

Committee for a National Intelligence Museum
P.O. Box 34682
Washington, D.C. 20034

January 10, 1977

Hon. George H. Bush
Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Mr. Bush:

STAT This letter is to enlist your support for a project to establish a National Intelligence Museum in Washington. As discussed with [redacted] of your staff, my associates and I hope that, upon leaving your present assignment, you will consider:

- (1) Serving on the Advisory Board of the Museum, and eventually also of a Center on Intelligence and National Decisions, which, hopefully, will be located at the site of the Museum;
- (2) Assisting in the large grants phase of our fundraising effort through endorsement of the project to potential individual donors and foundations;
- (3) Assistance in helping us to gain access to other national leaders whom we wish to ask to serve on the Advisory Board; and
- (4) Advice on Museum thrust and content.

I have discussed this project with many former members of the intelligence community. Among those who have endorsed the concept and are assisting with our efforts to get the project launched are Ray Cline and John Bross, both of whom are members of the Committee which we have formed recently. Others who have given favorable consideration in principle include Bill Colby, William Casey, and Melvin Laird.

We plan to ask President Ford to be Honorary Chairman of the Advisory Board, and Vice-President Rockefeller to be Chairman.

We also plan to approach all of the following about membership on the Advisory Board of the Museum: Governor Connally; Senator Buckley; Secretary Simon; Governor Reagan; Ambassador McGhee; Ambassador Luce; Mr. Cherne; Secretary Rumsfeld; Mr. Ball; Ambassador Shirley Temple Black; Senator Brock; Ambassador Bruce; Ambassador Rush; Mr. Warner; Mr. Warnoke; Mr. Alles; Ambassador Middendorff; Mr. Ruckelshaus; Ambassador Irwin; Secretary Richardson; Mr. Packard; Mr. Clement; Senator Taft; Julia Child; Frank Lindsey; James Stewart; John Wayne; and Mr. McCone.

After our Advisory Board membership is partly filled we plan to ask some Representatives and Senators to also serve (eg. Senator Mathias and Senator Nunn); but we do not plan to ask any incumbent officers of the Executive Branch to serve.

I am enclosing for you review, several descriptive items on the Museum and the Center. All are subject to change as the project develops.

We would add a few further specific comments on the project for your consideration.

We have worked out relatively detailed cost estimates and financial projections. We believe the Museum will, in a very few years, be self-sustaining and be able to direct income from ticket and book sales, not only to maintenance and updating of the Museum, but also activities of the Center, and, eventually, grants to other nonprofit organizations whose activities serve the purposes of the Museum and Center.

In addition, we have identified a number of very promising sites in downtown Washington, where the tourists are; and the legal work for incorporating the Museum and seeking non-profit status from the IRS is being done by Covington and Burling on a pro bono publico basis. A basis is also being laid for our initial fundraising effort.

We should be very pleased to provide you with further information about the project, either in person or by mail.

I hope very much you will be interested in this project; and look forward to discussing it with you in the near future.

Sincerely,

Martin G. Cramer
Martin G. Cramer

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

Routing Slip

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D/E [Signature] Executive Secretary

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PROPOSED ACTIVITIES:

1. Develop, establish and administer a National Historical Intelligence Museum for public education.
2. Establish a series of National Prizes for the best writings on intelligence and national decision-making in a democracy --
 - a. media coverage - print media - magazines and newspapers;
 - b. media coverage - electronic media;
 - c. media coverage - non-technical written materials, including speeches or lectures prepared for presentation to public affairs or educational organizations;
 - d. articles from learned journals or prepared for centers of special study (university centers, think tanks, Council on Foreign Relations, Foreign Policy);
 - e. full length books.
3. Working with other interested organizations, establish a lecture series on intelligence and national decision-making in a democracy and related subjects. Examples might include:
 - a. The history of covert intelligence collection and other covert activities, e.g., intelligence in the American revolution;
 - b. military intelligence;
 - c. legislative oversight of intelligence activities;
 - d. media treatment of intelligence activities;
 - e. counter-intelligence in a democracy;
 - f. judicial treatment of intelligence activities;
 - g. Presidential oversight of intelligence activities;
 - h. information and misinformation on espionage in books and movies.
4. Host meetings and symposia covering these and other subjects, and provide a site for organizational meetings for other non-profit organizations interested in subjects of priority interest to the Center.
5. Sponsor a film series on intelligence and related activities in peace and war.
6. Publish a newsletter digest on meetings; papers and articles; organizational activities of interest to students of intelligence and national decision-making in the U.S.
7. Maintain a reading room and hospitality facility for scholars visiting Washington who are undertaking research in the Library of Congress and elsewhere on subjects of priority interest to the Center.

