LATIN AMERICA



Editors' Note

"The Social Functions of Futebol"
American Universities Field Staff Report, East Coast South American Series, July 1970

"The Frustration of National Power"
World Affairs, September 1969

"Rojismo: The Resurgence of Colombian Populism"
American University Field Staff Reports, April 1970

"Relations Between the United States and Latin America"
International Affairs, July 1970

"Machismo or the Unromantic Latins"
"The New Latins", by Georgie Anne Geyer

"U.S.-Panamanian Relations Since 1941"
Journal of Inter-American Studies on World Affairs, July 1970

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No editorial approval is implied in the selection of these reprints, which are meant to stimulate thought, not channel it.

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Contributions to this second installment in our experiment in private circulation publications were selected individually with the intent of supplying varied but pertinent coverage on US - Latin American relations and Latin American cultural, economic and political realities in this decade. Each article deals with those relations and realities in a different way, but read together they paint a prospect of US - Latin American futures for the 1970's which is perhaps too bleak. We did not intend to play Cassandra, and can only assert that our search for suitable articles did not uncover more optimistic texts. Pessimistic though it may be, we hope that this second issue of LATIN AMERICA will stimulate inquiry and discussion among field colleagues as to where Latin America is going, or may go, in the 1970's.

The Editors

NEW WORLD REALITIES IN THE 1970's

1. The Social Functions of Futebol (Thomas G. Sanders; "AUFS Report", July 1970) Most Americans, especially those who have never been abroad, have little conception of the effect of football (soccer) on the other peoples of the world. Here is a perceptive and sympathetic commentary on the game and its significance to Brazil. A nation with almost unmanageable stresses in the areas of race, economics, education, politics, physical development and cultural identity, Brazil is truly united in only one aspect of her national life: "futebol".

2. In The Frustration of National Power ("World Affairs", September 1969) Walter F. Hahn, Deputy Director of the International and Social Studies Division of the Institute for Defense Analysis, examines the paradox of national power in a nuclear age - the frustrations of the superpowers in trying to bring their massive economic, technological, and military capabilities to bear on world problems and to serve their national interests. Confronted with a world undergoing rapid revolutionary change, he argues, power alone is becoming irrelevant to our goals. To maintain our dynamism

as a civilization, he concludes, national power must be reharnessed to a unified national purpose.

3. Rojismo: The Resurgence of Colombian Populism ("AUFS Reports", April 1970) In the aftermath of Colombia's 1970 presidential elections the author of the contribution on Brazil and football, foresees two possible courses of political development for Colombia during the 1970's. Thomas G. Sanders believes that Colombia may develop a new governmental alignment of political parties more consistent with Colombian realities than the 13 year old National Front. However, he offers the equally possible alternative that "...Colombia's controlling groups, fearing the people and populism, will follow the path of Brazil and turn to stronger measures to secure their position". Sanders finds that the broad mass of the Colombian populace did not share in the definite economic and socio-political progress achieved by the National Front and so is turning increasingly toward populist and left of center leadership for representation.

4. In Relations Between the United States and Latin America ("International Affairs", July 1970) David Bronheim, Director of the Center for Inter-American Relations in New York and former Deputy US Co-ordinator of the Alliance for Progress, discusses the psychological hang-ups and the cultural differences which have shaped the way Americans and Latin Americans think about each other. He analyzes the military, political, and economic "realities" of Latin America in an international context and concludes "there is little in Latin America that vitally affects the US national interest." His brief (and somewhat dated) assessment of individual countries confirms in his mind the low esteem to which Latin America has fallen in the eyes of US policy makers. Many readers will take issue with at least a few of Bronheim's conclusions. Among the conclusions: It is inadvisable to develop a foreign policy on Latin America during the next few years. The Panama Canal is no longer essential to the US.

5. Machismo or the Unromantic Latins ("The New Latins", by Georgie Anne Geyer) In her delightful chapter on "machismo" in her recent book on Latin America, Geyer (the interlocutor of Fidel Castro and others) goes beyond the usual treatment of this subject to relate it to the problems of national development in Latin America. Along with specific, sometimes racy comments on the practice of "machismo", she argues that the mental attitudes engendered by "machismo" (e.g., emphasis on style over substance) make it so hard for Latin Americans to attain a degree of impersonal cooperation needed for national growth.

6. In US-Panamanian Relations Since 1941 ("Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs", July 1970) Lester D. Langley of Central Washington State College describes in considerable, but very readable, detail the course of negotiations, political maneuvering, and violent clashes between the US and Panama over the Canal treaty issue during the past 30 years. Special emphasis is given to the nationalistic pressures which have fed Panamanian discontent and led to successive treaty revisions. This historical background adds a useful in-depth perspective to current jockying between the US and the Torrijos regime over a resumption of treaty talks, and the probable futures of Latin American nations in this and the next decade.

AUFS Report/July 1970

EAST COAST SOUTH AMERICA SERIES
Vol. XIV No. 2
(Brazil)

THE SOCIAL FUNCTIONS OF FUTEBOL

by Thomas G. Sanders

July 1970

To the majority of urban Brazilians, the most important date in their national history is not that of Independence or the Founding of the Republic, the Revolution of 1930 which brought Getúlio Vargas to power, or the military coup of 1964, but June 21, 1970, the day Brazil became the first country to win the world soccer championship three times and gain permanent possession of the Jules Rimet Cup. During the twenty days of the tournament, normal activities moved at half-pace in Brazil, as popular attention focused overwhelmingly on the six games that produced the championship. *Futebol* (pronounced FOOcheebol) dominated everything. Citizens read and discussed interminably the exploits of their heroes, the plots and insults of their adversaries, and the international reaction to their team. When Brazil clinched the title with a convincing 4-1 victory over Italy, they poured into the streets with joy, enthusiasm, and firecrackers, from Belem in the North to Pôrto Alegre in the South. Many cities came to a standstill for two days, and in Rio de Janeiro, when the conquering heroes disembarked at Galeão Airport and made their way through the streets, a rare off-season *carnaval* was proclaimed to celebrate.

An observer who deals with Brazilian economics and politics may feel himself in contact with issues relevant to history, but he who neglects *futebol* overlooks what is important for the Brazilian people. The average Brazilian, who does not understand the complexities of his country's economic and social problems and ignores his political leaders, is far more interested in his *futebol* team. He knows intimately the playing styles and personal lives of stars like Pelé, Gérson, Tostão, and Jairzinho. For weeks after the tournament, he joined others to crowd around store windows and stare silently and admiringly at the pictures of the national heroes exhibited there.

Americans are usually brought up to regard *futebol* as a somewhat boring "minor" sport and do not understand the mania it excites in many Latin American and European countries. (A month before the *futebol* tournament, Brazil's basketball team finished second in a world competition in Belgrade, but this fact attracted scant attention amid the preoccupation over the training problems of the *futebol* team.) When played poorly, *futebol* is painful to follow, and this partly accounts for the emotion and wrath of the fans; but when played well, which is difficult and uncommon, it demands exceptional speed, endurance, teamwork, and individual skill. On a lengthy field, with rare pauses in the game, the players must run constantly back and forth. The large ball, which can be propelled by the feet or head, is easily intercepted, and this can only be avoided by speed, accuracy in passing, team coordination, and deception. Each encounter between attacker and defenseman becomes an all-out struggle for the ball which may lead to contact and violence. The referee decides the narrow line between sportsmanlike effort and intent to injure, and fans who disagree may resort to fighting anyone who gets in their way. Though the players' inability to use their hands diminishes control over the ball, the freedom of their hands adds to their speed, balance, and deception. Scores are low, and a clever goal or gross misplay is often decisive and clearly visible to all the spectators. Rarely do more blunt or brutal public insults fall on anyone than those on a hapless player who has had a bad day.

In Brazil, *futebol* is more than a sport and lucrative occupation for the players and numerous hangers-on. It is even more than a psychological experience by which individuals detach themselves from their unexciting lives to participate collectively in the thrill of victory, to share the prestige of the nation, or to identify mystically with the players. *Futebol* serves clear social functions in a large and potentially powerful country that suffers from national disorientation, confusion about its image, and the pangs of overcoming underdevelopment.

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Brazil did not always have its present stature in international *futebol*. Although it is the only country to participate in all eight tournaments which have been held every four years since 1932 (except during World War II), it was not until 1950 that Brazil reached the finals. Heavily favored and playing before a home crowd in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil was upset by Uruguay 2-1 in what is still regarded as a national disaster.

Brazilian supremacy really began in the 1958 championship in Stockholm and coincided with the entrance into the third game, against Russia, of a seventeen-year-old substitute, Pelé. In the subsequent three games, Pelé gave an exhibition that foreshadowed his career as the greatest player the sport has ever produced and the Brazilian who is best known within his country and abroad. In a stubborn defensive contest against Wales, he scored the only goal; in the semi-finals against France, he made three; and in the final against Sweden, he marked two. This first *futebol* title put the stamp on Brazil's surge toward national and international significance, during an epoch of pride associated with the nationalistic government of President Juscelino Kubitschek, the construction of a new capital, and the implantation of heavy industry.

Pelé has continued for twelve years as the supreme symbol of Brazilian *futebol*. Born as Edson Arantes do Nascimento in a small city in Minas Gerais, he was "discovered" at sixteen playing in Baurú, deep in the interior of São Paulo State, and hired by Santos, one of the giant teams of Paulista *futebol*. In the multiterminological racial classification of Brazil, Pelé is a *prêto* (Black), but because of his attainments is politely described as a *moreno* (mulatto) or *escurinho* (dark mulatto). The name Pelé, along with other nicknames like The Black Pearl and Negão, refer to his color, but his title, The King, defines his standing in international *futebol* as the only player ever to score over a thousand goals professionally. Pelé has always been a model of simplicity and social responsibility, even though he is now a millionaire. Modest, friendly, devoutly Catholic, and attached to his wife and child, he can always be counted on to visit an orphanage or sign an autograph.

In 1962 Brazil again won the title in Santiago, Chile. In the first game, against Mexico, Pelé scored a goal and made a perfect assist in a 2-0 victory. In the second game, however, a 0-0 tie with Czechoslovakia, Pelé was injured and did not play again in the tournament. Other Brazilian aces took up the slack and crunched through Spain, England, and Chile before defeating Czechoslovakia in the final, 3-1. Winner of two straight world championships, Brazil could now claim pre-eminence not only for its players, but for its style, which emphasizes attack and innovation. Even though the country was going through hard times—increasing inflation, a slowdown in economic growth, political polarization, strikes, inept presidential leadership, and an Army anxious to take over—these had secondary significance for the average Brazilian to the premier ranking of the nation's *futebol* team.

Brazil's standing did not last long. In Europe, led by England, a new concept of "scientific" *futebol* began to dominate, based on defense, conditioning, and team discipline rather than improvisation and individual brilliance. The scoreless tie and 1-0 games became more common. Brazil arrived as world champion for the competition in England in 1966, but was ignominiously eliminated by Hungary and Portugal. Not only was Pelé injured once again, but the Brazilian performance was handicapped by inept defense, lack of coordination, and poor conditioning. The team never got on the track, and Brazilians had to look on while England's clever defense overcame Germany for the title. After the loss to Portugal, Brazilians cried in the streets, and the coach prudently decided to take a long vacation in Italy before returning home. From the role of champion Brazil fell to the level of an also-ran that was no longer regarded as a serious contender. Its style of *futebol* was now considered quaintly out-of-date, as not only the

Europeans but Latin Americans like Uruguay (also with a proud *futebol* tradition) rushed to imitate the English.

The preparation for 1970 was even less auspicious. After the disaster in England, the public (and the government) expected a turnover. To save himself, João Havelange, czar of the Brazilian Sports Commission, appointed a new technical committee for *futebol* and dusted off a former coach, Aimoré Moreira, who had led the Brazilians to victory in 1962. Throughout 1967 and 1968 Moreira worked with the team, producing mixed results. Despite some wins, the team lost to some unimpressive opposition, and in December 1968, after ties with Germany and Yugoslavia, Moreira and his technical committee were fired.

The next coach, João Saldanha, was a complete surprise. A professional radio, television, and newspaper commentator specializing in *futebol*, Saldanha had coached only one year (winning the Guanabara title for the Botafogo Club). Since hostile journalists had played a major role in the criticism and lack of confidence in the team, it was expected that the intelligent and articulate Saldanha would be able to counteract them. The professional coaches, however, looked on Saldanha as an interloper, and the newspapers of São Paulo did not view kindly the selection of a Carioca.

Saldanha lasted a full year, during which Brazil swept triumphantly through the elimination, scoring twenty-three goals and allowing only two against the pushover teams of Colombia, Venezuela, and Paraguay. As the World Cup scheduled for Mexico City drew near, things became worse. *Futebol* is so important to Brazilian national prestige that it provokes conflicts more serious than those of politics in other countries. The rivalry among the magnates of *futebol* (called *cartolas*—top hats) was reflected in pressures on the team. The four chief centers of Brazilian professional *futebol*—São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Belo Horizonte, and Pôrto Alegre—complained of discrimination in the selection of players. The newspapers never let up in their criticism of the antiquated playing style of the team, the mistakes of the players, their disorganization and lack of physical preparation. Tostão, who had been the leading scorer in the eliminations, suffered an eye injury, underwent an operation in the United States, and was feared unavailable. Pelé was not playing well, and it was charged that he was past his prime and should not even be placed on the national selection. Tension increased in a series of undistinguished contests that were billed as preliminaries to the tournament. Neither the attack nor the defense was functioning effectively, and a loss to Argentina, which had not survived the eliminations, augured disaster in Mexico City. Finally Saldanha cracked. He appeared one day waving a pistol and hunting for Yustrich, coach of Rio's Flamengo Club and one of his most contemptuous critics. The Brazilian Sports Commission, doubting that Saldanha had the emotional stability to survive further heckling, replaced him less than three months before the departure for Mexico City.

The new choice was thirty-eight-year-old Mário Lôbo Jorge Zagalo, coach of Rio's Botafogo Club, in what was regarded by most experts as a poor decision. He lacked experience for the awesome responsibility of upholding national dignity; he knew little about the European styles he would have to face; and worst of all, he was considered stubborn and inflexible, an advocate of the 4-4-3 formation that had won for Brazil in 1958 and 1962, but was now sneeringly regarded as outmoded. With only a few weeks to prepare a team that had shown no signs of championship calibre, Zagalo was widely discounted. Two unimpressive wins over Chile and ties with weak Paraguay and Bulgaria confirmed the worst apprehensions, and Zagalo's lack of flexibility seemed verified when he announced that Tostão would not be on the first team since he played the same position as Pelé. Critics predicted that Brazil would not win a single game in Mexico City, and intelligent gamblers put their money on England, Germany, and Italy.

Zagalo had only one thing going for him—he was regarded as legendarily lucky. Small and slow as a player, he had nevertheless been a standout on the championship teams of 1958 and 1962. As coach of Botafogo, he used an old-fashioned formation, but he won two straight titles in the tough Guanabara League. For the common Brazilian, whose religious and metaphysical views begin with a belief in spirits, Zagalo's success could only be explained as a supernatural power watching over him. And this was more important than anything else.

Zagalo also responded to the problems. He modified his style, teaching the defensemen to move up when the team was attacking, and his forwards to drop back for defense. He discovered that Tostão, the most intellectual of his players, was highly adaptable and could play alongside Pelé in a different position. Recognizing that defense was the team's weakness, he shuffled players in and out until he found a combination that would at least hold the line while the attack scored goals, and as goalie he chose the little-regarded Félix because he had experience. Perhaps most important, he made the players run more than they ever had in their lives, so that they reached a peak of conditioning just as they departed for Mexico.

The 1970 triumph was the most impressive of all. Brazil defeated the best Eastern Europe had to offer, Czechoslovakia and Romania, and defending champion, England, to qualify for the quarter-finals. Looking stronger as it went along, the team eliminated Peru, 4-2, and Uruguay, 3-1, before overwhelming Italy in the final game. Every opponent boasted that it would defeat Brazil by penetrating its defense. The defense did indeed look inept at times (for example, Italy scored its goal into an empty net, the goalie having been sucked a good fifteen feet out to cover the mistake of a defenseman), but it benefited from Brazil's constant control of the ball and attack. Sentimental Brazilians felt their hearts swell as their team conquered the fans by their clean play, modesty, and friendliness. The front four established itself not only as the world's best attack, but in the view of many observers has saved *futebol* from the tedium of defensive playing by turning the tide in favor of offensive tactics. The goals in the final game were scored by all the right players: Pelé and mid-fielder Gérson, whose age will probably preclude them from playing in another World Cup; Carlos Alberto, the team captain; and Jairzinho, the twenty-five-year-old surprise whose seven goals in the series suggest that he may succeed Pelé as Brazil's outstanding star. Pelé himself scored only four goals in the six games, but was unanimously chosen the best player in the tourney, as his experience, determination to win, and deceptive passes to his teammates made him the pivot of the Brazilian attack. Whereas the defeat of 1966 seemed to have relegated 1958 and 1962 to past history, with the future to be dominated by England and other defensive teams, one can now argue that 1966 was an interlude in a Brazilian traditon of *futebol* that has dominated the sport for fifteen years.

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Futebol in Brazil helps bolster myths that contribute to national unity and self-definition. All societies create interpretations of what they are, what distinguishes them from other peoples, why they are significant. In this process they often resort to exaltation of traditions and characteristics that are partly mythological or to symbols with which the citizenry only imperfectly identifies. *Futebol* helps gloss over such myths as the following: (1) Brazil is a nation unified by an effective set of political symbols. (2) It is a mixed society which provides equal opportunity for all races, including Blacks. (3) Through economic development the standard of living of Brazilians is becoming better.

Just as in much of its history, Brazilian political unity today is extremely fragile. In the colonial period, the Empire in the nineteenth century, and the so-called First Republic (1890-1930), the Portuguese crown, the Emperor, and a lackluster series of elected presidents could not hide the regionalism that made of each state an entity in itself, separated from the others by lack of internal communication. The Vargas dictatorship (1930-1945) coincided with a movement toward unity, molding a genuine nation for the first time. In literature, music, and popular culture, thoughtful Brazilians began to express themselves in ways that were distinctive and no longer imported from Europe, or more recently, the United States. Beginning in the 1950's and continuing until today, Brazil has reached an industrial level which suggests that in time it may achieve an economic autonomy commensurate with its vast size.

If regionalism helped undermine political unity in the past, the present problem is indifference and lack of a popular sense of identification with the government. The military dictatorship that has governed Brazil since 1964 maintains a façade of national unity by paternalism and force with little popularity. The three military presidents, Humberto Castelo Branco, Arthur da Costa e Silva, and Emílio Garrastazu Médici, all projected an image of severity and authority that had little

appeal to the average Brazilian. By eliminating or weakening popular electoral processes and intermediate organizations, the government has created a vacuum between itself and the people. Few Brazilians pay attention to the federal government, located as it is in the far-off city of Brasilia, and many do not know the name of their president. When asked to cite what is significant about their country, Brazilians often point to its size, the beauty and modernity of cities like Rio de Janeiro, music, racial tolerance, the beauty of their women, or the amiable Brazilian personality. Rarely do they express pride in their political institutions. They know, if they are educated, that many of their outstanding citizens live abroad as enforced or voluntary exiles, that much of the publicity outside concerns torture of political prisoners, and that a well-organized urban resistance movement is active robbing banks and kidnapping foreign diplomats.

The government recognizes this problem, but in a heavy-handed military way tries to solve it by counterproductive measures. A course in "civic and moral education" which is required on all school levels, even university, is so trivial and boring in its orientation that any thoughtful pupil would become less patriotic from enduring it. Military parades to commemorate historical holidays, such as the intervention of April 1, 1964, are quietly ignored by the citizens. Reiterated claims by high officials that the government is "revolutionary," "democratic," and "constitutional," reveal by their frantic insistence how questionable these terms are when applied to the present Brazilian political situation.

The current *futebol* success has promoted a pride in being Brazilian and a unifying symbol without precedent. Even the lower classes of the cities, thanks to television, felt a sense of participating in something representing national life. They know that Brazil is now internationally significant, not necessarily for reasons of interest to the scholar or public figure, but of importance to the common man. It is estimated that over 700 million soccer fans throughout the world watched Brazil defeat England and Italy. The Englishman in his pub, the French worker, the German with a Volkswagen all know that Brazil is not just another large "tropical country," but the homeland of the world's best *futebol* and a legend named Pelé.

Political leaders have not hesitated to capitalize on *futebol* power. General Médici, an austere and somber professional soldier who was practically unknown when military leaders circumvented the constitution to name him president, aroused the first signs of genuine popular interest in himself when he proclaimed himself an ardent fan of *futebol*, and especially of one player, Dario (who spent the tournament on the bench). The arrival of the winning team in Brasilia brought out a crowd which was unprecedented for a presidential reception. Cabinet officials went to great efforts to be photographed with *futebol* players in the hope that some of the popularity would transfer itself. President Médici unquestionably was thinking of applying the enthusiasm for *futebol* to other sectors of national life when he congratulated the team in the following words:

> I identify, in the victory conquered in this fraternal sports dispute, the existence of principles with which we must arm ourselves for the struggle in favor of national development. I identify in the success of our *futebol* team the victory of unity and the coordination of forces, the victory of intelligence and bravery, of confidence and humility, of constancy and serenity, of technical capacity, of physical preparation, and moral consistency. But it is necessary to say, above all, that our players won because they knew how to have a harmonious team in which, higher than individual genius, the collective will was affirmed.

As a vehicle of national prestige without equal and a catalyst of popular support, *futebol* has political power which Brazil's leaders hope to use for achieving a sense of unity and participation which is presently lacking.

The second myth which *futebol* helps validate is that of equal opportunity for all races. Brazilians often point to themselves as having created the most nearly perfect racial democracy in the world, a country which has mixed White, Black, Indian, and Oriental without rancor and discrimination.

Perceptive analysts like Florestan Fernandes and Charles Wagley have pointed out the flaws in this

image. Brazil does have an easy-going acceptance of different races, visible friendships, respect for the educated Black, and extensive interracial courtship and marriage. But as former slaves in a country with restricted social mobility and at least half the population functional illiterates, Blacks occupy a disproportionate role in such low-prestige occupations as sugar-cane workers, common laborers, maids, and as dwellers in urban slums. A recent article in the *Jornal do Brasil*, based on interviews with a major Rio employment agency, confirms what anyone who looks beneath the surface well knows, that "racial prejudice is the principal factor [in employment], and it exists on a large scale presently because there is a large supply of applicants. It always happens that, between a Black and a White, with the same professional qualifications, the firms always choose the White." Far less than the United States has Brazil provided the descendents of slaves with opportunities to overcome their economic and educational handicap. Power is overwhelmingly in the hands of the Whites, and the total number of Black university graduates is estimated at a few thousand in a country of nearly 100 million. The Brazilian national consciousness is permeated by the assumption that Caucasian characteristics are attractive and Negroid characteristics unattractive. Popular culture exalts the beauty and charm of the *morena*, but beauty queens are consistently White, often blonde, and a Black female model almost unknown.

Futebol, however, provides the clearest proof of the myth. Even though it is very difficult for the poor and relatively uneducated Black to improve his status by working within the system, through *futebol* he can acquire both wealth and fame. Every humble child in Brazil with a flair for *futebol* hopes that he can make the leap from misery to affluence by becoming a star. In June of 1970, prosperous and powerful Brazilians were screaming hysterically for Blacks from poor backgrounds, like Pelé, Paulo César, and Evaraldo, and light-colored mulattos like Carlos Alberto and Jairzinho. In fact, they would have been flattered to shake their hands. Brazil's racially mixed team which was observed by millions of spectators, the ascendance of Black stars in *futebol*, and the popular idolatry surrounding them nourish the myth and obscure for the average Brazilian the tough reality of racial discrimination. And this is more comforting and easier than providing educational facilities and decent jobs, or expunging from the national consciousness the bias for Caucasian characteristics.

