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CIA'S SECRET WAR IN ANGOLA

"We are most alarmed at the interference of extra-continental powers who do not wish Africa well and whose involvement is inconsistent with the promise of true independence."

Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger
September 24, 1975

The United States is today deeply involved in a brutal war in Angola. Like the Vietnamese and Laotian conflicts in their early years, the Angolan war is — as far as the public and most of the Congress are concerned — a secret war run by the CIA. As was true in Indochina, the President himself is making the key decisions. In fact, at about the same time that the Indochina war was finally ending last spring, President Ford personally authorized the CIA to provide covert money and arms to African independence groups in Angola.

Although the Ford Administration has repeatedly stated that the United States will not become militarily involved in Angola, official sources reported on December 12 that the CIA is now spending \$50 million on the Angolan war, and has already sent five artillery spotter planes piloted by Americans into the Angolan battle zones. According to these sources, U.S. Air Force C-141 transport jets, flying in behalf of the CIA, regularly land at the airport in Kinshasa, Zaire (formerly the Congo), disgorging tons of military supplies including rifles, machine guns, light artillery, rocket launchers, and ammunition; these supplies are in turn being flown into Angola by small plane. In addition, the *International Bulletin* reported in its December 5 edition that U.S. mercenaries are now fighting in Angola. David Bufkin, a Vietnam veteran who is recruiting mercenaries in New York, Chicago, and California, has admitted the existence of a nation-wide recruitment effort.

The evidence of large-scale CIA intervention is now clear (as is the intervention by the Soviet Union, Cuba, South Africa, Zaire, and other powers). The CIA's involvement was first reported by Leslie Gelb in the *New York Times* of September 25, 1975. On November 8 and 9, Gelb and Walter Pincus of the *Washington Post* both reported that CIA Director William Colby and Under Secretary of State Joseph Sisco briefed a closed session of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the involvement. An independent investigation by the Center for National Security Studies has now confirmed these reports and uncovered the details of President Ford's decision to fund the CIA's intervention.

The Decision to Intervene

President Ford was not so much faced with a decision to intervene in Angola last spring as he was with the question of whether or not to support and increase a long-standing covert CIA involvement there. The CIA had been funding the FNLA and Holden Roberto since 1962, according to five different Administration sources. Two other government sources report that Roberto's brother-in-law, President Mobutu of Zaire, started receiving secret CIA funds and other aid soon after Zaire gained its independence in June, 1960. In Angola, like Zaire more than a decade ago, the CIA provides large amounts of secret money and arms to its local allies who are fighting against groups backed by the Soviet Union.

The CIA's involvement in Zaire grew steadily during the Kennedy and early Johnson administrations. During those same years, the policy toward the nearby Portuguese colonies, including Angola, was to "play all ends against the middle," according to an ex-White House aide. This policy meant providing Portugal with some military and political support, and taking a public stance in favor of nonviolent change in the colonies. In secret, however, the CIA subsidized independence groups committed to armed revolution against Portugal, but never with enough support to turn the tide. According to the White House source, "The CIA had the habit of picking out single individuals and making them our guys, somehow assuming they would turn out all right. It was mainly a cash-in-the-envelope kind of thing, conscience money to show American good intentions." The CIA funded various liberation movements from 1960 on, and FNLA's Holden Roberto was a major recipient.

In 1969, the Nixon Administration decided to end the secret "program aid" to the independence groups as part of a larger policy decision to improve American relations with the white regimes in southern Africa (Portugal's colonies, Rhodesia, and South Africa). According to State Department aides, the CIA did not totally drop Roberto but kept the program going for five years later.

when it became clear that Angola would receive independence from the new government in Portugal, it was a relatively simple matter, as one Administration official puts it, for the CIA "to turn Roberto back on."

Thus, with Roberto already safely inside the American camp, President Ford's key decision last spring turned on whether to start funding a second independence group, UNITA. The 40 Committee, chaired by Henry Kissinger, had already approved \$300,000 in secret subsidies for Jonas Savimbi, head of UNITA, and the President personally approved that action, according to an Administration official

interviewed by CNSS. The source stated that both the President and Kissinger were aware that adding UNITA to the U.S. account constituted a major step, close to a commitment that the United States would not allow the MPLA to control Angola.

