schmitt describes the concept that a representative body such as Congress would attempt to reflect and refine public opinion on intelligence as "revolutionary."

"In fact this arrangement was not only revolutionary in the United States but the rest of the world as well; no other legislature had ever created such an entity" as congressional Oversight Committee, Mr. Schmitt said.

It wasn't until 1980 that the Intelligence Oversight Act reduced to two the number of committees the intelligence agencies were required to tell of their operations.

But the lack of consensus on foreign policy — and subsequently on intelligence policy — has left the oversight system "susceptible to sudden and sometimes disabling shocks," Mr. Schmitt says.

ASSOCIATED PRESS
13 July 1985

WEINBERGER, SENATE PANEL DISCUSS UNIFIED U.S. INTELLIGENCE STRATEGY
BY TIM AHERN
WASHINGTON

Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger met Thursday with the Senate Intelligence Committee to discuss development of a unified U.S. policy regarding what he called the much maligned but vital business of intelligence gathering.

After a 90-minute session behind closed doors Weinberger called the meeting constructive and useful.

He added that "intelligence frequently has been considered to be the kind of an unmentionable topic that somehow is a dirty business.

"Unfortunately, in the world in which we live it is a vital business," Weinberger said, "vital to our survival."

Committee chairman David Durenberger, R-Minn., said Thursday was the first time the panel had met with a defense secretary in its nine-year history.

One subject that did not come up was the current Navy spy case, in which four men have been charged with passing military secrets to the Soviet Union. Weinberger has described the case as causing serious damage to U.S. national security.

Durenberger said the Walker case deliberately was not discussed. He said it would be addressed later as part of a separate review of counter-intelligence efforts aimed at blocking Soviet efforts to recruit U.S. spies.

Durenberger has pressed the panel to come up with an overall intelligence strategy which would end disputes among the various intelligence agencies, including the Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency.

"A long-range strategy would have pinpointed the difficulties that we inherited in Central America," said Durenberger. "The shortfalls that we have experienced in our intelligence abilities in this vital section of the world might not have occurred in the first place or might have been anticipated and planned for."

Sen. Patrick Leahy, D-Vt., the panel's vice-chairman, said there had been "a great deal of concern expressed" by congressmen in recent years about "the quality of our intelligence (and) how we plan."

The meeting came a day after the Democratic-controlled House reversed itself and voted to renew aid to U.S.-backed Contras fighting the leftist Nicaraguan government.

Undersecretary of State Michael Armacost also met with the panel, but his testimony was interrupted by a vote on the Senate floor and will continue at a later time.

news release

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

STAT

WILLIAM V. ROTH JR. DELAWARE	LLOYD BENTSEN TEXAS
WILLIAM S. COHEN MAINE	SAM NUNN GEORGIA
ORRIN HATCH UTAH	THOMAS F. EAGLETON MISSOURI
FRANK MURKOWSKI ALASKA	ERNEST F. HOLLINGS SOUTH CAROLINA
AARON SPECTER PENNSYLVANIA	DAVID L. BOREN OKLAHOMA
CHIC HECHT NEVADA	BILL BRADLEY NEW JERSEY
MITCH MCCONNELL KENTUCKY	

ROBERT DOLE KANSAS EX OFFICIO
ROBERT C. BYRD WEST VIRGINIA EX OFFICIO

BERNARD F. McMAHON, STAFF DIRECTOR

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
JUNE 13, 1985

Senate Intelligence Committee
Hearings on National Intelligence Strategy

Senator Dave Durenberger (R-Minn.), Chairman, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, said today that had a long range national strategy for intelligence been in place at the proper time, past upheavals in the intelligence community could have been avoided. "If the true objectives of covert action had been thought through and articulated, the misunderstandings that have developed over this activity could have been avoided", Durenberger said.

"Regionally, a long range strategy would have pinpointed the difficulties that we inherited in Central America. The shortfalls that we have experienced in our intelligence abilities in this vital section of the world might not have occurred in the first place or might have been anticipated and planned for," Durenberger continued.

Durenberger also expressed concern that the lack of a long range national strategy could give rise to future difficulties. "Correctly handling the problems of terrorism, narcotics interdiction, and verification of future arms control agreements demands a well thought out, long range strategy if intelligence gaps are to be avoided and policy makers are to have the adequate and timely information their decisions require", Durenberger said.

Durenberger's comment was contained in an opening statement delivered at a meeting of the Intelligence Committee which marked the beginning of a series of hearings by that committee designed to establish a national intelligence strategy.

Durenberger went on to say that he believes the intelligence community itself will be far better able to make its case to a skeptical public and their representatives if it begins to articulate its plans in terms of an overall strategy, explicitly noting the relevance of plans and operations to national policy.

"At a time when the resources we can devote to national security are being increasingly strained, and the potential requirements of policy appear to grow every day, the Congress and the public must have confidence that our overall security policy is based on a sense of priorities envisioned," Durenberger said.

Durenberger said it was not possible to know today what conclusions the committee may reach at the end of these hearings. "We may find that the intelligence community is considering, and considering well, the kinds of questions about future investments that we begin to explore today," Durenberger said.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-20WASHINGTON POST
14 May 1985

Anti-Terror Projects Face Two Inquiries

Hill Actions Follow Beirut Bomb Report

By Charles R. Babcock
and Bob Woodward
Washington Post Staff Writers

The chairmen of both the Senate and House intelligence committees said yesterday that they will examine the Reagan administration's counterterrorism program following reports that CIA-trained Lebanese personnel instigated on their own a car bombing in Beirut that killed at least 80 people.

A Central Intelligence Agency covert support operation was canceled after the Reagan administration learned that the Lebanese had hired others to bomb the residence of a suspected terrorist leader, *The Washington Post* reported Sunday.

Rep. Lee H. Hamilton (D-Ind.), chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, said in a telephone interview that he started asking questions last week after a reporter contacted him about the CIA's connection to the March 8 car bombing. "I asked for a report on these matters and I expect to receive a full report," he said. "When you have units you do not control, obviously risks arise."

Sen. David F. Durenberger (R-Minn.), chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, said in a statement yesterday that the counterterrorism issue is high on his committee's agenda.

"The committee already has plans to take a detailed look at the intelligence community's policy and action on counterterrorism," Durenberger said. He indicated that that study "will occur out of the limelight," and only after the com-

mittee finishes its review of intelligence budget matters.

"Effective oversight of the intelligence agencies is possible only when the committee operates quietly, in a unified manner and in response to its own agenda—an agenda that is not set by *The Washington Post* or any other news organization," he said.

Sen. Patrick J. Leahy (D-Vt.), the committee's vice chairman, said Sunday that committee Democrats have started their inquiry into the CIA's counterterrorism program, the bombing incident and several other CIA operations, which he declined to identify.

