

## YEARS OF CRISIS: 1956

ANNOUNCER: At this time CBS Radio presents the eighth annual year-end report by CBS news correspondents who have gathered in New York from their posts around the world. Seven members of this distinguished team of reporters are meeting today with Edward R. Murrow to bring you this analysis of the year's major news developments. Now, here is Mr. Murrow:

Mr. MURROW: This has been a year of crisis, but not the crisis any of us foresaw. Last year we were sitting here looking forward to lessened tension. Atomic stalemate had been achieved. Universal war was ruled out. But, what's happened? There have been two big explosions. And, both have been almost incredible. One was in the Middle East and one in Middle Europe. One tore the Western alliance apart, and it even brought the United States and the Soviet Union together for a moment to snuff out a local war in Egypt. The other produced revolutions in Poland and Hungary that did the impossible. They proved that tanks and machine guns can't crush civilians set on winning freedom.

My colleagues and I have come in from the storm centers and propose to examine, for the next hour, what's happened this year and why--what the meaning of all this is. What do you fellows think really happened this year?

First, Howard K. Smith, our chief European correspondent:

Mr. SMITH: Well, I think that 1956 may be remembered as the year that tension relaxed so much that fighting broke out all over the place.

Mr. MURROW: Richard C. Hottelet, who is based in Bonn and who has just returned from Poland and the Hungarian frontier:

Mr. HOTTELET: I believe that this year has put an end to Communism as a world revolutionary force.

Mr. MURROW: David Schoenbrun, our Paris correspondent:

Mr. SCHOENBRUN: This has looked like the year of the turning of the worm. All around the world little people have turned on their mentors or their tormentors in a kind of global epidemic of revolt.

Mr. MURROW: Dan Schorr from Moscow:

Mr. SCHORR: It seems to me this is a year that Russia gained a foothold in the Middle East and lost her footing in her own backyard.

Mr. MURROW: Winston Burdett, whose base is in Rome but who has spent the last two months covering Suez:

Mr. BURDETT: I think this was the year that the pattern of postwar politics fell apart.

Mr. MURROW: Next, Bob Pierpoint, who came home from Tokyo by way of Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan:

Mr. PIERPOINT: It was a year in which Asians worked quietly at trying to get along with each other and then found that when they could, the West couldn't.

Mr. MURROW: Eric Sevareid, the chief of our Washington bureau:

Mr. SEVAREID: I would say that this was the year Americans began to wake up from their cozy dream of peace at bargain-basement prices.

Mr. MURROW: All right, gentlemen, that's what happened. How did the whole thing start?

Dan Schorr, suppose you begin.

Mr. SCHORR: Well, Ed, the key event happened last February in Moscow; the Party Congress proclaiming deStalinization. In the period of confusion and uncertainty that followed, Tito made a bid for Communist leadership. There were some puffs of steam in Russia herself. The long pent-up pressures began to explode all over the satellite countries. The lid blew off in Poland in the Poznan riots last June. That lid is now back on, but insecurely; then, Hungary, in October, where the lid is still off.

Mr. MURROW: Hottelet, how about Hungary?

Mr. HOTTELET: Well, the Hungarians asked for the same things that Poland had won. They wanted to throw out the Stalinists and ease the dictatorship. But in Hungary the Stalinists hung on just a little too long, perhaps only twenty-four hours too long. The people demonstrated; panicky police fired on them. The people blew up in a rebellion that is still not ended today.

Mr. MURROW: Well, just a moment, gentlemen. While this revolt was erupting, what did the rest of the world think about it? Did people grasp what was going on?

Hottelet, the Germans were right there on the border--

Mr. HOTTELET: Indeed, and they were scared stiff. In fact, the West Germans did everything they could to persuade the East Germans not to revolt.

Mr. MURROW: Schoenbrun, how about the French?

Mr. SCHOENBRUN: Ed, they were torn between their desire to help the Hungarians and their fear that it might start World War III.

Mr. MURROW: Burdett, how about the Italians?

Mr. BURDETT: In Rome there were demonstrations of rejoicing, and bricks were thrown at the Communist Party headquarters.

Mr. MURROW: Pierpoint, what did people in Asia say to this eruption in Middle Europe?

Mr. PIERPOINT: In the beginning, Ed, not very much, because Eastern Europe is just too far away. But eventually, even Nehru's India came around to criticizing the Russians.

Mr. MURROW: And, Severeid, how did Washington react?

Mr. SEVAREID: Well, perhaps one measure of our surprise down there is the fact that our ranking diplomatic emissaries were absent both from Poland and from Hungary when all this happened.

Mr. MURROW: At this very moment when all the world was watching the revolt behind the Iron Curtain, another explosion went off in the Middle East. The Israelis invaded Egypt, and the British and French prepared to land at Port Said.

Burdett, you were in Israel; how did it all begin?

Mr. BURDETT: It began more than a year before when Nasser made his first arms deal with the Communist bloc. The Israelis sat and watched the Russian-made MIGS and tanks and munitions pour into Egypt while Nasser boasted that he would destroy them. They felt their survival was at stake. For a year they weighed the pros and cons of preventive war. In October Nasser was deep in conflict with the West; the United States was deep in her Presidential elections. Things seemed right, and the Israelis struck.

Mr. MURROW: Smith, why did the British decide to move in?

Mr. SMITH: Well, there're two versions of that, Ed. The authorized version of the British Government is they wanted to stop hostilities and prevent a conflict from spreading. The unauthorized version, which, I think, is accepted by most people now, is that the British feared Nasser would use his grip on Suez to menace British vital interests, so they felt that his grip had somehow to be broken.

Mr. MURROW: Schoenbrun, what caused the French to move?

Mr. SCHOENBRUN: The same thing that moved the British--Nasser. The French felt they had to knock him over because he was the main source of supplies and encouragement to the rebels in Algeria.

Mr. MURROW: Well, you gentlemen seem to agree that the nationalization of the Suez Canal is the thing that really triggered off the Mid-East crisis. What made Nasser pull the trigger?

Burdett?

Mr. BURDETT: Well, that was an act of violent defiance of the West, Nasser's reply to America's public withdrawal of its Aswan Dam offer one week before. For Nasser, that was an insult and humiliation. His prestige in the Arab world demanded a swift, dramatic answer.

Mr. MURROW: Severeid, what did they say in Washington about the Aswan Dam decision?

Mr. SEVAREID: Well, it's complicated, Ed, but in some--publically, it was said Egypt was a poor credit risk; privately, that this kind of aid would be feeding what we decided was not, after all, a pleasant puppy but a kind of a cub lion.

