

RADIO TV REPORTS, INC.

4701 WILLARD AVENUE, CHEVY CHASE, MARYLAND 20815 (301) 656-4068

FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

PROGRAM The Fred Fiske Show

STATION WAMU-FM

DATE April 25, 1984 8:00 P.M.

CITY Washington, D.C.

SUBJECT Harry Rositzke/Soviet Union

FRED FISKE: Harry Rositzke has spent much of his adult life studying the Soviet Union. He's a Harvard Ph.D. who taught at Harvard, at the University of Rochester, and other places. Before that, before he went into intelligence work, Harry Rositzke was with the OSS in World War II; one of the first with the CIA, where he was Chief of Soviet Operations. His job was to dispatch agents into the Soviet Union. He also served with the CIA in Munich and in New Delhi.

What Harry Rositzke has to say in his new book, Managing Moscow, published by William Morrow, is unexpected, coming from a man with his background, and very important for the peace of the world. Essentially, he argues that our Soviet strategy has not worked and ought to be changed, that we should recognize that our effort at military containment has failed and that we should adopt a forward-looking economic strategy.

Harry, it's very good to see you again.

HARRY ROSITZKE: Nice to see you.

FISKE: What's it, the third book we've been doing?

ROSITZKE: Yeah. Yeah. Getting old together.

FISKE: Well, you look very, very well indeed. You've been retired from the CIA for 10 years now?

ROSITZKE: Fourteen years now.

FISKE: When did you arrive at the very interesting conclusions that you express in this book? Was it during your 25

OFFICES IN: WASHINGTON D.C. • NEW YORK • LOS ANGELES • CHICAGO • DETROIT • AND OTHER PRINCIPAL CITIES

years in the CIA, or since your retirement?

ROSITZKE: Well, the first 15 or 18 years in the CIA were all-enveloping. It was the Cold War. We were in the forefront. We were sending agents into Mos -- into Russia. We were fighting the Russians all the way along the Cold War line in Europe and working against them in the Far East, etcetera. So there wasn't much time for reflection in those years.

I think when I started looking at this thing kind of sanely -- because none of us were all that sane during the Cold War -- was during my five years in India, when I had a chance to see how the Soviet-American confrontation looked from there. And from that point of view, to a certain extent, I realized more and more the enormous political and economic factors in this, that just stopping the Russians with arms had not prevented them from making great advances in the Third World.

And mind you, they started that program only in 1955, when Khrushchev decided this was our soft underbelly and that if he could capture the political allegiance, and eventually the markets, of the Third World, the capitalist world would be pretty hard up.

So that started a train of thought, I think, which, since I retired, I've worked on, I've thought about, I've discussed with some of my more expert economic and military friends. And the simply fact was -- and this really dawned on me only after I got out -- that for 35 years we have never taken a serious foreign policy action that wasn't triggered by an actual Soviet or Communist, or purportedly Soviet or Communist, action. In other words, we've been reacting.

FISKE: Yeah.

ROSITZKE: And it's my feeling that I don't know of any other great nation in the world that has only had a policy of stopping somebody else.

FISKE: You refer to it as being the world's policeman, and that policemen have to react to what they find on their beats.

ROSITZKE: Exactly. And that means the other side has the initiative, the other side picks the spots, the other side takes the opportunities in those areas where they think there is something to be done. And we wait for them to act, and then we react. And we often overreact.

In my mind, there isn't any question we overreacted in Vietnam. I think our reaction to Grenada was really almost a

childlike overreaction. And I certainly we feel we are over-reacting in Central America.

FISKE: It's being trumpeted as a great victory by many.

ROSITZKE: Well, I think it was needed at one moment to flex our muscle and show the world that we were still the great power we always have been. I think it was patriotically very successful. But if one looks at it, is this the way a great power proves its competence to the world, to send in a handful of troops against a handful of mostly civilians and grab an island?

Well, to that extent, that was rather symbolic and not particularly needed.

FISKE: Harry, your conclusions are one thing. They're very interesting. They're different. They're certainly worth reflecting upon. You make a very good case for them. But what's even more surprising is your premises and your chain of reasoning leading you to those conclusions. You feel that our fears of Soviet military adventurism, on which our policies have been based, have been ill-founded; that the Soviets have been cautious, that they have not sought military adventures outside their sphere, that the fears that we have of the Soviet Union, which are leading us to spend huge amounts of money in defense and are the basis of our foreign policy and our alliances, and so on, that those fears are without basis.

Now, this coming from a man who headed Soviet operations in the CIA.

ROSITZKE: Let us say that the fears are exaggerated, that they have created an emotional climate in this country where the Russians have become bogeys and threats and sources of evil far beyond the bounds of any kind of common-sense approach, and that if one accepts the fact that we must always have a deterrent capable of stopping a strike against us by the Russians, once that is done, then I think we'd better start thinking about what we do in the rest of the world.

My objection to the hawks or to the professional anti-Soviet military are that once they've gotten that far, they don't know what else to do. And yet if you start looking at Soviet expansion of power and influence in a mere 30 years, you find that they are the dominant power in the Subcontinent, that India and Russia together, for example, form a relatively strong counterpoise to China. You find they have two or three rather stalwart friends in the Middle East, which helps them, particularly today with Syria, to exert an influence there that no number of American troops or bombs can affect. We find that they have two or three very good friends in Africa -- Ethiopia, Angola,

etcetera. They have had now for 20 years a very good friend in Cuba.

