

THE MAN WHO CAME IN FROM THE COLD. MAYBE.

and fired .45 caliber bullets into his auto. The similarity to the Veciana shooting apparently ends there however, because Muniz was an enemy of anti-Castro militants due to his sympathy with attempts to ease tensions between exiles and the Cuban government.

Veciana, now 50, was a Havana accountant who fled Cuba in 1961 and founded Alpha 66 in Puerto Rico in 1962. He directed many raids against Cuba during the 1960's and has been named as the organizer of several unsuccessful assassination attempts on Castro, the last occurring in 1971 when Castro visited Chile.

Veciana is also the source of the Maurice Bishop story. In 1976, Veciana told Gaeton Fonzi (then a staff investigator for Senator Richard Schweiker's Intelligence subcommittee) that an American named Bishop, who Veciana believed to be an intelligence officer, had directed him in all of his covert activities from 1961-71, including the Castro assassination tries. According to Veciana, in August 1963, when he arrived in the lobby of a Dallas office building to meet with Bishop, his mysterious contact was already there talking to a young man. Veciana was not introduced at that time, but after the JFK assassination he recognized Lee Oswald as the man he had seen with Bishop.

On July 30, 1978 the HSCA released a composite sketch of Bishop, produced from a detailed description provided by Veciana, but the committee was unable to identify him. Based on circumstantial evidence some investigators believe Bishop is former CIA man David Phillips. (Phillips denies it and so does Veciana). The HSCA investigated the Phillips/Bishop evidence thoroughly, but inconclusively, and the Veciana allegation about Oswald also remains an "indeterminate" mystery. (See HSCA Volume X, pps. 37-56).

Veciana now lives with his wife and children in the Miami area and works mainly at a marine supply store, which he refers to as "the family business." He also has a few investments and dabbles in boxing promotions, which he had been doing for many years in Puerto Rico.

In recent years he has been termed a "non-active" member of Alpha 66. Although he is still involved in the exile movement, "he's way behind the scenes at this point," says one source close to him. "You won't see or hear of him coming forth as a spokesman as he had been doing years ago. But he told me once that more than anything else in his life he wants to kill Castro."

—J.G.

One of the more intriguing figures in the JFK assassination case is Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko, a former KGB officer who defected to the United States fifteen years ago with a story to tell about Lee Harvey Oswald's sojourn in the Soviet Union. Nosenko was the highest-ranking Soviet intelligence officer ever to defect to the United States, and for a brief moment he enjoyed his status as a major prize of the spy wars. But soon the CIA began to doubt the truth of his information and to suspect he might be a Soviet penetration agent—a "mole." The agency clapped him into a five-year imprisonment, complete with torture. Years later, after a bitter internal dispute within the CIA, his tormentors changed their minds again, declared him a good-faith defector, and brought him onto the CIA payroll as a consultant. There he remained for ten years until a congressional investigating committee fingered him as a suspicious character and a liar after all, raising again the question of whether he might also be a Soviet mole, as had originally been suspected.

These sharp changes in Nosenko's fortunes with the CIA define the main twists of a spy story that has become basic to our understanding of the JFK assassination, the conflict within the CIA, the apparent murder a year ago of a covert CIA officer named John Paisley, and the still-unfolding drama of alleged Soviet moles in the top levels of the CIA. Dormant for years, the Nosenko affair may now be growing into the most important spy story since that of Nathan Hale.

Oswald reached Moscow in October, 1959, announced his defection, and applied for citizenship in the Soviet Union. His quid pro quo was that he had important military secrets to divulge, an offer that (as we now know) put him in the secret sights of the Second Directorate of the KGB's Seventh Department, the unit responsible for counterintelligence surveillance of tourists and defectors. Yuri Nosenko was deputy chief of this unit. Thus, he was the administrator of the KGB's Oswald file.

