

INTELLIGENCE

General Sun Tzu, who was a supreme military strategist in China long before Christ was born, wrote, "To win 100 victories in 100 battles is not the acme of skill. To find security without fighting is the acme of skill."

It is the goal of intelligence to help America achieve security without fighting. The mission of intelligence is to see that America's leaders know what is happening abroad and to alert them to what might happen tomorrow. This combination of informing and alerting is what intelligence is really all about.

The United States has conducted foreign intelligence activities since the days of George Washington, who wrote to Colonel Elias Dayton on July 26, 1777: "The necessity of procuring good intelligence is apparent and need not be further urged..." Funds for foreign intelligence, including a so-called secret service fund, were sought by President Washington in his first inaugural address. The legality of keeping such funds secret has been upheld in the Congress ever since. Both the notion that foreign intelligence is the responsibility of the Chief Executive and that there should be Congressional oversight can also be traced to the early days of the Government.

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The Intelligence Structure

But the need for an American Central Intelligence apparatus grew out of Pearl Harbor and the experiences of the Second World War. The Congress wanted to make certain that the US would not be caught short again because of a lack of good intelligence information. Thus the National Security Act of 1947 gave birth to a Central Intelligence Agency under the guidance and direction of the National Security Council -- composed of the President, Vice President, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense.

The Act established a Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) to be the Director of CIA and the coordinator of the intelligence activities of the Intelligence Community -- that is, the units of other federal departments (Department of Defense, State, etc.) that have foreign intelligence responsibilities. As part of his responsibility as Director of CIA, the DCI is designated the President's chief intelligence advisor. As the coordinator of the activities of the Intelligence Community, the DCI subsequently has been given the responsibility of being the President's advisor on intelligence concerns.

The charge by the 1947 Act to be coordinator of Intelligence activities did not carry with it the authority for the DCI to discharge the responsibility intended by Congress, and in 1971 the President instructed him by letter to take a more active role in coordinating resources and activities of the entire Intelligence Community. Still dissatisfied that the DCI was not exercising the authority desirable, President Ford issued

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Executive Order 11905 in February 1976, and President Carter reaffirmed it in Executive Order 11985 in May 1977, to strengthen further the DCI's management of all foreign intelligence functions. Especially meaningful for the collection and production of intelligence is the new Policy Review Committee (PRC), which is chaired by the current DCI, Admiral Stansfield Turner, whenever intelligence matters are discussed. This Committee establishes policy priorities for collecting and producing national intelligence and oversees budget preparation and resource allocation for the intelligence activities of the entire Intelligence Community.

There is also established the Special Coordination Committee to make recommendations to the President concerning special intelligence activities that support foreign policy objectives--so-called covert action. This group also reviews and approves sensitive intelligence collection operations. President Carter has also created an Intelligence Oversight Board of three prominent private citizens to ensure that the Attorney General and the President are properly advised concerning any activities of questionable legality and propriety. (The organization of the Intelligence Community is shown in the accompanying chart.) Finally, strong congressional oversight mechanisms have been established to assure that intelligence activities are properly guided and controlled.

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Congressional Oversight

Traditionally the Intelligence Community reports to and receives guidance from seven Congressional Committees; four are in the Senate and three in the House. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, created in May 1976, has assumed major responsibility for overseeing such national intelligence activities as covert action, all funding requests, counter-intelligence, the analytic process and collection activities. Oversight for departmental intelligence, that is intelligence for use by a specific agency, remains largely the responsibility of the Senate Committees with traditional oversight responsibilities-- Armed Services, Appropriations and Foreign Relations.

The House of Representatives established its own committee to oversee intelligence activities on July 14, 1977. When operative, this new Committee will assume exclusive responsibility for all activities of the CIA and will share responsibility for the activities of the individual agencies of the Intelligence Community with those House committees that traditionally have exercised oversight responsibility--Appropriations, International Relations, and Armed Services. The addition of this new committee will bring the number of Congressional committees to which the DCI reports to eight.

Budgets and Secrecy

Review and authorization of proposed funding for intelligence activities is an integral part of the government's control of

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intelligence activities. Budgets for the Intelligence agencies are of course reviewed by the Intelligence Community Staff, by the Office of Management and Budget and finally by the President, who approves them. The Director of Central Intelligence then presents and defends the overall budget for the Intelligence Community, as well as the one for CIA, before appropriate congressional committees. Thus, the process for budget formation and review is the same as that for any government agency, except that the budgets for the Intelligence agencies are not publicly disclosed.