In other words, we haven't, by our past policies, stopped them from expanding their power and influence in the Third World. To a certain extent, I think what we've done is assumed that extension of power always comes, somehow, through military means. And yet they have never used their divisions outside of their border areas. That includes Eastern Europe, but it also includes Afghanistan, which is crucial to their security, in their eyes. They have never sent contingents of Soviet troops to advance their interests in any part of the world. We have, of course, and we paid a great price with American lives to stop such forward moves as the North Vietnamese, the North Koreans.

So, all I'm suggesting here is that we have half a policy: Let's keep the Russians from attacking us. But the other half is: Let's start taking a forward policy in the Third World that will, in effect, over the long run in crucial areas of the Third World, advance our political and economic interests. And we have the economic clout to do it the Russians can't even begin to match.

FISKE: What your thesis is, that, in fact, the Soviets can match us militarily, probably have matched us militarily...

ROSITZKE: Let's call it military parity. Yeah.

FISKE: All right.

But that they are no match for us in the sphere of economics, and that's where we ought to be playing our strong suit.

ROSITZKE: Right. They will help out so-called wars of national liberation, in Angola, in other African countries. And what happens after the revolutionary powers have taken over? The Russians haven't got the capacity to give them the kind of economic and technical aid they need. Right now...

FISKE: Which is why they lose some of them after a while.

ROSITZKE: Well, Mozambique is a Marxist country. Angola is. Guinea. They are now coming to the United States and saying, "We'd like to have trade. We will give you good conditions for investment," etcetera.

Well now, if that happens, these so-called American countries become part of our, if you want to call it that, sphere of influence. They become our friends. [Unintelligible] their

politics follows economics. And that I've become completely convinced of. It's a Marxist notion, but I think more and more, as we see what's happening in German, East German, East European, French relations, as we begin realize now what we want out of China, what the Chinese want out of us, politics follows...

FISKE: It's largely economics. The President will be there tomorrow, and the reason is to arrange some economic goodies for the Chinese to cement their friendship.

[Confusion of voices]

FISKE: Harry, I would assume that the policy these last 35 years, which you're so critical of in your book, has been formulated on the basis of intelligence provided the State Department and various Administrations by the CIA, of which you then were an integral part, an important part. Agree? Were you wrong?

ROSITZKE: I would suggest that for the last 35 years the various Administrations, on the broader levels of foreign policy, haven't listened to intelligence at all. I call it stomach thinking. They haven't used their heads. They have been so allergic to this Communist menace, to Marxism-Leninism -- we have a high pitch of it today under the Reagan Administration. We had the highest pitch, obviously, in the '50s, to the extent where any move anywhere on the other side, or a purported move, immediately triggered a reaction, which then got to be automatically carried out, whether it made sense or not.

FISKE: Harry, I have spoken to a lot of CIA types. I've read a lot of their books. It seems to me that most of them have been virulently anti-Communist, have advocated courses of action and attitudes toward the Communists which may well have resulted in the kinds of policy that you deplore. It's one of the reasons that I raised my eyebrows when I read your book Managing Moscow. I think it's such a departure from the kind of reasoning, the kind of argumentation we've been hearing from CIA people and former CIA people.

ROSITZKE: Well, once you are committed, as I was for many, many years, to both the espionage and the covert action against the Russians, once you've been alerted to looking everywhere across the world for the strength of the Communist Party, what they're up to, etcetera, etcetera, you obviously get a cast of mind which is bound to be narrowed by your own professional function. Well, I certainly had that.

But I think one of my few virtues is that I taught English at the university for six years before I came in, so I did have a career other than this. And looking at facts

6

unemotionally, drawing conclusions from them is a habit which I trust I learned in those days. And after I got out and started taking a good cool look at the history of the relations between these two countries over the last 30 years, I came to the conclusion, as a few people are coming more and more to that conclusion, as Nixon did, as some of the people in the White House did in those days, that the Russians are there to stay, they are a political, economic, ideological threat. We will always be competitive. We will always be enemies. But my conclusion is, yes, for the next 10, 20, 50 or 100 years. And no matter how large our arsenal, that will not keep them from spreading both their institutions and their ideas to other parts of the world which are just waiting for some help from the industrialized nations. And in the long run, they're going to be a highly industrialized nation.

FISKE: And you say we should not fail to contest them, but we ought not contest them militarily; we ought to contest them economically.

ROSITZKE: Yeah. The only time we can contest them militarily is when they take military action. But most of their actions are not military.

FISKE: They use others.

ROSITZKE: Political, propaganda.

FISKE: Harry, there's a lot of argument about the extent to which the Soviets are using surrogates to stir up mischief, to arm, equip, advise, direct guerrilla forces in various parts of the world. To what extent is that true, based on your experience?

ROSITZKE: Well, to start with, there isn't any question that that was one of the elements in the Vietnamese, the North Vietnamese war. But what we tend to do, I think, is think that these other countries, like Cuba, like North Vietnam, like Syria, they're just automatic puppets of the Soviet Union.