In the Soviet Union, Oswald was an enthusiastic comrade at first, but then grew disenchanted and homesick. In February, 1961, he applied to the U.S. embassy in Moscow for repatriation to the states. In March, he met Marina Pruskova. In April, he married her. A year later, in June, 1962, he and Marina left the Soviet Union for Texas.

Nosenko, then serving as the KGB security escort to the Soviet delegation at the arms-control talks in Geneva, also made a big move that month. He found a private place and moment to ask an American diplomat to put him in touch with an appropriate U.S. intelligence officer. He had a proposal to make.

Soon Nosenko was talking secretly with the CIA's Geneva counterintelligence officer, Tennant "Pete" Bagley. Nosenko's story was that he had gone on a foolish drunken spree and spent nine hundred Swiss francs belonging to the KGB. He had to replace it quickly. Otherwise he would be discovered, fired, and heavily penalized. But if the United States could meet his small financial needs, he could survive. For such support, Nosenko would supply certain pieces of information in which he was sure the United States would be interested, such as the location of the KGB bugs in the American embassy in Moscow or the identities of Soviet agents working within the U.S. intelligence system. He did not want to defect overtly. He had a family in the Soviet Union. He would not give them up. Nor would he talk to the CIA inside the Soviet Union, only when he was in Geneva.

Bagley encouraged Nosenko. An agent-in-place was the most useful of all defectors, because he could maintain a constant flow of fresh intelligence and be directed toward specific targets.

But soon a doubt began to form in Bagley's mind about Nosenko. The problem was with the quality of intelligence Nosenko was delivering. A previous Soviet defector, Anatoli Golitsin (called Mr. X in the House Select Committee on Assassinations' final report), had given the U.S. much the same information in even sharper form. The Soviets knew, of course, that Golitsin had already divulged or compromised the information that Nosenko was now fobbing off as hot



new stuff. As Bagley later told the assassinations committee in executive session, he had begun to think that Nosenko was in fact "a sent KGB agent dispatched to deflect and negate" the authentic information of Golitsin. Bagley came to think, moreover, that Nosenko was not the man he said he was, that he had never been the deputy chief of the Second Directorate, that he had never administered Oswald's KGB file, and that the whole story was a "legend," a cover story for a deep-penetration mission.

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In September of 1963, Oswald was in Mexico City. He applied at the Soviet embassy for a visa to the Soviet Union. Nosenko later told his CIA and FBI questioners that he had personally reviewed and rejected this application, even though he was not now connected with the Second Directorate. He also said that in late November, after the killings in Dallas, he had reviewed the entire KGB Oswald file.

But now came a sudden change. On January 23, 1964, on Nosenko's first visit to Geneva after the assassination of JFK, Nosenko told Bagley that he had changed his mind about defecting. He was disillusioned with the Soviet system. His family would be taken care of. He wanted to come to the United States and begin a new life.

Bagley hesitated. His suspicions of Nosenko had not yet hardened but were hard to deny. He put Nosenko off.

Then, a week and a half later, Nosenko forced the issue. On February 4, he informed Bagley that he had just received a wire from KGB headquarters calling him home. He was sure he had been found out or was about to be. If he went back to Moscow, he would never come out again. It was now or never. Bagley swallowed his misgivings, and the CIA spirited Nosenko off to Washington. He was almost a free man.

Nosenko had already been questioned twice about Oswald by the CIA while he was still in Geneva, on January 23 and 30, 1964. Having arrived in the states in late February, he was questioned again on Oswald, this time by the FBI.

The FBI accepted Nosenko's story of Oswald's stay in the Soviet Union—that the KGB had been hardly interested in Oswald at all, that it had carried out only the most perfunctory and routine surveillance of his activities, and that in no way—this was the bottom line and the real point—was Oswald a KGB assassin in Dallas. Nosenko's message was: Oswald may have looked like a juicy intelligence morsel, but the KGB had declined the bait, had paid him no special attention, and if he had killed the president, the U.S.S.R. was not to blame.

