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"History is strewn with the wrecks of nations which have gained a little progressiveness at the cost of a great deal of manliness, and have thus prepared themselves for destruction as soon as the movements of the world gave a chance for it."

WALTER BAGEHOT

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INTELLIGENCE - GATHERING FOR WHAT?

(orig under Soc)

A Worse-than-useless CIA

HENRY PAOLUCCI

For this brief study of what ails the CIA we assume with Walter Bagehot that the strengths and weaknesses of a government like ours are best understood if we start off by dividing its constituent parts into two classes: "first, those which excite and preserve the reverence of the population—the dignified parts; and next, the efficient parts—those by which it, in fact, works and rules." When he drew that distinction in the 1870s, Bagehot had before him an English Constitution that had just suffered the shock of Disraeli's "reforms" and an American Constitution virtually decapitated by the impeachment crisis of the Andrew Johnson Presidency. It was a time, in other words, very like our own. Since 1961, and especially during these Kissinger-Watergate years, the parts of our Constitution have steadily lost both efficiency and dignity. Our Presidency is inoperative; our Congress vies with rioters for newsmedia attention; and our courts, ultimate custodians of our legal stability, let themselves be used for political advantage by self-righteous factions and persons of great private wealth. What ails our once dignified and efficient Central Intelligence Agency is thus typical of what ails our Government as a whole.

One after another our chief national-defense institutions are being placed in the newsmedia pillory and forced to confess their incompetence. First it was the military and the FBI; now it is the turn of the CIA. The top officials thus far pilloried have seemed to take it passively, not to say hopelessly. Why? Perhaps it is because they vaguely sense that, in having clung too long to jobs manifestly stripped of purpose, they have themselves helped to make their public disgrace virtually inevitable.

Military discipline up and down the ranks, vast networks of centralized investigation and intelligence-gathering—for what? Surely we don't need fabulously expensive land, sea, and air forces or elaborate cloak and dagger operations for the ends prescribed for us by Henry Kissinger "and the Presidents" (as Senator Adlai Stevenson III of Illinois has aptly phrased it) "who have served under him." Kissinger's avowed purpose is

to purchase peace with the communist powers at all cost. And he pursues it by means of a wandering diplomacy which, to quote Stevenson again, consists in always "leaving something behind" to save face: "a little treasure here, a little blood there, a little of the nation's prestige and influence everywhere."

Senator Stevenson's speech against the "aggrandizement in the hands of one man of more power than any man could wisely employ" was delivered on Lincoln's Birthday (CR, Feb. 12, 1975, pp. S1852-3). Its warning is suitably Lincolnian, and a far cry from the partisan ambiguities one has come to expect these days from the other side of the Senate aisle. Mr. Stevenson argues that our current foreign policy, or rather, lack of it, is crippling our government, stripping its major organs of their reason for being. "Almost any foreign policy," he says, "is better than none. Given a policy, the Congress and the military might begin to gear military expenditures to our purposes in the world instead of planning expensively for every conceivable contingency. The CIA and all agencies could act with some concert in support of some purpose. The United States has no foreign policy, only the odysseys of Secretary Kissinger, his dreams and secrets. The agencies of government are cut loose to fend for themselves with little direction or input."

Kissinger's so-called strategy for peace denies our armed services a distinctly military mission. His plans require their maintenance exclusively to help prevent, not to wage, a general war. If one could be certain that war would not result from unilateral disarmament, there would be no reason, from Kissinger's standpoint, not to disarm unilaterally. The rub is that, if an American government dared to disarm unilaterally—so Kissinger argues the point with his more radical admirers—the mass of Americans might react fiercely; Kissinger-type peace activists might be forced out of government and traditional standards of military preparedness might again become authoritative, as they have not been since 1961, in presidential decision-making.

The sums funnelled into our military under the circumstances amount to bribes of the same moral order as the pay-

offs made to riot leaders in the city ghettos under the guise of poverty programs. Hanson Baldwin has stressed the danger of a well-paid military that has no real military mission and doesn't protest that fact. "More of our high-ranking military leaders," he pleads, "if faced with a dilemma of supporting policies which they believe to be dangerous to the nation's future, should resign their posts not as a mutinous gesture but as conscientious indication that they cannot carry out the policies of the administration without fatally compromising their duty to the country and their loyalty to the men they command. Resignation, particularly by high-ranking military men, should never be a casual gesture but it can represent the only honorable alternative."

