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REVIEW OF THE REAL CIA BY KIRKPATRICK

By Professor G. Bondarevskiy

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Recently a book written by Lyman Kirkpatrick and bearing this title was published in the USA, Great Britain, and Canada. Numerous books, magazine and newspaper articles have been published on the sinister activities of the Central Intelligence Agency. One of the books on this topic -- The Invisible Government -- written by the knowledgeable journalists Wise and Ross, is well-known to the Soviet reader.

However, Kirkpatrick's work differs basically from all books previously published about the CIA: preceding works and articles were written by newspapermen and writers, by political figures and jurists, while the book under review belongs to the pen of a man who spent a quarter century in American intelligence and who for the last 15 years of his career was Inspector General and Administrative Director of the CIA. To a considerable extent, the contents of the book justify its promising subtitle: 'An Inside Man's View' of the Strength and Weaknesses of the Most Important Institution in Our Government.

The author gives us a step by step account of all stages in the activities of the CIA. In 1942, the intelligence agency that had been set up at the outset of World War II under the innocent name of Office for the Coordination of Information was divided up into the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and the Office of War Information. The OSS immediately began specializing not only in intelligence but also in sabotage activity as well. The combination of cloak and dagger, of espionage and sabotage became a characteristic feature of all subsequent American intelligence activity. In January 1946, the Central Intelligence Group was set up to take the place of the OSS which was disbanded after World War II. In 1947, the national security law changed the Central Intelligence Group into the Central Intelligence Agency.

Lyman B. Kirkpatrick. The Real CIA, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1968, 312 pp.

The first 3 years of activity of this new headquarters of American intelligence and espionage were filled with the struggle for first place against the intelligence organs of other government institutions -- especially against the Department of Defense and the State Department.

When in 1950, US ruling circles launched their bloody adventure in Korea, Washington decided to consolidate the authority and influence of the CIA. General Bedell Smith, who had been Eisenhower's chief of staff during World War II and subsequently American Ambassador to Moscow, was appointed its director. The reorganization of the CIA carried out by Smith with the active assistance of the book's author, who became his assistant for administrative affairs, completely removed individual subdivisions of the CIA from the control of the State Department and Department of Defense and led to a considerable increase in its activities abroad and at home. Devoting particular attention to the expansion of CIA scientific-analytical divisions, Bedell Smith recruited very prominent American scientists. The National Research Committee [komitet] was established. It was responsible not only for analyzing all covertly obtained data from abroad, it also drew up long-range intelligence plans. Characteristically, Harvard Professor William Langer, a major American historian and the author of a number of works on problems in international relations and colonial policy was appointed chairman of this committee and assistant director of the CIA. Professor Sherman Kent, author of the well-known work Strategic Intelligence, became his deputy.

Kirkpatrick admits that the CIA, reorganized in 1950, devoted an enormous amount of attention to all manner of intelligence activity directed against the Soviet Union and also at studying the economic potential of our Homeland. He confirms the fact that many far-reaching decisions of the State Department and White House, connected with the long-range planning of American-Soviet relations, were based on the economic predictions of CIA experts who, as the American government itself was forced to admit subsequently, substantially underestimated the state of and, in particular, the growth rate of the Soviet economy.

The aforementioned attempts to consolidate and expand the CIA nonetheless did not eliminate the struggle in US ruling circles surrounding problems connected with control over intelligence work. This was particularly manifested at the beginning of the 50's when the infamous MacCarthyism began to acquire more and more influence. After becoming the Chairman on the Senate Government Operations Committee and Chairman of the Senate Standing Subcommittee on Investigation, Senator Joseph MacCarthy -- a political opportunist and obscurantist -- who enjoyed the support of the nation's most reactionary circles, repeatedly tried to assert a kind of control over the State Department and CIA. In his book, Kirkpatrick, who during this period was Inspector General of the Agency, cites very interesting details concerning this period. As is known, MacCarthy's principal weapon was to publicly accuse the heads of the nation's most important institutions of employing communists. Even such an anti-communist citadel as the CIA had its turn. After each attack by the Senator, Allen Dulles, the new CIA director asked MacCarthy for the names of secret communists who had supposedly penetrated American intelligence, but to

no avail. Nor did matters stop here. According to Kirkpatrick, the "MacCarthy underground," by which he means a group of persons secretly working for MacCarthy, systematically blackmailed CIA personnel, threatening to expose their "weaknesses," overindulgence in alcohol or relations with women, etc., and demanded that they furnish materials that would be compromising to the leadership. Ultimately, Allen Dulles categorically forbade CIA personnel to have any contact whatsoever with MacCarthy's official or unofficial representatives.

