



**Director of
Central
Intelligence**


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
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


National Intelligence Daily

*Tuesday
27 March 1984*

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

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
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


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EL SALVADOR: Preliminary Election Results

Incomplete results of the presidential election indicate that Christian Democrat Duarte probably will have to face ultrarightist D'Aubuisson in a runoff next month. 


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The US Embassy reports that, with more than half of the votes counted, Duarte is building a strong lead with 47 percent of the vote, followed by D'Aubuisson with 29 percent. Conciliationist candidate Guerrero is third with about 17 percent. These figures are based on unofficial data supplied by Christian Democratic Party headquarters, but the Embassy regards them as reliable. 


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Insurgents prevented voting in a total of 44 municipalities, according to the Embassy. Nevertheless, the number of valid votes may be 1.1 million, nearly as high as in the Constituent Assembly elections in 1982. Despite various problems with the electoral procedure, the Embassy says most observers were impressed with the election effort. 

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Comment: If the current trends continue, Duarte will need little additional support to get a majority in the runoff. His chances will be greatly increased if Guerrero decides to support him in the second round, which is likely to occur within 30 days of the final tally. 

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Government military operations over the past few weeks evidently succeeded in keeping the insurgents off balance and in preventing them from launching coordinated actions to disrupt the electoral process. The guerrillas had claimed they controlled over 70 towns where voting would be denied. 

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[REDACTED]

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GUINEA: Succession Prospects

President Toure's death yesterday in the US during emergency heart surgery could result in a power struggle, afford possible opportunities for Soviet and Libyan meddling, and increase regional tensions. [REDACTED]

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Guinea's constitution calls for the Council of Ministers, which is led by 60-year-old Prime Minister Beavogui, to run the government pending popular elections. A candidate has to be chosen by the country's only party, and elections have to be held within 45 days of the President's death. [REDACTED]

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Comment: Toure ruled for 26 years. During that time, he allowed no individual or group to develop enough strength or experience to replace him easily. [REDACTED]

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The death of Toure probably will intensify factionalism and tribal rivalries and accelerate economic deterioration. These problems eventually could prompt a military coup—perhaps by the lower ranks—to end infighting or rule by an ineffectual successor. [REDACTED]

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Cabinet ministers in the party's political bureau are the most likely candidates to succeed Toure. Unless senior officials can agree on Beavogui or some other compromise candidate, more radical socialists—led by Toure's 47-year-old brother-in-law Mamadi Keita—are likely to vie for power with pragmatists led by Toure's brother, Ismael. Meanwhile, hundreds of thousands of Guinean exiles could complicate matters through possible subversive activities. [REDACTED]

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Whoever succeeds Toure probably would not reverse immediately Guinea's relations with the West. Keita allegedly favors moving in this direction, but more cautiously than does Ismael Toure, with Beavogui somewhere in the middle. [REDACTED]

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Moscow and Tripoli would like to see Guinea return to a radical course. They probably will try to exploit any prolonged period of political uncertainty to achieve this end. The USSR remains Guinea's principal military supplier, provides 365 economic and military advisers, and seeks access for TU-95 long-range naval reconnaissance aircraft and naval basing rights in the country. [REDACTED]

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The potential for instability and foreign meddling will cause Liberia and Ivory Coast to seek renewed assurances of Western support. Toure's death also may jeopardize Conakry's ability to host the next OAU summit, which is tentatively scheduled for May. Moreover, it could reopen the divisive issue of who should become the next OAU chairman, perhaps with the result that Ethiopian leader Mengistu will retain the post. [REDACTED]

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PHILIPPINES: Status of Assassination Investigation

Increasing evidence suggests that the government is trying to impede the work of the board of inquiry into the assassination of Benigno Aquino in order to prevent the emergence of damaging testimony before the National Assembly elections in May. Armed Forces Chief of Staff General Ver, citing an urgent matter of national security, missed a scheduled appearance to testify before the board yesterday. Another military witness refused to testify last Friday. In addition, a member of the board told US officials that Labor Minister Ople has put pressure on the board to delay a planned trip to the US to interview witnesses until after the elections. [Redacted]

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Comment: President Marcos is concerned about the effect of the inquiry on his party's election prospects. The board is angry at official stalling tactics, and it almost certainly will act forcefully to retain its standing as an independent body. Last week it ordered the arrest of two men who had refused to testify. If Ver does not appear later in the week as scheduled, the board could consider using its subpoena powers against him—a move that would embarrass the President.

