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DCI/IC 3852-81

DAMI-CIS

27 AUG 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, CRITICAL COLLECTION  
PROBLEMS COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: CCPC Study on Technology Transfer (U)

1. (U) Reference is made to your memorandum, 5 August 1981, DCI/ICS 81-6253, subject as above.
2. (U) The following information responds to the points in paragraph 2 of reference:

a. (S/NOFORN) Extent of analytical and collection effort - Although time did not permit a canvass of Army's overseas intelligence analytical efforts, we estimate that our analytical effort is between two and three man-years. About half of this effort is devoted to technology transfer considerations in the context of larger studies on foreign technology. The other half is devoted to COMEX/COCOM opinions. As an example, so far in 1981, the Foreign Science and Technology Center (FSTC) has processed 214 COMEX opinion requests and rendered 190 gain/loss assessments. Beginning about two years ago, we have been including the following questions in relevant collection requirements:

(1) (U) What are the technological deficiencies of the communist countries being reported on?

(2) (U) What technology, equipment or information are they likely to try to obtain?

(3) (U) What technology, equipment or information have they obtained in the past? From whom or via whom? When?

(4) (U) How well will the communist country be able to assimilate and use the technology, equipment or information?

(5) (U) What impact will (or has) this technology, equipment or information have (or had) on their military capabilities?

We note that only recently have solid results begun to be seen from the resulting collection efforts; probably a reasonable lag time for new collection

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CLASSIFIED BY: Chairman, CCPC

REVIEW ON: 4 Aug 2001

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initiatives. We cannot estimate the amount of collection effort expended, since it is largely integrated into the overall Defense technical intelligence collection program.

b. (U) Types of information being used - In addition to the results of the collection requirements noted above, there is an increased effort to review all intelligence reporting to include open source literature for technology transfer implications.

c. (S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) Collection elements involved - The emphasis is on HUMINT collection resources under Army control from both the positive and counterintelligence aspects. Counterintelligence is particularly good means to determine the efforts of hostile intelligence services directed against US research, development, test and evaluation activities. Others would include those collection activities selected by DIA to respond to Army's requirements, e.g., the Defense Attache System.

d. (C) Analysts opinion concerning adequacy of information - Generally, our analysts see an improvement in the quality of technology transfer data being reported. This largely results from their own initiatives in directing the collection systems. As the process of reporting and analyst feedback continues, there should be further gains although this is a slow process dependent in someways on the priorities of the analytical/collection activities involved.

e. (S/NOFORN) Key information gaps - Two information gaps are mentioned for which there may be reasonable solutions. First, with regard to Warsaw Pact visitors, students and commercial, there is no effective feedback from their hosts regarding their areas of interests and emphasis. Feedback of this sort could be very helpful in satisfying the requirements previously stated. In the same vein, our analysts are not receiving information on all COCOM cases, both by the US and by other COCOM members. License disposition and details would be very helpful in keeping track of transfers made and those planned. Since dual use technologies represent a particularly significant impact from a Defense point of view, concentration on this point could yield extremely important insights.

f. (S) Options for improvement and recommendations - First, there should be a statement of goals that the US Government wishes to achieve with regard to technology transfer. These goals should then be considered in light of the operating mechanisms that control the legal export of technology both by law, e.g., Army Export Control Act, and by functional responsibility, e.g., State Department Office of Munitions Control. We should also consider the adequacy of counterintelligence resources to protect illegal

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transfers. The intelligence analytical, collection and counterintelligence resources can be given priority tasking to determine our current state of technology loss, that is, a damage assessment and to determine where future foreign collection efforts are likely to concentrate by type technology, by collection method and by most probable target. It is then necessary to orient our law, our controlling agencies and our limited protective resources toward keeping our technologies of national significance within confines of sharing that are acceptable to the US and our interests in strong allies.

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