Mr. MURROW: Well, now, specifically in your areas, who gained and who lost by it?

What would you say, Burdett, about the Middle East?

Mr. BURDETT: In the Middle East everybody lost something--the British, the French, the United States, the Egyptians, and even the Israelies; everybody except the Russians. Some will say that Israel, at least, gained something. Israel's short term gain was in time. She knocked Nasser's new Soviet weapons out of his hands before his army had learned how to use them. But, what Israel lost by her attack was perhaps more important in the long run for a little country whose main problem is survival. She lost the prospect and possibility of peace; that is, of a final settlement with the Arab states. Israel's isolation in the Middle East was never so total as it is today.

American prestige in Arab countries stands high at this moment because, to their surprise, we condemned Israel and broke with our British and French allies when they invaded Egypt. In Egyptian eyes we take the credit for compelling the British and French to withdraw. However, our popularity of the moment is a fragile thing to set against the general collapse of the West's position.

Those who have gained are the Russians. They have discovered their ability to upset the Mid-East balance of power. A new alliance was born between Arab nationalism and Russian policy; and this alliance, fed by Communist

arms and Communist trade deals, gives the Russians almost endless possibilities for building fires in the Middle East.

Mr. MURROW: Howard Smith, did the British gain anything in this adventure?

Mr. SMITH: Well, in the case of the intervention in the Suez, Ed, I'm afraid the whole account for the British has to be written in red ink as a total and historic loss. The canal that Britain acted to secure is blocked because of Britain's action; the oil pipelines that Britain depends on are blown up and dry; the economic crisis that Britain sought to avoid is upon her since the substitute oil she has to buy from the States is eating up her limited reserves of dollars that are needed for other things. The British Commonwealth has been shaken; the Atlantic Alliance may never recover its spirit of mutual trust; the British nation itself is bitterly divided; and, as Burdett indicated, Britain's position as a power in the Middle East has gone up in smoke. I think it's fair to say that Britain truly climbed way out on a high limb and carefully sawed it off.

Mr. MURROW: Schoenbrun, how did the French come out of all this?

Mr. SCHOENBRUN: Very badly, Ed. They lost one of the most desperate gambles in their history, and they lost oil which will put brakes on France's expanding economy just when it seemed that a real boom was in prospect. Perhaps the greatest loss of all may, in the long run, turn out to be a gain. For, the French lost more than a battle in Egypt. They lost an illusion, an illusion that's been blinding them for the entire twentieth century--the illusion that France is still a great imperial power. But, that's a dream world of the nineteenth century which has now been shattered; and I think that's a great gain, for mental health begins with an acceptance of reality.

Mr. MURROW: Dan Schorr, what kind of balance sheet would you make up for Russia?

Mr. SCHORR: A definite net loss, I'd say. Last February the Party Congress confidently proclaimed a policy of deStalinization at home and many roads to socialism for the satellites, competitive coexistence for for the rest of the world. Buoyantly they launched their Five-Year Plan to catch up with the U. S. economically. The whole sense of confidence was reflected in the faces of men like Khrushchev and Bulganin when I'd meet them at the Kremlin. But a couple of weeks ago when I saw them, they looked anxious and depressed. From February's Party Congress to December's Central Committee meeting, that whole rosy dream of a Communist future had blurred and turned into their nightmare. The carefully blueprinted transition to a sort of safer and saner form of Communism after Stalin had got out of hand; developed its own momentum, and revealed unexpectedly violent forces; threatened the disintegration of this empire that the Russians were trying to turn into a commonwealth.

Mr. MURROW: Is that all that you have to say on your balance sheet, Schorr?

Mr. SCHORR: It's about all, except I would add that looking at it from our point of view, there's a great bounty in all of this, but a bounty so cloaked in peril for us that I hesitate, I hesitate to say so far that it's a net gain for us.

Mr. MURROW: You're reserving judgment, right?

Mr. SCHORR: I'm reserving judgment, yes.

Mr. MURROW: Dick Hottel, who gained and who lost what in Middle Europe?

Mr. HOTTELET: On balance, I think the West has gained in Middle Europe. In Poland and in Hungary the system of Soviet Communism has been seriously and maybe finally weakened. In Hungary a whole nation rose and did what we all had said was an unthinkable...It showed that courage and sacrifice are for a great time at least a match for tanks and bullets. This demonstration is a beacon for all the peoples in the Soviet bloc and a warning to Moscow that the time of automatic obedience is past. The Hungarians, perhaps, went too fast and too far. The Poles, on the other hand, with great restraint have wrung from the Soviets an almost incredible degree of freedom. Poland is today a satellite in name only.

Mr. SCHORR: It doesn't look that way from Moscow.

Mr. HOTTELET: Oh, Khrushchev and Molotov found that out when they came to Warsaw in October and were slapped down, defied, and humiliated then.

Mr. SCHORR: Well, it seems to us that Gomulka is still very much the Communist's man.

Mr. HOTTELET: Well, he's the Communist's man in Russia, perhaps, but certainly not in Poland, not in terms of the system, not in terms of military power. And, I think, the Poles showed their independence by breaking up the whole eastern economic structure of the Five-Year Plan, throwing that into a cocked hat.

Mr. SCHORR: Well, the Russians were ready for that.

Mr. HOTTELET: They may have been ready for it, but it's one thing to accept something because you have no choice and another thing to set it going. And, the Poles are the initiators in this whole thing.

No, I think, Dan, that Poland is not a satellite. Of course, it's surrounded by Soviet power. It's got the Red Army in its country, and the

Poles can't afford to antagonize or provoke the Kremlin unnecessarily; but they have asserted their desire for national independence; and they are discarding not only Stalinism but Marxism as well and seeking their own way to a better life.

And this experiment in freedom that's going on in Poland has had its corrosive effect in satellite East Germany. Young people there are beginning to ask questions, and the Party is afraid, afraid to make concessions. Instead, it's dug in behind threats and Stalinist doctrine, and Soviet occupation troops in the Soviet Zone have been enormously reinforced.

As to gains, I think on our side, in the heart of Europe, the most important fact is that West Germany has remained stable politically and economically; and in its dealings with Western nations, it's shown itself to be a good neighbor and a good ally.

Mr. MURROW: Bob Pierpoint, you operate in Asia; what gains and losses out there?