The source recalled that Kissinger pushed hard for the increased CIA intervention. "Henry wanted to be told why we should intervene," said the official, "not why not." Many within the government were opposed, including Nathaniel Davis, then the State Department's highest official for African affairs and formerly ambassador to Chile during

THE ANGOLAN INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENTS

On November 11, 1975, Angola became a free country after 500 years of Portuguese colonialism. But independence so far has meant only a violent civil war for Angola, as three competing African liberation movements, each massively supported by outside powers, vie for power in the country. Indeed, foreign intervention has turned the Angolan civil war into a potentially explosive cold war confrontation. The actual conflict in Angola, however, does not easily reduce itself to an ideological struggle between communists and capitalists. All three movements say they favor some form of socialism, and each has stressed the primacy of national reconstruction and independence.

The MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) led by Agostinho Neto, is generally recognized as the strongest and most radical of the three. The MPLA was founded in the mid-1950's and began armed resistance to the Portuguese in 1961. It draws its primary support from the Kimbundu people, who make up about 23% of the country's population. Urban based, with a socialist orientation, the MPLA seems to have considerably more support across tribal lines and among educated Angolans than the other two groups. Its forces currently hold the central portion of Angola, including the capital city of Luanda, where it declared itself the legitimate government of the country on independence day.

The Soviet Union, Cuba, Algeria, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau all recognize the MPLA's claim to legitimacy, and all have furnished it with military assistance. The MPLA started receiving modest amounts of Soviet aid in the early 1960's to fight Portuguese domination, after first having been refused support by the United States. However, it was not until after the April 1974 revolution in Portugal, and most recently since the spring of 1975, that the Soviets began providing truly large quantities of assistance. Soviet aid is said to range from rifles, machine

guns, and ammunition to armored vehicles, mortars, anti-aircraft guns, and ground-to-ground missiles. Additionally, U.S. intelligence sources report that about 3,000 Cuban advisors have been fighting with the MPLA since mid-fall.

The FNLA (National Liberation Front of Angola) is led by Holden Roberto, and based almost solely among the Bakongo people, who make up about 13% of the population. Roberto is closely allied with his brother-in-law, President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire, and has spent most of his adult life outside Angola in Zaire. Most of the territory controlled by the FNLA is in the north, along the Zairian border. On November 11, the FNLA and the third independence group, UNITA, formalized a shaky alliance by declaring themselves to be the legitimate government, with their capital in the southern Angolan city of Huambo.

Most of the FNLA's aid over the years has flowed through Zaire, with the United States furnishing the majority of outside support. The FNLA is now also receiving aid from Belgium, West Germany, France, Zaire, and South Africa. The Chinese provided assistance to Zaire and the FNLA until a few months ago, when they began withdrawing their support, and by the end of October all their advisors were out.

UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) was formed in 1966 under its current leader, Jonas Savimbi. Its base is among the Ovimbundu people, who comprise 38% of the population. UNITA's strength is in the southern part of Angola.


UNITA did not receive significant outside help during its nine years of struggle for independence until earlier this year, when Savimbi, in the words of a government source, "went begging to any embassy that would give him some money." Since then, UNITA has received help from the United States, Britain, Zambia, and South Africa.

the 1973 coup. State's African bureau in June recommended almost unanimously that the United States stay out of Angola. Moreover, Davis, according to an official directly involved, warned that "neither Savimbi or Roberto are good fighters — in fact, they couldn't fight their way out of a paper bag. Its the wrong game and the players we got are losers."

Since President Ford's decision, the United States has maintained a "two-track" policy toward events in Angola. Secretary Kissinger continues to publicly decry Soviet and Cuban intervention, supporting the call of the Organization

for African Unity for negotiations between the combatants and an end to outside interference. On the second track, the U.S. government itself intervenes by sending funds and arms to UNITA and FNLA. In addition to this covert assistance, the Administration is requesting an unprecedented increase in open aid to Zaire in FY 1976, as the graph below indicates. The Administration has come close to admitting that this assistance will be used in Angola, in spite of a congressional prohibition on providing aid to countries which pass it on to other parties or use it for non-defensive purposes — both of which Zaire has been doing in behalf of the FNLA.

ANGOLA: BACKGROUND NOTES



Size: With over 481,000 square miles, Angola is twice the size of Texas. Angola lies on the southwest coast of Africa, bordered by Zaire, Zambia, and Southwest Africa (Namibia). Included in its territory is Cabinda, a small coastal area north of the Congo River estuary bordered by Congo.