The reason budgets for intelligence are not made public is that over a period of time and with careful study, America's adversaries could detect trends in intelligence spending. For example, when an expensive new collection system is being developed--such as the U-2 in the late 1950s--then the intelligence budget increases. Such surges in the budget would easily tip off others to new developments. This question of whether budget figures for the Intelligence Community, and more particularly the CIA, should be disclosed publicly has been debated for years. Thus far Congress has upheld the need for continued secrecy.

However, the Senate Select Committee is reviewing the need to continue this secrecy. Admiral Turner has testified before the Senate Select Committee that he would not object to the disclosure of a single, all inclusive figure representing the entire Intelligence Community's budget. But Admiral Turner stated strong

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objections to revealing detailed budgets, noting that in the hands of enemies "they would be a powerful weapon with which they could make our collection efforts more difficult, more hazardous to life, and more costly."

Secrecy and Openness

Leaks of classified information to the press from many sources pose one of the more serious threats to an effective intelligence service. Protection of the country's foreign intelligence sources and methods--a responsibility assigned the DCI by the National Security Act of 1947--is severely weakened by such disclosures. First, disclosures of sources and methods make it a simple matter for hostile forces to take necessary precautions that terminate the flow of information. Second, friendly intelligence services and individuals cannot risk cooperating with the US when their activities stand a chance of becoming publicized.

If divulging sources and methods is to be avoided at all cost, so is "overclassification" and using secrecy as a way of hiding from the public. Admiral Turner is attacking this problem on two fronts. He has established the policy of releasing to the public, in unclassified version, as much of the CIA product as legitimately possible. Recently a complicated analysis of world oil reserves that projected serious shortages

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by 1985, given the current usage trends, was released to the public under this new policy. Admiral Turner has also made information about the Central Intelligence Agency more easily available to the press and to the public. For the first time news camera's have appeared inside agency headquarters. CBS was allowed to film a segment for their "Sixty Minutes" series there. Through this and other such activities, Admiral Turner is attempting to lift some of the mystique from intelligence and to inform the public on the continuing need for an effective intelligence service.

The Intelligence Process

Intelligence as we know it today goes far beyond traditional concepts and impressions. Today's concerns are with all aspects of the capabilities, intentions, and activities of foreign powers and organizations--and with the impact of political, economic, sociological and technological developments. Consider a few of the problems America faces: disarmament, nuclear proliferation, terrorism, overpopulation, imbalances between rich and poor countries, oil and reserves distribution, exploitation of the sea and space. This country's leaders must have a systematic knowledge of these and other complex subjects, a full awareness of the U.S.'s capability to deal with them, and an understanding of the intentions of other nations concerned with the same problems.

To provide the accurate evaluations and estimates required, information is gathered from a wide variety of sources. A large

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part of it is collected openly from publications, radio and television broadcasts and from normal diplomatic exchanges. It is also collected by technical means. Still other, smaller amounts of information is collected clandestinely. This method is only used when there is no other way to obtain necessary information and when the information is judged to be sufficiently important to justify the risks of secret operations.

While the sheer volumes of information dictate the use of large computers and complex storage and retrieval systems, intelligence is the product of the human mind--the work of analysts who sift through the data and produce "finished" intelligence for the policymakers.

There are various types of finished intelligence, each is in the form that is most useful to the particular needs of the users. Current intelligence takes the form of daily publications that analyze current developments and evaluate their impact in the near term. The most important of these, ^{the} President's Daily Brief, presents to President Carter each morning the critical events on the foreign scene. Another form of finished intelligence, the National Intelligence Estimate, is a more in-depth analysis of international situations that judges new developments in terms of what they imply for the future. A third form is the longer research studies done, for example, on strategic weapons programs of foreign countries and long range political developments.

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Admiral Turners fundamental goal as the Director of Central Intelligence remains the same as that of his predecessors: to produce the highest quality intelligence possible to meet the needs of the President, the Congress, and other decision-makers in government. Rebuilding the confidence of the US public in the Intelligence Community and the CIA by earning their trust through fair mindedness and excellence is a primary tenant of this fundamental goal.

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STRUCTURE

