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SUBJECT	Full Text		

WILLIAM BUCKLEY: The debate rages on the matter of Central America, with special reference to development in Nicaragua and El Salvador. At one extreme, the President's recent speech is being held as a reinvitation to a new Vietnam. At the other end, perhaps not correctly designed as an extreme, it is held that the President desires more than actually he is willing to endorse -- namely, the substantial evacuation from this hemisphere of satellite states that are military arms of the Soviet Union.

We have with us two guests. Congressman Stephen Solarz, familiar to this audience, is a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and returned recently from a trip to Central America with very emphatic views about what we should do in the area, rivaled only by his emphatic views of what we should not do in the area. Mr. Solarz is a graduate of Brandeis University, with a master's degree in public law taken from Columbia. He has served in the New York State Legislature and was elected to Congress in 1974, and threatens to live happily there ever after. Before returning to public service, he did a stint of journalism and of teaching.

Adolfo Calero was born in Managua, Nicaragua. He was graduated from the University of Notre Dame, and went then to the University of Syracuse, where he received a degree in law. He returned then to Nicaragua, where he went into business. He was active in the Conservative Party, opposed consistently the dictatorship of Somoza, and was jailed by Somoza in 1978. In January of this year, abandoning any residual hope for libertarian or social reform at the hands of the Sandinistas, he left Nicaragua, and serves as one of the directors of the FDN, [Spanish expression]. He is accepted as one of the leaders of

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the opposition to the Sandinista government.

We must understand that the word opposition, where dictatorships are concerned, tends to define military or paramilitary opposition, since in such countries there is no way to settle political differences by democratic means.

I should like to begin by asking Mr. Solarz, did Congressman Christopher Dodd, speaking the other night in rebuttal of President Reagan, exactly reflect your own views?

REP. STEPHEN SOLARZ: I think to a very large extent, Bill, Senator Dodd reflected my views about the situation in Central America.

BUCKLEY: Senator Dodd. I mean Senator Dodd. I'm sorry.

REP. SOLARZ: In Central America. Although had I been given the opportunity to respond to the President on national television, I might perhaps have put it a little bit differently.

BUCKLEY: What would you have put differently?

REP. SOLARZ: I think that I would have tried, perhaps, to...

BUCKLEY: Other than it would have been more seductive.

REP. SOLARZ: Well, I think Senator Dodd made a very eloquent speech and described very effectively an alternative perspective on the conflict in El Salvador, which it was very useful to put before the country.

I would perhaps have tried to draw a greater distinction between the President's policy in El Salvador, as it exists today, and what the concrete alternatives are before us in terms of how we ought to be proceeding in that part of the world.

BUCKLEY: And that concrete alternative, you think that he did not sufficiently elaborate, or that you would have elaborated it at the expense of something else that he said?

REP. SOLARZ: I think he was given ten minutes of time on television, so I don't think it would have been possible to have fundamentally expanded what he had to say.

I wouldn't want to create the impression that I find myself in fundamental disagreement with his approach. I think it did reflect the views of a substantial majority of Democrats in the Congress; obviously not all, but most. And in that sense, I

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think it was a fair statement of an alternative perspective on the situation in El Salvador.

BUCKLEY: Well, let me ask you, then, this. When you made the statement that you believe in unconditional dialogue between Salvador and the rebels, what did you mean by unconditional dialogue?

REP. SOLARZ: I mean, in effect, a negotiation in which both sides come to the negotiating table without preconditions. A dialogue in which both sides are free to put any proposals on the table, but both sides are equally free to reject any proposals that they believe are not in their interest to accept.

BUCKLEY: Well, what if they don't agree?

REP. SOLARZ: Well, if they don't agree, then you don't have an agreement. But my quarrel with the policy of the Administration is that while the President says he does favor a political resolution of the conflict and does favor negotiations between the government and the opposition, he has consistently opposed an unconditional dialogue between the government and the opposition, which is in fact the only way to get negotiations going, and therefore, hopefully, to achieve a negotiated resolution of the war.

BUCKLEY: Would you be in favor of an unconditional dialogue between Israel and the PLO?

REP. SOLARZ: No, I wouldn't.

BUCKLEY: Why?

REP. SOLARZ: I'll tell you why, and I think it's a very good question. For a number of reasons. First of all, the PLO, according to its charter and covenant, is clearly and unequivocally committed to the elimination of Israel as a Zionist state in the Middle East. Whereas in El Salvador, whatever one may think of the opposition -- and I want to make it very clear that I have no brief for the FMLNA. I think it would be most unfortunate, not only for the people of El Salvador, but for the United States, if they came to power -- it's quite clear that they are not calling for the elimination of El Salvador as a separate state. They're not calling...

BUCKLEY: They're calling for the elimination of Salvadoran democracy.

REP. SOLARZ: What they are calling for, as I understand it, is a political settlement in which free elections would be a part of the settlement.

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BUCKLEY: That's a joke, isn't it?

REP. SOLARZ: Not necessarily.

BUCKLEY: Well, why is it a joke that the PLO doesn't want that? They will tell you they want to come to terms with Israel, under certain circumstances. Well, you know, the PLO has come a ways from the days when it said that Israel should be eliminated. I happen not to trust the PLO. But I don't trust the guerrillas in Salvador. But I wonder why you mistrust -- why you trust the guerrillas but you mistrust the PLO.

REP. SOLARZ: I don't trust either of them. In the case of the PLO, it remains very clear that their ultimate objective is not a settlement with Israel in which they can have a Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza, living side-by-side in peace with Israel; their ultimate objective, as they have made clear over and over again, is the elimination of Israel as a Zionist state and the establishment of a Palestinian state, not just on the West Bank and Gaza, but including what is now Israel.

And if, in fact, the opposition in El Salvador was calling for the total elimination of the Salvadorian state, I would certainly understand the refusal on the part of the Salvadorian government not to enter into discussions with them.