A final social function that *futebol* seems to serve is enabling the poor to forget partially the harshness of their life amid the optimistic aura of development. In the past two years, Brazil has begun to repeat the phenomenal economic growth records of the 1950's—in 1969, for example, the Gross National Product increased 9 per cent, one of the highest figures of any country. On the public level and among businessmen one finds a new attitude of confidence that Brazil's population and economic growth will project it by the year 2000 into a position among the "giants," but this picture of development appears different to the masses.

Development has actually led to a reduction of the standard of living in the poorer sectors of the population. The austerity measures undertaken by the government to check inflation since 1964 have fallen heavily upon them. For example, between 1966 and 1969, the cost of living increased 117 per cent, while the minimum salary, and predominant workers' wage, increased only 86 per cent. In effect, real wages declined, and this in a country, which, according to a study by the Economic Commission for Latin America of the United Nations, has the most inequitable distribution of income in Latin America. Even in regions of special emphasis on industrialization and creation of employment, such as the Northeast, progress combined with inflation has reduced the percentage of participation among the lower income categories in the total product. The Bank of the Northeast recently published a study showing that in the cities of that region, income had become even more concentrated in the past decade. In Recife, for example, the recipient of most Northeastern industrial investment, the upper 20 per cent of the population in 1960 received 47.1 per cent of the income, while the lower 40 per cent received 16.5 per cent. In 1969, the share of the upper 20 per cent had increased to 56.4 per cent, while the lower 40 per cent was reduced to 11.5 per cent.

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This inequity is not new, and observers have often noted the capacity of the Brazilian lower classes to maintain a charm and tolerance amid their poverty. *Carnaval*, a four-day long outburst of dancing, music, costumes, and parades, and passion over *futebol* are usually cited as "safety valves" for releasing popular tensions.

With the victory in Mexico, an even more intense popular interest in *futebol* may be expected. Sitting in his bleacher seat or listening to his transistor radio, the worker lives in another world and can forget that in the midst of development his life is hard and his salary, if he has a regular one, scarcely provides for his family. Underneath he knows that he is watching the world's best *futebol* and that the players are himself. Later in a bar with his friends he can discuss the high points of the game and the accomplishments of his favorite players. Because he finds in *futebol* meaning and orientation, society can go on developing: more highways, electrical power, university cities, automobiles, color TV, computers.

Not all Brazilians have this consolation, however. It is often said that Brazil has ninety-five million fans (the entire population of the country). The nation's number one fan discovered that this was still another myth. Visiting the interior of the Northeast, devastated by one of its periodic droughts, President Médici asked a group of peasants who Pelé was. Only one of the men knew, and when asked what position he played, replied: "Goalie."

THOMAS G. SANDERS, who reports on several countries of Latin America, was formerly an Associate Professor of Religious Studies at Brown University. He received his A.B. in history from Duke University in 1952, and after studies at Union Theological Seminary in New York and the University of Copenhagen (as a Fulbright Scholar), he received his Ph.D. in religion from Columbia University in 1958. Dr. Sanders is the author of *Protestant Concepts of Church and State* and numerous articles on church-state theory and problems, and he contributed a chapter on Brazil to *Churches and States: The Religious Institution and Modernization.* In 1966 he became a Fellow of the Institute for Current World Affairs to work on various aspects of the relationship between Catholicism and development in Latin America. For the Field Staff he writes principally on Chile, Brazil and Colombia.

THE FRUSTRATION OF NATIONAL POWER

By WALTER F. HAHN

Not long after the installation of the Nixon Administration, the story made the rounds in Washington of the encounter between a highly-placed member of the New Team and a predecessor in the same sensitive job two administrations removed. They compared notes and they argued. The new appointee had the last word. "After all," he asserted, "our situations are different: for the first time, we are *forced* to construct a foreign policy for the United States."

The new policy-maker was not simply trying to score a debating point. The full interpretation of his remark runs something like this: "In past years, the United States did not really have to chart a comprehensive and logically consistent approach to world affairs. Relying, rightly or wrongly, on its massive and largely unchallenged power, it took the luxury of asserting and of reacting to global events. But today the situation is changed. We can no longer rely on sheer power. We must shape meaningful foreign policy."

What the policy-maker was endeavoring to articulate reflects in a significant way upon the central dilemma of our times—a dilemma which bedevils our policies and underlies in good measure the mood of confusion and somber frustration with which the United States is entering the 1970s.

The manifestations of the dilemma are clear. Here is the United States by all yardsticks the most powerful nation in world history, frustrated in Asia in a conflict with a small country, North Vietnam, which in many ways has not even made the turn into the modern industrial age. Here we are in the North Pacific, suffering such mosquito stings as the capture of an intelligence ship and the downing of an American plane without even slapping at the mosquito. Here we are in Europe, unable to maintain cohesion with our closest allies. Here we are in our own hemisphere, frustrated for almost a decade in trying to cope with an adversary on a tiny island nation 90 miles from our shores. Enough said: if a master of old-time power politics, like the 19th Century German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, were to return to earth today and witness the spectacle, quite probably he would shake his head in total disbelief.

Not only has preponderance of power failed to contribute to its wielders political control, but it has not braked the frequency of

old-fashioned warfare. In fact, the case can be made that the pace of conflict is accelerating. In a new edition of his book, *Limited War and American Defense Policy*, Seymour Deitschman catalogues 32 limited wars (including civil conflicts) that were waged between 1945 and 1964. By conservative calculation, one can add nine more to that list since 1964, making a total of 41. Moreover, the ferocity of conflict seems to be increasing as well: witness Vietnam and the Arab-Israeli war of 1968. A particularly depressing fact about this list of 41 conflicts is that all but four have flared in the Free World: the notable exceptions are the Hungarian revolt of 1956, the Tibetan rebellion of 1959, the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, and the Soviet-Chinese border war of more recent vintage.

Measured by this catalogue, the dilemma has victimized primarily the United States in pursuit of its global interests. This is not to say, however, that the Soviets have escaped unscathed. The mountains of megatons in the Soviet Union did not prevent communist China from bolting the Soviet embrace, challenging Moscow's preeminence in the world Communist movement, and actually engaging Soviet military force in border skirmishes. In August 1968, the Soviets moved brutally in Czechoslovakia when they deemed their vital interests at stake, yet the mountains of megatons in the Soviet Union had not prevented the ideological challenge in Prague from arising in the first place. According to all evidence, massive Soviet power has not exacted loyalty from the communist leadership in Rumania. Nor, for that matter, have Soviet megatons prevented some setbacks in Soviet policy outside the communist world: in Iraq in 1963, in Indonesia, in Guinea, and more recently in the abject defeat of the Soviet Union's Arab clients in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war.

The Measurement of Power

We face, thus, a phenomenon which might be described as the "paradox of power in the nuclear age." But before we grapple with this phenomenon, it is essential first to describe the concept of national power itself.

A common and persuasive definition of national power is "the degree of *influence* which a country is able to bring to bear in the international arena in pursuit of its objectives." If one accepts this definition, one quickly comes face-to-face with an obvious qualification—namely, that national power is not an absolute phenomenon, but a very relative one.

Consider the simple analogy of the man who buys an automobile which boasts a 300-horsepower engine and a top speed of 150 miles per hour. Unless he enters the Indianapolis 500 race, he is not likely ever to experience the thrill of getting his full power's worth. He has to observe speed limits and he has to weave his way through traffic in order to avoid collision.

In international relations, there are no enforced speed limits, nor for that matter are there other clearly defined traffic laws. There is a vague body of rules under the heading of international law, but even the most dedicated international lawyer will confess that international law resembles, at this stage of global evolution, more an Emily Post code of international etiquette than a compelling order of conduct. Yet, even if there are few, if any, enforced traffic rules in international relations, there is a traffic problem. And as has happened on our congested streets and highways, the traffic problem in international relations has become horrendous. More vehicles are on the road in the form of a proliferation of new and unstable countries. The rate of collisions seems to be increasing. More important, the potential cost of collision has soared to the point where safety measures have become urgent.

In any event, if national power is, in essence, the degree of relative influence exerted (or exertable) in the competitive arena of international relations, how is it measurable? In bygone days, the problem was simplified by the implicit measurement of national power in terms of military power. After all, a nation's war making capacity represented the ultimate expression of influence which a nation could wield on the international stage—it was, and remains, the "punch line" of power. Military power could be conveniently measured in terms of men under arms, seaborne armadas, tanks, guns, and planes. Moreover, military power, supported as it was by a nation's "mobilization base," was a reasonable mirror of the relative strength or weakness of a given society. Thus, the standard sources of national power listed in textbooks on international relations—sources such as the size of a nation, geographical location, possession of national resources, and population—invariably are treated in the context of their contribution to a nation's war-making capability.

The measurement, however, is no longer so convenient or relevant. Two developments have taken their toll. First the stampede of technology has altered some of the traditional criteria of power, downgrading some and elevating others. And more specifically, the advent of nuclear weapons has distorted, at least subjectively, the relationship between real power and its military "punch line."

The Impact of the Technological Revolution

The impact of the revolution in technology upon the traditional yardsticks of national power has been real, but to some extent it has been exaggerated. Consider, for example, the factor of the physical endowments of a nation: its size and its geographical location.

Physical mass has always been a salient element of power. Thus, Russia in modern times owes its survival, let alone its status of superpower, to sheer size: it was often invaded and defeated in battle but never

conquered. The armies of Napoleon and Hitler sliced deeply into the Russian land mass. But eventually exhausted, frozen and cut off from supply lines, they had to give up the game and to beat a bloody retreat.

Nuclear warfare has discounted to some extent the value of old-fashioned invading armies—at least in the confrontation between the two superpowers. At the same time, however, intercontinental ballistic missiles *can* conquer the space that was previously denied to marching legions. American missiles can reach any target in the Soviet Union, and Soviet projectiles can span the North American continent.

Yet, even in the age of devastating intercontinental warfare, size and space have not lost their meaning. Its new vulnerability notwithstanding, a spacious country like the United States or the Soviet Union could conceivably disperse its population and resources in order to survive and grope back from a nuclear attack. It could conceivably devise an anti-missile defense for this purpose. Assumptions regarding nuclear survival are admittedly debatable, and neither the United States nor the Soviet Union is likely to focus strategy upon these assumptions. The point is, nevertheless, that the two superpowers, by dint of spaciousness, can speculate about their chances of surviving a nuclear holocaust; the more diminutive, more densely populated countries cannot.

Physical size thus continues to cast its weight upon the scales of national power. More important, size relates even more meaningfully today to economic and technological predominance. It is no accident of history that two of the most sizeable nations in the world, the United States and the Soviet Union, became the world's first two superpowers, and that another massive country, Communist China, is beginning to make its weight felt. Increasingly in modern competition, first-rate technology means technology of scale—the command over vast resources and manpower. The demands of scale technology explain why some of the more technologically proficient countries in the world, such as the nations of Western Europe, have reached the agonizing conclusion that they cannot in the longer run compete by relying on their own national resources, prodigious though these may seem by momentary standards. Acting upon this conclusion, they have taken the first tentative steps to merge their respective capabilities into continental combines. Their conclusion may be rewarded in the long run. In the more foreseeable future, however, the outcome of the race seems, according to qualified prognosticators, to be predetermined. The dizzying pace of the technological revolution is such that it has assumed its own momentum. If anything, the gap between the front-runners in the technological race and their challengers is likely to widen. In terms of overall technological supremacy, the positions of the two superpowers are quite secure.

In addition to sheer size as a criterion of national power, there is the connected factor of geographical "situation," relating to a country's

location and to other dimensions of nature's blessings. To what extent have these been revolutionized by events and by technology?

Before the advent of the nuclear age, the factor of geography loomed large among analysts trying to fathom the reasons for national success or failure. Indeed, during the first half of the 20th Century, geography became almost a preoccupation, giving rise to the pseudo-science of geopolitics. The founder of geopolitics, Sir Halford Mackinder, at the turn of the century originated the "heartland" concept of global power politics. Mackinder's "heartland" embraced the territory in which most of history ostensibly had been made: the Eurasian land mass from the Volga to the Yangtze, and from the Himalayas to the Arctic Ocean. Beyond this "heartland" (covering primarily the territory then governed by Russia), Mackinder saw a larger "world island" composed of the continents of Europe, Asia, and Africa. In terms of power, this world island was the pivot around which the rest of the earth's political surface revolved. Mackinder capsuled his concept in his famous formula: "Who rules East Europe commands the heartland; who rules the heartland commands the world island; who rules the world island commands the world." The concept to a large extent shaped history: it is prominently credited with influencing the strategy of Adolf Hitler and his advisers, particularly his fateful decision to invade the Soviet Union.

The theory of geopolitics clearly was illusory—or what Professor Hans Morgenthau terms the "single-factor fallacy," the abortive attempt to attribute national power to a sole source. Exaggerated or not, however, geographical location was a crucial factor in the power politics of the world before 1945. In the days when everything hinged on the thrust of armies, a country's success or failure depended on whether it enjoyed the natural protection of mountain ranges or ocean moats. Spain dominated a good part of the world centuries ago because it operated from a relatively secure base in the southwestern peninsula of Europe, protected by the Pyrenees. Great Britain became a world power largely because the English Channel secured it from attack from the continent. The United States could develop its robust power because no adversary could dream of crossing 3,000 miles of Atlantic Ocean or 5,000 miles of Pacific waters.

Technology obviously has changed this picture drastically. Long-range weaponry, sophisticated means of airlift and sealift, modern logistics and instant communications have shrunken the world. Mountains and oceans no longer assure protection. Nevertheless, geography still asserts its influence.

In some cases, that influence continues to be real. The abiding insecurity of the European members of NATO is a case in point. The planners of the Alliance have been bedevilled by the inescapable fact that the geography of Western Europe renders a defense in depth extremely difficult against potential invading armies from the east. At

one point the distance between the Iron Curtain and the Rhine is a mere 90 or so miles. In the event of conflict and assuming an initial breakthrough of communist forces, where between the Rhine and the English Channel would NATO forces regroup in order to muster a second line of defense? It is this palpable prospect which has made Europeans, especially West Germans, abidingly nervous regarding American notions of a conventional or "flexible" defense of Western Europe.

In other cases, while geography has lost its cutting edge, it nevertheless continues to condition national outlook and policy. Consider the example of the Soviet Union. The leaders of the Kremlin, in their wildest nightmares, should not really expect a massive NATO army of invasion, let alone a new German army, sweeping across the European plain into Russia. Nevertheless, the Soviets still seem to be impelled by this fear, which strongly influences their policies in Eastern Europe.

Consider another example: Great Britain. Only 22 miles of Channel or a few minutes' flying time separate the British Isles from the European continent, but psychologically the distance might as well be a thousand miles. Great Britain is just now trying to decide whether politically or economically she will "join Europe." In the meantime, when an Englishman takes off on a holiday to Paris, he still announces to his friends that he is "going to Europe."

Even if national attitudes and policies have not kept pace with the technological revolution, therefore, the impact of that revolution upon power relationships on the international stage has been profound. The impact, however, does not in itself explain the paradox of power. If anything, as we have seen, the thrust of technology not only has created the phenomenon of superpower, but it is constantly widening the gap between the have and have-not nations. Technology in itself does not explain why, in an age of superpowers, that power appears to be increasingly untranslatable into the ability to control, let alone to dominate. It does not explain why, with all of its massive power, the United States seems incapable of coping with tiny North Vietnam. Nor does it explain why the Soviet Union has difficulty in grappling with the problems of Eastern Europe or with the challenge of Communist China.

One obvious reason for the paradox is the standoff between the two superpowers. In the poker game of international power politics, the principal players have become understandably cautious. The reason is clear: under the shadow of the mushroom cloud, the dimensions of bluff and of "gamesmanship" more generally have narrowed. The destructive power available to the two superpowers, and the diversity of that power have become so enormous that the small, calculated risk has become monstrous in its implications.

Not only has the arena of direct competition between the two superpowers become constrained, but the general terrain has become

increasingly dangerous. Mention was made earlier of the fact that nuclear technology has distorted the relationship between overall national power and the military expression of that power. The nuclear genie, having been released from his bottle by the two superpowers, now beckons to others. He promises a short-cut to disproportionate power and prestige. France and Communist China have succumbed to that promise, and other "nuclear threshold nations"—countries like Israel, India, and Japan—eventually may follow suit. The incentives that are pushing toward the nuclear option do not necessarily reside in sinister global ambitions or aspirations for superpower status—although the leadership in Peking may be swayed by such grandiose goals. Rather, the motives of would-be nuclear powers focus essentially on perceived requirements of self-protection and preservation of national identity in an increasingly dangerous world. To that extent, the trend of nuclear proliferation mirrors in itself the paradox of superpower—the inability of the United States and the Soviet Union, respectively or mutually, to provide the kinds of solid pillars of security that would relieve their allies, friends, and clients of the need to find purely national, and often dangerous, solutions to their security problems. Thus, if Israel or India should choose the nuclear route, it will be largely out of despair over superpower protection.

In any event, nuclear proliferation holds out the prospect to the superpowers that, in moving in an already complex and risk-strewn world, they will confront increasingly the tripwires of nuclear conflagration. Yet, the increase in danger, although ominous, would be essentially marginal. The tripwires of conflict already are ubiquitous.

Perhaps one of the salient causes of the growing "impotence of power" in the nuclear age is that, to a large extent, power is no longer taken seriously. This is so partly because military might has become so monstrous as to render incredible any notions of its actual use. Thus, the leaders in Hanoi have been able to steep their strategies against the United States in Vietnam fairly confidently in the assumption that American nuclear power will not be unleashed upon them.

At the same time, also, the impact of power is waning because of the blinders of ideology and emotion. The world today is in the throes of what has been aptly termed a "systemic revolution." The old regulating systems of international order, like the chandelier balance and the colonial empires of the 19th Century, have crumbled and no new embracive systems have emerged to take their place. In the process, in broad expanses of the world, new and impatient forces have been spawned. They are spurred by the revolution of rising expectations, the convenience of modern communications, by the vulnerabilities of the industrial societies which they challenge, and not least by the examples of success. They are in a real sense irrational forces, unmindful and even contemptuous of existing and predominant power.

Indeed, the revolutionary momentum of these forces is such that it may be questioned whether unchallenged power could control them—whether the United States could cope with them even if the Soviet Union were suddenly to disappear from the globe. Quite probably our moral scruples—especially the American conscience steeped in Hiroshima—and our sensitivity to the judgments of history would render the United States even more constrained in invoking its immense power for political benefit.

The Need for Purposeful Policy

The paradox of power is thus explicable in its major outlines. Yet, understanding the dilemma does not resolve it, nor does it relieve the burgeoning frustration in American society. As has been suggested earlier, the frustration is sponsored not least by the growing recognition that some 24 years of unprecedented American power, combined with righteous ideals, have not produced the "American age"—that, indeed, the rest of the world either is challenging us or turning its back upon us. We sense, on the one hand, that in our confrontation with our principal adversary our massive power may not be enough in the long run. We sense, on the other hand, that in trying to influence global evolution—and, indeed, the evolution of our own society—our power may have become to some extent irrelevant.

Is there no way out of the dilemma? Perhaps in the long (hopefully not too long) run, the vagaries of power in the nuclear age will confirm an old but neglected lesson of history. The lesson, simply expressed is this: Foreign policy is the harnessing of national power to national purpose. The implements donated by nature and human resourcefulness are necessary to national power. Yet, power is not a substitute for purpose or for policy.

Purpose, moreover, does not spring full-blown from policy-making wisdom. Especially in democratic systems, purpose expresses the values of harmonious society. The stark lesson of history is that great civilizations, empires and nations succumbed not on the battlefield, but because their dynamism was dimmed by internal conflict and confusion.

Perhaps it was this basic thought which the member of the new Administration was endeavoring to convey in his remarks regarding the need to construct a foreign policy for the United States. Not only is power not a substitute for policy in the nuclear age, but in many ways power is becoming somewhat irrelevant in the business of winning friends and influencing people on the international stage. Under the nuclear cloud, the emphasis increasingly is not so much on *what* we play the game with, but on *how* we play it. And how we play the game will depend not only on the cogency of American foreign policy, but perhaps more meaningfully on our unity of purpose as a society.

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ROJISMO: THE RESURGENCE OF COLOMBIAN POPULISM

by Thomas G. Sanders

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"It is easy for a prosperous, contented oligarchy to assume the existence of democracy, as long as it averts its gaze from the condition of others. Such groups develop an easy, unconscious social arrogance that *they* are the people. What is good for them is good for the people."[1]

"Todos los pobres con Rojas" (All the poor with Rojas—a campaign slogan written on a wall in Colombia)

On April 19, 1970, the citizens of Colombia, normally one of Latin America's most stable and predictable countries, cast approximately 39 per cent of their vote in a four-man race for former dictator, Gustavo Rojas Pinilla. The elections, instead of providing an expected easy victory for Misael Pastrana, candidate of the governing National Front, resulted in demonstrations, a state of seige, and the imposition of a curfew, as Rojas took an early lead, then succumbed, under protest, by only 66,000 out of the four million votes cast. The impressive support for Rojas, which surprised both Colombian and foreign observers, reflected an overt protest by dissatisfied groups and may well permanently reshape Colombia's political climate.

"Rojismo" is an example of what is commonly called in Latin America "populism"—a political movement of great diversity which usually includes the following characteristics:

(1) A leader who provides a unifying symbol, such as Argentina's Perón, Brazil's Vargas, Peru's Haya de la Torre, or the Dominican Republic's Bosch. In some cases the populist leader comes from the armed forces and bears the image of a reformist strong man. Gustavo Rojas Pinilla was commander-in-chief of the Colombian Armed Forces when he was thrust into power in 1953 with enthusiastic popular support to counteract the Fascist tendencies of President Laureano Gómez. Today at seventy, his blunt and vigorous oratory makes up for a somewhat tired and stooped appearance, so that more than any of his three opponents, he projected a personal, even charismatic image with which ordinary people could identify.

(2) Populist movements commonly depend on the personal attraction of their leader rather than a coherent social and economic program. Their "ideology" often consists of disparate and basically unachievable promises aimed at attracting the support of as many groups as possible. Just as critics sneered at Perón's "Justicialismo" and Vargas' "Estado Nôvo," they criticized Rojas' platform for ignorance of economics and lack of coherence. Rojas' claim that he would make the

Colombia peso (currently worth about 5 cents) equivalent to the dollar led observers to dismiss him as demagogic or senile.

(3) Populist movements, on the whole, attempt to build new political coalitions in countries where power continues largely in the hands of traditional groups. Colombia's National Front is a unique political arrangement between two parties, the Liberals and Conservatives, whose historical differences over laissez-faire and the church-state question have become less important than their common concern for defending the interests of the country's upper class. The National Front governments have been accurately described as an attempt by the traditional elites to modernize the country while avoiding social revolution and maintaining their hegemony and privileges. It is not surprising that eventually widespread resentment should develop against this paternalism and feed on the failures of the government. While another candidate, Belisario Betancur, also tried to exploit this resentment, Rojas was better known and untainted by cooperation with the National Front. (A campaign slogan scrawled on walls argued that "Belisario no es el pueblo"—Belisario is not the people).

The fundamental political base of Rojas came from the marginal lower class: nonunionized workers, many of them victims of the country's serious unemployment problem, and the poorest class of peasants, who have not benefited from the agrarian reform. In the Rojista demonstrations in Bogota following the elections, the *mestizo* facial characteristics and shabby sport coats of the marchers identified them overwhelmingly as lower class. The electoral results in Bogota also reflected the sources of Rojista support. The northern part of the city, which is middle and upper class, voted heavily for Pastrana, the official candidate. The south, which is lower class, went for Rojas, overwhelmingly so in the poorest *barrios*.

In addition, Rojas attracted many people from the lower-middle class, whose monthly salaries of $50 to $150 do not enable them to live in a style befitting their white-collar status. One such person with whom I spoke, a camera repairman, explained in detail how his own desire to study in a university had been frustrated when his father died, leaving his mother with inadequate means. Now with three children of his own for whom he has similar aspirations, he voted for Rojas as the only means of breaking the monopoly of the upper and upper-middle class on the better secondary schools and universities.