A plausible message. What Soviet need to see JFK eliminated could have been so piercing as to motivate the immense risk of an assassination scheme? But senior officers of the CIA, like Bagley, did not accept his claim.

What made Nosenko's story impossible for the CIA to accept in those early days was what he said about Oswald and the KGB. For what Nosenko told his CIA questioners about the KGB's attitude toward Oswald didn't correspond at all with the CIA's best idea of the Soviet spy manual. The CIA could not believe that the Soviets would ignore a target like Oswald, who bragged of his information on U.S. radar and hinted (some said) at knowledge of the U-2 aircraft—at that point the CIA's most secret secret. As Bagley told the House assassinations committee much later, "the KGB . . . would face an American swimming into their sea . . . like a pool of piranhas."

So when Nosenko said the piranhas only yawned at Oswald, Bagley couldn't believe it. Nosenko had to be lying. If he was lying about this, what else was he lying about?

And this was important. As then—deputy director of the CIA Richard Helms told the House committee last September, "It is difficult to overstate the significance that Yuri Nosenko's defection assumed in the investigation of President Kennedy's assassination. If Mr. Nosenko turned out to be a bona fide defector, if his information were to be believed, then we could conclude that the KGB and the Soviet Union had nothing to do with Lee Harvey Oswald in 1963 and therefore had nothing to do with President Kennedy's murder.

"If on the other hand," continued Helms, "Mr. Nosenko had been programmed in advance by the KGB to minimize KGB connections with Oswald, if Mr. Nosenko was giving us false information about Oswald's contacts with the KGB in 1959 to 1962, it was fair for us to surmise that there may have been an Oswald-KGB connection in November, 1963, more specifically that Oswald was acting as a Soviet agent when he shot President Kennedy.

"If it were shown that Oswald was in fact acting as a Soviet agent when he shot President Kennedy," Helms went on, "the consequences to the United States of America and indeed to the world, would have been staggering. Thus, it became a matter of the utmost importance to this government to determine the bona fides of Mr. Yuri Nosenko."

By March, 1964, Nosenko's credibility with the CIA had totally eroded. No one believed him about Oswald, and few believed him about anything else. Helms, Bagley (by this time promoted to deputy chief of the Soviet Bloc Division), and Bagley's superior, David Murphy, were united with the chief of CIA counterintelligence, James Angleton, in viewing Nosenko, as Bagley put it, as "a false defector on a disinformation mission."

Nosenko may have still thought at this time that he carried a little clout. Through the FBI, he offered to tell the Warren Commission all he knew about Oswald. The offer was rejected. Nosenko's name does not appear in the Warren Report.

On April 4, 1964, meeting what he thought was a doctor's appointment, Nosenko was arrested by the CIA and transported to a specially prepared safe house in North Arlington, Virginia, where he was confined in a cell that his current CIA defender, John Hart, told the committee was "most comparable to a bank vault." When Nosenko failed a lie-detector test, the CIA became convinced that he was an unregenerate Soviet agent. But Nosenko refused to budge from his story.

This led the CIA to the use of inquisitorial methods. Under the control of David Murphy's interrogation team—including John Paisley, an officer who will reenter the narrative much later as a corpse—Nosenko was isolated in solitary confinement in his CIA bank vault for more than three years. He was tortured during this time. Overall, the CIA kept him in custody for about five years.

The revelation last fall of this sorry episode was at once logged in as yet another CIA scandal. The CIA's John Hart, part of the pro-Nosenko group that took charge of Nosenko in 1968, flatly called it "an abomination."

To which Bagley replied before the committee, "Please bear in mind that I find this case . . . just as 'abominable' as Mr. Hart does. Its implications are ugly. It imposed immense and unpleasant tasks upon us and strains upon the agency, which are all too visible today in your committee's hearings."

The central problem facing the CIA, Bagley said, was "Nosenko's credibility and what lies behind his message to America concerning the KGB's relations with Lee Harvey Oswald." He went on, "The detention of Nosenko was designed initially to give us an opportunity to confront him with certain contradictions in his story . . . Our aim was, as Mr. Hart said, to get a confession: either of KGB sponsorship or of which lies could, finally, form some believable pattern."

