"New Course for the New Left" Saturday Review, 30 May 1970

"Foreign Policy in Latin America" Survival, April 1970

"Fidel and the New State-Class" Encounter, April 1970

"The Rules of the Game"

The New Yorker, 25 April 1970

"The Peruvian Military: A Summary Political Analysis"

The Rand Corporation, May 1970

"The Soviet Union in the Third World: Purpose in Search of Power" Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, November 1969

Vol. 1 No. 1 Summer, 1970

CONTENTS

| Foreword | |
|--|---|
| Something Old and Something New | 5 |
| "New Course for the New Left" Saturday Review, 30 May 1970 | 7 |
| "Foreign Policy in Latin America" Survival, April 1970 | - |
| "Fidel and the New State-Class" Encounter, April 1970 |) |
| "The Rules of the Game" The New Yorker, 25 April 1970 23 | } |
| "The Peruvian Military: A Summary Political Analysis" The Rand Corporation, May 1970 43 | } |
| "The Soviet Union in the Third World: Purpose in Search of Power" | |
| Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, November 1969 65 | |
| Vol. 1 No. 1 Summer, 1970 | |

No editorial approval is implied in the selection of these reprints, which are meant to stimulate thought, not channel it.

... We are all disposed to relax into action...

I mean the phrase quite literally. The life of the mind is a hard life indeed. Anyone who has tried to organize his thoughts while facing a blank sheet of paper knows how sweet the relaxation is to quit and to accept the self-indulgence of any kind of action. It is much harder to write, to study, to take data or design experiments, to think beyond the Vietnam war...or to do almost anything than it is to stir... activity on the issue of the moment. I do not mean at all to discourage...individual contributions of any kind; these provide marvelous service as well as relaxation. But habitual turning aside from hard intellectual problems into easy and popular action is a major threat - perhaps the major threat...

-Provost Robert L. Sproull at a University of Rochester conference on "What's Right and What's Wrong with Today's Universities," 1 November 1968

This private circulation publication is a new venture. It is based on the premise that field colleagues, although constantly under pressure to act quickly to carry out their specific duties and already overburdened with papers, may occasionally need to take time out to consider the broader problems of this age of multiple social and moral crises.

No one can read more than a small fraction of the publications which strive to interpret what is going on in Latin America, but by using a panel to screen a fairly large number of popular and learned journals, and by reproducing significant articles -- mostly pertinent directly to Latin America but sometimes reaching out to include analyses of U.S. and even international developments -- we hope to capture the attention of busy colleagues and to stimulate this kind of serious thought.

The descriptive comments in the following paragraph will indicate the range of topics covered in this first issue. Our tentative schedule is to make this a quarterly publication, reproducing five or six articles each time. No comments are necessary, although you are urged to report a real lack of reader interest. We realize that your time is limited, and that this sort of material may be irrelevant. Conversely we shall be grateful to any reader who cares to suggest changes in content, format or concept.

THE EDITORS

SOMETHING OLD AND SOMETHING NEW

In this issue we include coverage of the "New Left," the "New Church," the "new middle class military", the "New State-Class" in Cuba, the "old" Soviets in the Third World and a "borrowed" Chilean's view of foreign policy in Latin America. We feel these six items should provide an appropriate mix for openers. Briefly they are:

- 1. In New Course for the New Left (Saturday Review, 30 May 1970), Irving Howe, a not unsympathetic observer of the New Leftism in the U.S., describes how the movement's earlier phase of "participatory democracy" has degenerated into a "quasi-Leninist fascination with violence." Howe suggests that, if the New Left movement is to avoid becoming a sterile and isolated political sect, it must return to its earlier view of politics to a re-application of youthful energy and idealism to the preservation and improvement of our democratic institutions, marred as they may be.
- 2. In <u>Foreign Policy in Latin America</u> (reprinted in *Survival*, April 1970), Claudio Veliz, Director of the Institute of International Studies in Santiago, Chile, discusses the historical roots and recent trends which have led to the resurgence of nationalist feelings in Latin American countries. In this context he points up current Latin American efforts to avoid the negative impact of conflicting U.S. economic policies through technological innovation, economic integration, and new ties with nations outside the hemisphere.
- 3. In Fidel and the New State-Class (Encounter, April 1970), John Mander describes Castro's use of Marxism-Leninism to legitimize his new brand of caudillismo. The applicability of the Marxist-Leninist justification to other revolutionary situations in Latin America is questionable, however. Mander suggests that in practice anti-oligarchic forces in the hemisphere are likely to turn to the army or the "state-class," i.e., an entrenched bureaucracy which uses new technological means and exploits nationalist feelings, to gain power and produce social change.
- 4. In her "profile" of Ivan Illich, <u>The Rules of the Game</u> (The New Yorker, 25 April 1970), Francine du Plessix Gray makes little effort to be objective. She obviously admires the controversial ex-Jesuit who, although an orthodox theologian and disciple of the late Cardinal Spellman, has made both bitter enemies and devoted followers by his caustic criticism of what he describes as the smugness and bureaucratic ways of the Roman Catholic Church in the U.S. and Latin America.

- 5. In his memorandum The Peruvian Military: A Summary Political Analysis (RM-6048-RC, May 1969) for the Rand Corporation, Luigi R. Einaudi examines the political role of the Peruvian military and explains why the military leaders took power in 1968. He also provides a succinct analysis of the social origins of the officer corps, its educational and institutional background, and its relationships with other sectors of Peruvian society.
- 6. In The Soviet Union in the Third World: Purpose in Search of Power (The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, November 1969), Fritz Ermarth of the Rand Corporation describes how Khrushchev's vision of Soviet-inspired revolution in the Third World has been dampened by nationalist aspirations of Asian, African, and Latin American countries and by the continuing influence of Western powers in areas where their interests are at stake. Ermarth argues that Khrushchev's successors have adopted more pragmatic tactics, concentrated on specific areas of the Third World. He notes, however, that it's still too early to say whether this new approach will make the Soviet Union "as conscious of the limitations of its power in the Third World as the U.S. has become, at no insignificant cost."

New Course for the New Left

by IRVING HOWE

AUTHOR'S NOTE: The following essay, the introduction to my book "Beyond the New Left" to be published later this spring by the McCall Publishing Company, was written before the recent events in Cambodia and at Kent State. I find it encouraging that in the tremendous student upsurge of protest there has been thus far mainly a stress on the need for democratic and nonviolent political change. The hope for this country is to find a politics combining radical measures with liberal values, and if the students stick by something like that combination they can do enormous good.

hat is the New Left? The phrase has become part of our journalistic currency, but the phenomena to which it points are barely a decade old and remain strikingly diverse in character, scattered in organization, and sometimes incoherent in statement. In any traditional sense, the New Left does not comprise a structured political movement. Whenever it has tried to form a national organization, as at the disastrous Conference for a New Politics held in Chicago during the summer of 1967, it has quickly fractured into several hostile groups. Students for a Democratic Society, the major New Left group, has recently split into three or four embattled factions, with the two main ones using physical violence on one another, as if intent upon re-enacting the worst of Stalinism. As Mark Rudd, leader of the SDS Weatherman faction. was quoted in The New York Times of September 26, 1969: "We sometimes beat them up [the other faction] and

IRVING Howe, author of *The Decline of the New*, is on the faculty of CUNY. Beyond the New Left, copyright © 1970 by Dissent Publishing Corporation.

they beat us up. What we usually do is beat them up when we find there"

The New Left has become an important force, but only in certain limited segments of American society. It has made no impact on such major institutions as the trade unions, or on such major social groups as the working class-by traditional Marxist expectations, the lever of revolution. It has not been able to establish itself nificant presence in either national or regional politics (e.g., the pitiably small vote received by Eldridge Cleaver and Dick Gregory in the 1968 Presidential election; the failure of New Leftists to win even a primary in a stronghold like Berkeley). But the New Left has had a notable effect on campus life; it has exerted an oblique but measurable influence on the more extreme black militants; and it has contributed to the growth of a distinctive "youth culture."

Some questions about New Left influence are hard to answer. The claim is often made that it has played a major role in mobilizing public sentiment. even if through confrontationist shock tactics, against the Vietnam War. My own judgment is that large sections of both the American population and our political leadership turned to opposing the war mainly out of a realization that it could not be won short of an intolerable escalation. Nevertheless, it seems likely that on this score, despite some exaggeration, the New Left deserves credit. It did play a valuable role in stirring dissent against the war; it did serve as a pressure on the conscience of liberals. Yet, the paradox that must be noted here is that such credit is of a kind that the New Left cannot, in ideological consistency, be very enthusiastic about. For a central www Left dogma has insisted that "the system can't be changed," and that to achieve even limited ends it is necessary to complete a wholesale socia, transformation, what is these days very loosely called "a revolution."

Insofar as the New Left claims credit for mobilizing popular sentiment in behalf of changing U.S. policy in Vietnam -and I think it has some right to make that claim-it undercuts its own "revolutionary" theories and tacitly acknowledges that, despite its intentions and rhetoric, it has played the role of a reformist pressure group mobilizing sentiment for change within this society I see nothing dishonorable in playing such a role; I wish only to point to the problems it presents the New Left. And let me also stress that it is not I nor people of my persuasion who insist that achieving short-range goals within the present society is incompatible with working toward long-range social change.

f, however, we do try to estimate the immediate consequences of New Left activities, we must also look at the other side of the balance. We must ask ourselves: How much sentiment has it helped to mobilize for the far Right? To what extent has it contributed to the victories of Nixon in the country as a whole, Reagan in California, and Stenvig in Minneapolis? Now, there is no completely accurate or "scientific" way of measuring the consequences of any political conduct, not even conduct as abrasive as that of the New Left: but every available source of evidencefrom opinion polls to electoral results to the use of common sense-indicates that among large segments of the middle and working classes there has set in a strong, and sometimes violent, reaction against New Left methods. My impression is that the more can'did New Left spokesmen would not deny this, for, believing as they do in "polarization" (that is, in provoking large numbers of people toward the extremes of the political spectrum, thereby dislodging and disabling the liberal center), some of them would actually see the growth of the far Right as a tribute to their own effectiveness. And so it is, although hardly in the way they suppose. For what the New Left, in its thoughtless fascination with apocalypse, fails to consider is the probable line-up of forces in this country if there is to be a polarization during the next few years—to say nothing of the probable victor in such a showdown.

Other questions concerning its influence are equally hard to answer. To what extent, for instance, was the recent appearance of that promising political tendency we call the New Politics-the Leftist-liberal coalition associated with the campaigns of Senator Eugene McCarthy and the late Senator Robert Kennedy-a consequence of pressures from the New Left? There can't be an assured reply. but I for one would be prepared to say that yes, some of the credit should go to the New Left. Saying that, however, I would also want to note that most New Left segments, and especially SDS, sneered at and refused to support Senator McCarthy's candidacy when he rallied public sentiment against the war. One New Left spokesman, Tom Hayden, was even reported to have declared that "a vote for George Wallace would further his objective more than a vote for R.F.K." (Village Voice, May 30, 1968).

So far, the New Left has made few serious contributions to political thought or cultural experience. Whatever interest the New Left shows in political theory is usually directed toward the work of older writers whose work it appropriates and sometimes twists for its own ends. But the New Left has had a considerable impact on intellectual styles and fashions, reviving radical sentiments in elderly men of letters who found it expedient to restrain themselves during the conservative Fifties, providing a rhetoric of excitement for young writers often well attuned to the demands of the market, and helping to make "radicalism" a hot journalistic property in magazines as various as Esquire and The New York Review of Books.

In its few years of existence the New Left has already gone through

two distinct phases. The first was a phase of populist fraternity, stressing an idealistic desire to make real the egalitarian claims of the American tradition, a non- and even anti-ideological approach to politics, and a strategy of going into local communities in order to organize oppressed minorities. Perhaps the major stimulant to this early New Left was the upsurge of the American Negroes in the early 1960s, when they began to struggle for their dignity as men and their rights as citizens. And perhaps the most dramatic action of the early New Left was the journey hundreds of young people took in the summer of 1963 to live and work in Mississippi, helping Negroes organize themselves for local community and political ends. The main slogan of that moment -appealing but vague-was "participatory democracy." From the viewpoint of those of us committed to the politics of democratic socialism, this first phase of the New Left was, despite occasional tactical blunders, a profoundly welcome and promising reinvigoration of American political life.

The second phase of the New Left signifies a sharp turn: away from fraternal sentiment and back to illabsorbed dogma, away from the shapelessness of participatory democracy and back to the rigidity of vanguard elites, away from the loving spirit of nonviolence and back to a quasi-Leninist fascination with violence. In this second phase, the New Left grows in numbers yet makes certain, through its sterile authoritarianism, that it will not be more than a blown-up reincarnation of the radical sects of the past.

What are the causes of this sharp change? The breakup of the Negrothat had labor-liberal coalition sparked the civil rights movement and ensured the victory of John F. Kennedy; the despair, much of it warranted and authentic, over U.S. involvement in Vietnam; the rise of separatist and nationalist sentiment among black youth; an intense disillusionment not only with liberal politics of the moment but with the whole idea of liberalism; and the growing appeal of the "Third World Revolution" conceived (or misperceived) by the New Left as an odd blend of

romantic anarchism and Leninist toughness. In this second phase of the New Left, it sometimes seemed as if the SDS were transforming itself into a society for the resurrection of the god that failed. Notions, dogmas, ideologies, and slogans that an earlier generation of radicals had discarded after painful reflection and experience now came back in crude form. The theory of "social fascism," Stalin's contribution to the victory of Hitlerism, was transformed into a theory of "liberal fascism" by SDS leaders. The idea of a self-appointed "vanguard" that will prod the sluggish masses into rebellion-one of the more dubious contributions of Leninist orthodoxy-was uncritically embraced by middle-class students whose view of the actual conditions, sentiments, and needs of "the masses" was utterly lacking in reality. The notion that "bourgeois democracy" is no more than a mask for the domination of capital and therefore not to be valued by radicals found strong echoes in the Sixties. And perhaps most distressing of all, the liberal values of tolerance and respect for the rights of opponents were sneeringly dismissed in accordance with the arid formulas of Herbert Marcuse. To be sure, not all New Leftists succumbed to this authoritarian debauch. Some, like Greg Calvert, former SDS national secretary, complained sadly about the "Stalinization of the New Left," and looked back wistfully to its earlier years; but in the main, the drift was toward the sectarian wastelands.

It would now seem that we are on the verge of still another phase in the development of the New Left. Some elements within it—the Weathermen and the Crazies, for example-seem to be abandoning what they have regarded as orthodox Leninism and to be turning to a mixture of violent adventurism, staged desperation, and even hooliganism, all marked by serious symptoms of social pathology. Any contrast between the United States today and Russia in the late nineteenth century must of course be made with a maximum of caution, yet it is hard to avoid the impression that the desperado-totalitarian Left comes to us as a re-enactment of the politics of the fanatical Russian terrorist Serge Nechayev The Weathermen, having given up hope for the proletariat, now see the main revolutionary force in our society as the high school students; their experience may yet lead them to the kindergartens.

How far some elements—not, it should be said in fairness, the majority—of the New Left have sunk into the pathology of violence can be seen from the following report about a recent Weathermen gathering that appeared in the January 10, 1970, issue of *The Guardian*, a New Left weekly. The report summarizes the keynote speech of Bernardine Dohrn, former interorganization secretary of SDS:

Dohrn characterized violent, militant response in the streets as "armed struggle" against imperialism. . . . "We're about being a fighting force alongside the blacks, but a lot of us are still honkies, and we're still scared of fighting. We have to get into armed struggle."

Part of armed struggle, as Dohrn and others laid it down, is terrorism. Political assassination—openly joked about by some Weathermen—and literally any kind of violence that is considered anti-social were put forward as legitimate forms of armed struggle. . . .

A twenty-foot-long poster adorned a wall of the ballroom. It was covered with drawings of bullets, each with a name. Along with the understandable targets like Chicago's Mayor Daley, the Weathermen deemed as legitimate enemies to be offed, among others, The Guardian (which has criticized Weathermen) and Sharon Tate, one of several victims in the recent mass murder in California. She was eight months pregnant.

"Honkies are going to be afraid of us," Dohrn insisted. She went on to tell the war council about Charlie Manson, accused leader of the gang which allegedly murdered the movie star and several others on their Beverly Hills estate. Manson has been portrayed in the media as a Satanic, magnetic personality who held near-hypnotic sway over several women whom he lent out to friends as favors and brought along for the murder scene. The press also mentioned Manson's supposed fear of blacks-he reportedly moved into rural California to escape the violence of a race war.

Weatherman, the "Bureau" says, digs Manson...

"Dig it, first they killed those pigs,

then they ate dinner in the same room with them, then they even shoved a fork into a victim's stomach! Wild!" said Bernardine Dohrn.

It will be said that these sentiments are in no way characteristic of the thousands of young people who have been protesting against the Vietnam War. I entirely agree. It will be said that the Weatherman group isn't representative of the New Left. In one sense, that also is true. No other New Left tendency has abandoned it. self so completely to corrupting fantasies of blood. But it needs to be said that Miss Dohrn's ravings have a connection-distorted, extreme, yet with the representativeness of caricatureto things one can hear these days among some portions of the New Left. The cult of violence, the identification of a tiny group of affluent youth with the "destiny of the revolution," the adulation of charismatic authoritarian leaders, the crude hatred for liberal values-all these can be found in various New Left tendencies, even if without the vivid pathology of the Weathermen.

The most interesting theoretical question concerning the rapid changes within the New Left has to do with the relation between its earlier and later phases. Those of us who write for such journals as *Dissent*, whatever our shortcomings, can at least claim some credit for having foreseen the possibility that a politics of populist vagueness would lead to a politics of authoritarian rigidity. For this decline I would suggest two causes:

1) The crisis and virtual collapse of U.S. liberalism. During the 1960s, with the possible exception of John F. Kennedy's brief tenure as President and Eugene McCarthy's effort to win the Democratic nomination, American liberalism was in a bad way. Without pre tending to a full explanation, let me as least indicate a few summary reasons for this decline: The exhaustion of traditional New Deal politics, alliances and outlooks; the appearance of moral political issues that bread-and-butter liberalism was not equipped to dea with; the involvement of certain libera leaders (e.g., Humphrey) in a war tha large numbers of young people rightly saw as indefensible.

A rough but useful axiom can be sug

gested about recent American politics: The New Left has flourished as a result of, or in direct proportion to, the failures and failings of liberalism. When the candidacies of Eugene McCarthy and Robert Kennedy seemed to offer a significant alternative, a way of realizing the hopes of the idealistic young through electoral politics, thousands of young radicals and liberals flocked to their campaigns. Both on and off the campus, the New Left then began to wither into a marginal group, limited for the time to nasty and impotent sniping. But when there seemed no viable alternative, and both candidates in the 1968 Presidential election spoke as supporters of the Vietnam War, moods of despair swept across the campus, and the New Left could transform these moods into a disillusionment with liberal politics in particular and the idea of liberalism in general.

2) An internal connection between the thought of the early New Left and the thought of the later New Left. What both shared was an impatience, sometimes a distrust, and more recently a downright contempt for the methods and norms of democracy-the "cumbersomeness" or "sham" of representative elections, the "irrelevance" of undemonstrative majorities, the "manipulation" of the masses by politicians and the media, the "dullness" of ordinary middle-class people, etc. Under the guidance of such authoritarian thinkers as Marcuse, the New Left in both its phases, although more so in the later one, revealed a profoundly clitist bias. It might speak about "the people," and sometimes even "the workers," but it found its base of support mainly among the alienated middle-class young.

When the phrase "participatory democracy" first began to be heard, it gained its impact as a response to a genuine problem that had been troubling both socialist and nonsocialist thinkers for some time: What could be done to stop the gradual erosion of democratic institutions, in which the formal appearance of participation by the people continued but the real substance declined?

At first, the New Left's emphasis on participatory democracy signified mainly a desire to reinvigorate democracy, to give it greater meaning and immediacy-although the New Left rarely had any concrete proposals for achieving this end. Too often participatory democracy meant in practice a blithe dismissal of parliamentary rules in the discussions of the New Left: groups, a practice that may have encouraged collective expressiveness (and interminable meetings) but also proved to be peculiarly open to manipulation by tight little factions and charismatic figures emphasizing their own modesty. At best, such procedures helped enliven-were relevant to-the politics of small groups; but they could contribute almost nothing to solving the problem of democratic politics in large societies, where the sheer number of citizens and the complexity of competing interests require a system of representative institutions.

The stress on participatory democracy proved to be especially damaging in the curious way it prepared the ground for authoritarian politics. There was not too great a distance between the distrust shown for the limitations of representative institutions by the early New Left and the contempt shown for the very idea of representative institutions by the later New Left. To dismiss "formal democracy" in behalf of participatory democracy was in effect to jettison the values of both-as if, in reality, democratic rights didn't always require a commitment to "forms," that is, rules both fixed and open to change through agreed-upon procedures. By the late Sixties, one rarely heard much about participatory democracy from the New Left. Now the fashionable phrase was "revolution," unspecified as to social character, political possibility, or ultimate goal, and too often reduced to a ritual of expressiveness that required neither thought nor moral justification.

Those of us who want to preserve and extend democracy, while simultaneously working toward fundamental social change, must acknowledge that the coming decade is likely to be a time of trouble, even peril. There are linked dangers from the irrationalities and violence of both polar extremes, which together could destroy our hopes for an American movement at once democratic, militant, and radical. The New Left plays a double role here. It contributes valuable energy to the needed task of protest and insurgency, but it also contributes a political-moral confusion, sometimes verging on nihilism, which threatens liberal values and helps provoke a popular backlash.

Nor are our objections merely tactical. The kind of "revolution" envisaged by all the SDS factions has nothing to do with the large-scale social transformation this country needs. Who with a reasonable impulse to self-preservation and democratic survival would care to test out the dispensation of a Tom Hayden or a Mark Rudd? Worthy fellows, perhaps, but better powerless.

The perspective I would advance for the immediate future combines a oroad coalition of popular forces to work for immediate social improvements along a liberal course, and a regathering of those people, now a tiny minority in this country, who believe in the values of democratic socialism. This signifies:

- the premise that we are not and will not soon be in a "revolutionary situation":
- the subpremise that, if "revolutionary activity" in the next few years comes to more than loud talk, it will have an elitist, desperado, and adventurist character;
- the belief that it is in our interest to preserve and improve the present agencies of democratic politics, marred as they may be, requiring changes as they do, and even liable to sudden collapse as they are.

I think that the more sensitive and undogmatic elements in and near the

New Left will soon have to face the futility of trying to "go it alone." Their movement has grown and probably will continue to grow; yet, barring some major self-transformation, it will also continue to have the character of a sect isolated in fundamental outlook, language, and psychology from the American people. Nevertheless, it contains precious resources of energy and idealism, and this energy and idealism ought to be thrust into the mainstream of American politics.

One can only hope for a slow regathering of forces among the liberal-labor-Left in the United States. A movement that fails to understand the needs and aspirations of the American workers and their unions, or that dismisses them contemptuously in the name of some abstract revolutionary purity is doomed to failure. A movement that fails to understand the urgency of moral protest animating the young and that stays rigidly within the limits of traditional New Deal and post-New Deal liberalism is also doomed to failure.

Can we then bring together the strategy of coalition with the passions of insurgency? Can we recognize that in the American system wide and loose electoral blocs are essential, even if inherently unsatisfactory to ideological purists, while at the same time the idea of stirring the bottom layers of society to speak out for themselves is also urgent? Such a view is inherently complex, and this is a moment when many people are seized by a mania for simplicity; but I think it is a political perspective that, no matter how difficult to realize, is required by the present state of things. Oddly enough, if you were to go back to the founding document of SDS, the nowfamous Port Huron statement, you would find a view of politics fairly close to what has been said here. One can only hope that many young people will yet return to it.

Foreign Policy in Latin America

CLAUDIO VÉLIZ

The Dyason Memorial Lectures were set up twenty years ago, to invite distinguished overseas specialists to speak in Australia. The recent series of talks were given by Dr Claudio Véliz, Director of the Institute of International Studies, Santiago, Chile, and were reprinted in Australian Outlook. The second talk by Dr Véliz, of which the full title was 'Foreign Policy and the Rise of Nationalism in Latin America', is reproduced below.

Australian Outlook (Melbourne). December 1969. Reproduced by permission.

The disconcerting and unfortunate conflict between the Central American republics of Honduras and El Salvador ought not to obscure the fact that Latin America has a long and sophisticated tradition of diplomacy and intra-Latin American politics which has evolved through four centuries to the present situation, in which a complex nationalism finds functional expression in the desire, shared by all political parties and groups of opinion, to construct an independent foreign policy.

If relative change is a principal characteristic of human action in scientific and technological matters, then relative continuity is a main feature of political activity. Things change indeed, but less than we think, and all too often the changes that do take place are not those we had planned for and confidently expected. Consequently, if we are to seek an understanding of the current political situation of Latin America, it is useful to examine, however briefly, the traditions, the attitudes and the manner of political activity which have led to the present state of affairs.