Population: Approximately 6 million people, with population centers in the west coastal and plateau regions.

Ethnic Groups: Angola's three primary ethnic groups are the Bakongo in the north; the Kimbundu and the Ovimbundu in the south.

Resources: Angola produces coffee, sugar, cotton, tobacco, and other foodstuffs. The country is considered to be potentially one of the richest in southern Africa, with large resources of oil, diamonds, and iron ore.

History: Angola, a Portuguese colony for 500 years, was granted independence on November 11, 1975.


Strategic importance: Angola is strategically located in southern Africa. Its major ports provide the primary outlet into the Atlantic Ocean for Zambia and Zaire, and its railroads provide the major outlet for Zambian and Zairian copper. It is also located north of Namibia (Southwest Africa), the colony of South Africa, which the United Nations and the World Court have ruled is held illegally by South Africa.

per capita income: Approximately \$200 per person (1973 figure)

Foreign Investment: The Portuguese lead in foreign investments in Angola. American corporations have approximately \$240 million capital investment in Angola, almost 90% by Gulf Oil Company which has the rights to the oil in Cabinda. Texaco has a marketing operation in Angola, and other oil companies have some operations there.

Source: State Department.

U.S. AID TO ZAIRE FY75-76 (in millions of U.S. \$)



Source: (unless otherwise indicated)
"Foreign Assistance and Related Appropriations"
Senate Hearings before the Committee on Appropriations FY '76 p. 1467

(1) Economic Aid--
Breakdown of FY '76 figure as follows (in millions of U.S. \$)

8.0 PL 489 (Food For Peace)
.6 Population Grant
22.7 Security Assistance
11.0 Commodity Credit Corporation Credits
(Source: Zaire, Desk, State Department)
2.6 Other

N.B. Total FY '76 Figure

Does Not include a requested \$29 million from Ex-IM Bank. This figure is down from \$56 million in FY '75, due to "severe liquidity problems" in Zaire, according to an official at Ex-IM Bank

THE ZAIRE / ANGOLA CONNECTION

The following exchange took place between Senator Daniel Inouye (D-Hawaii) and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger before the Senate Appropriations Committee on November 20, 1975:

Inouye: "Is Zaire providing military or economic assistance to any of the warring factions in Angola?"

Kissinger: "I think Zaire has a major national interest in the future of Angola since its major outlet to the sea goes through Angola, and, therefore, the orientation that controls Angola will have a sort of stranglehold on Zaire, too. So I believe that it is certainly giving some economic assistance."

Inouye: "If that is the case, would you say that we are providing some indirect subsidies to Angolan insurgents?"

Kissinger: "I think that would be correct."

PROHIBITION ON TRANSFER OF FUNDS

Sec. 505 — Conditions of Eligibility of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as Amended, is excerpted below:

(a) In addition to such other provisions as the President may require no defense articles shall be furnished to any country on a grant basis unless it shall have agreed that -

(1) it will not, without the consent of the President -

(A) permit any use of such articles by anyone not an officer, employee, or agent of that country,

(B) transfer, or permit any officer, employee or agent of that country to transfer such articles by gift, sale, or otherwise, or

(C) use or permit the use of such articles for purposes other than those for which furnished;

South African Intervention

The outside power with the largest direct involvement in Angola currently is white supremacist South Africa. South African troops entered Angola as early as August, and on September 9 South African Defense Minister Botha admitted that the country's troops had secured the Ruacana Falls hydroelectric project inside the Angolan border, across from South African-controlled Namibia. The South Africans then escalated considerably in late October, according to reliable U.S. intelligence sources, and their forces started to move deep into Angola. There are now two separate mechanized South African units, with a strength between 1,000 and 1,500 men, operating inside Angola. Additionally, the South Africans have equipped and otherwise supported yet another armored column of about 1500 Africans and 500 white mercenaries which has driven the MPLA out of many key positions in southern Angola, ostensibly on behalf of UNITA and FNLA. The South African government has censored its own press concerning its involvement in Angola, but on November 29, *Die Burger*, the official paper of the ruling National Party, reported that the fighting in Angola has become a "mobile conventional war", in which South Africa is providing "brain power, advice and supplies" to the two Western backed independence groups. A November 23 article in the *Washington Post* reported that not only were South African regular troops fighting hundreds of miles into Angola, but that these forces were supplied from permanent South African military bases on the South-West African border with Angola, from which "regular airlifts of military equipment were made deep into Angola by C-130 transport aircraft."

