



**Director of  
Central  
Intelligence**

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# National Intelligence Daily

*Monday  
26 March 1984*

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
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
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


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**EL SALVADOR: Election Day Difficulties**

*New voting procedures caused problems and delays in the presidential election yesterday, but the insurgents apparently did not make a major effort to disrupt the balloting.* 


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The US Embassy reports that the voter turnout was heavy, although nearly all sections of the country reported confusion and administrative problems. The lack of polling personnel and shortages of ballots and ballot boxes were the most common complaints. Mistakes in the newly compiled national voter register also caused problems. 


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The secretary general of the Christian Democrats told the press his party may present a motion to invalidate the election because of trouble with the new voting system. Spokesmen of other parties expressed only mild concern about the irregularities. 

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
The government's Electoral Council blamed a power blackout caused by the insurgents for much of the trouble. The Embassy says guerrillas also interfered with voting in at least four departments by overrunning polling stations, destroying ballot boxes, and scattering voters. 

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**Comment:** It probably will take several days to determine the winners. Problems with the new voter registry appear to have caused the most difficulties. The Christian Democrats may choose to challenge the results unless they take a substantial lead. 

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**IRAQ-IRAN: Attack on Shipping**

*Baghdad claimed that its air and naval forces attacked a convoy near Khark Island on Saturday, destroying four merchant ships and oil tankers.* [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted] Iran has denied Baghdad's claims, and, according to US diplomats in Kuwait, a National Iranian Oil Company official in Tehran said Saturday that operations at Khark were normal. [Redacted]

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Fighting on the ground remains at a low level. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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**Comment:** Iraq probably attacked a convoy going to Bandar-e Khomeyni, as it did earlier this month, but the attack could have been aimed at ships going to Khark Island. Iran also denied the earlier attack, but after about a week there was confirmation that some ships had been damaged. Iran's Bushehr Airbase is responsible for protecting Khark Island and nearby shipping. [Redacted]

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**SURINAME: Effort To Isolate Left**

*Prime Minister Udenhout apparently is taking steps to remove radical leftists from key government posts, probably with the knowledge of Army Commander Bouterse.* [Redacted]

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The US Embassy says that several officials affiliated with the leftist Revolutionary People's Party were recently removed from posts in the Ministries of Labor and Education. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] efforts are also being made to remove party members from positions in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, including those in charge of relations with the US. The Embassy also reports that the leftist-dominated university steering group and the hospital board have been replaced. [Redacted]

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**Comment:** Bouterse's motives for permitting the assault on his radical supporters are unclear. He may only be biding his time, allowing the labor-business coalition to show its hand before taking action. [Redacted]

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
**CHILE: Protest Against Government**

*The antigovernment protest scheduled for Tuesday will renew the cycle of confrontations with the regime that was suspended in December because of Chile's summer vacation period.*



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The opposition has asked Chileans to boycott schools, government offices, and stores; beat pots and pans; and hold neighborhood protest meetings. Press reports indicate the important truckers' union will block access to Santiago and other major cities.



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The three main opposition forces—the centrist Democratic Alliance, the Communist-dominated Popular Democratic Movement, and the broad-based National Labor Command—are coordinating their plans for the protest more closely than last year. The radical leftist opposition has decided to work with the centrists for the time being.



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**Comment:** The Democratic Alliance hopes that President Pinochet's failure to speed the liberalization process begun last year has reduced support for the government, especially in the middle class. The Alliance knows, however, that the opposition movement will need to remain basically peaceful and under the control of moderates if it is to retain the backing of the middle class. Larger and more comprehensive protests will be needed this year if they are to be effective against Pinochet.



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The Popular Democratic Movement probably wants to use the protest to test its support among the working class. The outcome could have an influence on which groups dominate planning for a possible general strike in the next few months.



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The government wants to avoid heavyhanded repression, which could produce sympathy for the opposition. Pinochet has made economic concessions to try to reduce participation by labor in the protest movement. The government hopes that an improving economy will strengthen its position and induce the moderate opposition to accept Pinochet's plan for a slow transition to democracy under the current constitution.