Rojas promised these two groups—the lower and the lower-middle class—direct assistance in the vital areas of cost of living, health, and education. He argued that it was possible to reduce the price of transportation, industrial goods, and food by gradually nationalizing imports and eliminating the profits of intermediaries. In his previous administration, Rojas had curried the support of the poor by low-cost housing programs, free education, and by sending trucks into their neighborhoods with food and other items to sell at cost. He reminded his audiences of these programs and proposed administrative austerity, free education at all levels, housing without large initial down payments, and free medical services. Demagoguery perhaps. But the poor and lower middle class have nothing to lose because they do not enjoy these benefits at present.

Rojas also tried to attract the following elements to his coalition:

(a) Conservatives who have always opposed the National Front as a dilution of traditional Conservatism, and who suspected that Pastrana was linked too intimately with Liberal President Carlos Lleras. For this group Rojas emphasized the "Christian" character of his movement, questioned the use of birth control for dealing with the population problem, and offered himself as a strong military figure rooted in the Conservative past.

(b) Retired military officers and reservists, some of whom had served in the Rojas regime from 1953 to 1957, and who believe that Colombia should join most of the other South American countries in giving the armed forces a major role in government.

(c) Women. Colombia, like most Latin American countries, continues by law and custom to maintain women in a subordinate and sometimes tragic position. Rojas' principal adviser and spokesman is his daughter, Senator María Eugenia Rojas de Moreno, a symbol of female emancipation

who repeatedly pointed out that her father first extended suffrage to women and who circulated campaign posters featuring herself and her two children.

(d) The left. Colombia's Communist Party, which adheres to the nonrevolutionary Moscow line and seems chiefly interested in electing its candidates to lower office, urged its followers to abstain in the presidential elections. Colombia, however, also has many intellectuals, students, and some workers who believe in class struggle as the key interpretive concept of the country's problems and propose a social and political "revolution" as a solution. Rojas appealed to this group by calling his movement "revolutionary," and suggesting that he would restrict the powers of the "oligarchy," restore relations with Cuba, and nationalize the Bank of the Republic.

Rojas also made extremely strong inroads into the left wing of the Liberal Party, which, like some Conservatives, questions the National Front. Leading Liberal politicians openly departed from their party's commitment to Pastrana, throwing their support to Rojas, not only because they objected to supporting an establishment Conservative like Pastrana, but also because they are populists, inheritors of a tradition in their party dating back to the nineteen forties and the late Jorge Eliécer Gaitán.

The attempt to satisfy such a diverse constituency with often contradictory promises contributes to the negative image of Latin American populists like Rojas. North Americans are often shocked because populists use, among other themes, nationalism with anti-American overtones, a more "independent" foreign policy, and nationalization of foreign-owned property. (In this respect Rojas must be classed as a moderate. In his previous government and in his comments during the recent campaign he adopted a positive attitude toward the role of foreign capital in development.) Most frightening for outsiders is the emotional appeal populists direct toward the lower class, whose spontaneity and unpredictability contrast with the elegance and culture of the elites who own the newspapers, control groups like Colombia's National Front, and have the means to travel abroad and spread the word about how terrible populist leaders are.

We cannot understand the strength of Rojismo, however, without recognizing the failures of Colombia's recent history. Colombia is usually considered one of Latin America's most "traditional" countries precisely because it has not undergone an extended period of populism, through which new groups might become awakened and participate more effectively in political, economic, and social power. In some aspects Colombia has modernized greatly in recent years. The National Front has provided twelve years of stability, thoughtful economic planning, expansion of industry, and continued attempts to diversify and increase agricultural production. Colombia's traditionalism, however, appears most clearly in the total lack of popular participation in significant political decisions, despite a façade of democratic institutions. The relative passivity of the masses during these years seemed to suggest their contentment with National Front policies. In actuality, before Rojas ran for president in 1970, the discontented had no clear symbol for asserting themselves.

The year, 1930, is usually considered a watershed in Colombian political and economic history. It marked the end of a long Conservative monopoly on the presidency and the beginning of a series of Liberals: Enrique Olaya Herrera (1930-1934), Alfonso López (1934-1938, 1942-1945), and Eduardo Santos (1938-1942). López especially was a strong reformer who introduced changes in education, taxation, land ownership, and church-state relations, and who promoted labor organization and social security. The Liberals, who had traditionally been an anticlerical and pro-laissez-faire party, became associated with these reforms and drew on the popular support engendered by them to replace the Conservatives as Colombia's dominant political group.

The adoption of reformism in a party led by the upper class divided the Liberals. One segment preferred to retrench and stabilize; the other, led by populist Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, wanted to expand the reforms. In the elections of 1946, the two wings presented different candidates, Gabriel Turbay and Gaitán, and the Conservatives, with Mariano Ospina Pérez, regained the presidency. It was clear, nevertheless, that the Liberals remained the largest party, and Gaitán, an eloquent orator with mass appeal, seemed a sure winner for 1950.

On April 9, 1948, everything changed when Gaitán was assassinated on a Bogotá street. His murder kindled a senseless violence which disrupted the nation for a decade and cost the lives of perhaps 200,000 people. Although Gaitán had represented reformism and populism, the violence did not entail significant political options. On the surface, it pitted Liberal against Conservative, chiefly in the countryside, but it had the characteristics of feudal rather than ideological strife. According to Colombia's best-known sociologist, Orlando Fals-Borda, it was "formless, becoming a confused expression of predominantly personal conflicts: an irrational weapon of distorted politics."[2] Three Conservative presidents—Mariano Ospina Pérez, Laureano Gómez, and Roberto Urdaneta—used the power of their high office to persecute Liberals systematically and to dismantle the facade of Colombian democracy. Gómez was a great admirer of Francisco Franco and intended to institute a Catholic corporativist model based on Fascist Spain and Colombian tradition.

As revulsion against the Gómez policies grew and the violence continued, the Army, in 1953, put Rojas into power. It is generally acknowledged that he did not seek the post. His credentials as a military man capable of bringing about order and his own affirmation that he was a Conservative seemed to suggest his fitness for restoring the *status quo ante* the assassination of Gaitán. Rojas enjoyed the confidence of the Armed Forces, the establishment—including the Liberals and former President Ospina Pérez—and the masses, who poured joyfully into the streets when he assumed office.

Rojas' honeymoon with the establishment was brief. In his first speech as president he said, "The Fatherland cannot live in peace while it has children who are hungry or without clothing," and to their surprise he began to act like a populist, appealing to Gaitán's followers and listening to certain socialist intellectuals. He did not conceal his distaste for the politicking of the Liberal and Conservative Parties and restricted their activities. When Colombia's 100 per cent partisan newspapers failed to heed his appeal for self-discipline, he shut down the two major Liberal organs, *El Tiempo* and *El Espectador*, for a time. Although Rojas assumed the style of a dictator, a perceptive North American writing at the time pointed out that he "did not destroy democracy in Colombia, for it never existed."[3]

Economically, Rojas followed a policy of openness to private investment and committed the government to unprecedented public works (especially roads), established a government petroleum company, and instituted the TVA-like Cauca Valley Project. Like many populists he did little to shake the real economic and social control of the upper classes. In fact, as high coffee prices provided a bonanza of foreign exchange, he allowed them to import large quantities of luxury goods. But he gained their enmity by increasing taxes in the upper brackets and on banks and insurance companies, while taxing for the first time earnings from stocks and bonds.

It was Rojas' populist measures that provoked fear among the country's traditional ruling groups that they might not be able to regain political power. Alongside paternalistic measures providing free education and cheap food and housing, he began to sound like a Peronist as he deliberately cultivated a base in the non-Catholic labor union confederation and made plans for a populist-type political movement to maintain himself in power.

By early 1956, the movement against Rojas began to gain momentum. The restrictions on civil liberties (which were actually less severe than those under Gómez) and the closing of newspapers intensified his image as a mere dictator in the United States, where populists are rarely understood. This negative image was assiduously fertilized by Colombia's upper classes in their frequent trips abroad. On February 5, 1956, the nation was shocked by the death of eight people at a bullfight during riots which were instigated by some of Rojas' followers, and—it was suspected—by Rojas himself. The Catholic Church, recently emerged from a major role in the overthrow of Juan Perón in Argentina, now interpreted Rojas as a similar and dangerous phenomenon. The violence which Rojas had largely pacified by a combination of amnesty and strong-arm tactics, continued sporadically. Most significant, the traditional ruling groups decided that the populist threat to their control was more serious than their own political differences and made peace. In a pact signed in Spain between the Liberal Alberto Lleras Camargo and the Conservative leader, Laureano Gómez, it

was agreed that Rojas must go. On May 10, 1957, military sympathizers with this plan forced Rojas out and established a caretaker government until the traditional parties could agree on a president.

The National Front that emerged provided that the Liberals and Conservatives would alternate the presidency, with secondary appointed offices—governors, mayors, the judiciary, and the public administration—being divided equally between the two parties. After considerable negotiation it was agreed that the Liberal leader, Alberto Lleras Camargo, would be first president under the new structure, from 1958 to 1962. He was followed by Conservative Guillermo León Valencia (1962-1966) and Liberal Carlos Lleras Restrepo (1966-1970). The National Front was initially written into the Constitution for twelve years, then extended to sixteen. (The fact that many politicians now favor a further extension obviously reflects a desire by the privileged parties and classes to keep power in their hands.) Other parties cannot compete for the presidency, so that all candidates in the recent elections, including Rojas, had to be Conservatives, just as in 1966 they had to be Liberals.

The National Front has given considerable stability and surface progress to Colombia. President Alberto Lleras Camargo put an end to practically all the violence and helped restore the country's image abroad. The National Planning Department has gradually assumed a central role in development as Colombia became one of the first and most enthusiastic supporters of the Alliance for Progress, often referred to as a "showcase." Gross national product grew at just under 5 per cent annually during the 1960's, although a yearly population increase of 3.2 per cent has bitten deeply into this figure.

Probably the toughest and most effective of the three chief executives is the present one, Carlos Lleras Restrepo, an economist and banker by profession. When he entered office in 1966, inflation was about 15 per cent, and low coffee prices, liberal import policies, and an overevaluated exchange rate had greatly reduced the nation's foreign reserves. By 1968, he reduced inflation to a respectable 7.5 per cent. He introduced stricter controls on imports and gave special attention to promoting nontraditional exports to supplement the nation's old standbys, coffee and petroleum. As these new exports expanded by about 25 per cent a year, he was able gradually to increase imports and accumulate a reserve of over $170 million. The growth trend in the national product rose to 6.5 per cent in 1969.

During these same four years, government income increased substantially through sales and travel taxes, combined with more effective collection. The government has thus augmented its total investments and its proportion of investment in relation to private sources. The two chief beneficiaries are agriculture and education. The Agrarian Reform Institute has expanded its long limited resources. Teachers' salaries were increased, and by 1968, 19.3 per cent of the relevant age group was attending secondary schools and 3.5 per cent universities (as against 14.0 per cent and 2.5 per cent respectively in 1965). Credit and tax benefits are available to private industry, which has been growing recently chiefly in technology and capital intensive areas. Construction has increased at very high rates (20.7 per cent in 1967 and 11.4 per cent in 1968), while agriculture has escaped from a tendency toward fluctuation to correspond to the rest of the economy in growth.

President Lleras Restrepo was also the person who initially proposed integration of the Andean countries to overcome the doldrums of the Latin American Free Trade Association, and together with Chile's President Frei, continues to be its strongest advocate. Colombia holds an advantageous position in the Andean group; it has the largest population of the constituent nations, a strategic geographic location on both the Pacific and Caribbean coasts, and along with Chile, the most advanced industry.

Perhaps the most important contribution of the National Front has been its maintenance of steady growth and social stability along with elections and civil government, at a time when country after country in Latin America has succumbed to military rule.

Observing economic indicators does not help, however, to understand the upsurge of Rojismo. Progress or growth does not necessarily mean a better life for everyone who votes. Inadequate internal savings, aggravated by massive flights of

capital abroad by the wealthy, and a shortage of foreign exchange led the National Front to contract loans which by 1967 totalled $1,600,000,000. Continued inflation and the weakness of interest groups among the middle and lower classes provided a context for the small wealthy class to absorb most of the productive increase, leaving the lower class in much the same condition as before, if not worse. Recent studies of several major Colombian cities reveal that 10 per cent of the population receives 50 per cent of the income, while the other 90 per cent share the remaining 50 per cent. Educational advances cannot hide the fact that Colombia's tuition-charging secondary schools and universities continue to be preserves of the privileged that exclude most of the population. Construction of housing meets the needs of limited groups who can save the substantial down payments required and pay quotas far beyond the means of the poor. Industrial growth has not provided jobs for the waves of people moving into the cities. It is estimated that currently 13.5 per cent of the urban working force is unemployed, and the country faces a bleak future of increases in this figure. Many peasants continued unaffected by agrarian programs.

Until Rojas ran for the presidency, the most obvious expression of discontent under the National Front was the high rate of electoral abstention. In 1957, 72 per cent of those eligible voted in a referendum to approve the National Front, but subsequently this percentage steadily declined, with only 40 per cent voting in the presidential election of 1966. It was assumed that the electorate lacked interest, given the predetermined outcome. Attempts to present options within the structure failed. In 1958 and 1962 anti-National Front Conservatives led by Jorge Leiva made little impact against the official candidates. Similarly unsuccessful was the Revolutionary Liberal Movement of Alfonso López Michelsen within the Liberal Party. Labor and student strikes pointed to sporadic unrest; and Colombia's staid Catholic Church spawned a "revolutionary" movement initiated by Father Camilo Torres and continued by the Golconda Group.

Enter Rojas again. After deposing him, the National Front unleashed a campaign of vilification aimed at blackening his administration totally. Newspapers like *El Tiempo* and *El Espectador*, which cultivate an image abroad of objectivity and responsibility, vied in accusing him of a variety of political and economic crimes. The ex-dictator refused to take this lying down—when he was removed in 1957, he seems genuinely to have been surprised because he thought he was doing a good job. He returned from exile in October 1958, to face trial by the Senate for bringing indignity to the presidential office and for enriching himself and his friends. As a result he was sentenced to perpetual loss of his political rights, deprived of his honors as a retired military officer, and forbidden the pensions due him as an officer and president. After years of disgrace and litigation, however, the nation's Supreme Court exonerated him of all charges and restored his political rights.

Rojas' strength in 1970 is only understandable by referring to this process. Consistently those who voted for him cited his mistreatment by the "oligarchs" who control the National Front and the press. For many Colombians the General became an underdog who successfully cleared his name from a malicious attack by the country's controlling groups.

Already in 1964, Rojas began his comeback, when his followers received 27 per cent of the Conservative and 1.4 per cent of the Liberal vote in congressional elections. In 1966, 16.7 per cent of the senators elected claimed to be Rojistas, and 734,000 voters (28.3 per cent) cast their presidential ballots for José Jaramillo Giraldo on the indication of Rojas. With the establishment of an organization called Anapo (Alianza Nacional Popular—Peoples' National Alliance), Rojas announced his candidacy for 1970 and began to attract attention by the surprisingly large crowds that attended his rallies. Few people, however, expected him to come through as he did. On the day before the elections *El Tiempo* confidently published the results of an independent survey showing that Pastrana would get 40 per cent of the vote and Rojas 24.3 per cent.

The narrowness of the final results reveals that: (1) Dissatisfaction with the National Front among many segments of the Colombian population is far greater than suspected. (2) For the first time since 1958 the dissatisfaction found a political symbol around which to gather. (3) Popular interest in

politics, long assumed to be dormant, is now awakened. (4) The dissatisfaction has chosen "populism" as a means of expression.

Colombia's era of National Front stability may now be at an end, and three questions without answers becloud the future.

What is the future of Rojismo? There is some doubt whether Rojas will run again in 1974. When I pointed out to a prominent Rojista leader that seventy-four-year-old Jorge Alessandri was vigorously campaigning for Chile's presidency, he made the following negatively-toned comment: "Alessandri is Alessandri, and Rojas is Rojas." The General looks tired and suffers from diabetes. His political movement, Anapo, will continue even without him, but the ongoing question is whether it can continue to control 39 per cent of the vote. Many of the major participants in the Rojista movement were basically Liberals and Conservatives who supported Rojas, but do not care to subject themselves to the erratic counselors who direct Anapo.

Can Misael Pastrana govern? Whether it is true or not, the Rojistas generally believe that the government defrauded them of a victory, and they will hardly remain quiet for four years. One third of the Senate will be Rojista, and largely because of the Rojista upheaval 70 per cent of the new House of Representatives is composed of new faces. Sr. Pastrana will undoubtedly give special attention to social programs, but the question is whether paternalism as conceived by the National Front will work. However worthy its inception, with four years to go the National Front is already outmoded, and the opposition is unlikely to let it carry out its programs in peace.

What will be the effect on politics of the new political consciousness among the urban masses? Rojas outpolled Pastrana in every major Colombian city, and it is the cities that are growing and bearing burdens like poor housing and unemployment. Even though Rojismo is populist, its Marxist segment was especially prominent in the demonstrations and violence following the elections. One leaflet handed out urged the formation of popular political organisms on all levels, the nationalization of large industries without compensation, and called on "all the popular sectors . . . to *organize the insurrection*, and let us take power to realize what the Colombian people require and need." At its best, Colombia will develop a new political alignment more consistent with reality than the National Front, by which new segments of the population will have an effective voice. A more ominous possibility is that Colombia's controlling groups, fearing the people and populism, will follow the path of Brazil and turn to stronger measures to secure their position. Despite President Lleras' assurances to the contrary, it is most unlikely that if Rojas had won, he would have been allowed to take office.

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NOTES

1. Vernon Lee Fluharty, *Dance of the Millions: Military Rule and the Social Revolution in Colombia, 1930-1956* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1957), p. 145.

2. Orlando Fals-Borda in Claudio Véliz, *Obstacles to Change in Latin America* (Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 197.

3. Fluharty, *op. cit.*, p. 158.

Note on author, p. 12

RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

David Bronheim

THERE is in the United States a great tendency among those concerned with Inter-American affairs to talk of the 'brotherhood' in the Western Hemisphere, and of our 'neighbours' to the south of us, and to make believe that generally everything is rosy, and that we are really very friendly with the Latin Americans. That is becoming increasingly less true. I think it is important to understand that in the United States most people neither know very much about Latin America nor care very much. I suspect that Marlon Brando playing 'Zapata', Wallace Beery playing 'Pancho Villa', or Carmen Miranda, have done more to shape the image of what people in the United States think about Latin America than any educational institution.

Nevertheless, I suspect that many people in the United States believe that the Latin Americans like us. We have something of a sentimental attachment to them. We probably feel that they are a little ungrateful for what has been in recent years a fairly significant amount of assistance. They are somewhat chaotic. They have a tendency periodically to run towards military governments. And, aside from a Brazilian unit which fought in the Italian campaign during the Second World War, and a Colombian unit that fought in the Korean War, they have not really stood alongside of us in any of the causes that we felt were important.

From the other side, how do the Latin Americans view the United States today? I think the attitude changes as one gets further from the United States. Obviously our nearer neighbours, in the Caribbean, Mexico, and Central America, see us in one way, and have strong feelings about us. As one moves south, these feelings tend to become somewhat diluted. I think that at one time the United States stood for, and was an example of, the type of democratic system that many of the Latin American countries aspired to. That day is long past. Today the Latin Americans feel that we exercise too great an influence in their countries; that our private sector exerts too great an influence over our public policy. We appear to be reluctant to lend them a significant hand in their development. In those countries nearest to us, we have been casual users of military force. In some ways we are probably an incomprehensible giant to them. Increasingly, their students see us as

imperialists. Yet amongst the majority of their uneducated inhabitants, I suspect the United States is still held in very substantial awe. I travelled with Governor Rockefeller of New York on his mission through Latin America last year. That was at the time of the moon launchings, and many people were listening to their transistor radios day and night. They were not listening to Radio Havana, nor to the broadcasts run by the Church which teach them morality and agricultural modernisation: they were listening to the transmissions from the Apollo capsules, and they listened day and night. But in terms of the educated people in the hemisphere, I think that as they become more and more frustrated so does their resentment of the United States grow.

We in the United States, especially those of us who grew up in the period of the Second World War, and even for those generations which drew their morality from Woodrow Wilson, have a tendency to forget that we have always been casual users of military force. Especially has this been so in connection with our neighbours. They have 'profited' most from this neighbourly characteristic, and it affects the way they look at us. We have taken more than half the territory of Mexico. When I was in the government, I used to watch our Foreign Service officers trying to explain to serious Mexican officials the dangers of the Communist threat. The Mexicans were very polite, and you could see them trying to work out how they could possibly make us believe they were worried about the Russians. Yet it is not the Russians who bother them. We have at various times invaded Haiti, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, and Cuba. We provoked the secession of Panama, and we have arranged for armed invasions of Guatemala, and again recently, Cuba. Our troops sit astride the Panama Canal. This is something that, as I say, we in the United States, do not keep before us. The Latin Americans do. Their memories of these things are much better than ours, and those memories do shape their view of us.

There is also the question of the economic policies adopted by the United States towards Latin America since the Second World War. The Latin Americans joined the Allied cause, some rather late, as soon as they saw who was definitely going to win, but in any event they all became allies before the war ended. Having done so, I think they expected economic assistance in accelerating the rate of their development. Although it is hard for people in the United States to understand this, the Latin Americans were very disappointed when the major reconstruction effort of the United States was directed towards Western Europe and later to Greece and Turkey. Then, after our effort in Europe, we turned our attention to Asia. We made a major effort with the Japanese, and then we became involved in the Korean War. The attitude towards the Latin Americans was that if they could just arrange the climate in their countries so that private investors, especially foreign

private investors, could find it attractive, their development problems would be dealt with, and they would not need substantial amounts of public funds.

As the Fifties wore on, it became quite clear in the United States to those who watched what was going on in Latin America that perhaps we had made a mistake. The Latin Americans, led by former President Lleras Camargo of Colombia, and former President Kubitschek of Brazil, took the lead in trying to create a hemispheric scheme, Operation Pan America, for their development. By late in the Eisenhower years, we began to see a change in U.S. policy. To some degree, this was influenced by the experience of the then Vice-President Nixon, who, it was felt, almost lost his life in his trip through Latin America in 1955, and by what was happening in Cuba when Castro took over. So, towards the end of the Eisenhower years, we began to see acceptance on the part of the United States of the need for U.S. public assistance to help Latin American economic development, and also the need to help them in what was then called 'social development'—schools, hospitals, housing. The United States had previously been unwilling to provide that kind of aid.

With the coming of John F. Kennedy, there was a drastic change in U.S. policy towards Latin America, and, especially, in the public declarations that accompanied that policy. What was envisioned, in a phrase that he used in a speech in the spring of 1961, was an 'alliance for progress'—a vast co-operative economic and political development effort which would be financed in part by the United States, but in the main by Latin America itself. It foresaw rapid economic development and rapid political change, with an increasing democratisation of the political systems. It was really an extraordinary undertaking. The document that sets forth the goals of the Alliance for Progress is known as the Charter of the Punte del Este, signed in the summer of 1961, in Uruguay.

It was doomed to fail. The level of aspirations that it set out for the hemisphere was far beyond the capacity of the Latin American political systems to achieve. The one thing that it did do was raise expectations, and, as a result, in the years that followed, it probably also raised frustrations. It could not foresee that President Kennedy would be killed two years later, nor that the United States would be increasingly involved in a war in South-East Asia. In any event, I think that Lyndon Johnson tried to meet the U.S. obligations under the Alliance for Progress and the Charter of Punte del Este. In the main he was not unsuccessful. But Latin America kept falling further and further behind on its share in the plan, and the spirit was gone from the United States effort. Frustratingly, the United States was changing

faster than Latin America. The 'development gap' was not narrowing. It was growing.

Although some very significant economic development has taken place in Latin America, it has not been enough. For thinking people in Latin America, who are working hard on development problems, it is increasingly frustrating to see that the developed countries of the world, Europe, Japan, the United States, Russia, are pulling away from them. How this development gap can be bridged becomes increasingly difficult to determine.