But let me make one other point.

BUCKLEY: Wait a minute. Wait a minute. Wait a minute. First of all, I want to ask Mr. Calero something.

Mr. Calero, is there a parallel there between the behavior of the rebels in El Salvador and the behavior of the Sandinistas? Did the Sandinistas say when they were struggling for power that they would not, having achieved power, grant freedom to dissenting minorities?

ADOLFO CALERO: Well, could I first comment on the PLO tie-up with the Nicaraguan Sandinistas, because they are there in Nicaragua. They're flying airplanes and they've trained the Nicaraguan Sandinistas for years. And then the Nicaraguan Sandinistas have helped and have aided the Salvadorian communist guerrilla. So there's a definite tie-up between the Salvadorian guerrilla, the Nicaraguan government, Sandinista government, and the PLO.

Now, furthermore, Nicaragua, when Israel, in a defensive action, entered Lebanon, the Nicaraguan government, which had not formal relations whatsoever with Israel, in order to provoke a scandal, in order to attack Israel, they came and broke relations with Israel, something which didn't exist. And then Israel

answered back, saying, "Well, we've had no relations."

But Nicaragua, the Nicaraguan government, the Salvadorian guerrilla, the PLO, and Libya have a definite tie-up. And they are Israel's enemy, the Americans', the United States' enemy, and enemy of Nicaraguans who want democracy.

BUCKLEY: Well, I think that's true, and I'm glad you made that particular point about the involvement with the PLO. But here's the question I'm asking. I happen to know Mr. Solarz moderately well, and I really honestly think that he's in favor of freedom, though not an awful lot of freedom is generated by his policies. And I'm asking you this: Is it or is it not true that when the Sandinistas were fighting to overthrow Somoza, they said that they were fighting for a democratic Nicaragua? Is it or is that not true?

CALERO: Well, the Sandinistas, when they were fighting against Somoza, to begin with, counted with the support of a wide spectrum of the Nicaraguan people. We were all fooled, however. Because once they took power, they denied every reason for which the Nicaraguan war against Somoza was fought. They have fooled the Nicaraguans. They have fooled the Organization of American States. They made commitments before the Organization of American States for democracy, pluralism, for everything that Western democracy stands for. And they have violated, one by one, every one of those commitments. They haven't fulfilled them, and they have no intention, apparently, of doing.

BUCKLEY: In what sense is there to be a distinction drawn between the Sandinistas fighting for control of Nicaragua and the guerrillas fighting for control of El Salvador?

CALERO: Well, both the Sandinistas -- when they fought for control of Nicaragua, they definitely were fighting for Soviet expansionism. It's been demonstrated. It's been shown. It's clear to the eyes of everyone. And the Salvadorians are exactly doing the same thing. They are trying to create in El Salvador another Soviet satellite.

BUCKLEY: Why can't he see that?

REP. SOLARZ: Let me try my hand at that, Bill, because I think you do have a somewhat different situation.

We failed, unfortunately, in our efforts to promote a negotiated settlement of the conflict in Nicaragua. And when the Sandinistas came to power in that country, they came to power after Somoza fled, after the National Guard collapsed. And to the extent that power does come out of the barrel of a gun, as Mao once told us, they were clearly in a commanding position,

once the revolution triumphed, to do what they pleased.

And I fully agree that the Sandinistas have betrayed the Democratic promise of the revolution. I think that's a great tragedy.

The potential difference in El Salvador is that we may be in a position to achieve a negotiated settlement of the conflict with the Salvadorian armed forces still more or less intact, thereby providing a meaningful counterweight to the political forces represented by the opposition.

I have no doubt, by the way, that if the government of El Salvador collapsed and the guerrillas came to power militarily, you would have in El Salvador precisely the same kind of government you now have in Nicaragua. And I think that's something which we ought to try to prevent. But I think we have a much better chance of preventing it in the context of seeking a negotiated resolution of the conflict while there is more or less a balance of forces in that country, than continuing the policies of the present Administration, which in my view are more likely to produce the very result they're designed to avoid.

BUCKLEY: Well, Mr. Solarz, the only balance of forces there exists in El Salvador is a balance that is effected by what I call the skyjacker's leverage. One man in a 747 with 500 other people can effect a balance of forces. In fact, he can prevail if he is willing to throw a hand grenade out in the center of the plane.

Now, there is no such balance of forces if those elections meant anything at all. They were very widely observed. They were certified by even the United Nations observers as having been democratic. And it showed an absolute, total opposition to the rebels.

Now, what they are simply insisting is, "We don't abide by democracy. We're going to use guns. We're going to blow up bridges and blow up hospitals. And we're going to do that until the opposition is worn down."

REP. SOLARZ: I would put it a little bit differently, Bill. I think that what the turnout in the Salvadorian elections demonstrated more than anything else was the overwhelming desire on the part of the Salvadorian people for peace and an end to the conflict. They have suffered enormously, as you know, in the last four years. Over 40,000 noncombatant Salvadorians have been killed. Most of them, by the way, by the security forces rather than by the guerrillas.

But I think that the government of El Salvador and our

own government took what was fundamentally an utterly unrealistic position. What they, in effect, said was, when the elections were being held last year, was that the guerrillas should lay down their arms and come into the electoral process. And all I can say is that however desirable that would have been, it was utterly unrealistic to expect the guerrillas to lay down their arms in order to run in an election supervised by security forces that have been responsible in the last few years for the murder of literally 40,000 of their own people through gangland-style death squads that execute people in the middle of the night. Just as, by the way, it would have been equally unrealistic for the guerrillas to say to the government that the security forces should lay down their arms and run in an election supervised by the guerrillas.