The sticking point in Nosenko's story was his stubborn assertion that Oswald had not been of serious interest to the KGB. David Murphy told assassinations committee counsel Ken Klein, "The Soviet Union with foreigners don't do that," and went on to explain the importance to the Soviets of Oswald's technical knowledge of the U-2 spy plane. That Nosenko should maintain that the KGB did not question Oswald or closely watch his activities in the Soviet Union despite this knowledge, explained Murphy, "is one of the things that created an atmosphere of disbelief, [a feeling] that there must be something to this case that is important, vitally important, to the Soviet Union, and we can't understand it."

Nosenko had had other problems with the CIA as well. His leads had not been useful. Golitsin had already told it all. The CIA's background check was turning up indicators that Nosenko was not the



person he said he was. Two previous defectors whose usefulness to the U.S. had been established were skeptical of him. But his biggest problem remained his story about Oswald. That was the story he seemed to have come to tell, and that was the story no one could believe.

In 1966 Nosenko was given another polygraph examination. Again he failed. Helms knew, too, that Murphy and Bagley were preparing a gigantic document, called "The Thousand-Page Report," fully stating their argument that Nosenko was a KGB plant.

But Helms faltered at this point. "I made the decision," he told the committee, "that the case simply could not go on in that fashion; it had to be resolved." In October, 1967, Helms assigned Bruce Solie of the CIA Office of Security to review the case. Solie at once objected to the isolation of Nosenko and had him moved to comfortable quarters.

In February, 1968, the CIA Soviet Bloc Division submitted a four-hundred-page condensation of the original report, concluding that Nosenko was a liar. But Nosenko now had a CIA defender in Bruce Solie. Solie responded to the four hundred pages with eighteen pages of his own, criticizing the Murphy-Bagley conclusion and saying that Nosenko was a good-faith defector who was telling what he thought to be the truth about Oswald and the KGB. Solie recommended further interviews by new people and another lie-detector test.

Nosenko's third polygraph exam was administered in August, 1968, under the supervision of Solie's Office of Security rather than Murphy's Soviet Bloc Division. There is no ready explanation for the fact that Nosenko was said to have passed this third test. But ten years later, the House assassinations committee brought in an independent polygraph expert to review the 1964, 1966, and 1968 tests. The expert concluded that only the second of these was valid—one of the two, of course, that Nosenko failed. But that was ten years later. In 1968, the new test appeared to put Nosenko back on the sunny side of the CIA.

Then in October, 1968, Nosenko-advocate Solie issued an in-house memo disputing all the findings of the Murphy-Bagley report. "Nosenko," wrote Solie, "is identical to the person he claims to be." As for the Oswald-KGB question, said Solie, that was "an FBI matter." He had no reason to disbelieve Nosenko or question his sincerity on this point. Solie told the committee that he "did not have all the facts" on Oswald because Oswald was not a main area of CIA interrogation of Nosenko. The statement directly conflicted with Helms' testimony that Oswald's stay in Russia constituted—"no question about it"—a major area of CIA questioning of Nosenko.

Later in 1968, over the anguished protests of Murphy and Bagley, and their interrogation team, the CIA formally conceded Nosenko's good faith and authenticity. On the first of March, 1969, Nosenko was compensated for his time under arrest and "employed as an independent contractor for the CIA" at a salary of \$16,500 a year. "I was imprisoned for the whole five years," said Nosenko to the House assassinations committee, "and I started my life in the U.S.A. in April of 1969."

By 1973, Helms and James Angleton, strong Nosenko skeptics, had been pushed out of the agency. John Hart authored a CIA internal study of the Nosenko controversy and found that Nosenko, though not reliable on the Oswald-KGB question, was sincere.

Nosenko was thus vindicated. Soon he was lecturing CIA and FBI classes on Soviet intelligence. But his problems were not over.