Nor did the battle between the CIA and MacCarthy end here. The facts cited by Kirkpatrick show that even during the time of the OSS, General Streng, head of the Pentagon's military intelligence, did everything in his power to undermine the authority of the new intelligence organization in the eyes of official Washington. In no way did relations improve after the formation of the CIA. The author admits that during the postwar period, Streng created a competitive intelligence organization that the CIA was compelled to finance. When the flow of confidential funds to Streng was cut off, he gave MacCarthy falsified documents compromising the CIA. Once again, the old charges that communist agents had infiltrated the executive organs of American intelligence were raised. Anti-communist propaganda reciprocal accusations, and intrigues became so intensive that, as our author admits, there were many mental disorders among CIA personnel. It reached the point where Agency leaders were compelled to employ a special staff of psychiatrists.

Nonetheless, the internal discord, intrigues, and reciprocal attacks did not weaken CIA activities directed toward the development and intensification of the struggle against democratic and revolutionary-liberation movements in the various corners of the globe.

The data in the book reveal the methods employed by US ruling circles, which did everything in their power to strengthen the positions of their intelligence service on Cuba during the first postwar years. Kirkpatrick flew to Havana three times between 1956 and 1958 to render assistance to the rotten regime of Batista. And on his first visit, he was received with great ceremony by Batista. It is not without interest to take note of Kirkpatrick's admission. He did indeed give the bloody Cuban dictator a special message from Dulles, but not from the director of the CIA, but instead from his brother -- the Secretary of State. In this document, John Foster Dulles gave instructions to Batista on the organization of a special agency to fight communism. As it later turned out, all directives of the Brothers Dulles were carried out. However, this by no means improved Batista's situation. And then, in the bowels of the CIA the plan for sowing discord among the "Movement of 26 July" was born. But this evoked energetic opposition from Batista's counterintelligence, which feared that the Americans would refuse support to his regime. In this struggle between the two intelligence services, matters reached a curious state. Once, CIA agents were even taken by surprise in a safe apartment while briefing certain liberal leaders who were supposedly connected with the "Movement of 26 July."

By the second half of 1948, the situation of Batista and his henchmen had become entirely untenable. Fierce battles raged in the American Embassy

in Havana: how could American influence on Cuba be consolidated? At that time, the Brothers Dulles worked out a new maneuver in the strictest secrecy: the replacement of Batista by a military junta. All measures pertaining to the implementation of this plan were carried out by CIA representatives; at the personal direction of John Foster Dulles, this new turn in US diplomacy and intelligence was even kept a secret from Earl Smith, the American Ambassador in Cuba. But all efforts were in vain. The Cuban revolution was triumphant (1 January 1959).

The facts cited by the author in the chapter entitled "Batista's Cuba" emphasize the enormous part that the CIA plays in all US foreign policy and confirmed the fact that the most highly secret directives of the ruling circles of America are carried out by CIA representatives, frequently behind the backs of their own Ambassadors.

Having lost the "battle for Batista," the US ruling circles adopted a policy aimed at open intervention in Cuba. The author throws additional light on the preparations for and the execution of one of the most shameful undertakings by American imperialism. Kirkpatrick in detail describes the life of the 200,000 Cuban emigres in the USA, their internal struggle for power and, in particular, for doles from the American treasury. This struggle has been waged by more than a hundred emigre organizations who have besieged the State Department, CIA, FBI, the Senate and House of Representatives with various plans for intervention, sabotage, and with endless demands for more and more allocations.

Initially, Washington was inclined to send individual groups of saboteurs to Cuba. However, by the end of 1960 the ringleaders of the CIA had convinced the White House of the need to change tactics and to place its stake on broad intervention.

After the basic decision had been made on this question, the functions between the various government organs and US institutions were divided up as follows: the CIA was entrusted with basic preparations for the intervention; the State Department carried out a diversionary maneuver: its representatives repeatedly declared that the USA had no intention of taking part in an intervention.

As regards the Cuban emigres and the most aggressive American Senators and members of the House of Representatives, they literally filled numerous sittings of the congress, calling for the "salvation" of the long-suffering Cuban people.

At the same time, intensive training of the "army of invasion" was underway at secret CIA bases in Guatemala.