White House spokesman Larry Speakes said yesterday: "That's our policy, of not commenting on any alleged intelligence matter. We point out that we do not undertake any activities—have not—that are inconsistent with the law and we meet our obligations under the law to report to Congress."

U.S. embassies were reported to be on alert for fear of anti-U.S. activity.

Administration sources have emphasized that the CIA had no direct connection with the March 8 bombing, and that when the Lebanese went off on their own, the counterterrorist support program was ended. The CIA issued a statement yesterday saying that the agency "never conducted any training of Lebanese security forces related to the events described" in the story and that the CIA "had no foreknowledge of the Lebanese counterterrorist action mentioned" in the news account. The statement added that the agency "scrupulously observes the requirements to keep all the congressional oversight committees appropriately informed."

Islamic Jihad, a shadowy group that is believed to be an umbrella for radical Shiite Moslem terrorists based mostly in Lebanon, has issued statements claiming that it has conducted two attacks to avenge the March 8 car bombing, one against a restaurant near Madrid frequented by U.S. servicemen. The explosion killed 18 Spaniards and injured 15 Americans, one seriously. The other attack is believed by some security experts to have been a blast on

March 29 in a Paris movie theater that was holding a Jewish film festival, injuring 18.

Several congressional sources have questioned whether the new heads of the intelligence committees had been fully briefed on the counterterrorism program and its cancellation.

Leahy said Sunday he wanted to look at several CIA programs he did not feel fully informed about to prevent a recurrence of last year's controversy over the mining of harbors in Nicaragua.

Meanwhile, Reps. Patricia Schroeder (D-Colo.) and Don Edwards (D-Calif.), members of the House Judiciary Committee, which has jurisdiction over terrorism issues, introduced a resolution yesterday that would require the CIA to provide the House with "documents and factual information" about covert support for counterterrorist units in the Middle East.

Edwards said, "The use of proxies to avoid executive order prohibitions against assassinations is fraught with problems . . . Such groups are inherently uncontrollable. With a license to kill from the United States government, they serve only to escalate the problems of international terrorism and further tarnish our reputation abroad."

Hamilton said that he also was concerned about whether the CIA's reported role in the car-bombing incident violated the ban that prevents the U.S. government from either direct or indirect involvement in assassinations, and whether the agency lost control of the situation by training foreigners to make the preemptive strikes. "These are major points that have to be looked at," he said.

In Beirut, a cabinet minister said he doubted that Lebanon would order an investigation into the reported car bombing. Education and Labor Minister Selim Hoss said the report will "soon be ignored" because the truth about the attempted assassination is not likely to come out. "We all know that such explosions are arranged by foreign services . . . because catastrophes benefit those who have an interest at stake," he said on Beirut radio.

WASHINGTON POST
13 Mar 1985ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-1

Sen. Leahy Is Probing Some CIA Operations

Counter-Terrorism Program Scrutinized

By Bob Woodward
and Charles R. Babcock
Washington Post Staff Writers

Sen. Patrick J. Leahy (D-Vt.), vice chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, said yesterday that he has begun an independent inquiry into a half-dozen CIA operations, including a counter-terrorism program that was canceled after an unauthorized car-bomb blast last March killed more than 80 persons in Beirut.

Leahy said he wants to know more about several sensitive operations and seeks more details on others about which he feels the committee wasn't fully informed.

"We're going to review six to seven operations on our own," he said.

Leahy said he did not know of the counter-terrorism plan in Lebanon, but when asked about it last month, he made inquiries "and found out about it on my own." He refused to give further details.

By law and by agreement with the Reagan administration, the chairmen and vice chairmen of the Senate and House intelligence committees are to be informed of all covert CIA activities. An administration source insisted that the committees had been fully informed, both orally and in writing, of all covert or otherwise sensitive operations.

The Washington Post reported yesterday that President Reagan approved the plan late last year directing the Central Intelligence Agency to train foreign teams to make preemptive strikes against terrorists.

The plan was rescinded after members of the unit hired others to set off, without CIA approval, a car bomb that killed more than 80 persons on March 8, the sources said. The target, a suspected terrorist leader, escaped unharmed.

"Things have fallen between the cracks," Leahy said. "I do not want my side to get caught on a Nicaraguan-mining type problem."

A CIA operation to plant mines in harbors in Nicaragua caused controversy last year because several members of the intelligence oversight committees claimed CIA Director William J. Casey had not told them enough about the operation.

Leahy said he feels Casey and other agency officials are willing to answer the committee's questions about any matter. But he said nothing is volunteered if the questions are not framed exactly right.

Leahy said he told other committee Democrats last week that the inquiry is needed because when he became vice chairman in January, he found that he did not know sufficient details of some of the CIA's most secret and potentially controversial operations.

He declined to identify the other operations.

Leahy said he told the Democrats he is committing his staff to the inquiry and might ask them also to provide staff assistance. The com-

mittee assigns staff members to individual senators.

Sen. Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) said yesterday that he was not able to attend Leahy's meeting of Democratic committee members, held last Thursday.

No staff members were present, Nunn said. He added that he would have no comment about Leahy's plan or The Post story.

Leahy said he has good relations with the Senate intelligence committee chairman, David F. Durenberger (R-Minn.), but feels it is necessary to proceed with his own inquiry.

Another committee source said, however, that Leahy and Durenberger have basic disagreements about the use of staff resources and the direction of the committee.

Durenberger could not be reached for comment yesterday. But he said in a recent interview that he hopes the committee will not have to spend much of its time dealing with controversial CIA operations.

He said he wants to shift the oversight role "from putting out fire to fire prevention."

Durenberger said that, in the past, about 90 percent of the committee's time has been spent on intelligence controversies and that he hopes to reduce that significantly.

Administration spokesmen continued to decline to comment on The Post story.

Secretary of State George P. Shultz, in Israel yesterday, said of the story: "I haven't seen The Washington Post today. I do have a very strong view about terrorism, as is well-known. I also have the view that at this stage, actions will speak a lot louder than words, so I don't have anything to say about it."

Shultz, who has made strong public statements about taking action against terrorists, said later that he has decided, for the time being, not to comment on the general subject of terrorism. While Shultz was in Jerusalem, several terrorist bombs exploded there and one was defused.

Robert Sims, deputy White House press secretary, told United Press International, "We never discuss intelligence matters." But he added that The Post story contained "a lot of speculation."

Continued

Sources have said Reagan ordered that only the chairmen and vice chairmen of the intelligence committees be notified of several covert operations undertaken late last year, including the antiterrorist training program in Lebanon. There is some question whether all the details filtered down when Durenberger and Leahy assumed leadership of the Senate committee in January.

