



Situation Report

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The Carter Administration, out of its maladroitness for putting last things first, is about to make its final move against the three former senior Federal law enforcement officers whom it marked nearly a year ago as sacrificial offerings to its liberal-left supporters.

Early this spring, Mr. L. Patrick Gray, briefly the Acting Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and two long-standing career officers, Mr. W. Mark Felt, Acting Associate Director, and Mr. Edward S. Miller, Assistant Director, Intelligence Division, are scheduled to go on trial in the nation's capital under criminal indictments instituted against them last April by their former employer, the Department of Justice. They are charged with directing an illegal investigation of a band of American terrorists who call themselves the Weatherman Underground Organization (WUO).

No possible good can come of this trial. It is a vengeful and destructive action. At best, the result, in our opinion, could be a woeful miscarriage of justice — the pillorying of patriotic civil servants for performing what they had every reason to believe to be their duty under usages long sanctioned by the highest authorities since the presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt. At worst, the trial, leading as it must to further exposure of essential intelligence sources and methods, is bound to spread consternation among Americans already alarmed and confused over the Carter Administration's apparent inability, or unwillingness, to defend our nation from its foes at home and abroad.

In fact, we are driven to say that just about the last thing the country needs at this hour of deepening world crisis is another rattling of supposed skeletons in the FBI's empty closets by zealous prosecutors who seem obsessed with the delusion that the intelligence services entered into a conspiracy to destroy civil liberties and who themselves are determined on that account to stage another Roman circus for television and the press.

The assault on the FBI and the intelligence community began four years ago under the Congressional mandate conferred upon the Church and Pike committees. The assault succeeded only because President Ford and the leadership of the intelligence community crumpled before the unexpected challenge and surrendered the constitutional sanction and authority of the Executive in the defense of the national security. To satisfy the cry for victims from the American Civil Liberties Union and the civil rights libertarians who dominate its Criminal Division, the Department of Justice, in April 1977, indicted a middle-level FBI supervisor, John Kearney, of the Bureau's New York office, where the investigation of the Weatherman Underground was largely focused.

So intense was the protest from outraged Americans, that Attorney General, Griffin B. Bell, admitted, in chagrin, that his mail was running 300 to one against the action and he was "fast losing" even that one.

A year later, Mr. Bell gingerly withdrew the Kearney indictment, only to raise the Bureau's three top officials within his sights. This was manifestly a face-saving act; and to give it plausibility he let it be known that 68 other FBI supervisors and special agents were still under investigation for alleged illegal wiretaps, unlawful entry and mail openings. On December 5, 1978, the Director of the FBI, Judge William H. Webster, in a statement akin to that of Mr. Bell's, announced that no disciplinary action would be taken against the special agents, but that two of their superiors would be fired, another demoted, yet another suspended, and two more censured. In January, in consequence of the collapse of the evidence, not to mention the weakness of his case, he rescinded one of the firings and let the other officer retire.

The same strange air of uncertainty and hesitation has lately befogged the Government's approach to the case of the most senior former FBI officers. First set for January 24, then postponed to March 5, the trial was

postponed again three days before it was to begin on the Government's tardy plea that it needed more time to decide whether classified intelligence bearing on the *Weatherman connection with hostile foreign groups* could be released to the defense, as the judge in the case had ordered. That issue goes to the heart of the case and the government's shilly-shallying is all the more bewildering in light of Judge Webster's settled opinion that *the Weatherman Underground was and is the "closest thing we have in the United States to international terrorism."*

A kind of madness, certainly folly, is at work here. The national intelligence services, although their jurisdictions differ in law, are all of a piece. One must complement the other. When one fails or falters, the rest are weakened.

The dismal and predictable consequences of the pointlessly destructive revelations of the Church and Pike Committees in 1975 are visible among all too many other situations in the collapse of American intelligence in Iran and the growth of the Italian Communist Party. Now, in the aftermath, the public has awakened, tardily, to the realization that the danger to our security lies far less in the likelihood of the intelligence services willfully preempting our civil rights than in their incompetence to perform the vital tasks they must do for us.