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8. Provide information and services to member organizations and individuals, to the extent staff permits.
9. Cooperate with research and other non-profit academically-oriented associations in support of Center objectives. Such organizations would include the Association of Retired Intelligence Officers, the Military Studies Section of the International Studies Association, the National Military Intelligence Association, the Hoover Library and Institution, the American Enterprise Institute, American Historical Association, Organization of American Historians, American Political Science Association and the military history associations.
10. Assist organizations and individuals in the preparation of educational materials on intelligence and national decision-making for both college and school level teaching, through bibliographic and other advice.
11. Encourage expanded consideration of intelligence and national decision-making for inclusion in national meetings and other activities of learned and other national education, public service, patriotic, veterans and youth organizations.
12. Develop a program for summer interns to assist with research on intelligence and national decision-making and other Center activities, to be funded through a separate, later development effort.

Project for a National Intelligence Museum
In the Nation's Capital

The intense recent criticism of our intelligence agencies, some warranted, much unwarranted, has now continued for many months. The impact of this criticism--and particularly, the exposure of secrets which has sometimes accompanied these attacks and critiques--have been very destructive. The nature of the damage wrought has been spelled out in recent articles by former Defense Secretary Melvin Laird in the Reader's Digest and Lieutenant General Daniel Graham, former Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency in a study of U.S. strategy and the need for good intelligence.

In a democracy all agencies, including those which depend on secrecy, can expect public criticism and can, on occasion be improved by it. The kind of exposure, however, received recently by our main foreign intelligence agency can only be damaging. America's allies wonder whether their futures can be linked closely with that of a country which has done so much in recent years which has crippled one of its principal national security arms. Newspaper accounts indicate that while these developments were taking place, the KGB and its allies continued business as usual.

How could this situation have come about? How, for that matter, could there have been so little public involvement in the arguments that have raged for several years over the place of intelligence organizations and activities of the world's most complicated and powerful democracy? Part of the answer lies, surely, in the lack of knowledge and understanding of intelligence among the American people.

It is almost incredible that, although our leaders and our people are increasingly educated, they know very little about intelligence, its historical importance to our country, and particularly its role in the establishment of the United States; or its present role in national decision-making on defense and international questions. Some very basic factors relating to intelligence, which are too little understood by our people, are that:

- Intelligence operations represent a virtually universal activity worldwide.
- Intelligence collection, however,-- especially through espionage--is also one of the most "national" activities, varying greatly between free and totalitarian countries both with regard to how they are conducted and how they are viewed.
- Espionage is one of the oldest activities of peoples, long before there were nations in the modern sense.
- Although Americans have long thought of intelligence and related operations as somehow "un-American". American national interests have been greatly influenced by them from Revolutionary times and through hot and cold wars ever since the Republic was founded.

- Major national decisions depend on good information, including intelligence. But having good information does not always mean it will be used in a timely fashion-- or lead to wise decisions.
- As the world has become technology-centered, so has the arena of intelligence and espionage--in the air and space and the oceans, as well as on land. But it has always had its technical side, from the first secret writing onward.

Nor are the specifics about intelligence, which bear upon our national history or prospects, known by our people.

Beginning with George Washington's campaigns and Ben Franklin's mission to enlist France as a secret ally of the revolting American colonies, intelligence has played a very important part in the country's past, which has barely found its way into the popular education of Americans. Lives, resources, and the well-being of allies have all depended on good information, well used by our national leaders, both in war-time and in time of often precarious peace.