Staff writer Don Oberdorfer contributed to this report.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 29

WASHINGTON TIMES
16 April 1985

Hill panel seeks to pull plug on Soviet spies

By Ted Agres
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

The Senate Intelligence Committee is attempting to find out how to unplug the Soviet "vacuum cleaner" to protect U.S. scientific and technological secrets, the head of the panel says.

Sen. David Durenberger, R-Minn., chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, told The Washington Times in an interview that one study will seek to evaluate security issues involving information transmission in the United States.

"We are sensitive to the fact that they [the Soviets] may have a greater capability [to eavesdrop] than we give them credit for in terms of how we communicate," Mr. Durenberger explained.

The Soviets, he said, use the "vacuum cleaner" approach to collect U.S. secrets.

Mr. Durenberger's comments follow closely a Reagan administration announcement that it was planning to equip hundreds of thousands of government offices with new, bug-proof "secure" telephones to counter electronic espionage.

Last month, the National Security Agency, which is responsible for, among other things, keeping U.S. government communications secure, announced that three U.S. firms had been chosen to build the new generation computerized scrambler telephones.

The three firms, RCA, AT&T and Motorola, reportedly will share a \$44 million grant to develop the new phones.

NSA said the new phones could be placed in up to half a million government and government contractor offices within five years. The scramblers, which will be about the size of a standard multi-

line office telephone, are expected to cost about \$2,000 each.

Government officials have said that U.S. secrets and sensitive information are being siphoned off by other governments, especially the Soviet Union. If an eavesdropper should intercept a conversation between two secure telephones, he will hear only a scrambled signal.

The situation with Soviet espionage has become so critical that last October President Reagan authorized the formation of a Cabinet-level group to attempt to counter it.

Mr. Reagan signed National Security Decision Directive 145, which established a Systems Security Steering Group to evaluate the problem and seek solutions. Members of the SSSG include the secretaries of State, Treasury and Defense, the attorney general, director of the Office of Management and Budget, and director of Central Intelligence.

An unclassified version of NSDD 145 released afterward stated that, "the compromise of [U.S.] information, especially to hostile intelligence services, does serious damage to the United States and its national security interests."

"A comprehensive and coordinated approach must be taken to protect the government's telecommunications and automated information systems against current and anticipated threats," the directive stated.

"This approach must include mechanisms for formulating policy, for overseeing systems security resources programs and for coordinating and executing technical activities."

The Cabinet-level steering group will oversee activities of a newly created, high-level Information Systems Security Committee, which is to focus on tele-

phone and computer security as two top priorities.

Later today, Senate investigators will hold hearings on the government's ability to conduct background security investigations for personnel cleared to handle sensitive information.

The Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations will look into the problems that have arisen. Sen. Sam Nunn, D-Ga., a member of the panel, was quoted as saying, "the government is already plainly incapable of adequately investigating and reinvestigating all persons seeking security clearances."

He added that the more than 4 million Americans who have security clearances are potential targets for the Soviet KGB.

The potential for electronic eavesdropping was highlighted recently when it was revealed that the Soviets had hidden bugs in about a dozen IBM typewriters in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow.

The tiny devices apparently detected the striking of individual keys and transmitted signals to antennas hidden in the building's walls, where the information was relayed to Soviet receivers.

A knowledgeable intelligence source in Washington told The Times that the incident highlights a horrible lack of

security at the embassy. But, the source added, the information that was compromised was not among the most sensitive that the embassy deals with.

High-level information is handled in special rooms designed to keep signals from leaking out, the source said. This technology of electronic containment is called "Tempest," and it involves placing copper shielding around typewriters, computer terminals or otherwise insulating the room.

Intelligence experts say that every communications device radiates weak electrical interference that can be picked up by sensitive electronic instruments called spectrum analyzers.

The interference patterns can be stripped away by computer to reveal the content of the message being handled, they say.

The NSA, which is based at Fort Meade, Md., about halfway between Baltimore and Washington, is trying to insulate its main operations building from electronic espionage.

Late last month, the agency told a House subcommittee it was seeking \$12.7 million to "Tempest-proof" its headquarters with an "electromagnetic envelope" to prevent spying.

In his interview with The Times, Mr. Durenberger also stated that the Senate Intelligence Committee will do a "long-term assessment of technology and, within that, a sense of technology security."

He said that some technology is inherently costlier in terms of security risks than other technology. He said that those factors haven't previously entered into the committee's long-range budget process.

"This obviously has some political judgment. To have a so-called security factor is important," he said.

The Minnesota senator also said that a similar study will be conducted regarding human intelligence, or "humint" as it is called.

"We're going to try to figure out why we are so weak in so many areas of humint," he said.

"We already know that we don't help the intelligence community think long-range in that regard; we don't educate and help them plan five years before there might be a problem, or 10 years before they are ever needed," he said.

UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL
14 May 1985

CIA DENIES INVOLVEMENT IN UNIT THAT RAN AMOK
By ELIOT BRENNER
WASHINGTON

The CIA says it did not train a Lebanese squad that reportedly hired people to rig a car bomb in Beirut that killed more than 80 people in March, but House members are asking for a review of the matter.

In a cautiously phrased statement, the spy agency Monday denied it trained special Lebanese "security forces" to work in counterterrorism, as was reported in The Washington Post Sunday and The New York Times Monday.

At the State Department, sources said U.S. diplomatic outposts have been warned to "be careful" about possible terrorist attacks because of the report, which said President Reagan had authorized a specific response to terrorist acts against the United States.

The CIA's statement also rejected allegations that it had not briefed congressional oversight committees on the connection with the Lebanese group.

Dave Durenberger, R-Minn., chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, said Monday his panel "already has plans to take a detailed look at the intelligence community's policy and action on counterterrorism" when it finishes with the fiscal 1986 intelligence authorization.

Reps. Patricia Schroeder, D-Colo., and Don Edwards, D-Calif., asked the House to order the CIA to inform the chamber about the training and support of covert terrorist units so the legality of such operations can be determined.

"What in the world are we doing using tax dollars to finance hit squads in the Middle East?" asked Schroeder.

Schroeder and Edwards are members of the House Judiciary subcommittee with jurisdiction over terrorism issues.

Rep. Sam Stratton, D-N.Y., said the allegations show, "What we were doing in that instance was to provide a form of retaliation and I think most of the citizens of the United States would feel that we should have retaliated."

But, "To suggest this is somehow OK for the Moslems and not for the Americans seems to be a tragic simplification," Stratton said.

The CIA's statement said it "never conducted any training of Lebanese security forces related to the events described" and it "had no foreknowledge of the Lebanese counterterrorist action mentioned in the article."