I happen to believe that an electoral process does provide, hopefully, the best way of bringing the conflict in El Salvador to an end. But to the extent that it can provide a basis for ending the war, it can only be on the basis of elections in which both sides can have some real confidence that the security of the candidates will be protected and the results of the election will be respected.

BUCKLEY: But my point is that nobody who is not a far-gone romantic can entertain any such confidence. What grounds would a Salvadoran have for believing that his right to worship, that his right to express his points of view, his right of freedom of the press would be protected by people who unabashedly identify themselves, as Mr. Calero says, with the Sandinistas, whose whole purpose, really, is to show that they are not interested in these bourgeois distractions?

REP. SOLARZ: Well, if in fact they were the ones who were running the election, I think that that kind of lack of confidence would be amply justified. But presumably they wouldn't be the ones supervising the elections.

My sense is that if you can get an agreement between the government and the opposition to end the war based on some kind of electoral process in which all forces and factions can participate, it would presumably be based on an election in which some sort of mutually acceptable regional force came into the country, as in Zimbabwe, to supervise the electoral process. And to the extent that it is widely believed in Washington and in San Salvador itself that in the context of such elections the guerrillas would not be able to win a majority of the vote, then I think we have every reason to seek an electoral process in which the opposition is willing to participate, because out of such a process we could hopefully not only achieve an end to the fighting, but a new government in El Salvador in which the prospects for political pluralism and genuine freedom were enhanced.

BUCKLEY: What do you think the alternative, Mr. Calero, is to a pursuit along those lines?

CALERO: Well, I certainly wouldn't trust any commitment made from the guerrillas in El Salvador, because I know them, through the Sandinistas, I know what they are after. They're after power. I know what they pursue. And they simply do not believe in elections. Where they get their instructions from, Cuba and the Soviet Union, they don't have elections. Power is never given to the opposition.

The Sandinistas have repeatedly stated that there will be no option for us, the opposition, to reach power. We can go to elections, like in Eastern Germany, but we will not have the option to govern. I mean that's the way the communists are.

REP. SOLARZ: Well, Bill, if I could interject a thought here. If a dialogue could be established between the government and the opposition in El Salvador and if the government offered to hold elections on a basis in which all forces could have a legitimate sense of security, where it was clear not only to the Salvadorian people but to the rest of the world that a genuinely free and fair election was in the offing, and the opposition rejected such an election, then I think it would significantly strengthen the capacity of the government in El Salvador to appeal for regional and international support, not to mention the support of our own people; and would certainly strengthen the base of domestic support for the President's policy in our own country.

BUCKLEY: If you were the Napoleon running this show and your...

REP. SOLARZ: I thought you were the Napoleon running this show.

BUCKLEY: Well, I'll tell you what I'd do. But if you were the Napoleon running the show down there and this were offered to you, would you not, on behalf of the guerrillas, say, "Of course. I'll be glad to engage in such an exercise," intending, therefore, merely to take an opportunity to advertise your synthetic social programs, to fool 15 percent more American congressmen than are already fooled; and then, when the results came in, you would charge all kinds of threats and you would say, "Well, there was intimidation there, and we're going back to the war for the virtue of social"? That's what...

REP. SOLARZ: Well, I'm not, of course, Napoleon. Nor do I have any desire to be Napoleon. But if I were in that position, I can tell you, Bill, that I would not come to the conclusion you came to. Because if in fact a political agreement

can be reached between the government and the opposition in which both sides go into an election under some form of regional supervision, and it should turn out that the opposition is soundly defeated in the election, which is a...

BUCKLEY: They were a year and a half ago.

REP. SOLARZ: Well, they didn't run in the election, so one can say that they were defeated.

BUCKLEY: Well, they boycotted it. They boycotted it. But there was an absolute majority of voters who voted for the other side. So even if all of them had voted on the other side, there would have been a majority.

REP. SOLARZ: But my point here is that if in fact you have elections under some kind of regional supervision and it turns out the opposition is soundly defeated, and then they went back to a form of guerrilla warfare, it would deprive them of virtually all of their internal and external legitimacy.

BUCKLEY: It wouldn't at all.

REP. SOLARZ: Oh, I think it clearly would. And I think it would break the back of the insurgency and put the government in a much better position over the long run to prevail.

But let me ask you a question, if I might.

BUCKLEY: Well, Mr. Calero has something.

CALERO: I wanted to make a comment. It seems that people don't learn from recent experiences. In Nicaragua, when the moderate opposition, in private enterprise, the church, had Somoza against the wall, and there had been some uprisings, also, in the country, then there was a mediation, led and inspired by the United States. And between this [unintelligible] which grouped all the democratic forces and the government of Somoza. And you know who boycotted that? The Sandinistas. They were opposed to any -- to the reaching of an agreement. They were opposed to getting Somoza out because they wanted to overthrow Somoza. And they boycotted that. They boycotted every effort. And I participated in that. I know. And because they didn't want to have Somoza out, they didn't want a coup d'etat in Nicaragua that would get Somoza out, because they wanted Somoza there in order to be able to keep on fighting him, as they did, to overthrow him, and to keep power to themselves.

The communists don't share power. I mean that's common knowledge. Any neophyte will know that.

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REP. SOLARZ: It seems to me that we have everything to gain and very little to lose through an effort to bring this war to an end through a negotiated settlement. The way things are going now in El Salvador, Bill, if the war continues much longer -- and there's no imminent prospect for a military victory by either side -- the eventual winners may end up envying the losers. So far, over 40,000 Salvadorians have lost their lives. That's the equivalent, in American terms,...

BUCKLEY: You may say it one more time. You've said it twice. A limit of three.

REP. SOLARZ: Well, that's a lot of people, and it's something I think we ought to be concerned about. In American terms, that's the equivalent of over two million Americans.

Five hundred thousand Salvadorians are now refugees. In American terms, that's the equivalent of over 20 million.