In 1976 Congress created the House Select Committee on Assassinations to look into the controversies surrounding the murders of President Kennedy and Martin Luther King, Jr. By the middle of 1977, a deputy counsel for the committee, Ken Klein, was assigned full time to the Nosenko question. Said one of Klein's colleagues on the committee staff, "Kenny was in a bit over his head on Nosenko and the whole Kennedy case, but he worked on nothing but Nosenko for a year, and finally he broke him down."

The breaking of Nosenko, after all these years and efforts, took place early in the summer of 1978. Klein put Nosenko through some twenty hours of hostile interrogation, playing constantly upon the myriad contradictions and inconsistencies in Nosenko's story. "He just went to tatters when we got to him," said the staffer.

What did the breaking of Nosenko reveal? While the transcript of this particular encounter is not available, it is known that, in the end, "the committee was certain Nosenko had lied about Oswald."

Under the pressure of Klein's questioning, Nosenko changed his Oswald story in two particularly important respects. The first, key one involves the KGB file on Oswald. Nosenko formerly characterized this file as all but nonexistent. He insisted that the KGB had carried out no surveillance of Oswald and that he personally had "thoroughly reviewed Oswald's file." Now he told the Congress that this file comprised "seven or eight thick volumes," most of them containing "information relating to the surveillance" of Oswald by the KGB, and only one of which Nosenko said he had a chance to look at.

Second, Nosenko had always maintained that the KGB didn't know anything about Oswald's relationship with Marina until they were married. "There was no surveillance on Oswald to show that he knew her," he told the FBI in 1964. But in 1978, when counsel Klein asked him, "If [Oswald] met Marina on March 17, how long would you estimate it would take before the KGB would know about her?" Nosenko's answer was: "In the same March they would have quite a big batch of material on her."

So a completely different picture of the KGB's interest in Lee and Marina Oswald emerged, and with it a completely different picture of Nosenko's defection. The committee does not go so far as to say that Nosenko was—is—a Soviet plant. "In the end," reads its final report, "the committee [like the Warren Commission], was unable to resolve the Nosenko matter." But as a staff member confided shortly after the report was published last summer, "Yeah, basically I would really have to go with the theory that he's a plant."

Suppose this is correct. If Nosenko lied when he said that Oswald had not been closely watched and questioned by the KGB, was he also lying when he said that Oswald had not been recruited by the KGB and that he was not a Soviet agent or assassin when he returned to the states?

One's first impulse, of course, is to assume that whatever a liar says is the opposite of the truth. If Nosenko is a liar, and says Oswald was not a KGB agent, then Oswald must have been a KGB agent. If Nosenko, the liar, says that the Soviet Union did not send Oswald to kill Kennedy, then the Soviet Union must be the one to blame.

Is that what the CIA thought about the JFK assassination until the middle of 1968? *That the Russians did it?*

Bagley protested to the committee that, even though he thought Oswald a KGB agent, he did not think the Soviets had ordered him to kill Kennedy. Nosenko's "message," said Bagley, "hides the possibility that [Oswald] is or could have been a Soviet agent. [But] by 'Soviet agent' I don't mean a Soviet assassination agent. I mean something quite different . . . Perhaps he was a sleeper agent . . . They may have said, 'We will get in touch with you in time of war' . . . But then if he is on their rolls as a sleeper agent or for wartime sabotage or something of that sort, they would be absolutely shocked to hear their man had taken it upon himself to kill the American president." And as Bagley says elsewhere, "The Soviets have shown a proclivity to use tricky methods like this to give us messages through clandestine means." Thus, he thinks the KGB "might indeed change the mission of another man of another operation [Nosenko] in order to get this message over to us, that they really had nothing to do with [the assassination]."