The newspaper reports said a March 8 car bombing in the Lebanese capital that killed more than 80 people and wounded hundreds of others was carried out by people hired by a Lebanese counterterrorism unit that had been working with the CIA.

Continued

The Post reported the bombing was directed at a militant Shiite Moslem leader who is "believed to be behind terrorist attacks on U.S. installations."

The Post quoted sources as saying that after the mission, "immediate steps were taken" by the CIA and the administration "to cancel the entire covert operation."

The bombing's apparent target, Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah, Shiite leader of the Party of God, escaped unharmed. U.S. intelligence reports have linked Fadlallah's group to attacks on U.S. Marines in Beirut in which more than 241 have been killed.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 5CHICAGO TRIBUNE
1 February 1985

Open CIA panels to public: Senator

It's not all secret, he says

By James O'Shea
Chicago Tribune

WASHINGTON—The new chairman of the supersecret Senate Intelligence Committee said Wednesday that he was confident the committee could hold a few public hearings to help "sow the seeds" of public understanding of the spy business.

"Clearly, intelligence must operate with the greatest degree of secrecy possible to preserve the secrecy of sources and methods," said Sen. David Durenberger [R., Minn.] after his first meeting as chairman of the panel that rides herd on the Central Intelligence Agency's budget.

"But there are some aspects of the process which might usefully be discussed a bit more openly," he said. "I am confident that, if handled with discretion and with an absolute commitment to avoid making comment simply for the sake of comment, a few public meetings of this committee could help sow the seeds needed for the growth of long-term public understanding."

The committee deals with many sensitive subjects, and Durenberger didn't specify what areas he would like to deal with in public hearings.

But in a separate statement, Sen. Patrick Leahy [D., Vt.], the new vice chairman of the committee, said during the next year the committee would deal with issues ranging from the CIA's well-publicized "covert war" in Nicaragua to such supersensitive areas as the adequacy of procedures to verify Soviet compliance with arms-control agreements.

"We will be expected to make a judgment for the Senate and ultimately for the entire government on the verifiability of any arms agreement. We cannot just wait until the President presents a treaty for ratification. The committee must follow the evolution of proposals at every step of the way, injecting its views at the time so the President can take them into account," Leahy said.

The committee has held public hearings in the past but only on legislation that it was seeking, a committee source said. It has not held hearings on intelligence matters, the source said, and he didn't understand what intelligence issues Durenberger referred to in his statement. "No matter what," he said, "classified information is classified information and can't be disclosed in public."

One issue that is expected to be aired in public is any administration request for funds to aid the Nicaraguan contras—about 12,000 to 15,000 rebels trying to topple the leftist Sandinista government in Managua.

Both Durenberger and Leahy indicated after an organizational meeting that the committee would try to dump the issue of Nicaragua into the laps of others.

In an interview, Durenberger said that so much has already been made public about the CIA's aid to the contras that the "covert war" is no longer a secret. He said its status makes it a proper subject for foreign policy, which could place the issue before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Leahy, too, said that Nicaragua no longer "fits into the normal mode" of the Intelligence Committee. "It has become a major foreign policy issue for the Senate and the whole country," said Leahy, an opponent of aid to the rebels.

Both Durenberger and Leahy said the Intelligence Committee's first order of business would be to deal with the administration's intelligence budget.

But Leahy said he and other Democrats on the committee are interested in several other areas, such as terrorism, the hardships or dangers faced by intelligence agents and problems with special operations, such as the Green Berets.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 26NEWSWEEK
28 January 1985

Confronting Congress

Reagan's new team faces a fresh congressional lineup.

For much of its first term, the Reagan administration provided a textbook lesson in congressional relations. Now—at a critical juncture for several major initiatives—the Reagan team will consist largely of new faces or old faces in new places. And Congress itself will have a different cast. Some House and Senate veterans will assume new responsibilities at the helms of the key committees that will confront such complex issues as deficit reduction, tax reform, defense spending and “covert” operations in Nicaragua. Among the new leaders:

Sen. David Durenberger: The Minnesota Republican, now chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, is soft-spoken, reflective and cautious. The outgoing chairman, Arizona Sen. Barry Goldwater, is brash, outspoken and caustic. So the most immediate change with Durenberger at the helm will be stylistic. “Durenberger will do what he does quietly,” says one Intelligence Committee staffer.

What he will actually do is far more open to question. On the first major issue confronting his committee—the administration proposal for continued aid to rebels opposing the Sandinista government in Nicaragua—Durenberger’s record provides few clues. Even he concedes that “it looks like I’ve been on all sides of this thing.” And in fact he has, opposing the covert operation at first, but reversing himself in September 1983 to vote for the aid. Disclosure last year that the CIA had been involved in mining Nicaraguan harbors angered him: “Indiscriminate use of mining gives people around the world the opportunity to say Ronald Reagan is crazy,” he said. The House has repeatedly rejected additional funds for the contras, and Durenberger appears ready to buck the White House, too. The aid, he says, is “helping to destroy the [congressional] oversight process” by undermining public confidence in covert operations.

At the very least, Durenberger intends to scrutinize CIA activities. He is no fan of William Casey, having described the CIA director in a recent Minneapolis Star Tribune interview as a “2 on a scale of 10.” Still, Durenberger says he has no intention of taking on Casey directly by seeking his resignation. “I told [Casey] I didn’t hire him,” he said. “I wasn’t going to try to get him fired.”

Durenberger is anxious to concentrate on what he considers Intelligence’s prime task: establishing control over U.S. intelligence activities. He is not enthusiastic about proposals that his committee investigate matters such as alleged atrocities by the contras in Nicaragua or reports that U.S. aid to rebels in Afghanistan is being misappropriated. “The headline business . . . is not my idea of what the committee ought to be,” Durenberger told The Washington Post. “If we spend the next two years investigating Afghanistan and the contras, we aren’t going to get the job done that we are expected to do.”

EXCERPTED

WASHINGTON TIMES
17 January 1985

Durenberger backs Contra aid

By Thomas D. Brandt
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

Sen. David Durenberger, the new chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee who has criticized the CIA program of covert aid to the rebels fighting to overthrow the Marxist government of Nicaragua, said yesterday that the United States should help the rebels openly.

Sen. Durenberger told The Washington Times in an interview that the Nicaraguan government is preparing an offensive this year to wipe out the Contra rebels.

Regardless of the outcome of that effort, however, Sen. Durenberger agrees with the Reagan administration that it is in the U.S. national interest to continue pressuring the Nicaraguans.

His disagreement with the White House is over the negative effects of CIA covert operations that now are well-known.

While Mr. Durenberger's view supports U.S. goals in that region, it could shift the debate in Congress away from covert operations and toward ways to press for democratic reforms in other nations.