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**MEXICO: Presidential Trip**

*President de la Madrid's trip to South America, which begins today, is designed to enhance his prestige at home and to strengthen bilateral relations with key Latin countries.* [Redacted]

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The President will visit Bogota, Brasilia, Buenos Aires, and Caracas. Recent public statements and the itinerary indicate that talks will focus on the Contadora initiative, hemispheric solidarity, trade, and financial issues. [Redacted]

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According to the press, the Secretary of Energy may join the presidential party in Caracas, so that joint petroleum aid programs for Central America can be discussed. De la Madrid has sharply limited his entourage, in contrast to the large party that accompanied his predecessor on state visits. [Redacted]

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**Comment:** De la Madrid is seeking new support for his Central American policies and muting the shrill tone of foreign policy under the previous administration. He rejected or deferred invitations to visit Cuba and Nicaragua, probably to avoid irritating relations with the US. Even though foreign debt is a major issue in Mexico and most of the host countries, Mexico City remains opposed to joint regional action on the problem. [Redacted]

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The inclusion of Argentina reflects Mexico's improving relations with the new civilian government in Buenos Aires. De la Madrid probably will urge the Argentines to ratify the Mexican-sponsored Western Hemisphere nuclear nonproliferation treaty. [Redacted]

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The absence of pomp in preparation for the trip reflects the Mexican President's personal style and his desire to avoid criticism for squandering public funds. The trip will help enhance his image at home and in Latin America, even though dramatic developments are unlikely. [Redacted]

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**WEST GERMANY: Christian Democrats Win State Election**

*The Christian Democratic victory in Baden-Wuerttemberg yesterday will be seen by Chancellor Kohl as a vote of confidence in his government.* [Redacted]

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The Christian Democrats dropped about 2 percentage points from the election in 1980. Projections indicate, however, that they will retain their parliamentary majority with nearly 52 percent of the vote. The Social Democrats, weakened by divisions and ineffective leadership, remain a distant second with 32.4 percent. In 1980 they won approximately 32 percent. [Redacted]

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The Greens increased their proportion of the vote from 5 percent to 8 percent. The Free Democrats lost some voters but won over 7 percent, reversing a series of losses at the state level. [Redacted]

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**Comment:** The vote probably reflects primarily the popularity of state Minister-President Lothar Spaeth and the state's strong economic performance. Kohl and his party, however, almost certainly will claim the election represents popular endorsement for his government. [Redacted]

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Some observers may hold to their earlier speculation that any loss of votes would reflect poorly on the Christian Democratic government in Bonn. Others will interpret the retention of the parliamentary majority as a positive sign. [Redacted]

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The Social Democrats and Free Democrats had hoped just to retain the voting totals they received in 1980. Both parties probably view the results as an indication that the decline in their fortunes has leveled off and may even begin to improve. [Redacted]

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The Greens almost certainly will claim a clear victory. The party had suffered from philosophical disputes in public, poor organization, and the resignation of its delegation from the state parliament. Its improved showing reflects the solid core of support the party has won. [Redacted]

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
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
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**SOUTHERN AFRICA: Possible Food Transport Problems**

*Growing food imports will create transport bottlenecks in southern Africa and, together with political tensions between South Africa and Zimbabwe, could delay deliveries of emergency food aid and commercial grain imports to the drought-stricken region during the next year.* 


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South African officials say that the country's transportation system may be unable to handle the volume of food imports needed by its landlocked neighbors because of its own massive import requirements. Although South Africa normally exports corn, government officials say that the country may have to import more than 4 million tons of corn this year because of drought. 


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Moreover, Mozambique, which is struggling to overcome drought and typhoon damage, is anticipating a large volume of food and other aid deliveries that could overwhelm the capacities of its ports unless deliveries are scheduled carefully. 


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South African officials reportedly have told Zimbabwe that deliveries of 40,000 tons of corn per month—less than may be required—can be virtually assured if Zimbabwe combines its purchases and deliveries with those of South Africa for more efficient handling. Harare reportedly has rejected this arrangement on political grounds, and it will seek supplies independently. 


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Zimbabwe may be able to obtain as much as 150,000 tons from Malawi, according to the US Embassy in Harare, but the main truck routes through Mozambique are vulnerable to attack by insurgents. The Embassy believes these shipments may have to travel the longer, more costly route through Zambia. 

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**Comment:** Zambia and Zaire may receive preferential treatment on transportation by South Africa because they have been traditional purchasers of its corn. Port congestion in Mozambique probably will force Zimbabwe to rely entirely on South African ports. 

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Harare's refusal to accept combined purchases, however, may reduce South Africa's willingness to guarantee timely deliveries. South Africa is likely to use its leverage to force Zimbabwe to comply with Pretoria's longstanding demand for negotiations at the ministerial level on food and other issues. 