But this fine distinction was lost as the CIA's interpretation of Oswald's alleged act percolated up to President Johnson. Earl Warren writes that he at first resisted Johnson's request that he head up the JFK inquiry, and that Johnson "then told me how serious were



the rumors floating around the world. The gravity of the situation was such that it might lead us into war, he said, and if so, it might be a nuclear war. He went on to tell me that he had just talked to Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, who had advised him that the first nuclear strike against us might cause the loss of forty million people. I then said, 'Mr. President, if the situation is that serious, my personal views do not count. I will do it.' He thanked me, and I left the White House."

What can this mean if not that the CIA's theory of the JFK assassination led Johnson, and thus Warren, to fear that the price of the truth in this case could easily be World War III? Nosenko's apparent lies about Oswald in Russia became the basis of that fear.

But this view of Nosenko and Oswald did not, and does not, prevail. The assassinations committee finally declared that "there is no evidence that the Soviet government had any interest in removing President Kennedy, nor is there any evidence that it planned to take advantage of the president's death before it happened or attempted to capitalize on it after it occurred." The committee concluded, therefore, "on the basis of the evidence available to it, that the Soviet government was not involved in the assassination."

Well, if it is true that Oswald was not a Russian agent assigned to shoot the president, then Nosenko told the truth on that count. If Nosenko is nevertheless thought to have lied substantially about Oswald and the KGB, what could be the explanation for his strange mixture of truth and lies?

And to come to the practical heart of the whole Nosenko mystery, why, if the Russians had nothing to do with Kennedy's death, would they have contrived so intricate a method of conveying this critical information as that of a false defector? Said Bagley, "Why they might have selected this channel to send [this information], and what truth may lie behind the story given to us, can only be guessed at . . . I couldn't find any logical or any illogical explanation for why [Nosenko] said what he said about Oswald."

A source on the assassinations committee staff expressed the same bewilderment: "You'd have to assume that Khrushchev and even Brezhnev would have had to make the decision to send Nosenko in here like that. And it would have looked so risky. I just can't see why they would have made that decision. When [Nosenko] breaks down, he sobs, he gets real bitter, and he says he doesn't care what we believe, but if we ever try to torture him again, the word is going straight out to Daniel Schorr!"

I needed clarification on this. Was there any suggestion that Nosenko had a *continuing* espionage role?

"No," said the source, "nobody says that. The theory is that he was sent to do the JFK stuff."

How does this bear on CIA internal power struggles?

"Well, Angleton and those people [i.e., the anti-Nosenko group] really had to go. They were the most sinister of all people there."

"Really?" I asked. "More sinister than William Colby?" (Colby took over from Helms as CIA head in 1973.)

"Oh, sure!"

"The Colby who supervised the assassination of some 50,000 Vietnamese people in Operation Phoenix?"

The source laughed. "Oh, well, that! But I mean, apart from mass murder, you know, Colby's pretty straight!"

I have a simpler explanation—a rather innocent explanation, in fact—for why the Soviet leadership might have chosen the Nosenko method of communicating to the United States leadership that Kennedy was not a Soviet victim.

Grant Bagley's point about the "piranhas" of the KGB and assume that Oswald, indeed, had been questioned at length and in detail by Soviet intelligence people. Assume, too, that the Soviets at the same time remained wary of Oswald and found him too unstable and mysterious for recruitment. The KGB took what it could get from him,

was very possibly surprised at the usefulness of his information, rewarded him with a nice job and a comfortable apartment and the privilege of owning and shooting a rifle, and kept him at arm's length.

So Oswald goes home, and in a year and a half, Kennedy is killed. The Soviets are shocked to see their friend Oswald accused, then killed himself. Their urgent review of the KGB Oswald file discloses that a paranoid imagination could easily be led to see Oswald as a KGB recruit. That was not true, but it *looked* true, just as though Oswald had been groomed for that very purpose. Was someone trying to frame the KGB for the Kennedy assassination? How could the Soviets convincingly inform the wounded, suspicious Americans that appearances were, in this case, deceiving? A convincing reassurance could not be given by officials because, if the assassination of JFK were an official Soviet act, naturally, Soviet officials would be sworn to keep it secret.

