

DCI
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WORLDWIDE BRIEFING

Intelligence must not only report developments around the world as they occur, but also step back and to discern patterns, linkages, and strategies that may work to endanger the United States and its interests. During 1985, the pattern of challenges and threats to our strategic interests broadened, sharpened and intensified.

The main thrust still comes from the Soviet Union, which is increasingly posing a many dimensioned global challenge to the United States and the Free World. This threat resides:

- (1) in the military might the USSR is piling up on the Eurasian land mass,
- (2) in its steady acquisition of geopolitical bridgeheads in Asia, Africa and Latin America, and
- (3) in the development, linking and use of these bridgeheads for growing Soviet naval and air operation and to further enlarge the Soviet geopolitical position.

The Soviets continue the modernization and expansion of their military forces both conventional and strategic. The conventional weapons threat from the Warsaw Pact countries was the first element of this threat to emerge. It has been intensified in recent years and has now progressed to the point where the Pact enjoys huge military advantages, and is now developing more exotic arms for the future.

In the European Central Region, the Pact maintains a three-to-one advantage in tanks and artillery, and more than two-to-one in armored vehicles and aircraft.

< GRAPHIC #1: BAR CHART: NATO/WARSAW PACT
GROUND FORCE COMPARISON

While NATO has historically had the qualitative edge in military equipment, this edge is eroding.

The newest Soviet tanks are at least the equal of those in NATO's arsenal. In some aspects, such as firepower and armor protection, they are superior.

The fielding of more self-propelled artillery is boosting Soviet ground units' maneuverability, survivability, and tactical nuclear firepower. Soviet bridging equipment is so good that our army has benefited from reverse engineering and is fielding models of Soviet design.

Soviet aircraft are among the world's finest. Newer fighters and fighter-bombers have improved performance, larger payloads, and better avionics--though the latest US aircraft still maintain leads in sortie rate and avionics.

The Soviets have developed and used in Afghanistan special effects munitions to provide massive destruction without crossing the nuclear threshold. (Example: Fuel-Air Explosives)

We know that the Soviets are working to develop aircraft and cruise missiles employing stealth features, and remotely piloted vehicles for acquiring and attacking armored vehicles. At the same time they are developing their own anti-tank warheads with increased penetration ability, precision guided munitions with enhanced accuracy, conventional explosives with enhanced destructiveness, and a new generation of fighters, some with multiple target look-down/shoot-down capability.

< GRAPHIC #2: PHOTO: RPV

These Soviet developments add up to a dominance in land warfare which requires the West to count on its maritime reinforcement capability to counter and its strategic forces to deter.

Some of the Soviets' greatest strides have been in submarine production. In the last two to three years, they have introduced three new types of nuclear attack submarines. They have also launched a 65,000 ton aircraft carrier, and in their naval deployment and naval exercises have brought US-Soviet competition into Atlantic and Pacific waters where until now we have enjoyed a near monopoly.

< GRAPHIC #3: DRAWING: NEW SOVIET CARRIER

The second element of Soviet military power to emerge is its strategic force. By the mid-1990s, nearly all of the Soviets' currently deployed intercontinental nuclear attack forces--land- and sea-based ballistic missiles and heavy bombers--will be replaced by new and improved systems. The number of deployed strategic force warheads will increase by a few thousand, over the next five years, with the potential for greater expansion in the 1990s.

< GRAPHIC #4: PIE CHART: SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCE MODERNIZATION, MID 1990S

The Soviets have already deployed their first new mobile ICBM

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Specific major improvements are also under way in Soviet ballistic missile submarines and bomber forces.

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We expect the Soviets to complete improvements to their operational ABM defenses at Moscow by 1987. This provides them with all the components necessary for a much larger, widespread ABM defense, including transportable engagement radars, above-ground launchers, and a new high-acceleration short-range interceptor.

The distinction between missions for surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and ABMs is becoming increasingly blurred as the result of technology improvements



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The Soviets have long been working on technologies basic to our Strategic Defense Initiative.



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We estimate that between 1980 and 1983, Soviet space program costs nearly doubled. The costs of the USSR's military space activities alone are about the same as those for their strategic offensive forces. Soviet space systems are likely to be an integral part of any strategic missile defense system the Soviets might develop and deploy.

The five-year plan which Gorbachev will soon propose to Party Congress will call for an 80 percent increase in the investment in machine building. There will also be ambitious goals for high tech support industries. This will include the microelectronics and computers essential for developing the more complex weapons systems the Soviets plan for the next decade. We believe the current high level of military spending will continue to grow at the roughly one percent rate that has prevailed for the past ten years.

The important thing is not how much the Soviets spend on arms, but the quantity and quality of arms they get for their money. Because of accumulated earlier investment and defense industrial capacity, the number of weapons systems that they will be able to buy over the next five years will be substantially greater than what they acquired the past five years.