United States-South African Collaboration?

The extensive South African and U.S. intervention in Angola places the United States in a *de facto* alliance with the apartheid regime, raising the possibility that the governments are secretly cooperating. Certainly, the South African leadership hopes to bring the United States into open support of its position in Angola, as it has already proposed. When the South African-backed troops driving northward towards Luanda were reportedly stalled in their efforts, the South African press began to call on the

Western powers to begin open support of their allies in Angola. An MPLA counter-offensive would force the South Africans to ask for even greater intervention.

United States and South African cooperation in southern Africa is not unknown. In the early 1960's, South African intelligence worked closely with the CIA to recruit mercenary forces for the Congolese civil war, according to intelligence sources. This collaboration was part of what three independent Administration sources describe as a "close" liaison relationship which the CIA has maintained with South African intelligence for years.

Administration spokesmen deny any connection with South Africa. One State Department official noted as the reason for State Department opposition to intervention in Angola that the United States will certainly "be tainted with the South African brush." He also noted that the United States is building up an increasing debt to the South Africans who "are not at all adverse to calling in their markers."

However close the cooperation between the United States and South Africa, the extent of South African intervention in Angola has already caused tremors throughout Africa. Uganda's President Idi Amin who had severely criticized the Soviet intervention in Angola, warned the FNLA and UNITA that the African states "may have to review their positions on the Angolan situation and their attitude to your two parties in particular," because of the reports of South African assistance in the fighting.

Both Nigeria and Tanzania, important African states, now recognize the MPLA government, having changed their position of neutrality after learning of the South African role. Ethiopia has announced that it may also alter its position. The Organization of African Unity has called a foreign minister's meeting on the Angolan situation for December 18, 1975.



THE IMPLICATIONS OF COVERT ACTION

The intervention in Angola is a CIA covert action program. It need not have been: the President could have acted openly, come before the Congress and made the case for intervention. The decision to act in secrecy was not simply a tactical choice; it has broad consequences for American policy in Angola.

Hidden from Whom?

The CIA intervention in Angola is not a secret to the combatants there, to the leaders of other African countries or to the USSR. The primary victims of secrecy are the Congress and the American people. Covert intervention enables the President to avoid submitting his policy to the public and Congressional scrutiny which open policies must endure.

Generally, a President faced with a hard or controversial choice in foreign policy must address many audiences. Within the bureaucracy, opponents of the policy have their day in court. New commitments of resources require Congressional approval and come under debate in the Congress, the press and the public. One result is that public policies generally do not stray too far out of touch with what the public will condone.

All of this is avoided with secret policies. Covert action projects usually originate in the Clandestine Services branch of CIA, and are approved by the 40 Committee, an inter-departmental committee of five members. Generally the appropriate intelligence analysts in the CIA and country desk officers in the State Department are not consulted or informed. Any disagreement within the bureaucracy is closely guarded and severely restricted. Finally, a covert policy simply avoids Congressional and public discussion.

In a Lou Harris poll released November 21, 1975 at the Democratic Issues Conference in Louisville, Kentucky, the following opinions of the American people were reported:

* A solid majority, 75% - 18%, believe it would be wrong for the U.S. to commit soldiers to another war like Vietnam.

* 72% of the people feel this country should avoid all guerilla-type wars in the future, and involvement where it appears we are participating in civil wars in another country.

The ability to act secretly has policy consequences. A President is much more likely to decide to intervene simply because it can be done without expending the time and effort to gain public support and congressional approval. Proponents of covert action often argue, as William Colby did in his statement to the *Pacem in Terris IV* convocation on December 4, 1975, that although covert action was misused in the past, "a

situations truly important to the country" in the future. By their very nature, however, clandestine operations are most attractive not for situations clearly important to our defense, but precisely in those instances in which the intervention would be controversial, the national interest unclear.

The decision to intervene in Angola illustrates this clearly. Angola presented a situation in which a national liberation movement equipped and armed by the USSR was competing with other movements for power in a country not of vital concern to the United States. The response could have been to intervene, to protest Soviet intervention or to do nothing. The African bureau of the State Department was almost unanimously opposed to intervention. Since Secretary Kissinger was ardently in favor of intervention and served as chairman of the 40 Committee, it is difficult to believe that the objections received much consideration.