It would be a mistake to date the awareness of national identity in Latin America only from the first decades of the nineteenth century, when the Spanish colonies successfully carried out their revolution for independence. In fact, if one accepts the view that the modern phenomenon of nationalism and the formation of the nation-state should be traced back to the sixteenth century, then one can legitimately use, as a working hypothesis, the proposition that the major nations of Latin America are among the oldest in the western world. For, indeed, during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the geographical isolation

of the colonies; the nature of their direct links with the Iberian peninsula and their lack of communications between each other; even the resulting parochialism of their cultural development over a long period, facilitated the gradual development of a sense of separateness and a related feeling of internal coherence and cultural identity.

This national awareness became politically significant during the revolutions of the decade after 1810, when most of the colonies severed their relations with Spain. At that time, national feeling was principally associated with the rejection of the Spanish connection which was considered a reactionary, obscurantist and dead tradition to be shaken off if the new republics were going to move along the road of progress and liberty. On the other hand, the cultural complex of Western Europe - especially Britain and France - exercised a tremendous attraction and was uncritically accepted as a viable and most desirable alternative. The choice was understandable; liberal or radical Europe appeared in the vanguard of everything and to follow her was to be on the road to progress; at the other extreme, Spain, sunk in poverty and political repression, still torn apart by wars of religion or dynastic succession, offered a distressing spectacle to her old colonies.

The dilemma was expressed in forthright terms by many Latin American intellectuals. Perhaps the best known presentation of the case was that by Sarmiento, the Argentine thinker and politician, who in a book entitled *Civilization and Barbarism*, tried to prove – among other things – that everything European was civilized while

things Latin American were equated with barbarism.

In cultural terms, the assumption of political power by the new national governments was not paralleled by a significant inward-looking search for domestic roots; nationalist feeling was identified with the conscious and enthusiastic imitation of the political and cultural habits of the principal nations of Western Europe.

Moreover, the ruling circles – to which the intelligentsia and the cultured groups undoubtedly belonged – had economic and political interests which coincided with the prevalent liberal, free-trading trends in vogue in the more enlightened European capitals. These ruling groups were mostly exporters of mineral and agricultural products, or were directly or indirectly associated with foreign firms which imported manufactures from Europe and the United States. Hence, even without reference to ideological determinants, these people objectively tended to accept a liberal, free-trading solution to the problems which confronted them at the time.

Therefore, the cultural attitude which informed the development of nationalist feeling at this relatively early stage did not seek a break with Western Europe; rather, it looked upon the imitation of the European cultural complex as a desirable goal.

But perhaps the most important characteristic of this long, systematic and occasionally successful process of imitation was that it was consciously focused on learning how cultured Europeans consumed, and not how they produced. The object was to become civilized, European-like; this object did not include a manner of production for the very simple reason that it was not needed. Those Latin Americans who aped the consumption habits of Europeans had ample financial means to indulge in this activity; Latin America has always been rich in resources and during the second half of the nineteenth century, the world demand for her primary products was growing at a very rapid rate.

The Latin American and the Japanese processes of conscious imitation ran their respective courses almost simultaneously, but the results were different: the Latin Americans became experts at consuming like Europeans while they continued to produce like eighteenth-century apprentice Spaniards; the Japanese learned fairly rapidly how to produce like Europeans without,

at the same time, massively accepting Western Europe's habits of consumption.

* * *

In the nineteenth century, the countries of Latin America had little political, military or strategic importance in world affairs. Partly because of this, and partly because of the very great distances which separated them from the centres of decision, although they earnestly tried to imitate the style and manner of European diplomacy, their international politics were emphatically intra-Latin American. Culturally, their nationalism fed on European example, but when it came to action, it was directed against one another. Thus there developed in Latin America a complex, sophisticated diplomacy; a microcosm of world affairs, with international wars, secret pacts, betrayals, arbitration, defence treaties, and - of course - a delicate system of balance of power.

The first stage in this development was brief and violent. As soon as Spain was ousted from the region, it became apparent that the frontiers between the new republics had to be defined, and this was only accomplished after fighting a number of small wars. The major viceregal or imperial centres - Mexico, Colombia, Peru, Brazil and Argentina - retained their territory and their claims were not challenged; but between them there were a number of captaincy-generals and presidencies - smaller administrative units within the Spanish Empire – whose territory was claimed by more than one of their powerful neighbours. These early struggles were resolved through the formation of a number of independent buffer states - Ecuador, Venezuela. Uruguay, Paraguay and Bolivia - which more or less corresponded to the colonial frontiers of the disputed territories.

During the rest of the century and up to the First World War, intra-Latin American politics were mostly dominated by the stresses and shifts of two interlocking systems of balance of power; one ranged along the Atlantic coast and included Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay and Argentina; the other alongside the coast of the Pacific, with Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia and Chile. This second system of equilibrium eventually achieved a delicate internal balance which may have had a positive influence in maintaining stability in the

region during the half century which followed the War of the Pacific in the early 1880s.

It is also worth noting that the Pacific coast system included almost exactly the territory of the Inca Empire and later of the Viceroyalty of Peru, and this is again the area covered by the countries which signed the Andean Pact in 1969.

During this period, which can be roughly considered to have started in the mid-nineteenth century and ended with the depression of 1929, relations with the United States were not always easy. Anti-Americanism, which became such a violent and well-publicized phenomenon during the worst years of the cold war, has its roots in the British-American rivalries of the nineteenth century when the idea that a vast cultural distance separated the presumably civilized, sophisticated, well-mannered, bilingual, European-like Latin Americans, from the loud, wealthy, vulgar and upstart Americans, was time and again used by British, French and German businessmen and diplomats to gain a foothold in the region. Yet in spite of the Mexican-American War and the numerous instances of outright military intervention by the United States Marines in the Caribbean, relations between the major Latin American republics and the United States were not the most important feature of the region's diplomatic history; rather, as I have suggested, it was intra-Latin American relations that consumed most of the energies of the foreign ministries of the new republics.

This relatively sheltered state of affairs came to an abrupt end, not with the First World War which was considered a very distant conflict whose outcome did not really affect Latin America one way or the other, but with the Great Depression of 1929. The economic and social consequences of this event were simply staggering, and reinforced much of what had been preached for some years by the supporters of nationalistic, reformist and revolutionary creeds. A situation of mass unemployment and a general paralysis of economic activity caused not by local maladministration but by financial disruptions which had taken place far away, and for reasons which escaped the control of the Latin American governments, could not but lead to the strengthening of the nationalist positions. These feelings of impotence and frustration were quite general and it became apparent that, whatever their party allegiance or political inclination, practically all

governments in Latin America were moving towards a reconsideration of their relations – political and economic – with the rest of the world. It could perhaps be said that Latin America's awareness of her inter-dependence with the industrialized nations of the world first became politically significant during this decade after 1930, and it was in those crucial years that governments started for the first time to formulate more or less coherent extra-Latin American foreign policies.

This process had hardly begun when the Second World War put an end to it. Undoubtedly, diplomatic activity continued, but these first stirrings of a new and complex nationalism were overwhelmed by the immediate political demands of a conflict which divided the world into two vast enemy camps with Latin America securely within the sphere of influence of the Western allies.

War and depression also brought about great changes in the economic life of these nations. The outbreak of war, especially, led in fact to the establishment of a system of absolute protection for the production of industrial goods in Latin America. There followed a tremendous growth of import-substitution industries, based on public capital, channelled through the central state and necessarily using imported, advanced, capital-intensive techniques. Within two decades, Latin America built a number of vast industrial complexes and in doing so, acquired some considerable knowledge of how to produce the manufactured goods demanded by the large urban markets.

The imitation of consumer tastes which characterized the cultural nationalism of the nineteenth century was in this way completed with a rapid process of adaptation of United States technology and modes of production.

* * *

The end of the war did not bring about any great changes in the foreign political situation as seen from Latin America because soon after hostilities were over came the Truman Doctrine and the cold war, which presented her with a new dilemma, the reflection of yet another situation which was completely beyond her control. However, it appeared to many that the dilemma proposed by President Truman was less convincing than the one posed by the Second World War. It

is possible that a principal reason for this scepticism was that Latin American politicians knew perfectly well that the local Communist movements were very far from being revolutionary and most unlikely to act in the way that President Truman and his successors described. At any rate, although the cold war dilemma was quietly rejected as unrealistic, practically every country used the preoccupation of the United States with the problem of Communist subversion as a lever to secure greater financial aid and military assistance.

The tensions of the cold war resulted in the acceptance by nations on both sides of the Iron Curtain of a number of supra-national arrangements to counteract the real or imagined threats from their respective adversaries. These arrangements became so numerous and well-known that some observers were inclined to think that they were symptomatic of a great trend towards the disappearance of old-fashioned nationalism and the coming of the age of internationalism.

From Latin America, the situation was seen differently. It appeared that the fears, the threats and the military and political demands which resulted from the cold war confrontation, had convinced a number of countries of the wisdom of postponing their own national interests momentarily, for the sake of entering into defensive agreements to protect them from a common danger. In this way were formed NATO, the Warsaw Pact, the Baghdad Pact, ANZUS, SEATO, CENTO, the Organization of American States, and so on.

The high tide of the cold war covered all but the highest peaks of national interest and the conflict gradually resolved itself into a massive confrontation between two great nationalisms; those of the Soviet Union and the United States. For the allies of each contender, the term 'internationalism' acquired a new significance as a euphemism which described the rapid and loyal support these smaller nations gave to the foreign policy decisions of the great powers.

When, for a multiplicity of reasons, the high tide of the cold war started to recede, the peaks of the national interests of lesser nations, which had been submerged, but not eliminated, started to reappear on the surface. Slowly at first, but gradually gaining momentum, polycentrism proliferated on both sides of the old Iron Curtain and there came a moment, perhaps three or four years ago, when the Soviet Union probably felt more significantly challenged – politically – by China than by the United States, while the United States was much more bothered by France than by the Soviet Union.

This restoration of fluidity took place in the shadow of two very great powers, armed to the teeth, locked in a close embrace and unable to manoeuvre with anything approaching agility. More important, perhaps, the principles and ideologies which the Soviet Union and the United States claimed were the ultimate cause for which the cold war was fought, have been challenged all too often even by their respective allies and were quietly shelved while their place was taken by what can only be described as a flexible and pragmatic approach to international politics.

Furthermore, it appears that during the immediate past a dissociation has been taking place between factors which traditionally have gone together in international affairs. At least since Machiavelli pointed it out quite clearly and brutally, military and economic power have been considered essential prerequisites for the efficient exercise of political power. This is not so clear today; Rumania has neither economic nor military power remotely comparable to that of the Soviet Union, and yet she acts in politics in a way which can most certainly be described as significant. France, when President de Gaulle caused such difficulties to NATO, was certainly not in a position to match the United States' economic or military power. In military or economic terms, Peru is a very minor country, and yet this small nation has successfully challenged the United States and is now exercising a considerable political influence in Latin America, much greater than her economic and military might would warrant.

The fact is that, whatever its causes, there is at present a situation which allows certain countries in certain circumstances to have greater political mobility, and perhaps power, than their limited military and economic strength would suggest.

At this juncture in the development of international affairs, Latin Americans face a difficult and exciting problem. If we are to have an

In fact, in the past forty years, there are only two documented instances of active participation by Communists in revolutionary attempts to take over a Latin American government; these happened in Brazil in 1935 and in San Salvador in 1932.

independent foreign policy, based on a civilized and efficient appreciation of what constitutes our national interest, we must first discover what we are, what is it that we want to be, and how we want to go about it. These questions do not really need immediate and definitive answers; it is enough of an accomplishment for us to ask them. Until now, Latin Americans have been at worst mediocre imitators; at best, able to supply intelligent answers to questions posed elsewhere. To begin asking our own questions represents a very great and positive change.

For three hundred years Latin Americans tried to become like Spaniards; then for one hundred and fifty years we used our wealth and energy to try to turn ourselves into sophisticated Europeans; for the past twenty years we have accepted – for good or bad reasons – circumstances and situations which have made us increasingly dependent on the United States.

Today it is fairly obvious that the dynamic possibilities of dependence have been exhausted and Latin Americans are at last faced with themselves; forced at short notice to establish a coherent and functional relation between national aspirations and foreign politics.

It is important, if we are to understand correctly what this political and intellectual mood really means, not to fall into the trap of thinking it is just one more instalment of the facile anti-Americanism of the cold war years. This is simply not so. The nationalist resurgence cuts across political boundaries in a very real way. Only a few weeks ago, when the government of Chile was revising its policies with respect to the United States copper companies operating in the country, all the political parties, from the extreme Right to the extreme Left, were in favour of nationalization. In the confrontation between the Peruvian government and the International Petroleum Company, again, all the political parties and organized groups of opinion supported President Velasco Alvarado although they openly disagreed with him on other issues. Such examples can be multiplied and indicate that the old cold war divisions no longer apply to the relations between Latin America and the United States.

This resurgence of nationalist feeling has not, of course, taken place in a vacuum. A number of political decisions mark the transition from the quiet acceptance of a dependent role – which was

more or less common a decade ago to the generalized and almost respectable defiance of today. One most significant event in this process of transition has undoubtedly been the Alliance for Progress, that scheme of co-operation first launched by President Kennedy at the beginning of this decade and whose unhappy life has surprised even its most bitter critics with its inglorious brevity and quiet demise.

When the Alliance was first launched, it was openly proclaimed to be the answer of the United States to the Communist menace in the region; it differed from all other schemes in that it conditioned the granting of financial assistance to the fulfilment of certain types of reform (agrarian, fiscal and administrative), and the maintenance of representative, democratic forms of government. Apart from other considerations, the Alliance represented a conscious attempt by the United States to change her political allies in Latin America. There was at the time, inside the Democratic Party and especially among the President's closest associates, a feeling of great unease with the type of political support the United States was receiving in Latin America. It was felt that it was unfair, inefficient and dangerous that the support which the great democratic power obtained in Latin America should have been almost exclusively forthcoming from the extreme Right-wing groups which loudly and frequently made public their loyalty to the United States in her anti-Bolshevik crusade. The new Kennedy Administration felt that this identification of the United States with every petty southern tyranny and the most reactionary political movements was extremely undesirable, as well as paradoxical, for the United States stood precisely for principles of political conduct that were anathema to these southern hemisphere political movements. Moreover, the victory of Fidel Castro in Cuba was seen by many - mistakenly as it turned out - to be a portent of things to come, and there was a genuine desire to find for the United States a course of political and economic action more in tune with changing circumstances.

The Alliance, through its emphatic advocacy of reform and democratic control, tried to shift the site of local political support for the United States from the extreme Right-wing to the centre-Left. It was felt that with its strong advocacy of structural reform, the non-Communist Left

would have no option but to support it. On the other hand, it was also felt that the loss of the support of the extreme Right-wing was not such a catastrophe and would be more than amply compensated in quality and numbers by the new loyalties which the Alliance was expected to inspire among the centre-Left.

This analysis was only partly borne out by subsequent events; the Right-wing felt betrayed and was absolutely indignant with the United States, but the centre-Left greeted the initiative with coolness and in fact was never really prepared to support it. As a result, the United States was more deprived of political support than before.

In an indirect manner, the political failure of the Alliance for Progress opened the way to the type of nationalist challenge that has now become characteristic of the foreign policy of the countries of Latin America. For, after years of loudly proclaiming her cold war aims, the United States had believed her own arguments and was imprisoned in a rigid mould of policy which could only conceive of a Communist Left-wing challenge from Latin America. In a way, she resembled the fortress of Singapore on the eve of the Second World War, all guns facing the sea but practically defenceless against a land attack. The United States had all her formidable political and military artillery aimed against the Latin American Left-wing, but she was quite vulnerable to a nationalist challenge from the Right or the centre-Right. And this is precisely what has happened: the resurgence of national feeling; the desire by the intelligentsia, large sectors of the urban middle groups, the armed forces and some Church groups, to put an end to the limitations of dependence; the frustration of the Right-wing and the relative decline of the influence of the United States in world affairs in the face of a growing polycentrism and a general restoration of fluidity to international politics, all have contributed to bringing about a complex crisis in the relations between Latin America and the United States

This crisis has been facilitated by Washington's delay in announcing a coherent policy to replace the defunct Alliance for Progress. There is indeed a pause on the part of the new Nixon Administration which reflects an equilibrium between conflicting pressure groups within the United States. This is not likely to be resolved at short notice and in the meanwhile Latin America will prob-

ably have sufficient time to put together a fairly impressive and politically viable nationalist foreign policy.

In the past, the policies of the United States towards Latin America were mostly influenced by the traditional primary producers' pressure group - those United States corporations interested in the production of Latin American raw materials and primary products which were subsequently exported elsewhere - and in the export to Latin America of United States manufactures. These groups were mostly identified with the Republican Party and had close links with the local Right-wing groups in Latin America. Their relative economic influence has been declining over the last two decades whilst the importance of another group, the financial and industrial interests, has been growing. These new corporations are not interested in the production of raw materials for export, but in the production of manufactured goods inside Làtin America. Theirs is a progressive and modernizing outlook and they are prepared to support all the reforms, however radical, which they feel are compatible with rapid economic development. They are mostly associated with the Democratic Party and at the time strongly supported the Alliance for Progress. The trouble is that although their influence has been growing, they are now out of power, while the traditional pressure group of the primary producers whose influence has been declining, finds itself back in power with President Nixon. In a way, Governor Rockefeller symbolizes this paradoxical situation in his own person because through his family he is associated with Standard Oil (and hence with the International Petroleum Company) which is typical of the traditional primary producers' pressure group, but personally he is mostly interested in the new industrial and financial ventures, through the Chase Manhattan Bank, IBEC, and other enterprises.

At present, the delicate equilibrium between these conflicting pressure groups does not appear to be moving towards a resolution, but from the point of view of the new Latin American nationalists, one is as bad as the other, because the type of economic development which the modernizing pressure group would support would drive the region even deeper into a position of utter dependence.

This concern with the problem of dependence

underlies the whole issue of relations with the United States and although at times it may appear crude, it hides the essence of a cultural attitude which may well become the most dynamic force behind the resurgence of nationalism.

After centuries of more or less successful imitation of foreign models, Latin Americans are convinced that they must start creating their own environment, intellectual, political and artistic. The history of the passing of man through this planet is in many ways the history of the physical and institutional shapes he has designed to serve him as instruments. Man is the only animal who used tools systematically, but these are not absolutely practical; they have different shapes which identify the user. A Greek vase is different from a Coca-Cola bottle and yet both were designed to hold liquids. If two thousand years hence archaeologists were to dig up present-day Latin America, they would find little or nothing to differentiate that part of the world or to identify it with a certain people.

What Latin Americans find most undesirable in the development of industries using United States capital, technology and designs, is that this is gradually building a cultural environment which is utterly deprived of functional contact with the social conglomerate which inhabits it. As industrial products are every day more abundant and production is growing very rapidly, the urban groups in Latin America have almost a feeling of suffocation under an avalanche of foreign shapes which obliterates the personality of the region.

As can be imagined, this is not a small problem and it most certainly does not have a single or easy solution. However, three initiatives are now gaining considerable support which in my opinion—accurately reflect the spirit in which solutions to these problems are being sought.

The first is a conscious and deliberate attempt to create in Latin America a scientific and technological pool with sufficient capacity to generate and innovate in those fields. This is a difficult if not impossible enterprise for a single country, but it is now being planned at least on the basis of the Andean group of nations. Secondly, the movement for Latin American integration which until recently was seen mainly as a commercial initiative, has now attained a new political significance not so much as a free trade area, but rather as a powerful coalition which would improve the negotiating capacity of the member countries and also afford a broad base for the development of industrial ventures built around autonomous, multinational state or mixed corporations.

Finally, there is a widespread feeling that an effective and opportune way of helping to solve the problem of dependence is by breaking away from the vertical axis, United States-Latin America. This is to be accomplished not by falling into the negative trap of anti-Americanism, but rather by diversifying the foreign relations of the southern republics; by making a determined effort to open up functional channels of communication and trade, activating exchanges between the countries on either side of the Pacific. The opening to the Pacific is thus an indirect consequence of the crisis in the relations between Latin America and the United States and has now become a major object of policy for the Andean group of nations, the most imaginative and dynamic coalition of the region.

Fidel & the New State-Class

By John Mander

PIDEL CASTRO, according to Mr. Herbert Matthews, is the first Latin American to have achieved world fame during his own life-time. Of course Mr. Matthews, as readers of Encounter (see his long article, "Dissent over Cuba," Encounter, July 1964) will know, has an interest to declare in this matter, and readily declares it. A dispassionate observer might indeed get the impression that Mr. Matthews had invented Fidel Castro; and he would not be far wrong. Castro himself has been heard to refer irritably to "this old man who thinks he's my father" (quoted by Mr. Matthews in the present biography). The irritation comes naturally from a man who, if he has not yet claimed immaculate conception, is known to have re-sented his actual father as strongly as he resented the tutelage of an Eisenhower, or a Khrushchev. Still, it would be as much a mistake to attempt to psychologise Fidel away, as to take his wordy rhetoric for gospel, which is more or less what Mr. Matthews contends Mr. Theodore Draper has been doing. In that long battle Mr. Matthews comes up with several cogent points. Kremlinology, as practised in contemporary think-tanks, is wasted on Fidel Castro. When Mr. Matthews first interviewed him in the Sierra Maestra, he was most certainly not a Communist. That he was a potential eaudillo, of great force and very Latin American type, Mr. Matthews spotted correctly and duly informed his N.Y. Times audience. It had been thought that Fidel was dead-killed when his boat from Mexico made its disastrous landfall. Mr. Matthews revived the man and

his legend, and by so doing gave him a place in American folk-lore and Batista a nasty shock. For once, the historian had made history. One can hardly blame Mr. Matthews for

sticking so doggedly to his invention.

"Invention" sounds impolite, and perhaps "discovery" would be more gracious. But one cannot help feeling that Mr. Matthews' Fidel is as much "invented" as, say, Mr. Draper's or Messrs. Huberman & Sweezy's in their feedly appleastic account when they admit frankly apologetic account—though they admit the more glaring mistakes—of the social and political structure of the new Cuba.2 Mr. Matthews quotes a school report that credits the young Fidel with "remarkable histrionic abilities." Fidel is indeed, though not quite in the sense Mr. Bolt intended, a man for all seasons. If it suits Fidel, as it did late in 1961, not only to claim that he was a Marxist-Leninist, but that he had always been one-an easily controvertible fact—this is more readily understood within the context of the history of Latin American caudillismo (as can be gleaned from Irene Nicholson's posthumous The Liberators, or from Lewis Hanke's immensely scholarly collection, History of Latin American Civilisation') than of the history of the world communist movement. Thus, it may well be that in the Draper-Matthews controversy both camps have right on their side. "Objectively" (to speak in Marxist terms) Fidel has certainly brought Cuba into the Socialist camp, and is pro-Soviet enough to have condoned the Czechoslovak intervention. But at the same time it is entirely credible that Raul Castro (in a laughing comment to Mr. Matthews) should have said, "Yes, we tried to read Marx's Capital when we were in prison. But we threw it away after three chapters.... The Latin American caudillo has traditionally won power through his personal qualitiesbravery, panache, millenarian rhetoric. Ideo-logical consistency has never rated very high.

But this is not to say that the caudillo -Bolivar, Peron or Castro-does not operate

¹ Castro: A Political Biography. By Herbert L. Matthews. Allen Lane The Penguin Press, 50s. ² Socialism in Cuba. By Leo Huberman and Paul M. Sweezy. Monthly Review Press, 54s., \$5.95. ³ The Liberators. By Irene Nicholson. Faber &

Faber, 55s.

4 History of Latin American Civilisation. Edited by Lawis Hanne. Methuen, 65s.

according to certain rules inherent in the make-up of Latin American society. The similarity of the pattern suggests, on the contrary, a high degree of consistency. Historically, caudilismo was a rough and ready solution to the problem of legitimacy in the broken societies "the Liberators" left behind them. It is clear from Professor Hanke's volume and fessor Humphreys', that very little in the colonial experience of Latin America (unlike that of the Thirteen States) had prepared her inhabitants for self-government. Before Miranda, Bolivar, and San Martin (as famous, surely, in their lifetimes as Mr. Matthews' Fidel?) royal authority had been absolute. After them, no firm basis of authority remained. The oligarchs ruled, but who should rule the oligarchs? The upshot could only be territorial fragmentation, and reversion to the rule of the strongest. If a more intellectual justification was looked for, tradition dictated that the ruling caudillo should turn to Europe or North America for some suitable ideology to under-pin his authority. The ideology in question need not be especially relevant to the circumstances of the country he ruled: but it must be new, and it must have at its back the pres-tige of some recently triumphant cause. Thus Bolivar and San Martin (as Miss Nicholson shows) were children of the Benthamites and the French Revolution. Later in the century, Porfirio Diaz of Mexico, and many others, proclaimed Comte's positivisme as their state philosophy. Peron of Argentina-and Vargas of Brazil-dabbled in Fascism. Seen in this perspective, Castro and Guevara were merely following the tradicional path in proclaiming their revolution "Maxist-Leninist"—without troubling to read the Marxist classics and, indeed, keeping the genuine communists (as the two Escalante affairs show) as far as possible from the levers of power. This is one point, among many others, made by Mr. Richard Bourne in his excellent recent *Pelican* study of Latin American leaders of the present day Guevara, Frei, Stroessner, Lacerda, Kubitschek, Evita Peron. All exhibit this type of caudillo leader-ship; all tend to make up their (very varied) ideologies as they go along.