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MOZAMBIQUE-SOUTH AFRICA: Crackdown on ANC

Raids on the homes of 12 ANC members in Maputo over the weekend publicly demonstrate Mozambique's intention to abide by the commitment it made to restrain the insurgents under provisions of the recent nonaggression pact with South Africa. Four people were detained and some weapons were confiscated in the raid. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Comment: The ANC probably will try to intensify its military campaign to prove that it remains a credible force. It has used Mozambique as its main staging area for attacks against South Africa. The group is now likely to increase use of Botswana and Zimbabwe, despite efforts by those governments to limit its activities. To lessen their dependence on black governments in the region, ANC guerrillas also probably will try to build up an infrastructure in South Africa. [Redacted]

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SIERRA LEONE: President's Illness

President Stevens, who is in his 80s, was evacuated this weekend to London for emergency medical treatment. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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Comment: If Stevens dies or is incapacitated, the poor health and unpopularity of his most likely successors could lead to a protracted power struggle or a takeover by the Army. At the outset, however, either a civilian or a military regime would be likely to continue the country's moderate, pro-Western policies. [Redacted]

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
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EGYPT-SUDAN: Movement of Aircraft

The movement of Egyptian F-4s to Aswan on Sunday reflects Cairo's increasing concern about Khartoum's vulnerability to another Libyan airstrike. US military officials in Cairo report that two of the seven F-4 fighters being sent to Aswan encountered maintenance-related difficulties, and two others are being sent as replacements. The fighters are intended to compensate for continuing delays in sending an Egyptian air defense unit to Sudan.



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CHINA: More ICBM Silos Under Construction


[Redacted] that two new CSS-4 ICBM silos are under construction in a previously known ICBM deployment area near Jingxian. Four other CSS-4 ICBM silos have been seen under construction, two in the Jingxian area and two near Lushi. The CSS-4, which has a range of 14,500 kilometers, is operational at two silos near Luoning. Support facilities like those of Jingxian and Lushi are under construction near Huaihua. [Redacted]

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Comment: All known CSS-4 construction sites are heavily camouflaged and are in rugged terrain, making them difficult to locate and identify. If construction patterns seen at Lushi and Jingxian are repeated, two or four ICBM silos may be under construction near Huaihua. Additional CSS-4 silos may have gone undetected in other areas of China. The silos now under construction probably will be completed over the next two to four years. [Redacted]

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NETHERLANDS: Possible New INF Proposal

The Netherlands Government is seeking NATO's support for a new INF initiative that would eliminate the need for a decision on deployment of INF missiles on Dutch soil. According to the US Embassy, the proposal calls for a reduction in Soviet missile forces while NATO builds up, with the Alliance committing itself to ceasing deployments when a balance is reached. The Belgians reportedly have been approached by the Dutch on the idea and have rejected it. A Belgian official says the plan would not commit The Hague to deploying the missiles if the Soviets refused to go along. [Redacted]

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Comment: The government has promised to make a decision on INF by the end of June and is now searching for a politically palatable compromise. The Dutch have said an arms control agreement would make a decision unnecessary, and they probably believe their plan will steer NATO in that direction. The other Allies, however, almost certainly will join the Belgians in rejecting the proposal. The Dutch probably will decide ultimately that efforts to obtain parliamentary agreement on less than the full complement of 48 missiles is the least damaging alternative. [Redacted]

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UK: Reductions in Falklands Garrison

The UK plans to begin reductions soon in its garrison on the Falkland Islands from the current level of over 6,000 personnel to approximately 2,000 by mid-1985. [Redacted]

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Comment: Most of the forces to be withdrawn probably will be engineer units that have been clearing minefields, repairing war damage, and constructing permanent facilities for the garrison. A new airfield near Stanley is scheduled to be completed next year. If the islands were to be threatened again, it would allow the British to rely on rapid reinforcement by air of their remaining ground and air units. London may try to make use of the withdrawals as evidence of its willingness to take steps to reduce tension. [Redacted]

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SWEDEN-USSR: Trade Commission Meeting

Swedish and Soviet officials begin annual trade talks today amid troubled relations resulting from suspected Soviet submarine intrusions, the expulsions of three Soviets last year, and the USSR's attempts to secure computer technology through Sweden. The US Embassy in Stockholm says the Swedes will seek assurances that trade will be based solely on economic considerations. They also will try to improve economic and technological cooperation and to reduce their persistent trade deficit resulting from large imports of Soviet oil.

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Comment: Despite efforts by senior members of Prime Minister Palme's government to revive trade in 1983, economic relations are likely to remain depressed. The Soviets recently rejected a Swedish firm's bid for work in the Tallinn Port expansion project, a move Stockholm believes was in retaliation for Swedish firmness. The Swedes probably will reject proposals to extend a Soviet gas pipeline from Finland to Sweden's east coast. The USSR presumably is content with its favorable balance of trade with Sweden, and Stockholm admits it has no specific proposals to offer that would be economically attractive to Moscow.

