



Director of  
Central  
Intelligence

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OCPAS/CIG

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# National Intelligence Daily

Thursday  
22 March 1984

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


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
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**USSR-NICARAGUA-US: Moscow Protests Tanker Incident**

*The USSR has made an official protest to the US about mine damage to a Soviet tanker on Tuesday in Nicaraguan waters, but the incident does not immediately threaten major Soviet involvement or Nicaragua's fuel supplies.*




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Foreign Minister Gromyko gave the US Chargé a note accusing the US of acts of "banditry and piracy" against Nicaragua and violations of international law and freedom of navigation. The note indicated the USSR would demand compensation. The note also asserted that some Soviet seamen had been injured, and earlier, TASS had quoted Managua as saying five seamen had been hurt.



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**Comment:** Gromyko's personal delivery of the note shows that Moscow considers this a serious matter. Nonetheless, the note avoids suggesting any Soviet action. Moscow is likely to intensify media attacks on the US and reaffirm its backing for Managua, and it also probably will support a Nicaraguan complaint to the UN Security Council.



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On the other hand, the USSR's avoidance so far of any public commitment to Nicaragua and its desire not to provoke a US response in the region suggest that the Soviet Navy will not become involved in clearing Nicaraguan ports. The Soviets, however, may provide advice and technical aid for Nicaraguan mine clearing operations. Although Cuba has a limited minesweeping capability, Havana also probably would be reluctant to become directly involved.



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**EL SALVADOR: Election Campaign Ends**

*The campaign for the presidential election Sunday has ended with polls showing Christian Democratic candidate Duarte still in the lead, but with ultrarightist D'Aubuisson and Conciliationist candidate Guerrero in a close race for second.* [Redacted]

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The US Embassy reports that all three front-runners held large rallies over the weekend. They appeared satisfied with their respective parties' efforts. A grace period prescribed by electoral law begins today and prohibits further campaigning. [Redacted]

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Although Duarte is ahead, polls show that he lacks enough strength for a first-round majority. They also indicate that D'Aubuisson's lead over Guerrero has narrowed considerably. A substantial number of those polled, however, remained uncommitted.

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[Redacted]

**Comment:** The polls are of questionable accuracy, but Duarte probably will have to face a runoff. If Guerrero came in second, he would provide a strong challenge to Duarte in a runoff. [Redacted]

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


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**IRAN: Logistic Difficulties**

*Iran is experiencing problems with logistics and poor planning as it prepares for its offensive in the south.* 


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On Tuesday Ayatollah Montazeri, Ayatollah Khomeini's heir apparent, publicly accused military commanders in charge of the war of bad planning. He instructed commanders not to squander popular support and to prepare attacks that lead to victory. He suggested that a special corps of military planners be established. 


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**Comment:** Montazeri's comments indicate Tehran is becoming concerned that these obstacles could reduce its chances of victory in the coming battle. As more Iranian troops are massed in the southern area, Tehran's logistic difficulties could increase. The main offensive, however, probably will be launched despite these setbacks. 

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**IRAQ-IRAN: Countering Subversion Among the Shias**

*Iraq is moving on several fronts to counter Iranian attempts to subvert Iraqi Shias.* [Redacted]

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Iraqi intelligence announced last week it had thwarted a plot by Iranian-sponsored Shia terrorists to bomb the Kuwaiti, Saudi, Soviet, and French Embassies in Baghdad. According to US diplomats in Baghdad, one of the terrorists was injured when a bomb went off prematurely in a British school. Iraqi authorities say the plotters were recruited by Dawa—the leading Iraqi Shia opposition group—and trained at a guerrilla camp near Ahvaz, Iran. [Redacted]

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Since Iran began its series of attacks along the border last month, Radio Tehran has intensified its propaganda campaign to subvert Iraq's Shia community. The Iranians are repeating their call to their Iraqi coreligionists, who make up 8 million of the country's 14 million people, to overthrow President Saddam Husayn. [Redacted]

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US diplomats in Baghdad report the Iraqis have countered Iran's propaganda campaign by appealing to the Shias' patriotism and Arab pride. They also note that Saddam is personally popular with the Shias and that so far he retains their loyalty. In recent well-publicized tours of Shia areas, Saddam was received enthusiastically. [Redacted]

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**Comment:** The Iranians, who probably underrate the strength of the Iraqi Shias' nationalist sentiment, are likely to attempt to increase terrorist attacks in Iraq to coincide with their planned military offensive against Al Basrah. Iran also will continue to aim propaganda at Iraq's Shia community—and at the 75 percent of the military's enlisted ranks composed of Shias. [Redacted]