Despite the much greater US spending for arms of the past few years, only recently has the US begun to catch up with Soviet weapons acquisition; until then, we simply were not falling behind as fast.

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The steady growth of Soviet weapons procurement from the high level of the last decade will give the Soviets a massive cumulative inventory of weapons, and they will continue substantially to modernize their forces in the next five years and buy larger numbers of weapons.

Even at a time of economic difficulty and a reordering of domestic priorities in the Soviet Union, Soviet defense programs have been protected. For example, during the next five year plan we expect ICBM production to increase substantially over the 1981-85 plan, submarine production to be up about 20-25 percent, and tank production to jump well over 50 percent. There will be some 4,000 fighters and helicopters and a few hundred new strategic bombers produced during this period. While these numbers are somewhat lower than in the preceding five-year period, the new aircraft will be substantially more technically advanced and capable. Thus, the prospect is for continuation of the steady 20-year expansion and modernization of Soviet strategic and conventional forces. The cumulative effect of this buildup is so great that the United States has only begun to catch up.

This huge military force and its continued growth may never be used against the United States or NATO--although the Soviets clearly are prepared to do so if their vital interests are threatened. But the mere existence of this force not only validates the Soviet Union as a superpower but has an intimidating effect on countries around the world as the Soviets seek to expand their presence, influence, and power. It represents the backdrop for an aggressive challenge being played out worldwide, but most particularly on the ground in the Third World and in the vicinity of critical sea lanes.

The Soviet Union has acquired bridgeheads in Cuba, Angola, Nicaragua, Afghanistan, Cambodia, South Yemen and Ethiopia. Gorbachev, since coming to power, has moved sharply to strengthen the Soviet hold on these bridgeheads. In the last six months alone, he has extended a \$600 million credit to Nicaragua, a \$1 billion in new economic assistance to Vietnam, and completed the supply of \$1.5 billion

in military equipment to Angola. Each of these countries has become an outpost for Soviet intelligence collection, propaganda and subversion in its respective region. Several have undertaken on their own to destabilize neighboring regimes. Virtually all are strategically located either near important strategic choke points or in areas of almost certain regional conflict.

GRAPHIC # 7: WORLD MAP

As the map indicates, the USSR now has Marxist-Leninist allies or clients spread around the globe. It has naval and air basing rights in some of these places, close to Free World sea lane choke points. These various strategic positions which the Soviets have acquired around the world are being linked, moreover, in a growing logistic and infrastructure network.

The Soviets have created in Cuba the strongest military force in the Western Hemisphere, with the exception of our own.

Even more worrisome than this military bastion on our doorstep are the growing logistic networks that the Soviets have sponsored in both Cuba and Nicaragua. In Cuba at least three, and probably more, airfields have been upgraded to host Soviet TU-95 Bear heavy bombers capable of carrying nuclear air-to-surface missiles. These planes are routinely transiting from the Kola Peninsula in the Soviet Arctic to Cuban airfields. In Nicaragua, aircraft revetments to handle high performance fighters have been completed at Sandino airfield; the runways at Puerto Cabezas and Bluefields on the Atlantic coast and Montlimar on the Pacific have been extended to host MIG fighters.

Cuban construction crews are completing the new airfield at Punte Huete outside Managua, which with a 10,000 foot runway will be the only airbase in Central America capable of accommodating Soviet jet fighters, heavy transport aircraft, and TU-95 bombers.

A direct sea connection between the Cuban base and its extension in Nicaragua will be made this year when the Bulgarians complete a major port facility at El Bluff on the Caribbean coast near Bluefields.

This, in conjunction with the Pacific ports of Corinto and San Juan del Sur, where the Soviets intend to install a dry dock, will provide the Soviets with secure port facilities on both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans in close proximity to the Panama Canal. In addition, a Soviet team is surveying the construction of a second canal between the Atlantic and Pacific across the San Juan River and Lake Nicaragua.

We see similar parts of this network snaking around the globe. In the South Atlantic, Soviet naval and naval air forces operate astride Western shipping lanes. These forces depend on a growing infrastructure manned and protected by nearly 2,000 Soviet Bloc advisors, 35,000 Cuban military, and a local Angolan government army of 100,000. You will note from the map that this node is linked to the Cuban part of the network.

The Soviet global network encompasses the Mediterranean anchored at Libya and Syria. About 6,000 Soviet Bloc advisors support those bases, which include air, naval and air defense facilities.

Similarly, this network threatens Western sea lanes in the Red Sea-Arabian Sea-Indian Ocean from bases in Ethiopia and South Yemen. Over 7,000 Soviet and Cuban military personnel and about a quarter million Ethiopian military support this node, as well as Soviet Bloc personnel in South Yemen and Mozambique.