In most cases, let's say in our own hemisphere, the revolutions in Cuba and in Nicaragua took place, to start with, as straight nationalist movements. The Soviets didn't direct them. These came out of the circumstances, the social, the political, the injustice, the dictatorships that were there, from local situations.

Once that happens and these people get into power, the Soviets couldn't be more eager to help them out. But to consider them the makers of these situations, that somehow or other they instigated these situations, whether it's the African colonial

7

countries, whether it's Central or South America, that, I think, is false.

FISKE: Well, don't they, haven't they all these years had home-grown Communists in these various countries, particularly those countries that were seen as ripe for revolution, ripe for the establishment of Marxism, who in fact have sought to take advantage of the adverse conditions existing in those countries to set up Marxist revolutions? Didn't they attempt to do it here? Don't they attempt to do it in every other country where they exist?

ROSITZKE: Fred, there were practically no Communist Parties at all in Africa, outside of the Union of South Africa, south of Egypt and the Sudan. These people who fought these various guerrilla factions -- and there were so-called good guys, from our point of view, as in Angola, and bad guys -- they were on the nationalist grounds, for the most part, starting insurrections.

After the guerrilla warfare, the insurgencies we had in Latin America in the '60s, they were almost totally squelched. I doubt very much -- and only the State Department could tell, and they probably would find it hard to tell -- that there are more than 50 or 75 or 100 Communists -- that means members of a Communist Party under Soviet control -- in Nicaragua or Salvador.

In other words, let's not identify these nationalist insurgencies as Communist.

FISKE: Is that an impression, or do you have knowledge of it?

ROSITZKE: The latest figures from the State Department, when they kept track of Communists, which they didn't do during detente, because that didn't look very polite, I think there were 25 members of the Salvadorian Communist Party left then.

And you remember that farce about the Dominican Republic, where we went in because there was a lot of chaos and a lot of leftist people at work? But when President Johnson said, "Give me a list of the Communists behind all this," he got a list, quickly put together, of 50 people, some in jail, some dead, some in Europe.

In other words, we've got to stop this business of identifying every anti-capitalist, anti-dictatorial movement as being Communist, in the technical sense.

FISKE: You say in your book that fear of Communism is deeply embedded in the American psyche, leading us to believe, as

8

you think, that we start with that fear; and then, I suspect, that we find justification for it.

ROSITZKE: It's a deep emotional reaction which, for example, you cannot find in Europe. There are Communist Parties in Europe. There are Communists in the French Cabinet. You can invite someone to dinner there even if he is a Communist. These are political groups that are fighting for power.

Now, we don't have that kind of thing in our country. In our country, the Communists have always been looked upon as foreigners, as absolutely anti-American, as stooges of a foreign power, etcetera, etcetera. And it was this that led, for example, to the hysteria of the late '40s and early '50s. This all came about again in the early '60s, when Presidents actually agreed to assassinate a nasty Communist like Castro.

In other words, to me, this is not sane thinking. That Communists and Communist Parties, as such, are against our interests and that we should do all we can to keep them from moving ahead, and that most of them are actually, let's call it, they're puppets of Moscow, although there are still Chinese Communist Parties in Latin America and the Middle East that take their orders from Peking.

Let's be realistic about it. Let's take it on as a political...

FISKE: But we divided them into good Communists and bad Communists. Right?

ROSITZKE: How easy that is, isn't it? Suddenly we are against Communists, we are anti-Communist, and the President goes to Peking. And the only man who I think really brought a little sanity into this was President Nixon, because he said, "We've got to live with them. Let's work out our problems as best we can by talk." And I think that's the one thing that's missing today.

FISKE: Harry, you argue that we, in fact, don't know the Soviets. We have an erroneous perception of what they're about and how they operate. How well do they know us?

ROSITZKE: Over the last 10 or 15 years, the Russians have gotten to know us much better. Stalin had a childish notion of capitalism, Wall Street running the White House, etcetera. Khrushchev, somewhat more realistic. But over the last 10-12 years, they've made a very strong effort, through an institute which has both classified and unclassified material available, the Arbatov Institute, where they now have over 350 people trying to understand the U.S. better and better. And they'll never understand us in toto, as we can't understand a strange society

like theirs, but I think they're much more realistic about the fact that, for example, there are pressure groups in this country, the pressure groups have a great effect upon legislation, that Wall Street doesn't dictate legislation, that the President also is open to popular opinion, which is, after all, not a possible thing in the Soviet Union itself. So I think they are more and more realistic.

But when, for example, the President of the United States gets up and starts talking, as he did earlier, about partial strikes or limited wars or...

FISKE: Or evil empires.

ROSITZKE: ...evil empires. They're a fairly dignified people, and they don't like insults. This then gives them a reinforced feeling that this President really hates them and will do everything he can against them, a feeling they didn't have, for example, under Nixon.

So, to that extent, they can understand us. But I think they probably are as scared of us, at that level, as we are of them.

FISKE: You argue that on the basis of history, they are more scared of us, the fact that we, in fact, have on several occasions taken action against them. We landed troops there during the Bolshevik Revolution. We formed alliances of which they're very suspicious. We shut them out after World War II was over, didn't aid them the way we aided some of our former enemies, and so on. And they harbor strong resentments about that.