Dr. Henry Kissinger, in a recent interview in *The Economist* of London, has rightly marked one of the principal sources of the waverings and incertitudes that caused the United States, in the face of the Carter presidency's first international testing, to behave like the "pitiful, helpless giant" which Richard Nixon swore it never was. The failure in Iran he blames, in large part, on the "emasculatation" of our intelligence services brought about by the onslaughts of the two congressional committees in league with a hostile part of the press that took leave of its responsibilities along with its senses.

Even Senator Frank Church, the new chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, was moved the other day to say, in a freset of crocodile tears, "I wonder if we are competent to manage an intelligence gathering program on anything." He ought to know. No one did more to shatter the structure, the *esprit de corps*, and, in consequence, the competence of American intelligence.

A DORMANT LAW

Central to the case against Messrs. Gray, Felt and Miller is the question of the precise limits of the constraints which the law places on counterintelligence operations against American terrorists. The three men are charged under a 60-year-old statute, as revised in Section 241 of the Civil Rights Act of 1969, with having engaged during 1972-3 in a "conspiracy to violate the civil rights of friends and relatives of Weatherman fugitives by utilizing techniques of

surreptitious entry." Weatherman was the name taken by a brutal band of radicals who emerged in the forefront of the anti-war mobs that broke American unity while the Vietnam War was still unfinished and unwon. The name itself came from a leftist folksong carrying the lines:

"You don't need a weatherman to know the way the wind is blowing."

At its murderous peak, 1969-72, the Weatherman band numbered by the FBI's count, 1,554 men and women, mostly in their twenties and thirties. Today the remnants on the wanted list number no more than eight or nine hard core individuals, all fugitives, perhaps in this country, or settled in revolutionary sanctuaries abroad.

Considering the Weatherman peoples' shocking record of terrorism in support of alien communist causes, their mysterious travels to communist centers abroad for training and indoctrination, the statute which the Department of Justice's clever young lawyers have dusted off for degrading the law enforcement officers who struggled to put a stop to the deadly business is hardly on all fours with the facts of the case. They have closed their eyes to the pervasive foreign connections of the Weatherman terrorist, and dredged up an old statute which until the present case was used almost exclusively in the South for the prosecution of Ku Klux Klansmen and local police who beat up or otherwise harassed voters at the polls — actions having nothing to do with national security.

In other words, to bring this moss-covered law to bear, the Department of Justice's prosecutors have staked their case on the premise that the Weatherman organization was and remains a genuine homegrown expression of political dissent. For proceeding on this line, the prosecution took its cue from the Supreme Court's ruling in the "White Panther," or Keith, decision in 1972, growing out of an incident in Detroit. Here the Court ruled that the Presidential authority for warrantless search under the War Powers Act does not apply where dissent or civil disobedience is domestic in character. That decision abruptly changed the rules under which the FBI and, as the sovereign authority, the President himself, had until then operated in confidence; for it asserts the doctrine that under the Fourth Amendment the Bureau must now have judicial approval *before* it can resort to surreptitious entry, or electronic surveillance, in *all* national security cases.

But the ruling still left open the question of the Bureau's authority under the Executive power to conduct such surveillance where the target is an individual or group having "significant" associations with a foreign power — that is, looking to a foreign source for political direction and control, or money. On this point the case stands or falls.

The Weatherman organization certainly introduced something novel and ominous in

American political action. Its aim, in Judge Webster's own words, is "to foster a sustained armed struggle, seeking to create a revolutionary atmosphere that would lead to the violent overthrow of the Government." It rose out of the pandemonium loosed in the mid-1960's by the protest against the war in Vietnam. The Weatherman conspiracy called for sundering American society by armed struggle and random violence in the cities while communist comrades abroad decimated our forces overseas in so-called "wars of national liberation." Even Judge Webster, in his December, 1978, statement, conceded that the Weatherman people themselves acknowledged "they could never live peacefully within the existing political system," and they sought power not through the orderly processes of the ballot but "from violence and revolution, which they viewed as inevitable."