President Ford chose to intervene, supporting FNLA and UNITA with \$50 million. Given the current absence of consensus on foreign policy, it is at least doubtful that he would have made the same decision if he had been required to win Congressional approval for the funds. Finally, it is unlikely that the Congress, struggling with the domestic economy and sharing the public disenchantment for U.S. intervention in Indochina, would have appropriated the funds to intervene in the civil war in Angola.

Secret Commitments

President Ford was not faced with a decision to intervene for the first time in Angola. He was presented with a 40 Committee recommendation for a covert action program in support of a longtime American client facing increasing pressure from a Soviet-supported group. The secret commitment of the CIA to Holden Roberto and FNLA significantly altered the bureaucratic perception of the situation in Angola. The Soviet assistance to MPLA was viewed as a "test" of American mettle primarily because the CIA had long supported Holden Roberto in Angola.

In Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau, the Soviet Union also provided extensive aid to marxist liberation groups, but this did not trigger American involvement. In Angola, the administration's response reflected the established secret commitment to Roberto and the ties with Mobutu in Zaire. Without these, the dramatic increase in Soviet assistance to MPLA might have produced private American remonstrations to the USSR, or even a visible effort to align African and international opinion against Soviet interference, but direct covert intervention would have been

The CIA is, as its director William Colby suggests, "merely an instrument of American foreign policy," but its activities and capabilities may create or foreclose options which greatly influence substantive decisions. The CIA, like the inexpensive handgun known as the "Saturday Night Special," is an instrument more likely to be used simply because it is there.

Angola — A Congressional Oversight

In December, 1974, Congress passed the Hughes-Ryan Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act (P.L. 93-559). The amendment prohibits the expenditure of any funds for any covert action project "unless and until the President finds that each such operation is *important to the national security* of the United States." [emphasis added]

CIA Director Colby testified in executive session that the United States has no strategic interests in Angola. His statement was supported by NSSM 39, a 1969 National Security Council analysis of American policy toward southern Africa which concluded that "the United States does not have vital security interests" in the entire area of southern Africa, much less in Angola alone. Only the most expansive definition of "national security" could provide the basis for the finding required by law. According to congressional sources, President Ford has made that determination.

The Ryan Amendment also requires the President to report the details of any covert action project "in a timely fashion" to six committees of Congress. Introducing the amendment to the Senate on October 2, 1974, Senator Hughes (D-Iowa) called it the "beginning . . . of imposing some order and structure to . . . exercise a measure of control over the cloak and dagger operations of the U.S. government."

After the act was passed, each of the six oversight committees—the Armed Services, Foreign Relations, and Appropriations Committees of the House and Senate — delegated the authority to receive briefings to a handful of senior members. To brief six committees, CIA officials had only to inform about fifteen representatives about the agency's covert actions abroad. These few, bound by secrecy regulations and fearful of leaks, have neither informed their colleagues nor curtailed the CIA's activities abroad.

When Senator Dick Clark (D-Iowa), chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Africa, heard about the Angolan intervention, he demanded a briefing for the entire Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Although only three or four Senators appeared for the briefing, those present expressed serious objections to the enterprise. Senator Clark now states that his hands are tied. He cannot go public with the information, he informed CNSS Associate John Marks, because "if I were to tell you that the United States was involved in covert activities in Angola, I could be kicked out of the Senate." In theory, he cannot even inform his colleagues in the Senate without exposing himself to similar

sanctions. Learning about the activities in executive session has severely circumscribed his freedom of action.

Senator Clark's experience demonstrates the limits of congressional oversight of covert operations. The 1974 Act which many hoped might limit covert operations abroad may serve only to make the Congress complicitous in acts which it neither initiates nor can hope to control.

In 1974, Congress also passed the War Powers Act to control Presidential war-making. According to the Administration, however, the Act does not apply to the CIA or to civilian or mercenary troops engaged in conflicts. Thus the Act is said not to apply to American pilots reportedly flying Forward Air Control planes (FAC's) in combat operations in Angola. As a result a covert CIA operation enables the President to avoid the reporting requirements of the Act, further diluting the ability of Congress even to learn about American intervention, much less to control it.

WHO DECIDED TO INTERVENE IN ANGOLA?