THE CONTRAST LETWEEN the slapdash amateurism of the 26 July group (which Mr. Matthews makes no attempt to conceal) and the dreary, but disciplined professionalism of the official communists could hardly be greater. But if the

professional communists came in handy (they were good organisers—they had organised for Batista), their ideology satisfied certain needs which existed not only in the Cuba of the 1960s, but equally in the Latin America of the Liberators, and indeed of the Conquistadores. The Conquistadores had the universal Catholic religion to sustain them in their incredible endeavours in the New World, and it is hardly conceivable that a band of mere marauders could have achieved the same results.

Similarly, the Liberators had the universal ideology of "the Rights of Man" to sustain them in their struggle against the decrepit, bigoted rule of the later Bourbons. Armed with this ideology, they did not feel themselves provincials, and were not so treated by their European or North American contemporaries. Indeed, they could feel that in making their revolutions they had put themselves in the forefront of humanity. Certainly, it is not difficult to see a certain ambiguity in their eager adoption of this new ideology. For, while they felt that they were "making it new," it is apparent to us that they were employing a borrowed ideology, often fatally ill-suited to the real problems of their continent.

It is unkind perhaps, but surely accurate, to see in this a typically colonial reaction. The attitude to the metropolis is ambivalent: on the one hand, it and all its works are rejected as outmoded; on the other, its newest, most avantgarde thinkers are called in to redress the balance. It is apparent that Marxism-Lenism satisfies these ancient needs very well. It is universalist: it is anti-American; and it can still be presented as "the new thing." Without it, Castro would be just another Latin American caudillo lording it over a relatively insignificant island. With it, he becomes part of a universal process—indeed its avant-garde. Yet, from another aspect, it must appear that all he has done is to exchange one variety of colonial dependence for another.

THIS ARGUES, THEN, for a Latin American interpretation of the phenomenon Fidel Castro. Whether Fidel Castro, so interpreted, is more or less of a danger to the United States I am not sure. Logically, it would appear that an indigenous Castrismo was far more of a threat to the

⁵ Tradition and Revolt in Latin America and other essays. By R. A. HUMPHREYS. Weidenfeld &

Nicolson, 63s.

* Political Leaders of Latin America. By Richard Bourne. Penguin, 78.

⁸The same ambiguity runs through much of Latin American art and literature. For those interested in the cultural working-out of this inherited ambiguity a study of German Arciniegas' Latin America: a cultural history (Barrie & Rockliff, 84s.). or, in the visual arts, Leopoldo Castedo's excellent, up-to-date and splendidly illustrated A History of Latin American Art and Architecture (Pall Mall, 50s.) is strongly recommended.

"American system" than an alien regime imposed by force on an unwilling society. But this is perhaps to ignore the heterogeneity of Latin American society itself (as Castro and Guevara did), and to argue that a formula that worked in one area of the continent is applicable to another with wholly different conditions (i.e., Bolivia). This, too, is an ancient problem. Is Latin America one—as the titles of Professor Hanke's and Professor Humphreys' volumes assume—or is the heterogeneity so great as to render all generalisations meaningless? It will be seen that both communists and anti-communists are potential victims of this dilemma.

Theoretically, Marxism should take "objective conditions" into account, and proceed therefrom. But it is evident that in today's prevalent anti-Americanism it is subjective conditions that really count. Anti-Americanism is a reaction that bears little relation to the objective facts of American investment, interference, etc. In fact, it is clear that one reason why Cuba was among the top league of Latin American states economically before Castro was precisely that American investment was so high. But this has to be balanced against the fact that I I avana (like Mexico City and Lima, "City of the Kings") was, at the time of the Declaration of Independence, a richer, more powerful, more elegant city than any in North America. The historical humiliation involved in the descent from this status to a centre of gambling and prostitution for the yanqui tourist is painful to imagine, and may well count for more than all U.S. imperialist activities in this century. If Cuba is competing in any kind of avant-garde race, it is in the subjective depth and violence of its anti-Americanism.

But there is a profounder view of the "Latin Americanism" of Fidel Castro's revolution; and an excellent analysis of it is to be found in Luis Mercier Vega's Roads to Power in Latin America. Mercier Vega is clearly on the side of those who see Latin America as a frustrated civilisation. The states of Latin America have a common problem. The old oligarchies are not well-adapted to coping with the complexities of modern society. Yet the social progression we are familiar with in Europe—feudalism-bourgeoisie-proletariat—makes little sense in Latin America. There is no bourgeoisie, because the middle class remains largely dependent on the old oligarchic structure, and desires only to live by its traditional values. Equally, there is no proletariat because the "feudal" re-

Yet the old, oligarchic state is plainly obsolescent. What, then, is the alternative? In a brilliant analysis of the various guerrilla movements of the past decade, M. Mercier Vega makes it very plain that guerrilla tactics are not among the "roads to power" he has in mind. True, in Cuba they can be said (with reservations) to have succeeded. But elsewhere, he suggests, there are only two real alternatives: the Army, and what he calls the "Stateclass." We are already familiar with the Army. It is in power in Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Bolivia today, and provides one possible alternative (and not necessarily a "right-wing" one, as the Peruvian example shows). But Army régimes are generally short-lived, because armies do not possess the kind of expertise, any more than do oligarchies, which modern administration requires.

The second alternative, then, is the "State-class." This is not a middle class in the conventional Anglo-Saxon or Marxist sense (if anything, it is closer to that "New Class" of which Djilas wrote). This "State-class" is essentially an extension of that centralised bureaucracy which Latin America has known since Colonial days, laced with a portion of modern-type technocracy. It is to be seen in Mexico in the PRI party, where it functions efficiently and with a degree of "democratic centralism," by electing a caudillo for a non-renewable term of six years, and uses the rhetoric of a Revolution in which it only fitfully believes. This type of régime is more long-lasting than the military type, because it possesses greater expertise and elasticity, control of the pork barrel, and an ability to exploit the nationalist sentiments of the electorate, while pacifying the concern of the foreign investor. It needs, still, a caudillotype figure who can act as arbiter between conflicting interests. It is both very modern, and very traditional. It is to M. Mercier Vega that we owe the bold suggestion that what we are seeing in Cuba is essentially the establishment of a "State-class" and a "class-State," of a type that will become increasingly common in Latin America. M. Mercier Vega has taken Fidel firmly out of the hands of Mr. Matthews and Mr. Draper, and those of Messrs. Huberman & Sweezy, and convincingly de-demonised him.

lations that existed in the countryside have been reproduced in the context of industrial life, and trade unions are almost everywhere dependent agents of the state or the oligarchy. (Equally, one might add, there is no true peasantry in the European sense, so that even "feudalism" is an inappropriate term.)

Roads to Power in Latin America. By Luis Mercier Vega. Pall Mall Press, 45s.

¹⁰ Guerrillas in Latin America. By Luis Mercier Vega. Pall Mall, 455.

THE RULES OF THE GAME

CROSS the Tiber from the sumptuous palaces of the Vatican, in an old square off the Piazza Navona, there stands a fragmented statue of unknown origin that has come to be known as Pasquino, in honor of a fifteenth-century tailor who lived nearby. Tradition has it that the original Pasquino was a man of mordant wit who delighted in cutting men's reputations apart. For centuries, Romans have been using the statue, the pedestal on which it stands, and the wall behind it to affix satirical quatrains, epigrams, and lampoons in prose and verse. These pasquinades, as the satires are called, have been directed against the venality of popes and cardinals, against indulgences and simonies, against the vainglory of princes, against any person or institution considered unjust. Pope Julius II, for example, was described by the following verse: "A fraudulent merchant, he has sold so much Heaven that none remains for him." Throughout the centuries, Pasquino has been a symbol of resistance to all pomp and solemnity-and especially to clericalism. It was in a café facing the statue of Pasquino, one sunny June morning in 1968, that Monsignor Ivan Illich, a naturalized United States citizen of Spanish, German, and Yugoslav ancestry who had become one of the most admired, feared, and controversial priests in the American hemisphere, chose to eat his breakfast before keeping an appointment to which he had been summoned at the Vatican. Illich, a tall, lanky man in his early forties with handsome, hawklike features, who was dressed for the occasion in a secular gray suit, a secular white shirt, and a secular black tie, rose from a third cup of cappuccino shortly before 9 A.M. He walked with a swift and feline stride across the Ponte Sant' Angelo and toward the building, just to the left of St. Peter's Basilica, that houses the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. This agency, also known as the Holy Office, is an offshoot of the Sacred Congregation of the Universal Inquisition, which had its origins in the early thirteenth century.

It was to answer certain questions about his faith that Illich had been summoned to the Vatican. The questions had been divided by the Holy Office into four categories: "Dangerous Doctrinal Opinions," "Erroneous Ideas Against the Church," "Bizarre Conceptions About the Clergy," and "Subversive Interpretations Concerning the Liturgy and Ecclesiastical Discipline." In past centuries, men had often been dragged to similar interrogations in chains. In 1968, proceedings of such nature were rather more civilized, even in the case of a man who had become "una cosa de curiosità, de maraviglia, de scandalo"-"an object of curiosity, bewilderment, and scandal"-to the Roman Catholic Church. Illich, for seven years the director of a center of higher learning in Mexico whose progressive character had come to alarm the Vatican. had arrived in Rome by plane, and he presented himself punctually at the Holy Office, smiling and very obviously

After ringing the doorbell and being admitted into a small vestibule, Illich was led through a set of double doorsone of them padded with leather for soundproofing-into a large reception room, which he recalls as rather stuffy. He was left there alone to wait. The windows were shuttered and partly covered with triple sets of curtains. The chairs were of a high-baroque style, gilded and upholstered with red plush. In front of a large sofa stood an imposing table of pink marble. On it was a ballpoint pen chained to a green plastic holder, which was glued to the table. Illich walked to a window and opened it wide. Leaning on the windowsill, he looked out at the construction site of a new church building, designed to serve as a meeting hall for future Vatican councils. Men in yellow helmets were directing the placement by large cranes of some precast cement modules twelve feet high. Behind the building site, and partly hidden by the cranes, stood the splendid little medieval Church of Camposanto Teutonico. Illich sat down at the pink marble table and, with the chained

green pen, wrote a brief letter in Portuguese—one of eleven languages in which he is fluent—to a close friend, a Brazilian archbishop. He described, in that brief note, the furniture in the reception room of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith and expressed grave doubt whether any part of a church should be built with precast cement blocks.

Punctually at nine, Franjo Cardinal Seper, of Yugoslavia, the head of the Congregation and one of the highest ranking prelates in the Roman Catholic Church, entered the room and greeted Illich. The Cardinal, having received a ceremonial kiss on his ring, vigorously shook his visitor's hand. After exchanging a few phrases in Italian, the two men talked for twenty minutes in Serbo-Croatian about the weather in Dalmatia, Cardinal Seper, as Illich later described him, seemed "very kind, very correct, most humane, rather apologetic . . . acting like a man obligated to proceed in a transaction which embarrassed him profoundly." After this pleasant interlude in the Cardinal's native tongue, the two men went back to Italian to discuss the business at hand. Cardinal Seper then called into the room an unsmiling man dressed in a worn black cassock, and explained that this official of the Holy Office, whom he introduced as Monsignor de Magistris, would show Illich where he was to go next. On the way out of the reception room, Monsignor de Magistris picked up a heavy silver inkwell with a pen in it-Illich is struck to this day by the preponderance of pens in his recollection of that visit-and the two men walked down some back stairs to a very ancient and creaky elevator, which took them several stories deeper into the subterranean regions of the Vatican. They emerged into a musty corridor lined from floor to ceiling with shelves of ancient leather-bound volumes. After passing through three more narrow rooms lined with bookcases-which were covered with what Illich describes as "real chicken wire"—they arrived in a chamber dominated by a heavy oak table on which stood two candlesticks, a Bible, a black wooden crucifix with a white figure of Christ, and a large dossier of press clippings, one of which Illich recognized as a page from the French weekly Paris-Match, Behind the table sat a small, rubicund man who appeared to be in his fifties. Monsignor de Magistris deposited the silver inkpot on the table. Illich walked up to the man scated at the table, and the following conversation took place (in Italian):

"I am Illich."

"I know."

"Monsignor, who are you?"

"Your judge."

"I thought I would know your name."

"That is unimportant. I am called Casoria."

All three men then made the sign of the cross, and Illich was asked to put

his hand on his chest and swear to tell the truth. He obliged. He was then asked to keep secret everything that took place in the ensuing exchanges and was warned that a special excommunication would be issued against anyone who revealed the proceedings of the Congregation. Illich, in very rapid Italian, replied that he refused to take any oath of secrecy, on the grounds that such an oath would be "against the natural law of selfdefense and the divine law of honesty in the Church" and that it would contradiet the Vatican Council's reforms of the Congregation's methods, violating in particular the papal edict "Integrae Servandae," of 1965, which stated that the charges and the rules of procedure of the Congregation should be a matter of public record.

This refusal apparently took the two officials by surprise, and a heated discussion followed, "We have other means at our disposal!" Monsignor Casoria exclaimed, waving some papers in the air. "If you don't want to swear to secrecy, this is over!"

Thereupon, Illich began to intone, "In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the . . ."

"What are you doing?"

"I am putting an end to this session." Illich recalls some very excited shouting, "This is without precedent!" the interrogators cried. Illich persisted, and it was finally agreed that he would not have to answer any accusations until he had received a written copy of all the charges against him. Monsignor de Magistris went upstairs to confer with Cardinal Seper, and while he was gone the two men remaining in the chamber had a strained but polite conversation. Illich asked the judge what his official post was at the Vatican. Monsignor Casoria disclosed that in addition to being a Judge of the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, he was Under-Secretary of the Sacred Congregation for the Discipline of the Sacraments, Counsellor of the Sacred Congregation for the Clergy, Deputy to the Monasterics of Rome, and a specialist in the physical details of unconsummated marriages. When Monsignor de Magistris returned, he announced that, with Cardinal Seper's consent, a written copy of the Congregation's questions would be brought to Monsignor Illich that afternoon.

Illich was staying at the Capranica, Rome's oldest and most distinguished ecclesiastical residence, where he had once lived while studying for the priesthood. And he was waiting there when, at three-thirty, a messenger arrived with a Xerox copy of the Congregation's questionnaire. Illich sat down to read it, and almost at once he started laughing. He laughed a good deal that afternoon as he sat in the Roman sunshine perusing the extraordinary document that had been drawn nary document that had been drawn Msgr. de Magistris and Msgr. Casoria, up against him, for he found that and to give Your Eminence my own

most of the questions were not only theologically unsound and based on the vaguest of anonymous innuendoes; they were also very funny: "What do you think of Heaven and Hell, and also of Limbo?" "Do you deny the distinction between shepherds and

> sheep among the people of God on earth?" "What are your thoughts on the peaceful coexistence of East and West?" "What did you have to do with the kidnapping of the Archbishop of Guatemala?" "What is the nature of your relations with Octavio Paz and Carlos Fuentes?" "Is it true that you would like to see women go to confession without a grate in the confessional box?" "Is it true that, beginning in 1960, there has been in you a dangerous general development of new ideas and disintegrating tendencies of a humanitarian and libertarian nature?" "What would you answer to those who say that you are petulant, adventurous, imprudent, fanatical, and hypnotizing, a rebel against all authority, disposed to accept and recognize only that of the Bishop of Cuernavaca, Mexico?"

That evening, sitting in a trattoria near the Teatro di Marcello over an excellent Roman dinner and three carafes of Frascati, Illich composed

a letter (in Italian) to Cardinal Seper, which began:

Most Reverend Eminence:

Following upon the interview that Your Eminence granted me yesterday morning with so much pastoral feeling, I find myself obliged to report to Your Eminence all that took place during and after the interrogation conducted by view of the situation as it now stands. Let me start by saying that, faced with authoritative procedures which, at least in my opinion, are very questionable in both substance and style, I am left—as a Christian and as a priest—with a single, clear-cut choice.

I can, on the one hand, simply withhold any defense of myself, without claiming my reasonable rights or advancing my lawful defense. On the other hand, I can (not for my sake but for the sake of defending the divine constitution of the Church and the honorable status of its ecclesiastical institutions) set myself systematically in opposition to everything that I recognize as a distortion of the Gospel, contrary to the divine principles that govern the Church, contrary to what has been decided by the councils, and contrary even to the most recent and repeated statements of the highest ecclesiastical authorities.

Eminence, I must acknowledge to you that I have decisively chosen the first way, and that I have resolved to take as my watchword "If a man asks you to lend him your coat, then give him your shirt as well."

In this letter, Illich added that many of the questions put to him were so phrased as to elicit defamatory information about other priests, about laymen, and even about bishops-information that he suggested the judges should "ferret out by other and more correct channels." And he stressed the fact that his refusal to answer the Congregation's questionnaire was in no way a personal defense but had the purpose of "contributing to the greater splendor of the Church." The letter ended in a tone of contrite subservience to Rome that has always been Illich's style, and that annoys many of his progressive friends. "Trusting in Your Eminence's continued understanding," he wrote, "I declare myself Your Eminence's most humble son."

The next morning, before boarding a plane for Mexico, Illich returned to the Vatican to deliver his letter personally to Cardinal Seper, and the Cardinal received him with emphatic cordiality. "I had the impression that his feelings were somewhere between perplexity, incredulity that such a procedure was possible, exasperation, and humorous annoyance," Illich said later. "As we parted, he gave me an abbraccio, most affectionately. And then a truly extraordinary thing happened.

We were speaking in Croatian, and as the Cardinal led me to the door his last words to me were 'Hadjite, hadjite, nemojte se vratiti!'—which means 'Get going, get going, and never come back!' In other words, 'Beat it!' It wasn't until I was going down the stairs from his office that it struck me that he was quoting from the Inquisitor's last words to the prisoner in Dostoevski's story of the Grand Inquisitor."

WHEN Illich arrived in the United States in 1952, shortly after he had been ordained in Rome, he was assigned to the Incarnation Church in New York's Washington Heights, a prosperous, conservative Irish neighborhood that was receiving a startling influx of Puerto Ricans. He was welcomed to the parish by its pastor, Monsignor John Casey, a hearty Irishman who had once served as secretary to Francis Cardinal Spellman. "Ivan Illich?" Monsignor Casey asked incredulously as he greeted his new curate. "What kind of a name is that to go around with? It sounds Communist. We'll call you Johnny." One of Johnny Illich's first assignments was to add Spanish to the number of languages he spoke by attending the Berlitz School, where Monsignor Casey had been studying Spanish three times a week for three years, with indifferent results, in order to attend to his growing flock of Puerto Rican parishioners. Illich's performance at Berlitz staggered Monsignor Casey; he covered seven lessons in one session. Within three weeks, Illich had quit Berlitz. Within three months, he was speaking Spanish fluently, having learned it mostly by standing around the street corners of Washington Heights asking questions of his Puerto Rican parishioners. Where did they come from? What were their native customs? What could the Church do to make them feel more at home? Illich discovered that although not all Puerto Ricans had close ties to the Church, more than one-third of the nominally Roman Catholic population in the New York archdiocese was Puerto Rican, and he soon became aware that the problem of integrating Puerto

Ricans into American-style religion was one of Cardinal Spellman's biggest headaches. Before long, Illich was revolutionizing the New York archdiocese's approach to the Puerto Rican problem. His methods were unorthodox. During his yearly vacations, he walked, rode horseback, and hitchhiked all over Puerto Rico with a knapsack on his back. "The first Mass I said at about six in the morning, after I had slept on the altar steps of the chapel," he wrote of a typical day on one of those excursions. "Then I travelled on, by horseback, to the next chapel, I heard confessions, baptized, married, and off I went to the third chapel, on horseback still, where I arrived after noon."

A genial, dynamic, obsessed man, Illich puzzled his colleagues. His background was strikingly different from that of most of the young curates in the New York archdiocese. His father, who came from a titled Dalmatian family, had been a wealthy engineer and landowner in prewar Germany; his mother's family were Sephardic Jews who had come to Germany from Spain. Born in Vienna in 1926, Illich was expelled from the Austrian school he attended in the thirties because of his mother's Jewish background. During the war, he continued his education in Italy, and at first he seemed destined to be a scientist. He did research in crystallography at the University of Florence, and developed a method of discerning blood types by their crystallographic formation. By the time he was twenty-four, he had earned a doctorate in history from the University of Salzburg (he wrote his dissertation on Toynbee's philosophy of history) and other degrees in philosophy and theology at the Gregorian University in Rome. Since his teens, Illich has been a close friend of Jacques Maritain, and he describes Maritain as a central influence on his life. The Vatican had wished Illich to enter the Collegio di Nobili Ecclesiastici, where gifted linguists and intellectuals are prepared for high-ranking careers in the Church's diplomatic corps. It was therefore a source of bewilderment to all who knew him when this high-strung, suave,

dazzlingly brilliant aristocrat turned away from the distinguished posts for which the Holy See had intended him and sought assignment to an obscure position in New York City's most conventional Irish territory. "What in heck did you come here for?" one of his colleagues at Incarnation, Father Joseph Connolly, once asked him. "I came because my friends in Rome ribbed me about not being able to make it in an American parish," Illich answered. A need to test himself, to accept the toughest challenges, has always been a trait of Illich's character, which some of his friends say borders on the masochistic.

According to Father Connolly, living in the same parish with Illich was "like riding a Piper Cub with an atom bomb under the seat." Illich climbed stairs three at a time; he never walked through the rectory but swept through it like a tornado. His ability to recruit people was nothing short of extraordinary. He started employment agencies for Puerto Rican migrants and persuaded Madison Avenue magnates to publicize them. When he set up Sunday camps for Puerto Rican children, dozens of Irish bus drivers gave up their Sundays to take the kids to the country. He encouraged young social workers to live in cuartitossmall apartments in the Puerto Rican slums-so that they could better observe the needs of the people. "The Puerto Ricans idolized him," Father Connolly has said. "He was Mr. Puerto Rico, their Babe Ruth." Father Connolly has also described him as "the most prayerful and ascetic priest I've ever known." Illich was in the church by 6 A.M., before anyone else, saying his breviary and his rosary. He forgot to eat when there was work to do. He was known for his zeal in visiting the sick, the aged, and men in jail, and also for his rigorous, sometimes pedantic orthodoxy. He was always looking up ancient sources to resolve a doctrinal dispute. He insisted on frequent confession and frequent Communion. Some of Illich's colleagues criticized him for an overabundance of zeal-they felt, for instance, that he

encouraged too many women to enter convents. "Lay off that stuff," Father Connolly would say. "You're pushing them in." Yet although Illich was idolized by parishioners, he was never entirely at ease with the other priests he met and worked with in New York. He once turned to Father Connolly, a man from Hell's Kitchen who had worked as a slaughterhouse butcher, and said wistfully, "I wish I had been a slaughterhouse butcher, so I could be closer to the other priests." Father Connolly smiled, and told Illich, "You were not cast for the role of shepherd but for empire."

Early in his career, Illich began to criticize the American Church for its smugness, its bureaucracy, and its chauvinism-especially for its way of imposing its own values on minority groups such as the Puerto Ricans. He voiced his criticism in essays published in theological journals under the pen name of Peter Canon, "A critical attitude is precisely one of the areas in which Christian love for the Church can develop," he wrote in one of the first of these essays. "Criticism is the fruit of hard work and prayer." Irritated by the "ecclesiastical conquistadores" whom he saw working as missionaries in Puerto Rico-he was shocked by their ignorance of native idiom and their lack of interest in native tradition-he soon began to agitate for a radical transformation of American missionary methods. The missionary must be indifferent not only to possessions and material comfort, he wrote, but to all the values and customs of his own home. The American priest working with people of a foreign cul-

ture should cultivate a spirit of "total cultural indifference." To Illich, any expression of cultural superiority seemed as powerful a manifestation of original sin as the confusion of tongues at Babel. The process of obtaining grace, he wrote on one occasion, might involve a total stripping away of cultural values, "a beatitude of cultural poverty." The missionary, therefore, had to be

"willing to witness with his life, to a foreign people, the relativity of human convictions in front of the unique and absolute meaning of the Revelation."