* * *

Against that background, a new Administration came to office in the United States in 1969. At this point, let me turn for a minute from Latin America and look at what might be called 'the current international reality'. This reality, as I see it, tends to highlight some of the difficulties in formulating meaningful U.S. policy towards the rest of the world, and especially the Western Hemisphere.

First, let me consider what I will term the 'military reality'. There are a great many people in the United States who, as in other countries, are always preparing to fight the wrong war. They remember that in the Second World War Latin America was of some significance in the search for German U-boats in the South Atlantic, and as a source of vital supplies of food and raw materials. For them it is too easy to believe that Latin America continues to have vital military significance for the United States. I would argue that, given the present state of the art of waging war in the world today, Latin America has no vital connection with any war in which the national security of any major Power in the world is likely to be involved. It is very difficult for the Latin Americans, and for many people in the United States, to understand that Latin America could not make a vital, and I stress the word vital, military contribution in any serious war that is likely to occur which will threaten the national security of the United States.

The 'economic reality' is, for Latin America, equally distressing. Mexico and Canada aside for the moment, the statistics tend to show that east-west trade (and by east-west I mean from any place in the globe) and east-west investment relations are developing faster than those north-south. That means that in terms of U.S. trade interests, investment interests, or business interests, our relations with Western Europe or Japan, and probably eventually with Eastern Europe and Russia, will become more important to the United States than its relations with Latin America and the Caribbean. The rapid economic growth in Europe and Japan—the northern tier of the globe—is creating trading and investment demands that far outstrip anything that is happening in the rest of the world.

In the third place we have something much more difficult to assess—the 'political reality' of Latin America. This involves very curious psychological phenomena. Latin America is an area that most of the world sees as being under U.S. dominance, and the United States is supposed to be embarrassed when things 'go wrong' in Latin America. There is also talk about our need for Latin American votes in the U.N., or the effect on our image if Latin America 'goes down the drain'.

My view is that there is very little in Latin America that vitally affects the U.S. national interest. This is not to say that Latin America is not very important for certain U.S. companies. I do not mean that it would not be embarrassing or difficult for the United States if the whole Western Hemisphere, excluding Canada, went into a rouble trading bloc. A major change of that kind would certainly create serious problems, but otherwise, in a more piecemeal fashion, the vital importance of Latin America to the United States is by no means clear.

There are three groups that tend to want to concentrate on Latin America's 'vital' importance to the United States, and they are very strange bedfellows. The Marxists in Latin America, and I think that includes a large percentage of the educated class, are determined to persist in their belief that the strength of the United States is directly connected with its continued exploitation of Latin America. I do not know of any empirical way of proving them correct; I do not agree with them, but I think it is very important to them to continue to believe it. It may indeed be psychologically important for the Latin Americans in general to overstress their own importance to us. They are joined in that belief by the U.S. business community that has investments in Latin America. They constantly stress the vital importance of Latin America to the United States—clearly because they are trying to keep the U.S. Government interested in protecting them and their investments. This is not reprehensible. It is a standard technique by which you try to keep your government involved.

There is another group in my country that believes in the vital importance of Latin America to the United States. It is a small group, very sentimental, and very vocal. It contains some of those I mentioned earlier. These people have a sentimental connection with Latin America. They were involved in getting the Germans out of the Latin American airlines, and in getting the German military missions out of Latin America, during the Second World War. They remember the problems of getting the German spies out of Buenos Aires—very serious problems which I do not belittle. Many of these people have lived in Latin America, they have very good friends in Latin America, and they have deep-seated love and affection for the area. Most of their feelings about the vital, strategic importance of Latin America to the United States, I maintain, are sentimental. These three groups do add up to a very

vocal, high-decibel level of opinion about the vital importance of Latin America. But in fact they constantly distort the issue. The issue turns out to be people arguing whether or not Latin America is vital to the United States, with the assumption that if you prove it is vital, one set of actions would follow, while if you prove it is not vital, then no action at all is required. I would argue that this is the wrong way of approaching the problem. It is the wrong issue.

Latin America is philosophically important to the European/North Atlantic community. It is the last area that is an off-shoot, a direct off-shoot, of Western Europe which has not managed to accelerate its technological progress and its economic development. If Latin America cannot do this, then the Atlantic Community really has nothing philosophically relevant to offer to the rest of the Third World. Culturally, Latin America is very interesting at the present time. Their cultural production, especially in the sphere of the novel, is fascinating. Historically, Latin America is also interesting. There are important things that all of us can learn from Latin America, but that is not the same as saying it is vitally important to our national security.

* * *

One other point that I would like to touch on is the use of the words ' Latin America '. I have noticed increasingly in the United States that the use of that phrase tends to hide an unconscious effort to reduce all of the problems in the hemisphere to a least common denominator so that it can be dealt with more easily. This, I think, is a very harmful habit. When we think about Western Europe we generally have enough sophistication to understand that we must have a German policy, a policy for dealing with the United Kingdom, and for dealing with the French. In other words, the phrase ' Western Europe ' is not used to cloak real difficulties. Yet when the words ' Latin America ' are used, and you hear people talking about ' our Latin American policy ', we are, in effect, asked to believe that the problems of Brazil, a country with a population of about a hundred million inhabitants, are the equivalent of the problems of Honduras, a country with only about two million inhabitants. The differences between countries in the hemisphere, and their real national issues, thus tend to be ignored.

Let me, therefore, mention some of these differences and these issues. Mexico, to the south of the United States, is a country of about fifty million people. It has one of the fastest-growing populations in the world. It has a rapidly-developing modern economy. It shares a two thousand mile undefended border with the United States. It is ruled by a civilian government which is not a representative democratic government; indeed, it can sometimes be a quite repressive government. It is a serious country which studies the United States very carefully. It

sends its young technicians to be trained in the United States. As I said earlier, we preoccupy Mexican thinking. Before long Mexico will be a country of sixty-five to seventy million inhabitants, with a modern industrial complex—altogether a fairly significant country. Already it stands high in the ranks of key secondary Powers. That is the way the Mexicans are beginning to think of themselves.

South of Mexico are the Central American countries. Their most recent exercise in statesmanship was the efforts of the Hondurans and the Salvadorians to kill each other off in the so-called 'football war'. That affair raised, in a very acute form, the key question that plagues us in many areas of the world today. What is to become of countries of that size and of that economic capability? These are countries that range in population from one to four million, with less than half that number really participating in the economic life, and with even a smaller percentage engaged in the political life of the country. In Central America only Costa Rica has made any serious effort to develop democratic institutions.

Southwards again, there is a piece of real estate, Panama, that owes its existence to us, and to our desire to have an inter-ocean canal, and whose continued existence depends on such a canal. In my view the importance of the Canal to Panama should not be likened to that of the Suez Canal to Egypt. Without the Canal there would be no republic of Panama.

There is also the Caribbean. For reasons that I sometimes understand and sometimes do not, when Britain thinks about Latin America, she tends to think about the Caribbean. I was once invited to a conference there which was supposed to deal with British and United States attitudes and policies toward Latin America. We spent most of the time talking about bits and pieces of territory in the Caribbean that I had never heard of, but where apparently they speak English; and, everybody at the conference was obviously vitally concerned about them. Since that conference, I have been to quite a few of those places in the Caribbean, and they all have a couple of things in common. They are poor, and their people want to emigrate. Their economies are subsidised in one way or another, whether it be through sugar subsidies or Commonwealth preferences, either by the United States or by some European Power, and they are increasingly dependent on tourism. Along the northern tier in the Caribbean, there are the larger countries in the area—Cuba, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Puerto Rico. Of these there is only one country that is truly independent and that is Haiti. It is a brutal, repressive, dictatorship with a decaying economy. It may be that the realistic lesson here is that the future of the Caribbean requires a certain kind of obviously dependent relationship with a metropolitan Power.

Today that is a very unfashionable view. I would say that the reason for this is that the word ' satellite ' has become a dirty word.

In South America three countries, Venezuela, Colombia, and Chile, are making what I consider to be a serious effort at developing democratic institutions. They have had the opportunities in recent years to transfer national power through the use of elective procedures, and they are seriously trying to broaden the base of democratic participation in their society. Both Venezuela and Chile depend on the export of a primary commodity, the first oil and the second copper. Historically, this is always a very unstable situation, especially when a large proportion of those exports depend on the United States as a buyer. Colombia, which until very recently has been thought of in the same category, through her dependence on coffee, has managed in the last four or five years to achieve a rather miraculous diversification of her exports. The Colombians are now selling abroad substantial amounts of what they call ' minor exports '—products other than coffee.

Uruguay, once a democracy, has deteriorated into chaos. It is now ruled under a state of seige. Perhaps Uruguay became jealous of Argentina. Argentina has the unique distinction of being the only modern developed country to try to become an underdeveloped country. The Uruguayans, not to be outdone, are now, it seems, trying to follow that example. Apparently the Uruguayans' long-term development plan went wrong. It seemed to be based on there being a world war every twenty-five years; but for some reason that is not quite clear to them, we and the Russians did not co-operate. So their economy collapsed. I make light of it, but in fact it is a very serious problem.

Argentina and Brazil, the two largest, and by far the strongest and most important, countries in South America, are today ruled by military dictatorships, with various degrees of repression and various degrees of freedom. They are either deliberately, or just by the necessity of military rule, rapidly destroying what little civilian political party structure they had. The frightening thing, too, is that the longer the military stay in power, the less chance either country will have to evolve smoothly to anything vaguely resembling a representative system. This is a considerable problem which I think troubles many Argentines and Brazilians, even those who were prepared to accept a military government as an interim measure. I do not see now how they are going to be able to abandon such a system. In both countries the military are no longer talking in terms of a timetable by which they would eventually relinquish power.

Argentina is a remarkable country. I have always said to the Argentines that the thing that saves them is that they do not have the administrative or managerial capacity necessary to destroy their country. In the late twenties and early thirties, Argentina had a standard of living

that was probably above that of the French, the Italians, and certainly of the Spaniards. They were probably ahead of the Australians and the Canadians by almost any indicator that could have been used. But their political system fell apart. Nevertheless, I think it is a country to be reckoned with, because its apparent wealth is so vast.

Brazil, also, is in some ways a unique country. It is a country that we always talk about—'if the Brazilians develop it'. But it is a big 'if'. I think the statistics tend to be misleading. I do not know of any easy analogies. Perhaps Brazil should be compared with Italy after the Second World War, Northern Italy being the equivalent of Southern Brazil. The southern part of Brazil is a developed country; São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Belo Horizonte, Curitiba, Porto Alegre—these are modern European cities, by any standards. The region has a modern industrial complex and is developing rapidly. It is only when you include the population in the north that the statistics show Brazil to be an underdeveloped country.

Paraguay, Bolivia, and Uruguay constitute a buffer ring between Brazil and Argentina. Paraguay and Bolivia today are also military dictatorships. They are, by Latin American standards, small countries, with substantial Indian populations which really do not participate in the political life of the country.

There are also, of course, Peru, Ecuador, and one country that is probably over-reported in the British press, Guyana. At present Peru is a source of great interest to the military everywhere in Latin America. They are waiting to see whether Peru, once again being governed by a military dictatorship, has developed a form of military rule that will really carry out a populist programme. But the important question is whether the Peruvian military will turn out to be different from what the military have been over the last two thousand years. I think they are being watched very carefully. They appear to be following Perón's path.

Ecuador is a country that is ruled sometimes by civilians, sometimes by the army. I do not myself think it is very important. I doubt whether Ecuador has a very bright future, unless the oilfields now being opened up in the northern part of the country prove to be valuable.

Guyana has a serious frontier problem with Venezuela which claims about two-thirds of its territory. I suspect that the political situation in Guyana is such that there is a very good chance that its political institutions may break down. If anything could prevent that, it is the realisation that that is what the Venezuelans are waiting for. The Guyanese have no allies in South America. Because they are English-speaking, they tend to look to the Caribbean for friends. But countries like Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados, and Jamaica are trying to become active members of the Organisation of American States, and thus the

support that they might give a country like Guyana could interfere with their future relations with their Spanish and Portuguese-speaking friends of the OAS.

* * *

Let me now turn to what President Nixon has said about Latin America, and what we have done about it. An adviser to the President, Mr. Patrick Moynahan, has recalled an apt phrase first used by an Englishman in describing Canada. The phrase is 'benign neglect'. Mr. Moynahan offered it as a policy description of how President Nixon should treat our black problem in the United States, but it has been increasingly used to describe other areas of our policy. I would argue that for the past year it has been a perfect description of the Nixon Administration's policy toward Latin America.

Too often, in my country, there is a tendency to equate a low-priority area with the absence of any policy for it. It is very difficult for the Latin Americans to realise that they are an area that is being given a low priority by the United States. Those in the United States who like to think of themselves as international activists, and who have a strong feeling about Latin America, do not like to see such a low priority given to Latin America either. The argument tends to be formulated in the question 'do we have a policy for Latin America, or don't we?' when it should really be over the level of priority such a policy should have. I would urge that we do have a policy; and that the discussion should be about the fact that it is based on a low priority being assigned to the area.

A key part of this 'benign neglect' has been the development of the phrase 'low profile'. I have looked into the origins of the phrase; I am not completely sure from whence it comes, but I think it is a phrase used by designers of armoured vehicles to indicate the effort made to make a smaller target. When the most powerful country in the world, which has very deep psychological, political, and economic connections with what is essentially an underdeveloped area, announces that it is going to lower its profile, it is being a little nonsensical. We may be planning to make available less aid. We may be planning to restrict the conditions on the assistance we make available. We may be planning to increase Latin American access to U.S. markets, or to decrease that access. We may even be planning to stop dabbling as much in the future as we have in the past in political matters which have only tangential importance to the United States. Many of these policies would be good policies, but certainly the adoption of some or all of them should not remove the responsibility from the United States of trying to be an intelligent leader in the hemisphere. Intelligent leadership means innovation and co-operation, and I would argue that they are what is needed.

Another phrase now current in Washington is ' the dumb-bell theory '. I am tempted to say that the phrase be reserved as a label for those who use it. It is used to conjure up an image of a Latin American bloc on one side of the dumb-bell and the United States on the other. The great worry then becomes how should the United States deal with this bloc? What the U.S. Government is doing is trying to mould the problem of the hemisphere into a shape with which it can deal. Rather than facing the actual national and regional problems of Latin America, we are encouraging the creation of a bloc just because we know how to deal with a bloc. So the U.S. Government is now seriously concerned about whether it should be in favour of a bloc, or against a bloc. This to me is a very suspicious business, because it amounts to an effort to get all your adversaries into a room together in the hope of reducing their complaints to the basis of a least common denominator so that even though the Ecuadorians may be deeply concerned about bananas, the Bolivians about tin, and the Chileans about copper, they all come out of the room talking about ' trade '. Then the United States can deal with them at the same level of generality. I have argued in the United States that this is an effort to distract attention from the real problems in the hemisphere.

* * *

Let me outline a few of those problems that intelligent policy should be dealing with now, or at least planning for. This is why I feel that, even if she decides that Latin America is of low priority, there is really no excuse for the United States not to try to prepare solutions for, or at least try to foresee, the problems that will arise in the very near future.

First, I think we have to look at North America. By North America I mean at its minimum Canada, United States and Mexico. This is an area that is becoming increasingly linked economically, and, sooner or later, it will have to face the problem of whether it should begin joint planning for the solution of economic and environmental problems.

In South America there are other problems. Brazil and Argentina are separated by that buffer ring I mentioned earlier, Uruguay, Bolivia, and Paraguay. As Brazil and Argentina develop more rapidly, the buffer nature of those three countries will become clearer. In fact, Argentina is now very quietly beginning to make very substantial investments in Uruguay, Paraguay, and Bolivia. I am not sure whether that kind of buffer situation has any long-term viable future. It is the kind of situation that nobody likes to talk about. The Bolivians admit that they would rather have us as the imperialists than the Argentines, because we are farther away. But no one else wants to face that problem, and I think it will be an increasingly serious one. The rest of South America, leaving aside Guyana, and except for some reservations by

Venezuela, is already organising itself in the shape of the Andean Group—theoretically designed as an Andean common market, although any analyst of European trade and European alliances would identify it as an effort to balance power. For, in reality, Venezuela, Ecuador, Colombia, Peru, Chile and Bolivia are joining together in a system clearly designed to enable them to deal more adequately with Brazil and Argentina.

There is also the problem of the Panama Canal. The Canal is a very emotional issue in the United States for reasons that I think are primarily related to the U.S. citizens who live in the Canal Zone. They have very strong feelings about the vital character of the Canal, and about its necessity to the United States. I would argue that the Canal is less important to us than it is to the countries on the Pacific coast of South America. The reason why the Canal is of economic value to the United States is because neither our rail system running west nor our port system on the west coast are really adequate to handle the industrial production of the east coast. Coal can only be shipped to Japan economically through the Canal, out of either Atlantic ports or Gulf ports. The Canal also has a peculiar value in times of limited warfare in Asia. For a combination of coincidental circumstances, we do not have a large number of munitions handling ports on the west coast. Dry cargo for wars in Korea, Vietnam, and for the Pacific War in the Second World War, in large measure has moved out of the east coast and the Gulf coast through the Canal. But these are shortcomings that we have the wealth to overcome, so I would argue that the Canal is not vital to us. For Chile and its copper, for Peruvian copper and fishmeal, and for Ecuadorian bananas, the income from all of which is vital to the survival of these countries—for those products to be saleable in the European market, there must be a canal and there must be low toll rates. This is one of the reasons why they do not support their Panamanian brothers in their claims to ownership of the Canal. In fact they are probably delighted that the United States is running the Canal and subsidising the tolls.

As to whether the United States should undertake further responsibilities in the Isthmus, either in the form of a new sea-level canal, or the widening of the present Canal to take larger sea vessels, I would argue against both. I do not see the advantage to the United States in buying the political headache that would result from either course. Some people argue that the big tankers need a new canal. I would urge that somebody should study the economics of the big tankers. It is precisely the big tankers that do not need a new canal.

* * *

It took the Nixon Administration ten months in office before the President enunciated his Latin American policy. This, I claim, is related to the low priority given to Latin America, not to the difficulties involved. During that ten months, the key position in the U.S. Government relating to Latin America, that of Assistant Secretary for Latin American Affairs, was vacant for over four months, and all policy formulation was delayed so that Governor Rockefeller could make his tour of the hemisphere and report to the President. Mr. Rockefeller did not complete his tour until the first week in July; his report went to the President in August; the President made his long-awaited Latin American policy speech at the end of October, and then added substantially to it in a press conference in November.

The first thing to look at in analysing U.S. relations with Latin America is the use made by the President of Governor Nelson Rockefeller. Latin America, apparently, is one of the regions that the United States regularly treats to Presidential emissaries. Vice-President Nixon himself was one. Adlai Stevenson was another. Robert Kennedy went, and now, in this Administration, Nelson Rockefeller. I would argue that this is part of the general circus atmosphere in which U.S. policy toward Latin America is made. The Latin Americans are fairly sophisticated people. They understand that when the U.S. Government is interested in talking seriously to the Japanese, it sends the Secretary of State, and that if they want to do serious business with the Germans, or the British, it is the Secretary of State who does it. The sending of Presidential emissaries has a large public relations factor built into it, for none of them has a continuing responsibility for the problem under review.

Apart from these general considerations, there was the matter of the actual choice of Governor Rockefeller. There are, I think it fair to say, quite a few people in the United States who do not connect this Rockefeller with the attitudes that were connected with the first Rockefeller. The link just is not recognised. You can either like or dislike this generation of Rockefellers, based on who they are and what they are. Those who dislike them relate their dislike to the present generation. The Latin Americans, however, have a different kind of memory. To them the name of Rockefeller is the symbol of everything the Latin American Left opposes. I do not subscribe to the theory that the President's choice of the Governor was some kind of a dark conspiracy on the part of Mr. Nixon to get Mr. Rockefeller in trouble, for the theory does not do credit to the high level of incompetence that goes into decision-making in every government. The fact is that Mr. Nixon accepted a proposal on the part of Señor Galo Plaza, the Secretary-General of the Organisation of American States, that Mr. Rockefeller should go. Mr. Rockefeller accepted because such acceptance was con-

sistent with his image of himself as a good, regular, party-line Republican, and because he feels deeply, warmly and strongly about Latin America. I think he believed that Latin America felt the same way about him.

What have been the results, so far, of Mr. Rockefeller's trip and of Mr. Nixon's policy? To me the most interesting thing is that we no longer hear about aggregate amounts of public assistance. Ten years ago, the figure of two billion dollars a year of public assistance to Latin America was almost an accepted statistic. It was generally agreed that the United States, through public and private sources, would have to provide about half of that amount. There is no mention, either in Mr. Rockefeller's report or in any statements made by the President to date, of any aggregate amount of public assistance. This situation will necessarily change when the President submits the next Foreign Assistance Bill to Congress, but, at least in terms of general policy concepts, these figures are no longer involved. There are a few things that the President has done for which I think he deserves credit. For example, two main irritants have been removed from the public assistance programme. He did away with the 'additionality requirement' and he allowed hemispheric procurement rather than tied procurement. 'Additionality' and 'tied procurement' required the Latin Americans to use aid funds to purchase more goods in the U.S. than they would have had there been no aid programme. 'Hemispheric procurement' permits them to use aid funds for purchase in both Latin America and the U.S. These concessions are of little substantive value and they are of little cost to the United States, but they are pleasant gestures to the Latin Americans, for they are things that they have been complaining about for at least five years.

On trade, the President made the usual observations on the importance of expanded Latin American trade to Latin American development. He went further. He repeated what has become a standard U.S. Government position. We will work to get the Europeans to set up what are known as 'generalised non-reciprocal trade preferences'. The United States says this pretty regularly. The European reaction is that they already have such a policy and do not discriminate against the Latin Americans, and so the discussion goes on. I do not know what will become of it. Then the President said something which is much more significant. He said that if these arrangements cannot be worked out with the Europeans in a suitable period of time the United States would be prepared to move towards what would be essentially a system of hemispheric preferences. Now this is a very important proposition because it could lead to a Western Hemisphere trading system—an economic counterpart of the Monroe Doctrine. Some Latin Americans

have been arguing in favour of such a system for some time, and now, clearly, their bluff has been called.

In some ways it is an insidious position for the U.S. to adopt, because one effect of it is to split the Latin Americans, although they cannot admit it. The Argentines and the Brazilians are not really interested in a Western Hemisphere trading system. Some of the Central American republics, and maybe the Colombians, would opt for it, but it is a very divisive element to introduce at a time when the United States and Latin America appear to be trying to encourage the creation of a Latin American political bloc. I do not think that the United States did it deliberately to divide the Latin Americans. For some time there has been considerable discussion on the idea inside the U.S. Government, and the sentimentalists in the Administration have always been in favour of it. However, the spontaneity of the statement of the theory probably exceeded the political means available to translate it into practice. But it is an interesting proposal, and one should not make light of it.

Another interesting point that came out of the Rockefeller report, and the President's subsequent speech, is that Rockefeller saw Communists everywhere, and put a very heavy emphasis on the security element in the hemisphere. I think he was very substantially influenced by his experience in the forties, when he personally was responsible for much of the task of getting the Germans out of the hemisphere. He is therefore very conscious of the effect of sinister external forces. In his report he stressed military assistance very heavily, with the idea that we should make such assistance available to all governments in Latin America regardless of their political complexion. Yet, interestingly enough for a Republican administration in the United States, the President himself has not talked about the Communist threat in Latin America, nor has he talked about any military assistance programme. Very shortly he will have to introduce his political strategy to Congress and list both the economic assistance and military assistance that he would hope to provide. But, at least so far, there has been no full statement by the President on the question of military assistance.