Mr. PIERPOINT: Communist China and the United States both gained during 1956, Ed. Britain, France, and Russia lost. Early this year, perhaps following Krushchev's line from Moscow, Communist China began a carefully planned campaign to convince a skeptical world that China today is a progressive, peace-loving, law-abiding nation. By the end of this year that campaign had proved so successful that Communist Premier Chou En-lai was invited on a series of friendly state visits throughout Southeast Asia, including, I might add, a stop-over in Pakistan, a member nation of the American-created SEATO Pact. In Japan there's frank talk today of more trade and closer relations with Communist China.

But the United States also gained: friends, prestige, and influence. The action of America during the Egyptian crisis both surprised and pleased the Afro-Asian bloc. America demonstrated for once that it is willing to oppose imperialism, a great gain in colonial-conscious Asia.

As for Britain, France, and Russia, they merely proved what the Asians have long maintained--that imperialists will act like imperialists when the chips are down. Britain and France lost even more prestige in Asia than Russia because Hungarians are not Afro-Asians; they're white people. But Russia lost, too.

Mr. MURROW: Sevareid, what about gains and losses in this country?

Mr. SEVAREID: Obviously, Ed, the Dodgers and the Democrats didn't do very well. In fact, I would think it quite possible that Yankee and Republican preeminence and domination may continue for a good many years.

I think the President both lost and gained. He gained stature in a

sense of world popularity, chiefly because the French, British, and Russian leaders threw their own away. In terms of the alliance he is leading, it's no longer really a unified command; it's kind of a combined command that is breaking up its old formations and doesn't yet know how to reform its ranks. The President gained new moral prestige with the loose grouping called the Afro-Asian block, but at the price of participating in the political weakening of our strongest allies--a process, of course, of which they, not he, are chiefly responsible.

I wouldn't say, as some do, that isolationism has gained in this country. I would say that the concept of America as a world mediator and a moral proctor has gained over the concept of America as the active, determined leader of the West, and maybe that could become a way-station to neutralism.

Most of us in this country certainly gained in our supply of health, wealth, and equality. We lost, I hope, in the supply of our illusions. I think fewer of us believe the peace of the world will be automatically kept by the combination of virtue and H-bombs, and maybe that's a gain; but not if it's replaced by another illusion: that the peace will automatically be kept by the combination of moral force and the United Nations. I would think that short of world government, and we're far short of that. Peace will not be preserved unless the vital strength of the peaceable nations is preserved; that means our allies' as well as our own. It's true that might does not make right, but it's also true that right does not always make might.

Mr. MURROW: Well, I shall try to sum up what you gentlemen have said, and I hope that I can make it right. It's a very difficult assignment with such divergent points of view, but it seems to me that you gentlemen have compiled a rather strange profit and loss account. It shows more losses than gains.

The biggest gain was Russia's gain of power in the Middle East, but that was offset by the Russian defeat in Poland and Hungary. Here the Soviet Union's military and economic power were sapped, and left-wing sympathies the world over were forfeited.

The United States lost much power in the weakening of the Western alliance; but it gained some prestige, particularly in the Afro-Asian world. In exchange for British and French solidarity, we have Arab gratitude for as long as such gratitude lives. We have chosen to mediate rather than to lead. And, when we mediate between our friends and their enemies, we sacrifice some of the power of our friends which in turn means we sacrifice some of our own power.

Britain and France, as you gentlemen see it, won nothing at all. Israel, at best, won a little time. Poland and Hungary have escaped annihilation and have won a partial promise of independence. But still, it's only a promise, and the nuclear stalemate continues to hang over everything else and to



dominate it.

So, as you gentlemen see it, that's where we are. The question arises, how did we get here? What forces were brought into play?

Schoenbrun?

Mr. SCHOENBRUN: Ed, I think it was a case of too much too fast, just too rapid a change. As I see it, the world this year doubled up in the bends like a deep-sea diver who came up to the surface before equalizing pressures on him. And, I think that coexistence was responsible; that is, the relaxation of pressures on a world frozen into a two-block mold for ten years was just too much. When the pressures were released, the blocks began to break up: The Soviet block was the first to break because there the pressures were heaviest. And the Western powers were then caught unprepared. Concentrating on coexistence, the perpetuation of a status quo, we in the West did not have a policy to deal with the disintegration of the Soviet block. Moreover, our own Western block had begun to disintegrate itself with the sudden removal of Stalinist pressures upon us. Tiny Iceland, early this year, told America to go home. They thought they didn't need our air bases any more. All around the world, all of us have seen this happen, from Reykjavik to Rabat, from Warsaw to Budapest. We've seen it in Cairo, Tel Aviv, Singapore, and Hong Kong. Small nations and little peoples breaking their bonds or their allegiances and defying the great atomic powers.

Mr. MURROW: Dan Schorr, would you agree that it was this relaxation of pressure that set the whole thing off?

Mr. SCHORR: Well, yes and no, if I can put it that way?

Mr. MURROW: You can.

Mr. SCHORR: Let me explain it though. You could say that the explosions in the Soviet empire were the consequences of deStalinization. In fact, some of the more right-wing, or let me call them reactionary, Communist leaders have been explaining that in Kremlin councils. But, I think it's too simple. It's like blaming the valve instead of the built-up head of steam. I think it's a consequence not of three years of deStalinization, but the delayed result of thirty years of Stalinization. The new leaders may have opened the valve too little, too late. They may have made the mistake, as some Communists think, of releasing political controls a bit before improving the economic situation; in effect, letting people talk while they had too much to yell about. But the pressures were so intense that it's doubtful they could have been long contained anyway.

So, the main element was these thirty years of Stalinism. But there were others. The Communist regime fostered mass education. But having taught people to read, and to build machines, and to solve chemical formulas,

it found that some had also begun to think. And, that wasn't a part of the plan. And then, I think, a third element, and that was the feeling of national identity, the same nationalism that the Soviet's successfully exploited among the former colonial nations, turned against them in their own colonial empire--Hungary, Poland we've heard about, but even in the Soviet Union--the Latvians, the Lithuanians, the Georgians. Tito started it, I guess. Russia then tried to depolarize Tito by bringing him back into the family, only to find that it set up a terrific new polar attraction within the family.

Mr. MURROW: Dick Hottel, how would you explain what's happened in the Soviet block?

Mr. HOTTELET: The root causes go back a long way, Ed, as Schorr says; but the present crisis in the Soviet block started with the death of Josef Stalin, the one man strong enough to hold it together. With his death, his own international police network fell apart, and, just as in Russia, satellite leaders began to clear out the men who had terrorized them. The police grip relaxed; the fear of reprisal, in general, diminished.