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Iraq's well-trained and efficient security services should be able to contain the Iranian subversive campaign. In the past year they have foiled all of Dawa's attempted terrorist attacks. [Redacted]

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
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**SOUTH AFRICA-ANGOLA: Troop Withdrawal To Resume**

*South Africa informed Angola on Monday that it would resume the phased withdrawal of its remaining forces from southern Angola in the next few days.* [Redacted]

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Pretoria also agreed that the Joint Monitoring Commission could move its headquarters from Cuvelai to the next monitoring site at Mupa. The pullout is now scheduled to be completed by 18 April. [Redacted]

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The US Liaison Office in Windhoek reports that South Africa is satisfied with Angola's efforts to remove SWAPO guerrillas from the disengagement area. Pretoria also accepts Luanda's promise to request South African help if it cannot control SWAPO insurgents trying to infiltrate Namibia. Nevertheless, the South Africans have told the Angolans that the continued presence of SWAPO guerrillas near Cahama could again delay the withdrawal. [Redacted]

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Cuban President Castro and Angolan President dos Santos issued a communique on Monday following their meeting in Havana. The document states that a gradual withdrawal of Cuban troops will begin after the South African forces have left Angola, the UN plan for Namibian independence is carried out, and all outside support to UNITA is ended. The communique characterizes the South African Government as "repugnant." [Redacted]

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South African Foreign Minister Botha denounced the communique and repeated Pretoria's position linking Namibia's independence with the withdrawal of Cuban combat troops from Angola. He demanded that Luanda restate its willingness to abide by the troop disengagement agreement. [Redacted]

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**Comment:** South Africa probably will continue the withdrawal despite its anger at the Angolan-Cuban communique. The communique and the South African reaction show that neither side has changed its public position on the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. [Redacted]

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### Japan's Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund Projects in China



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**JAPAN-CHINA: Visit by Nakasone**

*Prime Minister Nakasone arrives in Beijing tomorrow for a state visit both sides are using to highlight their excellent bilateral relations.*

[Redacted]

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Nakasone will announce a seven-year, \$2.09 billion development credit to China for transportation, communications, and energy projects. In addition, the Japanese are working out details for large Export-Import Bank loans to support Chinese coal and oil development. [Redacted]

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Tokyo also has agreed to a one-time export of nuclear reactor equipment, subject to on-site "visits" by Japanese officials. At the same time, however, it is urging stricter controls before signing an overall agreement on bilateral nuclear cooperation. [Redacted]

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Press reports state Nakasone intends to make a "Beijing Declaration," which will emphasize Tokyo's determination to pursue peace and reject militarism. The statement also will reiterate Japan's long-term commitment to supporting China's modernization and to cementing friendship with Beijing. [Redacted]

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Nakasone intends to transmit Seoul's desire for broader contacts with Beijing. According to press reports, he may even call for joint efforts to ease tension in Korea by expanding nonpolitical exchanges between Japan and North Korea and between China and South Korea. [Redacted]

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**Comment:** The aid package, which Japan is billing as the largest it has ever offered, is intended in part to draw China closer to the West and to forestall any improvement in relations with the USSR. The aid will be in yen, and Japanese firms will be strong competitors for the business the credits create. China would welcome a "Beijing Declaration," but it will respond cautiously to Japanese proposals on Korea. [Redacted]

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
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**USSR-US: Collision at Sea**

The US aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk reported a collision yesterday in the Sea of Japan with a submarine, apparently a Soviet V-I nuclear-powered attack unit. The Kitty Hawk suffered no damage. The submarine surfaced and is in the company of a Soviet cruiser. The Kitty Hawk is participating in an exercise in the Sea of Japan, where it has been closely followed by Soviet naval forces. 

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**Comment:** If damage to the submarine is more extensive than now appears to be the case, a support ship may escort or tow it to a repair facility. The Soviets are particularly sensitive to the presence of US aircraft carriers in the Sea of Japan. Their ballistic missile submarines frequently operate there, and the headquarters of their Pacific Fleet is located at Vladivostok. They usually monitor aircraft carrier operations with surface ships, submarines, and aircraft. 


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**FRANCE-LEBANON: Status of French Forces**

President Mitterrand evidently has concluded that the failure of the talks in Lausanne has undermined the current role of French forces in Beirut. Shia leader Barri, following his meeting yesterday with Mitterrand, announced that France has decided to withdraw its troops from Beirut. French military sources previously told US Embassy officials in Paris that France has chartered a car-ferry capable of evacuating its forces as early as next Monday. Another French military source has claimed, however, that French troops will be withdrawn by 7 April. (S NF)

**Comment:** Paris may leave a significant residual force in Beirut to protect French installations there and to help preserve France's influence. 