ROSITZKE: There isn't any question. We had their borders covered by military bases, military pacts all through the '50s. It was perfectly clear that we were potentially an aggressive power and that we had the capability of really hurting them.

Now, today, when you get down to the business of do we understand their concerns, Arbatov makes the point, "If you had a billion Chinese soldiers in Canada and you had the NATO alliance in Mexico, how would you feel about your own security?" So they make the point, and I happen to agree with them, they are primarily defensive-minded when it comes to military action, and that they have been very, very cautious for 35 years now not to confront us and face American military force.

FISKE: Fair to say you didn't have this view when you were in the CIA?

ROSITZKE: Partly, to a certain extent, in the late '40s

because we were realizing then what enormous difficulties Stalin was in: almost half the economy destroyed, people hard to handle in the Ukraine and Central Asia, etcetera, with an enormous compulsion on the regime to make their country whole again. As we began to realize that, I thought to myself, "Well, these are the last people who are going to start another war. They're certainly not going to invade Western Europe. They've got enough troubles controlling Eastern Europe. What would they do with Western Europe? Would they try to have occupation forces from Scandinavia to the U.K.?" It was all totally unrealistic.

But we still worried then, particularly after Korea, they're going to invade Western Europe.

Well, 30 years later, they still haven't done it. And today it's even less likely than it was then.

FISKE: Harry, you make an argument in your book that one of the difficulties in the formulation of our policy, from the perspective that you give us in this book, is that the CIA has for a substantial portion of its history been directed by military men who approach it with a military mentality, leading our policy in the direction that we've taken.

Would you like to elaborate on that?

ROSITZKE: Well, I'm not -- no, I don't think I say we have been led. We were born in a khaki uniform. We had generals to start with, and admirals, as directors. But when Allen Dulles came into power, since that time it's almost always been civilian directorship.

And the other thing, I think, to keep in mind...

FISKE: A few admirals.

ROSITZKE: A few admirals. Yeah. Not too long.

Since the Director of the CIA really can't do anything on his own, since he is an instrument of the President, since any projects we get into have to be approved by the President, it's perfectly clear that what determines their actions, our actions over the last 35 years is the Administration in power. And, in fact, in the mid-'70s, when Senator Church exposed these nasty things CIA had been doing, he used a phrase, "They're a rogue elephant." It became perfectly clear from the discussions that [unintelligible] raised that it was the President who was the rogue elephant. The President was the one who decided that we would go into Guatemala, we'd go into Cuba, we'd go into Angola. In other words, that is not a policy determination of the Director.

11

FISKE: The Director provides information; he doesn't make policy.

ROSITZKE: He provides information, and he also will take action when instructed.

FISKE: But policy is made by Presidents, you say.

ROSITZKE: The National Security Council is really the President's top policymaking apparatus. And that means the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and Treasury are the main role-players.

FISKE: Do the political realities in the United States make it more politically advantageous to a President to be tough than to seek some sort of detente or agreement or coming together or softening?

ROSITZKE: I'd say the advantages are on what I call the hard boys. Anybody who doesn't feel that this is primarily a military affair and you've got to deal with them toughly, they're soft, they're wimps, they're liberals, I think is the nice word they use today. And there is no question, it's terribly tempting to stand up and be against the enemy, because that pulls all the people together.

Now, the man who broke that for the first time, really, was President Nixon. President Ford didn't go on this too hard. President Carter tried to get a little moderation into our approach to the Russians, but their invasion of Afghanistan really forced him to realize, "They really are the hostile ones."

And then, to me, President Reagan comes in with about the same kind of stance that I lived through in the '50s, when John Foster Dulles was determining our attitude, because he had a -- he was the father of what I call 'theological anti-Communism, because he put the whole thing on a moral plane, where they were evil and we were good, they were Satan and God was on our side.

So, to that extent, I'd say the really tough, hard men who scare the American people, obviously -- they have to get their budgets -- are in a stronger position than the soft men, because fear is something easy to exploit.

But it's gotten now, I think, to the point where some people are afraid that this has gone so far that our defense budget will assist us in developing a kind of economic status which would be against all our interests.

FISKE: Do you agree with General Haig, who when he was Secretary of State said that the Soviet Union funds international terrorism?

12

ROSITZKE: I took it upon myself a couple of years ago to write an article for the New York Times on that. And the issues was, if there was no KGB, would there be any less terrorism? I feel fairly strongly, looking at the evidence as well as I can, that most, if not all, of the major terrorist movements have their own spontaneous political purposes, they have their training and equipping, all through the Middle East, in Libya, even in Algeria; and that here and there the Russians might take an interest in making a contact with one of these groups, but that they themselves do not sponsor it, except, for example, with the PLO if it's in their long-term interest.

FISKE: Well, the PLO is providing tactics and weaponry and training for many of these guerrilla groups all over the world. There would seem to be some sort of centralization involved there. I don't think that the PLO itself has the resources or the weaponry or the capability of doing that without the kind of help that it's suspected they receive from the Soviet Union.