Illich frequently pointed out that many Puerto Ricans failed to attend Mass in the United States because it started on time. And if he had had his way, he would have totally transferred the church of the campesinos, with its unpunctuality, its semi-pagan rituals, its great community feast days, to the streets of New York. He wanted to cut through all formalities in order to meet the needs of the communicants. His crusade to give church weddings to the numerous Puerto Rican couples who had had only a civil or

consensual marriage was a nightmare for Incarnation Parish. "The rectory bell would ring at any time of day or night," Father Connolly has recalled, "and there would be a bridal party, bride and groom all dressed up, holding flowers, accompanied by all their children and friends, asking for Father Illich to marry them on the spot. And he was ready to marry them, without any papers or certificates. We had to hold him back. How did we know the groom wasn't already married to someone else? We had to curb him—he was like a wild horse. I'd say to him, 'Form them first-don't just get them to church.' Hit idea was simply to bring all the Puerto Ricans into church and make them feel they were wanted. He had the aristocrat's bread-and-circuses approach to the poor. I'd say to him, 'John, you're getting at them through their stomachs."

In 1956, in what turned out to be a highly successful bread-and-circuses approach, Illich decided to stage a national feast day for the Puerto Ricans of New York. The Italians had their Columbus Day and the Irish had their St. Pat's. Why shouldn't the Puerto Ricans have their San Juan's Day, on June 24th? San Juan Masses had in-

deed been offered in St. Patrick's Cathedral since 1953, drawing a few thousand persons, but Illich wanted his celebration held in a grandiose outdoor space that would be reminiscent of a native plaza. He asked permission to hold the fiesta in the great quadrangle of Fordham University, and Cardinal Spellman was invited to be a guest of honor. "The boss says all right," the message came back from the chancery, "but he says he doesn't like to play to empty houses." Illich saw to it that the house was full. He took ads

in Spanish-language newspapers and travelled through the city for weeks on a sound truck announcing the fiesta. "You might get five thousand people," a police

official said the day before the event to Father Joseph Fitzpatrick, of Fordham, who was helping Illich plan San Juan's Day. "I've been watching Father Illich, and I think there will be thirty thousand," Father Fitzpatrick said. Enough police were assigned to handle a crowd of eight thousand. The event was scheduled for noon, but streams of Puerto Rican families began converging on Fordham at dawn, and by noon there were thirty-five thousand people in the quadrangle. It was a kind of turning point for New York's Puerto Ricans—the first time they had gathered in such numbers to assert their cultural identity. Illich had arranged for national flags and native bands, and had programmed speeches in Spanish by Puerto Rican leaders and New York officials, including Mayor Robert Wagner. He had also provided a large traditional piñata—a gaily colored paper vessel that when hit with a bat spills out hundreds of gifts for children to scramble over. Breaking open the piñata was to bring the fiesta to its climax. The Cardinal knew what happens when a piñata is broken, but some of the police—already tense because of the unexpected size of the crowddid not. As the gifts spilled out of the piñata, thirty-five thousand Puerto Ricans shouted and seemed to converge upon the Cardinal. The police, fearing a riot, whisked the Cardinal out of the Fordham quadrangle, though he was

reluctant to leave. "CROWDS SWAMP CARDINAL, MAYOR" was the frontpage headline of the News the following day. "What did the Big Boss think?" one of Illich's friends asked a chancery official the next morning. "He's thrilled" was the reply. "Without Illich's mob scene, the story would barely have made page 17." By that time, the Cardinal had concluded, for many reasons, that Illich was a key man in his diocese, and a key man in the American Church. A few months after the mob scene at Fordham, Spellman agreed to Illich's appointment as vice-rector of the Catholic University of Puerto Rico, where he was to start a pioneering center for the training of American priests in Latin-American culture. A year later, the Cardinal made Illich the youngest monsignor in the New York archdiocese. The nom de plume Peter Canon disappeared.

The new monsignor began to sign his essays "The Very Rev. Ivan Illich, Ph.D."

The relationship between Spellman and Illich was a remarkable one.

The champion of Catholic traditionalism and the adventurous thinker whose ideas would radicalize thousands of American Catholics had a deep respect for each other. Illich recently described Spellman as "a simple man, rigorously true to himself, for whose consistency I had the most profound admiration." Spellman trusted and admired Illich, used him for a number of delicate diplomatic missions, sanctioned all his projects, and served as his protector as long as he lived. The two met many times, and disagreed three times out of four. "So you know better than the Archbishop of New York," Spellman would say, with a big smile. "Well, you'd better succeed."

With typical efficiency, Illich, within three months of his arrival in Puerto Rico, in November of 1956, had organized a conference of the heads of the largest Catholic universities in the United States to discuss the problems of Latin-American studies for missionaries. By the following summer, he had started an intensive language program

to teach Spanish to American priests. The training center was called the Institute of Intercultural Communications. Its purpose was to steep American priests in various aspects of Puerto Rican and Latin-American culture, or, as a Brooklyn priest put it, "to stop the Irish malarkey of imposing our ways on other people." In 1957, Cardinal Spellman sent half his newly ordained priests there for training. The center was often crowded to overflowing. When rooms were scarce, Illich would set up a cot in the kitchen, where he read arcane European journals of theology late into the night. In the daytime, he tortured his students. He made them live on the simplest of native diets, inspired them to travel to the wildest mountain regions of Puerto Rico on foot and on horseback, and grilled them with cross-examinations worthy of a Jesuit novice-master. Father Edmund Burke, a priest in Brooklyn's Ocean Hill-Brownsville district, reported that during his first trip to the Institute he was often "ready to throw Illich into the Caribbean." According to Father Burke, "Illich ran a disorganized Latin-American shop, never appeared anywhere on time, and at midnight he came into my room and psychoanalyzed me until dawn. What he was doing was forcing Burke to take a good look at Burke, to get him rid of all the Yankee hangups." Father Burke, after overcoming the shock of his initial exposure to Illich, returned to Puerto Rico for three years in a row and became one of Illich's most devoted friends.

During the nineteen-fifties, the Catholic Church on the island had grown increasingly inimical to the progressive government of Luis Muñoz Marin. Illich, however, made friends with a number of the island's highest officials, and worked for four years, in the face of much criticism from the local hierarchy, to reconcile the Church to Muñoz Marín's government. His difficulties with the island hierarchy came to a head in the election year of 1960, when Bishop James P. Davis, of San Juan, and Bishop James E. Mc-Manus, of Ponce, both of whom were outraged by a birth-control program

that Muñoz Marín had developed, formed a Catholic political party to oppose him. The bishops threatened excommunication for any Cataolic who voted for Muñoz Marín, but Illich soon became known as an opponent of the Catholic party. "As a historian, I saw that it violated the American tradition of church and state separation," he said later of this episode. "As a politician, I predicted that there wasn't enough strength in Catholic ranks to create a meaningful platform, and that the failure of the Catholic party would be disastrous to the already frail prestige of the Church in Puerto Rico. As a theologian, I held that the Church must always condemn injustice in the light of the Gospel but never has the right to speak out in favor of a specific political party." And as a satirist, Illich found that a political party organized on a birth-control issue, campaigning under a banner decorated with a crucifix and a rosary was downright comical. He ridiculed the Catholic party frequently in private conversation and drew upon himself the growing animosity of the head of his diocese, Bishop McManus. In October, when the election campaign was at its peak, Cardinal Spellman was expected in San Juan to consecrate Bishop Davis as archbishop. A few weeks before Spellman was due to arrive, a prominent Puerto Rican layman with wide influence in his government came to New York to ask the Cardinal if he would lunch with Governor Muñoz Marín while he was in San Juan. Cardinal Spellman readily agreed, and after the two had had lunch together they also attended a banquet honoring the new archbishop. Because Muñoz Marín was to be at the banquet, Bishop McManus had not only refused an invitation to attend but had forbidden any of his clergy to attend. Illich blithely overlooked the ban and went to the banquet with the Cardinal and the Governor. Within twenty-four hours, Bishop Mc-Manus-who is said to be convinced to this day that Illich arranged the meeting between Spellman and Muñoz Marin-had written Illich a stinging letter ordering him to leave the Ponce diocese. Illich returned to New York, where he was appointed to a position on the faculty of Fordham University that allowed him to travel and continue to work on his own projects. Bishop McManus shortly thereafter was relieved of his post.

For several weeks after his return from Puerto Rico, Illich studied a map of Latin America, searching, he said, for "a valley with an excellent climate, with a town not more than an hour away from a great library and a good university, where housing and food would be cheap enough to accommodate many students." Still obsessed with the problem of missionary training in Latin America, he flew to Santiago, Chile, and proceeded to walk and hitchhike to Caracas, Venezuela-a distance of three thousand miles. In moments of crisis or decision throughout his career, Illich has imposed on himself many austere disciplinesfasts, retreats, pilgrimages-of a kind that many of his contemporaries consider outdated. At the age of eighteen, when he decided to be a priest, he had gone into a thirty-day retreat under a Jesuit spiritual director to decide whether he should become a Jesuit. In 1959, he had undertaken a forty-day meditation at a monastery in the Sahara. His trip from Santiago to Caracas, which took him four months, was a form of pilgrimage that marked another turning point in his life. When asked what he learned on that walk, he smiles and answers, "I learned the meaning of distance." But it is evident that he was also searching for a place to start a new center of missionary training; he observed with growing alarm the contingents of Yankee priests who were dotting the slums of Lima, Buenos Aires, and Quito with smug brick rectories and parish schools in imitation of those in Chicago, Brooklyn, and St. Louis.

South America yielded no valley that met Illich's specifications, and he continued his search northward. In the spring of 1961, he found himself in Cuernavaca, Mexico, comparing the prices of the vegetables in its marketplace and the housing facilities

with those in other Latin-American countries, and reflecting upon the delights of the city's perennially dry, sunny climate. The Bishop of Cuernavaca, Sergio Méndez Arceo, was known for his open-mindedness. One day, Illich rang the Bishop's doorbell, was ushered into his study, sat down on his couch, and announced, "I would like to start, under your auspices, a center of de-Yankeefication." The two men talked without interruption for nine hours. Illich settled in Cuernavaca because, he said, "I found in the Bishop a man for whom le bon ton, le bon goût were of supreme importance, a man with whom I could communicate on my own wavelength. I knew from the start that we could please and even surprise each other." The Bishop, for his part, agreed to sponsor the educational venture because he found Illich to be "an extraordinary man with startlingly lucid ideas, who I knew would live in a state of perpetual renewal."

The center of de-Yankeefication was launched under the most respectable Yankee auspices. It had the express approval of Cardinal Spellman, who considered it a continuation of the missionary training center that Illich had established in Puerto Rico. It had the joint support of Fordham University and the Bishops' Committee on Latin America. Richard Cardinal Cushing, of Boston, who described Illich's venture as "by far the best. training center we have," helped to get it on its feet by setting up scholarships for his priests, and several other Catholic hierarchs did the same. It was first called CIF, for Center of Intercultural Formation, but that was later changed to CIDOC, for Center of Intercultural Documentation. At a conference at CIDOC shortly after it opened in 1961, the keynote address was given by Monsignor Helder Pessôa Câmara, of Rio de Janeiro, who, translating Illich's epithet into Portuguese, approvingly called the school "un centro de digringoação." 1961 was the year that the Alliance for Progress was launched, and also the year that the Pope issued a call for the North American Church to

send ten per cent of its personnel-or about twenty thousand priests and religious-to Latin America in order to alleviate the critical shortage of clergy on that continent. Illich saw an ominous conjunction between the two projects. He was sarcastic about the Alliance for Progress, which he labelled "an alliance for the progress of the middle classes," and he predicted that the kind of Yankee missionaries who responded to the Pope's call would be "pawns of United States cultural imperialism." Illich's CIDOC-part language school, part conference center, part free university, part publishing house---was designed not so much to train missionaries as to keep all but the most progressive of them away.

T is ironic that Ivan Illich should have chosen to settle down for the next phase of his career as priest-educator in a country that has produced one of the world's most reactionary brands of Catholicism. Mexico was the first of the new lands to be evangelized in the missionary zeal of the Counter Reformation, and it became the most powerful theocracy in Latin America. The spirit of dedication and of poverty represented by the first wave of missionaries-Franciscan, Dominican, and Augustinian friars—was soon perverted by the Church's growing riches. At the end of the eighteenth century, the Catholic Church owned more than half the money in circulation in Mexico and more than half its land. During the revolutions that swept through Latin America in the nineteenth century, the Mexican Church aligned itself closely with the wealthy landowners and sought alliances with the numerous foreign powers that periodically

invaded the country to combat its movements of liberation. For these reasons, among others, the Church in Mexico was more violently persecuted by the nineteenth century's revolutionary governments and by the twentieth century's progressive regimes than it was in any other nation on the continent. In the eighteen-fifties, the number of priests in the nation had been reduced to

a mere five hundred. The Mexican Church's funds, lands, schools, and hospitals were expropriated, its libraries confiscated and its seminaries closed, and well into the twentieth century the Mexican Church was deprived of most means of scholarship and theological research. For most of the past century, Mexican priests have been forbidden by their government (rather prophetically, it has turned out) to wear clerical clothing in public. In the nineteen-twenties, under the regime of President Plutarco Calles, church worship was severely restricted. And in that decade a prominent elected public official, Governor Tomás Canabal, of the state of Tabasco, publicly flaunted his hatred of Catholicism by naming his two sons Lucifer and Lenin, decreed that only married priests could reside in his state, ordered every church in his province torn down, and commanded his troops to shoot any groups of peasants who might congregate in the ruins of a church building. The hierarchy of the Mexican Church has emerged from these persecutions impoverished and bitter, nostalgic for its lost power. It ranks today, along with the Colombian hierarchy, as the most conservative in Latin America. The tenor of its theology is cautious and regressive, and the most popular forms of religious expression are still steeped in a worship of the Virgin that verges on idolatry. Mexican Catholicism today is marked by what theologians call integralism—that wedding of reactionary politics with reactionary theology which has played a large role in protecting the interests of oligarchies in many parts of the Latin-American continent. Yet in the midst of the aggressively conservative men who compose the Mexican episcopate there is one maverick. Bishop Méndez Arceo, of Cuernavaca, was to startle the world in 1962—a year after Ivan Illich had settled in Cuernavaca—by emerging as a leader of the Second Vatican Council's ultra-progressive ecumenical wing. Indeed, it is quite clear by now that Illich's inquisi-

by now that Illich's inquisition in the bowels of the Vatican was aimed not only at removing Illich from Mexico but also at removing the bishop who has sponsored and protected him.

Sergio Méndez Arceo, seventh Bishop of Cuernavaca, is an erect and portly man in his early sixties, with warm brown eyes that are both witty and thoughtful, a luminous smile, and a most

informal manner. His frayed cassocks, worn shoes, and modest way of life evidence a profound disdain for comfort, for worldly goods, and for any outward show of authority. The son of a prosperous lawyer in southern Mexico, he studied in Rome, wrote his doctoral dissertation on early-sixteenth-century humanism, and is the leading authority in Mexico on the thought of Erasmus. He lives in two austere, high-ceilinged rooms by the side of the Cuernavaca cathedral, his study stacked high with advanced intellectual journals in numerous languages and sparsely furnished with a few pieces of worn furniture that suggest a very aristocratic kind of poverty. On the walls hang a large painting (left by a previous occupant) of a saint whose name the Bishop can't remember, a portrait of Pope John XXIII drawn by a Protestant lay theologian, and a drawing of a Madonna with Indian features, done by the Mexican painter David Alfaro Siqueiros, a former leader of Mexico's Communist Party and a longtime resident of Cuernavaca. In these simple quarters, the Bishop lives alone, without a secretary, cook, or housekeeper, and he takes his meals-frugal fare brought in by nuns from a neighboring convent—with the twelve clergymen of the city in a little room off the cathedral cloister. Méndez Arceo's diocese, which is in the state of Morelos, south of Mexico City, was the terrain of Zapata's revolution, from 1911 to 1916, and the Bishop has always declared himself to be a staunch Zapatista. "To say that I am a Zapatista is to say that I am a citizen of Morelos," he has said. "Zapata was the only leader of the revolution with a coherent social program." Unlike most of his colleagues, Méndez Arceo takes great pride in the poverty of the Mexican Church, and of the Catholic Church in the United States he has said, "Its tragedy is its huge human organization and its horrible riches."

Before being appointed to the diocese of Cuernavaca, Méndez Arceo was spiritual director of students at the largest seminary in Mexico, and he is distinguished from other bishops by an immense interest and trust in the young. Seminarians are assigned to answer his phone on a rotating basis, so that he can become "intimately acquainted with the wishes of the young generation." He spends two days a month in retreat with the sixty priests of his diocese to "receive their impressions" of the work that has to be done-in fact, to allow them a chance to participate in the running of the diocese. And he has encouraged weekly meetings at which his young priests get together without him to discuss means of part-time secular employment, so that they can adapt themselves to what he calls "the inevitable secularization of the future clergy." Although Méndez Arceo is loved by his priests as few bishops are, he is gently criticized by some of the older men for one fault: he is too modest. "He is so simple, so approachable," one of them has said. "He does not satisfy our people's regressive need for authority, their need for pomp, for formality, for great personages." But authoritarianism is not in the character of Méndez Arceo. He is a man who believes that "the desire for human power over others is demonic, the clearest manifestation of original sin," and he has said, "The bishop must preside with the greatest simplicity. He must advise rather than direct. He must respect the free spirit of scientisic investigation. The bishop is the humble coordinator of the work of the Holy Spirit." A Mexican proverb that dates back to the evangelic spirit of the early sixteenth century goes, "Báculo de oro, obispo de palo. Báculo de palo, obispo de oro"—"Golden staff, wooden bishop. Wooden staff, golden bishop." Méndez Arceo's staff is a simple oak stick, which he begged, one Christmas week in Cuernavaca, from a boy dressed as a shepherd for a holiday procession. "That's just the staff I've been looking for!" the Bishop exclaimed as the child came down the

street. "May I have it, brother?" The Bishop has used this staff in his cathedral ever since, at Masses that he celebrates dressed in a chasuble of rough Indian hemp and a mitre of white cotton.

When Méndez Arceo began the renovation of his cathedral-one of the oldest in Mexico-in the nineteenfifties, he stripped the interior of its baroque altar and nineteenth-century ornaments, and stripped it, too, to the fury of the conservatives, of its statuary santos. He retained, at the left of the altar, one lone nineteenth-century statue of the Virgin Mary. The interior of the cathedral as he has restored it has the grandiose ruggedness of the early Franciscan mission style. Its furnishings have a severe modern elegance. The altar, a single slab of stone, is dominated by a plain bronze ciborium, which is flanked by stark bronze lecterns and a filiform wooden cross. "A cathedral, like a bishop, must be stripped and denuded of all material wealth," the Bishop says. "One hears the Lord best in the desert." On portions of the basilica's coarse interior walls, wherever the architects were able to restore the original seventeenthcentury frescoes, is depicted the martyrdom of the missionary priest St. Philip, Mexico's only saint. Pointing to the image of St. Philip, hanging, thin and cerulean blue, from a gallows, the Bishop says, with a mischievous smile, "We are too poor to have more than one saint. Our poverty is our greatest asset."

To the discomfort of conservative Mexicans, the Bishop's Sunday Mass has become the chief tourist attraction of the state of Morelos. The music is based on folk melodies of Mexico, Chile, and Brazil, and is played, from the Angelus to the last Alleluia, by a native mariachi band of violins, drums, guitars, and trumpets. The mariachi Mass originated at CIDOC, where Illich, who had commissioned it from a young Canadian musicologist-priest, first had it performed. The Bishop heard it there, liked it, and, as an American in Cuernavaca says, "brought it to Broadway." The worshippers, who fill the cathedral long before the eleven-o'clock service begins, join lustily in the syncopated singing, and some of the younger members of the congregation literally dance to the altar at Communion time to the rhythm of a Chilean folk song. Between refrains, the Bishop frequently engages in a dialogue homily with his congregation. It is an animated, pentecostal atmosphere, for the Bishop is a great admirer of pentecostal sects, and of their "trust in the Holy Spirit." He believes in creating-and his arms flail the air powerfully as he says this-"an explosion of the Gospel through liturgy." Although in the rest of Mexico religion is considered a woman's thing and barely ten per cent of the Catholic men attend Mass, there is spectacular enthusiasm for religion in the Cuernavaca diocese because of the excitement and vigor of its liturgy. One young citizen of Cuernavaca has said that he and his friends have started to go to Mass again because Bishop Méndez Arceo has restored masculinity to religion. "It is evident," a young New York priest said recently, "that under such a bishop no Underground Church would ever need to exist."

The conservatives who were startled by the modernism of Méndez Arceo's liturgy were scandalized when he sanctioned the use of psychotherapy by a whole community of Benedictine monks in the dry, sage-covered hills above Cuernavaca. The experiment was started by the prior of the monastery of Santa María de la Resurrección, Grégoire Lemercier. Lemercier had settled in Cuernavaca with his community of Benedictines in 1951 after they were chased at gunpoint by a monk turned bandit from their former abbey, in southern Mexico. He quickly became a close friend of the Bishop's, and he was considered an eccentric from the start. His community of Benedictines was singing Mass in the Spanish vernacular as early as 1951, and its avant-gardism was a major influence on the Bishop's evolution toward modernism; for until his arrival in Morelos, Méndez Arceo had been a relatively conservative man, primarily known for his rigorously classical Ro-

man training. Lemercier, an intelligent, humorless Belgian with icy blue eyes, sought psychiatric help after experiencing a vision one night in October, 1960, while lying in bed after compline. He describes the vision in a recent book, "Dialogues with Christ": "I saw a multitude of lightning shafts of all colors, an excessively beautiful spectacle.... My eyes were wide open and I delighted infinitely in these fireworks, which I would have liked to prolong forever.... A sort of screen then appeared on the wall of my cell, on which I saw a rapid succession of human faces. This kaleidoscope focussed on a very beautiful face of great kindness. I started to weep with extreme violence, invaded by the profound consciousness of being loved by God, and of not deserving His love because of my sins." Lemercier entered into psychoanalysis three months later to allay his sense of guilt and to "purify his vocation," as he put it-particularly to aid him with the problems posed by celibacy. His monks, who had the same problems, also sought psychiatric help, and before long therapists were coming from Mexico City twice a week to hold group-therapy sessions at the monastery. Lemercier, with a typically Benedictine concern for productivity, observed that his monks worked faster and better under therapy-that they tilled more land, grew more vegetables, produced more stained glass. But the experiment outraged the Mexican hierarchy, which branded it "a repugnant immorality" and "'aggiornamento' and progress converted to heresy." For the fourth session of the Second Vatican Council, in 1965, Méndez Arceo nevertheless chose Lemercier to accompany him to Rome as his special theological adviser—a choice that hardly enhanced the Bishop's reputation at home.

Méndez Arceo was the only Mexican bishop who spoke at the Council. He spoke a great deal. And he startled observers by agreeing with the progressive Northern European bishops about most of the items on the agenda. The Mexican hierarchy's triumphalist view that the Church had never erred, and had nothing to learn or be sorry for,

epitomized the traditionalists' resistance to ecumenism, whereas Méndez Arceo's concept of a sinful pilgrim Church ("semper renovanda, semper reformanda"), which should apologize to all those whom it had estranged throughout history, put him in the vanguard of the ecumenical movement. Méndez Arceo had been the only bishop at the Council's first session, and was the first bishop at its second session, to suggest that the Church ask the "forgiveness" of the Jews-a request the Council fathers finally made. "The purification of the Church by the Council," Méndez Arceo said, "could not proceed without a humble declaration of regret at all the injustices committed throughout history against the Jewish people." His crusade for rapprochement with the Protestants was equally intense, for he has often said that he would like to be known as "a bishop of both confessions," in the sense that Karl Barth has been called "a theologian of both confessions." Since anti-Protestantism is more prevalent in Mexico than anti-Semitism, the Bishop's sympathy with Protestants was even more controversial in his country than his crusade for the Jews' forgiveness. The Bishop also urged that the ban of excommunication be lifted from all North and South American Freemasons, which prompted Gente, an official paper of the organization called Opus Dei, to urge immediate excommunication for him.

Mendez Arceo was progressive on many other points at the Council. He was, for example, a staunch supporter of collegiality, the decentralizing philosophy that aims at democratizing

Church structures by giving the bishops a voice equal to the Pope's. At one point, after belittling such legalisms as requirements for fasts and definitions of venial sins, he described Christ's teaching as "a deliverance from the servitude of the law, in such a manner that the veritable Christian law is not one written in stone but one written in hearts." He urged the Holy See to freely allow marriage for those priests

who asked to return to the lay state. "The consciousness of a possibility of a return to the lay state and to the dispensation of the celibacy vows would be not a peril but a source of greater fidelity and screnity among priests," he said. And during the debate on religious liberty he took the floor to urge the Church to recognize the benefits of psychoanalysis. "The Church has assumed a position toward psychoanalysis that recalls the history of Galileo," he said. "This has been due in part to the anti-Christian dogmatism of some psychoanalysts; but, because of her distrustful approach, the Church up to now has had no influence on those engaged in this science." Going still further, he suggested that the methods of psychoanalysis might be used in clerical circles "to purify vocations." Although he warned that psychoanalysis might be harmful if it became overconfident of its methods, he praised it as "a precious tool for the spiritual and psychological liberation of man" and as "a most efficacious tool for discerning religious vocations and for elevating souls toward the way of evangelical virtue and Christian holiness."