Approval for a clandestine operation is given by the top-secret "40 Committee", which is directly accountable to the President. At the time of the decision to escalate CIA involvement in Angola, the "40 Committee" was made up of the following individuals:

Henry Kissinger, Chairman Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs	Gen. George Brown Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
William Clements Deputy Secretary of Defense	William E. Colby Director, CIA
Joseph Sisco Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs	

Open Secret

The CIA intervention in Angola is no longer secret. That it continues in spite of being revealed suggests that its secrecy was not directed at the Angolans. "Overt covert action" may become a new weapon in the President's arsenal. It enables the President to retain a closed decision-making process and to act unilaterally, and later allow the Congress and the public to know about the policy. The President can then claim that congressional and popular acquiescence ratifies the policy. Congress, of course, is always more reluctant to interfere with an on-going operation than to defeat a proposal for a new commitment or operation.

WHY ARE WE IN ANGOLA?

Ever since the end of World War II, we have justified our mindless meddling in the affairs of others on the ground that since the Russians do it, we must do it too. The time is at hand to re-examine that thesis.

*Senator Frank Church
Speech on "Covert Action:
Swampland of American Foreign Policy"
Pacem in Terris Convocation*

Angola, like Vietnam before it, is of little intrinsic interest to the United States. As noted above, the 1969 National Security Council study, NSSM 39, concluded that, "Although the United States has many interests in southern Africa, it has none which could be classified as vital security interests." Secretary of State Henry Kissinger reiterated this view in his press conference on November 10, 1975, noting that "We have no United States interest to pursue in Angola." The outcome of the struggle in Angola is simply unrelated to our nation's defense.

Administration spokesmen are now fond of offering economic rationales for many American defense policies. Angola has great wealth in resources, but the present total value of fixed American investment is quite small, the vast majority of it held by one company, the Gulf Oil Corporation. Ironically, Gulf officials do not share the Administration's fears about the MPLA. On November 15, Gerald Bender reported in the *Los Angeles Times* that Gulf officials had communicated their reservations about American intervention to the State Department. Direct American economic interests are not at stake in Angola, and any Angolan government will encourage trade relationships with the United States.

The defense of democratic freedoms is also not at issue. The suppression of democratic liberties in Angola did not stimulate significant American concern during the years of Portuguese colonialism. It is also unclear which, if any, of the three competing movements would establish a constitutional democracy in Angola.

Why are we in Angola? CIA Director William Colby informed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the primary reason the Administration is intervening in Angola is that U.S. assistance is the only way to prevent the Soviet-backed MPLA from forcefully taking control of the country. Two inter-related explanations are offered for the concern generated by the prospect of an MPLA victory.

A Soviet Satellite?

One version rings with traditional Cold War fervor, rather than the softer tones of detente. Put simply, the charge is that the Soviet Union intends to "colonize Africa," as Daniel P. Moynihan informed the *Pacem in Terris* convocation on December 2, 1975. This is the

MPLA would establish a "Soviet satellite" in Angola which would, as U.N. Ambassador Daniel P. Moynihan claims, "considerably control the oil shipping lanes from the Persian Gulf to New York." The explanation makes three major assumptions: that the USSR intends to establish a satellite in Angola; that MPLA would follow Soviet dictates; and that a Soviet satellite would constitute a threat to the United States.

The intentions of the USSR in Angola are far from clear. The Soviet Union has been the prime source of support for most of the anti-colonial movements in southern Africa, and has given aid to MPLA for years. In the fall of 1975, Soviet aid to MPLA began to increase significantly, and has escalated rapidly over the past months. The initial Soviet escalation may have been a response to the supplies and reinforcements which Holden Roberto and the FNLA were receiving from Zaire. Indeed, many Administration sources state that the June decision by Ford and Kissinger to escalate aid to FNLA and UNITA sparked the Soviet intervention. The massive Soviet reaction in turn triggered a response by the CIA, Zaire and South Africa. By September, MPLA faced the intervention of the South Africans in the south. Spokesmen in the State Department agree that some of the Soviet assistance, and the recent arrival of Cuban advisors, may have been a reaction to the intervention of South Africa.

Whatever the intention of the USSR, the tragic reality is that all of the competing groups in Angola are now receiving and using far more deadly weapons to fight one another than were ever available to oppose Portuguese colonialism.