Then last February when Khrushchev denounced Stalin, the Kremlin destroyed the appeal of Soviet Communism. The so-called "science of society" turned out to be only another word for dictatorship, and its promise of victory was highly doubtful. Many who had put their faith in it were left with nothing to believe. With more chance to look around and compare ideas, and, stripped of their illusions, the people became acutely aware of Communism's shortcomings. A glimpse of the truth had a dramatic effect on intellectuals, writers, news-men, and especially students. Suddenly, almost miraculously after so many years of suppression, they demanded freedom and government of, by, and for the people.

But, I think, to keep things in perspective, that it's important that we see one thing: what is shaking the Soviet empire today is an elemental force, the essence of man's history, an irrepressible striving for truth and self-expression. It is not a victory of Western policy. In fact, the Suez episode showed how little it was understood in the West, and how little credit Western nations may claim. At the very moment when the eyes of the world were on Hungary, Suez blurred the issue, paralyzed the West, and gave Moscow a priceless smoke screen behind which to act.

Mr. MURROW: Well, let's turn to the Middle East for a moment. Burdett, what factors brought about the situation there?

Mr. BURDETT: Ed, I think we got where we are in the Middle East largely because of an almost insoluble problem which we ourselves created--the problem of Palestine. Now we've been living with that problem and watching it grow for nearly nine years since Israel was created, and we have let it slide.

Mr. MURROW: You mean the problem of Israel?

Mr. BURDETT: The problem of Israel, and the conflict with the Arab states. And the fact that we've let it slide, it seems to me, is the reason why Israel went to war against Egypt this year. Unless I'm completely wrong, the Israelis attacked out of a desperate sense of insecurity. They saw Nasser building a lavish new army and new air force, and Israel waited in vain for a clear arms commitment by the West or a clear and binding guarantee of her borders. There's a great deal of argument as to whether Israel's position was really desperate. The fact is that she felt desperate. It became the ruling thought and obsession of her national policy that she would have to rely on her own strength alone. This fact the West failed to recognize. And Israel received from the West neither a firm guarantee nor an unmistakable warning that an attack on Egypt would be condemned and opposed.

We underestimated Nasser. We thought he was bluffing when he said he would go to the Russians for arms. When he did, we panicked and pressed on him our offer of hundreds of millions of dollars to build the famous Aswan Dam. Our eagerness gave Nasser his chance to play us off against the Russians and to blackmail us with the threat of accepting large scale Russian aid. We all know how it ended--the collapse of the Aswan negotiations, the breakdown of confidence, Nasser's furious reaction in nationalizing the Suez Canal, and then the Anglo-French invasion. One lesson that we've learned from it all, I think, is that we just cannot blatantly buy the Arab world over to our side.

Mr. MURROW: Do you think we've learned that lesson permanently?

Mr. BURDETT: I think that we've learned it in the sense that hereafter we will press our economic assistance on the Arabs less blatantly and with greater discretion and restraint. To that extent, yes.

Mr. PIERPOINT: Winston-- Winston, I would like to ask you, if we cannot buy the Arabs, why is it that the Russians have been so successful in doing so in Egypt and Syria with their arms' deal?

Mr. BURDETT: It's a psychological difference, I think, Bob. It's the West that the Arabs mistrust and they're hypersensitive to the conditions that we set down for our aid. As for the Russians, they're newcomers in the Middle East, and the Arabs think, naively, that they can outsmart them. As Nasser said to me when I interviewed him, "Russia has no history in Egypt, but Britain and France have."

Mr. SMITH: And I don't think really that there's any evidence that they have yet bought the Arabs.

Mr. MURROW: Well, the difficulty always in talking with Arab leaders,

as Howard will agree, I'm sure, and the same thing is true in Asia, is that it is quite impossible to substitute intelligence for experience. They have had no experience with Russian colonialism; and, therefore, they do not recognize that it exists.

Mr. MURROW: But, Howard, can you explain how the British got themselves into this mess in the Middle East?

Mr. SMITH: Well, that, Ed, is one of the year's best mysteries. I think the real objection to what Britain did in Egypt is not that it may have been immoral, but that it was impossible. The British say, and I think they say rightly, that America should not moralize about their attack on Egypt for America did almost the same thing in Guatemala a couple of years ago when an unfriendly government there seemed to threaten our interests on the Panama Canal. I think the British are right when they say that, but I think they missed the point. Politics is still the art of the possible in this imperfect world; and what America did in Guatemala was, moral or not, possible.

Mr. MURROW: Well, if the British action had no chance of succeeding, why did they do it, Howard?

Mr. SMITH: Well, it's only a theory I have Ed, but I think the answer is panic--panic and something else. The decision to invade Egypt was taken by the Conservative Cabinet. No British diplomat on the spot was consulted or advised; members of the Foreign Office permanent staff have told me that they were not informed. The Cabinet that made this decision consists of eighteen senior ministers. I think it's an essential fact that of the eighteen, ten are graduates of Eton. What I am getting at is: this is the aristocracy. Nine centuries after William the Conqueror, Britain is still ruled by the aristocracy of blood through the instrument of the Conservative Party as freely elected by a majority of the people of Britain. Now, they're a good aristocracy; and as long as things went reasonably normally in the world, they behaved all right. But in 1956 they got kicked around by the natives too hard, too often. They put Jordan, their little Arab ward, into the Baghdad Pact, and the Jordanians rioted and jumped right back out of the Baghdad Pact. Rebellious terror against them on Cyprus got nearly unbearable. But worst of all, Nasser, to whom Eden had conceded a great deal, refused to be friends and finally nationalized the Suez Canal and insulted Britain. The small, imperial, right-wing of the Tory Party, always angry at adjusting to the modern world, began to scream at their government, "When are you going to stand up to the natives", and "Stop being weaklings", and so on. The government panicked under this pressure. It began stocking the east Mediterranean with troops that it had had to use or else look doubly ridiculous for backing down. So, out of the frying pan, into the fire they leapt, shutting their eyes and hoping, like Mr. Micawber, that something would turn up. It didn't!

Mr. MURROW: Then you're saying that Suez was lost on the playing fields of Eton, but it's also necessary to say that for a period of three months, the British followed our lead, decided it wasn't good enough and then decided to do it on their own, isn't that right, Howard?

Mr. SMITH: That's roughly it.

Mr. MURROW: Pierpoint, about a year ago, we were sitting here talking about possible invasion of Formosa. Asia was supposed to be a powder keg. What happened to the keg?