But nothing the Bishop said at the Council shocked his compatriots more than his attempt to deemphasize the cult of Mary. The question whether a statement on the Virgin Mary should be included in the schema "On the Church in the Modern World" or should appear in a separate document produced one of the Council's most heated debates. As the progressives saw it, a separate schema on Mary would encourage further excesses of devotion to the Virgin, and thus widen the cleavage between Catholics and Protestants. In the view of the traditionalists, who included the hard-line Roman Curialists and most Spanish-speaking clerics, Mary should have a schema to herself because "the mystery of Mary is greater than the mystery of the Church." The conservatives wanted to see the Church in the context of Mary, whereas the progressives wanted to see

Mary in the context of the Church. Throughout these debates, Méndez Arceo sided fervently with progressive Northern European Council fathers like Bernard Jan Cardinal Alfrink, of the Netherlands, saying that the worship of Mary must be restrained in order to correct excesses in popular devotion and to further ecumenical reunion between the Catholic Church and other Christian sects.

"Devotion to Mary and the saints at times obscures devotion to Christ," Méndez Arceo argued. He was angrily rebutted by a Spanish bishop, who stated that without a schema of her own the Virgin would be seen "in a passive role as the Church's eldest daughter, not as the Mother of the Church," To this, Méndez Arceo replied that the epithet "Mother of the Church" was nonsense. Mary is a member of the Church, he said, and so how can she be her own mother? Let us just say, he urged, that she is the one closest to Christ, the first of the saved. The progressive faction won, and Mary was included in the larger schema, but the victory was a very close one and left much bitterness. Méndez Arceo's attack on "the excesses of Marian devotion" had particularly violent repercussions in Mexico, where the cult of the Virgin still persists as passionately as ever and where the saying "Mary came to save us, Christ came to condemn us" is a popular proverb. In once more centering Catholicism upon the person of Christ, the Bishop not only was masculinizing and modernizing his nation's religiousness but was subtly threatening the very fabric of Mexican society. Psychologists have often noted that the machismo of Latin men and the passivity of Latin women are closely related to the sentimental cult of the suffering Mother Goddess. "To do away with the cult of Mary would be to emancipate the women of Mexico and make us ready to act in social change," a progressive young Mexican woman, a sociologist, has said. "That's why Méndez Arceo is considered so revolutionary, and why he is so feared."

In 1968, Méndez Arceo was the only Mexican bishop who refused to sign a declaration drawn up by Mexican clerics in support of the Pope's new ban on artificial contraception. That same summer, he was the only member of the Mexican hierarchy to deplore the Mexican government's repressive measures against students in the riots at the University of Mexico. And still later that same year he published a strong condemnation of America's Vietnam policy, and declared that the United States should "renounce its role of world police, consecrating itself instead to the common good." The statement was praised by former President Lazaro Cardenas-a circumstance that produced a certain amount of notoriety in itself, for no one could recall another occasion on which a successful liberal political figure had supported a member of the Church hierarchy on any subject whatever.

But Méndez Arceo was facing increasing opposition within the Church; in fact, a group had been organized for the express purpose of getting the Bishop removed from his diocese. It called itself El Comité pro-Reivindicación de la Iglesia Católica en Cuernavaca (the Committee for the Recovery of the Catholic Church in Cuernavaca). The membership included Catholics in Guadelajara, Puebla, Michoacan, and provinces two thousand miles from Cuernavaca who had never been to Cuernavaca and had no intention of ever going there but considered the Bishop's modernism a threat to national security. Articles criticizing the Bishop began to appear with increasing frequency in the right-wing Mexican press. One stated that Mendez Arceo's "amicable relations with atheists, Freemasons, and Marxists" were proof that he was contributing to the infiltration of Communism into the Church throughout the world. Another denounced the Bishop for playing "music of dangerous folkloric character" in his cathedral and for allowing his liturgy to be attended by "theatrical personages of doubtful moral character." An editorial in the Opus Dei paper Gente, after quoting the Bishop's statement at the Council that "we must establish a dialogue with all idiom, "Nos atomes ne se sont jamais

men, notwithstanding how much of Marx or Freud they have in them, for Christ is in all men," concluded that "the only fitting music for the Cuernavaca liturgy would be the 'Internationale." Still another article, after denouncing the Bishop's views on the Virgin Mary, on Protestantism, on Jews, and on Freemasons, concentrated its fire on his friends, and particularly on the serious harm that he was doing to Catholicism by harboring at his side "that strange, devious, and slippery personage, crawling with indefinable nationalities, who is called, or claims to be called, Ivan Illich." In a letter to the Holy See published in the form of a paid advertisement in all Mexican dailies, the Committee for the Recovery of the Catholic Church in Cuernavaca complained of "the shameful events concealed under the veil of Freudian psychoanalysis" at Grégoire Lemercier's Benedictine monastery and of "the heretic ideas of the enigmatic Ivan Illich," and urged Pope Paul to "make a final end to this fearful drama, which threatens with such danger the faith of so many souls, and which has so harmed the prestige of our Church."

Méndez Arceo remained serene and undaunted under the barrage of his compatriots' criticism, never wavering in his belief that "the Church must retain, within her unity, the diversity of the Holy Spirit." His love of diversity is perhaps most clearly evidenced by the fact that the two chief sources of controversy in his entourage, Grégoire Lemercier and Ivan Illich, have a profound dislike for each other. Lemercier has characterized Illich as "un genie détraqué en grand besoin de psychoanalyse"-"an unhalanced genius in great need of psychoanalysis." Illich, who was brought up in the Viennese psychoanalytic milieu, has said that he is "vigorously opposed to any religious community's being used as a base for psychoanalytic experiment." The two men have seen each other only about five times in the years that both have spent in Cuernavaca, though they live less than three miles apart. As Lemercier says, in a Belgian

crochus"—"Our atoms never hooked up." And yet the Committee for the Recovery of the Catholic Church in Cuernavaca had the two men so inextricably linked that the second question in the Vatican's questionnaire for Illich, directly parroting accusations of the right-wing press, went, "Is it true that, beginning in 1960, and especially under the influence of the Benedictine monk and psychoanalyst Grégoire Lemercier, there has been in you a dangerous general development of new ideas and disintegrating tendencies of a humanitarian and libertarian nature?"

Méndez Arceo has had to act all along as a buffer between "the two volcanoes of Cuernavaca," as Mexicans sometimes call Illich and Lemercier, in an allusion to the two mountains that dominate Mexico City. "Whenever I give one of them the other's latest article to read, he moans, 'It's ghastly!'" the Bishop once said. "I have tolerated with the greatest diplomacy the mutual dislike of two extraordinary men." And with an ingenuous smile, he added, "I am very

pleased with myself."

In June of 1967, psychotherapy at Lemercier's Benedictine monastery was ordered stopped by a direct edict of the Holy See. The edict came after what Lemercier calls "une scrie d'événements abracadabrants," one of which was Lemercier's own inquisition at the Vatican, in 1966. For eight months, he had sat in a room of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith answering questions in writing, and had never once seen either one of his judges. At the end of the eight months, he sent Pope Paul a list of his expenses in Rome and a long letter stating his opinion that he was being used as a pawn in an inquisition that was in fact aimed not at him but at Bishop Méndez Arceo. When the papal edict banning psychotherapy at Lemercier's monastery was issued, the monks were given the choice of stopping their therapy or continuing it and being dispensed from their vows. The following Sunday, as his weekly sermon, Méndez Arceo read an extraordinary pastoral letter. Instead of passing any judgment on his Benedictine friends' experience, he urged his flock to become more open than ever to the spirit of renewal in the Church. "I ask you to place yourselves before the Holy Spirit," he said, "that Spirit whose action lies deeper than institutions or sociological changes, that Spirit who is present in the hearts of the people of God." And in asking his flock to offer the monks of Santa María de la Resurrección their prayers and their brotherly support, Méndez Arceo made this unusual statement of conscience: "I feel deeply the pain of breaking with the past, the uncertainty of being far from land on uncharted seas. But I also feel the purifying emptiness of poverty in being stripped of the very riches that the past has given us."

Of Lemercier's community, which consisted of twenty-four monks, twenty-one, including Lemercier himself, chose to leave their order and remain in therapy. In July, 1967, soon after renouncing his vows and turning his monastery into a secular community for group therapy, Lemercier got married with some fanfare—in a manner that Illich criticized as "extremely incorrect."

ILLICH, gesticulating with his long, gangling arms, conversing in several languages, walks swiftly through the rooms of CIDOC, which is housed in an elegant villa in the flowered hills above Cuernavaca. "I would like to help people smile—smile the social system apart," he says. "Here at CIDOC, we smile violence apart. It is a place where violent people can come and learn a respeto para la vida. Real revolutionaries are men who look with a deep sense of humor-with sarcasm—upon their institutions. Sarcasm is adult playfulness. Cynicism is its opposite. Instead of freedom and independence, cynicism produces not real revolution but a regressive attachment to slogans and self-worship. For deadly serious revolutionaries—non, merci. But sarcasm is essential, to purify us of our illusions. As Marx said, we must go beyond our illusions to change the conditions that made them necessary. That is two paragraphs before the mention of religion as the opiate of the people, in his commentary upon Hegel's philosophy of the law. When it comes to change, I do not really like to use the words 'iolence' and 'non-violence.' At times, idols must be shattered. A flower grows through stone and breaks the stone. Is that violence?"

And he rushes out of the room to attend to some business. It is typical Illich tactics to let the visitor answer tough questions by himself.

Another time, walking around his luxuriant garden, bending solicitously over his flower heds, he says, "What makes the place run here is le bon ton, our basically correct behavior, our concern for the garden. I am attacked by both the left and the right because I insist on rigorously correct behavior. I am profoundly opposed to the Underground Church, because it is counterrevolutionary. You reform by staying within the system. I believe in good manners, in playing by the rules of the game. If you don't like the rules of chess, stop playing it, but do not try to change its rules. The Yankee Underground Church is not civil disobedience but civil unkemptness. I have never seen effective change achieved through means of civil unkemptness. I am attacked by my liberal ecumenical friends because I insist on good manners. An American priest comes here and takes a glass-not even a beautiful glass, the ugliest glass he can find-and starts saying Mass in a sports shirt, an ugly black-and-white striped sports shirt. Quelle horreur! Underground churchmen? No, thank you. On n'est pas frères et cochons avec le Seigneur. I am theologically a profound conservative. I could teach with deep relish a course in preconciliar theology. I would like to have lived in the Middle Ages, one of the high points of man's spirit. We want to keep CIDOC a free island, an oasis for the free exchange of knowledge and experience. The only rules we hold are: one, you may talk for ten minutes without being interrupted; two, do not try to proselytize or brainwash; three, do not organize any direct political, economic, or social action—not even religious movements. CIDOC is in the deepest sense a contemplative place, not a conspiratorial place, and this is scandalous to both the left and the right." Illich smiles and throws back his shock of long black hair with a boyish gesture. In the long face, with its beaklike nose, the deepset brown eyes are both gentle and probing, and the wide mouth curves up in a way that is mocking and knowing yet kind and ingenuous.

The catalogue of publications printed at CIDOC under Illich's supervision for the benefit of those studying sociological and cultural change in Latin America includes, along with some forty other listings:

Peruvian Catechisms in the Sixteenth Century

Socialization of Medicine in Mexico, 1965-68

Che Guevara: Reactions of the American Press Concerning the quences of His Death, 1967-68
Birth Control in Brazil, 1966-67

The Religious Beliefs of the Aymara Indian Tribes of Bolivia

Concubinage in Central America
Pentecostal Sects Among the Puerto
Ricans of New York City

Missionary Attitudes of the Latin-American Episcopate Toward Indians in the Sixteenth Century (six vol-

Guerrilla Violence in Peru, Bolivia, Colombia, and Ecuador from 1960-68 (twelve volumes)

In preparation is a work that will summarize the findings of every diocesan council and synod held in Latin America since the year 1531 and will include a bibliography of all religious documents, periodicals, and pamphlets ever published on the continent. Its editor, a young Mexican priest named Julio Torres, predicts that the work will fill at least twenty-five volumes and may take him his entire lifetime to prepare. The primary purpose of the work will be, Torres says, "to provide a pastoral method more deeply rooted in the cultural tradition of Latin America, and to combat the prevailing trend of developed countries' impos-

ing their solutions on underdeveloped countries." It will serve as basic text for extensive seminars on the history of the Church in Latin America.

Among the thirty-odd courses offered at CIDOC in recent summers

Social Change and Argentine Literature, 1945-65

The Peasant Leagues in Northeastern Brazil, 1955-63

Camilo Torres: The Development of His

University Reforms and Student Movements in Latin America Today

Revolutionary Awareness in Brazilian Popular Culture and Contemporary Art

Cuban Fiction Under Castro
Attitudes Toward Authority in Mexican

An Analysis of the Haitian Press A New Concept of Literacy Training

The last of these courses has been taught by Paolo Freire, a prominent Brazilian educator, jailed and later exiled, who has claimed that he could teach fifteen million illiterate Brazilians to read in six weeks if the government would allow all its teachers to use his method-a method based on what Freire calls the principle of "conscientization," or "awakening the political conscience of the deprived." He has already demonstrated, in small experimental groups throughout Latin America, that adults can be taught to read in six weeks of evening classes if the teaching vocabulary is built around emotion-loaded phrases that are related to their social conditions. For example, one lesson might start out with the words "This land produces our food. The land must be ours."

When Illich was asked recently to define his conception of grace, he replied, "Another form of grace, in our time, can be attained through night school." Illich believes deeply in adult education, and he would like to see all traditional school systems abolished, because, he says, they favor the privileged middle classes at the expense of the marginal groups; only through a radically transformed system of adult education can the underprivileged rise from misery to the secular grace of

enlightenment. He also believes that wealthy nations foment violence by trying to impose their values on underdeveloped countries, and that priests, social workers, and government employees must acquire formidable expertise in the economic, social, and political problems of any underdeveloped country they work in if they are to avoid fomenting violence themselves. CIDOC can thus be looked upon as a kind of secular monastery, where men come to immerse themselves in Latin-American culture, and where all the forms of education—seminars, civilized discourse, language training, library research—are the sacraments of Illich's secular grace.

The CIDOC library's collection of material pertaining to social and political change in contemporary Latin America has few equals. It includes, for instance, the only complete collection in existence of the writings of Camilo Torres, the Colombian priest who was killed by government troops in 1966 when he joined Colombia's guerrilla bands. Another unique service offered by CIDOC is its language school. Many of its students learn faultless Spanish or Portuguese in twelve weeks, and the school, by which CIDOC is largely financed, is said to be one of the two best language schools in the American hemisphere. The other one is in Petrópolis, Brazil, where CIDOC has set up a small sister organization, and where Illich himself learned to speak impeccable Portuguese in three weeks.

CIDOC was established primarily to provide training for those doing missionary work in Latin America, and in its first years its attendance was predominantly clerical. It gradually grew more secular, however—in part because Illich rejected numbers of priests who he decided could never be "de-Yankified" enough to serve properly in Latin America. The sort of North American clergymen who became devoted to CIDOC were tough-minded and brilliant progressives such as Monsignor Robert Fox and Father Robert Stern, of the New York archdiocese, and Father

Joseph Fitzpatrick, of Fordham's Sociology Department, who feel that CIDOC serves an important function in breaking down "the savior complex" of the American clergy, and who look upon Illich as a prophetic genius working to build the Church of the future. The students-secular and lay-who survive CIDQC and like it are an unusual assoftment. The Protestant theologian Harvey Cox, of Harvard, who taught a course in "Religious and Social Change in Latin and North America" at CIDOC in the summer of 1968, described some of the thirty students who attended his seminar in these words: "There was a very brilliant, very radical French nun who had worked for years in Mexican slums, a Panamanian priest who was also deeply involved in social work, a young Maryknoll seminarian from the Middle West who was probably the most radical man I've ever met. The rest were lay: a couple of Belgian sociologists, a Ph.D. student in zoology f om Berkeley, another Ph.D. student in sociology—a nisei-from the University of Chicago, an S.D.S. leader from Radcliffe. It was the most interesting bunch of students I've had in all my years of teaching."

Illich began his operations in Cuernavaca, back in 1961, in an old hotel on the southwestern slope of the city, which delighted Bishop Méndez Arceo because of "its spirit of Christian poverty, its so un-American way of life." The present, far more splendid, home in the northwestern part of the city suggests anything but poverty, and reflects Illich's austerely sophisticated tastes. The main building is a white colonnaded structure built in a U shape around a swimming pool in an idyllic setting of pines, flowering trees, and tropical plants. The rooms are large, white, screne, and sparsely furnished with modern pieces designed by Illich's brother Aleksander, an architect. The tiled floors are scattered with starkly handsome Indian rugs in hues of brown and tan. There are a few abstract

crucifixes here and there. CIDOC has its own printing plant, lecture rooms equipped with earphone systems for simultaneous translation, a film projection room, a row of forty cubicles where the language courses are given to groups of four students per class, and study space for visiting scholars. Its atmosphere of rarefied scholarship evokes the style of the great medieval monasteries where laymen came to steep themselves in study and in learned dialogues. And yet CIDOC's super-efficiency, the impeccable institutional courtesy of its staff members, and the dazed expression on the faces of young Americans in the process of cultural transformation also suggest a very modern and luxurious private clinic. Like a physician making his rounds, Illich moves constantly through the rooms, pausing to deliver a short discourse on St. John of the Cross, to suggest that a student look into Wittgenstein's philosophy of language, to startle a priest by drawing a parallel between tenth-century monastic groups and twentiethcentury hippie communes. Sometimes, however, Illich deliberately makes himself unavailable to his trainces, in order to force them to work out their own problems-the way they will have to when they are in the mountains of Peru. And to keep an appointment with an American overly possessed of Anglo-Saxon punctuality, the habitually punctual Illich will arrive an hour late to teach him the Latin sense of time.

Illich refuses to be anybody's hero, and befuddles men on both the left and the right by his rigorously conventional behavior. Underground clerics who have come to Cuernavaca to steep themselves in Illich's progressive thinking are appalled to hear that he rises at six every morning to say his breviary, goes to confession in an old-fashioned booth, dutifully receives Communion every Sunday at Bishop Méndez Arceo's Mass, and delights in observing saints' days, holy days, and other ancient feasts of the Catholic Church. Talking with a traditionalist who ac-

cused him of not believing in canon law, Illich once said, "We are called to observe the law, not to believe in it." He enjoys teaching by puzzlement, and answers questions with cryptic aphorisms worthy of the toughest Zen master. "Being a Christian is like understanding the joke in the story," he told a young Catholic not long ago. "A story is told to a group of people. Only the Christian smiles. Only he gets the joke. And some men smile who do not know that they are Christians." Another young Catholic asked him what faith was all about. "Faith is a readiness for the surprise," Illich replied. "We must have a sarcastic readiness for all surprises, including the ultimate surprise of death." ("I love the way Illich tortures his missionaries," Bishop Méndez Arceo once said. "Sometimes I cry with emotion at secing aged men, elderly priests, shed their old selves under his care.")

Illich is at least as hard on himself as he is on others. To come to grips with a certain discomfort he has felt about Mexican culture ("I was terrified of their gods, of the devouring eyes of their sculptures"), he frequently goes to spend the night alone on the desolate peak of Xochicalco, a Toltec ruin near Cuernavaca filled with terrifying bas-reliefs of sacrificial themes, where he sleeps on a flat mountain ledge, wrapped in a sarape.

Illich is at his roughest with those who take a romantic view of revolution, especially those who try to use CIDOC as a center for political proselytizing. When a group of S.D.S. students picketed CIDOC in protest against the presence of Grayson Kirk, then the president of Columbia University, who had been invited to dine at the center, Illich sent an Argentine Jesuit, an authority on guerrilla warfare, to accuse them of practicing Yankee imperialism. What made them think they had the right to tell a Mexican institution what it could or could not do? Yankee student radicals expressing admiration for Central American guerrilla bands are packed off to the library to read

Goethe. The progressive priests who express admiration for Camilo Torres (whom Illich knew as "an adorable drinking companion" but never invited to CIDOC) are coldly reminded that Torres shed his clerical status before going into the hills, and that this was "the canonically proper thing to do." For although Illich is primarily known as a progressive, he insists that a priest must abstain from direct political action. He believes that although through history the Church has constantly participated in the shaping of political change, blessing some governments and condemning others, the time has come for it to withdraw from any specific social initiative. It is a modern rendering unto Caesar. Illich traces this belief to what he calls his "profound Jewish roots," and quotes, "Do not use Yahweh's name in vain." Social problems must be solved by secular ideologies. The Church must condemn all forms of injustice but never support any specific program to combat it. Within the framework of this logic, Illich has as much scorn for a progressive Catholic party such as Chile's Christian Democrats as he has for Colombia's equally Catholic but reactionary Conservative Party. He once said that the function of the Church is co recognize the presence of Christ among us through liturgical celebration, and to charge human beings, through these celebrations, with the proper emotions toward social action." And he added, with a smile, "The less efficient the Church is as a power, the more effective it is as a celebrant of the mystery. Let us follow the example of the Pope-let us have the courage to allow churchmen to make statements so ephemeral that they could never be construed as the Church's teaching." Another of his epigrams: "I celebrate my faith for no reason at all."

The notion that the place for a priest is at the altar is distasteful to the young Yankee clergymen who flock to Cuernavaca in the hope of finding it a center of social activism. Two such priests of the Los Angeles

diocese came to CIDOC once to complain to Illich that James Francis Cardinal McIntyre, the arch-conservative of the United States hierarchy, had not allowed them to march in demonstrations for civil-rights legislation. They did not receive the sympathy they had expected. "If I were your cardinal, I would not allow you to march, either," Illich snapped. "If you want to parade against discrimination in general, O.K., but not for the passage of another lousy stopgap law. Or else take off your white collars." When Father Daniel Berrigan, the radical American Jesuit, was sent to cool his heels in Cuernavaca after his anti-Vietnam War activities had alarmed his superiors, he found in Illich "a lot of intellectual violence aimed at our religious left." ("It's too bad Illich isn't a Jesuit," Berrigan once said. "He's such a caricature of us.") When asked to comment on Thomas and Marjorie Melville, two former Maryknoll missionaries, now married, who had helped Guatemalan guerrillas to arm, and who spent a night at CIDOC on their way home to the United States, Illich shrugged disdainfully and said, "Dilettantes! Ingénues! One does not take shortcuts." Nothing could be more foreign to Illich than the type of guerrilla activities engaged in by the Melvilles or the acts of witness chosen by Daniel Berrigan and his brother Philip. For Illich, the proper way to force an upheaval in society is through a revolution in the education process-teaching a million Brazilian peasants to read in six weeks of night school, ridding a few thousand missionaries of their Yankee hangups. Providing such adult education, in Illich's view, is far more radical than training guerrillas or going to jail in protest. One of Illich's close friends has said, "Ivan would never be trampled by the wheels of revolution-he'd be at the hub of the wheel, at dead center."

What Yankee progressives come to recognize, if they stay long enough at CIDOC, is that removing the Church

from the political sphere in Latin America could in itself be a supra-political act. As recently as 1937, the Archbishop of Lima had this praise for the Latin-American status quo: "Poverty is the most certain road to eternal felicity. Only the state which succeeds in making the poor appreciate the spiritual treasures of poverty can solve its social problems." In countries where the Church has been diligent in providing such comfortable justifications for extremes of wealth and poverty, the removal of Church support might mean the collapse of an entire network of oligarchies. And so Illich's demand that the Church stay out of politics is in fact highly political. His position, however, continues to puzzle those who know of his expertise in international affairs and of his frequent vitriolic attacks on United States foreign policy.

There is something about the Yankee way of life that evokes more sarcasm from Illich than any other brand of nationalism. And it is generally believed that some of his anti-American statements had more than a little to do with his visit to the cellars of the Vatican. He found himself frustrated and amazed, in the mid-nineteen-sixties, by the inability of his North American students to relate the problems of the ghettos and Vietnam to the Yankeebred violence in Latin America. In a speech to the Foreign Policy Association in 1966, he referred to Guatemala as "Vietlat." And he compared the peace movement to "cough syrup given to nineteenth-century syphilitics," because of its failure to protest United States intervention in Latin America as vigorously as it protested Vietnam. Noting that the Alliance for Progress had tripled the amount of revenue flowing into the United States from Latin America, he labelled it "an alliance pregnant with violence that has maintained or swept into power military regimes in two-thirds of Latin American countries," "a deception designed to maintain the status quo," "a bone thrown to the dog, that he remain quiet

in the back yard of the Americas." Violence in Watts, Vietnam, and Guatemala, he wrote in 1967, had a common cause, which he identified as United States messianism. He referred to "the failure to win hearts and minds of people by an outpouring of money and human lives that Americans perceive as an expression of heroic generosity," and added, "It is not the American way of life lived by a handful of millions that sickens the billions, but rather the growing awareness that those who live the American way of life will not tire until the superiority of their quasi-religious persuasions is accepted by the underdog." He compared the Alliance for Progress to the war on poverty in the United States: "Both programs were designed to have the poor join in the American dream. Both

programs failed. The poor refused to dream on command." And in another anti-Yankee polemic he said, "Only God can create values. The United States breeds violence by im-

posing its values on other nations." For, according to Illich, the world is divided not so much into nations or political blocs; rather, it is divided into an international middle class that takes its style and values from the United States and billions of underprivileged who are increasingly alienated from that middle class. Illich has the aristocrat's sentiattraction—recalling mental stoy's-to cultures of poverty untainted by bourgeois aspirations. As in his early days among the Puerto Ricans, he delights in seeing people celebrate in their native fashion, "Peasant cultures provide categories which endow even extreme rural privation with dignity," he has said. "I am for those who want to deepen life rather than lengthen it." The peasant is richer and wiser than the Alliance for Progress. Let him enjoy himself at his traditional fiestas and die young, rather than live on powdered milk from the Yankees' sacristy and yearn for the vulgar Coca-Cola culture imported by United States foreign aid. For this attitude, which in some ways resembles that of the reactionary Archbishop of Lima and which could serve to support the most oligarchic status quo, Illich continues to be attacked as often by liberals as by conservatives.

