

*R. Burt, Richard*

*CIA 4.02 KH-11*

*GRQI SALT (orig und)*

*CIA 4 IRAN Burt*

*Jackson, Henry*

# Arms Treaty:

By RICHARD BURT  
Special to The New York Times

## How to Verify Moscow's Compliance

WASHINGTON, March 20 — Six months ago, as the White House began building support for a new strategic arms treaty with the Russians, President Carter told an audience at Cape Canaveral that the proposed accord "would not rely on trust" and that the United States had "photographic satellites" guarding against possible Soviet cheating.

Mr. Carter's disclosure caused hardly a stir; through press reports, the public had known about American as well as Soviet spy satellites for more than a decade. Nevertheless, Administration officials say Mr. Carter's reference to surveillance satellites, the first official acknowledgement by an American President, followed a heated interagency debate in which Defense Department and Central Intelligence Agency aides strongly urged the White House to avoid public discussion of the satellites.

With a new Soviet-American arms treaty nearly complete, officials this week pointed to Mr. Carter's comments of last October to underscore the Administration's predicament in convincing the public and the Senate that it can police the provisions of the projected agreement.

In addition, officials are said to be discussing whether the White House, for the first time, should turn over to the public such intelligence data as satellite photos of Soviet missile installations.

### Laying Worries to Rest

Although the C.I.A. strongly opposes this, other officials say the photos would help allay concern over the ability of the United States to monitor Soviet missile developments.

Whether the United States can verify Soviet compliance has become a possibly decisive issue in the emerging arms-treaty debate. At the same time, officials maintain that the ability of the United States to monitor an accord and collect other intelligence data rests to some extent on its ability to keep surveillance techniques hidden.

After the loss in Iran last month of electronic listening posts used to monitor Soviet missile tests, officials report that the Administration's predicament has grown more acute. Although intelligence aides refuse to address the issue in detail, they insist that steps can be taken to compensate for the loss of the Iranian stations.

However, in a speech in Houston earlier this month, Senator Henry M. Jackson, Democrat of Washington, a leading critic of the proposed accord, charged that the loss of listening posts in Iran had done "irreparable harm" to the C.I.A.'s ability to monitor Soviet compliance.

tion of highly sensitive information concerning the operation of the KH-11 surveillance satellite, the C.I.A.'s most advanced reconnaissance system. William P. Kampiles, a former C.I.A. employee, was convicted last year of selling a manual detailing the functions of the satellite to a Soviet agent in Athens.

As a result, Congressional aides said that Mr. Jackson and other key senators, such as Howard H. Baker Jr., the Republican minority leader, were examining the possibility of offering amendments to a completed accord that would require Moscow to give the United States more access to data about its strategic programs.

One possible amendment, the aides said, would prohibit concealment of radio signals beamed from missiles to ground monitors during test flights. The signals are vital to determining the performance characteristics of new rockets.

At present, the two sides have agreed to a somewhat ambiguous provision on telemetry that still permits Moscow to conceal some missile-test information.

White House aides stoutly oppose any effort to amend a new treaty and, to head off such a move, Administration arms specialists have started to brief senators on American verification techniques.

### Uncertainty Seems to Persist

But the Administration's problem goes beyond whether to turn over sensitive information to the Senate and the public, for officials acknowledge that even top intelligence aides are uncertain that every element of the nearly completed accord can be absolutely verified.

This stands in contrast to the American-Soviet arms agreements of 1972, which restricted the deployment of antiballistic missiles and put a ceiling on land-based and sea-based offensive rockets. In the 1972 accords, each side agreed not to interfere with the other's "national technical means" of verification. This entailed the use of satellites to count missiles as they underwent deployment. For example, land-based rockets were counted as they were inserted in underground silos while missile-carrying submarines were detected as they were prepared for launch.

Despite these achievements, questions still arose over Moscow's compliance with various provisions. These questions included whether Moscow was trying to hide the construction of new submarines, whether it was converting old radars for use with antiballistic missiles and whether under the 1972 accords Moscow was permitted to deploy a large new missile, known as the SS-19.

Neither the Ford nor the Carter Administration ever charged the Soviet Union with cheating. Administration officials say that Moscow has stretched the meaning of the 1972 agreements to their limits.

the current round of the talks a special effort has been made to obtain Soviet agreement to practices that would make it easier for Washington to monitor compliance.

An example cited by officials is the ceiling in the proposed treaty on missiles equipped with multiple warheads. While they concede that there is no way to detect whether a missile is fitted for more than one nuclear charge, the officials report that Moscow has agreed that once a new missile is tested with multiple warheads all others of that type will be considered to have that ability and will be counted as such under the treaty.

Still, the proposed accord is much more comprehensive than the 1972 agreements, particularly in limiting missile modernization. Thus, critics maintain that, without the Iranian stations, the Administration will be unable to verify proposed limitations on increasing the size, accuracy and number of warheads on existing Soviet rockets.

In a recent briefing for reporters, Herbert Scoville Jr., a former assistant director of the C.I.A. and a strong supporter of arms control, maintained that the Iranian stations were not vital to verifying compliance. He said that listening stations in Turkey and the Aleutian Islands, together with new satellites, ships and aircraft, could be used to collect missile telemetry and other test data.

### Margin for Error Widens

Administration aides agreed and said steps were under way to upgrade capacity in the other areas. At the same time, one aide closely involved with verification said that the new procedures would take months to carry out and that, in the meantime, the Administration's margin for error in detecting the precise abilities of Soviet missiles would be roughly double what it had been before.

The aide and other Government analysts agreed additionally with Senator Jackson's recent argument that even if the Iranian stations had not been lost, the proposed accord could still not be completely verified. In particular, they confirmed Mr. Jackson's doubts over the ability to police a three-year ban in the new accord on long-range cruise missiles launched from the ground and sea.

But a State Department official said that while in theory it might be possible for Moscow to evade some minor provisions of the accord, it would not be in the Soviet interest to do so. He contended that the United States was able to police the accord in the areas where Soviet cheating could lead to a significant military advantage for Moscow.

"In some marginal areas, the Soviets might be able to get away with a little cheating, but it wouldn't matter much," he said. "Furthermore, if we did catch them, it would probably mean the end of SALT. So they would really have very little incentive to cheat."