Mr. PIERPOINT: The powder keg is still there, Ed, but for the moment, at least, the fuse has stopped burning. The Communist Chinese eased off their pressure. They even went so far as to offer Formosa's Chiang Kai-shek a new job as a vice-president of the People's China. This sort of thing happened in other areas of Asia too. In Laos, that tiny little country tucked away in the far corner of Indo-China, the government and the Communist insurgents are now holding meetings trying to form some sort of coalition cabinet.

To tell the truth, Ed, I don't think America can take much credit for this sudden peace in Asia. Although, right at the moment, we look pretty good in comparison to Britain, France, and Russia. Maybe that's merely because this year America just stood still while the other big powers moved backwards.

Mr. MURROW: Eric, what would you say about all this?

Mr. SEVAREID: Well, Ed, I don't want this to sound like hindsight, but I don't think it is really; because, if you look back over the last few years, you'll find that all kinds of people, including some of us at this table, had all kinds of recommendations for a decisive American policy in the Middle East; but it was never followed out, which now we are trying to do a little late. Anyway, for eight long years we and our allies have left this vacuum spread in the Mid-East from Turkey to India. Obviously, somebody was bound to try to fill it. And with all the great power and authority of the West, it never really insisted on a settlement between very weak and dependent countries like Israel and Egypt. As for the United States, we were willing to sign the 1950 tripartite agreement with Britain and France allowing action, outside the U. N. if necessary, to preserve Mid-Eastern peace; but, we were not willing to take that action last spring when the British asked for it. We were willing to see the British leave the canal zone two years ago; we were unwilling to arrange some counter balance. We were the ones who pushed for the Baghdad Pact, but we were not willing to join it ourselves. We were against Russia selling arms to Egypt; we were unwilling to do the same ourselves, nor did we give any concrete hope to Israel on such things as her rights of passage through Suez. In the showdown last summer, after the seizure of the Canal, we were willing in principle to put economic squeezes on Nasser but unwilling in practice. As to Middle Europe, I think this is

all with all of us hindsight, because everybody at this table did not expect a year ago what has happened this year and, of course, necessarily therefore, America made the mistake of not planning in ten long years for a policy in case there was this rebellion that nobody anticipated.

But I think we can be too hard on ourselves. There are some very fundamental things that we can claim considerable credit for. We did help produce this remarkable West European economic boom that has provided a constant contrast to all those people under the Russian boot in East Europe. And we did have the good sense to take a chance on Tito, in spite of a good deal of domestic quarrelling about it.

Mr. MURROW: And Tito was probably the best gamble that we have made in the post-war period, wouldn't you say?

Mr. SEVAREID: Up to now, one of them, certainly.

Mr. MURROW: Well, gentlemen, we've been rather juggling hemispheres here for the last few minutes, with some rather profound comments both fore and hindsight.

Any of you fellows heard any good anecdotes lately? People must have been talking about something other than crises. Where will we start?

Smith?

Mr. SMITH: Well, I spent part of the year in the Middle East and there was a story there--part of it I know was true; I don't know whether all of it was. The head of a British archeological expedition there said he was driving his jeep in the desert one day and there on the trackless horizon he spotted a car moving. He got out his binoculars and, sure enough, it was one of those Arab Cadillacs bought with oil dollars. So the British scientist pulled on his emergency brake and decided to wait this one out. Well, the Arab car crept all the way across the desert and came up to him and, bang, hit his jeep right on the fender. I'm not sure what it illustrates, but the sheik who was in the back seat is said to have pulled down the window and looked out and smiled and said in English, "Sorry--inexperienced driver. He always loses his head in traffic."

Mr. MURROW: Well, another illustration of the lack of consistent policy, right?

Mr. SCHOENBRUN: He's a French driver.

Mr. MURROW: Hottelot?

Mr. HOTTELET: Well, old Chancellor Konrad Adenauer may have been wanting to sum up the events of this past year when he said recently, "The good Lord

set limits to man's wisdom, but he did not limit man's stupidity. And, that's just not fair."

Mr. MURROW: Schoenbrun, there must be a good story in Paris.

Mr. SCHOENBRUN: Well, there is, Ed, but I don't think I can tell it on a family radio program. However, there was a political story over at the NATO meeting in Paris two weeks ago about a group of foreign ministers talking about critical times in which we all live. One of the diplomats--I think, actually, it was the Dane--said to a colleague, "If you had a choice, in what period of history would you liked to have lived?" And the other minister replied, "In Napoleon's time." When asked, "Why?", he said, "Because at that time, only one man thought he was Napoleon."

Mr. MURROW: I remember Ben Gurion saying to me in Israel that in that country you must believe in miracles in order to be a realist. I think he summed up Israel's position rather accurately.

Dan Schorr?

Mr. SCHORR: Well, Ed, I've used this one before, but I still like it. It's the one Russians tell about the three Hungarians who meet in Lubianka Prison in Moscow. And one of them asks a second one, "What are you in for?" The second says, "I was Pro-Nagy; how about you?" The second says, "I was Anti-Nagy." The third had been silent all this time; and they turned to him and said, "What about you?" And he says, "I'm Nagy."

Mr. HOTTELET: You think he's still there, Dan? Do you know where he is?

Mr. SCHORR: I think he's in Bucharest or in a villa right near Bucharest right now.

Mr. MURROW: Well, gentlemen, you may now relax, we've come to that point in our program where I am required to say that we will be back in thirty seconds after a pause for station identification.

Well, gentlemen, we've heard a few stories. What are some of the other things people in your area have been talking about?

Schoenbrun?

Mr. SCHOENBRUN: Well, over in Paris, mainly about how to keep warm, how to get gas and oil; but, also, about the magnificent performance of Ingrid Bergman in the French version of Tea and Sympathy.

Mr. MURROW: Dick Hottelet?

Mr. HOTTELET: Well, the West Germans have taken a leaf out of our book, Ed, and they've plunged into their election campaign even though election day is not until September 8. The speakers are speaking and the pollsters are polling. Everyone is feeling the pulse, taking the temperature, arranging coalitions; and all the results are different. For the next eight months, it will be an all too familiar picture of confusion.

Mr. MURROW: No one examining the grass roots?

Mr. HOTTELET: Or turnip tops, too.

Mr. MURROW: Bob Pierpoint?

Mr. PIERPOINT: In Japan, Ed, they are talking about juvenile delinquency. They've got trouble with young boys, who wear American Aloha shirts and ducktail hair cuts, and girls, who dye their black hair red and put on tor-reador slacks. The kids say their parents are old-fashioned--don't understand them; the parents are beginning to ask us what we do about our J. D. problems.

Mr. MURROW: Winston, what are they talking about in Italy?