The new chairman — a Republican from Minnesota — said he is eliminating all subcommittees, taking over all staff hiring, and taking the panel "back to basics"

because nine of the 15 members are new this year.

In Central America, however, he wants a greater U.S. investment in intelligence gathering to make up for years of neglect but a shift from "covert" to "overt" methods to achieve policy goals.

"I expect that someplace during the course of '85 that the Sandinistas — I mean they're already gearing up — will gear up to try to get rid of the FDN," he said. FDN is the Spanish acronym for the Nicaraguan Democratic Force, the main body of anti-Sandinista rebels.

"I expect that there will be some kind of an effort to try to move the FDN out," he added, citing as one example the acquisition by the Sandinistas of Soviet helicopter gunships.

When asked to compare his support for overt aid to his opposition to the Reagan administration's covert aid to the Contras, he said, "I just said don't use the CIA to do it. I'm all for supporting the Contras . . . overtly.

"That's where we come up against the problem of how would you do it?" He said one problem is that under international law open support for a military operation can be tantamount to a declaration of war.

Mr. Durenberger said he had no dollar amount in mind and that it was not his position to recommend details for an overt program. But at one point, he referred to the effect of U.S. military maneuvers in Honduras.

However, the CIA efforts have poisoned U.S. domestic support for Reagan administration programs in Nicaragua, the senator said. The CIA program also stiffened anti-U.S. sentiment among Nicaraguans and weakened the standing of moderates in the Sandinista government competing for power with the Marxists, he added.

He said that U.S. pressure was necessary to push the Nicaraguans into negotiations and democratic liberalization and that he would support an overt program with that goal even if the FDN were out of the picture.

Mr. Durenberger, who met privately this week with the Reagan administration's special envoy to Nicaragua, Harry Shlaudeman, said he did not know if the White House planned to change its strategy in Congress and ask for an overt aid program due to resistance to a resumption of covert aid.

"That, I wish I knew. I don't know," the senator said.

Last year, Congress voted a freeze on funds for the Contras, pending additional votes early this year, with many observers on Capitol Hill believing the measure has little chance of clearing the Democratic-controlled House in particular.

Like Mr. Durenberger, the new chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, Rep. Lee Hamilton, D-Ind., is

critical of the covert CIA program against Nicaragua that started in 1981.

Sen. Durenberger said that whether the administration uses covert or overt pressure should be decided on the floor of the Senate and that he does not want to "politicize" his committee with hearings seeking to build a record against covert aid.

Even if there were not a Sandinista push against the Contras, the senator added, "I would support it [an open aid program] just to support the negotiations . . . I think they [the Sandinistas] still worry a lot about us.

"Even eliminating — if they were successful in eliminating the FDN — it wouldn't relieve all their worries. Every time you move 3,000 [U.S.] Army National Guardsmen into Honduras, it will worry them sick. You always have some negotiating power there, but you need enough to push them into realistic negotiations, to deal with us or with the Contadora."

The Contadora is a regional peace negotiation, led by Panama, Mexico, Venezuela and Columbia, that has

Continued

2.

sought accords for removing foreign military forces from the region, securing the sanctity of national borders and stopping the flow of arms across borders.

"Every time something goes wrong down there, whether it's Teddy Kennedy and his atrocity line, or whatever it is, the American public confuses the policy with the CIA," Sen. Durenberger said.

Although there are bilateral negotiations between Sandinista officials and Mr. Shlaudeman and efforts on the Contadora process, "the front page news is something about atrocities, or something about manuals," he said.

Some senators have called for hearings on allegations of atrocities committed by the FDN within Nicaragua. Another controversy erupted in Congress last fall over a CIA-produced manual for the Contras that some observers claimed advocated political assassinations.

Because of the anti-U.S. sentiment built up over the CIA operations, Mr. Durenberger said the moderates in the Sandinista hierarchy "aren't calling the shots anymore. When it comes down to deciding who goes to the meetings and who gets to sign off on the proposal, or whatever it is, the Borge-Arce kind of faction is the strong one."

He was referring to Tomas Borge Martinez, minister of the interior, and Bayardo Arce, a member of the

Sandinista directorate, both viewed as Marxist-Leninist hardliners.

"All they needed was to put an

Uncle Sam mask on their problems and they confused the people enough," Sen. Durenberger said.



Photo by Richard Kozak/The Washington Times

Intelligence Committee Chairman David Durenberger

ARTICLE APPEARED
PAGE A-30WASHINGTON POST
18 January 1985

Panel Chairman to Fight Contra Aid

Rep. Hamilton Backs Leadership on Covert Program

By Charles R. Babcock
Washington Post Staff Writer

Rep. Lee H. Hamilton (D-Ind.), in his first public statement as new chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, said yesterday he will stick with the House Democratic leadership's effort to block covert CIA aid from anti-Sandinista rebels in Nicaragua.

He said in an interview that he will schedule a series of closed hearings on the Nicaraguan covert aid program, including an inquiry into reports that the Central Intelligence Agency is channeling aid to the rebels through third countries, such as Honduras, El Salvador and Israel.

Rep. Joseph P. Addabbo (D-N.Y.), chairman of the House defense appropriations subcommittee, wrote Secretary of State George P. Shultz last week that such action would be "a rather devious contravention of the law." Hamilton said he didn't know if the reports were true.

The hearings on Nicaragua also will cover alleged atrocities by the Nicaraguan "contras," reports that U.S. military equipment is being transferred by the CIA to Afghanistan, and the possibility that the CIA evaded congressional spending limits, he said.

"If they want to come back and make a fight, there'll be a fight," Hamilton said of Reagan adminis-

tration plans to continue to push for \$14 million in additional funding for the contras. Congress cut off the aid last year. If the administration asks for twice as much money, Hamilton said: "I'd oppose it, maybe doubly hard."

The 20-year House veteran said he had heard reports that House Speaker Thomas P. (Tip) O'Neill Jr. (D-Mass.) was asking Democrats interested in serving on the committee to promise to oppose the Nicaraguan covert aid. Eight of the 14 committee members are being replaced, and about 100 members are said to be interested.

Sen. David F. Durenberger (R-Minn.), new chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, has announced that he opposes continuation of the covert aid program in Nicaragua.

Durenberger has suggested that he would support some form of overt assistance to the rebels as a way of keeping pressure on the Sandinistas.

Hamilton said yesterday that he is willing to listen to administration proposals for alternatives to the covert aid program.

"I think the covert action type you have in Nicaragua, a paramilitary action, diverts the entire intelligence community so that it is not able to perform as well its function of intelligence analysis," Hamilton said. "It becomes a divisive matter. The top leadership of the

CIA diverts a disproportionate amount of time to covert action, and intelligence-gathering suffers."