BUCKLEY: We lost the equivalent, in modern terms, of 60 in the Civil War. So I know what it is, historically, to die in civil wars.

REP. SOLARZ: And in economic terms, the gross national product in El Salvador has declined by over 25 percent in real terms in the last two years.

BUCKLEY: Thanks to the rebels, yeah, largely.

REP. SOLARZ: So, what is the answer to this problem and this dilemma?

BUCKLEY: It's not an easy answer. But I'll tell you exactly the way we're headed right now. We're headed towards the defeat of the democratically-elected, however imperfectly libertarian-oriented, force because of the attitude of the United States of America. Because they look at us and they say, "Well, these are the people who did it in Vietnam. These are the people who have done it for everybody except Israel," the sole example of people that we are, apparently, steadfast friends of, "and they're going to do it to us."

REP. SOLARZ: Let me suggest...

BUCKLEY: And for Christopher Dodd to get up there and say, "They're all sending their money to Miami," so would Christopher Dodd send his money to Miami if he thought that day after tomorrow the Nazis were going to take over, or the communists take over.

REP. SOLARZ: Well, let me suggest an alternative perspective to you. Because it seems to me that the policy we're

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now following is almost certain to eventually produce precisely the result it's designed to avoid, which is to say...

BUCKLEY: Thanks to you people.

REP. SOLARZ: ...a military victory by the guerrillas.

BUCKLEY: Thanks to you people.

REP. SOLARZ: No, and I'll tell you why. I'll tell you why. Because in the last two years we have provided the government of El Salvador close to a quarter of a billion dollars in military assistance. And from a purely military point of view, they're in worse shape today than they were then.

I would suggest that we could double, triple, or even quadruple the amount of military assistance we provide to the security forces in El Salvador, and it would make relatively little difference in terms of the eventual outcome. So far, we've given the Salvadorians far more military aid than the opposition has received from its outside sources of assistance.

BUCKLEY: How do you know?

REP. SOLARZ: I know on the basis of reports from the intelligence agencies of our own government, which have made it clear that while it is true -- and I fully accept this and acknowledge it, and condemn it, by the way -- that the FMLNA, the guerrilla group in El Salvador, is receiving aid from Nicaragua, from Cuba, from Libya, from Vietnam, and from other communist countries. Yet the total amount of aid they've received is substantially less than the total amount of aid we've given the government of El Salvador.

The problem, from the military point of view, with the government of El Salvador has much more to do with ineffective leadership and inadequate motivation than it does with any shortage of arms or ammunition.

BUCKLEY: Well, that may be. That may be. The fact of the matter is that to the extent that the rebels have fewer arms that they'd like to have is because we're keeping them from getting them, not because they aren't there. The Soviet Union is giving 20 times more military assistance to Cuba, to Cuba, than the United States is giving to all of Latin America. Now, that just gives you some sense of the scale in which we are playing around there, like ballet dancers, in a very serious war that the other side is winning.

CALERO: I think we are never going to convince Congressman Solarz or our position. And I would suggest, if you

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don't mind, that we go a little bit into Nicaragua.

BUCKLEY: Of course.

CALERO: And into Mr. Dodd's speech, since he said that he was backing -- he was in agreement with most of what he said.

I would like to comment that, to begin with, Senator Dodd said that he was dead sure that at the foot of every revolution was hunger and poverty. Well, we know that in Uruguay was a model welfare state, way back before the United States ever thought of welfare. And the communists, through the Tupamaros, the terrorist Tupamaros, also helped by the PLO and by all the terrorists in the world, turned back that government from being a welfare to being a military government now. And what the communists wanted there was power. They didn't want welfare. They didn't want the people to live in a high standard of living, because they already had it.

Now, in the case of Nicaragua, all the slogans of the revolution, mind you, did not mention one word about hunger or poverty. They said, "Liberty or death. Free country or death. Nicaragua will again be a republic." I mean those were the slogans.

And then, people who live in affluency, like they do here in the United States, think that because we don't eat New York steak cuts every day, I mean that we are -- you know, that we are in misery. And we are not. I mean I prefer to go to a lonely beach in Nicaragua than to go to Coney Island. I mean that's the way...

REP. SOLARZ: Coney Island is in my district.

[Laughter and confusion of voices]

REP. SOLARZ: Brighton Beach. You might like that.

CALERO: Let me finish. Let me finish, please.

Political underdevelopment is at the root of the problems we had in Central America, the problems we've had in Latin America. It's not necessarily, as I have demonstrated, poverty and hunger. Also, the desire or the wish or the will of Soviet expansionism, which will topple any government that will allow itself, or that the United States will permit itself to topple.

And I want to ask you a couple of questions. Mr. Dodd said that he would oppose -- and you, of course -- the establishment of Marxism in Central America. And since 1979,

Nicaragua fell, Grenada, and lately Surinam, and Salvador -- I mean nothing much is being done, or not enough effort is being done to keep Salvador from going communist.

Another thing he said, that he would not accept the creation of Soviet bases. I bet you this very minute the Soviets are building bases in Nicaragua. This very minute they are doing it.

And something else he said was that he would not tolerate the placing of missiles. And, I mean, the Nicaraguan defense minister has stated that he has the right to place Soviet missiles in Nicaragua.

I mean to sum this up, how will -- how do you suggest, Congressman Solarz, that you will stop Soviet expansionism in Central America, in view of what is already happening there?

BUCKLEY: In answer to your question, Nicaragua's regime has built 36 new military bases and garrisons. The previous regime had 13. Nicaraguan pilots and mechanics are being trained in Bulgaria. The regime has received, so far, 50 Soviet tanks, 1000 East German trucks, 100 antiaircraft guns, Soviet 153 millimeter howitzers with a range of 17 miles. Cuban has four to five thousand civilian advisers in Nicaragua, plus 2000 military and security advisers.