That was quite a judgment of the true nature of the Weatherman terrorists to come from a former judge on the eve of the trial of one of his predecessors and the two other senior FBI officials. It moved a retired FBI officer of high rank to remark, "Judge Webster's background permits him to take judicial notice of an old truism; if it looks like a duck and walks like a duck and quacks like a duck, it is a duck."

The Weatherman annals are brief and sinister. Our purpose here is to describe their salient particulars, so that you will have a fair understanding of the menace which this brutish lot injected into our lives, and the severe testing to which the FBI was subjected in defense of the nation's security. The evidence presented herewith is drawn from three sources: "The Weatherman Underground; and Terrorist Activity Inside the Weatherman Movement," a report of the International Security Subcommittee of the Senate Committee of the Judiciary, issued in 1975; a previously Top Secret but declassified 400-page report by the Chicago office of the FBI on Weatherman operations and political goals, prepared in September 1976, and excised for public release; and a separate analysis of the aims and operations of the Weatherman threat prepared for our Fund by two former senior FBI officers, W. Raymond Wannall, formerly Assistant Director, Intelligence Division, and Donald E. Moore, Inspector, Counterintelligence Branch. Both are officers of our Fund.

"A GENERATION OF FIREBRANDS"

The Weatherman people have never been in doubt about what they themselves really are and where their allegiances lie. In their first manifesto, issued in the midst of a raucous and blasphemous convention in Chicago, in June, 1969, they proclaimed that "revolutionaries are internationalists" and owe their allegiance to the world communist movement.

V.I. Lenin would have found that profession of ideology heartwarming. Early in 1975, having meanwhile adopted the styles and clandestine guise of full-blown terrorists and subversives and having changed their name to the Weatherman Underground Organization, these people surfaced again briefly to restate what they stood for. They did so in a broadside called "Osawatomie" — a name taken from the little town in Kansas where the abolitionist John Brown massacred a group of pro-slavery settlers. They then had this to say for themselves: "The Weatherman Underground Organization (WUO) is a revolutionary organization of communist women and men. . . For five years the clandestine WUO has been hated and hunted by the imperialist state." Their followers, in their secret communes, were assured that the work of organizing revolution, though pursued in secret, was continuing apace: "Without the habit of revolutionary practice among the people, a generation of firebrands will slowly cool into positions of comfortable opposition."

By then, the Weatherman people had acquired a national reputation for violence impressive enough to invite comparison with the PLO, the Red Brigade, and the IRA. They had claimed credit for, or were convincingly identified with, at least 35 separate bomb plants and bomb explosions across the nation. Among the most daring they took credit for were these:

December 6, 1969. Several Chicago Police cars were bombed. Almost five years later the WUO claimed credit.

February 16, 1970. A bomb exploded at the Golden Gate Park Branch of the San Francisco Police Department, killing one officer and injuring a number of other policemen. It was a WUO job.

March 6, 1970. Thirty-four sticks of dynamite were discovered in the 13th Police District Station House of the Detroit Michigan Police Department, killing one officer and injuring a number of other policemen. The WUO took no credit for this failure. Evidence exists, however, that it was its work.

May 10, 1970. The National Guard Association building in Washington, D.C., was bombed. Four years later the WUO took credit.

June 9, 1970. The headquarters of the New York City Police Department was bombed and the WUO issued a communique boasting of having done it.

October 5, 1970. The police memorial statue in Haymarket Square in Chicago, Illinois, was bombed for the second time. The WUO leadership took credit with an insolence that was becoming its trademark.

October 8, 1970. The WUO bombed the Hall of Justice, Marin County, California, and admitted it.

October 10, 1970. The WUO bombed the Long Island City Criminal Court House. In a

communiqué it boasted that the job was "part of an international conspiracy."

October 14, 1970. The Harvard University Center for International Studies in Cambridge, Massachusetts, was bombed by a group calling itself the "Proud Eagle Tribe." The WUO exulted that its "Woman's Brigade," of which the "tribe" was a unit, had executed the bombing.