Hamilton said his agenda for the committee also includes an examination of the nation's ability to verify any arms control agreement with the Soviet Union, including President Reagan's "Star Wars" space-defense proposal.

Hamilton said he will work to repair the strained relations between the CIA and Congress, damaged last year by revelations of the agency's mining of Nicaraguan harbors and preparation of "assassination" manuals for the guerrillas.

While saying he has "a good relationship" with CIA Director William J. Casey, Hamilton added that the job should be filled with an intelligence professional rather than a political appointee. When asked whether he would tell President Reagan that he should replace Casey, Hamilton said, "I don't want to comment on that."

He refused to comment on a Washington Post report that the CIA's secret aid to insurgents in Afghanistan has become the largest item in its covert aid budget. But he said he plans to have the committee review all the CIA's covert action programs.

In a related matter, Paul Reichler, an attorney representing Nicaragua in its World Court case against the United States, said in an interview that an independent probe has obtained 200 signed affidavits from Nicaraguan victims or witnesses of human rights abuses by the contras.

Reichler said the affidavits are "a devastating indictment not only of the contras but of U.S. policy there" and will be used to bolster Nicaragua's suit seeking a World Court order against the contra program.

*Staff writer Joanne Omang
contributed to this report.*

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-11WASHINGTON POST
12 January 1985

Chairman Aims to Make Panel More Professional

Probe of Atrocity Charges May Come Later

By Joanne Omang
Washington Post Staff Writer

Investigations into charges that Nicaraguan rebels commit atrocities or that U.S. aid to rebels in Afghanistan is vanishing might come "later on," but the new Senate intelligence committee will have several other things to do first, Chairman David F. Durenberger (R-Minn.) said yesterday.

Tops on his priority list is "professionalizing" the committee's nine new members and the staff so as to take them out of the newspapers and away from rehashing past mistakes, and to put them into controlling future acts of the intelligence community, Durenberger said.

"If we spend the next two years investigating Afghanistan and the 'contras' [in Nicaragua] we aren't going to get the job done that we are expected to do," Durenberger said in an interview. "These are on the list of things we'll explore later on . . . but the idea that all of us will be in the headline business overturning wrong is not my idea of what the committee ought to be."

Sen. Patrick J. Leahy (D-Vt.), the panel's vice chairman, called last month for a probe of charges that rebels who have been fighting Nicaragua's leftist Sandinista government with U.S. aid for three years have engaged in murder, rape, torture and other atrocities against Nicaraguan civilians.

Sen. Gordon J. Humphrey (R-N.H.) has set up an ad hoc task force of senators and House members to evaluate the way U.S. policy in Afghanistan is being implemented. Humphrey has expressed concern about reports that as much as 90 percent of covert U.S. aid to

rebels fighting the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan disappears before it reaches the guerrillas. An aide said Humphrey had hoped that either the intelligence or Foreign Relations committees would look into those reports.

He said as much as \$400 million may be involved. "Since the committees are reluctant, we will do it through the task force," the aide said. Hearings are planned later this month.

Durenberger said he is hopeful that other intelligence committee Republicans will support his opposition to renewed Central Intelligence Agency aid to the Nicaraguan "contras." "The program is helping to destroy the [congressional] oversight process" by undermining public confidence in the legitimacy of covert operations, he said. "As long as that little poison remains, we're going to have troubles."

However, Durenberger added, probing the rebels' behavior is another matter. "I'm not real anxious to spend a lot of time being conned by a lot of Nicaragua propagandists" charging rebel atrocities "when I can't get at the human-rights violations by the Sandinistas," he said.

Durenberger added that documenting atrocities probably would be possible but would chart no new waters. "I deplore it, but I predicted it three years ago when this program started," he said.

He acknowledged that Reagan administration officials have asked for alternative proposals for pressuring the Sandinistas to make political concessions. "I said to [former national security affairs adviser William P.] Clark three years ago I wasn't hired to come up with the ideas—that's your responsibility," Durenberger said.

He has repeatedly made clear his opposition to the Sandinista government, suggesting last month that the administration consider ways to apply military pressure in an overt manner. Several members of Congress have said they may propose withdrawing diplomatic recognition from Nicaragua and passing a law to permit open backing for the resistance forces.

"You have to draft a policy that implements U.S. law," Durenberger said. "If the administration doesn't give us any alternative to the CIA program, there will be serious problems."

Law prohibits the United States from seeking the overthrow of any government with which it maintains diplomatic relations, and bans spending to overthrow the government of Nicaragua.

Durenberger said that, contrary to rumor, he expects to retain most of the intelligence committee's staff and to permit each one to be the "designee" of a committee member. But he said some of the nine new senators will have to accept staff aides as their designees, because "the staff is going to be much more professional and much less honed by the members than it has been."

He said he will expect staff members to labor for the committee 90 percent of their time and keep their senators informed on current issues the other 10 percent, devoting no time to speechwriting, casework or floor statements not related to intelligence activities.

He also said he opposes a pending recommendation from a select committee on Senate reorganization to consolidate the House and Senate intelligence committees.

"You wouldn't consider a joint ethics committee. That's like intelligence—they're both superspecially nonpartisan; you bend over backwards to take politics out," he said.

Durenberger was quoted in a recent interview with the Minneapolis Star and Tribune as saying that CIA Director William J. Casey is a "2 on a scale of 10." But the chairman said yesterday he would not ask for Casey's resignation.

"Nope. I told him I didn't hire him and I wasn't going to try to get him fired," Durenberger said.

ARTICLE OFF
A-1WASHINGTON TIMES
10 January 1985

Senate intelligence panel a hurdle in move to aid Nicaraguan rebels

By Thomas D. Brandt
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

The Republican-controlled Senate Intelligence Committee is drawing fire from conservatives who say it is a center of resistance to the Reagan administration's final push for congressional approval of aid for the rebels fighting Nicaragua's Marxist government.

Conservative sources in Congress have told The Washington Times that under Sen. David Durenberger of Minnesota, the Republican chairman, and Sen. Patrick Leahy of Vermont, the Democratic vice chairman, they expect the intelligence committee to reorganize itself and also schedule hearings that will work against the president's program in Central America.

The growing power over foreign affairs, and most recently affairs in Central America, has so raised the profile of the committee, once a congressional backwater that most members avoided because its mostly secret work had no home state impact, that 15 Republicans and 22 Democrats are said to have asked to be put on it this year.

Conservative sources point to a number of developments that weaken their voice on the critical panel. Majority Leader Robert Dole, R-Kan., turned down the request of Sen. Malcolm Wallop, R-Wyo., and others who wanted a waiver of the panel's eight-year membership rule so they could continue to serve.