What's Dodd doing about it?

REP. SOLARZ: Well, I think it's a very fair question. And let me respond, Bill, first of all, by saying that I would begin by responding to the communist threat in Central America by working far more closely with our friends in the region, almost all of whom favor negotiated resolutions of the conflicts in that part of the world. I would support the initiatives being taken by Mexico, Venezuela, Panama and Colombia, who have called for dialogues both between and within the countries of the region.

BUCKLEY: You wanted to comment on that, Mr. Calero.

CALERO: Look, I went to Panama last week to find out about what had happened in Contadora, and I was told -- I will not mention the person, but at a very, very high level -- that the Contadora meeting was boycotted, was torpedoed by the Nicaraguan communist foreign minister, Mr. d'Escoto. He refused to talk to the other Central American ministers. I mean all d'Escoto wants to do is to talk to the United States. You know, they want to have a dialogue with the United States. And then, of course, they will reach no agreement. And then a bigger scandal will be raised. You know, "These damn American imperialism. Yankees, enemies of humanity," like the Sandinista

hymn reads.

BUCKLEY: What about Mexico?

CALERO: Well, Mexico. Mexico foreign policy, really, is the opposite of what the United States does. I mean that seems to be their guide, you know. And they were even flabbergasted. I heard that even the Mexicans.

Now, the Sandinistas, I'm sure, have lost support from Venezuela. They are losing support from Colombia. These are members of the Contadora group. And the Panamanians are not happy at all, since they hosted this reunion and the Sandinistas boycotted it. I mean this reunion in Panama of the Contadora group, with the Central American foreign ministers participating, was a failure because the Sandinistas -- which is equivalent of saying the communists -- just boycotted them.

REP. SOLARZ: Well, I think that if our foreign policy in Central America is going to succeed, Bill, that we've got to work in concert with the countries of the region rather than in opposition to them. And at a time...

BUCKLEY: It depends whether they're on our side. Right?

REP. SOLARZ: And at a time when everyone from the Pope through the Mexicans, the Venezuelans, the Colombians, the Panamanians, the Costa Ricans are all calling for a political settlement of the conflicts in the region, it seems to me that we ought to be lending our influence and our prestige to such...

BUCKLEY: Don't bring the Pope in. Don't bring the Pope in. The Pope is bound by generic chains to say, "Under no circumstances should disputes be fought out violently." So the fact that he is making this -- that he says people should talk to each other is not really one diplomatic chessmate for you.

REP. SOLARZ: Would you say the same thing about Archbishop Rivera y Domas (?) in El Salvador, itself, who has also called for a dialogue...

BUCKLEY: I would say that about almost man of the cloth. It is extremely hard to expect a minister to say, "Go out and kill as many of them as you possibly can. And then let's hope that we get peace that way." But, unfortunately, there are the martial arts, which are not the same as [unintelligible]. It should, in a sense, ultimately be guided. But the prudential judgment of how to achieve the best for the majority sometimes calls for the use of the force of arms. And God knows [unintelligible].

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SOLARZ: The question which you addressed, I think, Bill, which Mr. Calero addressed to me, was: What should we be doing to prevent the spread of communism in Central America? And I think that the answer, of course, depends on the country involved.

In the case of El Salvador, one of the things I would do is to say to the government there that if they want military assistance from the United States, which clearly they do, that they have got to bring to an end the killing of their own people by their own security forces, by eliminating the so-called death squads that are operating in that country.

BUCKLEY: ...angelism. I mean this has been doing on in Latin America for 400 years before you were born. I think they ought to do that too. But they're not necessarily going to do that. Colombia, without any reference to the United States, lost a million people in five years after the Second World War. It had nothing to do with capitalism. That's just, unfortunately, the way some people are who are not practiced in the political stability Mr. Calero speaks of.

So, I don't think people should kill each other. But I do think it has nothing whatever to do with whether or not there's going to be progress or whether or not we have a vital interest in preventing the satellization of Central America by Russia.

REP. SOLARZ: Well, I would make two points here, Bill. The first is that so long as the death squads remain in operation in El Salvador, it will be objectively impossible for the government there to win a military victory. Because for every noncombatant killed by the security forces, they generate a dozen sympathizers for the guerrillas.

And secondly, the success of Rios Montt in Guatemala, who no sooner after coming to power managed to eliminate the urban death squads in his country, even if he permitted the army to continue running on the rampage in the countryside, demonstrates that if there is a will and determination to end these death squads, it can be done. And if he did it in Guatemala, why can't it be done in El Salvador?

BUCKLEY: I'm saying it can be done and I'm saying it should be done, and I'm saying its being done is not politically decisive. There were death squads in Argentina, and the people who countenanced them are still in power. And they were killing other people who were busy killing them. So there's no particular moral winner in that death squad vendetta.

But I think you're quite right as regards the first two

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points, but not necessarily right as regards the third.

CALERO: It was very interesting for Congressman Solarz to mention the government of Guatemala, that he has suspended the death squads, etcetera, you know. That means that Guatemala --oh, my God -- in Guatemala things have improved. And yet there's no aid to Guatemala. I mean Guatemala hasn't been given anything to fight the communist guerrillas.

REP. SOLARZ: Well, I would, frankly, have to disagree with you here, Mr. Calero. Because while it is true that the situation in Guatemala improved in the cities after Rios Montt came to power, it clearly got much worse in the countryside, where the Guatemalan army went on the rampage and killed literally thousands and thousands of Indians living in the Kishe (?) and Wawatango (?).

CALERO: You mean just now? Just now?

REP. SOLARZ: Over the course of the last year. I spoke with...

CALERO: Under Rios Montt's...

REP. SOLARZ: Under Rios Montt.