On one political question the President and the Governor appeared to be in complete agreement. They both indicated that the United States should deal with Latin American countries regardless of the kind of political system those countries have—in other words, that whether the country is a dictatorship or a democracy, the official U.S. attitude towards it should be the same. Either this is an abstract intellectual exercise about which nobody really cares very much, or it represents a very substantial change in U.S. policy. If the President is talking only about diplomatic relations, if, in fact, public assistance will be reduced, and if there is not going to be any military assistance, then as

a diplomatic doctrine it is not very startling. In fact, it does not represent any change from U.S. policy in recent years. On the other hand, if the President has in mind the provision of economic assistance and of military assistance to whatever kind of government is in power at a particular time to enable it to fight a real or imagined Communist threat, then that amounts to an extraordinarily pernicious policy. It is too early to say at this point what the effects of the President's statement will actually be. I suspect that given a reduction in economic assistance, and the fact that the political reality in our Congress makes the provision of military assistance very unlikely, it will indeed prove to have been an abstract intellectual exercise.

A final point that has become clear is that U.S. policy on Cuba will remain unchanged. In his speech the President said the only thing that we had against the Cubans was that they were exporting revolution. Superficially that statement appeared to reflect a very substantial change in our policy, because previously we had two complaints against Cuba; export of revolution and her connection with the Russian bloc. But having talked to people in the State Department I have concluded that there is not in fact to be any change in U.S. policy toward Cuba. The reason is fairly simple. This Administration does not put a very high priority on achieving any change in our relationship with Cuba, and I do not think that the Cubans themselves are greatly interested in any change at this point.

Although it seems to be slightly disappointing, that appears to be the sum total of current U.S. policy towards Latin America. I do not think that it is very heady stuff. However, I would suggest that it should be seen in terms of an Administration that is trying to extricate the United States from a war in South-East Asia; that is trying to deal with a combatant situation in the Middle East; that is trying to develop a more constructive relationship with Russia and with Peking; and that will have to deal again with Germany, and evolve a longer range relationship with the Japanese. At home we have inflation, an urban problem, a pollution problem, a racial problem, and a student problem. This is really a full plate for even the most talented of men. As a consequence I am led to believe that the making of a Latin American policy, and innovation in that field, will really be a part-time job, and not high on the list of priorities.

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Based on a talk given at Chatham House in March 1970.

Letter from Manuela Saenz, mistress of Simon Bolivar, announcing the break with her English husband, 1825.

"Sir, you are excellent, you are inimitable. But, my friend, it is no small matter that I leave you for General Bolivar; to leave a husband without your qualities would be nothing. Do you think for a moment that, after being beloved of this General for years, and with the security that I possessed his heart, I would choose to be the wife even of the Father, Son, or the Holy Ghost, or of all three? I know very well that I cannot be united with him under the laws of honor, as you call them, but do you believe that I feel less or more honored because he is my lover and not my husband? I do not live for the prejudices of society, which were invented only that we might torture each other.

"Let me be, my dear Englishman, let me be. Let us instead do something else. We should marry when we get to heaven; but on this earth--No!--In our heavenly home we shall lead entirely spiritual lives. There everything will be quite British, for monotony is reserved for your nation in love, that is, for they are much more avid in business. You love without pleasure. You converse without grace, you walk unhurried, you sit down with caution, you do not laugh even at your own jokes. These are divine attributes, but I, miserable mortal who can laugh at myself, laugh at you too, with all this English seriousness...."

CHAPTER 5

Machismo *or The Unromantic Latin*

"A Latin man is a man who expects not only his wife to be faithful, but his mistress too." A Latin man.

The Latin man enjoys the world's most extravagant reputation for romance. His image on the world stage is an infinitely enviable one and when many American men go to Latin America they feel obliged to imitate him almost to the point of exhaustion. The Latin's elegant posturing, his tireless and single-minded pursuit of women, his sure manliness—all these are the apparent handmaidens of the man who is *the* romantic male of the world.

Underneath this reputation for romance, there lies a curious concept, barely known in the rest of the world yet affecting and permeating every fiber of Latin American life. It is the concept of *machismo* and it is perhaps the prime reason why Latin America has not progressed more rapidly.

Machismo is present in all the Latin American countries to one extent or another, but it is more prevalent, for instance, in Mexico than in Chile and far more predominant in the Spanish countries than among Latins of Portuguese descent. In Brazil, it is overshadowed by the irresistible urge to compromise, something the *macho* man looks on with about the enthusiasm he would have for being castrated.

Macho is used to refer to anything very, very male in certain

obvious and often vulgar ways. When its values are imposed on the rest of society, the concept of *machismo* comes into play.

In the Hispanic view of the ideal man, which is greatly influenced by the Moorish sense of exclusivity and dominance of the male and the extreme dependency and public scarcity of the female, male virtues revolve around intense activity, competition, domination of other men and sexual prowess with women. It is not the truth of what the *macho* says that is important but the brilliance with which he says it (the form over the substance again). It is not the quality of the love he feels for a woman that is important but the number of conquests he can claim. It is not the substance of his political program but the power of his presence.

There must be a zest for physical action, which means a corresponding down-playing of the day-to-day, time-consuming, self-effacing work of experiment, scientific inquiry and intellectual investigation. This should be accompanied by daring speculation, which means a public disregard for the plodding businessman who seeks the kind of long-term investment that causes countries to progress rationally and steadily. In intellectual life, it is the brilliant speaker rather than the substantive man of knowledge who gains attention. In every sphere it is forcefulness and conquest which are most admired. They become ends rather than means.

It is part of the reason why Latin Americans have over and over again been able to harness their obstreperous energies to build great and dramatic projects (Brasília, for instance), only to let them fall apart once they have been built. It is one of the reasons why they have at crucial times been able to rise to the solutions of great problems (the Uruguayan welfare state, the Mexican one-party "solution," Costa Rica's democratic paternalism), only to lack the flexibility to change them again when these answers grew stale. It is partly why there is no institutionalization of change. As Jaime Benítez, the wise rector of the University of Puerto Rico, said of his Latin brothers, "How grand to die for a principle, how tiresome to live for it."

If you look for the typical assertive and theatrical *macho* in Latin American history, he is not hard to find. The brother of

the Mexican president Manuel Avila Camacho was noted for keeping fifty-one mistresses at one time. When a nude statue was found missing one day in Mexico City, his brother remarked wryly, "Ask brother Max, he might have built a house around her."

The brutal Bolivian dictator Mariano Melgarejo, a presumptuous *cholo* looked down upon by the upper classes who ruled in the 1860s, flew into murderous drunken rages, lost vast expanses of land to Bolivia's neighbors and left his country in bankruptcy. Nonetheless he is still held up as a kind of *macho* hero. Though Melgarejoism is used as a generic term for completely wanton, selfish and brutish behavior, he is also begrudgingly admired. To vow allegiance to him, his followers were required to kiss the bare bottom of Melgarejo's mistress.

That is the ultimate in vulgar *machismo*, but Melgarejo's life exemplified the term. At one point, the Queen of England X-ed Bolivia off her map, symbolically banishing it from the sight of the world. The Bolivian dictator had seized her representative in La Paz, tied him to a donkey and beat him.

But it is not only among the ruling classes, whether upstart *cholos* like Melgarejo or aristocrats, that *machismo* is indulged. In Mexico City I once was driving with a lower-class cabdriver—unshaven, husky, in good spirits—who wanted to talk. "I have eleven children by my wife and two others," he began. And then he added sadly, "But I've never been in love." I sympathized with him as best I could, and he went on, "I never really could say I know what it is—to 'love' a woman."

Then he reminisced. A voluble sort. "When I was young, I was nuts about dancing," he said. "My whole life was dancing. Every night I was in the café. If I didn't go dancing one night, I couldn't sleep. Even now, I listen to Pedro Infante—you know Pedro Infante?" I said, yes, I knew the famous singer. "Well, every song he sings reminds me of another girl. And you know how many songs Pedro Infante sings?" I nodded.

"Now I go every eight to fifteen days to see the mother of my other two children . . ." Why, I asked him, did he need so many women? "It is natural," he answered, shrugging.

Machismo *or The Unromantic Latin*

Mexico produces its share of *machos*—perhaps it ranks first in the continent. And they are indestructible. One Mexican businessman of Lebanese descent has a very elegant bedroom atop one of the office buildings he owns. All the floors in the bedroom slope—toward the bed. The imaginative *macho.*

An accessory of *machismo,* almost as indispensable as his lusting after women, is his weapon. *Machos* fight not with fists but with knives or pistols. It is common, particularly in Mexico but also elsewhere, to carry pistols to answer insults, giving rise to the Mexican saying that pistols are "pointed with hands but the triggers are pulled with the testicles." *Machismo* has a grim humor about it. Another Mexicanism is the joke about the *macho* curing his friend's headache by emptying his pistol into his head.

All of the elements of *machismo*—and honor is one, despite "vulgar *machos*" like Melgarejo—are intertwined and interrelated. *Machismo* is not simply power; the *macho* is not the American he-man. *Machismo* is very subtle. Sometimes men who are perceived by their societies as *muy macho* are physically unimpressive, even puny. Occasionally they are even homosexuals. *Machismo* is an elusive thing, having to do with a kind of life force inside the man or with a courage that makes him stand out among his fellows. Usually, too, there must be an element of *caballerismo* or gentlemanly behavior, or else the *macho* is simply an unseemly boor.

Of all the attributes of *machismo,* the most spoken of—and probably the most important for his public image—is the *macho's* sexual prowess. It can mean political success or failure. Yet it is complex and tied up with other factors. The ideal *macho* is characterized by ceaseless sexual activity, intense attention to women, and the idea that any woman outside his own family group is fair prey. He is characterized, on the one hand, by a puritanical and obsessively vigilant attitude toward his wife, mother and daughters, and, on the other, by a totally predatory attitude toward all other women. The wife and mother is perceived in the role of the Virgin Mary and even most "modern" young Latin men today say they insist their wives be virgins at marriage. The wife is also supposed to be sexually undemonstrative. Studies

have indicated that Latin couples own to less sexual intercourse than their Anglo-Saxon counterparts, and Latin doctors have accused Latin men of being basically disinterested in sex—only interested in the appearance of it. It is from his mistress that the Latin man expects professional sexual behavior.

Latin Americans tend to be honest about sex, however, (they can afford to be honest about it since it is so carefully regulated) and Latin American history is filled with stories of famous mistresses and lovers that are considered part of the national heritage.

Dom Pedro I, the emperor of Brazil in the beginning of the nineteenth century, took as his mistress a high-spirited woman of determined temper, the Marquesa de Santos from São Paulo, and built for her a beautiful little white house down the street from his palace at São Cristovão outside Rio de Janeiro. On the walls he had painted the marquesa in the role of various women, including a bare-breasted Brazilian Indian woman. The marquesa became so involved politically that she eventually was obliged to retire from politics. In true Latin style, Dom Pedro decided to marry—not the marquesa, of course—and, the perfect Latin romantic, swooned when he saw the delicate young virgin princess Amelia whom he would take as his bride. Recently the Brazilian government decided to restore the marquesa's house, which tradition insists had a tunnel running to it from the palace, and workers from the National Trust on Historic Monuments started eagerly peeling off the layers of paper trying to find the bare-breasted Indian girl-marquesa. And they did.

There has always been a great deal of flair in relations between the sexes in Latin America, and the sheer size and openness of the continent sometimes added to it. President José Manuel Balmaceda began the greatest sheep-raising industry in remote and lonely Tierra del Fuego, the southern tip of Chile, on February 19, 1893, when he gave a million acres of land to the husband of a Sarah Brown. It seems that the president had taken a fancy to Sarah, daughter of a Russian Jew who made good in Chile. The land was a payment to Sarah's husband for her ample favors.

Although it differs from country to country, and also from class to class, and although this is changing radically with the younger

generation, it is permissible—and in many countries considered far more natural than monogamy—for the traditional Latin man who can afford it to keep a mistress or even two or three. Often he is in love with her and often they have children—his "second family." She lives in a *casa chica* (literally little house) which he provides for her. To know a man's mistress and to spend time with them is to know the man intimately and to be considered his dearest, most special friend.

One Central American president, Anastasio "Tachito" Somoza of Nicaragua, is said to be madly in love with his mistress, though he has several children by his wife. His enemies applaud this, saying, "It is the only proof we have he is human."

In Bolivia the late President René Barrientos in the beginning lived openly with two wives—one in the capital, one in the second city. For a long time it was common knowledge. Both had the same number of children of the same ages, and when the second wife (second in influence) needed money she phoned the first wife. Eventually, however, it all became too open (*machismo* is a very delicate thing) and the public gossip became noticeably unfriendly toward the "arrangement." He divorced the second wife, and all was well. But every time he traveled around the country, he managed to spend a day—or a night—with her.

That the traditional patterns are breaking down is one of the most important things occurring in Latin American life today, as Latin men begin to observe more conventional sexual patterns. Today men have begun divorcing their original wives, as divorce becomes legalized in the countries which are undergoing intense revolutionary experiences. In Bolivia, for instance, divorce came into being with the 1952 revolution, which also disgorged from the lowest depths of society and flung to its apex an entire new class of Indian and *mestizo* leaders. Almost without exception, these leaders divorced their original wives and married women of a higher social class—a class whose status coincided with their newly acquired importance.

In the winter of 1967 there occurred another case symptomatic of the new thought. Puerto Rican governor Roberto Sánchez Vilella announced his intention to divorce his wife of thirty

years. He wanted to marry his judicial assistant, a young woman many years his junior. Under old *macho* rules, this would have been as unnecessary as it was impossible. Even if the *macho* man got involved emotionally, he would never consider upsetting his marital arrangement or, moreover, feel any need to legitimize any other romantic entanglement.

Nor did the old-style Latin American woman, no matter how much she suffered from society's "arrangements"—and psychiatrists tell us that contrary to popular myth, she suffered a great deal—demand that anything change. She was wisely counseled by her mother and aunts to accept "the way men are," with such advice always having a strong tinge of woman's-superior-and-spiritual-nature-versus-man's-weakness-and-carnal-nature about it. It was only an insult to the wife if her husband chose a mistress less attractive than she. It is probably true that many women preferred and today prefer the ordered, stable life of Latin society, in which the family is sacrosanct and indissolvable and where they know they will always be the respected, virginal wives and mothers, no matter what other women their husbands enjoy.

As in all Latin society, in the world of love and privilege that the *macho* has set up there are precise and rigid forms, and love is generally spontaneous only within these forms. Almost always, he observes the exigencies of social class, for it tells a man—and a woman—where he or she belongs, how to act and how, when and whom to love. Latin Americans don't *need* to be loved in the often desperate way that Americans need to be loved. Security is gained rather by obedience to traditional forms, to class and to the historic prerogatives or non-prerogatives of sex. Latins don't depend upon the approval of persons outside their family groups to the extent that the atomized American does.

Love comes usually within the already-established forms. A certain kind of love—with marriage, say—can almost never come if you are not of the proper class. So people gain security through performing well the accepted actions of their group, adhering to their class and their sex, and through celebration of the unchangeable "place."

Just as "place" is important in the forms of love, there are places

for love—physical places—which comply with the kind of society the *macho* has created. They serve him and his desires and his image of his world. These are places that tell a great deal about Latin American society; they show how specialized love is; they show how unromantically structured Latin society is. In North America, the places for love are fluid—any kind of love can take place anywhere—and motels, apartment houses, hotels, cars are interchangeable. The kinds of love are egalitarian, like the society. It is not like that in Latin America.

In addition to his home and his *casa chica*, the Latin American will often patronize the black nightclubs—those lightless, curtained places which proliferate from Mexico to Tierra del Fuego, but particularly in the "*macho* belt" that stretches from Mexico to the borders of Chile and Brazil. These "black nightclubs" are disconcerting at first to the North American who may innocently wander into them for a typical evening out and who considers that courting and lovemaking are more wisely done in a car or a bed.

These nightclubs are pitch black. Generally the headwaiter has a tiny flashlight which he uses to lead people to a table—that way they cannot see the others and the others cannot see them. In one of them, in Bolivia, the bottoms of the glasses glow so you can find your drink in the darkness. There is a certain surrealistic feeling in seeing the darkness pitted by floating, glowing glass bottoms. In Lima there is a club used largely by military officers and their mistresses where, when one opens the door to the bathroom, the light inside momentarily goes out.

One of the rules of *machismo* is that a man never takes his mistress to places where he might expose his wife to meeting her or even hearing about her. The dark nightclubs serve this specialized purpose. But there is a club in Mexico City which carries the ritual of the *macho* a step further. When you enter you first see a large, rather typical nightclub, with couples sitting at tables and a dance band playing. But there are seven rooms. In the second the lights are dimmer and there are open booths with low stools. In each subsequent room the lights grow lower, the darkness becomes more pervasive, the stools merge into couches and the couches into

beds, the booths become curtained and finally closed. It is the specialization of love—the stations of love—carried to its ultimate degree.

Latin strongmen have always made their lovelife public and prominent, and none more so than the Venezuelan dictator Marcos Pérez Jiménez. He built a huge, stolid "hotel" in the mountains surrounding Caracas, each floor with a great circular suite, for the sole purpose of entertaining the Cuban prostitutes whom he and his men particularly liked. But in addition to these peculiarly specialized places, the exploration would not be complete without a look at the *posadas*, as they are called in some countries (although it should be noted that *posadas* is the common name for perfectly reputable hostelries in many places). In Cuba these are actually motels, sometimes low and sometimes in apartment complexes, which rent by the hour. They are the common place for a man to take a woman, they cost a few dollars for a couple of hours and drinks are served through a rotating shelf that provides for complete privacy.

After the 1959 revolution in Cuba, the government planned to close down the *posadas*. But there was such a display of civic indignation that the Communist government retained them, spruced them up and now runs them. How does socialist morality jibe with lovemaking motels, with mirrors on the walls? No one says.

Implicit in the world of the traditional *macho* is a double view of women that divides them with admirable simplicity into good and bad. A man marries the good women and the bad women he enjoys. This, of course, imposes upon the woman a definition that originates in man's desires and psyche and which Latin women no longer accept with docility. Latin men also often consider that it is all woman's fault—a projection of the primordial idea that original sexual sin is lodged in some dark corner within the woman's being.

As Juan Lechín Oquendo, the former Bolivian vice president, leader of the volatile tin miners and a *macho* par excellence, said one day in his laconic way: "I was seduced for the first time by a servant girl when I was five, again when eight by a girl fifteen, a

virgin. I am a man who was corrupted by women." Though Lechín is known for his success with women (he once refused to join an insurrection because he was with a woman he liked—something that gained him admiration from all sectors), he is typically *macho:* he is not above insisting that the women maintain "standards." "If the West falls, it will be because of the degeneration of the standards of women," the tall, handsome, sloe-eyed Lechín told me once. "Women can't have the sexual freedom of a man. Russia started, and went back to strict morality." As to his own responsibility, he answered simply, "I only do what any man would do who has my chances."

The *macho's* relations with women, however, are not so simple as they may at first seem to the outsider. For although in society's terms, the man dominates his woman, he himself is most often dominated by his mother. The brutal Dominican dictator Generalissimo Rafael Leonidas Trujillo, who ruled bestially from 1931 to 1961 in the Dominican Republic, used women as cynically as any man in Latin American history. He had mistress after mistress and was pathologically incapable of keeping up any real relationship with any one woman. It was considered an honor for Dominican families to take their daughters to *el jefe* to be deflowered; and his sexuality seemed to know no bounds. "Nice girls"—*semiseñoritas,* they called them—who had fallen some hot Dominican night were kept in government jobs and given on a nightly basis to visiting American congressmen, a good number of whom were on Trujillo's payroll.

But like all real *machos,* the little, squat, squint-eyed dictator who tortured men casually in his dungeons across the Ozama River, had one woman in his life he adored: his mother. She was a wizened little woman who had been abysmally mistreated by his father, an errant sexual roamer. As is typical with traditional Latin men, the first thing Trujillo would do after work was visit his mother. When he was assassinated in 1961, he was busily erecting a statue to her on the spot where he was born in the town of San Cristóbal. The thirty-foot-high pedestal on which she was to be enthroned still stands, now defaced with vulgar scrawlings.

I recall once in Lima watching a young newspaper editor who

was the soul of *machismo*. In his office he ordered people here and there with that special peremptoriness of the Latin man. Then one day he told me why he had not gone to Bolivia to cover what would have been that active country's 180th revolution.

"I was dying to go," he said. Then he added, with both disgust and admiration blended in his voice, "My mother!" I must have looked puzzled. "I was all packed," he continued, "and she carried on something terrible. She cried and cried. She said, 'Do you want to kill me? Do you want to kill me? Then go!'" I must have looked a little bemused, for he said then, irately, "Well, did you want me to kill her?"

But if the key element to understanding the *macho* is his sexual behavior and his attitude toward women—mother, wife, mistress —another, and closely related, is his attitude toward power. For if we seek what the *macho's* attitudes do to politics in Latin America, we find the innermost core of the entire problem of political instability in that wildly mercurial continent.

There is a saying in Spanish, *Hay gobierno? Yo soy contra.* It means literally, "Is there a government? (Or: Is there authority?) I am against it." In Mexico, one of Benito Juárez's closest associates, a loyal general who had fought beside him, suddenly vanished when Juárez became president. When Juárez asked about him, his secretary informed him, "I'm sorry to have to tell you this, Citizen President; the general has just come out against you because you're in the government now."

In Latin American politics, it has been not the man who seeks to unite and to compromise and to heal wounds who was admired but rather the man who wielded total power—that classic Spanish type, the *caudillo* or strongman. Power could not be shared; it could not be dissolved in that curious Anglo-Saxonism, compromise. "It is not considered *macho* to heed the council of others," Dr. Alfonso Millan, probably Mexico's most respected psychiatrist, has explained. "In politics, as in the family, the father is not criticized openly." He sees *machismo* as "an almost neurotic compensation" for feelings of inferiority, personal and national. He further classifies it as "the admiration of power" and says that as a result "men often receive admiration not in proportion to

what they deserve as individuals but in proportion to the power they wield. When they lose power, they lose admiration."

With political *machismo*, to oppose is to fight to the death, and to lose is to begin, at that very moment, plans to annihilate the winner. Latin Americans do not lose gracefully. Neither in sports nor in politics do they accept defeat, saying, "The best man won . . ." Latin men, indeed, are incapable of losing, for loss means diminution as a man; every contest is an attempt to justify one's existence and one's power in the world.

In the United States, at various crucial times in its existence, men of both political parties have linked together to put through the legislation and reforms needed to enable the country to survive. Because of political *machismo*, this is not possible in Latin America. It is typical that today with the masses of people in every Latin country having expressed over and over, with the vote, their desire for representative government and social reform, change is stymied because of *Hay gobierno? Yo soy contra.*

If this were the only principle at play, of course, the continent would be forever locked in a clash of absolute wills. There have to be ways to get around it, and there are. Part of the ritual of *machismo* is for a man's friends to plead with him in moments of intense confrontation and to beg him "for our sakes, for your children's sake, for your mother's sake, for your country's sake not to go the whole way." It is common to see two men about to fight, and each one finally led away by his friends. His *macho* comes out intact, for he has done something greater than rise to a confrontation: he has responded to the cries of friendship.

I recall a dinner table conversation in the Hotel Sucre Palace in La Paz, Bolivia, after Victor Paz Estenssoro had been deposed from the presidency in 1964. Three men were drinking heavily, and one, a former Paz politician, was saying drunkenly, "And I still say Victor Paz was the best president this country ever had . . ." He was becoming unruly when the other man started appealing to him: "If you weren't such a good friend, I would feel obliged to do something, but you are such a good friend . . . the ties of friendship are the only thing that keep me from taking action . . . but you are a friend, a real friend." Everyone was

saved, and the three walked out with their arms around one another's shoulders.

Politically, too, "ways out" have been found for the absolute confrontations of *machismo*. Attempt after attempt has been made to curb this destructive, runaway horn-locking through devising "solutions" that will control it, by imposing, usually after times of bloodshed and tribulation, rules that will control the excesses of individualism and male ego.