A broad new study of Senate rules last month recommended such a waiver so the panel would not lose so much expertise at one time; nine of its 15 members are departing this year.

Mr. Durenberger opposed that waiver which, had it been granted, would also have applied to Sen. John Chafee, R-R.I., who by seniority would have then assumed the chairmanship instead of Mr. Durenberger.

Both Mr. Durenberger and Mr. Leahy have criticized the Central Intelligence Agency's covert support for the "Contras," the rebels fighting the Sandinista government of Nicaragua.

(This is also the view held by Rep. Lee Hamilton, D-Ind., the new chairman of the House Intelligence Committee.)

The intelligence committees oversee all U.S. intelligence operations, including the CIA, which has been supporting the Contras since 1981. Sometime after March 1 both houses will vote whether to continue that funding, which ran out last September. This vote is the focus of White House lobbying.

Administration figures are said to be preparing a report describing a Nicaraguan arms buildup and the nation's ties with Cuba and the Soviet Union as part of the administration effort to persuade Congress that Nicaragua is reducing civil liberties and becoming a growing threat to its neighbors.

Over the last two years the Senate panel has switched from support for the Contras to hostility because of a growing belief that the Contra purpose now exceeds U.S. policy objectives.

A committee summary of its work in 1984, released this week, was highly critical of the CIA and said its "inadequate management and supervision" of the Contras contributed to the loss of support in Congress for the program.

For his part, Sen. Durenberger has said he wants to continue pressure on the Sandinista government, but he swas CIA support for the Contras erodes rather than enhances Central American support of U.S. policy there.

Over the last few days, some conservatives say, prospects have dimmed for Mr. Reagan's policies.

Mr. Wallop believed he had Mr. Dole's commitment to the waiver that would have kept him on the committee, and when he did not get it he wrote an angry letter to the leader. On the Senate floor last Thursday, Mr. Dole told Mr. Wallop it was difficult to get an exception for him because work was under way on eliminating most exceptions.

"Sen. Wallop was greatly upset over the means by which he was removed from the committee while being assured that such was not the case," said one Republican senator who spoke only on the grounds that he not be identified.

Mr. Wallop has said he was particularly concerned that the com-

mittee was listening more and more to the CIA establishment that tends to favor technical information collection, while Mr. Wallop has called for more agents, with better protection, in world trouble spots.

Other changes under consideration by Mr. Durenberger are equally vexing to conservatives, who support the Reagan administration's view that the Contras are crucial in putting the military pressure on the Sandinistas to force them to move toward democracy.

Though no decisions have been made, according to a spokesman for Mr. Durenberger, he may eliminate the "designee system" whereby each committee member could appoint his or her own person to the committee's staff, which currently numbers about 41.

Instead, the chairman may appoint a professional staffer to each of the areas under the committee's jurisdiction — one for Nicaragua, another for arms control, terrorism and so forth — according to an aide to the new chairman.

Though Mr. Durenberger has asked for the ritual letter of resignation from everyone on the staff, most will not be accepted and the chairman "does not envision a house cleaning," according to his office.

However, conservatives see an anti-Reagan design because the proposed changes would consolidate power over staff under Mr. Durenberger and would make it more difficult for the new conservatives coming on the panel — such as Republican Sens. Orrin Hatch of

Utah, Chic Hecht of Arizona and freshman Mitch McConnell of Kentucky — to place men of women of their own choosing on the staff.

However, some staff holdovers have already left, including staff director Robert Simmons and Angelo Codevilla, who was Sen. Wallop's designee but by some accounts also the most effective and most forceful advocate of President Reagan's Central American policy.

On Tuesday, Mr. Codevilla was told

2.

to have his desk cleaned out by 5 p.m., he said. Another source on the committee said it appeared that Mr. Codevilla was removed quickly and with no notice so he could not appeal the decision to other conservatives on the committee.

If a staff member leaves the committee, he must obtain a new security clearance, which requires about 60 days time.

"The real point is what Durenberger is doing in taking control of the committee is turning it into a battering ram against the president's policies, primarily in Central America," according to a committee source who is familiar with the maneuvering over the changes.

Conservatives see their declining influence on the budget for the CIA as another example of the erosion of their power on the committee.

Budget review of the CIA and other agencies in the intelligence community is a major responsibility of the committee, and this process is usually where the panel performs most of its "oversight" responsibility.

While a Durenberger spokesman said only that budget procedures are under review, several conservative sources say they believe he may eliminate the budget subcommittee so additional budget authority can be consolidated under the chairman's office.

And, finally, conservative sources said they expect Mr. Durenberger to hold hearings early this year to investigate charges of atrocities committed by the Contras. If these allegations are proved to public satisfaction, they say, the administration's policy will be further undermined.

Mr. Durenberger's office said that no hearings are scheduled.

Roger Fontaine contributed to this article.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 1AMINNEAPOLIS STAR AND TRIBUNE (MN)
16 December 1984

Durenberger claims CIA is in disarray, lacks public trust

By Steve Berg
Staff Correspondent

Washington, D.C.

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is "disintegrating" because the Reagan administration insists that the agency continue to run a secret war in Nicaragua that is not secret, Sen. Dave Durenberger, R-Minn., said last week.

CIA Director William Casey "has no idea that his agency is going down the tubes," said Durenberger, who, unless he is out-manuevered by a curious mix of his fellow senators, will inherit the chairmanship of the Senate's Select Committee on Intelligence when Congress convenes next month. He would be the first Minnesotan to head a full congressional committee in 10 years.

Durenberger's unflattering assessment refers more to poor morale within the spy agency than to its effectiveness, he said. The CIA's visible hand in running the *Contra* fighters in Nicaragua has created "serious morale problems" in an agency designed to operate under cover,

Durenberger said.

Only Casey, and perhaps his top deputy on covert action, are in favor of the CIA continuing to play a lead role in Nicaragua, he said. "The responsible people in the agency don't want anything to do with it."

The senator also warned that public trust in the CIA and other intelligence agencies is beginning to erode, as it did in the mid 1970s after CIA figures became embroiled in Watergate, and after congressional investigators uncovered CIA plots to assassinate world leaders.

"We're getting close to a crisis trusting Ronald Reagan and his administration in how they use (the CIA)," he said, citing the Lebanon bombings, the harbor minings in Nicaragua, and the issuance of a manual to *Contras* that suggested that government figures be "neutralized."

Durenberger blamed conservative politicians — including President Reagan's national security advisers

— for forcing the CIA into the daylight in Nicaragua, thereby jeopardizing its morale and, to a lesser extent, its effectiveness. The politicizing of the CIA began when Reagan took office and "the right wing began undermining the entire intelligence process," he said.

Durenberger avoided criticizing Reagan directly. He agrees with Reagan's general policy that a Marxist regime in Nicaragua is intolerable, but he disagrees with the CIA's role there.