CALERO: Things have improved. I've been in Guatemala many times and I've traveled -- I find now that people who would not go to their farms before, because they were afraid of the guerrillas, I mean are now going to their farms. And that the farmers themselves have made what you call in the West, have made posses in order to defend themselves against guerrilla attack.

You know, the paymaster of [unintelligible] goes on Saturdays to pay -- used to go on Saturdays. Now they go Monday, Wednesday, Thursday. You know, they change the days because you have no security from the guerrillas.

REP. SOLARZ: Let me say to you, Mr. Calero, that what you have in Guatemala today in the countryside is the peace of the grave.

I think it's very interesting that when the Afghan refugees come out of Afghanistan, we implicitly believe what they tell us about the horrors perpetrated against their people by the Soviet forces in their country.

BUCKLEY: Well, because it's plausible.

REP. SOLARZ: Yeah, because it is plausible. When the Vietnamese flee from Vietnam, we accept what they have to tell...

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BUCKLEY: Ditto.

REP. SOLARZ: ...us about the treatment which they received from the communists in Hanoi. But there are today 30,000 Guatemalan refugees in Mexico who have, over the course of the last year, fled from their country and from their homes and villages, almost all of whom report massacres having been committed by the armed forces of Guatemala.

CALERO: And these people that go over to Mexico train in Mexico and come back as communist guerrillas to Guatemala.

REP. SOLARZ: I'm sorry to say that that is not quite the case. I was in Mex...

BUCKLEY: I'm glad it's not the case.

REP. SOLARZ: Well, so am I, because I would not like to see Mexico being used as a base of aggression against Guatemala.

CALERO: It is already being used. I mean the Guatemalan guerrillas are training in Mexico, as well as -- you have mentioned here, and I accept, the Nicaragua guerrillas were trained in Salvador. And the Nicaraguan Sandinistas were trained in Costa Rica. I mean that is logical. That happens whenever there are borders. It's a good thing, though, that the guerrillas -- I mean the communist guerrillas are in southern Mexico now. I mean when they come up to northern Mexico, then it will be a different story.

REP. SOLARZ: You can approve or disapprove of Rios Montt. But certain facts are indisputable. Amnesty International, America's Watch, U.N. observers, and others, all of whom have visited the refugee camps in southern Mexico, report that there are literally thousands and thousands of Guatemalan Indians there who have fled in the course of the last year, all of whom have tales of terror and horror to tell about how army troops came into their villages, shot up everything in sight, executed whomever they could get their hands on, as a way of terrorizing the indigenous population and drying up the sea, as it were, in which the guerrillas...

CALERO: I brought Guatemala up because you cited Guatemala as an example of what could happen in El Salvador if the death squads were liquidated. So you were the one who said that things had improved in Guatemala.

BUCKLEY: But he said they improved in the cities but not the country. Right?

REP. SOLARZ: Yeah. I...

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BUCKLEY: But I really don't know why we [unintelligible]. Because, unhappily, if the job here today is going to be able to describe inhuman activity in Latin America, it will be an endless show. It is unfortunately a bloody land, as a result of its failure to discover political civility, even as Spain was a bloody land in this century. God knows, we have enough blood on our own hands, though not on that scale recently.

We're talking about people like Christopher Dodd -- this was brought up here by Mr. Calero -- saying, "Ah. It is indeed against the interests of the United States to permit a Marxist-Leninist force, military force, to embed itself in Central America." Well, what is he proposing we do about Cuba? It would be about as hard for us now to take Cuba as it was Okinawa. Cuba's a formidable 800-mile-long aircraft carrier.

Now, what is Dodd -- what does he mean by all this empty rhetoric about how he believes the United States ought to prevent this kind of thing, when it has happened?

REP. SOLARZ: I think that Senator Dodd will have to speak for himself. And I hope you'll invite him on one of your programs so he can do so.

But my answer to that question would be that with respect to Cuba, we ought to follow the advice of the commission which is headed by Sol Linowitz, our former Ambassador to the OAS, and previous President of Colombia, Mr. Paz, who...

CALERO: Of Ecuador.

REP. SOLARZ: Yeah, of Ecuador. Excuse me -- who, together with many other distinguished leaders from the Americas, have just suggested that a serious effort ought to be made to try and resolve the differences between the United States and Cuba in the context of a comprehensive dialogue in which, hopefully, we could persuade them to refrain from providing military assistance to revolutionary groups in the region.

BUCKLEY: I see them and up them one. Let's do that between us and Moscow.

REP. SOLARZ: Fine. I'm delighted to know you favor negotiations with the Soviet Union.

BUCKLEY: But you say unconditional. Unconditional --the only circumstances under which I would deal with Moscow, I'd say, "Look, old shoe. I'm going to hang on to my Constitution." But as I understand your use of unconditional is that you don't set any limits on what you hang on to.

REP. SOLARZ: In this regard...

BUCKLEY: Israel wouldn't say, "I want to hang on to my sovereignty."

REP. SOLARZ: On the contrary, Bill. On this question of unconditional dialogue and negotiations, I take precisely the same position taken by Prime Minister Begin, who said to King Hussein of Jordan and to the elected leaders or self-appointed leaders of every Arab state -- because there are no elected leaders in the Arab World, unfortunately -- that he would be willing to sit down at the peace table with them on an unconditional basis, in which they could put whatever demands they wanted on the table and Israel could put whatever proposals it wanted to on the table.

BUCKLEY: He didn't really mean unconditional. Either we use language precisely or we don't. It's obviously conditional, because he's not going to give up the security of Israel.

REP. SOLARZ: I think if there's any world leader who uses words very carefully, it's Menachem Begin.

[Confusion of voices]

BUCKLEY: Because if you say unconditional, meaning no conditions, that presupposes that up for barter or discussion is the sovereignty of Israel. Now, you and I both know that isn't so.