ROSITZKE: Well, I think the main help they get and they've gotten for the last 20 years is really basically in Syria. That is where the most terrorist-minded of the Palestine Liberation Organization groups live, where they're trained. And to that extent, one can say that Syria; Cuba, in terms of supporting revolutionaries; Libya across the whole board; and, to a certain extent, Algeria.

But to try to draw the line between simple terrorism, the worst possible kind of almost pointless murder, and wars of national liberation is a hard line to draw. And I suppose in the long run we're talking now about state-sponsored terrorism. One would have to find some evidence that that state and that state and that state are supporting it.

And of course, unfortunately, right at this stage, we're supporting the terrorists in Nicaragua.

FISKE: How do you feel, as a former CIA official, when you read about the covert activities in Nicaragua and the harbor mining?

ROSITZKE: Well, I have two reactions. One, CIA should not be in a business that makes the front pages. In other words, they ought to take the paramilitary function away from us. All the way from the Bay of Pigs on, we have not had a paramilitary operation yet that was covert in the real sense, that it couldn't be traced to the President.

FISKE: And mining is especially hard to trace.

ROSITZKE: That gets to be public, but that also gets to

introduce other factors, whether CIA does it or the Pentagon does it: that here we are dealing with an action which, at best, can really serve very little purpose, and, at worst, really goes against both the legal and moral principles I think we tend to abide by.

FISKE: Well, it would seem that while policies of various sorts, such as you've described, were made by Administrations, that covert actions are strictly a CIA area.

ROSITZKE: They're carried out by CIA. The great argument, as you know, over the last month has been whether or not CIA adequately briefed the House and Senate Intelligence Committees on their actions. And I gather, from what has been said, some people heard about it, some didn't.

But it's also a fact that the House and the Senate Intelligence Committees must be briefed, but they can't veto an action that the President has recommended. And so to that extent, the whole Nicaraguan operation is a direct presidential, NSC decision.

FISKE: I would be very surprised if the President recommends an action of that sort without first receiving a recommendation from the CIA about its feasibility and its wisdom, etcetera.

ROSITZKE: I should think they would make a proposal and say what's good and bad about it.

FISKE: You know, you wrote this book some time ago. You can never tell what happens, as a result. But you refer here to Muammar Qaddafi. And in this book, in this book, Managing Moscow, you say that the support of terrorism, Qaddafi's invasion of Chad, his threats to Egypt and the Sudan, it's easy enough to throw out his diplomats and tweak his nose with aerial dogfights off the Libyan coast, but our hostility has so far managed only to magnify his prestige without affecting his actions. Must he be outlawed? Many Europeans and some of the Americans who still work in Libya do not see the advantage of that to the West.

Now, how do you think about that view now that Qaddafi has taken the stand and said what he's had to say about the difficulties in London, the shooting?

ROSITZKE: I think there's going to be more of this. My only point would be that Qaddafi has certain interests. Now, they happen to be mainly with the Europeans because they are buying a great deal of his oil. They depend on Libyan oil. So they can't afford to be too moral about this thing, even though this horrifies, pretty well, everybody.

14

My point would be nothing can be lost by, if you want to call it that, a quiet kind of diplomacy in which talks are held with even such strange characters to try to find out what they're really up to and what can be done in terms of, obviously, giving him something he needs to cut this out. Now, there may be no results whatever. But the fact remains that if we simply keep on talking about Castro and Qaddafi and Khomeini as being the outlaws of our generation, I can't see that we're doing anything very much to affect their behavior.

FISKE: Okay. An invitation to our listeners to join the discussion....

Good evening.

MAN: ...nationalist movements in the Third World and how, in a sense, the present Administration is sort of...

FISKE: Can we ask you to speak a little louder, sir?

MAN: I make a point about the general idea that nationalist movements in the Third World are diverse, that they're not Communist, etcetera, etcetera, and that it's a mistake to take a monolithic view of this. The thing is, I think, in a sense, that's an evasion, because while there's no question the evidence that many of these Third World movements and leaders who we dislike are not Communists -- I mean, obviously, Khomeini and Qaddafi are far from being Communists -- we know that Fidel Castro, when he initially took power in Cuba, was not a Communist. He hadn't been...

FISKE: There's some dispute about that.

MAN: There's some dispute. But even the Sandinistas, the Communist Party in Nicaragua played a very small role.

But my point is this: The one thing they all seem to have in common is a hatred for America. In a sense, the common bond between these various national liberation movements, terrorist organizations, and leftist regimes in the Third World is anti-Americanism, which puts them on the same course as the Soviet Union. For instance, in Nicaragua they laud the regimes in North Korea, in Vietnam, etcetera, etcetera. Their foreign policy pronouncements, as well as many of their actions, puts them very much in alliance with the Soviets.

So, I mean, you know, so what that they're not members of Communist Parties? The bottom line is that they hate the United States and that they seem to take actions which are directly against American interests.

FISKE: Harry?

15

ROSITZKE: Well, I agree with you. I would say not so much anti-American as anti-capitalist. The anti-Americanism, I think, is particularly powerful in Latin America, for reasons I think you and I could both understand. But in Africa, for example, they were working against European colonial powers. They were anti-capitalist in the sense that they wanted to get the foreign exploiters, as they call them, out of the way. To that extent, their international affiliations are important.

