



**Director of
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JORDAN: Parliamentary Byelections

Jordanian officials are concerned that the byelections being held today to fill vacant seats in the lower house of parliament—the first national elections in 17 years—will broaden the base of political participation and possibly threaten long-term stability. [Redacted]

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The key issue during the intense campaign has been Palestinian representation. Palestinian residents in the East Bank are technically represented by the 30 West Bank parliamentarians. They argue, however, that the large Palestinian community deserves more positions. [Redacted]

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The government worries that East Bank Palestinians are trying to increase their political role and upset the East Bank–West Bank balance by putting themselves forth as candidates. [Redacted]

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[Large Redacted Block]

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Comment: King Hussein will view the byelections as a good indicator of Jordan's ability to handle general parliamentary elections. He may believe that his decision to recall Parliament and hold byelections has quelled domestic disenchantment with the political system. Hussein may hope to wait another four years—the longest this parliament can legally sit—before holding general elections. [Redacted]

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The intensity of the campaign, however, suggests that Jordanians are no longer willing to accept a limited role in government. The Palestinians in particular are seeking a larger political role in a society where they are the majority. If they do not succeed, they may turn to Islamic fundamentalism or leftist movements. [Redacted]

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
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LATIN AMERICA: Drug Smugglers' Propaganda Efforts

Narcotics traffickers in Latin America are making increasingly successful use of the media to encourage wider public acceptance of their activities and to discredit government countermeasures. 


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US Embassy and press reports indicate that some of Colombia's major cocaine and marijuana traffickers recently have increased the use of advertisements, interviews, and other media coverage to rebut US and local criticism of their activities and to improve their image. The smugglers portray US-backed antinarcotics programs as meddling in internal affairs and promote themselves as seeking to improve society and shore up the economy. Last month, however, they murdered a prominent attorney who had pushed strongly for enforcing the extradition treaty with the US. 

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In Bolivia, traffickers have sought to depict coca cultivation as an economic necessity, and they have employed scare tactics to stir public concern about purported health and environmental hazards of herbicides used for eradicating drug crops. In addition, they have produced and aired a television documentary defending coca production, lauding cocaine use as therapeutic, and calling for the government to legalize and nationalize the illicit drug industry. Peruvian smugglers, however, have increasingly resorted to the use of violence and intimidation against journalists and others trying to investigate narcotics trafficking. 

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Comment: The media efforts clearly are eliciting greater local public support for drug production and have complicated national efforts to bring it under tighter control. For example, a US request to extradite two major traffickers from Colombia late last year was blocked, partly because of the public's perception that Washington was interfering in an internal affair. Similarly, the influence of large numbers of Bolivian coca farmers, who have been persuaded to join pronarcotics labor groups, has helped to impede coca control projects. 

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ARGENTINA-INDIA: Cooperation on Arms Control

Buenos Aires recently publicized a letter from President Alfonsin to Indian Prime Minister Gandhi concerning the need for the Nonaligned Movement to focus international attention on the deadlock in arms control negotiations. Alfonsin urged Gandhi, who currently chairs the movement, to take the lead in this effort [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Comment: Alfonsin's letter could be the first step in a coordinated effort by the movement to condemn the US and the USSR for failing to make progress on arms control as stipulated in the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Many developing nations probably would respond favorably to such a proposal at the conference reviewing the treaty next year, because it would be a more visible public forum than the UN Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. Although neither Argentina nor India is a signatory to the Treaty, both attended the last Review Conference in 1980 as observers. They used the Nonaligned Movement's special nuclear coordinating committee to spur other developing nations that signed the treaty to take a tough stand against the superpowers on arms control issues. [Redacted]

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EC-HUNGARY: Trade Talks Stalled

Preliminary discussions on a trade agreement between the EC and Hungary have reached an early impasse. EC officials in January proposed to begin negotiations this spring on a limited accord. In a recent reply, however, Budapest reiterated demands that any agreement be nonreciprocal and include substantial reductions in EC tariffs and quotas on Hungarian goods, particularly farm products. Although the EC Commission had previously termed these conditions unacceptable, EC members have yet to decide whether exploratory talks should continue. [Redacted]