Confronted with a long list of battles and other events which had a profound impact on the life of the nation or millions of its people, even our highly informed voting public could not describe the role intelligence played in these events. Yet from Trenton and King's Mountain to the Bay of Pigs, the Cuba Missile Crisis, and the wars in the Near East and East Asia, as well as in the wars and confrontations over the fate of Europe, how intelligence was gathered, analyzed, disseminated and used by us, our friends and our adversaries, had very substantial influence on decisions-- good and bad--which affected us all.

Consider a few questions about such events, taken from a very long list: What did happen before Pearl Harbor? Was the problem lack of information, or poor dissemination, or poor analysis, or all of these things?...What were the warnings which were disregarded by Stalin when Hitler's armies attacked the USSR, despite a pact between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia? Is it true he was given the exact date of the massive attack, and still refused to believe the intelligence available to him?...Did cryptographic breakthroughs almost lose the Battle of the Atlantic for the British, when the Nazis were breaking their naval codes? Lie behind Rommel's North African victories? Lead to many strategic and tactical victories by the British and Americans, because Hitler's exchanges with his top commanders were being read by the Allies? And bring about the death of one of Japan's top military commanders?...Or, if you prefer some of the other secret activities allied with intelligence collection--what were the many ways the British successfully deceived the Nazi leaders which were so important to the outcome of D-Day and World War II generally?

Or, going back well before the Second World War: Can it be proved that the early Chinese and other ancients conducted espionage operations? Are Napoleon and Queen Elizabeth sort of the modern parents of professional intelligence activities? How did the British learn about the Zimmerman Note, inviting Mexico to join Imperial Germany against the U.S. in World War I, a discovery of very

large influence on whether the U.S. would join the nations allied against the Kaiser? For that matter, how much did the North know about prospects for hostilities when the Civil War broke out? And, how far into intelligence operations did General Washington actually get?

Or, shifting to intelligence in the age of science and technology: How many of our people could comment on the role of technology in intelligence--beyond cryptography--over the years and centuries? On the U-2? the Polaris? the SAMOS satellite? How many would know that our intelligence people listened to the communications of hostile leaders from a tunnel under Berlin? How many of our younger citizens would know our Ambassador at the UN displayed there a "bugged" eagle from our Embassy in Moscow?

Equally interesting is the subject which makes up the third main element of the information which will be conveyed in the National Intelligence Museum--People. What a crowd the people--all real people--who have been involved in intelligence and its allied activities make! Many are familiar from history; others, from the movies or books...heroes and villains, Who's Who in Espionage from England, France, Nazi German, the Soviet Union, and Militarist Japan; and the heroes of the Resistance, such as those who blew up the heavy water plant in Norway or spirited the secrets of the V-weapons from Poland.

Some of the people who played major roles in the development of intelligence will be very well known; and the names of others will have become known only well after their death and to a relatively few people. All who receive this letter will have heard, of course, of the Presidents who had the most direct involvement with intelligence and related activities--Washington (as a military man before becoming President), Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower (also as a General), Kennedy, Nixon and Ford.

Almost everyone will have heard of Major Andre and Benedict Arnold, and know that the British had a spy (a double agent of sorts) working for Ben Franklin; but how many will have heard of General Washington's head of intelligence, Benjamin Tallmadge, or Robert Townsend, another unsung hero of American intelligence in our War of Independence? or later, in the Civil War, of Rose Greenhow?

All or most, will also have heard of two of the best known figures of modern U.S. intelligence--General "Wild Bull" Donovan and Allan Dulles, in particular. Yet how many of us know about Herbert Yardley, the flawed genius of American cryptography who broke the Japanese codes before World War II, or Colonel William Friedman, another parent of modern American cryptography...or remember who Francis Gary Powers of the U-2, or Captain Lloyd Butcher of the Pueblo were? or know how important intelligence was to Winston Churchill throughout his career? or to General Rommel? or in the Battle of Midway? or what Kim Philby, "Colonel Abel", George Blake, Burgess and McClain, or Richard Sorge did for the USSR; or "Cicero" for the Nazis; or Moe Berg, or Colonel Penkovsky for the U.S. and Britain?

The Museum will thus fill a need in the three main areas which it will describe--History; Technology; and "People", all subjects on which the American people could use both more understanding and a lot more information.