But the point I tried to make was that they could be made not anti-American, that what they need, in many cases, is the kind of assistance, and profit to us, as well, that they do need; and that whether they're Communist or Marxist, whatever that now means, or Leninist, or strictly nationalist, we have the capacity to get them at least, if not on our side, not on the Soviet side.

And if in the long run we're trying to diminish Soviet power and influence, that obviously is a forward movement.

FISKE: You're on the air.

MAN: Harry, I appreciate your comments. And I think that a rational, objective view of the situation around American policy is much needed.

You mentioned a lot of things that contradict the way in which people perceive the world around them. I think in the conversation you were having, you were not abstracting the word Communist to mean the evil outside, which I see the population in this country gets worked up in periods to a hysteria, and the word Communist does not necessarily any longer have meaning as a political or economic line, or political movement. It becomes the feared outside. And it becomes a pretext or a delusional state as we go to war and we kill. You know, we have a ritual killing of our young.

Could you talk more in a dynamic -- I don't know. It's a very deep, deep archaic, barbaric thing that American foreign policy is. And I wouldn't say that populations around the world are anti-American. They are being murdered, and they're not even counted here. I mean Kissinger and the Administrations during the Vietnam war, when questioned how many Vietnamese were killed, they had no idea. They just said, "We didn't count. We didn't count that."

And what I'm trying to say is it stems from a very, very deep, very, very, very dark place within our psychology in this country, which enables us to dovetail our economic interests into an archaic, you know, atrocious brutality...

FISKE: Okay. I think we get your point.

16

ROSITZKE: Well, I'm aware more, as I read some of the memos, memoranda, and the Haig and Kissinger stories, of the last 35 years, that there is a deep-seated attitude, which I consider mainly fear, and therefore can be called upon to hate, inside the American psyche, more so, I think, than in some of the European countries, where they've actually suffered directly a great deal more than we have. To that extent, it's there to be called upon.

And one of the questions I raise is, do we need an enemy? Do we need an enemy to focus all our national discontents, frustrations, anxieties on? And at this stage of life, I think we still do need an enemy. And that's why it's so easy for a man like President Reagan to come to the fore, say again, as we said 30 years ago, "This is the enemy," and get most of the American people behind him.

FISKE: Can't we make the same argument for the Soviets? Even though you argue that they are not likely to engage in an international war -- and, of course, it's silly. They've been able to spread their ideology, which is their purpose, without doing so -- that they also need an enemy, and Uncle Sam has become their enemy? It's part and parcel of their theology, if you will, their political ideology to spread it. They've announced it repeatedly. It's part of their basic doctrine. Don't they use us in that same way?

ROSITZKE: Fred, there is no question about it. They have worked against the enemy -- not only America. It was Great Britain in the '30s. The enemy really is a system and a set of ideas. It's capitalism. It's what they call bourgeois values. And they have exploited that both at home and broad for 35 or 40 years. And, in effect, I would say that the kind of paranoia they have toward the rest of the world, whether or not it's justified, is exactly what I'm afraid we are ready to share now and then, which makes us less capable of handling their hostility, their competitiveness.

So, what we're really saying is they are the professionals at the use of fear and hatred of the enemy that we are, now and then in our society, beginning to share. And I see that, so far as we're concerned, that does not make us more effective.

FISKE: Good evening.

MAN: I'm especially pleased to hear the kind of interpretation you give to the problems of our foreign policy as we view them in the Third World, the kind of thoughtful consideration you give to the needs of, say, the Latin Americans and the underlying reasons why they would revolt or they would join a Communist Party. And the implications of that are, obviously, I

17

think -- I hope I'm not putting words in your mouth -- that our foreign policy ought to undertake a more forthright democratic response to the needs of, say, Latin America than just running guns down there.

However, what I don't hear from you -- and since you're such a dramatic expert in this field, I'm going to ask you a questions about this. What I don't hear from you is a characterization of the Soviet Union per se and what it has done in Eastern Europe as being anything all that awful.

Now, to explain. I come from a fairly liberal background that agrees with all the foregoing. But my experiences, my life experiences in meeting people that have come out from behind the Iron Curtain, quite frankly, leave me shocked and mortified, to gain the appearance that the Soviet Union is every bit as bad and every bit as evil as some feverish-minded right-wing Reaganite would suggest.

ROSITZKE: There isn't any...

MAN: What's your perception of it?

ROSITZKE: There isn't any question -- under Stalin, less so under his successors -- that there is a highly authoritarian government in the Soviet Union that will do everything it can, through a very efficient internal security service, the Second Chief Directorate of the KGB, to control dissent, to see to it that the so-called dissident intellectuals don't have much in the way of freedom to speak. They are putting people in jail, etcetera. It's nothing like the Stalin days, you know, with the millions in the Gulag.

It is also true that in Eastern Europe, which vary now -- after all, Hungary is not like Poland, and Poland isn't like Czechoslovakia -- the Russians, themselves, will guaranty to themselves that they'll maintain control of Eastern Europe at any cost.