The admonition applies with equal force to top officers in our intelligence-gathering agencies. Indeed, in the case of the CIA there are additional dangers. Our military strength can be deprived of its reason for being by Henry Kissinger's supranationalist peace strategy, but it cannot easily be diverted to serve supranationalist, not to say anti-nationalist, ends. Our Armed Services fly the American flag, and where that flag is flown the American national will is manifest, to be openly challenged by avowed or secret enemies only at their great peril. It is otherwise with the CIA. Precisely because it cannot fly the flag, it needs to be thoroughly imbued with an uncompromised sense of purpose, animated by an unmistakably American national will. Otherwise it is in danger of becoming a body without a soul, and thus liable to penetration and possession by an alien will.

Cord Meyer's Sanctuary

Up until the late 60's, the CIA, chartered with the National Security Council in 1947, remained a haven of secrecy, not only against investigative reporting but also against congressional inquiries of the kind that have now become only too fashionably easy to pursue. At Yale in 1958, CIA chief Allen Dulles was able to boast without danger of protests that the "National Security Act of 1947 has given our Intelligence a more influential position in our government than Intelligence enjoys in any other government." That didn't much upset anybody on campus then—perhaps because during the 50s that same Allen Dulles had provided a sanctuary in his CIA for many a projected "victim" of Senator Joe McCarthy's badgering search for security risks in high places.

Stewart Alsop, who despised McCarthy, noted in *The Center* (Harper & Row, 1968), how Allen Dulles had "bravely defended" top CIA man William Bundy "against an attack by Joseph McCarthy in the early 50s." And Merle Miller, whose autobiographical articles on "What It Means To Be A Homosexual" suddenly qualified him in 1971 to speak, at least for the *New York Times*, as a moral authority on all sorts of subjects, put in a similar good word for Dulles in an article on Cord Meyer Jr. (titled: "Long Journey—From a One-World Crusade to the Department of Dirty Tricks") that appeared in the Jan. 1973 issue of *Times Magazine*.

Cord Meyer Jr., one needs to recall, was the wounded war veteran who went to San Francisco in 1945 as an aide to Harold E. Stassen at the founding of the UN, and who in the late 40s founded the United World Federalists to "achieve peace through a world government."

1951 and, as Miller notes, it was Allen Dulles who pressed him to do so. "But in those days," Miller adds, "that was a respectable—even an admirable—thing for a liberal and humane man to do. It was necessary to keep the agency out of the hands of the reactionaries, and some years later didn't McGeorge Bundy, then still a knight in fairly shining armor, say that there were more liberal intellectuals in the CIA than any place else in government? And hadn't he named Meyer as one of the best examples?"

Meyer's presence in the CIA, even more than William Bundy's, had aroused McCarthy's wrath. Vice-President Nixon prevailed upon him to call off public hearings "in the interest of national security." But McCarthy insisted, on the strength of a thick FBI dossier, that Meyer be purged. The security "trial" lasted several months. But, as Miller is pleased to relate, it had a happy ending. "On Thanksgiving Day, 1953, Allen Dulles called Meyer to say that his brief had been judged satisfactory, that the charges had been dropped, and that he could return to work the following Monday."

Throughout the Eisenhower and Kennedy terms, its anti-McCarthy credentials kept the CIA virtually immune from liberal criticism. *The Invisible Government* by David Wise and Thomas B. Rose didn't appear until 1964, after an assassin's bullet had brought Lyndon Johnson to the Presidency. Advertised as an expose, it became a bestseller. Yet even in its detailed review of the abortive Kennedy-authorized Free-Cuban invasion of Castro's communist stronghold at the Bay of Pigs, criticism was more implied than stated. That Kennedy himself had cancelled the essential second airstrike, and that Richard Bissell, CIA architect of the invasion, had failed to speak his mind to the President when Dean Rusk handed him the phone to do so at the eleventh hour was, however, completely veiled over—as was also the fact that the agency had served from its inception as an anti-McCarthyite haven. In the end, while warning of the potential dangers, the authors of *The Invisible Government* drew precisely the sort of conclusion that might have prompted a Cord Meyer to join the CIA in the first place: "The solution lies not in dismantling this machinery but in bringing it under greater control."