The Committee is confident that the National Intelligence Museum will attract a very large attendance. This assumption is based on the widespread interest in the subject of the exhibits. It is also based on the knowledge that museums have become a very important part of the country's educational and entertainment network. The annual attendance at Washington's institutions which display exhibits is extremely impressive--up to 14 million visits a year to parts of the Smithsonian Institution and over half a million to the commercial wax museum. The FBI tour, movie and small exhibit, draw half a million people a year, as does the display at the more scholarly-focused National Archives.

We believe, therefore, that the Museum will reach a self-sustaining basis in a relatively few years and will, over time, reach a point where it will also fund a Center on Intelligence and National Decisions to be sited at the Museum. Hopefully, it will also gain enough revenues from memberships, and ticket and book sales to assist other projects which strengthen education on the role of intelligence in national decision-making.

A people as uninformed as ours about intelligence cannot make decisions relating to the nation's intelligence programs as well as if they understood the uses, limits, history, and future of this vital activity. Such understanding is as necessary to the well-being of the Republic as it was when our nation was founded. The reasons for these statements are not hard to find:

- The U.S. faces another weapons superpower with worldwide interests and a proclaimed objective of seeing free political and economic systems pass into history.
- Questions on arms limitation agreements and the massive budgetary questions on weapons systems which relate to them must be faced continually. Arms limitation agreements, moreover, continue to depend upon technologically-advanced means of intelligence-collection.
- Nuclear capabilities have spread to many smaller countries; and this spread is accompanied by the threat that nuclear weapons might fall into the hands of other groups such as terrorist forces engaged in national or regional struggles. At the same time, terrorists, using conventional weapons, pose a danger to the world's airways and to most regions of the globe.
- Governments change worldround with bewildering frequency. "Successions" occur in nations large and small, resource-rich or poor, important or unimportant strategically. Such changes occur with or without warning, legally or illegally, predicted or unpredicted. In addition to attempting to foresee them, it is a function of intelligence to evaluate their impact, if any, on U.S. interests.

For all these reasons, the American people need now, perhaps more than ever, to support our intelligence activities because they understand them and the need for them. The many means of education and communication in this media-centered age, TV, newspaper universities, and public affairs forums, are expanding their treatment of this important subject. But an important educational instrument is lacking. Unlike several smaller countries which have "Resistance" or "war" museums, the U.S. has no museum dedicated to educating and informing large numbers of our citizens on intelligence and how it serves

This gap has existed too long. The Committee for a National Intelligence Museum is working to eliminate it through establishing this powerful educational device in the nation's capital.

The Need for a National Intelligence Museum
as an Instrument for Public Education

Communication in the U.S. on intelligence and national decision-making needs to be institutionalized and taken out of a polemic context. Pre-college education does not try; undergraduate and even postgraduate higher education covering the subjects reaches very few people. Efforts of government agencies are limited, almost by definition. Volunteer and other private efforts are thus far limited to the conventional media.

The papers which follow attempt to describe a new way of providing comprehensive and lasting information to the US public on intelligence and its uses. The institution to be used is a National Intelligence Museum.

The American is deluged by information through all of the mass media on an incredible variety of subjects. Recently - as on some past occasions since World War II - this deluge has included a heavy barrage of information and opinion regarding intelligence and related secret activities, and, particularly, the question of how best an intelligence apparatus might best be made to serve the purposes of a rare type of country, a gigantic democracy.

The polemic discussions, and the national fever which underlay them in part, seem to have diminished somewhat; but they spawned an interesting phenomenon, which would appear to be more lasting... an attempt by organizations and individuals with varying points of view on intelligence, and on the US intelligence community, to put those viewpoints before an expanding public.

These informational campaigns, together with the natural activities of the media to cover intelligence-related subjects, led to a fairly large outpouring of television programs, radio discussions, newspaper analyses and magazine coverage; and several books will be forthcoming soon from distinguished alumni of the US intelligence community.

Although it is sometimes hard to see, in the long run, this is probably all to the good. The American public, including the informed public on current international affairs and the smaller groups informed on defense matters and on the history of US foreign policy decision-making, has paid too little attention to intelligence and its importance to the nation.