MAN: Is there any chance, sir -- I'd like you to go a little further with this, this Eastern Europe. Is there any chance that the United States, through its foreign policy activities, could somehow regain any measure of political freedom for the peoples of Eastern Europe?

ROSITZKE: I doubt if that is possible without, as we knew back in the '50s, another war.

What we can do, and I suggest this, is we can make the way of life of East Europeans somewhat better than they are now.

MAN: How so?

18

ROSITZKE: The economic instrument. And, for example, I am all for having trade, as Germany and France are, with Poland, certainly with Hungary, which is growing every day, making their way of life in, let's call it, economic terms much more satisfactory. But I don't think there's anything we can do directly to see to it that the system, the one-party control system, gets weaker.

But there is another factor. If people there are more prosperous, if they actually could take care of their own needs, if they can get along without being forced to depend on the Russians for gas and oil, etcetera, the odds are that those Communist Parties in Eastern Europe will be able to afford to be somewhat more liberal.

Now, Dubcek was obviously the example, and to a certain extent he went to extremes. But it's conceivable that, as in Hungary today, with a tough party but a good way of life, that these other countries can approach a level of well-being which will make their people happier, even though they are not in a socialist democracy.

That's as far as I can see it going in the next 10, 20, 30 years.

FISKE: You're on 88.5 FM.

MAN: I just wanted to point out to Harry Rositzke the title of several recent books that have appeared that would seem to dispute some of the premises that he's been outlining on this program. And the first one is by France's most famous media voice, and a man of the left, Jean Francois Revel, whose book How Democracies Perish was a bestseller for 23 weeks last year. It's coming out in this country in October. And it outlines, with scores of examples, how disinformation, Soviet disinformation operations have been conducted inside the Western media, a point that Mr. Rositzke disputed four years ago.

The next book that he should know about is something called Disinformatio, written by Professors Shultz and Godson, which appeared three weeks ago, also documenting scores of Soviet disinformation operations inside the Western media.

And then Terrorism: The Soviet Connection -- that is the title of the book -- by Ray Cline and Yona Alexander, the latter having spent months poring over the thousands of documents captured in South Lebanon by the Israelis in 1982, which does indeed reinforce what the emcee said earlier, or one of your questioners said earlier, and that is that terrorists from 26 non-Arab nations were being trained by the PLO. All of this

19

under close supervision by KGB officers. There are scores and scores of smoking guns in this book.

And while there isn't a war room in the middle of the Kremlin that directs terrorist operations, there have been so many -- there's been so much testimony now from Soviet defectors on these connections, that I don't see how Mr. Rositzke can argue that this is just very loose liaison work.

Thank you.

ROSITZKE: If you want my opinion, I can simply say this: that terrorism at work in the world today is based upon a series of both places and nationalities -- and I tend to put them mostly in the Middle East -- with whatever help that needed. And that does normally not mean training. These people are better trained at terrorist and can train terrorists than, I think, anybody in the KGB or in the GRU can.

So, I don't want to discount that factor. But if there were no Soviet assistance, the factor would remain that terrorist activities, particularly in the Middle East, but also in Spain, in Latin America, in Ulster, are factors that we have to deal with on the ground.

Now, I started working against terrorists, in terms of intelligence, back in the late '60s. And the fact remains, whether you're talking about the Baader-Meinhof Gang or we're now talking about the renewed Red Brigades in Italy, etcetera, we're faced with almost the same kind of thing that we face with the Mafia. We have to work getting in where there is a front office, but mainly it ends up to be a kind of police, counterintelligence, passport-control item which has to attack every one of these problems right in the place where they take place.

FISKE: As I read you, Harry, you don't deny that the Soviets are interested in and will do whatever they can to subvert capitalism, as they see it, and replace it with Marxism-Leninism where they can. And even to the extent that they fund terrorist movements or guerrilla groups, they're not the kinds of people we fight with the kind of sophisticated military weaponry which we're now spending so much of our resources on. Your argument is that that can be better defended against economically.

ROSITZKE: The subjects that have been raised now, really, you can't do much about. To me, it is an almost global counterintelligence problem to start with, because you have to know who is doing what. But when we start getting back to that old story, let's go back to the source, I don't know what that means in terms of counterintelligence.

20

MAN: Can I have one more question?

FISKE: Sure.

MAN: There were a number of references to Libya and to Qaddafi earlier in the program. And I don't know if Mr. Rositzke is aware -- he must be aware, just from reading the papers, that the French have been forced to put 3000 troops into Chad, a pretty empty, useless desert, only because this French Socialist government's credibility was on the line vis-a-vis French-speaking African heads of state who had begged them to intervene in Chad to block Qaddafi's expansionism.

So, I can't go along with Mr. Rositzke when he says our European friends don't think that we're handling Qaddafi correctly, when the French feel forced to put in 3000 troops there.

ROSITZKE: I think we're dealing with two different things. The moment you have armed forces going across a border into another country, particularly if that country is of interest to any Western nation, then obviously the answer is, our answer has been for a long time, the French is here, let's give them the wherewithal to stop the invasion.

MAN: But the French have also launched countless covert paramilitary operations, that the world, of course, is not aware of because they were truly covert, including Chad, before they put in their 3000 troops.