As we know, after the failure of the intervention, American propaganda loudly maintained that of all US government institutions, only one of the CIA departments took part in the preparation of the intervention and then unofficially. Kirkpatrick's book enables us to refute these claims. It turns out

that the highest military organ in the USA -- The Joint Chiefs of Staff -- repeatedly discussed the most important aspects of the intervention. The book under review also enables us to refute another assertion of American propaganda to the effect that the USA did not promise armed support to the emigres. Unwillingly, through gritted teeth, Kirkpatrick is nonetheless forced to admit that such a promise was made. In his analysis of the general causes of the failure of the intervention on Playa Hiron, the author concludes that not only the CIA but all of official Washington were to blame.

From the first days of its existence, the CIA has devoted much attention to Africa. American intelligence became particularly active on this continent toward the end of the 50's. As a result of the enormous upsurge in the national liberation movement, the old colonial powers -- Great Britain, France, and Belgium -- were forced to resolve the question as to the granting of political independence in one or another form to their former possessions. This caused genuine consternation in Washington. The USA began making feverish preparations to strengthen American positions in the liberated African countries. It is notable that in the summer of '59, i.e., on the eve of "Africa Year" (1960 -- the year of liberation for many African countries was known as such), Kirkpatrick made a long trip through the African continent. Evidently, his personal presence in the colonies and liberated countries was considered by Washington to be particularly desirable for the preparation of a large-scale plan for an offensive against this continent. Otherwise, it would be difficult to understand why the author of the book, who after having suffered from poliomyelitis was confined to a wheelchair, was sent on such a complicated and difficult trip.

The Inspector General of the CIA and his associates from this department, visited Egypt, the Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika, Southern Rhodesia, the South African Republic, the French and Belgian Congo, Nigeria, and Ghana. So it was that CIA resident agents, located in the politically and economically strategic nations on the continent were inspected. This shows the scope of American intelligence activity in Africa. The author admits that everywhere during his trip, he devoted much attention to the work of Soviet engineers as well as that of engineering experts from other socialist countries.

Throughout the entire book, Kirkpatrick repeatedly emphasizes that the degree to which the CIA is informed about international events is considerably greater than that of the State Department. He also mentions this in his exposition of events in Africa.

According to him, information he presented upon his return to Washington, concerning serious, impending cataclysms in the Congo, were met with great skepticism by the State Department.

Defending the CIA from attacks by democratic forces accusing American intelligence both of exceeding its functions as well as of inefficient work, Kirkpatrick reports curious details connected with the US role in international relations in the Near East. Up until the present, American scientists,

diplomats, and publicists have maintained that Washington knew nothing about the plans for the triple aggression against Egypt in 1956. These statements are based on the public announcement by Dulles: "We were not informed." It turns out that this was by no means the case. As early as 1955, the CIA had warned the State Department concerning the consequences that would result from the refusal of John Foster Dulles to grant Nasser a loan for the construction of the Aswan Dam. During 1955-1956, CIA agents and military intelligence agents in London, Paris, and Tel Aviv regularly informed their government about the mobilized activities of the three powers and about the feverish preparations that were underway in Israel to hurl tank units into the Sinai Peninsula. All this information was tallied, discussed in Washington, and systematically reported not only to Dulles but also to President Eisenhower.

In the book, much attention is devoted to problems connected with improving the complex and unwieldy structure of the numerous American intelligence organizations. In summer 1960, following the latest major scandal resulting from CIA activity (this time, connected with the failure of the gangsterish flight of the U-2 over Soviet territory and the sad culmination of this episode for US ruling circles), it was decided in Washington to create a joint study group headed by Kirkpatrick to investigate the state of American intelligence. After extensive work in Washington, the entire group went to Europe. The program on this trip included the study of the activity of all American intelligence organs connected with NATO. They decided to return home on the American liner United States and, during the voyage, to keep the secret documents in the safe of the ship's purser. The American intelligence agents were shocked when literally on the eve of the flight [sic!] it was found that \$40,000 had been stolen from this vaunted storage place!

As is known, the CIA was the principal initiator of the U-2 flights. But its leaders naturally tried to channel the dissatisfaction of US ruling circles to other agencies. It was for this reason that Allen Dulles tried to have his man appointed chairman of the study group. And Kirkpatrick did not let him down. Making broad use of CIA arguments, which explained the shameful finale of the U-2 flight over Soviet territory as being due to the poor work of American military intelligence organs who were insufficiently informed about new Soviet ground-to-air rockets, the joint study group proposed that all military intelligence organizations be combined under a single intelligence agency of the Department of Defense. Kirkpatrick considers the implementation of this plan to be one of his great personal accomplishments. He maintains that prior to this reorganization, there were approximately a dozen top secret intelligence bulletins published daily in Washington and after the reorganization -- only two: the CIA Bulletin, designated for the President and the Bulletin of the Defense Intelligence Agency.