The most successful "solution" of this sort was Mexican, arrived at after the bloody revolution which began in 1910 in which more than a million people lost their lives. It was the one-party solution that other countries have tried to copy and in which one party expresses the will of the revolution and, therefore, the will of the people. A president rules for only one term and he is chosen from the bowels of the party, by horse trading and negotiation; the power plays are not in public, so destruction need not be the ego's revenge for losing.

Before the election, *the* candidate is coughed up from the insides of the party and presented full-blown to the people, which gives its approval ceremonially to the new interpreter of the revolution and of the people. He is the father of the people and he is never criticized, for that would bring the destructive needs back into play. But he cannot keep himself in power; his power is relative. He is not permitted, under any circumstances, to see himself as the indispensable man, for he has accepted the solution of the revolution which says that only the revolution is indispensable. After one term, another man is suddenly coughed up; they have molded *machismo* to a new idea—*machismo* serving the ideals and the solution of the revolution.

Uruguay is another country which, at a crucial time in its history, rose above and out of itself to find a "solution" to Latin underdevelopment, backwardness and *machismo*. Uruguay, which came to be considered a model of order and progress, was traditionally a country of frontier gaucho brawling and political instability. Then in 1903 there came to the presidency a highly unusual man, José Batlle y Ordóñez. Batlle, a staunch democrat and constitutionalist, traveled to Europe and looked at Switzerland, where he got

the idea that subordinating the president in the political structure would be the panacea for Uruguay's ills—*caudillismo*, which is simply another word for *machismo*. He urged that Uruguay do away with the office of president and substitute a "collegiate executive," in effect, that Uruguay be ruled by committee instead of strongman.

The full transition from the one-man presidency to a nine-man ruling council did not come until 1951, but Batlle did succeed in diminishing the president's powers, and he created the famed Uruguayan welfare state, where workers retired at full pay at age fifty and there was no illiteracy or real poverty. Women could get pensions after a few years' work, if they had children. Unemployment was taken up by massive public employment.

By the 1960s, however, the "solution" began to sour, drained by its inflexibility and by the burdensome mass of unproductive social welfare laws. Of 380,000 on the public payroll, many simply did not show up for work, and the Uruguayans joked that a government worker had to get to work early to get a seat. "Uruguay is the largest office in the world that qualifies as a republic," the wags said. Once I met a charming young middle-class couple, both high-school educated, who were living in a rude board house with a dirt floor on the outskirts of Montevideo. They had built it themselves and had moved out from their city apartment house. With half of the husband's salary taken for welfare benefits, they had no money left to pay rent.

There was no flexibility built into the Uruguayan "solution." It signified again the Latins' enormous ability to rise to great occasions and find answers to complex problems; and it signified the inability to build the kinds of institutions, with intrinsic flexibility, that allow them to evolve. In the '60s the Uruguayans voted for the return of the presidential system, in a desperate effort to put the economy—riddled by a "benefits only" socialism, with little state planning to continue a sound economy—back on its feet.

Both the Uruguayan and the Mexican solutions were and are only temporary solutions, yet they creak on. The solution that turned out to be the most tragic was Bolivia's, for that was a

country that had a total social and political revolution in 1952 and then allowed itself to fall back into the abyss.

There were four men who made the revolution of 1952, the second (next to Mexico) great social revolution in Latin America —Victor Paz Estenssoro, Juan Lechín Oquendo, Hernán Silas Suazo and Walter Guevara Arze. They were brilliant men, as attractive as you will find in recent Latin American history and idealistic to the extent one can be idealistic in a country as brutal as Bolivia. Under them the world changed. The Indians, descendants of the Incas, who had lived the most slavish lives in Latin America (they mined the great silver mountain at Potosí), took over the lands from the big landowners and began to get fat on their own crops. The tin mines were nationalized, the government became openly a people's government, and massive settlement of the eastern regions was begun. And there was an understanding, a "solution." "We were going to go the Mexican way," Walter Guevara told me fifteen years later, when it had all collapsed from the sheer imperatives of Latin ego. "Each of us was to rotate the presidency."

Under the party, the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement or MNR, they began taking their turns. First Paz, a bespectacled, deceptively scholarly looking man who had been the intellectual leader of the revolution. Things were going well. Then Silas, an emotional, dedicated man, for he was second-in-line.

Things were still going well when in 1960 political *machismo* began reasserting itself. It was Guevara's turn, but Paz said, "No." He himself must be president again. He was the only one to lead the country, the indispensable man. Paz's men trailed Guevara's men and left them hanging from light fixtures; Guevara himself was hounded from attic to attic. The "solution" was broken at that moment, but it took four more years for the men of the revolution to devour each other. For Paz was not satisfied with just one more term, he wanted still more. He changed the constitution so he could be elected once more, and he got himself in again in 1964, which was to have been Lechín's period to serve.

One of the things Latin Americans will not stand for—and another example of the basically democratic reaction of Latin Ameri-

cans—is *prorroguismo* or *continuismo*, a man's continuing himself in power after his time. And this time it was all over. In the fall of 1964, the three he had double-crossed united to throw Paz out. And the country sank back into the bottomless abyss of political savagery, with each leader vying for absolute power for himself.

This is *macho* politics and Latin America is rife with monuments to it. One of the most dramatic is in the cemetery of Guatemala City, where barefoot little boys suffer the cost of the political savagery with no schools, no future: all they can do is sell water to mourners at five *centavos* a can. If you walk through the cemetery, you see the monument to Colonel F. Javier Arana, hero of the right, assassinated in the 1940s (assassin never apprehended), another to Mario Méndez Montenegro, hope of the democratic left in the 1960s, found mysteriously killed in 1965 (case never solved) . . . Others were luckier—they escaped into exile. One of them, General Miguel Ydígoras Fuentes (president of Guatemala from 1958–63), sat in his exile house in neighboring San Salvador one day going down the list of Guatemalan presidents in this century. "Not one was not either exiled or shot," he said, smiling a bittersweet smile. "Being president of Guatemala, being president in these countries—it is not a very good job."

The *macho* man who looks so romantic to much of the outside world is not looked upon as romantic by his most intelligent fellow Latins, who more brilliantly than anyone—and more devastatingly—have analyzed him. The Mexican poet-philosopher Octavio Paz, wrote: "One word sums up the aggressiveness, insensitivity, invulnerability and other attributes of the *macho:* power. It is force without the discipline of any notion of order; arbitrary power, the will without reins and without a set course."

To Paz, as to most of the others who have studied the *macho*-style man and written about him, the *macho* engenders hostility and hatred in his sons, who then turn to the mother and, embarrassed and confused by her humiliation, become *machos*—authoritarians—themselves and complete the cycle. "The essential attribute of the *macho*—power—almost always reveals itself as a capacity for wounding, humiliating, annihilating," Paz says. "Nothing is more natural, therefore, than his indifference toward

the offspring he spawns . . . He is power isolated in its own potency, without relationship or compromise with the outside world. He is pure incommunication, a solitude that devours itself and everything it touches."

To Paz, the woman is to the *macho* the humiliated one, the creature the *macho* splits open—and anyone who opens himself to others, sexually, emotionally, politically, is despised. Life and the human being must be closed and safe. The verb *chingar* in Spanish is used to denote the woman's despised state. *Chingar*, he says, "is to do violence to another. The verb is masculine, active, cruel; it stings, wounds, gashes, stains. And it provokes a bitter, resentful satisfaction . . . To the Mexican there are only two possibilities in life; either he inflicts the actions implied by *chingar* on others or else he suffers them himself at the hands of others. This conception of social life as combat fatally divides society into the strong and the weak."

The background of *machismo* is not only in the Hispanic tradition but also in the New World experience, for it was here that the conquistadores came, in effect, to rape the land in their predatory lust. They literally did rape the Indian women, thus producing the new race of Latin American men who so often feel themselves the consequence of such raping. They lust after the figure of the father, the rapacious conquistador, yet they also hate and abhor him. For the figure of the mother there is sympathy and love, yet also the image of the victim, the figure of powerlessness. The man desires her largely as a mother to his children, and the more children he can have, the more a man he considers himself.

Dr. Humberto Rotundo of Peru, one of the most distinguished psychiatrists in Latin America, insists that Latin women do not like their role and that it causes them deep problems. "What the double standard does is it creates in women the devaluation of men," he says. A Latin American university woman insists that the "typical *macho* likes politics and sports better than sex, which probably he fears though he talks women all day. *Machismo* is the attitude of an incomplete man. It is the pampered boy who has never grown up. It is a form of immaturity, of underdevelopment. Our whole culture suffers from it. Perhaps that is why it is

so hard for us to develop stable political and social institutions."

Where, then, is the "romance" of the Latin American man? Where the romantic Latin of pictures, songs and poems? Where the man who appears so sure of himself, so elegant, so proud?

If we take "romantic" to mean the extravagantly ideal, the *macho* is the most unromantic man in the world. He has ordered his life in the most cynical way possible, in the way least responsive to man and man's possibilities. He is driven not to love but to conquest; oriented not to the drive for unity and community among men, but to predatory apartness. Totally uncontrolled in physical passion, when it comes to spiritual love he is as coldly calculating as the most parsimonious Prussian burgher balancing his accounts. When it comes to marriage he weighs class, status and gain on a careful scale.

There is the wife for child-bearing and raising, and there are the women outside the family for carnal pleasures, for the symbolic ripping open. He is the ultimate man of appetite—but ironically he probably is a man who rarely enjoys that appetite because it always must serve his own ego.

In the past the *macho* has been the Latin American ideal, and he is one of the major reasons why Latin America has never amounted to anything. *Machos* do not work together. *Machos* are not real patriots because they use instead of help. *Machos* are incapable of selfless dedication, of sharing power, of political gallantry. When they lose, their instinct is to kill. When they conquer, their instinct is to gloat. When they love, their instinct is to use. They are incapable of long-term work, of scientific experiment, of the patient investigation that builds civilizations. They cannot acknowledge defeat, and they spend their days crying "fraud" about the winner and plotting the downfall of those who do succeed. They are incapable of anything not immediately rewarded by sexual pleasure, unfettered power or social adulation.

They can be charming, but they are men who inflict and hurt and humiliate. Perhaps worst of all, they are men who are incapable of creating modern societies.

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U. S.-PANAMANIAN RELATIONS SINCE 1941*

Since 1941 United States relations with Latin American countries have fluctuated between the official cordiality of wartime cooperation, which provided the basis for the Organization of American States and the Rio Treaty, and deep-seated hostility and malaise, which erupted in the Nixon visit and in Castro's revolution, as well as in more recent unpleasant incidents. Latin American leaders have contended that the United States violated its wartime commitments, particularly in the economic sphere, by concentrating on the recovery of Europe in the first postwar decade and on Asian upheaval in the second. The history of U.S.-Panamanian relations since 1941 provides an excellent case study in order to test the validity of these contentions.[1]

I

During the 1930s, relations between the United States and Panama

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[1] The historian of recent United States-Panamanian relations must rely largely on the public record, for Department of State material on the years since 1945 is closed to the researcher. However, the Panamanian government's *Memorias* extend into the 1960s and provide an official view, albeit a biased one. The complete story cannot be told until State Department unpublished material is made available, but a partial summary can be obtained in official government publications, particularly Congressional hearings, and public statements of the presidents. In addition, the

improved considerably.[2] In 1931–1932 a nationalistic movement in the republic paved the way to power for Harmodio Arias, Jr., an international lawyer and author of a 1911 treatise on the Panama Canal who pledged honesty in government and a greater share of canal benefits. In October 1933 Arias visited Washington in order to impress upon Franklin D. Roosevelt the rectitude of Panamanian claims. From the discussions Arias emerged with a commitment to alter the 1903 canal treaty, which had reduced Panama to the status of a protectorate. Following 110 sessions in 1934–1936, the two nations signed the treaty of 1936 (Hull-Alfaro Treaty), which abrogated the Panamanian protectorate, adjusted the canal annuity, and promised Panamanians greater economic opportunities in Zone business.

Although the treaty remained unratified until mid-1939, the promise of a better deal for Panama produced a significant improvement in diplomatic relations. The cordiality was marred somewhat in 1939–1941 by an insistent American military, which demanded long-term defense leases in the republic, and the equally insistent Panamanian administration of Arnulfo Arias (Harmodio's brother), who refused to approve the lease agreements until the United States pledged extensive economic assistance to Panama. Arias, who became president in October 1940, was ousted in a coup d'etat a year later. His successor was more tractable, and the defense leases were finally signed in May 1942.

The wartime defense sites agreement was never satisfactorily worked out. As conceived, the compact signed on 18 May 1942 was a temporary lease of national domain to the United States in the interest of canal and hemispheric defense. In order to protect future military necessities, however, the American negotiators had insisted all along that the termination of the leases would occur "one year after the date on which the definitive treaty of peace which brings about the end of the present war shall have entered into effect."

Although article IV asserted the Panamanian retention of sovereignty over the bases and article V reiterated the temporary character of the lease,[3] the wording implied commitments and obligations that future Panamanian governments found reason to regret. This was especially true of the

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Eisenhower Library provided on microfilm a substantial amount of unpublished material dealing with the "flag" issue.

[2] For the history of U.S.-Panamanian affairs in the 1930s see Lester D. Langley, "Negotiating New Treaties with Panama, 1936," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 48 (May 1968): 220–233; and "The World Crisis and the Good Neighbor Policy in Panama, 1936–1941," *The Americas* 24 (October 1967): 137–152.

[3] Defense Sites Agreement, 18 May 1942, in Diógenes A. Arosemena, ed., *Documentary Diplomatic History of the Panama Canal* (Panama, 1961), pp. 453–467.

words "definitive treaty of peace," which meant something more than a mere cessation of hostilities. During the original negotiations, the Panamanian commissioner, Victor F. Goytía, had taken the position that the army might occupy the bases only for the duration of the emergency, which would end automatically with demobilization. When this stipulation was broached, Ambassador Edwin Wilson had acknowledged it as advantageous for the United States, which would not demobilize until after the wartime danger passed.[4]

Thus, while granting defense cooperation, the Panamanian government continued throughout the war to advance its own interpretation of the original lease and to press for the economic assistance demanded by Arnulfo Arias. A second agreement of 18 May 1942 had stipulated that the United States would transfer control of water and sewage facilities of Panama City to the republic, relinquish real estate owned by the Panama Railroad Company, and pay for Panama's share of the Río Hato highway. As a rebuke to what had been decried as "blackmailing" tactics by Arias, the Department of State offered this aid not as an official promise for the defense sites but in consideration of Panamanian cooperation in the protection of the canal. Like the defense sites, these promises constituted an executive agreement. Interpretations of the second agreement varied as widely as those of the first, for the Panamanian government refused to distinguish between executive agreement and treaty, looking upon the 18 May accords as solemnly binding as a treaty.[5]

Eventually, the commitments were honored, but never to Panamanian satisfaction. The United States appeared to be much more concerned with canal defense than isthmian economic development. The stationing of thousands of American troops scattered across the nation gave credence to fears that Panama had been transformed into an occupied state. When the republic's ambassador, E. Jaén Guardia, objected to the construction of a Canal Zone airport for a commercial aviation company, arguing that such facilities had little to do with canal defense and that Panama needed air traffic, he was informed that the new airport was indeed a wartime emergency and, in any case, Panama was ill-suited for commercial aviation.[6]

The Japanese surrender of September 1945 served merely to intensify

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[4] Víctor F. Goytía to Edwin Wilson, 5 February 1942, Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1942*, 6: 579–580; Wilson to Secretary of State, 9 March 1942, ibid., pp. 584–591.

[5] H. W. Briggs, "Treaties, Executive Agreements, and the Panama Joint Resolution of 1943," *American Political Science Review* 37 (August 1943): 691.

[6] Goytía, *Función geográfica del istmo* (Panamá, n.d.), pp. 135–136; E. Jaén Guardia to Secretary of State, 23 March 1942, *FR, 1942*, 6: 619–622; Wilson to Secretary of State, 21 April 1942, ibid., pp. 622–626.

the defense sites controversy. During hostilities, Panamanian officials had purposely toned down the harsher language of their dispatches, partly because of wartime camaraderie and partly because of the realization that the American government would not budge from its stated diplomatic position. News of the *Missouri* capitulation now brought angry demands from the Panamanians that the war was over and therefore American troops were obligated to evacuate the bases within one year. It appeared to make little difference to Panamanian negotiators that the Japanese surrender was technically not the "definitive treaty of peace" prescribed in the 18 May 1942 accord. From Panama City came a request for American evacuation. Instead of complying immediately, writes a Panamanian diplomatic historian, the Department of State waited for eleven months to send an official reply. When the American rejection arrived, the isthmian government was shocked to discover in it a proposal for a new defense sites convention.[7]

The president of Panama, Enrique Jiménez, was inclined to accept the new American offer, which reiterated the theme of isthmian defense, the temporary character of the agreement, joint jurisdiction over the bases, and a restatement of national sovereignty. While negotiations over the new agreement continued, however, Jiménez announced that the continued occupation of the sites after the "termination" of the 1942 lease (2 September 1946) would be in violation of Panamanian sovereignty. On September 4 he demanded the return of the bases. Though obviously annoyed, the U.S. Army began the laborious process of compliance, and by mid-September approximately 100 installations were being evacuated.[8]

Once signed, the new defense sites agreement encountered almost overwhelming opposition in the National Assembly and in the Panamanian national press. On 3 September the Assembly had passed unanimously a resolution demanding the immediate evacuation of the bases by the American military. As the government negotiated, the press launched its attack, decrying the new accords as a sell-out and as an illegal cession of national territory. As the legislators debated, Ricardo Alfaro, a former member of the Panamanian Treaty Commission, resigned his post as foreign minister as a protest against the administration. Students threatened a nationwide strike if the National Assembly voted favorably.[9]

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[7] Ernesto Castillero P., *Panamá y los Estados Unidos* (Panamá, 1964), p. 302 passim.

[8] Enrique Jiménez, *Para la historia; breves capítulos de la gestión política y administrativa de un gobernante liberal* (Panamá, 1951), pp. 25–27; the *New York Times*, 4 September, 10:3; 13 September, 16:8.

[9] Ibid., 3 September, 8:2; 11 December 1947, 28:3; Goytía, *Función geográfica*, p. 243.

On 22 December the Assembly unanimously rejected the defense sites arrangement with the United States. Years later, Jiménez wrote sarcastically that the legislative body would have approved it had the members been less fearful of offending public opinion and inciting a street eruption.[10] The opposition, however, acted less from fear than from the conviction, shared by most Panamanians, that the agreements violated the 1936 treaty, effectively denied Panamanian control over the bases, and laid the foundation for an occupation army and the creation of "little Canal Zones" throughout the republic.[11]

II

The political scene, which had shown little political violence since the ouster of Arias in October 1941, erupted once more in a coup. In November 1949 ex-President Arnulfo Arias, with the assistance of José Antonio Remón, chief of the National Police, successfully regained office. The former executive maintained that he was rightfully claiming the seat that had been denied him by the 1948 election. His enemies quickly fled. Two of them, former Presidents Adolfo de la Guardia and Enrique Jiménez, found sanctuary in the Canal Zone before Arias' police closed in.[12]

Once safely reinstalled, Arias was considerably less anti-American in his utterances than he had been in 1940–1941. He swore to defend the canal in wars "hot or cold," and he later averred his fidelity to U.S. policies in Korea. At the same time, the new president resurrected economic grievances that had lain dormant since the war. In 1950 the Panamanian government presented a list of disputed points, which included:

> 1. Studies for a bridge over, or a tunnel under, the canal at Balboa, the Pacific terminus.
> 2. Completion of the study authorized in 1940 to investigate the contraband trade between the Canal Zone and Panama.
> 3. Fulfillment of a 1942 American commitment to pay one third of the maintenance costs of those Panamanian roads used often by the army.

The last point dealt with the heated question of equality of employment for Panamanians in Zone labor. President Roosevelt had stated that the 1936 treaty would remove discriminatory practices, but employment procedures in the Zone remained unfavorable to Panama. The military command, the note said, has stated that the employment stipulations did not apply to civil-

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10 Jiménez, *Para la historia*, p. 30.

11 Castillero P., *Panamá y los EE. UU.*, p. 302 passim. Final withdrawal of troops was not completed until February 1948. The *New York Times*, 21 February 1948, 3:7.

12 The *New York Times*, 25 November 1949, 1:5; 27 November, 1:4.

ians who worked for the army. Panama contended that all who labored in the Zone should have equal employment opportunity.[13]

The overthrow of Arias two years after he had seized power failed to interrupt the Panamanian quest for solution of the 1950 demands. The unseating of Arias came after he arbitrarily annulled the Constitution of 1946 by executive decree. Possibly he wished to reinstall the fundamental law of 1941, which had been his own creation. In any event, he agreed to resign only after a pitched battle in the streets between his opponents and the *arnulfistas*, an affray that left three dead and forty wounded. Arias might have won in the power struggle had it not been for the decision of the national police, Panama's army, to throw in their lot with the demonstrators. On 11 May 1951 the president and his wife were incarcerated in the same jail Arias had occupied in 1941.[14]

After a year of interim executives, the electorate went to the polls and chose José Antonio Remón as president for four years. "Chichi" Remón, the power behind the throne since 1947, would never serve out those years, for an assassin's bullet would cut him down in 1955. He would, however, obtain a new canal treaty with the United States.

Remón seemed determined to make a new treaty the grand triumph of his administration, as Harmodio Arias had done in 1933–1936. In October 1953 Remón arrived in Washington on an official visit. He gradually overcame White House hesitancy by presenting to President Dwight D. Eisenhower a lucid, dignified plea for Panama's case. Eisenhower emerged from the interview with Remón convinced of the latter's sincerity and of his republic's economic rights in the Canal Zone. In a White House press release, Eisenhower announced that the two executives had agreed on the principles of 1933 (a reference to the Roosevelt-Arias accord on Zone employment) and of 1936 (the Hull-Alfaro Treaty) as a basis for adjustment. The stipulations of those previous arrangements, the press release stated, must be strengthened "to the end that there should be an equitable benefitting of the two nations which made possible the construction of the canal as well as the enabling of Panama to take advantage of the market offered by the Canal Zone and the ships transiting the Canal." Moreover, the two executives announced that "the principle of equality of opportunity and treatment must have full effect in regard to the citizens of Panama and the United States employed in the Canal Zone. . . ."[15]

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[13] Ibid., 22 May 1950; Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, in Arias, *Mensaje . . . 1° de Octubre de 1950* (Panamá, 1950), p. 19; Memorandum, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, *Memoria, 1950, Anexos* (Panamá, 1950), L/1-L/5.

[14] The *New York Times*, 10 May 1951, 1:4; 11 May, 1:4.

[15] *Visión*, 30 October 1953; White House Press Releases, 1 October 1953, Copy

The resulting Treaty of 1955[16] was as significant in its economic benefits as the one of 1936. In the Hull-Alfaro Treaty, the annuity payment had been changed from 250,000 to 436,000 dollars (or balboas) in order to compensate Panama for the depreciation in American currency after 1934. Thus, in effect, there had been no annuity increase in 1936. The 1955 treaty, however, added a substantial supplement to the canal rental by raising the figure to 1,930,000 balboas (or dollars). Article II allowed the republic to impose some taxes on the income of persons working in the Canal Zone, *excepting* American military personnel, U.S. citizens, and other residents in the Zone who were not citizens of Panama. This excluded, of course, a large number of people, but it did permit the Panamanian government to tax its own citizens who worked for the American government. It also represented a step forward in the republic's assertion of authority in the Zone.

The next article, as significant psychologically as economically, terminated the monopoly in perpetuity that the Panama Railroad held on transisthmian communication. In article IV the U.S. government gave up its treaty right to administer sanitation codes in Panama City and Colón; in article V it relinquished certain lands within the republic. Articles VI, VII, and VIII redefined boundary lines between the Canal Zone and Panama and marked out lands to be used for military maneuvers by the United States Army. In consideration of the abrogation of the monopoly held by the railroad, Panama agreed to waive its own rights under article XIX of the 1903 treaty, by which the republic had free transportation on the railroad for its troops.