March 1, 1971. The United States Capitol building in Washington, D.C., was bombed. The WUO took credit for the crime.

August 28, 1971. The office for California Prisons at the California state office building in Sacramento, California, and the Department of Corrections office in the Ferry Building in San Francisco were bombed. The WUO said both pieces of work were its own.

October 15, 1971. The Hermann Building in the Center for International Affairs at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in Cambridge was bombed. A flyer put out by the WUO claimed that this bombing was another action carried out by the "Proud Eagle Tribe."

May 19, 1972. The Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia, was bombed. The WUO said it had done the job.

May 18, 1973. The Latin American headquarters building of the International Telephone and Telegraph Company in New York City was bombed. A WUO communiqué claimed credit.

THE ENEMY WITHIN

That the Department of Justice's zealous prosecutors should measure the perpetrators of this string of outrages as nothing worse than Americans engaged in authentic American political action raises in our minds some serious questions about the prevailing perspectives of the Department of Justice.

The roots of the organization go back to the founding of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), a noisome pioneer gathering of young radicals who met in convention at Fort Huron, Michigan, in 1960. They represented a tight alliance of black activists, white civil rightists, anti-nuclear pacifists, intellectual Marxists and one-worlders whose common goal was to realign the Democratic party along a "progressive" course. At that time the SDS could be described as a generally domestic radical movement. Before the decade was out, however, the founding movement had come apart, and the breakaway Weatherman faction was bent on rallying a following for an assault aimed at the destruction of American constitutional society.

Along the way, the SDS leadership changed course with the shifting winds from Moscow, Peking, Hanoi and Havana. In the beginning, the weight of student agitation was thrown behind the civil rights movements. By the mid-1960's,

however, as American involvement in Vietnam deepened, the SDS objectives acquired an international content as well. The demonstrations which it organized in the streets and on the university campuses were directed not just against American intervention in Vietnam; the intent was to make sure that the United States forces in the field lost the war.

The Weatherman cadres served their apprenticeship in the turmoil of rock throwing, trashing, cop-baiting and street brawling promoted by the SDS through its inglorious decade of reign on the campuses. They had a hand in organizing the first anti-war march on Washington in 1965; in whipping up anti-draft demonstrations in the universities; in blockading factories, laboratories and the headquarters of the great corporations involved in supporting the war effort.

Yet, for the firebrands in the SDS national councils, these were fairly parochial exercises in contrived disorder. A mixed bag of undergraduates, dropouts, draft-dodgers, graduate scholars and unfrocked teachers, they began to come together in 1968-69 as an emerging Soviet of nomadic commissars in search of a swifter, deadlier vehicle for world revolution than the orthodox Moscow-Leninist line for overturning advanced industrial societies offered. By then, the world of Moscow-directed communism had, in addition to Moscow, three other lively capitals — Prague, Havana and Hanoi. Travel among them was easy to arrange. Expenses were looked after. "Guides" in ideology, and specialists in subversion and conflict, bomb manufacture and guerrilla warfare abounded. The Weatherman people, while casting about for a front to match their appetites for violence made the round of communist capitals, usually in delegations.

THE FOUL-WEATHER MEN

Mark Rudinsky, alias Mark Rudd, born in Irvington, New Jersey, chairman of the SDS chapter at the University of Columbia in New York City, found the model which he and others were seeking when he slipped out of the country to Cuba in February, 1968, with 20 other SDS activists. A month after his return from Havana he masterminded the riotous sit-in at Columbia. His student followers seized the principal buildings, took the senior Dean hostage, vandalized classrooms and shut down this seat of learning for 30 days. Before the siege was broken, some 700 people were arrested.

Later that same year, another SDS national officer and declared "revolutionary communist," Bernadine Rae Ohrnstein, alias Dohrn, a 1965 graduate of the University of Chicago and in 1967 of its law school, traveled to Europe for rendezvous with communist leaders in Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, East and West Germany, Sweden and France.