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
**GHANA: Dissident Attack Thwarted**

Forces loyal to Head of State Rawlings are continuing to hunt an unknown number of Ghanaian dissidents who infiltrated the country from Ivory Coast and Togo over the weekend. At least 10 dissidents have been killed. Radio Accra claims the infiltrators are remnants of a faction of ultraleftist northerners who attempted coups last year and in 1982. Most of the Ghanaian Army has been confined to barracks.



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
**Comment:** The failure of the sixth attempt to oust Rawlings's weak and unpopular three-year-old regime reflects the inability of opposition groups to organize and coordinate their efforts effectively. The fact that the plotters are from the north may encourage warmer relations at least temporarily between Rawlings and his ultraleftist security adviser, Kojo Tsikata, since both are southern Ewe tribesmen. Tsikata could emerge in a stronger position to oppose Rawlings's pursuit of IMF-imposed economic reforms. Shortages of food and fuel, drought, and rising prices of basic commodities that have resulted from the reforms nevertheless are likely to lead to further discontent and challenges to the regime.



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
**JORDAN: Black June Bombings**

Jordanian authorities discovered and defused three bombs, two of which were directed against British interests, following the explosion at a hotel in Amman on Saturday. The Black June Organization, based in Damascus and headed by Abu Nidal, claimed responsibility for the hotel bombing and has previously threatened to attack British as well as Jordanian targets. Jordanian officials believe that the bombings may be intended to force the cancellation of Queen Elizabeth's visit to Jordan, which is scheduled to begin today. Press reports indicate the Queen is proceeding with her trip.



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**Comment:** Abu Nidal has been attacking Jordanian interests since last fall because of Jordan's refusal to release imprisoned members of his group and because of Jordan's growing rapprochement with PLO chief Arafat. The UK has been threatened because of its imprisonment of Black June members responsible for the attempted murder of the Israeli Ambassador in London in 1982. Further attacks are likely during the Queen's visit in an attempt to embarrass the Jordanians.



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


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### Ethiopian Drought



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
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
**ETHIOPIA: Concern About Drought**

The increasing prospect that this year's food crop will fail is causing grave concern among Ethiopian officials, according to US Embassy reporting. Little rain has fallen since October in the central highlands, which is the major agricultural region, and wells in the countryside have dropped to low levels or dried up. Disaster relief workers report forest fires throughout the country, livestock deaths, and alarm over the absence of seasonal rains.



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
**Comment:** A major crop failure could lead to famine conditions on a scale equal to those caused by the disastrous drought in 1974. Fears of a poor harvest probably are being compounded by false rumors that Ethiopia has been declared ineligible for more US humanitarian assistance. Last year's harvest and international food aid will enable Ethiopia to feed most of its population until November. Nonetheless, food shortages in the remote areas of the north are likely to worsen because of inadequate security and transportation difficulties.



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
**USSR-ETHIOPIA: Planned Visit by Mengistu**

TASS announced yesterday that Ethiopian Chairman Mengistu will visit Moscow late this month. The US Embassy in Addis Ababa said today that he would leave on Thursday for 10 days in the USSR. According to earlier reporting from the Embassy, Mengistu reportedly was to meet with General Secretary Chernenko and sign economic, military, and cultural agreements. Mengistu is the first leader outside the USSR's allies to visit Moscow since Andropov's funeral.



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**Comment:** The USSR has turned down Ethiopian requests to cancel or delay payments on a \$2 billion arms debt, but Mengistu presumably will raise the issue again. Ethiopia apparently is unable to pay a \$200-million installment due shortly, so the Soviets will have little choice but to delay payments, but they are unlikely to cancel the debt. Mengistu probably will not raise the recent abrupt departure of two Soviet diplomats from Ethiopia, apparently because of espionage.



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


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**CHINA: Economic Policies Relaxed**

Beijing has issued a series of regulations that further liberalize current policies allotting farmland to individual peasant families. Farmland leases have been lengthened from three years to 15 years in an effort to encourage investment by farmers. Peasant families will be encouraged to specialize in growing one or two marketable commodities. They also will be allowed to sublease their land and move to towns to engage in privately owned service and transport activities. 

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**Comment:** It is clear that Beijing wants less government control and more personal responsibility in all sectors of the rural economy. The formation of individual transport enterprises will help augment the inefficient system and, if developed properly, eventually could lessen the demand for imported grain. Many provincial- and local-level officials oppose a further relaxation of government control, however, and implementing the new policies will be slow and may even be ignored in some areas. Beijing has tried to prepare for such opposition by including regulations making officials more accountable for promoting local economic growth. 