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SPAIN-USSR: Royal Visit Planned

The visit of the King and Queen of Spain to the USSR on 12 May, which was reported on Sunday by the Spanish press, will be the first by a Spanish head of state. The Soviets reportedly told the Spanish Foreign Ministry that, by the time Juan Carlos arrives, the Soviet president will have been appointed.

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Comment: The visit will symbolically complete the process of establishing normal bilateral relations that began shortly after Franco's death. Although the Soviets have not been pleased with the Socialist government's increasing willingness to remain in NATO, they will impress upon the King their desire for closer ties. General Secretary Chernenko and other Soviet officials probably will not raise major issues in order to avoid spoiling the political impact of the King's visit.


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BELIZE: Increased Marijuana Cultivation

[Redacted] extensive marijuana cultivation in northern Belize and clearing activity to increase the growing area. The US Drug Enforcement Administration estimates that Belizean shipments to the US this year will approach 3,000 tons, unless a portion of the crop is eradicated. Prime Minister Price recently suspended the successful spray eradication program in a bid to appease party factions and farmers opposed to using herbicides. The US Embassy reports that he ordered the military to destroy fields by hand instead. [Redacted]

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Comment: If Belize exports close to 3,000 tons, it would overtake Jamaica as the second-largest supplier of marijuana to the US, after Colombia. By expanding cultivation, farmers hope to offset losses incurred last year, when spraying destroyed an estimated 90 percent of the crop. Price faces a tough bid for reelection this year and is unlikely to risk provoking party dissent or public controversy by resuming the spraying during the campaign. The Army has too few men to eradicate enough marijuana to reduce crops substantially.

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
IRAN: Capabilities Near the Strait of Hormuz

Iran has not substantially strengthened its forces near the Strait of Hormuz, despite its threats to choke off oil exports from the Persian Gulf if Iraq attacks Khark Island. Iranian efforts to use mines or aircraft to close the Strait would fail if challenged by Western naval forces. Iran could choose instead to wage a prolonged campaign of harassing ships in the Gulf, hoping to wear down the West. Tehran already has plans for airstrikes or suicide boat attacks on tankers and other shipping in the Gulf. The Arab states in the Persian Gulf have tried to increase their readiness to meet the Iranian threat, but they remain vulnerable.



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Iran occupies a number of islands in the Strait of Hormuz—Hormuz, Larak, Hengam, and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs.



during the past year the Iranians have made only minor improvements to their forces on these islands. Most of their recent construction has been for defensive purposes.



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
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Several artillery emplacements have been built, but they remain unoccupied.



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Tehran has only about 70 operational fighter aircraft in its Air Force. It thus lacks the capability to carry out sustained, large-scale air operations in the Gulf. Iranian fighter aircraft in the Gulf are still at normal strengths, with about six F-4s at Bushehr and two to four more at Bandar-e Abbas.



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Iran's naval capability in the Gulf is low and probably declining. Only one of the three destroyers and two of the four frigates at Bandar-e Abbas appear seaworthy. Four of the 11 patrol boats at Bushehr could put to sea, but it is doubtful that any of the Harpoon antiship missiles aboard these ships would work.




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


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Persian Gulf Military Deployment



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Defenses Against Iranian Attack

The Arab states in the region have increased their military readiness to meet the Iranian threat. [Redacted] the United Arab Emirates had sent Mirage fighter aircraft to bases near the Strait by late December. In January the Omanis reportedly asked the British to send minesweepers to Oman in the event of a crisis. Saudi Arabia raised the alert status of its quick reaction fighter aircraft near the Gulf on 18 February. [Redacted]

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The air defenses of the Gulf states, however, could not prevent some Iranian aircraft from reaching important targets. Only about 10 of the 95 fighter aircraft and three of the 14 surface-to-air missile units on the Persian Gulf probably would be able to respond to a surprise attack. [Redacted]

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Outlook

Iran's fear of foreign intervention and dependence on transportation through the Gulf suggest that Tehran would try to close the Strait only as a last resort. Even if it decided on such a course, Tehran lacks the military means to keep the Strait permanently closed if challenged by Western naval forces. [Redacted]

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Iran instead may be considering a strategy of prolonged harassment in the Gulf. Its air and regular naval forces probably could make intermittent attacks on unescorted tankers and other shipping. Iran could augment such attacks with suicide boats and terrorist operations by Shia dissidents in the area. [Redacted]

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Such a strategy, if unopposed, would hamper international shipping and might discourage some ships from entering the Gulf. Tehran could compound the problems by making—or claiming—repeated attempts to mine the Gulf, to force minesweeping operations each time. Tehran would calculate that it could outlast Western resolve and that the West would not invade for fear of a Soviet reaction. [Redacted]

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