Thus, the threat evoked by the consequences of the U-2 flight over Soviet territory passed, almost without touching the CIA. However, the consequences of the even more scandalous failure on Playa Hiron affected this citadel of American intelligence in a more perceptible way. In the Fall of 1961, the omnipresent Allen Dulles had to resign and MacCone, the new director of the CIA, immediately undertook a new reorganization, placing the very same

Kirkpatrick at the head of a commission charged with drafting the reorganization plan. It was first of all decided to consolidate the centralization in the CIA proper and to strive for greater harmony in the work of the individual administrations -- information, operations, and scientific-research administrations; secondly, it was decided to increase the relative share of the USA in the entire system of American intelligence and, even more broadly, in the entire system of US government organs. To this end, the Kirkpatrick commission proposed to expand the functions of the chairman of the President's consultative council on intelligence affairs, a post which was also occupied by the director of the CIA, and to make the latter the official head of all US institutions and organizations engaged in intelligence. In January 1962, President John Kennedy signed a directive addressed to MacCone, which stated: "I want you to become the government's basic director of our intelligence work abroad and I want you to make the coordination and operational leadership of all US intelligence organizations a basic part of your work..."

Thus did a new post come into being, a post which opened up additional opportunities for the head of the CIA to exert decisive influence on all aspects of US political life.

It is not by accident that Kirkpatrick entitled the eleventh, next-to-last chapter of his book, devoted to the functions and duties of the head of American intelligence, "The President's Third Man." By this he wanted to emphasize that after the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense, the most important role in the country was played by a man occupying the position of director of intelligence, a post not actually provided for by the American Constitution.

Kirkpatrick indignantly notes that in 1957 the American magazine United States News and World Report placed Allen Dulles in 34th place in the Washington hierarchy, primarily on the basis of his wage level. Indeed, under the 1947 law the salary of the director of the CIA was included in the 5th category at the same time that the salary of members of government was in the 1st category. In 1964, this "injustice" was eliminated -- the salary of the CIA director was put in the 2nd category. To prevent the reader from gaining the false impression that this post is lacking in importance, even after this Kirkpatrick hastens to emphasize that the head of American intelligence is a member of the National Security Council, the only other members of which except for the President and Vice President, are the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense...

Using every means to defend the necessity for all-out centralization of American intelligence and of increasing its importance in government dealings, Kirkpatrick proclaims his belief that one of the most important factors in the annihilation of the American fleet at Pearl Harbor in December 1941 was the weakness and insufficient centralization of American intelligence. President Roosevelt received intelligence information from the reports of six persons, including three secretaries. After the 1964 reform, the US President receives all his intelligence information from one person. It would be difficult to present a clearer picture of the extent to which the relative share of the CIA has grown.

The expansion of functions and the sharp increase in the influence of the CIA, whose leaders have tried to exceed the limits of their official activities and, who in addition to supplying the government with information, have tried to influence directly the entire US government machine, have evoked and continue to evoke great concern among the American public. As far back as 1955, Senator Mansfield proposed the establishment of a joint congressional committee to keep a check on CIA activities. Initially, Mansfield's legislative proposals gained the signatures of 34 Senators, including future presidents J. F. Kennedy and L. Johnson. But the military-industrial complex was not asleep. At the last moment, the majority of the Senators withdrew their signatures and the draft bill collapsed resoundingly.

In his polemics with American opponents of the CIA, Kirkpatrick also makes another curious admission: he calls the CIA the "world's greatest research organization on problems of communism." Of course it would have been more correct to say on problems of anti-communism. Nonetheless, both the substance of the author's declaration and the entire orientation of CIA activities are characterized rather clearly. The main task, the main goal of the Central Intelligence Agency is not to collect information about the situation in foreign countries but rather to combat the most progressive order in the history of mankind -- socialism. It is for this very reason that the CIA enjoys such active support from US ruling circles and why the prestige, influence, and material well-being of its leaders are continuously on the rise. However, one cannot but note that the numerous failures of American intelligence are evidence of the fact that resources from the American treasury, which are in fact allocated on an unchecked basis for the maintenance of the CIA and to pay the high salaries of its directors, are clearly being spent in a way that is detrimental to the interests of the American people.