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Comment: Progress on a trade accord is unlikely in the near future, but low-level talks probably will continue. Although Ireland and Italy oppose dropping restrictions on Hungarian agricultural products, West Germany and the UK want an agreement for political reasons, and they are likely to persuade EC members to maintain the dialogue. Budapest's apparent inflexibility probably reflects its belief that it would benefit little if it were to accept the EC's terms. In addition, Hungary may be sensitive to recent criticism by its allies about its increased contacts with the West. [Redacted]

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Special Analysis**CHINA-USSR: Talks Resume in Moscow**

Chinese and Soviet negotiators are likely to make additional limited progress on secondary issues when they meet in Moscow today to begin the fourth round of their talks, but they are not likely to achieve any breakthroughs. The USSR has been promoting increased economic contacts and other exchanges in order to normalize relations gradually without giving in to China's demands on territorial and security issues. Beijing's response has been calibrated to reduce tensions and put China in as favorable a position as possible in the US-Soviet-Chinese triangle, without accommodating Soviet military superiority in the region.

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China uses its modest interchanges with the USSR to limit bilateral tensions, increase its leverage with the US, and demonstrate an independent foreign policy. Beijing scheduled Soviet First Deputy Premier Arkhipov's visit in May to follow President Reagan's visit, and it tentatively plans to send Defense Minister Zhang Aiping to the US the following month.

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Moscow is concerned about the possibility of closer Sino-US military ties, but it seems generally satisfied with the gradual improvement in its relations with Beijing. The Soviets, however, want some sort of an agreement with the Chinese on bilateral security issues, because it would contribute to the security of the USSR's borders. Such an agreement could have a major impact on assessments of the Sino-Soviet-US relationship in many world capitals.

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Signs of Progress

Under the terms of accords reached last year, both sides are increasing student, technical, and cultural exchanges at a modest rate.

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Arkhipov, who will be the most senior Soviet official to visit China in 15 years, reportedly will discuss economic cooperation. The annual trade agreement signed last month provides for \$1.2 billion in trade this year, an increase of 60 percent. In 1983 trade doubled.

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The Soviets claim the Chinese have agreed to host a fifth round of normalization talks in October. In addition, they say that vice foreign ministers will follow up their initial discussions on global issues last September with a second round this June. Although the Chinese state that they are still willing to meet with the Soviets at the foreign minister level, no time or place has been set. [redacted]

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Continuity Under Chernenko

China was quick to probe for changes in Soviet policy following Andropov's death by sending senior Vice Premier Wan Li to Moscow for the funeral. Wan's reception was in keeping with protocol. The Chinese were angered, however, when the Soviets did not single him out for special attention at the funeral or arrange a meeting with Premier Tikhonov the next day. [redacted]

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This treatment prompted Deng Xiaoping to tell US visitors on 22 February that the USSR is likely to remain "rigid" and incapable of new initiatives under the "transitional" leadership of General Secretary Chernenko. On the same day, Deng publicly insisted that Moscow remove the three obstacles to normalization—Soviet involvement in Afghanistan and Indochina and Soviet deployments along the Sino-Soviet border and in Mongolia. [redacted]

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The Soviets have been more positive, telling US Embassy officials in Beijing that Wan was interested in the idea of setting aside the obstacles for later discussion while improving relations where possible. At the same time, the Soviets have stressed that they do not intend to negotiate with China about Afghanistan, Indochina, or Mongolia. They have been careful to assure their Asian allies that they will protect their interests during the consultations with the Chinese. [redacted]

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Prospects for the Next Round

The Soviets do not appear ready to offer the Chinese any real concessions. Chernenko's remarks since becoming General Secretary suggest that he has not made improved relations a top priority, and the Soviets still seem determined to stand firm on the key issues. [redacted]

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Moscow continues to insist, for example, that relations have to get better before it can even consider substantial troop cuts along China's northern border. The Chinese maintain that the Soviets have to reduce the threat to China before relations can improve. [redacted]

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Both sides, on the other hand, probably will point to their developing contacts as evidence of some forward movement. Moscow also may try to reformulate existing proposals for longer term economic and technical agreements, if only to help create a more positive atmosphere for Arkhipov's visit. [Redacted]

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In addition, the Soviets could try to find some common ground in the proposals that the two sides advanced last October for easing tensions along their common border. At that time, they suggested the creation of a joint military group on border issues, but the Chinese refused. [Redacted]

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The USSR may try to make the proposal more acceptable to China, hoping this would create some movement in the talks toward an agreement on "confidence-building measures." The Soviets may hope this would eventually lead to broader agreement on security issues. [Redacted]

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