A change came for the CIA in 1967. The Marcuseite revolutionary strategy of the moment required that old liberal sanctuaries—particularly elitist universities and research centers—be singled out as targets for violent "new left" protests. *Ramparts* magazine, in the vanguard of the reversal, thus chose to reveal the obvious; namely, that the CIA which had recruited Cord Meyer in 1951 had since gone on to "recruit" almost the entire elitist intellectual establishment. Indeed, while recruiting Meyer in 1951, it had also managed to supply funds to set up MIT's Center for International Studies headed by Walt Rostow, who later became LBJ's advisor for national security affairs. By 1967, its network of subsidized academic groups had become incredibly vast—and, guess who headed it? Cord Meyer Jr. Why had *Ramparts* chosen that moment to publicize Meyer's role? Perhaps it was fear that President Johnson might soon be offered right-wing grounds for cleaning out the CIA's university network, even as he was in fact soon thereafter offered right-wing grounds for firing Defense Secretary Robert McNamara.

Last any of its readers mistake the significance of the

vide a "decent" perspective. Its Man in the News feature for March 30, 1967, was accordingly devoted to Cord Meyer Jr. and titled "A Hidden Liberal." "In the late 1940's and early 1950's," an introductory paragraph explained, "many liberals who wished to serve their country found in the CIA not only a personal haven, safe from the onslaughts of McCarthyism, but also an opportunity to bring to bear on the problems of the cold war a realistic and liberal understanding of the pluralism of emerging countries. Mr. Meyer and many high officials in the CIA are cases in point."

With new leftist critics tempted to assign Meyer "a high place in their current demonology," the *Times* urged fair-minded readers to recall that Meyer had in fact founded the United World Federalists, that McCarthy had tried in vain to have him purged from the CIA, and that, so far from having turned on his old idealism, "at 47, Mr. Meyer seems no less dedicated to the CIA than to world federalism."

The same issue of the *Times* carried President Johnson's approval of a Katzenbach-John Gardner-Richard Helms recommendation to discontinue CIA educational subsidies at once, with a proviso that it be done "without destroying valuable private organizations before they can seek new means of support." And Stewart Alsop's *The Center*, published the following year, provides this significant postscript:

"Oddly enough, after the student association and other front organizations were blown sky-high, the man who was in charge of them all was promoted; another bureaucratic tendency. He is Cord Meyer, a liberal, and wounded war veteran who, like Bundy was also once a target of McCarthy's charges. Meyer is, as this is written [1968], deputy to [Thomas H.] Karamessines, and his heir-apparent as DDP [chief of 'dirty tricks']."

In the end, the only person really hurt by the 1967 CIA revelations was President Johnson. While Meyer moved up in the CIA, Johnson, who might have "wished" to use the agency to help win the war in Vietnam, moved down in the Presidency. By March 31, 1968, Kennedy's gruff successor had been literally dumped and the CIA had ceased to be an effective instrument of Presidential power.

What has happened to the CIA since the start of the Kissinger-Nixon term is of course current news, spelled out in headlines as one after another of the agency's remnant of loyal functionaries is led to the pillory to confess the purposelessness of his service. Cord Meyer's name has surfaced only once during these years. And here again, as in 1967, a timely dose of leftwing pseudocriticism has served quite unmistakably to shield him from serious right-wing criticism.

In 1972, a story surfaced about how Cord Meyer had tried to censor in advance a book touching on the CIA's operations in Southeast Asia. Eventually the *New York Review of Books* ran a "documentary" on the affair, publishing all the relevant papers, and soon thereafter Merle Miller made it the focus of his *Times* article on Meyer from which we earlier quoted a passage. As Miller tells the story, Meyer "went into the offices of Harper & Row to ask, among others, his old ally of the world government movement, Cass Canfield, to let the CIA see "galleys" of a book, publication of which "might . . . be against the best interests of this country." The CIA eventually saw the galleys, but in the end the book was published unchanged. The thing was sleazy, wrote Miller, but not surprising.