Even assuming rapacious Soviet designs, the belief that a victorious MPLA would serve as a Soviet satellite is contradicted by the stance of the MPLA, and the Soviet experience in Africa and elsewhere. MPLA is an independent, socialist movement with a national base, not merely a Soviet puppet. According to Kenneth L. Adelman writing in *Foreign Affairs* in February, 1975, Agostinho Neto of MPLA is personally close to Mario Soares, currently the American favorite in Portugal, and certainly an ardent anti-communist.

MPLA spokesmen have repeatedly stated that they intend to establish a non-aligned and independent government. Adelman reports that Neto went to the USSR for aid only after being refused by the United States. In an October interview with members of the Southern Africa Committee, Paulo Jorge, part of the MPLA delegation to the United Nations, stated that, "We can assure you that we have fought for 14 years for the complete independence of the Angolan people, not to be under the umbrella of another power or another country." The *Washington Post* reported on November 15 that MPLA had turned down a Soviet

This stance is supported by the history of other Soviet-supported liberation movements in Africa. Both Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique are now run by Marxist, Soviet-aided national liberation movements, but neither serves as a Soviet satellite. Prime Minister Joachim Chissano of Mozambique has refused to allow Soviet warships the use of that country's ports. David Ottaway of the *Washington Post* recently reported on December 3 that Chissano publicly rebuked the USSR for placing too much pressure on his government. Similarly, Uganda's Idi Amin, a recipient of large-scale Soviet military assistance has bitterly criticized the USSR's activities in Angola, and recently sparked a rupture between the two countries.

Historically, the USSR has had little success in dominating any movement which has come to power with an independent national base. As Richard J. Barnet of the Institute for Policy Studies notes, "Every revolutionary government that has come to power without the Red Army has turned out to be ambivalent, cool or even hostile to the Soviet Union," including China, Yugoslavia, North Vietnam, Albania, and Cuba.

If our concern were actually to avoid the creation of a Soviet satellite in southern Africa, our policy might more profitably support MPLA's independence, rather than force greater dependence on Soviet aid and assistance by intervening on the other side. CIA Director William Colby suggested in his executive session testimony that our purpose in Angola was to force a negotiated settlement between the three independence groups. Thus far, however, our intervention has caused, as one well-placed State Department official noted, "a mutual ante-raising, an inconclusive situation, and a hell of a lot of dead Angolans."

Even if MPLA were to act as a Soviet satellite in southern Africa, it would still not constitute a threat to our defense. Some suggest that the USSR would use air and sea bases in Angola to threaten sea lanes around the Cape of Good Hope, endangering our access to oil. A good geopolitical imagination can develop several other possibilities. Yet the threat seems plausible only in the event of a lengthy conventional war between the United States and the USSR, an extraordinarily unlikely prospect for two Great Powers armed with nuclear weapons.

There was no need for the United States to choose sides. Angola provides the United States with an opportunity to set a more worthy example in foreign policy. To this end Washington could declare its readiness to establish relations based on the principle of mutuality of interest with whomever ends up governing Angola. It could seek from the Soviet Union a mutual agreement not to engage in an Angola war by proxy. It could prove to itself and the world that it did learn something in Vietnam.

John Marcum
 President African Studies Association
 Address to its 1975 annual conference

The Nixon Doctrine in Africa

The more sophisticated justification for Administration concern with Soviet intervention has been outlined by Secretary of State Kissinger. Kissinger chastized the USSR for having "introduced great-power rivalry into Africa for the first time in 15 years," and views Soviet intervention as a violation of the rules of the game in Africa, a violation "incompatible with the spirit of relaxation of tensions." Soviet intervention becomes a test of American will, and "the United States cannot be indifferent while an outside power embarks upon an interventionist policy . . ."

The Kissinger explanation reveals the basic principles of current American policy abroad, reflecting the bureaucratic lessons drawn from Vietnam. Since the much heralded "great debate" about foreign policy has not yet taken place, these lessons are still best formulated in the Nixon Doctrine, outlined in the first State of the World address on February 18, 1970. The fundamental premise of the Nixon Doctrine was that the United States would retain all of its commitments, and continue to define and police an international order in various regions of the world. The USSR and nationalist movements are still viewed as the major threat to that order. In this context, detente is the attempt to encourage the Soviet Union to accept the American definition of order in exchange for a relaxation of tensions.