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**Special Analysis**

**LIBYA: Qadhafi's New Aggressiveness**

*Libyan leader Qadhafi recently has adopted more aggressive tactics in hopes of dealing Washington a major foreign policy setback similar to the one he believes the US suffered in Lebanon. He also is motivated by frustration over recent attacks against Libyan officials, increasing economic difficulties, and lack of enthusiasm for his revolutionary programs at home. Qadhafi may now be willing to risk increased terrorist operations or, less likely, a limited military confrontation with the US or France.*

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Qadhafi's recent moves have been directed principally against Egypt, Sudan, Chad, and opponents to his regime abroad. In the past two weeks, Qadhafi launched an airstrike against Sudanese broadcasting facilities in Khartoum, was implicated in the terrorist bombing of a French airliner in N'Djamena, and

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He also called on Libyans to stage a mass march in Egypt to "impose unity," although he later denied doing so.

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Last month, Qadhafi encouraged demonstrators to burn the Jordanian Embassy in Libya as a warning to King Hussein against negotiating a Middle East peace settlement. He also began propaganda broadcasts to support Sudanese dissidents.

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**Foreign Policy Motivations**

Qadhafi may want to emulate Syria's ascendancy in the Levant. In recent speeches Qadhafi has pointed to the withdrawal of US Marines from Beirut and the abrogation of the Lebanese-Israeli accord as major "victories" for the Arab cause.

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The Libyan leader is attempting to exploit the reverses of Sudanese President Nimeiri, whose ill-conceived domestic policies have seriously weakened his authority and generated insurgency in the south. Libya's airstrike on the radio station in Khartoum probably was intended to increase Libyan influence among Sudanese dissidents and to highlight Nimeiri's vulnerability.

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Qadhafi probably believes moderate Arab regimes are vulnerable to arguments against the US role in the Middle East and to demands for a more united, militant stand against Israel. His call for a mass

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[Redacted]

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march into Egypt probably was designed to push President Mubarak toward a tougher approach toward Tel Aviv. [Redacted]

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In Chad, Qadhafi probably hopes the attack on the French airliner will increase pressure on Paris to negotiate the withdrawal of French forces there. [Redacted]

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**Domestic Pressures on Qadhafi**

Qadhafi also may see more aggressive policies as necessary to strengthen his position within Libya. His domestic opponents are undertaking increasingly bold actions. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted] Antigovernment leaflets are becoming more widespread, and Libya's ranking diplomat in Rome was shot by unidentified assailants two months ago. [Redacted]

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Even more unnerving for Qadhafi was the attempted murder of his confidant and cousin, Sayyid Qadhaf al-Dam, in Tripoli last month. Several days after the incident, Qadhafi lashed out at his domestic opponents and hinted at a purge of the revolutionary committees, previously considered his staunchest supporters. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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**Mixed Reactions**

Some of Qadhafi's actions have proved counterproductive.

[Redacted]

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Many moderate Arab states, however, have avoided condemning Qadhafi's actions directly. The Saudis—who have been trying to turn Libya toward moderation—have argued that isolating Qadhafi would make him even more dangerous. [Redacted]

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Moreover, the Libyan airstrike on Khartoum may yet sharpen opposition to Nimeiri within Sudanese military circles. The US Embassy in Khartoum says the attack already has eroded public confidence in the military. [Redacted]

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
**Prospects**

Qadhafi relishes posturing and brinkmanship, but he has generally responded to strong challenges by backing down, at least temporarily. His decision to play down the possibility of a march into Egypt after Cairo alerted its forces fits this pattern. 


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In the case of Sudan, however, Qadhafi may believe he is too close to victory to retreat despite greater US and Egyptian military support for Nimeiri. He is likely to increase help and encouragement for Sudanese dissidents. He will try to identify the US with Nimeiri's ineffectual domestic policies in order to discredit the US if Nimeiri falls. 

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Successes by radicals in Lebanon and the need to rally the Libyans may tempt Qadhafi to risk operations that would invite strong retaliation. His actions could include sponsoring terrorism against US and French interests in Sudan and Chad. 

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Qadhafi's objectives in the Middle East and Africa dovetail with some Soviet interests. Moscow probably will continue supporting Libyan policies designed to undermine US influence as long as it can avoid openly identifying itself with Qadhafi's behavior. The USSR, for example, accused the US of using the airstrike against Khartoum as a pretext for strengthening its military forces in the region but avoided mentioning the Libyan role in the attack. 

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