"Of course the CIA would try to—well, not censor books . . . just make publishers a little more timid next time . . . You know the only astonishing thing about the whole affair? That Cord Meyer Jr. was the man to make the request. Not to be believed . . . It happened, though, and I wondered why."

The rest of Miller's article provided a tender review of Meyer's career as a champion of world government, punctuated with anguished surmises about what could have happened to such a man to make him willing to censor books. It was just the sort of skin-pricking that suffices to vaccinate and immunize. The *Times* didn't offer an editorial response of its own this time. But during the next two weeks several letters appeared defending Cord Meyer and hinting at the incompetence of an avowed—petulantly avowed—homosexual to sit in judgment on a matter of such complexity as Meyer's equal dedication to world federalism and the CIA.

One such letter came from Zbigniew Brzezinski, Director of the Research Institute on International Change at Columbia University, a man who may soon take Kissinger's place as advisor for national security affairs. For Professor Brzezinski, Miller's article was "an exercise in cowardly journalism." Of the "quotations with which the author spices his personal attacks," it is significant, he notes, "that—with the exception of those few that are positive toward Cord Meyer—they are all anonymous. No respectable paper would publish an anonymous letter, yet somehow it seems acceptable to publish a piece based heavily for its effects on gossip and melodramatic mush about a man who has served this country with exceptional dedication for several decades."

We need to note that Professor Brzezinski is himself, like Meyer, a long-time champion of evolutionary or indirect convergence upon the common goal of an enforceable world peace. In his *Political Power: USA/USSR*, jointly authored with Samuel P. Huntington, he had not hesitated to conclude: "It takes a strong government to score diplomatic, political, and military successes in a cold war. It takes an even stronger one to negotiate detentes, to carry off retreats, and to survive reverses in a cold war. The American government may well be strong enough vis-a-vis its enemies to accomplish the former; it may not be strong enough vis-a-vis its own people to accomplish the latter." Those words were written before Kissinger's ascendancy in our government. Since then we have had no end of detentes, retreats, and reverses in the cold war. And all the while, as if to "prove" that it takes strength to lose, our CIA has been kept busy with worse-than-useless clandestine activities everywhere, serving thus to substantiate the worst sort of propaganda charges of "capitalist imperialism."

As architect of America's retreat around the world,

HENRY PAOLUCCI is Professor of Government and Politics at St. John's University. He was Eleanor Duse Traveling Fellow and Fulbright Scholar from Columbia University, where he received his Ph.D. He has published books on St. Augustine, Hegel, Aristotle, Galileo, Machiavelli, Beccaria, Maitland, as well as on the 1968 presidential crisis and Henry Kissinger. His articles have frequently appeared on the Times Op Ed page and in European political journals.

Kissinger has studiously guarded his right flank by offering the American people hawkish doubletalk coupled with brutal sacrifices of American lives in empty shows of strength, like invading Cambodia, mining Haiphong, and bombing Hanoi only *after* American forces in the field were in precipitous retreat. Today, in the final phases of retreat, the hawkish cover consists in calls for pittances of aid to abandoned puppet governments in Southeast Asia and tongue-in-cheek protests against left-wing disclosures of FBI and CIA dirty tricks that are dirty only because the men who continue to perform them ought long since to have resigned in protest against assignments manifestly devoid of national purpose.

Kissinger's CIA

On taking office in 1969, Kissinger projected a complete overhaul of national security intelligence. His Harvard colleague, James Schlesinger, was employed to complete a restructuring study in 1970, after which he served briefly as Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission before becoming Director of Central Intelligence where he could implement directly the Kissinger-ordered overhaul. Once that job was done, Schlesinger moved on to his present post as Defense Secretary, and William Colby, whose eldest son John worked for Kissinger in the National Security Council, took over at CIA.