REP. SOLARZ: No. What Prime Minister Begin is saying is that he would like to go into negotiations in which any demand or position can be put on the table. He's not obligated to accept it. But he doesn't want to establish conditions as a basis for beginning the negotiations, as a way of facilitating dialogue with his Arab neighbors.

BUCKLEY: Well, okay. Well then, do -- then, if you don't know it, I do. He's wasting his time. It's not going to happen.

REP. SOLARZ: Well, unfortunately, I think you're right and that it won't happen. And the reason it won't happen is that 35 years after the establishment of Israel, whose independence anniversary we celebrated just a few days ago, there remain no Arab leaders who are willing to come to the negotiating table and negotiate a genuine peace with Israel. Anwar Sadat tried it, and I think that was a great step forward, for which, unfortunately, he made and had to pay the supreme sacrifice.

Now, the Lebanese leaders are negotiating with Israel today, but clearly under duress.

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I think it was a terrible tragedy that King Hussein refused to come into the peace process.

BUCKLEY: I do too. But let's keep our attention focused. I am simply saying that, in my opinion and in my experience, talk about let's settle our differences amicably belongs either in a pulpit or on the part of people who want not to think. Because you can always leave a conference and say, "We've decided to try to settle our differences by negotiation," and you've accomplished exactly nothing.

We know what are the conditions. The conditions are that there shan't be a government in Salvador like Nicaragua's. That's our conditions. That's all we want. And we are perfectly willing to negotiate anything else.

REP. SOLARZ: I have a real sense of deja vu, Bill, because I first made my appearance on your program many years ago on...

BUCKLEY: And I was right. Whatever it was, I was right.

[Laughter]

REP. SOLARZ: On a discussion concerning what was then called Rhodesia and which is now called Zimbabwe. And I think there, too, you took the position that negotiations with the Patriotic Front, which was the name of the opposition in that country, would be fruitless and couldn't possibly succeed. And yet the fact remains that the British were successful in bringing about an end to the war in Rhodesia through a negotiated settlement between the Patriotic Front and the government of Bishop Muzorewa and Ian Smith, which led to free and fair elections and an end to the conflict in that country which was literally devastating that nation...

BUCKLEY: Nkomo wouldn't agree with that. And the casualty figures for last month were higher than those of any other month in the last ten years.

REP. SOLARZ: I think that some of the recent...

BUCKLEY: You should have used another example. What happened the second time you were on?

REP. SOLARZ: The second time was on the same issue.

But finally, Rhodesia became Zimbabwe, and it's got its independence. And we moved on to other matters.

But, look, I share your concern over some of the recent

developments that have taken place in Zimbabwe. But that doesn't vitiate the force of the example and the lesson here, which was that it is possible, even in the context of a civil war, to achieve, under certain circumstances, a negotiated settlement.

Now, it may well be that in El Salvador, no matter how hard we try, even if we can get negotiations going, that it won't be possible to get both sides to agree. I acknowledge that possibility. I'll go further. I'll say that there is a probability that you won't be able to get a negotiated settlement. But so long as there is a possibility, it seems to me that we have a moral and political imperative to pursue it.

BUCKLEY: Not if you undermine, as you would by pressing that particular line, the determination of the majority, who have been validated by democratic experiences, as recently as a year ago, to try to save their own country.

REP. SOLARZ: We would both agree, I assume, that in the long run what we would like to see in El Salvador is the emergence not only a peaceful El Salvador, but a genuinely pluralistic and democratic El Salvador. And I would submit to you that the prospects...

BUCKLEY: Not too pluralistic. I don't want any communists...

REP. SOLARZ: But an El Salvador in which people were free to determine their own future, in which opposition...

BUCKLEY: Only their own future. Not other people's future.

REP. SOLARZ: Right. And which would be, presumably, genuinely nonaligned; certainly, hopefully, sympathetic to the United States, not a base for aggression in the region.

I would submit, Bill, that we have a much better chance of achieving that solution in the context of a negotiated settlement than of a military victory for either side. And I'll tell you why. Both the opposition and the government essentially consist of coalitions in which there are genuine hardcore communists among the guerrillas and genuine and dedicated democrats among the opposition, as well.

BUCKLEY: Like Mr. Calero when he was against Somoza.

REP. SOLARZ: Precisely. And like Guillermo Ungo today, who's the leader of the Democratic Revolutionary Front in El Salvador, and Hector Dada and Reubin Zamora, and others. Just as there are within the government of El Salvador both genuine

democrats, like the President, Mr. Magana; the Foreign Minister, Chavez Mena; the previous President, Napoleon Duarte; but also what can only be characterized as, in effect, dictatorial, if not fascistic, elements within the security forces, who have no more of a commitment to democracy than you and I have to Marxism-Leninism.

And it seems to me that if the guerrillas win a military victory, then the prospects for pluralism will be nonexistent, because the democrats like Ungo and Zamora will be dismissed, as Mr. Calero was in Nicaragua. Whereas if the government in El Salvador wins a military victory, there's a very real possibility that the dictatorial elements within the armed forces will seize power and the Salvadorian democrats will be dismissed, as well.

BUCKLEY: Why? It didn't happen in the Philippines. It didn't happen in Thailand. It didn't happen in Venezuela. It didn't happen in Bolivia. It didn't happen in Colombia. In Bolivia to a certain extent, because everything happens in Bolivia. But Colombia is democratic now. So is Venezuela. We helped them. It didn't happen in Greece. It was another 20 years before the colonels came around.

REP. SOLARZ: Well, each country bears the burden of its own history. And in a certain sense, each country is unique.

BUCKLEY: You see, you have a marvelous skill at undermining what you've said by giving lofty generalities under which it becomes sort of irrelevant.

REP. SOLARZ: Well, look at the history of El Salvador, Bill.

BUCKLEY: You start by making broad assertions. Then I say, "Well, how does this fit this situation?" Then you say, "That really isn't covered by those broad assertions. I'll give you broader assertions."