Mr. BURDETT: The talk of Italy, Ed, is television. It's been the rage and revelation of 1956, and the girls who've walked off with the cash prizes on Italy's double or nothing quiz program are more honored and more talked about than Gina Lollobrigida.

Mr. HOTTELET: Don't boys win prizes?

Mr. BURDETT: Very rarely.

Mr. MURROW: Why should they?

Dan Schorr, what about Moscow?

Mr. SCHORR: Well, in Communist Russia, this may surprise you, people talk mostly about money--money and what it will buy--wage scales, and pensions, and consumer goods. The one item they most discuss is automobiles--how long you have to be on the list to get one, and where are all the new models that have been promised all these many years.

Mr. MURROW: How long do you have to wait on the list?

Mr. SCHORR: Officially, two years.

Mr. MURROW: Howard, what do you hear in London?

Mr. SMITH: Well, after Suez, I suppose they talk mostly about people, and this year it's been mainly two people who visited Britain: the Russian



lady discus thrower, whose fingers stuck to some 95¢ hats in a London store and almost fractured relations between Britain and Russia; and an American lady named Mrs. Arthur Miller, who spent the autumn in London making a movie but turned down the role of Lysistrata, the Greek woman who stopped war by withholding action.

Mr. MURROW: I notice that none of you mentioned war, except Smith, of course. Do you hear any talk of another world war, Schoenbrun?

Mr. SCHOENBRUN: Yes, Ed. In fact there was quite a war scare in Paris with a most extraordinary result. It caused panic-buying of salt. Someone spread the story that you can protect yourself from atomic radiation by sitting in a bathtub full of salt water and about half Paris is immersed these days.

Mr. MURROW: Have you really researched that when you say, 'half'?

Mr. SCHOENBRUN: I refuse to answer that question.

Mr. MURROW: Dan Schorr?

Mr. SCHORR: Why, I don't know in Russia about the magical properties of salt, but there's been some hoarding and panic-buying there, too. But, perhaps more important is, not since Stalin have the Russians been so nervous about the possibility of a war. They seem to sense from the new top line of their press that things are going badly for their government, that the leaders are in trouble trying to deflect the reaction by "whipping up" some kind of a war scare, or at least a cold war scare. When the Kremlin took its menacing position on Egypt, many Russians felt that this was partly because of desperation about Hungary. The Russians don't think their government wants a general war; they do think, however, that a calculated risk intended as a diversion from Hungary might turn out to be a miscalculation.

Mr. MURROW: Howard Smith?

Mr. SMITH: I think the British are too preoccupied with the aftermath of their little war to start thinking about a big one.

Mr. MURROW: Well, gentlemen, we've been talking about what happened and why. Now, where do we go from here? How does it look to you, Howard?

Mr. SMITH: Well, I believe, in a general way, we have to negotiate with the Russians as we've never negotiated before, however dirty their hands may be, to try to disengage them out of Eastern Europe, for that is Hungary's only hope of freedom and the world's chance of avoiding a war.

In the Middle East I think we should use our new-won prestige with

the Africans and Asians to try to pressure the Arabs into negotiating with the Israelies with promises of some substantial help of all kinds in return.

And in Europe I think we should do all we can to induce our British and French friends to forget dreams of retaining imperial influence or reviving it, and induce them to see their future in amalgamating with one another inside Europe. That way they could constitute a stronger unit than America or Russia and command much more respect from people like the Egyptians than they do today.

I think the situation, generally, is fraught with opportunities and dangers, as has been said; but my personal view is very optimistic. I think the opportunities far outweigh the dangers.

Mr. MURROW: Winston Burdett, what do you think we ought to do in the Middle East?

Mr. BURDETT: It's much easier to say what we should not do, Ed. The United States is in the game alone now, and, certainly, we must avoid slipping into the disastrous pattern of past dealings with Nasser. But, what will he do? Will he go back to the Russians for help in rebuilding his army, or in his need for economic help on a scale that only one country can provide, will he turn to the United States? Will he seek new prestige triumphs at the expense of the West, or will he concentrate on solving the immense problems of Egypt? I don't know the answers to these questions, and at the moment I don't think there are many people who do.

Certainly, in this coming year, we must keep striving with positive pressure on the Arab state for an Arab-Israeli settlement. I say that, even though I don't believe that we have the faintest chance of getting a settlement in 1957. In some ways, the problem is more acute and more dangerous than ever, chiefly, because the Russians are now actively in the picture. Israel is Russia's political ace in the Middle East. The Russians can always tell the Arabs that they are willing to pay the Arab price which is Israel's destruction; it is a price that the West can never agree to pay.

This year the local conflicts of the Middle East became part of a much bigger affair of the larger conflict between East and West. I think there's a big decision that this country must face up to in 1957. Perhaps we are facing up to it already--a decision to make known our readiness to move into the Middle East in force. The last thing the Russians want to see is American military strength securely based in that region on their southern flank. The only way we can hope to halt Russian penetration of the area, the only way we can get them to talk about a general Mid-East settlement, is by using our power--by letting them know that, if need be, we are ready to move in.

Mr. SMITH: You don't mean an invasion, of course. You mean just

establishing bases and filling those bases with troops.

Mr. BURDETT: Just that, precisely.

Mr. MURROW: Bob Pierpoint, what course do you prescribe for us in Asia?

Mr. PIERPOINT: At the moment America stand almost alone with relatively clean hands in the eyes of the Asian world. This is an opportunity to move in and exert our influence toward greater stability. It's in our own interest to do so because the political and economic instability of Asia is a constant threat to world peace. But there's still one big factor which limits American leadership in Asia--our refusal to recognize and deal with Communist China. We won't even allow our newsmen to go there to report. Our day-to-day relationships with Japan, Southeast Asia, Nehru's India, are all hampered by this policy toward a nation of more than half a billion people. There are some serious dangers in trying to reach a working agreement with Communist China. For example, what happens to our relations with Formosa and Chaing Kai-shek? And what about some of our smaller Asian allies; such as, Thailand and the Philippines--governments that have committed themselves to America's policy of refusal to recognize Peking? Without proper preparation, these governments could be left far out on our limb, in real trouble with their own peoples for blindly following wherever America leads. But these are facets of the China problem that must be met and solved, if America is to take full advantage of its present opportunity in Asia.

Mr. MURROW: Dave Schoenbrun, where do you think we go from here?