Despite excellent documentaries, informative films, extensive newspaper coverage, and intermittent debates in the Congress, even highly informed Americans remain uninformed and naive about the role of intelligence and the making of national decisions, including those with huge impact on the nation and its future. Wherever an observer's views fall on the spectrum of opinion on the secret activities of the US and other nations, he would probably agree there is not much understanding of them in America.

Instead of an understanding of the importance of timely dissemination of information and continuing evaluation of trouble spots in terms of Pearl Harbor, we are likely to find it explained in a one-line stereotyped sentence.

Newspaper coverage, by and large, does very little to

educate on intelligence and its part in the past, current and future national and world scene. And, anyhow, such coverage is transient.

The museum is perhaps the most underestimated communication and educational institution in North America. But the Smithsonian Institution and the Toronto Museum of Science and Technology, for example, have demonstrated what powerful tools for education and information they can be. Available, flexible, and a fine site for the use of other media and face to face discussion, a private national intelligence museum would be a very useful addition to the necessary effort to educate the U.S. public on intelligence and its uses.

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FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.

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STAT

1 June 1977

Mr. Hetu:

Martin Cramer, USIA, is calling and now wants to come out to see me at 2:15 tomorrow about the Agency's "new openness" per this morning's Washington Post.

Cramer. [redacted]

[redacted] is promoting in a very big way establishment of a "National Intelligence Museum" at a downtown location and has tried to enlist Mr. Bush as an advisor, and other former DCI's to aid his promotion. He also is in touch with various former presidents, senators, and ambassadors. Cramer has been reluctant to talk at the [redacted] [redacted] level heretofore. I guess he has decided he will not get in to you or Admiral Turner, which I don't think he should.

I propose to see him to hear him out, unless you object, and discuss the proposed visitors program in a very general way.

Regarding the museum, there is a much better idea, on the back burner, to establish an Agency exhibit here in the building (or at the Smithsonian as Mr. Colby considered) to portray on an unclassified basis some of the memorabilia of Intelligence. [redacted] favors this idea and feels it could be done in the house. Mr. Blake is worried about space and Mr. Gambino about security but neither oppose it outright. I believe this is worth exploring a little further in light of our outreach and visitors programs. If you agree I will take up with [redacted] and report in a week or two. We can discuss further at your convenience.

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Project for a National Intelligence Museum
In the Nation's Capital
Jul 2-4

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For all these reasons, the American people need now, perhaps more than ever, to support our intelligence activities because they understand them and the need for them. The many means of education and communication in this media-centered age, TV, newspapers, universities, and public affairs forums, are expanding their treatment of this important subject. But an important educational instrument is lacking. Unlike several smaller countries which have "Resistance" or "war" museums, the U.S. has no museum dedicated to educating and informing large numbers of our citizens on intelligence and how it serves the defense of our free institutions.

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Although it is sometimes hard to see, in the long run, this is probably all to the good. The American public, including the informed public on current international affairs and the smaller groups informed on defense matters and on the history of US foreign policy decision-making, has paid too little attention to intelligence and its importance to the nation.

Despite excellent documentaries, informative films, extensive newspaper coverage, and intermittent debates in the Congress, even highly informed Americans remain uninformed and naive about the role of intelligence and the making of national decisions, including those with huge impact on the nation and its future. Wherever an observer's views fall on the spectrum of opinion on the secret activities of the US and other nations, he would probably agree there is not much understanding of them in America.

Instead of an understanding of the importance of timely dissemination of information and continuing evaluation of trouble spots in terms of Pearl Harbor, we are likely to find it explained in a one-line stereotyped sentence. The intelligence aspects of the national experience in Vietnam was buried in reams of polemic or journalistic paper, and had to be extracted by an interested citizen from the Pentagon Papers and elsewhere. Newspaper coverage which dwells on the colorful Glomar craft or past talk of possible political assassinations does little to inform and

educate on intelligence and its part in the past, current and future national and world scene. And, anyhow, such coverage is transient.

The museum is perhaps the most underestimated communication and educational institution in North America. But the Smithsonian Institution and the Toronto Museum of Science and Technology, for example, have demonstrated what powerful tools for education and information they can be. Available, flexible, and a fine site for the use of other media and face to face discussion, a private national intelligence museum would be a very useful addition to the necessary effort to educate the U.S. public on intelligence and its uses.

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