ROSITZKE: Well, you're right. I don't know about their covert operations. But all I can say is that, in effect, what they're doing is taking each problem, and this is certainly separate from the normal terrorist approach, as it is in seeing what they could do to counter it. That's what we've been doing for 30 years. But up to now, I think we find it very hard to handle that terrorist sector, which the Germans have handled pretty well, the Italians have handled pretty well, the British are trying to handle.

MAN: The last thing that bothered me, Mr. Rositzke, is when you referred to the Soviet totalitarian dictatorship as an authoritarian regime. You wouldn't get one dissident or defector to agree with you on that, whether it's Andrei Sakharov, who is still in exile in his own country, who is still a hero to every liberal in the Western World -- I think he would be shocked to hear you describe it as an authoritarian regime rather than a totalitarian dictatorship.

ROSITZKE: Well, I don't quite follow Jeanne Kirkpatrick's distinction between the two. But let me say this: that one of the elements in Soviet history which I think in

21

the long run will not be disregarded is that it was a bloody one-man dictatorship for several decades, and that from Khrushchev on, the general handling -- put it that way -- of the Soviet population has been certainly a lot milder than it was in the old days; that there are people being put in jail for their thoughts, there are people being put in psychiatric hospitals, but they're not being murdered by the hundred thousand.

Now, from their point of view, that's progress. From us, it's a long way to go before we get the kind of regime there we'd like.

FISKE: Sir, we appreciate your call.

Good evening.

MAN: I'd just like to say that I'm in complete agreement with your guest this evening. And it's great to hear another point of view as to what's going on in El Salvador and around the world in general. And I think it's really fantastic.

Thank you very much.

FISKE: Good evening.

MAN: I wonder if you could elaborate a little bit on your economic theory. Do you mean to cut them off, or to involve them so quickly with the riches of capitalism that they conform?

ROSITZKE: Well, in the long run, I don't confine this strictly to using our economic clout with the Soviet Union. What I'm suggesting, for example, is that we develop anchors in the Third World of strong political and economic support in places like Brazil, the Congo when it gets a little more reformed, obviously Nigeria, Indonesia, India.

Toward the Soviet Union, I think economic sabotage does absolutely nothing at all, that we are being outstripped by our West European friends in terms both of trade with the Soviet Union and East Europe, and particularly capital investment in the Soviet Union.

I feel that we can work out with the Soviet Union -- and we already have started on a crucial sector, and that is selling them grain -- trade relations which in the long run will obviously help them become more prosperous, as it will help us become more prosperous, but need not contribute to their continuing hostility. If anything, for them to have such interest and capital in our goodwill and our trade, that they will modify their international policy.

FISKE: But that didn't seem to be borne out, you know,

by the trade that we established with them in recent years, before Afghanistan, when, in fact, our relations chilled so greatly.

ROSITZKE: Well, the relations really didn't chill until, I suppose, '74 or '75. And if we're talking about effective relations between two great countries, then what we're talking about is what will be the impact over a 10- or 20-year period.

I think one of the best things that we could have done for the Russians, in terms of their needs, was the grain. Well, that happens also to be in the American interest. There are other sectors of that sort that can be found.

And if one follows the notion, which I think is true --this is certainly true in Western Europe today -- that politics follows economics, that increasing trade with the Soviet Union -- and we are beginning to increase it with China -- will, in effect, make them more acceptable members of the family of nations.

MAN: I recall earlier in your introductory remarks, Mr. Rositzke, you said Mr. Khrushchev started out with the Third World thinking that if he could bring a lot of them into the Soviet sphere of activity, if not influence, then they could make things awfully rough for the West. And he, in effect, enunciated that politics would follow economics, in that sense, didn't he?

ROSITZKE: He did. And he and his successors were unable to follow it up because they cannot give the kind of support that the people, for example, in Angola or Mozambique want. They've invested an awful lot in Cuba because that's pretty crucial to them.

What I am saying is if we compete with them in the Third World economically, we've got it all over them.

FISKE: Harry, let's follow that up a little bit. A great advantage we have now is that the Soviets cannot deliver the economic aid which they would like to deliver to solidify the support of these countries where they've had revolutions of one sort or another. But if in fact we trade with them, as you have advocated, to improve their economic strength and viability, might they not then be in such a position? And is that not the reason for which a great many people do not want us to trade anything to the Soviet Union which can have any possibility of strengthening them?

ROSITZKE: Fred, you've hit the nub of the problem. And that is, can the capitalists or the Communists outdo each other

23

in the production of goods and their sale abroad? I happen to have enough faith in our system, and also in the West European system, that if it comes to the next 30 years, and even though the Russians get so they, let us say, can export more goods, that we can outbeat them in a way that they cannot compete with, because we have a capacity here to satisfy human needs by delivering goods, and with profit to ourselves, that no other nation has, except possibly the Japanese.

Now, if you look at the expansion of Japanese influence in the world, you find that they do it almost strictly through the economic platform. They have now spent several billion dollars to get a monopoly on semiconductors in the Third World. By the time we get ready to compete with them, they will have almost all the markets cornered.

In the long run, perhaps, the Russians will be able to do that, but not if we've progressed, with our superior technology, and outdid them any place they go.

FISKE: We have five minutes of news coming up....