Ms. Dohrn was one of Rudd's co-conspirators in the sacking of Columbia University, and she, like him, returned from her travels armed with schemes to fit the SDS into the world communist revolution of violence.

A year earlier, in November, 1967, Cathlyn Platt Wilkerson, a 1966 Swarthmore graduate, and Jeffrey Carl Jones, an occasional student at Antioch College, both SDS officials, set out for Hanoi. Because the city was under bombardment, the venue was changed to Phnom Penh, Cambodia. Here they were painstakingly drilled by propagandists of both the Hanoi and the Vietcong on how the SDS could best cripple the U.S. war effort, which had moved into high gear. A fellow conspirator, Naomi Ester Jaffe, had been luckier. Six months earlier, in May, Ms. Jaffe, a student of the "New Left" philosopher Herbert Marcuse at Brandeis University and a 1965 graduate in sociology from the New School for Social Research in New York City, was given the red-carpet treatment in Hanoi with four other SDS activists. They, too, were indoctrinated in what the international communist movement required of them. Ms. Jaffe's fervor was heightened by the experience (in her own account) of having shot down an American military plane while attached to a North Vietnamese antiaircraft battery.

THE CUBAN SOURCES

These were hardly the travels of rising young American politicians. Nor were they innocent of foreign taint. In 1967, Hanoi formed a front called the South Vietnamese Peoples Committee for Solidarity with the American People. Its declared aim was to open a channel to "Progressive groups and individuals in the U.S...." such as the SDS, and to work with them to undermine public support in the United States of the war. As early as September, 1967, a large delegation of SDS activists met in Bratislava, Czechoslovakia, with top propagandists of the Vietcong's National Liberation Front and Hanoi's senior specialists in deception and disinformation. Tom Hayden and Rennie Davis headed the American delegation, which included a sprinkling of fellow-traveling clerics. Afterwards, seven in the party went on to Hanoi with their hosts.

The practiced but shadowed hand of the KGB, which organizes and manipulates international fronts for the Soviet Bloc, was visible in these various collaborations, so crucial to the survival and eventual success of its Asian ally. And the KGB's genius for swaying impressionable American youth came most effectively into play in its exploitation of the Cuban connection.

Cuba was handy. It was readily accessible to American radicals by air from Canada or Mexico, as well as from the USSR. Here the agents of the hard-pressed Vietnamese communists could present their case to

impressionable American radicals. Cuba had the further attraction of being itself both a model and a school for revolution. Castro was shouting that it is "the duty of every revolutionary to make revolution." His principal lieutenant in tactics and ideology, Che Guevera, who had been run to the ground and killed in Bolivia in 1967, in a failed uprising, had coined the slogan "two, three, many Vietnams" for exhausting American "imperialism."

It was in this brutal admixture of Latin and Asian experiences in revolution — the drive of Marxism-Leninism overlaid with Maoism and a whiff of Latin romanticism — that the Weatherman idea took root. For the "Action Faction" in SDS, led in collegial association by Ms. Dohrn, Mark Rudd, Jeff Jones and William C. Ayers, a graduate of the University of Michigan and the son of the then President of Commonwealth Edison Company of Chicago, the logic for action was finally at hand. Armed struggle had become the essential precondition for the seizure of state power; the surest path to revolution lay through "Peoples" or "National Liberation" wars against U.S. "imperialism" throughout the Third World; and the role of the white American radicals in the struggle was to be internationalized by supplying a combat and intellectual vanguard for American blacks and other minorities who constituted Third World "colonies" inside the heartland of Imperialism. The "primary enemy," according to a Weatherman who recanted, was (and probably still remains) "the Mother Country and their total objective is the destruction of the United States."

What the Weatherman war plan boiled down to, after the jargon has been peeled away, was a blind acceptance of Moscow's strategy for wars of national liberation. It was further influenced by two other theoreticians of communist guerrilla warfare. One was the Brazilian Marxist, Carlos Marighella. In his work, "Mini-Manual of the Urban Guerrilla," Marighella theorized that a revolution to be successful had to demonstrate that a government was incapable of maintaining stability and order in the society. Once the law enforcement instrumentalities were shown to be impotent, a society would collapse, he argued, and the erosion could be brought about by urban guerrilla warfare.