How Colby made it to the top in the CIA, and what happened to Cord Meyer in the process, was reviewed in a *Times Magazine* article on Colby (July 1, 1973) by David Wise, co-author of *The Invisible Government*. Updating his CIA chronicle of 1964, Wise noted that Colby was the "third chief of Dirty Tricks to be named head of the CIA—the two others being Allen Dulles and Helms." After Helms left the dirty tricks post in 1966, Desmond Fitzgerald came in; but he died in 1967—to be succeeded "by the 'blackest' and least known of the operations directors, Thomas Hercules Karamessines, a New Yorker and Columbia graduate who served in the OSS and worked for the CIA in Athens, Vienna, and Rome under embassy cover."

In 1973, Karamessines seemed likely to succeed Helms as head of the CIA. And that would probably have raised his deputy Cord Meyer to chief of dirty tricks—just when the CIA was about to be led, like the Armed Services and the FBI before it, into the newsmedia pillory. How, if not why Meyer was spared the risk of that ordeal is briefly reviewed by Wise:

"Tom K," as he is known among the operators, was retired last March [1973] in the Schlesinger shakeout, along with several other big-name spooks, like Bronson Tweedy and Archibald B. Roosevelt Jr., both former London station chiefs. Very prestigious station, London, and Cord Meyer Jr. has been selected for the post. That's fine, of course, for Cord Meyer, but not so fine for some of the old Grotonians with the reversible names who have been put out to pasture while Bill Colby made it to the top."

And so Cord Meyer is safe. Types far more vulnerable are being led to the pillory as CIA spokesmen, on notice either to resign (as James Angleton and three of his aides have recently done) or cooperate with confessions of incompetence, if not immorality. Angleton has told friends that he was "done in" by Kissinger because of his "outspoken doubts about the US policy of detente with Russia and China." Colby, too, who

forced Angleton's resignation, has "on several occasions . . . appeared to blame the Secretary" for ordering the very kinds of covert operations that are now being dredged up to humiliate CIA operatives.

Paul Nitze's Example

While Kissinger flits about the world expounding his cosmopolitan dreams and keeping his secrets, the parts of our government that depend on his guidance are rapidly becoming empty shells staffed by hollow men. The time requires not rearguard defenses of such shells but exemplary resignations of the kind Hanson Baldwin has urged on the military.

Consider the case of Paul Nitze, who recently resigned as Assistant Secretary of Defense for SALT. His resignation came on the heels of Kissinger's much-publicized attempt, back in May, 1974, "to achieve what he referred to as a conceptual breakthrough" on the MIRV limitations issue. The breakthrough required American piecemeal "agreement on the principle that the MIRV throw-weight of the two sides be equal." That was too much for Nitze, for, as he later told a congressional subcommittee, "such an agreement would have accepted the negation of one of the principal offsetting US advantages which made the inequalities favoring the Soviet side in the Interim Agreement acceptable to the US side in 1972." But there was worse in store. Kissinger's eagerness to achieve his breakthrough at any price was so obvious that the Soviet negotiators immediately seized upon his piecemeal concession as an opportunity to demand more, and the US bargaining position was thus thoroughly undermined.

Mr. Nitze closed his testimony with this admonition: "It is my view that nuclear war is best avoided by assuring that no potential aggressor sees grounds for optimism in engaging in a course of action that could potentially lead to nuclear war . . . Declaratory statements concerning the desirability of peace are politically useful, but do not, by themselves, necessarily contribute to the above assurance." The words are gentlemanly, but their meaning is plain: under Kissinger honorable service has become impossible for a man like Nitze.

Thus for our SALT negotiators, as well as for our top military, FBI, and CIA officers, Henry Kissinger's continued dominance in government, after the disgrace of the President who brought him in, is a destructive dominance. The executive branch has failed to protect itself. And now the Congress is on trial. It is "moving ponderously," as Senator Stevenson put it in his Lincoln Day speech, "to arrest the decline of the United States in the world." It needs guidance, particularly in the form of exemplary resignations. But meanwhile, as Stevenson warns, "it has no duty to endorse error and repose unlimited authority in the architect of national decline—[its duty is rather] to protect the Nation from the egocentricity of its Secretary of State."

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40-05 149th Pl., Flushing, N.Y. 11354