Mr. SCHOENBRUN: Ed, I'm not sure that I know where we go from here, but I'm sure that we must go somewhere other than where we've been. I think that we must agree that the status quo of the past decade has been broken and that the bits and pieces of the post war structure cannot be put together again as they were before. If that's true, then it's time to explore the possibilities of a permanent European settlement. For the past ten years Europe has been a divided house, half slave, half charity ward, living under the feet of the Russians and the protection of America. I don't think anyone wants that to continue. The Russians themselves began to withdraw from Europe when they pulled out of Austria, a voluntary evacuation of territory by the Soviets. They stepped out of Finland, eased up their grip on Poland. Apparently, I think, they were going to try a similar relaxation in Hungary when the Hungarians over-relaxed. It is now agreed by all the West-European governments that every effort must be made to explore further this long hoped for withdrawal of Russia. That's what Hottelet was saying when he said the West Germans are doing everything possible to discourage revolt in East Germany. They don't want to frighten the Russians or make it impossible for the Soviets to relax their grip. Discouraging revolt is, however, a negative and in the long run a demoralizing, perhaps even an immoral policy. I think it's justified only as a temporary measure to create the conditions for a negotiated settlement; that is, to try to

find out what price, if any, the Russians really would accept for the reunification of Germany and the establishment of independent governments in Eastern Europe, and, of course, what price we of the West would be willing to pay for such a package. That would mean re-examining the strategy of NATO, the presence of our troops in Germany; it would mean a danger of neutralism serving the Communist cause, and a host of other issues. I don't know the answers, Murrow; I don't know how we're going to get this settlement. I do know that the questions must be asked, the challenge faced; for we cannot stand still any longer.

Mr. MURROW: Dick Hottelet, what do you think we should do about Russia?

Mr. HOTTELET: Schoenbrun is right! We cannot stand still any longer, and I believe, we must take resolute action. Let me be quite specific. Tremendous social forces are at work inside Poland, among them universal and bitter feeling against the Soviet Union and a yearning for national independence. Anti-Soviet incidents keep flickering all over the country. Moscow could, at any time, provoke a major riot or take one, that's got out of hand, as a pretext to step in and reimpose Soviet control. There are 26,000,000 Poles. They have an army and a tradition of revolt. They would fight, and the civil war would make Hungary look like a dancing class. This is a clear concrete danger. To avert it, Western leaders must prevail on Moscow to accept the inevitable and not to try to turn back the clock. Promises and reassurances are not enough. The Kremlin knows, as well as we do, that satellite revolt is contagious and a serious blow to the entire Soviet system. Righteous indignation is no deterrent either. Hungary has shown what the Soviets think of United Nations' resolutions. No, the Western position must be backed up with a warning. And this warning can have no substance unless it is based on Western (and let's face it; that means American) military power.

Mr. PIERPOINT: What kind of warning do you have in mind, Dick?

Mr. HOTTELET: Well, it can be a warning along any kind of lines-- diplomatic warning, discreet, without humiliating the Russians, not violating their legitimate interests, but warning them against violence.

Mr. SMITH: What do you mean, Dick? You mean that you'd be warning the Russians that we're going to do something if they don't let the freedom in Poland and Hungary? What'll we do?

Mr. HOTTELET: This is no novel suggestion. For the past eight years we have said that an attack on Berlin means war, and this has certainly helped stabilize peace in Europe. But time does not stand still, gentlemen. Can we now cling to old formulas when the whole of Eastern Europe is in a state of flux? What about Poland now? What about Yugoslavia? Not to mention Hungary where the crisis is far from over. We have met other similar challenges with the Truman Doctrine and in Korea. Again, today, we and our allies have got to make up our minds. We have a choice. We can sit still and let

Russia feel free to do what it wants in Eastern Europe without the risk of war. But this will solve nothing, just as France's unwillingness to die for Danzig in 1939 did not solve anything. Does the West want to go on indefinitely just picking up the refugees? We can take diplomatic action, on the other hand, as I said, secretly and discreetly, not blocking the way back for the Russians; and if that leads to war, then war was inevitable. But, if our warning succeeds, Moscow will have accepted reality and we will, at last and for the first time, have solid ground on which to bargain and negotiate the big settlements: European security and world disarmament.

Mr. MURROW: Dan Schorr, as our Moscow correspondent, what do you say?

Mr. SCHORR: Well, I agree with about almost everybody who has spoken about this except Dick Hottel. I agree that a settlement must be explored; I do not agree that the--must explore by the means of a threat. Let me restate this thing as seen from the point of view of Moscow. It seems to me the leaders of the Kremlin are pretty nervous right now. They are beginning to wonder if there's any percentage in trying to hold the satellites by force; whether, perhaps, neutral states like Finland and Austria may not offer them greater real security than a belt of unruly satellites; whether it might not be worth their while, in fact, to give up physical control of the satellites, if the price were right. I think Bulganin hinted all this in his disarmament declaration on November 17, suggesting a thousand-mile-wide demilitarized zone through the center of Europe. This implied that if we moved out of Western Europe, Russia would get out of most of Eastern Europe; and with Soviet troops out of Eastern Germany, it would be pretty hard to stop German unification. The implications of this are breath-taking. (There are some breath-taking questions, too.) Does the Kremlin mean it or is it just trying to buy time, making an offer while off-balance that it would repudiate once it had recovered its balance? Further, would it not disrupt the Western alliance, if we made a deal with Russia and pulled our troops out of Western Europe? But beyond all this is a much more fundamental question: Should we help Russia to restabilize her position? Should we now take the possible freedom of the satellites? In other words, take the 32,000 or gamble and stay for 64,000, the possible complete upheaval of Communism? Remember, gentlemen, the leaders of Communism have the capability, before they are destroyed, of unloosing destruction on the world. These aren't broad-gauge men; they are the tough little politicians who survived Stalin, and little men when cornered sometimes do desperate things. The big question, gentlemen, is: disarmament and a security deal with Russia now, or go for broke.

Mr. MURROW: Well, Eric Sevareid, as our chief Washington correspondent, what do you think the United States should do?

Mr. SEVAREID: Well, I think Winston is quite right in the general argument that there's no longer a way for the United States to avoid playing an extremely active role in the Mid-East, in spite of the costs in money or commitments or risks. If this tremendous area should slide under Russian

domination, Russia, conceivably, would be on her way to becoming a greater world power than we are. I think we have to go ahead with concrete terms for Canal management, Palestine borders, Arab economic development, and all the rest of it, and really try to drive them across, whether through the U. N. or not. We have to try! This is going to be indefinitely harder--infinitely harder, of course, than it would have been before because the influence of our allies, once strong in that region, is now gone; and since Russia, absent before, is now present. Nevertheless, we have to try, and I think we ought to act with a sense of urgency just as though failure would mean a tiny beachhead called Israel is the West's sole remaining toe hold in the Middle East. On the other hand, when we look at Middle Europe, then I think that the strong resolute line toward Russia is not applicable at the moment. I am sure that the Secretary of State and many others in Washington have indicated they believe the same. I think, too, that Dick Hottelet's emphasis is wrong and dangerous. I think this has to be a cautious and open-minded line toward Russia and Middle Europe. There's great immediate danger there. Not only danger of regional clashes, but danger of sucking in the great powers. My instinct, Ed, and impression is that the Russians are anxious to relax and retreat, if they can do it safely and with some--with saving their face.