More importantly, articles XI and XII severely restricted the operations of the commissaries. Beginning in 1957, the Zone commissaries were to cease the sale of goods (except for such minor items as tobacco, meals, or candy) to persons who were not U.S. citizens and did not reside in the Zone. Subject to the above modifications, of course, the treaties of 1903 and 1936 remained in force.

Although the Treaty of 1955 required less than a year of ratification (compared to three years for its predecessor), it encountered formidable U.S. opposition. Many congressmen had always been of the opinion that only American citizens should occupy technical or administrative posts in the Zone. Both Congress and the president received numerous petitions opposing concessions to Panama. The most persistent opponent to the treaty was the United States Citizens Association, which represented the 3,800

in Office Files 52, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas (hereinafter cited as DDE).

[16] *Treaties and Other International Acts Series 3297.*

Americans employed in the Zone. Citing the higher costs of living brought on by the 1951 decision to economize canal operations through higher rents and taxes, the U.S.C.A. bemoaned the low morale of employees. The canal, it proclaimed, should be run by "loyal and efficient Americans." More strident in his analysis of the Panamanian situation was Earl Harding, a frequent critic of canal policy, who warned in the National Economic Council Bulletin that relinquishment of "American sovereign rights in the Canal Zone is unthinkable." [17]

As a matter of fact, the Eisenhower administration emphasized that the treaty merely granted Panama deserved economic privileges or transferred to Panamanian jurisdiction certain functions, such as sanitary activities in Panama City and Colón, that were no longer considered necessary for canal maintenance. Beginning in July 1953 Panama had already started to manage those public services relating to water supply, plumbing inspection, garbage collection, and street cleaning. For clarification of those items relating to employment, the two governments had attached a "Memorandum of Understanding" to the text of the treaty. A portion of it read as follows:

> Subject to the enactment of the necessary legislation by the Congress, the following precepts are set forth in item 1 to govern the labor practices of all United States agencies in the Canal Zone:
> (a) All positions will have a basic wage scale, the same for all employees eligible for appointment thereto without regard to United States or Panamanian citizenship. . . .
> (b) Legislation will be sought for uniform application to the Civil Service Retirement Act to all United States and Panamanian citizen employees of this Government in the Canal Zone.
> (c) Equality of opportunity will be afforded to Panamanian citizens for employment in all United States Government positions in the Canal Zone for which they are qualified except where security factors serve to make undesirable the employment of non-United States citizens. . . .
> (d) Panamanian citizens will be afforded opportunity to participate in such training programs as may be conducted for employees by United States agencies in the Canal Zone.[18]

What the Senate really wanted was reassurance that the treaty stipulations did not impair the military interests of the United States in the Canal

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[17] United States Citizens Association to the President, "Résumé of the States of the United States Citizen Employee of the Panama Canal," n.d., in DDE, OF 52; Earl Harding, in *National Economic Council Bulletin* (15 August 1954), p. 1.

[18] Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Hearings on the Panama Treaty* (Washington, 1955), pp. 6, 12–13.

Zone. The definition of such interests was itself a debatable subject, for United States citizen employees contended that the treaty clauses eroded "the sovereignty of the United States over the Canal." In denying advantages to the Americans in the Zone, representatives of the U.S.C.A. declared, the Congress seemed to be inviting the less efficient and less industrious employee, who could not compete in the United States, to operate "such a vital and complex installation as the Panama Canal." The Metal Trades Department of the American Federation of Labor objected to the language of particular clauses because interpretation might lead to a diminution of American employees and an impairment of job security.[19] Eventually, of course, one senator resurrected the familiar question about "sovereignty" in the Zone. Assistant Secretary of State Henry Holland erased any doubts regarding that issue, as the following colloquy revealed:

> QUESTION: As I [Senator Wiley] understood from you, Secretary Holland, there is nothing in this treaty that would in the slightest degree depreciate all the attributes of sovereignty that we possess.
> ANSWER: That is true; and so true is it, that in the course of the negotiations the Panamanians advanced several small requests which, one by one, had considerable appeal, but all of which we refused, because we did not want to leave one grain of evidence that could a hundred years hence be interpreted as implying any admission by the United States that we possess and exercise anything less than 100 percent of the rights of sovereignty in this area.[20]

Nevertheless, despite Secretary Holland's strong reiteration of the hallowed "attributes of sovereignty," the 1955 treaty provided significant economic goals that, when fulfilled, would be as meaningful as the Taft Agreement of 1904 and the Hull-Alfaro Treaty of 1936.[21] The annuity was increased by $1,500,000; Panama was to receive property valued at $4,400,000 and gain greater access to the Canal Zone market. The bridge over the canal, promised in 1942, was still in the future, but the 1955 estimated cost amounted to $20,000,000, and the span would be infinitely more important to Panamanians than Americans.[22] Whether or not the treaty would dispel all the fears, both American and Panamanian, was a question also for the future.

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[19] Statements of L. R. Dilweg, Counsel, U.S.C.A., and of J. A. Brownlow, president, Metal Trades, A.F. of L., in ibid., pp. 78–79; 97–98, respectively.

[20] Quoted in ibid., p. 164.

[21] Such is the opinion of Isaías Batista Ballesteros, *El Drama de Panamá y América* (Panama, 1961), p. 81.

[22] Senate, Foreign Relations Committee, *Hearings on the Panama Treaty*, p. 56.

III

In several ways the Eisenhower administration facilitated Panama's economic opportunities in the Canal Zone following the ratification of the 1955 treaty. Under pressure to terminate unnecessary functions in the operation of the canal, the company closed down several businesses of marginal utility, including some meat-processing plants, an industrial laboratory, and an ice-making enterprise.[23] The Panamanian government, of course, wanted the discontinuance of a host of other activities considered unessential, but here the company won out in its bid to keep them open. In other areas the administration began to fulfill old promises. In July 1956 the Senate finally passed a measure authorizing funds for the construction of a bridge over the canal at Balboa. Congress generally disregarded the spirit of the 1955 treaty by inserting into the appropriations acts certain stipulations that only American citizens must be employed in particular types of Zone employment. Usually the president suspended these sections of the acts in order to comply with the treaty.[24]

The Suez crisis of 1956 gave Panama an opportunity to strengthen its position vis-à-vis the United States. The abrupt Egyptian seizure of the Suez Canal prompted many Panamanians to believe that a similar struggle against "colonialism" on the isthmus was unfolding and that under pressure the American government might release its firm grip on canal supervision. Indeed, those who had championed the Panamanian cause now could argue that it was in the interests of the United States and Egypt to surrender their power over canals in the promotion of world peace and commerce. Already isthmian nationalists were employing the example of Suez as a weapon against the Canal Zone establishment. In October 1956 President Ernesto de la Guardia, Jr., appeared before the National Assembly and bluntly declared that the treaties and accords signed with the United States from 1936, including the Eisenhower-Remón Treaty, failed to satisfy national aspirations. He vowed to assure Panamanian workers equality of employment with Americans in the Zone.

Almost two months later, as the United Nations debated the Middle East crisis, the Panamanian delegate to the United Nations, Aquilino Boyd, challenged the American government to prove that it dealt fairly with Panama in canal business. Citing statistics from the office of the Canal Zone governor, William Potter, Boyd strove to illustrate that the net receipts of

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[23] Mercer D. Tate, "Panama Canal and Political Partnership," *Journal of Politics* 25 (February 1963): 126–127.

[24] Assistant Secretary of State, Department of State, to Bureau of the Budget, 20 July 1956, 30 October 1956; Panama Canal Company to Bureau of the Budget, 17 June 1957; DDE.

the canal in the previous five years had amounted to almost $18,000,000, whereas the annuity paid to Panama during the same time had been $2,150,000. Proclaiming that Panama must enjoy the benefits from the canal in equal measure with the United States, Boyd condemned the Zone practice of using the geographic origin of the worker as a criterion for salaries and wages. "The only difference of salary that we accept as fair and non-discriminatory," Boyd went on, "was that of the skill or experience of the worker for each assignment."[25]

In delivering its criticism of canal policy, the Panamanian Foreign Ministry usually distinguished between Washington and its subordinates in the Canal Zone. The latter, claimed the minister of foreign affairs, were particularly loath to comply with prior restrictions and agreements. In 1958, the minister charged, the Canal Zone government purchased Ecuadorean rice, Danish dairy products, German and Dutch beer, and Australian meat in violation of stipulations that products bought for Zone consumption must be obtained in the United States and Panama. In the opinion of isthmian observers, the Canal Zone authorities interpreted the 1955 treaty provisions unilaterally in order to give them a prejudicial character. The purchase of "luxury" items from third countries was damaging to the national market that depended on Zone buying. Failure to implement the Treaty of 1955 produced increasing discontent within the republic, especially in Panama City and Colón, two cities that have always depended heavily on transisthmian trade and traffic. The Canal Zone, said President de la Guardia in October 1959, remained Panama's major problem.[26]

The next month witnessed the outbreak of serious rioting along the Canal Zone-Panamanian boundary. Ironically, the immediate cause of the disturbance was not the issue of employment so much as the Panamanian demand to fly the national flag in the Zone as a symbolic gesture of "titular sovereignty." During the 1955 treaty discussions Panama's negotiators, notably Dr. Octavio Fábrega, had tried unsuccessfully to obtain American approval to fly the Panamanian flag on ships transiting the canal (warships excepted) and at specified places in the Canal Zone. The designation of Spanish and English as official languages in the Zone was requested also to

[25] Ernesto de la Guardia, Jr., Speech, 1 October 1956, in de la Guardia, *Teoría y práctica de la democracia: conversaciones con el pueblo, 1955–60* (Panamá 1960), p. 42; Aquilino Boyd, speech, 23 November 1956, in Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, *Discursos pronunciados . . . Boyd* (Panama, 1956), pp. 15–17.

[26] Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, *Memoria, 1958: Parte Expositiva y Anexos* (Panama, 1958), pp. viii-ix, Miguel Moreno, Speech, 23 September 1959, in Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores. *Discurso pronunciado . . . Moreno* (Panama, 1959), pp. 20–21; "Panama Canal Troubles," *The Economist* 180 (September 1, 1956): 724; Ernesto de la Guardia, Jr., Message to National Assembly, 1 October 1959, in *Teoría y práctica*, pp. 222–228.

lend support to the claim of sovereignty. For fear of opening a Pandora's box of related questions, the Department of State refused the request. The treaty contained no reference to the matter, and for several years the issue aroused only periodical grumbling from the Panamanian side.

In 1959, however, Boyd and Professor Ernesto Castillero Reyes, a well-known historian and author of a standard text on the republic's history, resurrected the flag-flying scheme as a device to revive the sovereignty problem once more. Boyd was no street agitator. Trained as a lawyer, he had occupied important posts in the national government—assemblyman, ambassador to Mexico, delegate to the United Nations, and minister of Foreign Relations. His family pedigree was even more impressive, for he descended from Don Federico Boyd, one of the nation's founding fathers, and Dr. Augusto Boyd, a former chief executive. His enemies described him as a fanatic on canal disputes, and once he had sponsored a measure to extend territorial waters to twelve miles as a means of asserting domination over the approaching sea entrances to the canal. Boyd and Castillero R. chose 3 November for an announced peaceful march into the Zone to fly the flag. Zonians immediately decried the march as a cheap ruse to attract international attention, for Panama's colors had always flown throughout the American strip on 3 November, the republic's day of independence.[27]

Once the demonstrators arrived at Zone entrances, unfortunately, the situation quickly degenerated into a brawl. Each side blamed the other for initiating hostilities. Panamanian marchers charged that a Zone policeman trampled on the national flag that the students intended to hoist. In retaliation for this alleged misdeed, a crowd raced to the American embassy, pulled down the flag, and promptly tore it to shreds. Convinced that Boyd and his cohorts could not control their followers, Governor Potter ordered the sealing of Zone entrances. When the police attempted to repel the "invaders" with riot sticks, tear gas, and fire hoses, the demonstrators, now a mob, retaliated by hurling rocks and burning cars. It was soon apparent that the regular police could not hope to contain the Panamanians, and Potter requested army troops to guard the boundary. That night Panama was declared off limits to servicemen, and American civilians were warned by Potter not to enter the republic. The count of wounded at day's end was 120.[28]

Eisenhower was dismayed at the disappointing turn of events on the

[27] Thelma King, *El problema de la soberanía en las relaciones entre Panamá y los EE. UU.* (Panamá, 1961), p. 133; *Visión*, 20 November 1959, p. 18; the Panama *American*, 2 November 1959, p. 1.

[28] The *New York Times*, 4 November 1959, 1:3; 5 November 1:2; the Panama *American*, 4 November 1959, p. 1.

isthmus and stated in a press conference on 4 November that U.S.-Panamanian relations had been a "model" of cordiality. De la Guardia linked the outbreak to the failure of the United States to answer satisfactorily Panama's claims for a greater share of canal trade. In addition, the Panamanian executive maintained that two months before the riots occurred his government had warned the Department of State of dangerous "emotional reactions" among his countrymen because of frustrations in dealing with the Zone. Whatever the reason for the riots, editorialized the Panama *Star* and *Herald*, the results would only worsen American-Panamanian relations and bring untold economic loss.[29]

In the aftermath of violence, rational voices found few receptive ears. For practical reasons, Canal Zone officials momentarily stopped the purchase of foods processed in the republic, and this was immediately interpreted by Panamanians as economic reprisal for the 3 November demonstrations. The English-language *Star* and *Herald* blamed the riots on "Red-inspired troublemakers"; the Panamanian press indicted Governor Potter for careless inefficiency and callous indifference to the plight of Panama.[30] Several of the Panamanian newspapers were singularly irresponsible and incendiary in their handling of the incidents. One ran a vicious cartoon that portrayed dogs dressed as U.S. soldiers and holding signs that read: "Kill, Kill, the ——— Panamanian Patriots!" Still another cartoon (published on 11 November) of the same newspaper presented a caricature of Eisenhower, complete with horns and spouting fire, informing Potter that the White House was sending the plans of the "Hungary Operation" to the isthmus as a guideline for dealing with the Panamanians. Another newspaper on 17 November ran a cartoon that revealed a row of American artillery and missiles poised along the boundary. At their command was Potter, his head drawn above the body of a gorilla, proclaiming the "New Good Neighbor Policy: Panamanians, Communists, I dare you!"[31] In the National Assembly, the Panama *American* reported, Potter was denounced as a "bird of prey" and an "agent of American imperialism." Although the Panamanian press called for his ouster, the government made no official request for Potter's removal.[32]

In late November the violence was renewed when more demonstrators

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[29] The *New York Times*, 5 November 1959, 3:1; the Panama *Star* and *Herald*, 5 November 1959, pp. 1, 4.

[30] *Star* and *Herald*, 6 November, p. 1; 7 November, p. 4; the Panama *American*, 6 November, p. 8.

[31] *La Hora*, 5 and 11 November 1959; *La Nación*, 17 November; clippings in DDE, OF 52.

[32] The Panama *American*, 10 November 1959, p. 1; Bryce Harlow Memorandum, 17 November 1959, DDE, OF 52.

arrived at Zone gates and attempted to fufill the flag-flying mission. This time they were stopped by troops and members of the Panamanian National Police. The mobs, rebuffed, returned to the city but began looting stores and destroying foreign-owned businesses. For four ho · · during the evening of 29 November the Panamanian police battled the rioters and finally subdued them, but not until the mobs had crashed the heavy plate windows of the Chase Manhattan Bank.[33]

These violent incidents occurred when Eisenhower was on the verge of making what was in fact a courageous decision. During the month the president had been labelled a satanic fiend by several Panamanian newspapers, yet he was now preparing to make some concession to the nationalistic yearnings to fly the Panamanian flag in the Canal Zone as a symbol of the republic's "titular sovereignty." The subject was not new to the president, for in the summer of 1958 his brother, Dr. Milton Eisenhower, on a fact-finding tour of the hemisphere for the White House, had been informed in Panama that the flag question was an important one.[34] Evidently, the riots of November proved to be a catalyst, for on 1 December, in his weekly press conference, Eisenhower said that Panama deserved some "visual evidence of titular sovereignty." At the time he did not state specifically that the Panamanian flag would be flown.[35] In any event, this interpretation was assumed, and for the next several months the president grappled with the issue. The fears of many Americans that the erection of Panama's flag would be the initial step to a complete takeover of the Canal Zone and the canal were not dispelled by the editorials of *La Estrella*:

> As recently stated by President Ernesto de la Guardia, Jr., in an excellent speech we qualify as historic, the Panamanian flag should arrive at the Canal Zone with all the honors it deserves by right. We therefore do not doubt that when the moment arrives in which to give compliance to this national yearning, the flag of our country shall be received and saluted in the form already said. The extraordinary symbolism of this act, which will initiate a new era in the friendly relations of our country with the United States, demands that it be undertaken with supreme dignity.

Instead, many were angered at other editorials from the Panamanian press:

> *La Hora:* For the first time we agree with Public Enemy No. 2 of Panama (Congressman [Daniel] Flood) that if Panamanians gained their point in having the Panamanian flag fly in the Canal Zone, they would never stop in their demands.

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33 The *New York Times*, 29 November 1959, 1:2; 30 November, 1:6.
34 Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, *Memoria, 1958*, p. xiii.
35 The Panama *American*, 2 December 1959.

> *La Nación:* November 3 and 28 have passed and will go down in history as two dates of patriotism when the people launched themselves to plant the Panamanian flag in Panamanian territory. . . . Now there will be December 12, followed by December 22, and so on until all the Yankees are driven out of the Canal Zone and the Canal is nationalized.[36]

Eisenhower received a considerable amount of congressional and public opposition in 1960 to any proposal allowing Panamanians to fly the flag in the Zone. Generally, the Congress and the public believed that such an act, even as a gesture of good will, had legal consequences that would outweigh any possible advantage.[37] The president was asked to delay his decision pending an investigation of United States-Panamanian relations by the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Eisenhower did wait until September to authorize the announcement that the Panamanian and American flags would be flown together in Shaler Triangle, a plot of ground along the Zone boundary.[38]

Obviously annoyed, Congress attached an amendment to the annual appropriation act denying use of federal funds to pay for the erection of the new flagpole, but the costs were paid from the Emergency Fund of the President. Eisenhower's decision to allow the Panamanian flag to fly in one place in the Zone, a concession that he believed might satisfy the isthmian nationalists, failed to satisfy either Americans or Panamanians. The latter believed that the republic must assert ever stronger claims to running Zone affairs, and Americans (both in the Zone and in the States) were hostile to the grant. Out of 183 pieces of mail received by the White House in one period, only 3 favored the president's decision.[39]

Meanwhile, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs had been busily calling witnesses and conducting its own research of the events of the previous November. The published report of the inquiry attempted to answer critics of American policy and, above all, reassert the paramount strategic and economic utility of the canal. In reply to those who charged that the waterway was indefensible in a nuclear war, the committee called naval officers who testified that the canal might survive the first attack in a thermonuclear conflct and continue to be extremely useful in subsequent phases of the war. Some of the nation's aircraft carriers were too large for the locks, the report noted, but the *Polaris* and similar submarines could still transit the canal.

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[36] *La Estrella de Panama,* 12 December 1959; *La Hora,* 7 December 1959; *La Nación,* 3 December 1959; clippings in DDE, OF 52.

[37] This passage is based on contemporary letters in DDE, OF 52.

[38] White House Press Release, 17 September 1960, copy in DDE, OF 52.

[39] Mail Room Reports, DDE, OF 72-A-12.

In its rebuttal to Panamanian accusations that the canal did not pay a fair share to the republic's economy and actually caused the "distortion" of Panama's interior by attracting people to the terminal cities, the committee was quick to point out that in 1958, a year before the riots, Panama received one-sixth of its national income from the Zone. As for the second criticism, the report concluded that "long before the construction of the canal Panama's geographical setting favored activities connected with international trade, with the consequent concentration of population and political power in the terminal cities . . . and the virtual isolation and neglect of rural areas." Panama's economic imbalance was the fault of inadequate government planning. The United States had assisted the republic by granting almost $40,000,000 from 1945 to 1960 in the form of technical aid, special appropriations for sanitation, voluntary relief, and two-thirds of the construction costs of the inter-American highway. In summary, the committee believed that Panama's economic problems might be solved by greater attention to "that proper utilization of the resources which Panama does possess. . . ."

And the committee concluded that, although psychologically important to many Panamanians, the flying of the flag in the Canal Zone was an act "charged with dangers that could explode beyond Panama-United States relations" and "would constitute a major departure from established policy. . . ." [40]

IV

Despite the fact that the sovereignty issue remained a subject of heated debate, the isthmian situation in 1960 seemed to be improving. The House Committee on Foreign Affairs observed that restricted commissary activities since 1955 had not produced the serious consequences predicted by Canal Zone residents. The United States had also curtailed sharply its purchases of items from third countries in accordance with the 1955 treaty. Complete and full employment equality in Zone jobs had not yet materialized, but the committee noted with satisfaction that more Panamanians were now occupying trained positions (259 of 3,702) and that the upward trend would continue. Moreover, the president was initiating a special-point program for isthmian economic development in an effort to improve political relations. Wages paid to Panamanians were increased; the apprenticeship plan expanded; and 500 new housing units for Panamanian employees living in the Zone had been planned.[41]

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[40] House Committee on Foreign Affairs (86th Cong., 2d sess.), *Report on United States Relations with Panama* (House Report No. 2218), pp. 12–15, 38–40.

[41] Ibid., pp. 16–31; assistant secretary of the army, Memorandum, 7 July

Still, these measures appeared insufficient and tardy to many Panamanians. The 1960 isthmian elections showed that the opposition parties, if united, could triumph. The government-sponsored candidate, Ricardo Arias, was defeated by Roberto Chiari, leader of a coalition of four of the eight opposition factions. To a large degree, isthmian politics had always represented family feuding more than political principles or programs. The election of Harmodio Arias in 1932 was an exception, and the nomination of Chiari was supposed to constitute a change, for the president-elect had followed a tough line in American-Panamanian relations. Students believed that Chiari would lead the rising tide of nationalism towards greater concessions from the United States and, if necessary, personally command a crusade to assert Panamanian sovereignty in the Canal Zone.[42] The older families, usually eager to exploit anti-Americanism, feared that renewed violence might precipitate social-economic upheaval in Panama, and thus they looked to Chiari to maintain the status quo.

Chiari found himself wedged between two formidable forces—the aristocracy, which possessed the republic's wealth, and the students, who wielded political power in far larger proportion than their counterparts in neighboring Central American nations. The demands of the students that the Yankees get out of the Zone altogether were not lost on political leaders. In 1961 three parties—the National Liberal (then in power), the Patriotic Coalition, and the Civil Resistance—signed the famous Carta de San José which asserted that the United States must relinquish its commercial monopoly in the Zone and share political jurisdiction with Panama. Writers complained bitterly that the "dual" salary scale remained and that workers were still segregated in labor assignments.

But the Panamanian government, reporting in 1964 on economic trends, saw that conditions were improving. From 1950 to 1962, the number of Panamanians employed by the Zone increased from 11,000 to 13,000, and the wages paid to them rose from 15,000,000 to 31,000,000 balboas. The result was a gradual rise in the per capita monthly salary of these same employees from 98 balboas in 1950 to 212 balboas in 1962. These signficant alterations were due, the government report wrote, to changes in the composition of workers and to revisions in the salary or wage rate, as the treaty of 1955 had forecast.[43]

1960, DDE; administrative assistant to the president to Theodore Green, senator from Rhode Island, 13 August 1960, DDE, OF 209.

[42] "Canal Politics," *The Economist* 195 (21 May 1960): 733; Daniel Goldrich, "Requests for Political Legitimacy in Panama," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 26 (Winter 1962): 664–668.