The concluding chapter of Kirkpatrick's book is entitled "The Future of United States Intelligence." In 1965, on the eve of his departure from the CIA and of becoming a Professor of political science at Brown University, acting on orders from the leadership, Kirkpatrick drew up a 15 year plan of CIA activities, of which he naturally reports no details. Nonetheless, the very fact that there is such painstaking and long-range planning of espionage and sabotage is very noteworthy. Kirkpatrick attacks critics of the CIA from the American liberal camp, who in recent years have stepped up their demands to sharply limit the functions of this institution, to reduce these functions to the collection of information in foreign countries, and to cease its interference in US foreign policy matters. He indignantly mentions the five lengthy articles published in the New York Times in April 1966, which contained sharp criticism of the CIA and which repeatedly made mention of 150 bills drafted in recent years in the congress, containing the demand to place strict controls over American intelligence. Kirkpatrick emphasizes that 1) these were not 150 separate resolutions but, to a considerable extent, the repetition of an old draft bill at different sessions of the Senate and House of Representatives and 2) that these bills did not gain the required majority of votes.

However, even such impassioned defense of the CIA does not reach its goal. The fact that even the New York Times, which is known for its very close ties

with the leading US monopolies, was compelled to publish a series of articles exposing the CIA is rather notable. No less characteristic are the sharp pronouncements of leading US Senators -- Mansfield, Fullbright, and others, against the omnipotence of the intelligence service. In the history of the American Congress, there has never been another issue that prompted so many critical resolutions.

In the heat of the polemics with CIA opponents, the author blurts out two very important and very piquant facts. The first relates to one of the very dark episodes in the dirty policies of the USA with respect to Vietnam. This refers to the Fall of 1963 when the US ruling circles, having reassessed the values, decided to sacrifice their puppet of long standing -- Ngo Din Diem and his brother and actual co-ruler Ngo Din Nu (the author erroneously relates these events to the year 1962). Kirkpatrick admits that the CIA and its local representatives in Vietnam exceeded their rights and authority in Vietnamese affairs and attempted to influence US policies on Vietnam. Between the State Department and CIA, between the Ambassador and the intelligence service in Saigon there were sharp altercations surrounding problems connected with the future orientation of American policy. As a result of this conflict, Ambassador Nolting was initially recalled and replaced by Henry C. Lodge and subsequently, at the insistence of the latter, John Richardson, CIA resident agent in Saigon was also recalled. On 1 November 1963, in an effort to lessen anti-American sentiment and acting upon orders from American intelligence, a military junta headed by Zyong Van Min, overthrew the government. Ngo Din Diem and Ngo Din Nu were killed. Two weeks before this, the latter had accused the CIA of preparing an overthrow. After the overthrow, Nu's wife, after arriving in America, openly accused American authorities of murdering her husband and brother-in-law.

Kirkpatrick energetically defends the machiavellian policies of the CIA in Vietnam and proudly states that the President awarded one of the highest American medals to Richardson, who was recalled from Saigon.

Kirkpatrick cites even more interesting facts in connection with press disclosures of relations between the CIA and American student organizations, in particular, the National Students Association of the USA. As is known, word that the CIA was systematically subsidizing American student organizations with the aim of creating anti-communist groups and of carrying out deviant activity in democratic organizations evoked great dissatisfaction among the American public. Attacks in the press on the CIA were stepped up. Therefore, Kirkpatrick hurries to the defense. He knowledgeably asserts: "The payment of subsidies to the National Students Association by the CIA was first approved at the highest government level. Each year, this approval was confirmed at the same level." As the saying goes, commentary on such an admission is superfluous.

Comparing the activities of the CIA and the State Department, the author decisively speaks in favor of the former, stating that it is better informed and operates more effectively than does the US diplomatic machine. Exhorting US ruling circles and the American public against interfering in the multi-

faceted activities of the CIA and against hindering its leaders with all manner of congressional committees and financial obstacles, in the conclusion of his book, Kirkpatrick once again strikes the worn-out anti-communist gong. By way of frightening the American common man, he claims: "If the CIA becomes weak and ineffective, then the communists will win a great victory in the cold war and the security of our nation will be seriously menaced."

Such are the contents of this unique book which is filled with apologetics for American espionage and intelligence. Such is the banner that Lyman Kirkpatrick, a spy and saboteur with 20-25 years of experience, passes on to his successors in the CIA leadership. While increasing our understanding of the structure of various American intelligence organs and while revealing the close ties that exist between the CIA and US ruling circles, Kirkpatrick's book indicates that not only is there a process of capital concentration in the USA but that there is also a process whereby intelligence organizations are also becoming concentrated; that the CIA is becoming part of that sinister industrial-military complex in the USA, that presents such a serious threat both to the American people and to all mankind.