So if the Soviets' message that Oswald was not a KGB assassin were to be delivered as a fact commanding belief, then they would have to deliver it through somebody in a position to *know* it for a fact. That meant the message had to come from the KGB, because only someone from the KGB, and indeed from the specific KGB section that handled Oswald, could even begin to know whether Oswald was or was not a target of serious KGB surveillance while he was in Russia, or whether he was or was not dispatched to the United States as a sleeper, assassin, or whatever by the KGB.

In fact, such a message could only be delivered by a KGB defector. *KGB* in order to know the truth, and a *defector* in order to want to tell it to the Americans. No other communication channel would even be logical. No matter how risky the Nosenko method must have looked, the very logic of the situation, as in a game of chess, may have demanded it.

On the afternoon of September 25, 1978, ten days after John Hart, CIA, defended Nosenko before the House assassinations committee and just three days after Richard Helms, CIA, restated the case against him, the skipper of a crab boat in lower Chesapeake Bay looked up from his work to see bearing down on him a graceful sailing sloop, *Brillig*.

The wind was brisk. The *Brillig* was light in the water and clipped along in the light chop rapidly on a collision course. The crabber finally realized the *Brillig* had not seen him, though the day was clear. He hit his engines. He barely managed to clear the *Brillig's* charging bow. Angrily he radioed the Coast Guard to complain. It is not known if he noticed there was no one aboard the *Brillig*.

Coast Guardsmen discovered the empty sailboat grounded a few hours later, farther down the bay. Aboard they found an open jar of mustard and a half-made sandwich in the galley, a folding table torn off its hinges, secret CIA documents relating to Soviet military capability, and a highly classified burst transceiver, used only to transmit and receive sophisticated radio codes. The tiller was unlocked.

In just a few hours the *Brillig* was identified as John Paisley's craft and Paisley was identified as a "former" high-level official of the CIA now working for the agency on a consulting basis on a highly sensitive study of CIA assessments of Soviet capability. When last heard from in a routine radio call he had sent earlier that day, announcing that he was coming in, Paisley was aboard the *Brillig*. Now the *Brillig* was beached and Paisley was missing.

When Paisley's estranged wife, Maryann, heard of the beaching of the *Brillig*, she sent their son, Eddie, twenty-two, to check out his father's apartment. Eddie found the place ransacked and all of Paisley's papers gone. Several nine-millimeter bullets were scattered on the closet floor. Mrs. Paisley was all the more distressed to hear of this break-in because Paisley's apartment was in the same building, on the same floor, and off the same hallway as apartments of Soviet embassy employees whom Maryann Paisley knew to be under constant CIA surveillance.



On October 1 a year ago, the Coast Guard pulled a body from the bay. It was bloated and badly decomposed. Positive identification was impossible. But a consensus emerged among examiners, insurance agents, and two Paisley acquaintances who saw the body, that it was John Paisley's—despite such disturbing physical differences as the fact that Paisley stood 5'11", weighed 170 pounds, wore a beard and a full head of hair, while the body fished out of the bay was four inches shorter, 30 pounds lighter, beardless, and bald.

There was a nine-millimeter gunshot wound behind the body's left ear. There were thirty-eight pounds of diving weights strapped around its waist.

The official verdict was suicide, but Maryann Paisley did not believe it. She retained long-time family friend Bernard Fensterwald, the Washington attorney who handled James McCord during Watergate days, to try to fight the cover-up.

Mrs. Paisley called attention to her own "CIA background" in a furious letter she wrote at the beginning of this year to CIA director Stansfield Turner, protesting the CIA's "hands-off" attitude toward her husband's death.

"I was particularly anxious for Mr. Fensterwald to talk with Katherine Hart," she wrote, "because it is her husband, John, who is the agency's expert on Yuri Nosenko. You know that John Paisley [whose "activities," she wrote elsewhere, "were certainly not confined to the overt side"] was deeply involved in Nosenko's indescribable debriefing. It has crossed my mind, and that of others, that my husband's fate might be somehow connected with the Nosenko case."