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**Special Analysis****SOMALIA: President Siad's Problems**

*President Siad's domestic position continues to weaken because he will not make the political and economic decisions needed to reverse the country's decline. In the months ahead he will increasingly look to the US and other Western countries to solve Somalia's military and economic problems. Siad's opponents remain divided and pose no immediate threat. Over the longer term, however, his failure to find solutions will increase the likelihood of a coup.* [redacted]

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Siad's base of support is limited to his fellow Marehan tribesmen and their allies and to senior government and military officials. They benefit most from the pervasive corruption, Siad's patronage, and Marehan domination of the economy. Many of Siad's supporters see their positions closely tied to the President's retention of power.

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Since 1980, tribal dissidence has risen markedly. The regime's heavyhanded suppression of dissent has reinforced antigovernment sentiment, especially in the north. [redacted]

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Tribal frictions, however, have prevented Siad's opponents from uniting against him. The two dissident groups backed by Libya and by Ethiopia have resisted pressures from their benefactors to merge and to coordinate their military operations. The appeal of both groups in Somalia also is limited by their ties to Ethiopia and by the general belief that they represent parochial tribal interests. [redacted]

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**Status of the Military**

The capabilities of the armed forces continue to decline. Morale has been lowered by long tours along the Ethiopian border, a constant state of alert, obsolete equipment, poor logistic support, and generally poor leadership. During the past two years, these problems have led to several mutinies, increasing rates of desertion, and defections to the insurgents. [redacted]

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Siad and his senior commanders have spurned Western efforts to correct the military's basic weaknesses in training and maintenance. They believe that acquiring large amounts of armor and other advanced weapons will solve Somalia's problems. Siad has gained some time with the military, however, by acquiring old military equipment from Egypt, Italy, and several other countries. [redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Tribal tensions also have had an adverse effect on the military. Competent officers often are transferred for tribal reasons, and Army units have been used to defend Marehan interests in tribal clashes, thereby alienating other tribes. [Redacted]

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Some in the military—especially junior officers—are increasingly unhappy about the weak state of the armed forces and what they see as the unwillingness of the US either to provide needed weapons or to encourage other allies to be more generous with assistance. Some officers believe that Washington's mistrust of Siad is responsible for the military's problems and that the West will not rebuild the armed forces until Siad is removed. At the same time, the US defense attache has reported that some officers have been impressed by the contrast between the limited support Somalia receives from the West and the large amounts of military assistance Ethiopia receives from the USSR and its allies. [Redacted]

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**Economic Pressure**

Economic difficulties are adding to Siad's troubles. Crop failures caused by drought, military seizures of food, and hoarding by local merchants have led to food shortages. The US Embassy estimates that scarcities will remain a problem for about another two months, when shipments of food aid will arrive. [Redacted]

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Export earnings are being hurt by Saudi Arabia's continued ban on importing Somali cattle. In addition, Somalia has received its final oil shipment under a Saudi grant in 1982, leaving only enough stocks to last until mid-April. Nonetheless, the government recently rejected IMF-mandated reforms that were needed to qualify for a new three-year, \$83 million credit, thereby also jeopardizing another \$20 million in financing from the Fund. [Redacted]

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If the government fails to come to terms with the IMF, official aid donors will be extremely reluctant to cover the lost funds, and local businessmen are likely to move more capital abroad. Somalia soon will be forced to cut back further on imports and delay servicing its foreign debt of about \$1.3 billion. [Redacted]

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Siad is likely to respond by making more pleas to Western countries for economic assistance and eventually approaching the IMF for new credits. He almost certainly will continue to ask the US to urge the Fund to agree to more politically acceptable terms. [Redacted]

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**Outlook**

Ethiopia probably will keep trying to increase pressure along the border and to encourage more activity by Somali insurgents. Such moves would increase unrest in the Somali Army by focusing

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attention on its weakened condition. This would raise more questions about Siad's leadership, thereby heightening chances for a coup.

[Redacted]

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If Siad were removed, his successors would be likely at the outset to follow his pro-Western policies. A refusal by the West to meet the military's expectations after a coup, however, could lead to a power grab by pro-Soviet junior officers and closer relations between Somalia and the USSR.

[Redacted]

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Leftist Somali officers might overestimate the Soviets' willingness to respond favorably to Somali overtures because Moscow could risk jeopardizing its position in Ethiopia. Nonetheless, the officers probably would see nothing to lose by terminating what they regard as an unproductive relationship with the West.

[Redacted]

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