Finally, Soviet naval and air forces operating out of Cam Ranh Bay and Da Nang in Indochina not only command the economic lifelines of Japan, Taiwan and South Korea, but linked with Soviet naval and air bases in Siberia threaten US facilities in the Philippines. Thousands of Soviet military personnel man the infrastructure of this second largest Soviet military complex outside the Warsaw Pact.

Beyond the consolidation and linking of positions in these Soviet outposts, there is the spread of Soviet subversion--active measures, support to insurgent forces, efforts to destabilize countries friendly to the West and exploitation of economic hardship and political instability for strategic advantage. In the case of both their outposts and their support to subversive groups, there is a flood of weapons pouring out of the great arms depot at Nikolaev to regimes and groups all over the world supporting Soviet objectives.

To build the foundation and further project this far-flung program, Moscow maintains extensive military advisory presence in 29 Third World countries. This presence ranges from 5 military specialists in Benin to about 6,000 in Vietnam. There are something like 3,000 in Syria, about 2,000 in Ethiopia, Libya and Afghanistan, and 1,200 in Angola and South Yemen, and 800 in Mozambique. In some of these countries--Ethiopia, Angola, Afghanistan--Soviet officers exercise command and control and in others they have great leverage and influence.

In addition to this, the Soviets and their surrogates provide support to Communist or radical insurgents in some ten countries, and help some seven Socialist-oriented client regimes suppress insurrections of their own. All this involves 335,000 combat troops, over 65,000 advisors, extensive political and military training, and various levels of political support. The 335,000 combat troops occupying other countries include 118,000 Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan, over 130,000 Vietnamese in Cambodia and 45,000 in Laos, and over 40,000 Cubans in Africa.

← GRAPHIC #8: MAP OF LATIN AMERICA

The principal Soviet targets in supporting insurgencies are:

- El Salvador and Guatemala which are supported from Cuba and Nicaragua;
- Chile, in which Cuba, Nicaragua and the Soviet Union and several East European countries have been training and providing weapons for violent opposition and funding of the Communist party;
- Colombia, where three insurgent groups receive support from some combination of Moscow, Cuba and Nicaragua;
- Namibia, where weapons and military training for the insurgents of the Southwest Africa Peoples Organization comes from the Soviet Union, Libya and Cuba; and
- Sudan, where Libya and Ethiopia provide support for insurgents.

← GRAPHIC #9: MAP OF AFRICA / MIDDLE EAST

For most of the decade of the 70s people were flocking to join Communist insurgencies. This has been reversed and today some half million people around the world are fighting in resistance movements against Communist regimes. In Afghanistan, there is virtually a nation in arms fighting against 120,000 Soviet troops; in Angola, Savimbi has some 60,000 fighters at present in all parts of Angola. In Ethiopia, Eritrean and Tigrean rebels fight the

← GRAPHIC #10: MAP OF ASIA

Marxist Mengistu government and the largest army in Africa with its Cuban and Soviet advisors. In Cambodia, some 30,000 insurgents fight some 140,000 Vietnamese soldiers. In Nicaragua, some 20,000 resistance fighters are in a standoff with some 120,000 Sandinista troops and militia.

← GRAPHIC #11: MAP OF LATIN AMERICA

Finally, there are areas of great instability, for example, in Sudan and southern Africa and in the Philippines where US and Western political and strategic interests are at risk and which offer the potential of enormous gain to the Soviets.

← GRAPHIC #12: MAP OF ASIA

These soft spots may have largely indigenous sources but they offer tempting opportunities to the apparatus I have been describing. The most critical situation is that of the Philippines where a Communist-led insurgency controls an increasing proportion of the country's villages and rural areas. It has shown an ability to conduct urban violence in the second and third cities, Dabo and Cebu, and substantial preparation and potential for bringing violence into Manila itself. Whatever the outcome of the forthcoming election we are likely to face rising challenges to US interests in the Philippines. The USSR has been very careful to date, dealing with Philippine establishment figures there, not openly associating itself with the NPA--but definitely in touch covertly with various revolutionary groups. If the NPA's fortunes improve, as seems likely at present, we can expect the Soviet role to grow. Meanwhile, political and insurgent pressures on US basing facilities are likely to grow and the Soviet base at Cam Ranh Bay is only 120 minutes away from our bases at Clark Field and Subic Bay.