Now, countries have three instruments to use in their relationships: They have force; they have propaganda, and they have diplomatic negotiation. Force in that area is much too dangerous for the whole world. Propaganda alone will not work or it may backfire, as in the case of Hungary. We have to negotiate, I think. I think we've got to keep the door open now. To slam this curtain down again, to return to the cold war, I think, would lead to the world's disaster; and I think Washington is very aware of that. We are trying to keep the door open now with a new disarmament proposal that could lead to something. Ultimately, I think, it has to lead to a settlement of the German question. That's the core of the whole business, and that's the basis of the Russian security obsession. But we've seen in 1956 that events still have the capacity to get out-of-hand, and, I think, that's the process that could slide us all into big war--not any premeditated attack by either of the big powers. I think we have to start bargaining now; it may be later than we think.

But, Ed, to turn the coin over, to talk about what we should not do, (I think that's necessary at this moment in American public opinion.) I think we should not assume that moral force and reliance on the U. N. will solve these troubles for us. Moral prestige, like time, is worthless unless you put it to practical work. The U. N. is a means of proceeding with American foreign policy; it's not a substitution for it, nor is it a means of creating it. Over the years now, in this country, we have gyrated from talk about massive retaliation all the way over to saying that even the implied threat of force by free peoples to defend their vital interests is immoral--almost a pacifistic state of mind. Ever since the Canal seizure last summer we've been publicly throwing that ace, the threat of--the implied threat of force,

right out of our own diplomatic deck. That would be all right if the people across the card table like Nasser, the Russians, the Chinese, would do the same; but they never do that. I think the Americans have to stop confusing force with evil. Actually, the use of force, or the threat of using it, by free and peaceable countries to protect peace and freedom in this world, I think, is an act of the highest morality, or it can be in some cases. I don't think the British-French action in Egypt was immoral; I agree with Howard it was merely stupid, though that's probably worse.

Mr. MURROW: And it also failed, which is even worse still.

Well, gentlemen, this is not an all together optimistic picture that you have drawn, but let's try to see whether or not you feel that as a result of these events that you have recorded, the prospect for general war has been increased or decreased in the course of the last year.

Sevareid?

Mr. SEVAREID: Well, I have what sounds like an equivocal reaction to that, Ed, but I think it's--I'm sure with me it's an honest feeling. I think we're probably closer to World War III than any time since in this post war period; but I also think we're closer to the chance of a real durable peace. Which way it goes, I don't know.

Mr. MURROW: Burdett?

Mr. BURDETT: Well, Ed, in the Middle East I think that in the last analysis what happened at the critical moment this year was that both the great powers, the United States and Russia, backed away from a commission and did everything they could to halt the local conflict. There will be more troubles in the Middle East, but I don't think there'll be a war because of them, except by mistake or some terrible miscalculation.

Mr. MURROW: Dan Schorr?

Mr. SCHORR: Well, Ed, I've been convinced by everything everyone has said, including what I've said, that there are so many "ifs" I can't make up my mind. I pass.

Mr. MURROW: You were very persuasive with your "ifs".

Bob Pierpoint?

Mr. PIERPOINT: Well, Ed, in Asia we still have a few small wars, but I don't think that in the next year they're going to boil up into big ones. However, I would like to say I'd hate to see us throw away our right to use nuclear weapons, because the Chinese could still start across that Formosa Straits.

Mr. MURROW: Howard Smith.

Mr. SMITH: Well, I'm optimistic. I don't think a war is likely. I think in the final analysis the Red Army will be controlled by Red Army generals, and I don't think, as yet, they would be willing to attack through countries that are in open rebellion against their lines of communication.

Mr. MURROW: Then, as I understand it, it is your feeling that the army is achieving an increasing position of dominance in the Soviet Union in terms of determining policy. Is that right?

Mr. SMITH: I think the politicians have declined while the Red Army generals probably stood still.

Mr. MURROW: Would you agree with that, Schorr?

Mr. SCHORR: I absolutely would not! I think the Soviet Army is no factor in Soviet politics.

Mr. MURROW: Then you do not feel that when they had to call the army in in Hungary, that the army, perhaps, exacted its price in terms of control or influence of policy?

Mr. SCHORR: Absolutely not! The army's completely pervaded by the Communist Party and there is no such thing as an independent army in the Soviet Union.

Mr. MURROW: Schoenbrun, what do you think the prospects for general war are?

Mr. SCHOENBRUN: Well, I'll go along with Howard and Eric, although they've said different things. I agree with Eric that the dangers are very great, but, as Howard, I am very optimistic about the chances for peace. I think the Soviets have been weakened in Eastern Europe; their lines of communication are no longer secure; and they cannot afford a war. I think that the chances are we will have peace.

Mr. MURROW: Dick Hottelet?

Mr. HOTTELET: Well, I don't know whether the--whether war is more remote or has come closer, but I do know that in Central Europe the elements of danger, the element of war, are there, as they have been since the end of World War II. We have a divided Germany with all the tensions and all the struggle that that implies. Berlin is an outpost and a flashpoint. We see the Russians hanging on to East Germany like grim Death, with a vacuum growing behind them, and they have a stronger force in the Soviet Zone today than they've had since the end of the war.



Mr. MURROW: Well, gentlemen, we appear agreed that the United States must lead rather than merely mediate. We must be aware of our power rather than afraid of it. Neither dollars nor the United Nations are a substitute for policy. The U. N. is an effective instrument only when we and the Russians want the same thing. It could stop a war in Egypt; it couldn't even get observers into Hungary. We agree that the contest for power and influence in the Middle East is crucial, but that the critical flashpoint is in Middle Europe, and that the danger of general war stems primarily from the possibility of panic, miscalculation, or desperation on the part of the Russian leaders, or the possibility of a spontaneous uprising in one of the satellites. It seems to me, gentlemen, that we are cautiously hopeful, and I wish you all a pleasant New Year as you return to your posts. Good night and good luck!

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