So Paisley was part of Nosenko's "indescribable debriefing," was he? It is known from other sources that in 1972 and 1973 Paisley was also involved heavily in a CIA-wide search for a suspected Soviet mole. Paisley's job was then to determine if Soviet defectors were double agents, and he directly questioned Nosenko and another Soviet defector who came over at the same time, Soviet navy captain Nicholas Shadrin, who disappeared while walking through a public square in Vienna in 1975.

Thus, Paisley was a part of the group that regarded Nosenko as a false defector. So we can add his name to a group made up of Helms, Bagley, Murphy, and Angleton, none of whom are working for the CIA anymore, either.

Nosenko, however, as you read this, is drawing a CIA salary of \$35,325 a year and lecturing our counterintelligence trainees and future foreign-liason officers on the Soviet practice of the intelligence arts, as well as playing some direct role in current CIA counterintelligence operations.

This is not, alas, a finished story. Questions abound. Was it really Paisley's body that was found so sea-changed in Chesapeake Bay? If not, who might have orchestrated the cover-up that identified the body as his? And why? Is there substance to Maryann Paisley's belief that her husband was deeply involved in covert CIA operations and the Nosenko interrogation? Could Paisley's strange disappearance, as his wife suspects, have had anything to do with the assassinations committee's breaking of Nosenko's Oswald story shortly before? Was Nosenko a false defector sent to conceal a Soviet role in the assassination of Kennedy? Or to convey, through a calculated lie, the essential truth of Soviet innocence in the JFK murder?

On such mysteries, the Nosenko matter—perhaps from now on it should be called "the Nosenko-Paisley matter"—hangs in uncertainty and suspense, waiting for someone's next move.

—C.O.

[Reprinted courtesy of *Boston Magazine*. This article originally appeared in the October, 1979 issue.]

RECOMMENDED READING

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3. William C. Sullivan with Bill Brown, *The Bureau - My Thirty Years in Hoover's FBI*, W.W. Norton, New York, 1979.
4. G. Robert Blakey and David Belin letters, *National Review*, 9/28/79.
5. Jeff Goldberg, "Who Killed John Paisley?", *Inquiry*, 10/15/79.
6. Joseph Daughen and John Farmer, "The War Inside the CIA," *Philadelphia Bulletin*, 9/23 thru 9/27/79. Five part series on moles, Nosenko, Paisley and the Helms-Colby rift.

FUTURE BOOKS

Several books on the JFK case are in progress and expected to be published in the next year. Here's a quick rundown:

1. *Echoes of Conspiracy*, by Peter Dale Scott, Paul Hoch, Josiah Thompson, and Russell Stetler will probably be the first book out on the HSCA *Report*. Publication from Pocket Books is anticipated in late winter. It features commentary on the HSCA's acoustics/ballistics analysis, a history of the committee and the JFK issue, and Professor Scott's detailed research into the cover-up.
2. *Not In Your Lifetime*, by Anthony Summers for McGraw-Hill is also scheduled for later this winter. Summers, a British author/film producer (1978 BBC documentary, "The JFK Assassination: What Do We Know Now That We Didn't Know Then?"), has written a first person investigative account covering information he dug up the past two years in Dallas, New Orleans, Miami, Mexico City, and Washington—much of which corroborates the HSCA *Report*.
3. Sylvia Meagher has compiled a complete subject/name index to the HSCA's *Report*, hearings, and appendices which is scheduled to be published this winter by Scarecrow Press, NYC. Professor Gary Owens of Huron College in Canada is assisting on the project.
4. G. Robert Blakey and former HSCA staffer Richard Billings are at work on an inside look at the HSCA investigation for New York Times Books (no publication date set).
5. David Lifton continues to toil in New York on his super-secret manuscript (title, subject and publisher are still classified by the author). He promises a 1980 release.




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*Kennedy, John
CIA 4.01 Assassination
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