GRAPHIC #13: MAP OF AFRICA /
MIDDLE EAST

Another soft spot is Sudan. Its severe political and economic disarray is compounded by Libya's strenuous efforts to gain predominant influence there. At the moment, insurgents of the Sudanese Peoples' Liberation Army (SPLA) are supported primarily by Ethiopia. the Soviets may be increasing their contact with the SPLA and providing some arms assistance through the Ethiopians. We believe that East Germans and Cubans have been training Sudanese insurgents inside Ethiopia. Resulting pressures have led the Sudanese to withdraw from joint military exercises with us, revoke access rights for US forces, and question the future status of prepositioned US military equipment. Additionally, the Libyans have been given rights of air passage over Sudan enabling the Soviets to hook up more easily their presence in Libya and Ethiopia. US interests will be further jeopardized if radical elements pull off a successful coup in Khartoum, if the general situation becomes one of near anarchy, or if a weak elected government should draw closer to Libya. If it or a successor should allow more Libyan and Soviet influence and presence in Sudan, hostile forces would face Egypt on the west and the south--and pro-Soviet elements in the Sudan, Ethiopia, and South Yemen would fully command the southern approaches to the Suez Canal.

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This combination of subversive aggression and soft spots around the world has been gravely compounded by the emergence of what we would call the radical entente of Syria, Libya and Iran, all of which share the common objective of expelling the United States from the Middle East, the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia. These three states all have radically diverging interests, personalities, and style, but they share critical characteristics: opposition to nearly all aspects of US policy in the region; a desire to weaken or destroy moderate Arab leadership; active opposition to the US peace process; and the sponsorship of terror to attain political goals.

The activities of these states are not directed by the USSR, but their policies largely serve Soviet interests by damaging both Western interests and moderate forces. The Soviets provide major military support to two of the three--Syria and Libya.

Syria is the most effective of the three. While its goals are more limited than the other two, its leadership is tactically brilliant and generally successful--qualities which hardly describe Iran or Libya.

Iran's attentions are largely consumed by the Gulf war and by Shia politics in the Gulf--despite broader interests in propagating Shia fundamentalism in the world. Its role in Lebanon, however, was a critical factor in stimulating the US exodus from that country in the face of unremitting Shia attack.

In Libya, Qadhafi's interests and ambitions parallel those of the USSR in so many respects that the disruptive effects are not measurably different from what they would be, with Qadhafi a total surrogate of Moscow's. No other state outside the Soviet Bloc has a geographic range of subversive activity to match that of Libya. Qadhafi's ambitions are mirrored in subversive meddling which now ranges from Chile to the Caribbean, to South Africa, across the Middle East to East Asia, Indonesia, and New Caledonia in the Southwest Pacific.

Libya has significant military forces to bring to bear and its threat to its immediate neighbors of Chad, Sudan, Egypt, and Tunisia is very real. Libya is the greatest stockpiler of weapons in the world with billions of dollars worth, including hundreds of T-72 tanks (far more, for example, than Poland has), and hundreds of sophisticated Soviet jets.

Qadhafi's explicit ambitions with respect to Malta and the air and air defense weapons the Soviets have provided him to station in Libya make Libya a threat to the Mediterranean sea lane.

I will not dwell in detail on international terrorism this morning since your Committee went into considerable classified detail on these questions yesterday with NIO Charlie Allen and other US experts. I do wish, however, to stress the relationship of the USSR and its associates to terrorism.

The USSR and its Eastern European allies support a host of Near East and other Third World terrorist groups. The Eastern European hand is the more pronounced, the Soviet hand more disguised. Their combined support takes many forms: training, arming, the providing of communications and documentation, safehaven, and so on. Many of the most notorious terrorist leaders--including Carlos and Abu Nidal--have for years circulated fairly freely in Eastern Europe.

These problems we have highlighted this morning/afternoon by no means exhaust the threats that will increasingly confront the US. I can assure you that the Intelligence Community is deeply involved on a priority basis with alerting policymakers to hazards and opportunities in numerous other categories. These include, for example, developments concerning Soviet domestic problems, the Iran-Iraq war, China, Japan, the Korean Peninsula, LDC debtors, nuclear proliferation, CW proliferation, BW proliferation, technology transfer, drug trafficking, oil futures, ecological problems, resource problems, and so on.

All these questions will continue to receive our close attention. But in planning US defenses and military assistance, we believe, now and in the future, the broad, linked threats that I have stressed today demand and deserve the closest attention. The backdrop of growing Soviet military power, the Soviet network of assets and facilities abroad, and Soviet promotion of disorder in the Third World are together creating an increasingly interrelated threat of growing proportions. Growing Soviet global reach, Soviet basing facilities, developing military infrastructures, Soviet military air lanes, and growing Soviet or Soviet client proximity to target countries and to sea lane choke points are all combining to confront the United States with rising challenges for the future.

We have a tendency too often to focus on specific events as they come along, and to be skeptical about drawing linkages and relationships between events. In this view of the world in 1986 and the threats awaiting us in the future, I have tried to lay out for you how US intelligence sees the challenges which our country will have to face in the years ahead. It is only through understanding these emerging patterns and relationships that the United States can shape effective strategies for meeting these challenges.

Thank you for your attention. My colleagues and I will be pleased to entertain any comments or questions you may have.