MAKE a scrupulous distinction," Illich once said, "between the Church as She and the Church as It." ("That one can only say in English," he noted with a smile.) "She is that surprise in the net, the pearl. She is the mystery, the kingdom among us. The identity of the Church as She will remain through whatever changes She's currently undergoing, which are no greater than the changes She underwent under Constantine, or in Abelard's time. Those who believe in Her believe in something that cannot be said in words. No pronouncements, however stupid, be they on birth control or on clerical celibacy, can lessen my love for Her and my faith in Her mystery. People who leave the Church because of what She says don't understand love. It, however, is the institution, the temporary incarnational form. I can talk about It only in sociological terms. I've never had trouble creating factions and dissent toward the Church as It."

By the time Illich began his forays against the Church as It, in the midsixties, the Church in Latin America, which holds one-third of the world's Catholic population, had realized for a decade that it was in a state of acute emergency. Surveys conducted by the French Jesuit sociologists François Houtart and Émil Pin, whose work has had a great influence on Illich, revealed that in some regions of Latin America--in parts of the Dominican Republic and Guatemala, for instance-there was one priest for every seventy thousand Catholics, in contrast to an average of one priest for every six hundred Catholics in the United States; that in some Brazilian dioceses the average rate of ordination was two per year; that only some ten per cent of the nominally Catholic population

of Brazil took any part in religious observances; and that in some of Latin America's largest cities, such as Buenos Aires, only five per cent of the baptized Catholics attended Sunday Mass, It was in response to this crisis that in 1961 the Pope issued the decree calling for ten per cent of all North American religious to migrate to Latin America, But by 1967 the influx of North American religious had reached only six thousand of the twenty thousand called for by the Pope. At this point, Illich created a sensation with an article titled "The Seamy Side of Charity," published in the Jesuit magazine America, in which he rejoiced over the failure of the program and called for its immediate discontinuance. Like all his writings, the article was polemical, bristling with barbed aphorisms that were calculated to provoke, His central thesis in the article, which infuriated hierarchies on both sides of the border, was that the papal plan was nothing but "part of the many-faceted effort to keep Latin America within the ideologies of the West." Missionaries of the kind that were being sent south of the border, he wrote, were "pawns in a world ideological struggle;" they played the role of "a colonial power's lackey chaplain;" they transformed "the old-style haciendas of God into the Lord's supermarket." In Illich's view, the chief function of these priests and nuns was to buttress private institutions, such as Church schools serving the upper and middle classes, at the expense of the underprivileged. He related it to the general swamping of Latin America by United States values. "The influx of U.S. missioners coincides with the Alliance for Progress, Camelot, and C.I.A. projects, and looks like a baptism of these," he declared. He has since acknowledged that he wrote the article angrily and in a hurry, right after the March, 1967, issue of the magazine Ramparts exposed the C.I.A.'s backing of the National Student Association. "I wrote the article fast, to make it clear that within the Church there were people who refused to take funds from Alliance for Progress and similar sources."

Yet Illich's purpose in writing the article was fundamentally religious rather than political. For in that shortage of Latin-American clergy which had panicked the Vatican he saw a rare and precious chance to pioneer new forms of the priesthood. Illich's passionate involvement in Latin-American affairs stemmed in part from his realization that both its religious crisis and its turbulent political changes made it a valuable laboratory for the society of the future. What conservatives diagnosed as a crisis of scarcity in the priesthood Illich saw as actually a surplus, and a great blessing. "Exporting Church employees to Latin America masks a universal and unconscious fear of a new church," he wrote. "The promise of more clergy is like a bewitching siren. It makes the chronic surplus of clergy in Latin America invisible and it makes it impossible to diagnose this surplus as the gravest illness of the Church.... If North America and Europe send enough priests to fill the vacant parishes, there is no need to consider laymen to fulfill most evangelical tasks; no need to re-examine the structure of the parish, the function of the priest; no need for exploring the use of the married diaconate, and new forms of celebration." In Illich's view, increasing the clergy on any continent was a way of maintaining an irrelevant Church, Illich compared this cure to that of doctors who prefer aspirin to radical surgery. "They feel no guilt at having the patient die of cancer, but fear the risk of applying the knife."

To diagnose the symptoms of the cancerous structure had been Illich's task in another controversial article, "The Vanishing Clergyman." Written in German in 1961, it remains unsurpassed among his works for its bold prophecy of new forms of ministry. Its demand for a return to early-style Christianity, unsullied by riches and secular power, is similar in many ways

to the romantic longings of the Underground Church; but it is expressed in Īllich's rigorous methodological manner, and cloaked in his Apollonian sarcasm, "The Roman Church is the world's largest non-governmental bureaucracy," the article begins, and it goes on to say, "Men suspect that it has lost its relevance to the Gospel and to the world. Wavering, doubt, and confusion reign among its directors, functionaries, and employees. The giant begins to totter before it collapses. Some Church personnel react to the breakdown with pain, anguish, and fright. Some make heroic efforts and tragic sacrifices to prevent it I would like to suggest that we welcome the disappearance of institutional bureaucracy in a spirit of deep joy." Illich called the traditional clergyman "a folkloric phantom," "a member of the aristocracy of the only feudal power remaining in the world," "a man sentenced to disappear, whether the Church wishes it or not, by the changes in modern society." Employing Hegelian dialectics, he argued that if the Church was to retain men to preach the Gospel, the traditional antithesis between pastor and layman would have to produce a new synthesis, which would transcend the old categories. And the leisure society of the future, with its reduced working hours and its early retirement age, would allow this synthesis to take place. Illich predicted that the leisure society would free ordinary laymen to accept vocations for part-time ministerial functions-men chosen for "a sense of the Church," which they would cultivate by prayer, by scriptural study, and by a pure life. "An adult layman will preside over the normal Christian community of the future," he wrote. "The ministry will be an exercise of leisure rather than a job. The 'diaconia' [an informal community of worshippers meeting in each other's homes] will supplant the parish as the fundamental unit of the Church. The periodic meeting of friends will replace the Sunday assemblage of strangers. A self-supporting dentist, factory worker, professor, rather than a Church-employed scribe or functionary, will preside over the meeting. Only with the emergence of such a part-time priesthood will the Church free itself from the restrictive system of benefices and from that gigantic bureaucratic efficiency which corrupts Christian testimony more subtly than power." Illich himself, since the day he was ordained, has consistently refused to accept a stipend for any priestly function, and has always expressed disdain for the economics and the institutional pomp of the Church. "The title of Monsignor," he once said of his own rank, "is rather akin to the sexuality of a mule."

"The Vanishing Clergyman" went on to say that celibacy was an admirable way of life but that it had nothing whatsoever to do with the priesthood, the two states--priesthood and celibacy-having been linked by custom within a set of historical circumstances that no longer exist. Illich said he was all for celibacy, as long as it was chosen freely, for its own sake, and was stripped of any magic or ritualistic significance, "The Christian who renounces marriage and children for the kingdom's sake seeks no abstract or concrete reasons for his decision," Illich wrote, in a uniquely lyrical passage that reveals his profound strain of mysticism. "His choice is pure risk in faith, the result of the intimate and mysterious experience of the heart. His decision to renounce a spouse is as intimate and uncommunicable as another's decision to prefer his spouse over all others." But should the Vatican therefore be petitioned to relax its laws of compulsory celibacy? Certainly not, Illich wrote, reverting to a sarcastic vein. He was against married priests, because the Church already had too many unmarried ones, and such halfway "aggiornamento" would slow up any true revolution in the structure of the Church. "The clerical mass exodus will only last as long as the present clerical system exists," he wrote. "During this time, ordination of married men would be a sad mistake. It would only delay needed radical reforms." Illich believed in strictly adhering to the Pope's edicts on compulsory celibacy, because "his position helps assure the speedy death of the clergy."

And Illich boldly called for defections, for an increasing exodus of priests to insure this speedy death of the traditional priesthood. "May we pray for an increase of priests who choose radical secularization?" he wrote. "For priests who leave the clergy in order to pioneer the Church of the future? For priests who, faithfully dedicated to and loving the Church, risk misunderstanding and suspension? For extraordinary priests, willing to live today the ordinary life of tomorrow's priests?" And he urged all clergymen to ask themselves a question that has tormented an increasing number of Catholics in the past decade: "Should I, a man totally at the service of the Church, stay in the structure in order to subvert it, or leave in order to live the model of the future?"

"The Vanishing Clergyman" enraged many progressive Catholics in the United States by its sarcastic logic and its haughty dismissal of any possibility of meaningful reform in our generation. But it enraged the Latin Americans even more (so had "The Seamy Side of Charity"), because of its description of the Church as being "priest-ridden." A Mexican country priest who has remained a staunch supporter of Illich has said, "A few years ago, in a southern province, I was the only priest for forty thousand parishioners. The terrain was so rough that it took me one week to cross my parish territory on mulcback. And even then I could do it only in the seasons when the rivers were not too high. In the Peruvian Andes, priests often die in their early thirties, from overwork and heart ailments. And he tells us that we're priest-ridden!" Even Bishop Méndez Arceo criticized the article,

calling it "a caricature that missed the whole supernatural factor of the priesthood," and commenting that Illich had "projected the realities of the United States Church into Latin America."

If Illich's progressive supporters were annoyed by the two articles, one need not try hard to imagine the rage of the Mexican right wing. It was in the fall of 1967, after the publication of these articles, that concerted efforts were begun to bring the full discipline of the Church down upon "el tenebroso Dálmata Illich," and also upon the bishop who countenanced his activities. The attack was theatrically launched on October 4th by the open letter to the Pope published in Mexico's largest dailies as a paid advertisement by the Committee for the Recovery of the Catholic Church in Cuernavaca. The letter, signed by about twenty prominent laymen and priests, concluded, "The spectacular and theatrical liturgy that we have seen in the Cuernavaca cathedral, the new so-called Gospel that its bishop preaches, the psychoanalyzed and degenerate community fostered under him, the touristic hotel run by Monsignor Illich, where bizarre things have been witnessed—these are not, cannot be, the work of God." Almost simultaneously, the Archbishop of Puebla, who happened to be a cousin of President Díaz Ordaz, and who was president of the Conference of Mexican Bishops that year, wrote to Cardinal Spellman asking that Illich be recalled to the New York archdiocese. Cardinal Spellman replied courteously in mid-November, stating that "Illich is a priest of excellent standing in my diocese, in every way obedient," and informing the Mexican bishop that he would not recall Illich to New York, because Illich had academic contracts in Cuernavaca to which the Cardinal had given explicit approval.

Spellman's letter reaffirming his loyalty to Illich was one of the last letters he ever wrote. He died a fortnight later. Twelve days after Spellman's

death, the New York chancery received a new series of letters asking that Illich be recalled. Some of these letters were from Mexico; others emanated from the arch-conservative Roman Curialist Alfredo Cardinal Ottaviani, acting under Mexican pressure. "The timing was totally obscene," an official of the New York chancery has said, "Cardinal Spellman's body was scarcely buried. They knew that Illich had lost a staunch friend, and they did not have the decency to wait a week." On December 19th, Spellman's provisional successor, Bishop John Maguire, wrote to Illich requesting that he return to New York immediately, on orders from Rome. Illich, in a letter to Maguire postmarked January 6th, expressed "profound embarrassment" over what he called his "unavailability," and went on to explain that his duties at CIDOC made it impossible for him to come to New York at that time. Bishop Maguire, who turned out to be as staunch a supporter of Illich as Spellman had been, excused him from the trip and communicated Illich's statement to Ottaviani.

Meanwhile, the liberal factions of the Latin-American hierarchy rallied to counteract the intrigues being mounted against the diocese of Cuernavaca. Bishop Avelar Brandão Vilela, of Brazil, who was president of the Conference of Latin-American Bishops, asked two theologians-Father Lucio Gera, of Argentina, and Bishop Candido Padin, of Lorena, Brazil—to make a formal investigation of CIDOC, and after visiting Cuernavaca in November, 1967, these men compiled a highly favorable report on the center. They sent their report to Rome at the end of the month, but four months later, in March, its receipt had still not been acknowledged. The report had apparently vanished. Neither Bishop Méndez Arceo nor the Apostolic Delegate to Mexico, who made repeated requests to read it, was able to see a copy of it. It was clear that officials of the Vatican continued to view the Illich case

through the eyes of the Mexican hierarchy. "There was a moment when I felt that they would not return to an authoritarian style, but the path of dialogue was interrupted," a prominent Latin-American bishop wrote to Illich.

Illich made an attempt to open a dialogue of his own directly with the Holy See, but this, too, came to nothing. In January, 1968, he wrote a letter to the Pope, couched in an ecclesiastical style that some progressives deplored for what they called its attitude of "creeping humility" before the Papacy, "Most Holy Father, I, the undersigned Ivan Illich, am humbly prostrated before Your Holiness," he wrote. "With all respect and humility, I beg Your Holiness, if I have failed in any way against faith or morality, to communicate to me how I have so failed, disposed as I am to immediately retract my mistakes.... I humbly kiss your ring and submit myself to your kindness." The letter was never answered.

As the right-wing attacks upon the diocese of Cuernavaca mounted, Illich found himself accused of some extraordinary activities: consorting with witch doctors, practicing voodoo black magic in the mountain hinterland of Brazil, conspiring to kidnap the Archbishop of Guatemala. Finally, on June 10th, the Apostolic Delegate to Mexico, Guido de Mestri, instructed Illich to fly to Rome immediately and present himself for an interrogation at the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. De Mestri had frequently visited CIDOC to observe Illich's activities, and had always found his conduct above reproach. "Your position is so canonically impeccable," he had once said to Illich, "that I doubt if you are even a Christian."

FOR six months after being told by Cardinal Seper to get going and never come back, Illich scrupulously refrained from making any public statement about his session with the inquisitors. "I was so terribly embarrassed for

the Church," he explains. But in January, 1969, the Vatican made a second move against him, and this prompted him to break his silence. The move took the form of an order forbidding all Catholic priests, monks, and nuns to attend any more courses or seminars at Illich's educational center. No reasons were given for the ban except that the Vatican had received "many complaints," left unspecified, about the center's "unfortunate effects," also unspecified, upon the Catholic world. Illich, responding in what his friends call his "Roman manner," immediately telephoned the religion editor of the New York Times, Edward B. Fiske, and said he had a story that he thought might interest the Times. Fiske flew down to Mexico, where Illich released the questionnaire that had been presented to him in Rome six months earlier and described the entire episode in detail.

That was Illich's chesslike move against the Church as It. His lasting love for the Church as She was expressed that same week in a letter to Bishop Méndez Arceo. "I am deeply saddened by this procedure of the Holy See, which is the supreme teaching authority of the Church," he wrote. "I am distressed as I watch the Roman Curia launch a grave and global accusation against a nonsectarian institution of higher learning, without ever mentioning a single charge. . . . I am indeed sad, yet hopeful. The roots of my mind and of my heart have taken in the soil of the Roman Church. I am embarrassed by this decree, but my embarrassment will fade as it has before in front of Her immense contribution to beauty, truth, and awareness."

Illich also wrote in the letter to Bishop Méndez Arceo, "We shall leave it to others to express their indignation at the precedent-setting intervention of Rome in academic life through the ecclesiastical ban of an entire academic community." And, in the months that followed, a good deal

of indignation was expressed. Even the Brooklyn Tablet, long considered the most reactionary Catholic paper in the United States, came to Illich's support. After making it clear that they opposed most of Illich's ideas, the Tablet's editors declared, "One need not agree at all with Monsignor Illich, only believe in human dignity... This entire controversy must accelerate practical implementation of procedures for due process within the Church... to eliminate ecclesiastical procedures which are a scandal to responsible men within and outside the Church."

There was vigorous applause for the ban from the Mexican right, however. Paid advertisements in the Mexican papers reproduced the text of a telegram to the Pope thanking him for the ban on CIDOC: "This comforting news fully confirmed our views that any effort to sow confusion in the Church's dogmatic truths on the pretext of clarifying Her message to modern man will be rejected by the robust and total faith of the Mexican people."

Illich had always maintained that a priest is under obligation to abandon his clerical status as soon as he becomes controversial. And in March, 1969, he announced that he had decided to withdraw permanently from the institution of the Church as It, though he would remain an ever-faithful member of the Church as She. The announcement was made in a letter written to Spellman's successor, Archbishop Terence Cooke, shortly before he was made a cardinal. "Your Excellency," Illich wrote. "By now the press has extensively covered the proceedings of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (the former Holy Office) which were aimed at my work and my reputation. These proceedings have cast over me the shadow of a 'notorious churchman,' and this interferes with my ministry, my work as an educator, and my personal decision to live as a Christian.... I now want to inform you of my irrevocable decision to resign entirely from Church service, to suspend the exercise of priestly functions, and to renounce totally all titles, offices, benefits, and privileges which are due to me as a cleric." In closing, Illich stated that he would not ask to be dispensed from two priestly prerogatives. He wished to retain the obligation to say his daily breviary, and the obligation to remain celibate. Cardinal Cooke has not commented publicly on Illich's status. Church authorities have said that although Illich has ceased to function as a cleric he nevertheless remains a priest.

In this age rife with civil disobedience in both church and state, the Pope's order forbidding all Catholic priests, monks, and nuns to attend CIDOC produced a flood of applications from progressive priests, monks, and nuns throughout the world. And in June, 1969, under pressure from liberal bishops in several countries, the Vatican revoked its ban. The new order, which Pope Paul personally explained to Bishop Méndez Arceo in an audience, specified that CIDOC must return to "the spirit of its foundation" and that its teaching must be supervised by the Conference of Latin-American Bishops, In addition, Illich was invited to resign from the center "within a reasonable time." Illich, who has given no indication that he intends

to resign, has been busy arranging a marathon seminar on education being held at CIDOC this spring, attended by Paul Goodman, Jerome Bruner, Jonathan Kozol, Paolo Freire, and other prominent specialists from many countries. He was recently asked to comment on the relaxation of the papal ban, and said only that it would have no more effect than the previous ruling, since CIDOC had always beenand he emphasized the words-"a sec-

ular organization."

Illich's half-in, half-out position in the priesthood has caused speculation and consternation among Catholics the world over. How do his actions fit in with his theories? He prophesied a Church of sacramental laymen, and he himself has ended up as an unsacramental priest. As a theologian, Illich has made a rigorous distinction between the priest as bearer of the Word and the priest as administrator. As a man, he has found that the two are not so easily separable; he has had to dissociate himself, with great sorrow, from the sacramental life. And yet he remains a priest. It is all marvellously complex and enigmatic, like the man. As their Church's most agitated decade since the sixteenth century came to an end, Illich's puzzling status raised

many questions in the minds of progressive Catholics about their own status. How much can one disdain the Church as It without severing relations with the Church as She? How much criticism of It can one indulge in before losing contact with Her? The Catholic hierarchy has stiffened its position on many levels and denied most of the hopes inspired by John XXIII and the reformers of the Vatican Council. The ability of any progressive Catholic to remain in the institutional Church seems to depend more than ever on the mystery of faith, on what Illich calls "the childlike simplicity of the Christian faith."

"Father Illich felt that he had to resign some of his priestly faculties because he couldn't stand the institution's lack of trust," said a close friend of his who is highly placed in a chancery in the United States, "His position as a Christian is so at odds with that of the Holy See that he felt uncomfortable continuing as an officer of the institution. Canonically, he remains a priest, but there was a profound sadness among many of us in this country who love and admire him when he renounced his faculties. It was the feeling 'If he can't make it, how can I?' "

—Francine du Plessix Gray



MEMORANDUM RM-6048-RC MAY 1969

THE PERUVIAN MILITARY: A SUMMARY POLITICAL ANALYSIS

Luigi R. Einaudi

PREFACE

This RAND Memorandum summarizes findings of long-term RAND research on the Peruvian Military. The author conceived the study after Peruvian military behavior during and after the 1962 coup did not appear to conform to predominant expectations among U.S. observers. Substantial field research was undertaken in 1964-65, supported entirely by RAND Corporation funds. Detailed findings of the study have not yet been published, but the decision to make this summary available was based on its timeliness as background in considering the events precipitated by the 1968 coup in Peru.

The text of this Memorandum is a slightly expanded version of the author's opening statement of April 14, 1969 before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate.

This Memorandum, drawing as it does on a RAND-supported study without a client, thus cannot, and of course does not, reflect the views or beliefs of any governmental sponsors of RAND research or of The RAND Corporation. In fact, though the author gratefully acknowledges recurring dialogues with his colleagues Herbert Goldhamer, Hans Heymann, Richard Maullin, Alfred Stepan, and William Stewart, the views expressed here are entirely his own.

SUMMARY

Contrary to much conventional wisdom, which casts the Peruvian military in a monolithic, oppressive, and reactionary mold, the Peruvian military is in fact institutionally and politically a much more complex force. Their actions and attitudes reflect the many tensions of contemporary Peruvian life, which continues to shape military behavior even as the military develop greater institutional integrity.

The political posture of the military combines the provincial middle-class background of many Army officers with their membership in a reasonably efficient bureaucracy based on discipline and a highly developed military educational system. Many officers, including President Velasco, rose through the ranks. They feel little identification with the urban coastal elite and are suspicious of civilian politicians, plutocrats, and foreigners.

Attainment of relatively high professional standards has not taken the Peruvian military out of politics. In fact, the development of excellence in military education has increased political diversity and contributed to a shift in the political role of the military, from that of temporary warden to that of policymaker and participant.

The continued loosening of the military's ties with the urban social elite, increasing self-consciousness at having been maneuvered in the past into an automatically conservative and repressive role, and improved knowledge of political and social problems have also helped to move the military toward a politically independent position, substantially criented toward positive national development goals.

This independence is solidly based. No single group, domestic or foreign, can any longer intimidate the military. Peruvian military behavior may vacillate, but it is more likely to do so within a spectrum defined by institutional solidarity and national politics than in response to personal whims or narrow group interests.

Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP88-01314R000300550002-1

CONTENTS

| PREFA | CE | | |
|-------|--|----|---------|
| SUMMA | RY | | |
| Secti | on | | |
| I. | INTRODUCTION | 1 | (top |
| | | | of page |
| II. | INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT | 3 | |
| | Social Origins and Position of the Officer Corps | 4 | |
| | Military Education | 6 | |
| | Relations with Other Sectors of Society | 8 | |
| III. | MILITARY POLITICAL BEHAVIOR | 11 | |
| IV. | THE 1968 COUP | 15 | |
| | The Future | 16 | |

I. INTRODUCTION

Relations with Peru have become a matter of public concern in the United States since the emergence in October 1968 of the military government headed by Division General Juan Velasco Alvarado. The military appear to have used the seizure of the International Petroleum Company to forge a nationalist coalition. This act has endangered U.S. assistance programs and the entire fabric of U.S.-Peruvian relations. While the military government evidences considerable disaffection from organized civilian political groups and liberal democratic procedures, it also reflects widespread desires for national political and economic affirmation.

This analysis attempts to provide background information against which to assess recent Peruvian events. It begins by considering the increasing complexity and autonomy of the military institutions in Peru during the 20th century. It then analyzes the major patterns of political behavior of the military, noting the recent trend away from the role of political arbiter to that of policymaker and participant. It concludes by arguing that despite the coup of October 3, 1968, military behavior continues to reflect more traditional constraints of caution and diversity.

The basic research on which this summary is based has drawn on published materials as well as interviews with many Peruvian officers and other persons in Peruvian political, cultural, and economic life. Unfortunately, the policy of secrecy which the Peruvian Command instituted at the time of the 1941 conflict with Ecuador denied the author access to information often more freely available in other Latin American countries or in the United States. In spite of this, through interviews and other sources of a less official nature, including residence and extensive travel within Peru and friendships with several officers who have played important roles in Peruvian political history, the author was able to assemble a significant body of previously unavailable information. These statistical, descriptive, and historical materials will be presented in the final study, to which this summary can only serve as an introduction.

II. INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT

It is generally agreed that the Peruvian armed forces are one of the three or four most effective military establishments in Latin America. Their effectiveness is due more to their level of professionalism than to their size, which is modest for a country of twelve million people. The Army has an officer corps of approximately 3,500, with 30,000-plus enlisted men. The Navy and the Air Force each have about 600 officers and 5,000 enlisted men. The military consume an important slice of the Peruvian budget. From 1960 to 1968, the three services accounted for approximately 17 percent of government expenditures, which is in the middle range for Latin America. Even in the face of the undervaluation of gross national product characteristic of heavily agrarian societies, however, these military expenditures have amounted to roughly 3 percent of GNP.

The armed forces are represented in the cabinet by three senior military officers holding the portfolios of Defense, Air, and Navy. Constitutional and other legal provisions regulating their relations with civilian authorities are ambiguous and the military enjoy considerable autonomy, aided by secrecy (generally even from government agencies) in such matters as finances, personnel, and organization.

Article 213, Title 12, of the Constitution of 1933 provides an interesting example of ambiguity in a fundamental matter. It provides that "the purpose of the Armed Forces is to guarantee the rights of the Republic, the fulfillment of the Constitution and the Laws, and the conservation of public order." Although this provision does not conform to U.S. and European constitutional traditions, similar formulas are common in Latin America, where they have often been employed by constitution writers seeking to check potential executive

Comparisons of military expenditures in Latin America often fail to make explicit whether such items as military pensions or paramilitary police forces are included. Peruvian budgetary practice, which the above figures follow, includes pensions, but excludes the police forces. Since the *Guardia Civil* and the *Guardia Republicana* have played a secondary political role, they are also excluded from this summary analysis.

abuse. Civilian governments whose popular support is declining and whose policies are under attack on grounds of constitutionality must of necessity consider military views with great care.

The elimination of a major guerrilla challenge to the government in 1965-66, and the more recent purchase of French Mirage fighters are evidence of military proficiency and political power. Both can be further understood, together with the increasing independence of the military as a political actor, by analyzing the social structure of the officer corps as well as the institutional growth of a rationalized military bureaucracy and a political outlook centering on national development as epitomized in the doctrines of the Center for Higher Military Studies (CAEM).

SOCIAL ORIGINS AND POSITION OF THE OFFICER CORPS

In a culture which perhaps more than most abhors physical and particularly manual labor, professional pursuits have high prestige. For the military this status is strengthened by their closeness to the symbols of nationality and sources of power. During the colonial period, military prestige was enhanced by the officers' relations to the Spanish crown, whose prestige and power they partially shared. In the present century, however, the Peruvian officer has been considered as belonging to an honorable but nonetheless marginal profession.

The relative decline in military prestige reflected in this marginal professional status is due to factors rather similar to those which have operated elsewhere. In the Peruvian case these are represented by the military's loss of contact with an aristocratic tradition and social group during the wars of independence from Spain; with the associated loss of independent sources of wealth, which has reduced the officer's career to a way of earning a living; and by the progressive loss of national security functions in the decades which followed the War of the Pacific (1879-1883), which were only partially revived by the 1941 Ecuadorean conflict and the 1965 guerrilla campaign.

In recent Peruvian history, the translation of these abstractions into practice has varied considerably, but the trend is clearly

toward increased representation of the so-called "popular" classes in the officer corps.

At the turn of the century, the Peruvian officer was likely to be a young man from a relatively good family in Lima or one of the major provincial capitals whose opportunities were limited by the then aristocratic orientation of the University of San Marcos, or by the general impoverishment of Peru following the disastrous defeat at the hands of Chile during the War of the Pacific. The Military Academy offered a free higher education leading to a respectable profession, and many young men from impoverished but relatively good families found this an acceptable escape from the uncertainties of Peruvian life and the restrictions of a narrowly elitist civilian educational system.

Peru has come a long way in the past fifty years. A middle or upper middle class youth today may first seek admission to the Catholic University or the National Engineering University before considering the University of San Marcos, yet still may have several other universities to which he can apply without having to settle for a military career. Apart from greater opportunities in medicine, law, and engineering, there has also been a substantial increase in the financial rewards afforded by alternate marginal professions (such as school teaching) which have the added advantage of allowing more personal freedom than is found in a military career.

It is clear, then, that the officer corps has in this century never been identical with the social and financial elite. Membership in the officer corps has never, for instance, overlapped with the membership of the most exclusive social club or of the boards of directors of the largest corporations. At the other end of the social scale, Indian peasants have been largely excluded by the educational and the height requirements of the Military Academy.

In the broad range between the oligarchy with its "40 Families" and the Indian peasant masses, the shift within the officer corps in recent decades has been away from the whitish upper middle classes and toward the darker lower classes. It has been away from the coastal urban centers and particularly Lima, and toward the rural provincial towns of the interior. And the shift has been felt throughout the

officer corps. Fifty-six percent of the men who attained the rank of general in the Army between 1955 and 1965 were born either in the central highlands (sierra) or in the Amazon jungles (selva). According to the author's calculations, 94 percent of the directors of Peru's largest corporations in the same period were born in Lima or elsewhere on the coast. This separation is further accentuated by the fact that many generals, including President Velasco, rose through the ranks, gaining admission to the Military Academy only after service as ordinary soldiers.

Two political consequences follow from the social position of the officer comps. The first is that most officers experience a sense of exclusion or frustration in their relations with the top elite. They do not come from it and cannot expect to rise into it during even the most successful military career. They tend in fact to be hostile to what they themselves often call the plutocracy. The second point is that the officer corps is sufficiently distinct from the masses to feel no particular identification with them either, with the possible exception of a paternalistic regard for the Indian. Both points indicate military apartness, not to say isolation, from important sectors of Peruvian society.

MILITARY EDUCATION

This sense of separation, of a distinctive military group and outlook and of the desirability and feasibility of an independent social role for the military is considerably enhanced by an additional factor: the high level of military education.

Peru has one of the most sophisticated military training systems in Latin America. The Military Academy has been functioning continuously since 1896. Begun under French tutelage, it is now a wholly Peruvian institution giving a 4-year university-level education to some 1,000 cadets. The Navy and Air Force have similar, smaller academies of their own. The Superior War College (the Peruvian general staff college) has been graduating classes since 1905 and conducts a 2-year course often attended by officers from other Latin American

countries. The Center for Higher Military Studies (CAEM), which opened in 1950, offers a 1-year course largely devoted to social, economic, and political problems to a selected group of colonels and generals. Officers may also follow specialized military or civilian courses, in Peru and abroad, usually at government expense. Peruvian officers have studied in Europe and the United States for 60 years, often winning recognition as the best foreign students.

As William F. Whyte has suggested, most Peruvians do not believe that success in life is based on merit. Within the military, however, the emphasis on professional training and education in the promotion process has, for many years, made the military perhaps the most meritoriented sector at least of the state bureaucracy, if not of the society. All Navy and Air Force officers and more than 90 percent of all Army officers are Academy graduates. The continuing value of education in the Peruvian military career may be inferred from the fact that of the Division Generals on active duty between 1940 and 1965, no fewer than 80 percent had graduated in the top quarter of their class at the Military Academy.

All this gives Peruvian officers self-confidence in their own ideas and programs, and a desire to be heard on a broad range of issues. In the past, these issues were understood in crude terms centering on concepts of honor, duty, efficiency, and patriotism, usually leading to bitter complaints about the incompetence of civilians, and particularly politicians, plutocrats, and foreigners. As military education has improved and spread, these concerns have been transformed into an interest in economic planning and national integration. In this "age of total war," the largely frontier-minded nationalism of the past has been supplanted by a sense that national development is essential to defense. Some officers may have increasingly found in these discussions of national development an outlet for growing social and political resentments.

The Center for Higher Military Studies (CAEM) has consistently taught that, in accordance with Article 213 of the Peruvian Constitution, the military must defend national sovereignty. In practice, this has been defined to mean the increasing of Peru's capacity for maneuver

In dealing with the outside world, and particularly the United States. Recognition of the Soviet Union, coupled with some marginal trade, could be in harmony with this interpretation of the Constitutional mandate. Similarly, the Constitutional prescription for the maintenance of order has been interpreted by the CAEM as the need to ensure an order conductive to the "national well-being" of all Peruvians, not just that of the dominant social classes. Some officers believe they are the only ones competent to deal with these problems: they usually emphasize the need for authoritarian government and efficiency. Others believe that military expertise should be utilized by the civilian authorities: they usually emphasize the dangers inherent in military involvement in politics. All officers agree that the military must play a substantial role in national development.

This increased sophistication may entail political costs. Although one result of studying political and social problems may be to realize their complexity, another may be to undermine the credibility of competing solutions advanced by political parties, thereby weakening the legitimacy of civilian leadership.

RELATIONS WITH OTHER SECTORS OF SOCIETY

So much for the outlook of the military. Leaving aside for the time being the question of specific actions or coups, how do other sectors of society tend to view them in general?

The "oligarchy," however defined, is best characterized as ambivalently hostile. For the older families of wealth, the social and cultural gulf between them and the military often leads to contempt for the military, only partly checked by the hope that the military may act as a brake on social upheaval. But the cost and dangers to the oligarchy are both considerable. State support for a largely autonomous bureaucracy is expensive and may provide the basis for the development of a powerful and uncontrollable political force, which could take political actions hostile to conservative interests.

Among the middle classes, a set of clearcut attitudes toward the military is hard to find. Public employees are envious of the military's retirement benefits and special privileges. Some intellectuals

and students react negatively to any group as closely linked to authority as is the military: others are favorably disposed precisely because the Army represents authority and force. Political parties exert an influence somewhat hostile to the military. The politicians themselves are nonetheless constantly looking for ways to bind the military to their particular interests. This may help account for the fact that within Peru itself no significant voices were raised against the purchase of supersonic Mirage fighters by the Peruvian Air Force. The only generalization that can therefore be made about the middle sectors is that their attitudes toward the military are ambivalent and that their actual behavior is likely to be pragmatic, not to say opportunistic.

Among the urban lower classes, the reaction to the military is more generally favorable. The military is associated with patriotic sentiments to a greater extent than is true among the more cynical upper classes. The military is generally welcomed in civic action efforts in the slums, and there seems to be relatively little penetration of anti-military doctrines in the working class. Many lower-class persons share with the military an appreciation of popular "Criollo" culture and a sense of social solidarity, particularly with the enlisted cadre and with lower-ranking military officers. In addition, the lower classes, like some of the military, are often not averse to forceful or strong-arm solutions to critical problems. While a Mirage symbolizes national power, a coup symbolizes a housecleaning.

The situation is still different in the rural areas. The Indian peasant in Peru has learned through long and bitter experience to fear authority — whether public or private. He has therefore adopted a personal strategy of sullen passivity, often mistaken for laziness or stupidity. In dealing with the military, this strategy takes the form of avoidance and minimal necessary cooperation. The Indian serves as conscript when he must; otherwise, he has few dealings with the military.

This picture of resigned hostility may be changing. One factor is the vastly improved treatment of the Indian conscript by the Army. Another is the spread of communication and agitation, often with unusual results. In 1962, a young agronomy student, Hugo Blanco,

-10-

attempted to organize peasant leagues in a potentially rich but remote Andean valley. For a time, the isolation of the area from both public and private authority favored him. Even so, the local population proved very difficult to organize. By 1964, when the author visited the Convencion Valley, Hugo Blanco was in jail. But more important was the presence of military engineers, building a road to end the valley's isolation and provide an outlet for its agricultural produce. When the military first arrived, about 60 percent of the population of the closest village had prudently left, taking their possessions with them. In six months, they were back. The relationships worked out in this manner withstood the subsequent attempts by pro-Cuban intellectuals to establish guerrillas in the area in 1965, and may have become a basis for the erosion of traditional attitudes among both Indians and military leaders.

III. MILITARY POLITICAL BEHAVIOR

Given the relative isolation of the military from other sectors of Peruvian society, and the gradual development of a relatively modern military force in which (since 1960) engineers outnumber cavalrymen, and generals go to school, what can we say about the overall patterns of military political behavior?

It is commonplace to say that the behavior of any group cannot be understood out of its historical context. The fact that the military mounted major political interventions in 1914, 1930, 1948, and 1962 prior to the current intervention of 1968 has created a series of particular political traditions and relationships, which qualify any discussion of general tendencies, but some patterns do emerge from the labyrinth of past military involvement in Peruvian politics.

The first general characteristic of Peruvian military behavior that needs to be stressed is its internal diversity. It is easy to assume that the military, with its excellent organization, its professional competence and solidarity, and its well-maintained discipline, is politically monolithic. Nothing could be further from the truth. To begin with, personal and service rivalries and tensions often generate political differences. Other dissatisfactions often divide the officer corps internally along generational lines. Nearly all political groups, interests, and attitudes find some representation or expression within the officer corps. To these are added specifically military complications: officers who personally favor the same political party or outlook may disagree on whether the military should become involved, how, and to what extent.

The major limit on this internal diversity may well be the development of a military ethic setting the military apart from civilians in general and from civilian politicians in particular. Even the frequently mentioned opposition of military leaders to the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) Party is probably today less a manifestation of a specific hatred for APRA based on historical tension than it is a dislike mainly based on the perception of APRA as "another unreliable civilian political party." The continued

presence of Victor Raul Haya de la Torre, founder of the party in 1924 but now aged and moderate, certainly helps to stoke the fires of traditional suspicions. Ironically, the image of APRA as unreliable has been strengthened rather than diminished by APRA's recent moderation, which has come at a time when many officers were becoming disenchanted with moderate civilian solutions.

Internal political diversity leads to a second characteristic:
caution born of fear lest internal disagreements imperil the solidarity
and hence stability of the military institutions. Though one frequently
hears of military plotting, and some have suggested that conspiracy is
inherent to the profession in Latin America, analysis of military interventions in Peru reveals considerable reluctance, even under heavy
pressure, to take overt actions against established governments and a
primary interest in institutional preservation in the face of real or
imagined threats to the military establishment itself. Once in power,
the military has as a rule tended to behave cautiously and conservatively, using its power largely to ensure its own survival.

In contrast to the relative permanence of these two factors of political diversity and caution, it is possible to isolate two recent trends in the political behavior of the military. The first is essentially a change in style, but one with important consequences. The individual military leader or caudillo who seizes and maintains power largely in personal terms is fading from the scene. During both the 1962 and 1968 coups, for example, power was seized not by a prestigious general with troop command and a personal following, but jointly by the Commanding Generals of the three services under the chairmanship of the Chief of the Joint Staff. These officers referred to their coup as an "institutional movement" undertaken by the Armed Forces in support of the Constitution under the authority of Article 213. The 1968 coup may have been more clearly the work of a given group of officers than was the case in 1962, but institutional unity and even the appearance of an institutional movement were carefully preserved.

Professionalization, therefore, has obviously not taken the military out of politics. On the contrary, by giving officers an interest in economic development and Peruvian political integration, it has

promoted a new interest in governmental affairs and a sense of technical and perhaps political leadership. Incomplete data even suggest a positive correlation between military education and political activism: ever since the opening of the Military Academy, the more advanced the education of a particular officer, the more likely he has been to participate in national politics when compared to his less-trained fellow officers.

But professionalization has also contributed to the bureaucratization of the military, to the reinforcement of hierarchical relationships, and to underscoring the importance of preserving the profession and the institution from excessive individual adventurism. Generals, not colonels, take command of coups in Peru, and not since 1932 has there been a general under 46 years of age.

The second new development, partly related to the first, is that the military has shifted from the role of temporary warden to that of policymaker. The continued loosening of the military's ties with the elite, increasing self-consciousness at having been maneuvered in the past into an automatically conservative and repressive role, and improved knowledge of political and social problems have helped to move the military toward a politically independent position, which enables it to look in a relatively disinterested fashion at the claims and policies of competing groups.

Clearly, the role of policymaker (or even merely of policysupporter) is more complicated than that of a simple warden who acts
sporadically in a limited sphere. If the powers of the state are
to be expanded and used to direct national development, as most
officers would now prefer, the problems become much more complicated
and may require continuous intervention or participation of a relatively
sophisticated variety.

It is at this point that most fears about the military's future role arise. Some observers argue that the military's interest in social problems is potentially dangerous to established political patterns. Specifically, there is talk of the emergence of the military as a nationalist or revolutionary force expressing social, provincial, and racial antagonisms in a heavy-handed authoritarian effort to remake

-14-

Peruvian society. In 1962, prior aspects of military behavior -- caution, diversity, and aloofness from the corrupt civilian world -- ultimately dominated. Will the same hold true after the 1968 coup?

IV. THE 1968 COUP

What lies behind the coup of October 3, 1968, in which the military, acting as an institutional unit, replaced Fernando Belaúnde Terry, the reformist civilian President they had helped to elect in 1963, with General Juan Velasco Alvarado, until then the little-known Chief of the Joint Staff?

This question holds particular urgency because the seizure by the military government of the assets of the International Petroleum Company (registered in Canada, but in fact a wholly-owned subsidiary of Standard Oil of New Jersey), threatened to set in motion the Hickenlooper machinery and disrupt the economic fabric (as well as the weakened political and military framework) of relations between the United States and Peru.

Already in 1962-63, the governing junta was more than a little influenced by a combination of nationalism and a desire to bring about basic social reforms. In the end, the normal patterns of military caution dominated policy: the military junta contented itself with establishing a basic law for agrarian reform, founding the National Planning Institute, and ensuring the election of the one civilian politician, Fernando Belaúnde Terry, who seemed most closely to represent their views (and who had most assiduously courted military favor).

By 1968, enough had changed so that the military was no longer willing to act in this relatively restrained and more or less arbitral fashion, but was rather prepared to accept institutional responsibility for the direction of national policy for an extended period of time. Some reasons for this change are to be found in the altered framework of immediate prior military and political experience. In 1962, the reference point for military government was the rule from 1948-56 of General Manuel Odría, which had left many officers with a bitter taste of corruption and unpopularity and made them unwilling to risk the military institutions on new adventures. By 1968, however, the reference point was no longer the Odría government, but the more positive record of the 1962-63 junta. The political experience of the intervening five years of civilian rule, moreover, seemed to demonstrate

to many officers that the military junta of 1962-63 had acted with excessive caution and had not pushed its reform program far enough.

The 1963-68 period, with its political temporizing and the executive jettisoning of social and economic programs that could not be supported by a Congress dominated by opposing civilian political parties, therefore led to increasing military disenchantment with civilian politicians and perhaps with the procedures of liberal democracy as well. Belaunde thus appears to have been viewed by some military men as a last chance for moderate civilian reform. If the military's previous strategy of acting as a policy-supporter for a broad program of change under civilian leadership was frittered away, then what alternatives remained to taking over directly? As in Brazil, the more the military developed a clear consciousness and commitment to social and political development, the less likely they were to find civilian politicians competent to carry them forward and implement their goals, and perhaps also the more likely to underestimate the difficulties of governing that had sapped the energies of Belaunde.

Although it will be some time before all the motivations for the actual coup of October 3, 1968 become clear, it is therefore apparent that both military opposition to APRA (which might have won the presidential elections scheduled for 1969 and now cancelled) and the famous "missing page" (used to symbolize civilian corruption) in Belaunde's proposed IPC settlement, are but fragments of a complicated set of deteriorating relations between important elements within the Army and some leaders of the civilian political elite. The collapse of Belaunde's Acción Popular Party, and the President's use of the national police to retain control of his own party headquarters against his followers' opposition was probably of considerable significance in undermining Belaunde with the military.

THE FUTURE

Because the 1968 coup took place, it does not follow that all traditional patterns have been thrown to the winds. Caution is still very much a part of military behavior. One of the weaker links of the military junta is its fear of isolation and the consequent need

to maintain some civilian allies. Of the current reasonably broad coalition represented by the military, no single element is basically stable. Much of the elite may be alienated by the maintenance of high taxation. The Left may be alienated by inability to produce reforms. As the novelty wears off, the nationalist glue binding such diverse civilian groups to the military may also weaken.

In the absence of external pressure, these factors may with time be enough to permit the civilian political elite to take advantage of the political inexperience of the military as a whole to drive a wedge between them and their current supporters, thereby reducing them to their normal state of isolation. Should this happen, the military's choice between withdrawal and the attempt to develop new allies, perhaps by Peronist-style populism, may well hinge on whether or not there is a graceful avenue open for institutional withdrawal that does not appear to be a retreat.

The dispute with the International Petroleum Company is based on long-standing historical and political conflicts. Perhaps even more than the fishing industry (in which Peru now competes with Japan for world primacy), petroleum fits the category of a basic national resource. Contrary to some suspicions in the United States that President Velasco has been irresponsible and unrepresentative in his dealings with the IPC, he almost certainly acted with broad military support. As early as February 5, 1960, the Joint Staff, over the signature of the Commanding General of the Army, publicly recorded its belief that the La Brea y Parinas agreements were "harmful to national sovereignty." That it took nine years to put belief into practice is a sign of institutional caution even if ultimately the seizure was helped along by individual recklessness.

From a Peruvian standpoint, however, the seizure of the International Petroleum Company may have seemed far less reckless than it has seemed from the American perspective. In the first place, the Peruvians may not have believed the United States would actually apply the Hickenlooper amendments. A similar precedent, showing U.S. flexibility when confronted by a determined Peruvian position, was the belated willingness to make F-5 aircraft available once it became

clear that the alternative was the Mirage purchase. In the second place, the Peruvians probably calculated that even if U.S. aid was lost, it might be offset by the extra revenues obtained through nationalization. Already under the Belaunde government, Peru's National Planning Institute had calculated net annual foreign exchange earnings derived from U.S. assistance over the years 1960-67 at something just over ten million dollars per year -- not a very large sum, particularly if increasing indebtedness were also considered. Finally, it is not clear that the dominant military group realized that it was also placing its country's U.S. sugar quota in jeopardy.

The nationalist coalition forged on the petroleum issue has strengths as well as weaknesses. But it is unlikely to withstand an extension of nationalizations into other areas, just as it will be strained if the Hickenlooper amendments are applied. Realizing this, the predominant military view is as likely to oppose new measures that would widen the area of policy disagreement as it is likely to stand behind what has already been done. This interpretation is also in harmony with the CAEM's doctrinal tendency to statism, awarding the state a directive role in the economy, but decidedly not an exclusive one.

This analysis has suggested that the military have too much independence and pride to let themselves be manipulated for long by any single political group, military or civilian, and too much concern with professional solidarity and institutional stability to assume, completely on their own, a primary and authoritarian responsibility to remake Peruvian society. Ultimately, it also suggests that their behavior, in the long run and on most issues, will be vacillating and will continue to reflect tensions associated with general issues of Peruvian development.

^{*}The real significance of the assistance, however, is impossible to determine in the absence of information on gross earnings and expenditures on international account. This is particularly true if the possible effects of U.S.-Peruvian bilateral political relations on the international investment climate are also considered.

The Soviet Union in the Third World: Purpose in Search of Power

By FRITZ ERMARTH *

ABSTRACT: Although the Soviet Union inherited its ideological commitment to revolution in the Third World from Lenin, it was only in Khrushchev's time, after industrialization and victory in World War II had made the Soviet Union a world power, that this commitment became an important component of Soviet foreign policy. Khrushchev envisaged a fairly rapid transition by postcolonial states toward Soviettype "socialism." This process was to be guided by the example of Soviet national development, protected by the deterrent shield of Soviet strategic power, and accelerated by a modicum of Soviet economic and military aid. Khrushchev's vision exceeded the Soviet Union's power to fulfill it. Nationalists in power throughout the Third World advanced their own visions of the future, often at variance And the Western powers were not with Soviet views. restrained from intervening actively in the Third World where their interests were at stake. Khrushchev's successors have been less sanguine. They have tended to concentrate on specific areas of the Third World and have also been more willing to intervene in Third World military conflicts involving the United States. Only the future will show whether they use their increased power with the restraint that weakness imposed upon them in the past.

Fritz Ermarth, M.A., Pacific Palisades, California, is a member of the Social Science Department of The RAND Corporation and a specialist on Soviet foreign and military policy.

^{*}Any views expressed in this paper are those of the author. They should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of The RAND Corporation or the official policy or opinion of any of its governmental or private research sponsors.

M OSCOW has been interested in the Third World from the very birth of the Soviet state. Lenin's views on the socioeconomic roots of politics and, even more, his analysis of the prevailing international order, advanced in Imperialism, imparted to the Bolsheviks a profound sensitivity to the revolutionary potential of the East. Despite their inevitable preoccupation with Europe, as Professor Ulam has written: "From the beginning, the premises of Soviet-Comintern policy in the East and what is now known generally as the underdeveloped world were sounder than in the case of Europe."1 Lenin's ultimate hope that the postcolonial revolution would contribute substantially, even decisively, to the collapse of the capitalist order, can be deemed illusory. His more proximate anticipation, that decolonization would revolutionize the international system, was thoroughly realistic. Not only was revolution in the Third World just beginning in earnest, but the Soviet Union of Lenin's day clearly cid not possess the power to guide or shape this revolution in any meaningful way. And, while he quickly adjusted to the doctrinal and diplomatic demands of Realpolitik, Lenin never fully made the transition to the view that Soviet state power represented the central ingredient of the revolutionary process on a world scale.