Marighella's manual had a powerful effect on the Weatherman tactics. So did another work, "Revolution in the Revolution?" written by the French Marxist, Regis Debray. Debray's book is based on conversations with Fidel Castro and the example of Che Guevera. While their model of revolution was rural guerrilla warfare based on Maoist experience, DeBray shared Marighella's conviction that armed struggle was indispensable. The Weatherman plan, as influenced by these revolutionaries, called for converting the SDS movement into an urban guerrilla force and turning the cities of the United States into battlefields.

A DECLARATION OF WAR

By mid-1969, the "Action Faction" within the SDS national council, led by Dohrn and Rudd, Ayers and Jones, was sure enough of its revolutionary mission and of its support abroad as well as in the campus chapters to bid for the leadership of the movement. At the Democratic Party National Convention in Chicago in June, it revealed in a 16,000 word broadside the basic outlines of its war plan. The core of its proposition was straight from the revolutionary credo of Vo Nguyen Giap, Hanoi's Commanding General; the war against American imperialism in Vietnam was a struggle for the world; winning there meant winning everywhere; and war in the streets of the U.S. would make victory certain in the rice paddies of Vietnam.

The levees for the urban guerrilla forces were to come from a reservoir of street fighters recruited among the "underprivileged" and "oppressed" youth in the ghettos. They would become "the true revolutionary vanguard," smashing the pillars of law and order in the American cities exactly as the Maoist Red Guards of the Cultural Revolution had convulsed China.

In their thrust for power, the Action Faction leaders adopted the name Weatherman from the line in their manifesto that made them notorious. There was a fight on the convention floor. The newly formed Weatherman people broke with the more orthodox revolutionaries in the movement — those like the members of the Progressive Labor Party who were determined to make revolution along the classical Leninist line of "working class" action. The breaches in the SDS ranks were never healed, and the Weatherman people would in time lose support for their ruthlessness.

Directly after the convention, a Weatherman delegation numbering 30-odd, headed by Ms. Dohrn, flew to Havana for urgent discussions with their now-familiar Cuban and Vietnam advisors. Another Weatherman, Julie Nachamin, a 1964 graduate of the University of Michigan, had preceded them there by several months on another task: to make arrangements for receiving the first contingents of the Venceremos Brigade of American students traveling to Cuba ostensibly to help cut Fidel Castro's cane and savor the atmosphere of ongoing revolution. The Dohrn party had long discussions with, among others, the senior Vietcong representative in residence, Huyn Van Ba. He exhorted them to step up their anti-war demonstrations to protest the hopelessness of the U.S. war plan. The man from Hanoi also offered a piece of practical advice on the qualities to look for in an American recruit: "Don't look for the one who says the best thing. Look for the one who fights."

To appreciate the enormity of the treachery involved in these transactions, one must go back a full decade in memory. In Vietnam, the

communist Tet offensive of 1968, far from producing the American defeat which a rattled American press had reported it to be, had in fact been a disastrous failure for Hanoi. The Vietcong guerrilla forces had been all but annihilated, and the North Vietnamese main force divisions in the South were beaten to exhaustion. In Hanoi and Moscow, the immediate concern was to keep American opinion from awakening to the real situation and calling for the coup de grace. This sordid service was contributed in no small measure by Weatherman when, some two months after the visit to Havana, the group staged its "Days of Rage" in Chicago. For four days, starting October 8, 1969, student mobs led by Weatherman, shouting "Ho, Ho, Ho Chi Minh," brandishing Vietcong flags, and calling "Bring the War Home" rampaged through the North Side, the Gold Coast and the Loop, smashing store windows, overturning cars, beating up passersby, and pelting the police and National Guardsmen with rocks. Before the violence subsided, 283 demonstrators had been arrested, including most of the Weatherman leaders.