REP. SOLARZ: You clearly agree with Hegel, who once said that if theory and fact disagree, so much the worse for the facts. And let me tell you about the facts in El Salvador.

BUCKLEY: Well, in certain situations. In certain situations.

REP. SOLARZ: In El Salvador you've had 50 years of military rule.

CALERO: I want to say a few words. You know, history -- well, if you know about it, the Salvadorians were so determined to be democratic that in 1822, or so, they wanted to

become an American state. You know, they wanted to join the Union of the United States.

BUCKLEY: I wish the hell they had.

CALERO: Things would be better.

You know, but what is really at the root or the base of this problem is the fact that Central America, I'm sorry to say, was discovered by Americans until just now, and they found that there was someone else there already. I mean the communists.

And talking about El Salvador, I mean what can you expect when the revolutionary movement in El Salvador is named after Farimundo Marti, a renowned communist, who Sandino threw out of his camp. So the Salvadorian guerrillas are being true, they are being true to what they are. I mean they named their guerrilla effort after a communist. Farimundo Marti is his name. He was killed or something in 1930 -- in the 1930s. But they have revived him because of what he represented, communism. And I'm sure that's what they want.

And in El Salvador, I don't think these negotiations that you are proposing -- I mean why don't they -- in Salvador they had elections. Why don't the guerrillas -- I mean the ones who are real active in the guerrillas, they don't have to go to elections. Why didn't their supporters go? Because the guerrillas in Salvador have no supporters. I mean the Salvadorian guerrillas have dedicated themselves more to fight against power stations, against buses. You know, they have burnt hundreds of buses. They have shut down, dynamited hundreds of power stations, dynamited bridges. I mean they are destroying the country. I mean they don't care. As long as they reach power, they don't care if they destroy the country.

REP. SOLARZ: Mr. Calero, I have no brief whatsoever for the guerrillas in El Salvador. I don't want to see them come to power. But let me tell you this. When I was in El Salvador, as recently as January, I found that some of the most important and influential leaders of the Salvadorian government itself will tell you privately that they recognize that the only way to bring the war in that country to an end is through a dialogue with the opposition. But they refrain from coming out publicly in favor of such a dialogue because of the fear of the far right and their allies within the military. And they believe that if the United States changed its position, it would strengthen their hand within Salvador itself.

I'll tell you something else. Take Roberto D'Aubuisson, the leader of the Arena Party, the President of the Constituent Assembly, the spokesman for the far right in El Salvador, the one

who is most vehemently opposing the notion of dialogue. This very same Roberto D'Aubuisson, a few months ago, secretly went to Panama, where he met with Anna Guadeloupe Martinez, one of the leading guerrilla commandantes, precisely in order to explore the possibilities of a negotiated settlement.

When I was in El Salvador, I met with the leaders of the Arena Party and I asked them how they felt about dialogue. And do you know what they said to me? They said to me, "We're opposed to it because we're not in power. If we had won the elections, we would be doing it ourselves."

So I think there's a tremendous amount of hypocrisy here on the part of elements within the Salvadorian government.

It's all well and good for us to say that we don't think a dialogue will work, that negotiations can't succeed. The fact of the matter is that many influential Salvadorians see it as the only way out of an increasingly hopeless situation, and believe it should be given a chance.

BUCKLEY: Well, they would certainly see it as the only way out if we're going to pull the rug out from under them. Absolutely. They may as well give up tomorrow rather than protract this struggle. If we're going to start wheezing over \$110 million, then it seems to me that they'd better give up. It just shows that the United States cannot be depended on, period, end.

And then, where next do we look? Honduras? Guatemala? Mexico? Somewhere along the line, when Christopher Dodd says that Americans can't stand to permit the establishment of a Marxist state, he's going to have to say what Marxist states we won't permit. I see no program of his to do anything about Cuba or about Nicaragua. And day after tomorrow, he will have forgotten about Salvador.

REP. SOLARZ: Well, let me say that neither Chris Dodd nor I are advocating a total termination of American military assistance to El Salvador. What we've said...

CALERO: How about the Nicaraguan rebels?

REP. SOLARZ: I'll talk about Nicaragua in one second.

What we've said is that our military assistance to El Salvador should be made conditional on a willingness on the part of the Salvadorian government to enter into an unconditional dialogue with the opposition and to bring to an end the death squads being operated by their own security forces.

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Now, insofar as Nicaragua is concerned, all I can say here, Mr. Calero, is when I met with Aden Pastora in San Jose, Costa Rica a few months ago, he told me when I asked him what the United States could do to advance the prospects for political pluralism in Nicaragua, given the extent to which the Sandinistas had clearly repudiated the democratic promises of the revolution, he responded by saying that the single most meaningful thing the United States could do would be to terminate its military assistance to the FDN, or the so-called Contras, who are operating out of Honduras against Nicaragua.

BUCKLEY: Why?

[Confusion of voices]

CALERO: He's thinking differently now. His spokesman, Mr. Ravelo (?), just said that they were friends of the FDN and that they wanted to reach an agreement with the FDN. And so you are some months behind, Mr. Solarz. And I'm talking right now at this very minute. That's what has been said by Ravelo.

REP. SOLARZ: Well, my -- the answer to your question, Bill, is that Pastora, who I think is a genuine democrat -- and I hope you would accept that.

CALERO: Yes.

REP. SOLARZ: Who is...

CALERO: I accept it. Yes.

REP. SOLARZ: Who is genuinely and deeply opposed to what the Sandinistas have done to his country, said that he believed that American aid to the FDN enabled the Sandinistas to legitimize their repression within Nicaragua by arguing that it was necessary in order to prevent the ex-Somozasistas from coming back to power.

BUCKLEY: Thank you, Congressman Solarz.

Thank you, Mr. Calero.