[43] Víctor F. Goytía, *La tragedia del Canal* (Panamá, 1966), p. 5; Batista B., *El drama de Panamá*, p. 85; República de Panamá, Dirección de Estadística y

Under pressure from the more strident nationalists, Chiari asked President John F. Kennedy in late 1961 to consider another revision of the canal treaty. But Kennedy refused because of possible adverse political reactions in the United States and in the Canal Zone and, more importantly, because the likelihood of a sea-level waterway would necessitate a new canal treaty. Given this prospect, renegotiation of the 1903 treaty would be a moot question. The discussions would revive animosities over the "sovereignity" issue and perhaps impair plans for the new canal. In June 1962 Kennedy agreed to appoint negotiators to discuss U.S.-Panamanian differences and further promised to facilitate the entrance of Panamanian private business in the Canal Zone market. The president was willing also to help solve the persistent wage disputes and employment opportunities for Panamanians. Finally, Kennedy and Chiari arranged for the display of the republic's flag in the Zone.[44]

The Eisenhower solution of 1960—the flying of Panama's colors in Shaler Triangle, a small plot overlooking downtown Panama City—had since proved unacceptable to Panamanians. Following the Kennedy-Chiari communiqué, both flags were to be raised over the Bridge of the Americas (called Thatcher Ferry Bridge by American residents), completed in 1962, and at the canal administration buildings in Balboa Heights and Cristóbal. The terms of the agreement stipulated that wherever civilian officials raised the U.S. flag in the Zone, they should also fly the Panamanian flag. American authorities sought to appeal the "dual flag" question to the courts in order to test its constitutionality. Legal action brought inevitable delay, and the Kennedy-Chiari statement, which might have mitigated much of the rising hostility, was not immediately put into effect.

Instead, in January 1963, the governor of the Canal Zone decided to fly both flags in seventeen different places in the Zone. By his orders of 30 December the American flag was removed from other spots where previously it had been displayed. Many of the Zone's residents considered the hauling down of the Stars and Stripes an unwarranted retreat, and they were as determined as the Panamanians to fly their flag in conspicuous places. One of these places was on the flag-pole of Balboa High School.[45]

It was the removal of the American flag that precipitated most of the

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Censo, *Algunos aspectos de las transacciones en bienes y servicios entre Panamá y la Zona del Canal de Panamá y de las operaciones generadas dentro de dicha Zona* (Panamá, 1964), p. 3.

[44] The Center for Strategic Studies, Georgetown University, *Panama: Canal Issues and Treaty Talks*, Special Report Series no. 3 (Washington, 1967), p. 17; Kennedy-Chiari Joint Statement, 13 June 1962, in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962* (Washington, 1963), pp. 481–482.

[45] Investigating Committee, International Commission of Jurists, *Report on Events in Panama*, 9–12 January 1964 (Geneva, 1964), pp. 12–13.

Zonian antagonism. In some areas, such as the Gamboa War Memorial, the governor's command to take down the colors met with refusal. In other parts of the Zone, it encountered defiance. When the students returned from their holiday vacations, they found that the flags were not to be raised again in front of the schools. More than 400 of Balboa High's students sent a letter of protest to President Lyndon B. Johnson.

On 7 January 1964 five Canal Zone Junior College students hoisted the U.S. flag in front of the high school in violation of the governor's orders. Despite the angry protests from bystanders, school officials lowered the flag and confiscated it an hour later. The first period over, the students returned, raised their emblem once more, and this time left guards to prevent school authorities from removing it again. Through the night of 7–8 January, about twenty-five students guarded the flagpole while sympathizing residents and parents supplied them with food and blankets. Although officials did not intervene, the governor issued a statement calling on the citizenry to obey the flag decrees. The flag-raising in front of Zone schools, however, was repeated at eight different locations, and a motorcade picketed the governor's residence. Following still another appeal, the governor departed for the United States in the afternoon of 9 January.[46]

Meanwhile, news of the Balboa High School flag incident became known to students at the Panamanian National Institute. They in turn decided to carry their own flag into the Zone, and on 8 January institute leaders met with the principal of Balboa High and the Panama Canal Information Officer, Mr. Frank Baldwin. The Panamanian students gave no indication that they planned a march the next day, and at 4:45 P.M. on 9 January approximately 200 institute students paraded into the Zone carrying the national flag, placards, and banners. The intention of the students was to raise the flag in front of the high school, but the policeman in charge refused. Apparently, from later accounts, he agreed to allow the students to place the flag at the foot of the pole and sing the national anthem. Unfortunately, the policeman spoke through a translator, and the Panamanians may have thought that he had indeed granted their original request. As the students debated what to do, the crowd of Zonians surrounding the flagpole grew to about 450. When protests and exchanges became more intense, the officer in charge ordered the demonstration cancelled. Six of the institute representatives nearest the flagpole suddenly found themselves completely segregated from the main body of Panamanians. The Zonians began pushing forward, and in the ensuing scuffle the police employed their

[46] The Panama *American*, 3 January 1964, p. 1; 7 January, p. 1; and 8 January, p. 1; Panama *Star* and *Herald*, 8 January, p. 1; *Report on Events in Panama*, pp. 13–14.

riot sticks in, the Panamanians contended later, an unnecessarily aggressive fashion. At this critical moment, the Panamanian flag was torn. In their retreat from the Zone, the institute students smashed windows and street lights and upturned garbage cans. By 7 P.M. the majority had departed.[47]

The fleeing students found larger crowds already gathered at the border, demanding entrance into the Zone. A call to the Guardia Nacional of Panama met with no success, and the Canal Zone police, undermanned, now readied tear gas and drew their revolvers in a show of force, but the size of the crowd multiplied by such proportions that officials requested army troops. Attempts to calm the Panamanians by statements from a circling aircraft proved unrewarding. The Panamanian government seemed to be making little effort to deal with the threatening situation, and the local radio and television stations made matters worse by highly inflammatory broadcasts. Some Panamanians ransacked the besieged Panama Railroad station. Zone police began firing, at first over the heads of the people, then, allegedly, point-blank into the shouting Panamanian crowd. The mob, repulsed at the boundary, proceeded to destroy foreign symbols within their reach: cars were overturned and set ablaze, the Pan American Airways building was encircled and attacked with stones and bricks and then gutted by fire.

On the Canal Zone side, the looters, who rushed into the area through a ripped-out gap in the fence, stormed the Hotel Tivoli, an impressive old Victorian structure where Theodore Roosevelt had once slept. Troops sent to the Tivoli were sniped at from the Panamanian side. General O'Meary, in command of the regular soldiers, ordered his men to return the fire and, after failing to obtain Panamanian government cooperation to stop the sniping, brought in marksmen. Throughout the tenth the snipers and marksmen fired at one another. The firing and destruction subsided the next two days, but the scene obviously remained tense and critical. On the morning of 13 January, the Guardia Nacional, following a long delay, finally appeared.[48]

When news of the Panama City riots reached Colón on the opposite side of the isthmus, Panamanian demonstrators gathered and proceeded into the Zone town of Cristóbal, where they were allowed to raise their flag and sing their anthem. Zone officials here proved cooperative and understanding, but as the crowd moved back to the Panamanian side several cars were damaged. Joined by a larger group, the Panamanians broke windows in the Masonic Temple and YMCA, and at 10:30 P.M., 9 January, U.S.

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[47] *Report on Events*, pp. 15–19; National Institute Student Guillermo Guevara P., in Panama *Star* and *Herald*, 14 January 1964, p. 1.

[48] *Report on Events in Panama*, pp. 20–28.

troops arrived to restore order. Members of the mob grabbed at bayonets as the soldiers formed a barrier along the boundary, and desultory firing continued throughout the night and for the next three days. By the time Panamanian guardsmen appeared on 13 January, three American soldiers had been killed by sniper fire.[49]

The bitterness and hostility of the streets were not erased by diplomatic appeals. When President Johnson received news of the fighting, he ordered General O'Meara to guard the Zone boundary and sent Thomas Mann, assistant secretary of state, to the isthmus to investigate. On 10 January the Inter-American Peace Commission of the Organization of American States heard Panama's contentions of United States aggression and agreed to study the case and recommend measures of settlement. While U.N. Ambassador Adlai Stevenson deplored the eruption in Panama and castigated the mobs for destroying American property, President Chiari prepared to break all diplomatic relations with the United States. Simultaneously the Panamanian government denounced all treaties with the United States and announced that the charge of aggression would be presented to the United Nations. Chiari's conditions for negotiations were (a) an indemnity for damages caused during the rioting, (b) the flying of the Panamanian and American flags in the Canal Zone, (c) removal of barricades between Panama City and the Zone, and (d) withdrawal of American troops.[50]

The favorable responses of both governments to pleas from the O.A.S. and other Latin American states to discuss their differences proved premature. Much of the difficulty was a matter of semantics, especially varying interpretations of the Spanish verbs *negociar* and *discuitir*. Chiari's government swore that the Johnson administration had conceded to negotiate and not merely discuss a new treaty. This interpretation was denied by Washington. At last, Ellsworth Bunker and Miguel Moreno, representatives to the O.A.S. from the United States and Panama respectively, were able to overcome the problem of semantics, and thus it was the O.A.S. rather than the United Nations that provided the forum for discussion and debate of the riot. Subsequently, President Johnson became more flexible

[49] Ibid., pp. 29–32, 33–34; on 11 January, when most of the fighting was over, the *Star* and *Herald* listed the casualties: dead: 17 Panamanians, 3 U.S. soldiers; wounded: 293 in Panama City, 46 in the Canal Zone, and 45 in Colón.

[50] "The Situation in Panama," Department of State *Bulletin* 50 (3 February 1964): 152–157; the Panama *American*, 11 January 1964, p. 1; 12 January, p. 1; Panama *Star* and *Herald*, 11 January, p. 1. Charles Fenwick denies the Panamanian charges of aggression in "Legal Aspects of the Panama Case," *American Journal of International Law* 58 (April 1964): 436–441; and Joseph Alsop blames two Communists for the destruction of any early settlement in mid-January 1964. See the New York *Herald Tribune*, 22 January 1964.

to Panamanian demands for settlement and agreed to review all matters relating to the riots, the canal, and canal treaties. Had the president not taken this step, matters might have worsened considerably, for Panama threatened to carry the republic's case to the General Assembly of the United Nations.[51]

The tense atmosphere spilled over into February and March. Bunker accused the Chiari administration and Communist agitators of fomenting discord. Proprietors of the downtown Panama City cafes nailed up signs warning gringos to keep out. On walls, electric posts, and even billboards appeared placards denouncing the Zonistas in slanderous terms. The ill feeling afforded ample opportunity for the publication of leftist tracts, which excoriated Yankee imperialism and demanded the neutralization of the canal, nationalization of the Canal Zone, and advocated formal judicial appeals to the United Nations and the International Court of Justice.[52]

One international legal body, the International Commission of Jurists, investigated the riots after a formal request by the National Bar Association of Panama. Specifically, the Panamanian legal organization charged the Zone police and military with violations of articles three, five, and twenty of the Universal Declarations of Human Rights of the United Nations. These articles dealt with rights to personal security, protection against cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment, and the freedom of peaceful assembly and association. The commission dispatched a three-man team, composed of a Swedish judge, an Indian arbiter, and a Dutch professor, which left Geneva for Panama on 1 March.[53]

The conclusions of the investigating team rejected the harsher accusations of the Panamanian Bar Association and blamed both governments for their actions during the riots. In the judgment of the investigators, the discord of 9–12 January, 1964 had constituted a "real threat to life and security, which could only be met with strong measures." The investigating trio, however, indicted the American police and military for the degree of force employed to contain the rioters. In particular the group cited instances where Zone police fired into the crowd rather than employing water jets to accomplish the task, or where army marksmen used high velocity rifles to return sniping fire. The final report of the commission blamed the Panamanian government for a three-day delay in sending

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51 Panama *Star* and *Herald*, 15 January 1964, p. 1; Donald Allan and George Sharman, "Panama: Distrust and Delay," *The Reporter*, 27 February 1964, p. 29.

52 "OAS Council Moves to Assist in Solving U.S.-Panamanian Dispute," Department of State *Bulletin* 50 (24 February 1964): 300–304; *Visión*, 7 February 1964, p. 12; Humberto Ricord, *La cuestión del Canal de Panamá* (Panamá, 1964), pp. 15–16.

53 *Report on Events in Panama*, pp. 5–6.

National Guardsmen to riot areas and for its failure to curtail the incendiary radio and television broadcasts. Finally, the investigators regretted that Zone police had not extended sufficient protection to the National Institute students on the afternoon of 9 January.[54]

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Throughout the hectic months of February and March 1964 Panamanian spokesmen insisted that diplomatic relations would be restored only if the United States agreed to discuss the entire range of canal issues. It was 3 April before relations were resumed by a joint declaration in which the two governments announced that they would appoint special representatives to seek the solution to current difficulties. On this basis President Johnson appointed former Secretary of the Treasury Robert Anderson and Panamanian President Chiari named Jorge Illueca as delegates to the special conferences.

At the outset of the talks everything went wrong. Principally this was due to the fact that the two governments had not yet settled the debate between *discutir* (to discuss) and *negociar* (to negotiate): the Panamanian spokesman contended that the United States had promised to negotiate a new treaty in the 3 April agreement restoring diplomatic relations. Moreover, President Chiari, and his successor, Marco Robles, continued to search for third party assistance, primarily from other Latin American republics, to build another canal. For more than six months the United States delayed before finally accepting in December the Panamanian argument that there must be a new canal treaty and a new canal.[55]

Whatever its demerits, the old Treaty of 1903, modified in 1936 and 1955, contained numerous provisions that protected American security interests, and to replace it completely with a new instrument was a formidable task. Debate on this issue centered on the following points:

1. Jurisdiction of the United States in the Canal Area (a euphemistic term more palatable than Canal Zone).
2. Definition of "sovereignty."
3. Statement on criminal and civil jurisdiction.
4. Determination of the annuity, tolls, taxing authority, and costs of the canal.
5. Powers of the canal authority.
6. Life of the new treaty.

An added burden was the separate but related problem of American

[54] Ibid., pp. 36, 37, 40.

[55] "Panama—Nationalism and the Canal," *On Record* 2 (1964): 41–42; Georgetown University, *Panama*, pp. 20–21.

military bases in Panama. The present military establishment had been erected at a cost of $760 million and included several air fields and army bases, training grounds, jungle warfare school, facilities for instruction in guerrilla subversion, and a hemispheric command center.[56]

The military question proved to be less crucial to Panamanian negotiators than the more fundamental issues of politics and economics. Illueca sought a settlement that would erase forever the colonial image of the Canal Zone, restrict American operations to the basic necessities of operation and maintenance of the canal, provide greater economic opportunities for Panama in canal trade, and allow Panamanian participation in the new canal authority. This would mean a termination of several Zone auxiliary services, such as the sale of commercial products to residents, thus creating a larger market for Panamanian merchants. Under the new arrangement, Panama believed, the Zone would become an integral part of the republic. Panamanian stamps would be used; Americans would be taxed by Panama; Spanish would be the official language; and the national flag would replace the Stars and Stripes in the Canal Area. As for the canal itself, Illueca stated that his government wanted joint administration of the waterway and payment of a percentage of the transit fee collected from each ship.[57]

The formal acceptance of Panama's plan came in a statement by President Johnson on 18 December 1964 in a national television address. Briefly, the president said that the United States intended to construct a new sea-level canal presumably in Panama but possibly in Colombia or Costa Rica-Nicaragua and to negotiate a new canal treaty. Stressing that the American government was not yielding to threats of violence, Johnson added that the new canal treaty would effectively recognize Panamanian sovereignty in the Canal Zone. The United States would retain the necessary means to operate and defend the canal.

At the time of the announcement (issued simultaneously in Panama by Robles) the details apparently had not yet been worked out. During the ensuing months the public learned that the negotiators were working on three treaties, not one. In late September 1965 Johnson and Robles reported on the progress of these conventions, stating that the Treaty of 1903 would be abrogated and replaced by another canal treaty that would terminate either on a specified date or on the opening of a new sea-level canal, whichever occurred first. The new canal treaty would enlarge Panamanian jurisdiction over the Zone establishment, but the economic interests of the Americans already living and working there would be protected.[58]

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[56] Ibid., pp. 26, 28.
[57] Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, *Memoria, 1965*, pp. 10–11, 25–27.
[58] Ibid., pp. 13–14; Lyndon Johnson, speech, 18 December, Department of

News of the discussions, the details of which were reported in the press, immediately provoked a storm of harsh criticism from several members of Congress, notably Representatives Daniel Flood of Pennsylvania and Mrs. Leonor Sullivan of Missouri. For years Flood had made the canal his favorite specialty, and he was quick to point out that any deviation from full control of the canal or Zone was tantamount to appeasement. He traced the Panamanian campaign to achieve full sovereignty over the Zone directly "to the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 . . . and the international Communist conspiracy." [59] Mrs. Sullivan's arguments rested on more credible grounds, namely, that

> the establishment of a joint authority for canal operation would only serve to satisfy the aspirations of a few families who have controlled the Republic since its beginnings. In fact, if we were to turn the canal over to the Republic of Panama, lock, stock, and barrel, I am convinced that it would not benefit the masses, and it clearly would not be sufficient to meet the needs of the people of that Republic for more jobs and general improvement in its economy. . . .[60]

The negotiation and completion of the drawing-up of the three new treaties in mid-1967, however, brought favorable public response. A few newspapers concurred with Representatives Flood and Mrs. Sullivan that the prospective treaties were in fact a sell-out to Panamanian demands.[61] But a greater number believed that the concessions of the United States were a prerequisite for American-Panamanian harmony—in the "spirit of the Good Neighbor"—and served the interests of the nation. In a stroke, these newspapers said, the Johnson administration had helped to eradicate a long-standing economic and political injustice on the isthmus and had promoted American prestige throughout the hemisphere. In Panama the United States had an old canal and an old treaty; now was the time for a new treaty and a new canal.[62]

State *Bulletin* 52 (4 January 1965): 5–6; Georgetown University, Panama, pp. 22–23.

[59] Daniel Flood, *Isthmian Canal Policy Questions* (Washington, 1966), p. 519.

[60] Mrs. Leonor Sullivan, 23 September 1965, in *Congressional Record*, 111: 24942.

[61] James J. Kilpatrick in the Philadelphia *Evening Bulletin*, 4 October 1965; editorials in the Chicago *Tribune*, 28 June 1967; San Diego *Union*, 30 June 1967; and New York *Daily News*, 8 July 1967; clippings in Panama Canal Information Office Files, Balboa Heights, Canal Zone: hereinafter cited as PCIO Files.

[62] Editorials in the Washington *Daily News*, 25 September 1965; New Haven *Register*, 27 September 1965; Houston *Chronicle*, 27 September 1965; Des Moines *Tribune*, 27 September 1965; Dallas *Times-Herald*, 28 September 1965; Wichita *Eagle*, 28 September 1965; Detroit *News*, 28 September 1965; Arizona *Republic*, 29 September 1965; St. Louis *Post-Dispatch*, 30 September 1965; Seattle *Post-In-*

As predicted, the new treaties granted extensive powers to Panama. For the operation of the Canal Area, the two countries named a Joint Administration of five Americans and four Panamanians. The Administration would follow employment policies based on the principles that the Canal was a primary source of Panamanian employment and that equality of treatment, regardless of nationality, should be the rule in distributing jobs. The administration would also give permits to live in the Canal Area, supervise the servicing of ships, operate the Panama Railroad as a public carrier, and continue to provide public services, such as education and health; but within five years it would discontinue the various department stores, groceries, cafeterias, hotels, laundries, gasoline stations, and related services. Wherever possible, however, the administration would promote business activities in the Canal Area. In the critical area of education and public order, the new canal treaty allowed the continued operation of the one school system (except that Panamanians living in the Canal Area might be transferred to Panamanian schools) and, by a special grant of authority from the republic, permitted the maintenance of law and order by the Joint Administration.

The Panamanian negotiators also won out in their struggle to receive compensation based on the tonnage shipped through the canal. Under treaty provisions the Joint Administration would pay to the republic an annual payment of $0.22 per long ton of commercial cargo of yearly transits. (The amount would be $0.17 at first, then would be increased in five years to $0.22.) The United States would retain $0.10 per long ton, the remainder being used for canal expenses. In accordance with the principles of 1914, the canal should remain neutral, with both Panama and the United States responsible for its protection. The new canal treaty should remain in force until 31 December 1999 or one year following the opening of the new sea-level canal, whichever occurs first. At that time the old canal becomes the property of the Republic of Panama.[63]

Similarly, Panamanian aspirations found fulfillment of long-standing goals in another proposed treaty providing for canal defense. The defense pact stipulates that both countries must aid in the security of the canal, and Panama is obligated to render available defense areas to the American military. Such commitments will be applied *mutatis mutandis* to any new sea-level waterway in Panama. Unlike previous arrangements; the future

telligencer, 30 September 1965; Los Angeles *Herald-Examiner*, 6 July 1967; Florida *Times-Union*, 28 June 1967; Boston *Globe*, 28 June 1967; Chicago *Daily News*, 19 June 1967; and Cincinnati *Post*, 3 July 1967; clippings PCIO files.

[63] This is an unofficial digest of the treaty's contents as it appeared in the Panama *Tribune*, 15 July 1967, pp. 1, 8, 12.

defense area will be under the Panamanian flag with Panamanian laws extended to the area, although American authorities may have concurrent jurisdiction over those cases involving violation of the laws of both nations. In these situations, Panama will enjoy primary jurisdiction, unless the act involves treason, sabotage, or espionage. The United States would not exercise jurisdiction over any Panamanian unless he is a member of the American armed forces. The Defense Treaty was designed to lapse in five years after the expiration of the new canal treaty or when the United States would be no longer responsible to defend an interoceanic canal in Panama, whichever occurred later.[64]

Although ratification of the 1967 treaties would doubtless mitigate much of the suspicion and antagonism, relations between Panama and the United States will be deeply troubled for several years. In the first place, the 1967 treaties have encountered serious opposition in the Panamanian National Assembly and in the United States Senate. Nationalistic Panamanians now contend that the Americans should get out of the isthmus altogether. Their counterparts in Washington view the new accords as symbols of appeasement. Secondly, the 1968 Panamanian presidential elections demonstrated the persistence of political instability. Arnulfo Arias emerged victorious after a vigorous campaign, but, a few days following his assumption of power on 1 October, he was ousted by the National Guard. The military may prove more tractable in its dealings with the United States, but the coup could be employed as an excellent argument by anti-treaty senators who are convinced that major concessions to a country with such internal political turmoil would be patently unwise.

The major issues of contention—questions of "sovereignty" in the Canal Zone, economic benefits of the canal, jurisdiction of the Canal Zone government, and canal defense—have a long and troubled history. With the possible exception of defense sites inside the republic, a crucial question since the late 1930s, all of the remaining points of dispute are traceable to the original canal treaty of 1903. The flag issue of the 1950s and 1960s was really a logical corollary of the more complex debate over sovereignty. While the United States agreed to discussions of substantive issues in the 1930s and 1950s, which produced the 1936 and 1955 treaties, American negotiators clung steadfastly to the fundamental prerogatives of

[64] Ibid., pp. 1, 14, 16. For a discussion of a new canal see Immanuel J. Klette, *From Atlantic to Pacific: A New Interocean Canal* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1967). The future of the canal treaties is uncertain. The Panamanian National Assembly has not approved the documents and, according to a Department of State official, the Panamanian government is considering renewed negotiations on new treaties. Attorney Advisor, Department of State, to author, 8 May 1970.

the 1903 pact. Lyndon Johnson's acquiescence to a new canal treaty was thus a major concession, although he skillfully linked the new canal treaty with plans for a new canal.

The prospect of getting rid of the hated Treaty of 1903, however, has more immediate importance in Panamanian politics, and National Assemblymen are under great pressure to reject the 1967 treaties and demand a complete American evacuation. Since 1941, when Panama demanded economic assistance as the price of wartime defense cooperation, the republic's share in the canal economy has increased substantially, but progress has been overshadowed by such political legacies as the sovereignty question. Thus, the optimistic view—Americans and Panamanians should forget past grievances and labor together in the building of a new sea-level waterway—may now give way to angry cries about settling old scores.

LATIN AMERICA

(Independent Opinions on Latin American Realities & Problems in the 1970's)

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