"I don't expect Ronald Reagan to go to bed every night trying to figure this out. That's why he has advisers that should have been designing some alternative," he said.

Troubles within the CIA have spilled over into Congress, Durenberger said. Oversight — the process by which the secretive intelligence agencies are made accountable to the public — has "broken down" into political bickering and is "dead in the water," Durenberger said. "We started going after each others' throats ... now, we don't do anything."

Durenberger's remarks, in an interview, followed by two weeks his announcement that he would oppose more money for the covert war in Nicaragua. That announcement was meant to warn the administration that it cannot again approach Congress seeking to "sell a disintegrating agency" as a vehicle for either containing or overthrowing the Sandinistas, he said.

Instead, the administration must devise a more creative policy — perhaps above-board military aid or a concerted military effort by other Central American countries.

He invites such an alternative, he said, one that would return the CIA to its primary function of covert intelligence gathering. So far, the ad-

ministration seems not to understand that Congress will not continue to pay for a CIA-led war, he said.

If he becomes chairman, Durenberger said, he and his two closest allies on the committee — Sens. Bill Cohen, R-Maine, and Pat Leahy, D-Vt. — will set out to "get (the CIA and the committee) out of politics and back to overseeing the quality of the production and analysis of intelligence."

Before he can take on the secret world of the CIA, however, he must survive another clandestine and intriguing struggle, this one with colleagues in the privacy of the Senate. For complexity, its plot may be worthy of the best spy literature, the kind in which events are seldom what they seem.

In John LeCarre's famous novel, "Smiley's People," for example, an aging snoop reminds the hero, "It's not a shooting war any more, George. It's grey. Half-angels fighting half-devils. No one knows where the lines are."

In the oblique parlance of intelligence, Durenberger is searching for the lines these days. "It's a mess," said a Durenberger aide. "No one knows what's going on for sure."

To begin with, there's a Senate rule. To ensure that senators don't get too chummy with the CIA, five of the 15 members of the intelligence committee must rotate off the panel every two years. Moreover, no senator can serve more than eight consecutive years.

The rotation has never been enforced. But, since the committee is now eight years old, the question arises whether to enforce the eight-year service limit. Enforcing it would push many of seasoned members off the panel at a time when, arguably, the intelligence community is poised on the edge of a crisis in public confidence.

Continued

If the rule is enforced, Durenberger, as the senior remaining Republican, rises to the chair. If it is not, Sen. John Chafee, R-R.I., becomes chairman.

Although a liberal Republican, Chafee has been friendlier toward the CIA's efforts in Nicaragua. He wants a permanent committee or, at least, an extension of the eight-year limit.

Rob Simmons, the committee's staff director, is a Chafee ally. He agrees that inexperienced new members would be a mistake. The rotation rule "will degrade the oversight process," he said.

Durenberger said he will replace Simmons if he assumes the chair.

Add to this a proposal by Sen. Dan Quayle, R-Ind., to dump the current committee and form a joint intelligence committee with the House.

In all this, Durenberger and Chafee each have unlikely allies. Some of the Senate's most conservative members may back Durenberger because they want seats that would open up on the committee. Entrenched members, notably Sen. Daniel P. Moynihan of New York, the ranking Democrat, may back Chafee.

If the matter goes to the Senate floor, Durenberger may have to rely on Democratic votes; thus, perhaps, his hard-line stand against the Reagan administration's use of the CIA. Last week the Democratic caucus supported the rule.

It may not get that far, however. Incoming Majority Leader Robert Dole may simply decide whether to keep the rule and, thus, who will be chairman. Both Durenberger and Chafee backed him for leader. So far, Dole has not tipped his hand.

Neither has the administration, which has given Durenberger no clue as to whether, because of his criticism, it will oppose his aspirations.

Although ultra-conservatives within the administration oppose him, others may have concluded that the CIA war in Nicaragua is a "dead horse," Durenberger said, adding that he doubts the administration will play a strong role in the matter.

"I suspect it has already been decided by realities," Durenberger said. "We've got more important things to argue about."

Dole promised him nothing in exchange for his support for majority leader, Durenberger said, but he "clearly left me with the impression that he was more inclined to let the rule operate."

If Durenberger does take charge of the committee, he proposes to install a "more professional" staff and to steep new members in a more scholarly approach to the historic, cultural and religious backgrounds of the regions most closely watched.

He claimed that he can "work around" the animosity that has developed between many senators and Casey. Sen. Barry Goldwater, R-Ariz., the outgoing chairman, twice called for Casey's resignation. And Durenberger called Casey a "two on a scale of 10."

Said Allan Goodman, a foreign affairs specialist at Georgetown University, "Oversight is as good as the personal relationship between the committee and the director of Central Intelligence."

On other agenda items, Durenberger said:

■ He favors preemptive strikes against terrorists based on information supplied by U.S. and allied intelligence agencies. CIA agents, however, should not be the killers, he said.

Secretary of State George Shultz has recently proposed such preemptive strikes. The agencies are on a thin line, hoping not to be "pushed over into being a Mossad (the Israeli intelligence agency), where they are actually going out to do the killings in advance," Durenberger said. "They don't want to be the killers. They don't want to get dragged into that old stuff again. Their job is intelligence gathering," he said.

In many regions, the United States may have to rely on shared intelligence and a multinational anti-terrorist strike force, he said. The CIA may lack the "talent" to penetrate terrorist groups headquartered in the Bekaa valley of Lebanon, for example. "They are much like the Mafia and it's hard to penetrate that kind of a family," he said.

■ He favors retribution against terrorists after their attacks, either by American or allied agents.

Referring to the hijackers who recently diverted a Kuwaiti plane to Iran, he said, "They ought to know

that the minute they step off the airplane, they're marked people. Even if they make it off in Iran, that they may not live out the year, that somebody's going to get them. They know that with the Israelis. But not the Americans. Every one of those idiots (terrorists) has got to know that they don't have a license to kill," he said.

It's clear that the United States is strong in its electronic surveillance of the Soviet Union but needs to place much more emphasis on old-fashioned human espionage in the Third World, he said.

■ That he's unsure whether to insist that the CIA retrace its analysis of the attempted assassination of Pope John Paul. In light of recent evidence that the Soviet Union may have been involved in the plot, some observers have become alarmed that the CIA was quick to agree with the Soviet KGB that it had no part in the attempt.

■ That although he favors a political solution in Nicaragua, those hopes seem to be dimming and military action by surrounding countries against the Sandinistas may be inevitable.

"El Salvador, Honduras, Panama, Costa Rica and Guatemala cannot live with a Cuba stuck in their midst," he said. "And it's a question of time and means before they do something about it."