These "Days of Rage" supplied the wild and bloody beginnings of the Weatherman excrement. By the following June, the group was ranked in the late J. Edgar Hoover's annual report on FBI activities with the Black Panthers as the most dangerous body of militants abroad in the land. In the same report, covering the Fiscal Year 1970, Mr. Hoover listed 281 attacks on ROTC buildings, 38 demonstrations against Department of Defense research facilities, the arrest of some 7,200 persons on university campuses, and 9.5 million dollars worth of property damaged in the course of the antiwar tumult. The Weatherman organization was directly responsible for only a fraction of these breaches of the peace; but its much publicized example, where it did not incite such incidents, undoubtedly stimulated the general onrush of violence across the land and hastened the wilting of the nation's will that took the U.S. out of Vietnam in disgrace, and started our retreat from the world.

During the winter of 1969-70, only a few months after it surfaced, Weatherman went underground. In accordance with DeBray's theory that guerrilla war could be most effectively pressed by small cadres, or "focos" (from the Spanish word for cores), the veteran activists split up into collectives, or communes, each sheltering from 10 to 30 young men and women. These were scattered mostly in New York, California, Illinois, Ohio and the State of Washington. In their hidden communities, when not on the streets brawling, or picketing laboratories doing research for the Pentagon, or sacking ROTC quarters on university grounds, or manufacturing or planting bombs, they boned up on Marxism-Leninism, and pondered the maxims of Chairman Mao, Castro, DeBray and Marighella.

Larry Grotwohl, in testimony before the Senate subcommittee on Internal Security, on October 18, 1974, said that the WUO leaders were in the process in early 1970, when he quit them, of linking up with Third World terrorist organizations through channels already open. "The Quebec Liberation Front, the IRA, Al Fatah, et cetera," Mr. Grotwohl said, "What they wanted was outside aid."

But to prove that the WUO actually took direction, even money, from foreign sources is a difficult, if not impossible, task to lay on the accused FBI officials at this late hour. For purposes of cover, the Weatherman people made a point of insisting that they were self-supporting. Outwardly, their life styles followed the spartan standards prescribed in the Marighella manual. Cadres whose families had means ripped off their relatives. The rest resorted to little con games — relief payments, food stamps and unemployment benefits obtained by false identification, to supplement what stolen credit cards failed to provide. But these enterprises could not have paid for their continuous travel, their frequent conventions at home and in distant lands. The Cuban Embassy to the United Nations off upper Fifth Avenue in Manhattan was, by many accounts, a generous paymaster.

We say that the Department of Justice is chasing the wrong people. Instead of

prosecuting the FBI officers, it should be hot on the trail of the two key Weatherman fugitives, Cathy Wilkerson and Kathy Boudin. In all due respect we suggest to Attorney General Bell as the nation's chief law enforcement officer that his overriding duty to the nation at this point is to quash the pending trial until this unsavory pair of women terrorists have been brought to justice and the traitorous nature of the Weatherman established. To hasten that objective, a substantial reward should be offered by the government for information leading to their apprehension, or establishing their whereabouts behind the Iron Curtain.

A good deal more than the fate of three men, serious as that aspect is by itself, hangs on a sensible and timely resolution of this situation. President Carter, in his State of the Union Message of January 23, spoke of building "new foundations" for, among other things, our defense and foreign policies. The intelligence services, as we remarked earlier, must be brought together again into a coherent, interdependent and effective whole. If President Carter's new substructure is to tolerate a counterintelligence apparatus incapable of protecting the nation internally from subversion, terrorism and espionage and a foreign intelligence service too weak and demoralized to be a reliable watchman abroad, then he is building on sand.



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By October, 1970, Bernadine Dohrn and two other Weatherman maidens were entered on the FBI's list of "Most Wanted Fugitives" and Dohrn had actually "declared" war on the United States.