The Vietnam debacle forced a change only in the strategy of effecting this objective. The lesson drawn by the national security bureaucracy from the war was simply that the American people would not support a lengthy intervention costly in American treasure and lives. The Nixon Doctrine announced that the U.S. would "look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing manpower for its defense." It was necessary, as U.S. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker said about Vietnamization, to "change the color of the corpses."

The Nixon Doctrine does not exclude the possibility of direct American military intervention. Indeed, a world power must periodically use force to demonstrate the continued will to do so. The lesson from Vietnam was that intervention could not be gradual or depend upon large numbers of American troops. Current theory would begin with a massive application of American airpower. The Forward Air Controllers (FAC's) now in Angola were used in Vietnam to target bombing missions.

Angola may represent a "test case" for the Nixon Doctrine. Faced with Soviet violation of the rules of the game, the U.S. has reacted by providing large covert military assistance to the FNLA and Zaire. It looks to Zaire — and ultimately to South Africa — to enforce regional stability. If covert assistance is insufficient the country will face the prospect of further escalation.

The Global Policeman

There is, of course, an alternative to the Administration's imperial perspective. In an area in which the U.S. has no vital defense interests, the President could react to Soviet escalation by rallying African and international opinion to condemn outside interference. By encouraging others to act collectively, the United States would share the right to define and enforce the "rules of the game." The United States would thereby avoid tragic entanglements in conflicts unrelated to the nation's defense. The Chinese adopted this position in late October, terminating assistance to Zaire and

FNLA and joining with the OAU to condemn the involvement of outside powers.

The secret intervention in Angola demonstrates that, in spite of the defeat in Indochina and the chaotic situation at home, our national security managers still assume that the United States must police a self-defined order in regions of the Third World. For the United States, the implication is that we may once again be involved in a costly conflict in a distant land. For Angola, the result is that the United States and the Soviet Union may be prepared to fight a proxy war, down to the last Angolan.

CONGRESSIONAL UP-DATE

Because of growing concern in Congress about the use of covert funds in the Angola war, several bills have been offered prohibiting the expenditures of such funds and limiting the President's ability to wage an undeclared war. The following is a brief summary of legislation concerning Angola:

Senate

- The Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance unanimously approved a Clark amendment on December 16 stating that no U.S. funds can be used for covert military assistance to any party in the Angolan conflict, unless the President submits a written report stating the amount and justification for his requests. In any case, the President cannot authorize Angola aid until 30 days after his request, by which time Congress, by simple majority, can vote against it. This Amendment, originally offered by Senator Dick Clark (D-Iowa), to the Security Supporting Assistance Act of 1975 will not be voted on by either house until after the Christmas recess, and probably not until early February 1976.

- Senator John Tunney (D-Calif), along with Senators Alan Cranston, Dick Clark, Edward Kennedy and others, has offered an amendment to the Defense Appropriations bill, which, if adopted, would prohibit any covert money within that bill for any activities other than intelligence

gathering purposes in Angola. Nevertheless, even quick passage of this amendment would not cut off CIA funding of the Angolan conflict because money appropriated in other bills could still be used.

- Senator Thomas Eagleton (D-Mo) has offered an amendment to the Security Supporting Assistance bill that would prevent the Administration from sending civilians into "paramilitary operations" as has been done in Angola. This amendment would close a loophole left by the War Powers Act of 1973 which bars the President only from sending military personnel into combat situations without prior consultation with Congress.

House of Representatives

- Cong. Don Bonker (D-Wash) and Cong. Michael Harrington (D-Mass) have introduced legislation to the Security Assistance bill. One amendment would bar aid to Zaire "unless and until the President determines and certifies to Congress that Zaire agrees not to furnish such assistance to any group claiming governmental powers in Angola." The second amendment would bar any assistance, directly or indirectly, to Angola.

- The Congressional Black Caucus made a statement opposing the intervention of non-Angolan powers in the civil war, and deplored the apparent alignment of the United States with South Africa.

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Organizations to Contact

For further information on the Angola situation, contact the following organizations:

Project on Southern Africa
Courtland Cox
Center for National Security
Studies

122 Maryland Ave. NE
Washington, D.C. 20002
(202) 544-5380

Washington Office on Africa
110 Maryland Ave. NE
Washington, D.C. 20002

American Committee on Africa
305 East 46th St
New York, N.Y. 10016

Southern Africa Magazine
Southern Africa Committee
Fifth Floor
244 West 27th St.
New York, N.Y. 10001

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