Stalin completed this transition with a vengeance: revolution become synonymous with Soviet state power. Anything which was beyond, or did not contribute directly to, that power was inherently suspect, if not reactionary. At the same time, Stalin's foreign policy was cautious in practice and extremely defensive in motivation. It was designed to protect the process of forced

Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence: The History of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1967 (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), p. 125.

industrialization from military threats arising out of Europe and Japan. By achieving industrialization and by filling the territorial vacuums of Europe left by the defeat of Nazi Germany, Stalin did indeed revolutionize the Eurasian, and hence the world, balance of power. But it remained, in essence, a continental operation. The vacuums on Soviet borders which the war had created and which Soviet power had filled were of prime importance.

Also important, however, were the vacuums which developed, as a result of the war, in colonial Asia and Africa, in which the nationalist movements arose which so dominated the events of the ensuing two decades. In most un-Leninist style, Stalin at first showed no real interest in the opportunities opening to Soviet policy in the colonial areas. He was not in them militarily; he could not get into them without undue risk. He was notably suspicious of his own ability to control his only other instrument for projecting Soviet influence into these regions-local Communist parties, even where they were strong enough to be relevant. Toward the very end of his life, he began a general reappraisal of Soviet policy, including that toward the distant colonial world." His death interrupted this reappraisal, but his successors completed it.

KHRUSHCHEV'S THIRD WORLD VISIONS

Preceded by doctrinal revisions commencing as early as 1952, the new "Eastern" policy of Stalin's successors was effectively instituted in 1955, the year of Bandung, when Khrushchev and Bulganin went to Asia and Soviet arms began appearing in the Middle East. In a very real sense, one can say that the Kremlin leaders resurrected for their

² See Marshall D. Shulman, Stalin's Poreign-Policy Reappraisal (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963). foreign policy the ethos of world revolution which had perished at the gates of Warsaw in 1920 and had been buried under "socialism in one country."

Doctrinally, the Soviets elevated the anticolonial metamorphosis, postcolonial nation-building, and economic development-all under the heading of the national-liberation revolution-to the status of a component part of the world revolutionary process. The building of communism-socialism in Communist states, the national-liberation revolution, and the struggle of the working class in capitalist states were seen as comprising this process. They recognized the "national bourgeoisie," that is, local nationalists who were not workers or peasants, as an "objectively progressive" and, indeed, leading force, where they had previously been rejected as agents of the colonial powers. They searched around, rather unsuccessfully. for doctrinal constructs according to which they could confidently describe the transition of the newly independent states toward socialism, as they conceived it. A preponderant role in this transition was assigned to the force of the Soviet example as a developing soci-The role of local Communist parties remained ambiguous in Soviet doctrine for a variety of reasons. Finally, they declared that the growing nuclear power of the Soviet Union represented a stout shield that prevented the military intervention of the imperialists against the national-liberation movement, often citing the Middle East crises of the mid- and late 1950's as representative. For example, according to a basic doctrinal handbook of the late 1950's:

The postwar years have convincingly demonstrated the role of the socialist states as a mighty factor of restraint against the aggressiveness of the imperialists who, in other circumstances, would fall on the national liberation movement with all their power and crush it.

In practice, the policy involved a broadly based Soviet penetration of the underdeveloped world, involving a variety of diplomatic, economic, semi-official political, and military-aid activities. The total silhouette of the Soviet political presence in the underdeveloped world was markedly raised. In ultimate political terms, the Soviets saw their goal as the expulsion of Western influence from these regions and their gradual gravitation into the socialist camp or commonwealth.

Initially, the Soviets were confident that the systematic revolution in the Third World could be largely selfsustaining, that its favorable progress would little tax their economic, even less their military, resources. In any case they had little of these to spare. During the decade 1954-1964, Soviet economic credits and grants to non-Communist underdeveloped countries totaled slightly more than \$4 billion, of which only about \$1.5 billion had actually been drawn.4 By the end of 1964, Soviet military assistance, mostly in the form of long-term credits, had been extended to more than fifteen countries, but at a total volume of probably not over \$3 billion.⁵ During the period 1946-1965. total United States economic and military aid to less developed areas exceeded \$100 billion. In the main, the Soviets hoped to accelerate, and to guide by political means, an indigenous process.

³ Osnovy Marksizma-Leninizma (Moscow, 1959), p. 454.

⁴U.S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Current Economic Indicators for the USSR (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1965), p. 174.

The Soviet Military Aid Program as a Reflection of Soviet Objectives (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown Research Project, Atlantic Research Corporation, 1965).

This simplified picture characterized Soviet policy toward the Third World from 1955 to 1960-1962. It complemented Soviet concentration on internal economic progress, the construction of a viable nuclear deterrent, and a modulated détente with the West which kept the risk of war low while offering opportunities to press objectives in Europe. It projected Soviet power and influence into the Third World for the first time, and it did so cheaply. No doubt, when Khrushchev contemplated the Third World in detail, he saw many disturbing complexities. But he felt confident in the sweep of history.

PROBLEMS OF VIOLENCE, CREDIBILITY, AND CONTROL

From 1960 onward, the complexities eroded the basis for Soviet confidence. Two fundamental problems arose which challenged the relevance of the Soviet approach to the Third World, both connected with and aggravated by the growing Sino-Soviet rift. One remained essentially a doctrinal matter, but extended discussion of it, which is still going on, indicated that important leaders were worrying about the future of policy. The Soviets began to wonder, now that the colonial empires had largely disappeared, how, in fact, the transition from the nationalist to the socialist phase of the revolution was to take place. They saw nationalists acquire power who, while anti-Western, had their own notions about the future, reciprocated Soviet opportunism in their dealings with Moscow, and showed no inclination to step aside for the "objective laws of history" or to tolerate alternatives to their rule in local Communist parties. Notwithstanding Moscow's historic unconcern about the fate of local parties when state issues were at stake, the latter problem became urgent in the competition with Peking. Although a variety of ingenious formulae have been

invoked, such as "national democracy," "revolutionary democracy," and the "noncapitalist path," and cautiously ascribed to a changing number of developing countries, a satisfactory model for postcolonial development has yet to be worked out by the Soviets. In practice, this doctrinal question has not been demonstrably influential in shaping immediate Soviet policy in the underdeveloped world, but it has weighed upon the minds of a leadership which appeals consciously to an historical Weltanschauung for its legitimacy and political aims.

The second problem which emerged around 1960 was far more vexatious and pertinent to immediate action: the problem of violence in the revolutionary process and Soviet support for it. The Soviet position on violence and the use of military power in the Third World, which stressed peaceful revolution behind a deterrent shield and limited Soviet military aid largely to established governments in low-risk situations, came under attack on two fronts. On the one hand, the Chinese began to attack it bitterly as representing excessive caution at best or treason to the cause at worst. Peaceful paths, they insisted, are possible only in exceptional circumstances, and growing Soviet nuclear power now broadens the scope for armed struggle by inhibiting the response of imperialism. To this, the Soviets replied by backing deeper into the doctrinal box of deterrence: the deterrent shield is strong; therefore, peaceful methods are to be preferred as less costly, and less dangerous, unless the imperialists intervene. They began admitting at this point that their nuclear posture was

^e See Uri Ra'anan, "Moscow and the Third World," Problems of Communism (January-February 1965), pp. 22-31; and Robert F. Lamberg, "Moskau und die Dritte Welt: Vorzuege und Gefahren des Pluralismus," Osteurops (January 1968), pp. 792, 802. not as formidable a barrier as earlier declared.

Khrushchev outlined the Soviet case on armed conflict in the nuclear age in his commentary on the 1960 Moscow Declaration of eighty-one Communist parties, itself an ambiguous document. First, general nuclear war would be an unmitigated catastrophe and must be avoided. Moreover, despite the unchanged aggressiveness of imperialism. Soviet strength makes such avoidance possible. Second, local conflicts are very dangerous because escalation is likely, and virtually certain if nuclear powers get involved. Third, nationalliberation wars-local revolutionaries fighting local reactionaries—are possible and just; Moscow must "support" them when they occur. It is one of the major ironies of our time that this thesis was totally misread by the new Kennedy administration as a wholesale Soviet endorsement of subliminal violence in the Third World. It meant precisely the opposite, as the Chinese lost no time in pointing out. Khrushchev was keenly aware, and hoped others would be as well, that the line between national liberation and local wars had to be an obscure one, especially if great-power interests became involved. Nationalliberation struggles could easily become local wars, which could easily escalate to general war, in spite of Moscow's proclaimed nuclear might. This was as powerful a brief for caution in the use of violence and as explicit an admission of Soviet weakness as Khrushchev could bring himself to make. As a general principle, he did not want nationalliberation wars, and, if they had to occur, he did not want to get involved militarily. In practice, he deviated from this doctrine under pressure of events, but only slightly as the very cautious behavior of the Soviets in the Congo, in Laos, and in Vietnam through 1964 indicates. Unfortunately for Khrushchev, his line was not persuasive in Peking and not understood in Washington.

The Kennedy administration, impelled, among other things, by its reading of the Soviet line, mounted the second challenge to Khrushchev's position by rapidly developing the capability, and declaring the intention, to intervene directly against insurgent movements which it believed to be Communist-inspired or otherwise dangerous. Indeed, it expanded American capabilities for action across the entire spectrum of limited-conflict situations while dramatically fortifying its posture for general nuclear war.

The strategic basis for Khrushchev's optimism of the 1955-1959 period was further weakened by the Cuban missile crisis. The core of Soviet strategic posture was demonstrably too weak to sustain an assertive foreign policy in Europe and the Third World. Khrushchev reacted by retrenching his foreign-policy objectives, seeking détente with the United States, and turning his major attention to civilian economic development and an effort to stem the disintegration of international communism.

Developments between 1962 and 1964 in Southeast Asia also inflicted considerable damage on the pattern of political assumptions and perceptions supporting Khrushchev's policy. Despite a substantial material and political investment in the region, in Indonesia, Khrushchev adhered to his position of disengagement from the armed conflicts of Indochina. The Soviets did supply limited military assistance to the insurgent movements in Laos and Vietnam during this period, but, such as it was,

⁷ This reading of Khrushchev's "national-liberation doctrine" is elaborated in the author's master's thesis, "Current Soviet Doctrine on National Liberation," 1963, on deposit in the Russian Research Center, Harvard University.

it seemed aimed primarily at retaining some leverage against escalation. In Vietnam, however, the conflict did escalate, and it became a test case on which the Soviet position was highly vulnerable. First, it proved that neither Soviet military power at the general nuclear level nor Soviet restraint in local theaters of conflict could prevent the growing intervention of the United States. Second, it seemed to prove that a properly managed armed insurgency could succeed against local resistance massively supported by the United States. Third, if a major risk was involved at this point, it was that of United States attacks on North Vietnam which would bring into play quasialliance responsibilities to a Communist state. As events proceeded, especially after the Tonkin episode of August 1964, Khrushchev's stance of disengagement appeared to look more and more like the appeasement which Peking always insisted it was. Khrushchev fell from power for a variety of reasons, but this was probably one of them. The new leadership promised to take a new look at its relations with China and its policy on Vietnam.

To assert that the disintegration of Khrushchev's policy toward the Third World represented its failure, in a literal sense, would obviously be inappropriate. At worst, his reach considerably exceeded his grasp; but his grasp was sufficient to bring a substantial penetration of Soviet influence in areas geographically important to the Soviet Union and among elite groups playing vital roles throughout the underdeveloped world. The weakness of the Khrushchev policy was the intellectual weakness of Marxism, its overreliance on the operation of self-generated conceptions of historical inevitability. The policy as a whole rested heavily on the "objective necessity" of the postcolonial revolution's moving of its own momen-

tum toward socialism, and on all this meant for the Soviets in terms of domestic and international alignments. Nationalism was one difficulty. The Soviets did not underestimate its power; on the contrary, they bet heavily on it. But they ignored its capacity to generate its own political visions, including visions of "Arab," "African," and other "socialisms" which sorely troubled doctrinal monopolists in Moscow. The volatility of politics within developing countries was another factor that the Soviets underestimated, largely as a result of their ideologically motivated search for "class forces." And they found many of their early convictions about economic development to be excessively optimistic.

Essentially, the problem was one of power. In a decade of intensive effort, the Soviets exercised the ability to penetrate and operate in the underdeveloped world, but they could not shape it. In political, socioeconomic, and military terms, the events and developments over which they could exert determining influence seemed far outranked in importance by those which were beyond their control.

PRAGMATISM SINCE KHRUSHCHEV

Developments confronting Soviet policy in the Third World since 1964 have contributed further to the sobering lessons being drawn in the years just before Khrushchev's fall. In addition, there have been some rather rude Among the latter must be shocks. numbered the early phases of the United States bombing campaign against North Vietnam in 1965, and the June 1967 Middle East war. In Vietnam, the United States seemed able to attack a socialist state with impunity. In the Middle East, the Soviets found their fully armed clients unable to defend themselves against a numerically inferior opponent. Moscow's Third World

"deterrent shield" looked disturbingly thin. Equally shocking to Moscow were a series of political coups in underdeveloped countries of Africa and Asia which removed leaders highly favored by Moscow-foremost among whom were Ben Bella of Algeria and Nkrumah of Ghana—and testified to the political fragility of states that Moscow had deemed traversing the "noncapitalist path" to socialism. In fact, these events, coupled with rising pressure on Soviet authority in Eastern Europe, produced a somewhat hysterical doctrinal reaction against what Moscow perceived as the "global counterattack of imperialism."

Other trends were less dramatic, but unsettling, nevertheless. Moscow found large segments of the Third World, including the elites of countries with which relations were cordial, such as India, moving into positions of truculent and, to Moscow's mind, undiscriminating, irritation toward both the superpowers. The Soviet Union was lumped with the United States as part of the prosperous North and was found, for that reason, to owe the developing South more extensive economic aid.8 Similarly annoying to the Soviets was the view, which "has also gained currency among political leaders of some developing states," that Soviet support for the nonproliferation treatly represented a dictatorial condominium of the superpowers.9 Finally, each passing year of continued backwardness and population growth in the underdeveloped world, plus technological and economic progress in the industrialized

⁸ As evidence of Moscow's annoyance over this, see Soviet comment surrounding UNCTAD'S 1968 sessions and, inter alia, A. Kodachenko, "The Developing Countries and Economic Progress," Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta, no. 10 (March 1969), p. 45.

⁹I. Shatalov, "The Leninist Foreign Policy and the National Liberation Movement," *International Affairs*, no. 1 (January 1969), p. 74.

world, seemed to lengthen enormously the time-perspective in which the former could be een as moving toward socialism.

All was not uniformly gloomy, how-If Moscow's performance in defense of the national-liberation movement failed to measure up to previously proclaimed standards, these failings did not redound to the undiluted benefit of the United States. The Soviets found that, with patience and good luck. mainly in the form of American restraint, they could recover lost ground or, at least, cut losses. In Vietnam, the Soviets found that they could provide military support which may have been as critical to the endurance of Hanoi as United States intervention in 1965 was deemed critical to the survival of the Saigon government. The United States could intervene with force, but it could not win; and stalemate in Vietnam seemed to be undermining the entire American commitment to the Third World. In the Middle East, expensive as it was to redeem the losses of the June war, the net effect within a year of the dramatic setback seemed to be an augmented Soviet position in the region.

The patient diplomacy of the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime consolidated existing positions and opened new ones in a number of Third World states. The Soviet Union managed to improve its relations with Pakistan without serious damage to Soviet-Indian relations, and even facilitated control of conflict between the two neighbors throughout the Tashkent summit. Both Turkey and Iran were courted, with considerable success, a trend that the Soviet Union hoped would improve its position in the Middle East and vis-à-vis the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Even Latin America, a region of the Third World hitherto most likely to be termed a United States preserve, was proving susceptible to Soviet diplomatic and commercial blandishments.

Another trend which certainly encouraged the Soviets, although hardly a function of their own behavior, was the progressive political isolation of China in the Third World as a result of her intemperate behavior and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. similar if somewhat less prominent development was a slight ebbing of Castroite appeal in Latin America upon the failure of Guevara's Bolivian adventure. Both cases represented a reduction of pressure from the Left, first, upon Moscow's political ties to Communist parties in the Third World, and, second, upon Moscow's doctrinal disinclination to grant a blanket endorsement to the tactics of guerrilla insurgency. The threat of "ultraleftism" among Moscow's coreligionists and doctrinal allies remained, but became somewhat more diffuse.

Finally, a plus not to be discounted was the growing intellectual sophistication of Soviet thinking about the Third World.10 Khrushchev's doctrinal optimism of the late 1950's and early 1960's was reflected in, and reinforced by, scholarship and journalism founded on equally unjustifiable optimism. But under the impact of specific reversals and disillusionments, Soviet observers tended to become more sensitive to the political, social, and economic "complexities" at work in the Third World. (The term slozhnosti or "complexities" is a sure sign that difficulties are being encountered which do not fit the desired pattern.) If one takes seriously the private claims voiced by many Soviet social scientists and area specialists that they have lately enjoyed improved

10 See Elizabeth Kridl Valkenier, "Recent Trends in Soviet Research on the Developing Countries," World Politics (July 1968), p. 644 f. access to decision-makers, one would assume that this sophistication contributed to the caution of Soviet policy in many regions of the Third World.

As the Soviet leaders have drawn a running tally of their recent experiences, they appear to have developed a number of rough operational guidelines to shape their Third World policies.

(1) They have seen fit to concentrate their attention and resources geographically. The Arab world, from Morocco to the Persian Gulf, and South Asia, from Iran to India, represent the highpriority targets for Soviet diplomatic, economic, and military efforts. Latin America, Subsaharan Africa, and Southeast Asia (apart from Vietnam) are clearly accorded a lower priority. Of course, the concentration of Soviet attention in the Arab world and South Asia is not new; it was prevalent under Khrushchev. But it has noticeably increased under his successors. For example, according to data published by the State Department of the United States, new extensions of economic credit and grants to the Arab-Mediterranean area (including Turkey and Sudan) and South Asia increased from about 80 percent of total new extensions to underdeveloped countries during 1954-1964 to about 90 percent in the years 1965-1967, even though five additional recipients were added in other areas.11 Were recent data on military assistance available, the concentration might be even more marked. Although much of the shift is accounted for by the deterioration of Soviet-Indonesian relations after 1965, and

n U.S., Department of State, Director of Intelligence and Research, "Communist Governments and Developing Nations: Aid and Trade in 1965," Research Memorandum, RSB-50, June 17, 1966; and "Communist Governments and Developing Nations: Aid and Trade in 1967," Research Memorandum RSB-120, August 14, 1968.

does not include Soviet aid to North Victnam, the trend is nevertheless noteworthy.

The reasons for this choice are fairly obvious. These are regions where successful past investments have been made and can be protected. Their location gives them some strategic importance in relation to Moscow's European and anti-Chinese goals. The other regions are seen to offer targets of opportunity for low-cost, occasional efforts rather than a sustained campaign. It remains to be seen whether Brezhnev's rather dramatic, if elliptical, call for an "Asian security system," clearly a response to Sino-Soviet hostility and the prospects of post-Vietnam policy adjustments by the United States, will lead to significant increases in Soviet attention to Southeast Asia as a region.12 For the moment, the center of gravity of Soviet Asian policy remains in India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.13

(2) The Soviets remain convinced that, for the present, their interests will not generally be served by intranational or international violence in the Third World. They are even more convinced that, should such violence occur, their support of it or participation in it must be most circumspect. Indicative of this mood is a recent Soviet rejoinder to calls for more military involvement in national-liberation conflicts.

Twice in the lifetime of one generation, Soviet people fought with unexampled energy and valor against the principal forces of imperialist aggression, saving the world and all mankind. The Soviet Union has never shirked and does not intend to shirk its responsibilities for peace and world progress. But this does not mean that the principle of military support should irrationally be made absolute. In the age of atomic weapons, calls to settle

scores with imperialism by the military might of the Socialist countries are extremely reckless. They conceal . . . the desire of their authors to evade their own duty of creating a powerful, united, mass anti-imperialist movement. 14

Despite this general stance, however, the Soviet Union has seen fit to engage itself deeply, if indirectly, in two Third World conflicts fraught with risks of escalation. It concluded that the risks in Vietnam and the Middle East were manageable and that the costs of disengagement would be too high to bear. It may learn from these conflicts that its past inhibitions about limited conflict in third areas are unjustifiably confining in an environment of increased Soviet strategic and regional power. Furthermore, it has diverted scarce resources to the expansion of its capability to establish a visible military presence in third areas, in the Mediterranean and, so far, only intermittently, in the Indian Ocean.15

(3) On a doctrinal plane, the Soviets seem comparatively disinclined to advance elaborate models of the developmental process which describe the transition of postcolonial, backward societies to some form of socialism. They are eager to understand the developmental process and even to prescribe, ex cathedra, the paths which they insist must be taken, sooner or later, to assure the real emergence of the emerging nations. The "revolutionary democracy," with its mass-based radical politics, the "noncapitalist path," with its socialized and Soviet-oriented economics, remain meaningful symbols of the true way. The Soviets are still troubled by the almost uniform refusal

¹³ Pravda, June 8, 1969.
13 See V. Matveyev, "Saturated "Vacuum," "
Livestiya, May 29, 1969.

¹⁴ Shatalov, "The Leninist Foreign Policy and the National-Liberation Movement," p. 72.

¹⁸ See Thomas W. Wolfe, The Soviet Quest for More Globally Mobils Military Power (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1967).

of their non-Communist favorites to tolerate the participation of Communist parties in their countries' politics. ¹⁶ But, in theory, they are prepared to admit that the developmental process will be long and complex, and is not susceptible to detailed prognostications at the present time. And, in practice, these doctrinal issues, while reflecting the concern of many Communist decision-makers with ultimate goals, do not impose real constraints on Soviet foreign policy.

CONCLUSIONS AND REFLECTIONS

Soviet policy, like everything else, manifests continuity and change at any given moment. The present Soviet rulers are the legitimate heirs of Lenin's conviction that the Third World is an arena of revolutionary transformation in which vital elements of the ultimate world political order are being forged. They inherit from Stalin, among other things, the conviction that augmentation of Soviet state power is the main vehicle of world revolution. This

10 On these doctrinal themes, see K. Brutents, "On Revolutionary Democracy," Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhidunarodniya Olnosheniya, no. 3 (March 1968), p. 15 f., and ibid., no. 4 (April 1968, pp. 24 fl.); and Ye. Zhukov, "The National Literation Movement of the Peoples of Asia and Africa," Kommunist, no. 4 (March 1969), pp. 31 f.

imposes upon them general tactical cautiousness in foreign affairs and a set of international priorities in which Soviet internal development, the strategic relationship with the United States, and interests in Europe come before goals in the Third World. Nevertheless, as a result of their cumulative inheritance. their power to act upon, if not necessarily to shape, the international environment, including the Third World, is far greater today than it was in the past. And, as a result of Khrushchev's ambitious policies, they are committed in strength to vital areas of the Third World.

In short, the Soviet Union is becoming-in the sense that the United States has been for nearly three decades-a truly global power, perceiving interests and possessing strength which easily dominates the local powers in many areas of the Third World. It is beginning to acquire the power to match the universal pretentions born with the Soviet state itself. The vital question is: Upon attaining such power, after a half-century of containment and self-conscious inferiority, will the Soviet Union be as conscious of the limitations of power in the Third World as the United States has become, at no insignificant cost? History, as usual, does not offer a confident answer.

INTRODUCING . .

LATIN AMERICA

(A Quarterly Reprint of Opinion)

This new unclassified private circulation publication is produced by WH Division with the cooperation of other Head-quarters components. The articles in it are selected on the basis of their relevance to important problems or significant developments in the Hemisphere. It may be read anywhere -- in planes, on buses or at home -- whenever you have a few minutes to spare. Individual articles may be given to assets or other contacts -- obviously with a "not for attribution" warning.

The publication is meant to be stimulating and thoughtprovoking. It will not follow any propaganda or editorial line, but rather will include differing and sometimes controversial commentaries by authors of widely varying political orientation.

Any comments and suggestions regarding Latin America will be most welcome. In particular we solicit contributions of articles from local publications (often not available at Headquarters) which you feel may merit translation and reproduction in this form.

CONFIDENTIAL

| | ROUTING AN | D RECOR | D_SHEET | |
|---|-------------------|-----------|---|--|
| BJECT: (Optional) | | | Latin America | |
| OM: | | EXTENSION | NO, | |
| C/WH/CA | | | DATE 22 July 1970 | |
| O: (Officer designation, room number, and DATE uilding) | | OFFICER'S | COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom | |
| ang) | RECEIVED FORWARDS | INITIALS | to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.) | |
| A/DCI Mr. Goodwin 1 F | 04 | (A) | With our compliments, | |
| | | | | |
| | | Cm | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | to file. (new file) | |
| linnu! | | | , | |
| | | - | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| • | | | | |
| • | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | 1 | | 1 | |

STAT