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October 10, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: DCI

SUBJECT : APME Meeting Notes

You 're to speak first. I think your address should not be tied in any way with Sy Hersh. Shoot right over his head.

When he rises to speak he probably will do his thing about his famous "massive" story. He may even reach back into his heroic days in Vietnam. Don't forget he has a book coming out, and he may strike out at NSA, for instance.

You might want to have a copy of the Rockefeller Report around (though your citation of the page number to Agronsky decimated him and showed you seem to have a grasp of the thing) because you can use it to counter Sy.

We should aim to put the speech out in advance "for AM's of Oct. 15". That means it will be in the morning papers across the country if they want to use it as you begin to speak (or earlier). This is done all the time. We should send the thing out early the afternoon of Oct. 14.

We should take 50 copies down with us.

AMT

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DRAFT #3

Associated Press Managing Editors Association

Mr. President, members of the Associated Press Managing Editors Association:

When I talked to the AP general meeting last year in New Orleans, I addressed those attending as "fellow publishers".

I could do that today. I could also use an alternate form of address. I could say:

Fellow intelligence officers.

Because in a sense that is what both of us are.

It is your business to get information and tell the public.

It is my business to get information and tell the public.

Surprised? Don't think that my public is only the President and his key advisors. He is, of course, my main subscriber, you might say. Other subscribers are all the top policy-makers in our government.

But we in Central Intelligence have a larger audience. That audience is the public of the U.S. You serve them.

We serve them.

The American public knows about such matters as the fact that cocked missiles are poised against us -- and how many. The American public knows that nuclear armed

submarines of alien powers patrol the deep -- and where.

The American public knows that foreign satellites are spinning above our heads -- and when.

How do they know? The American <u>public</u> knows these things because the American intelligence community sees to it that our policy-makers know these facts. The American <u>policy-makers</u> make sure that we news collectors and intelligence officers work in tandem so that the American public is the best informed public in the world.

We assist the policy-makers, and you, and the public, in getting and understanding what's happening. Those of you who have Washington correspondents know that we do a little behind the scenes briefing of your newsmen at their request.

Additionally, we make many of our studies, maps and research papers available to the public through the Library of Congress. Although it is not CIA's specialty, I have even heard of the word "leak". They tell me some of our stuff gets to you and the public that way.

There are secrets left. Some real good ones. Rest assured of that. And there will be more. They'll be more because we still have good sources. I hope we can keep them, even though it's hard in the hysteria of today. We still have good sources because we protect them. Managing editors understand that. Managing editors know that you don't get news if you reveal your confidential sources.

In all of today's cry for openness, I hope you can ponder this matter as professional news gatherers. I hope you can ponder this as American citizens concerned for the sources of life and death "news" we intelligence men collect for our country and for the American public. I hope we can march together on the matter of the sanctity of sources.

In the light of the current hearings and certain public statements, there are a few blunt remarks I feel that I can make to fellow intelligence officers and fellow publishers.

I feel I should speak out and say:

Our country is safe from sneak attack.

I feel I should say:

The American intelligence record is studded with success after success.

But when we sit and look at our television sets night after night, we see fingers being wagged at intelligence officers. In our papers it seems as if the old wooden type were being picked out of the case to hit our eye with headlines telling only of intelligence failures, of misdeeds, of goof-ups.

What are we seeing? What are we hearing? What are we reading?

What's going on? What's going on is this: We're sitting in on a <u>public</u> Monday morning showing of the team's private movie of the Saturday football game. Who

didn't complete that pass? Who didn't block that kick?

Playing in the big international game of world politics, we, too, do a little private Monday morning quarterbacking. When we figure we haven't called the turn, we sit down, we write the equivalent of that Monday morning movie. We call it a post-mortem.

We say to ourselves:

Where did we go wrong? What methods of analysis were'nt up to the job? How can we improve? Then the coach singes a few hides and we move on to try to do a better job.

And that's what we're seeing on our television screens. Not the game we won but the passed we didn't complete, the end runs we didn't make. And, you might say, we made the film ourselves. We wanted to find out where we went wrong; how we can be better.

So remember: that's what we're hearing.

What are we not hearing? I'll tell you what we're not hearing.

That American intelligence gave seven years' warning on the development of the anti-ballistic missile system around Moscow.

That American intelligence pinpointed eight Soviet ICBM developments.

That we warned of the development of each one of these missiles from one to two years in advance of the first flight.

That American intelligence projected an operational Soviet MIRV in 1974 back in 1969.

That American intelligence identified two Soviet submarine programs well before the first two subs slid down the waves.

That we called the turn on conflict after conflict over a score of years.

That American intelligence alerted the world to a disastrous locust plague threatening 45 countries; action was taken; a tragedy was averted.

That our analysts track the flow of petrodollars and alert policy-makers to OPEC countries' world-wide investments.

That the total techniques of American intelligence are turned each year to the great tast of assessing the world crop prospects.

That the U.S.A. no longer has to guess in the field of strategic arms limitations; we \underline{know} what our possible adversaries are doing; we \underline{know} whether they keep their agreements.

There are some other things we don't hear about when the fingers shake and the headlines scream out.

We don't hear about brave men on hazardous duty in strange lands.

We don't hear of bold thinkers in our technical

directorate; how they go to the farthest skylines of technology; how they make our intelligence services the envy of statesmen everywhere.

We <u>don't</u> hear of the successes of brilliant analysts puzzling out mysterious political and military moves made by enigmatic people in far and closed societies.

And, finally, we simply $\underline{\text{don't}}$ hear what intelligence is really about.

So what <u>is</u> it about? What it's about is not the crystal ball business. Our job is to give our leaders the deepest possible understanding of the foreign environment in which he must protect our national interests.

The job of intelligence is to keep our leaders from being astonished by some event to which they must react at once. This is quite different from predicting a precise date and a precise hour, and a precise minute for some event that may transpire if someone who hasn't thought of it yet happens to think of it.

Etc, going on to explain intelligence