The bomb manufacturing program suffered at least one setback. One of the early "factories" was a fine townhouse in Greenwich Village, on West 11th Street, owned by Cathy Wilkerson's well-to-do father, John Platt Wilkerson, an advertising executive and among other distinctions president of the Amherst College Alumni Fund. On March 6, 1970, a tremendous explosion blew the house apart. Two young women, one quite nude, were seen streaking from the debris, to take refuge in a neighbor's house. One was Cathy Wilkerson. The other was the notorious Kathy Boudin, a Bryn Mawr student who passed her senior year at the University of Moscow and the daughter of a tireless defender of the lawless left, the lawyer Leonard Boudin. Three other Weatherman cadres died in the blast, two of whom had traveled to Havana the summer before with Bernadine Dohrn. Police found 66 sticks of dynamite, four finished bombs and 100 blasting caps in the wrecked house. Wilkerson and Boudin fled to Canada. Their whereabouts are unknown to this day.

Weatherman people were communists practicing, not merely preaching, violent revolution. The language of the founding Weatherman manifesto in Chicago, could not have been more forthright:

"The goal is the destruction of U.S. imperialism and the achievement of a classless state: world communism. Winning state power in the U.S. will occur as a result of the military forces of the U.S. overextending themselves around the world and being defeated piecemeal; the struggle within the U.S. will be a vital part of this process, but when the revolution triumphs in the U.S. it will have been made by the people of the world . . ."

Four years later, in May 1974, the WUO restated its self-conferred mission in another broadside called "Prairie Fire" — a term taken from Chairman Mao's aphorism, "A Single Spark Can Start a Prairie Fire." The ardor for armed struggle remained undiminished, and the paper prescribed the Weatherman "strategy for anti-imperialism and revolution inside the United States" — "the enemy of all humankind:"

Our goal is to attack imperialism's ability to exploit and wage war against all oppressed peoples. Our final goal is the complete destruction of imperialism, the seizure of the means of production and the building of socialism.

A year later, however, a new series of broadsides under the title of "Osowatomie," drafted, as were most of the others, by Ms.

Dohrn, were sounding a different bugle call. The "foco" principle in DeBray's theory of guerrilla warfare did not fit the circumstances of American society. In consequence, the Weatherman revolutionary leadership, Ms. Dohrn now argued, was thereafter "to concentrate on organizing the working class to seize power and establish socialism." In the changed role, she said, "our goal is revolution, not armed struggle," and that meant a reversion to the classical communist role of building a party organization which would take over the working classes.

With these utterances, Weatherman as the fighting vanguard of the American faction of the world revolution began to leave the stage, not with a last big bang, but with something of a whimper.*

But its brief and nasty record of violence has left its scars on American life. It scared the country and the government. We seemed to be sliding into anarchy. President Nixon and his advisors were baffled and alarmed that so menacing a band of terrorists could whirl up unforeseen in the midst of American society. The FBI was under fierce pressure to assemble intelligence on the size and scope of the Weatherman organization, the background of its principals, and their connections with foreign powers or international political networks. Similar pressure was brought to bear on the CIA. Judge Webster, in his statement of last December 5th, disclosed that President Nixon had personally pressed the Bureau to come up with the answers and to put the Weatherman organization out of business and that "this intense interest in catching the Weatherman fugitives at all costs was conveyed by FBI headquarters to those in the field responsible for the effort."

In the test, the Bureau marshalled its then still impressive resources. The quarry was run down by the Bureau's resort to the various techniques of surveillance which had been the authorized methodology in national security cases throughout the professional careers of the officers responsible for the investigation.

Now, by the vagaries of politics, the men who blunted this naked threat to the nation's law and order are required to prove that the threat was real and, additionally, that it had a "significant" foreign connection. That the Weatherman leadership considered themselves part of an international apparatus is plain enough on the public record. A one-time Weatherman, Mr.

*Actually, there was a last serious try two years later: an attempt to bomb the Los Angeles office of California State Senator, John V. Briggs. Two FBI underground agents who had infiltrated the Weatherman watched the plot hatch, then pounced when the infernal machine was assembled. Five Weatherman were seized with the bomb. Four pleaded guilty and are now serving sentences. The fifth is to go on trial in May.