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	Director of Central Intelligence	Top Secret_
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## **National Intelligence Daily**

Tuesday 6 March 1984

CPAS NID 84-054.IX

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


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
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#### IRAN-IRAQ: Iranians Prepare for New Attack

The Iranians are continuing their preparations for a major offensive in the AI Basrah area.	25X1
	25X1
were shelling Iraqi defensive positions in the northern and eastern	25X1
parts of the Al Basrah front and that they were continuing work on a pontoon bridge across the marsh.	25X1
	25 <b>X</b> 1
In a speech on Sunday, Ayatollah Khomeini criticized Iranians who want to end the war. He also denied Iran had suffered heavy losses in the recent fighting and castigated Iranians who argue that	051/4
Iran should try to reach a settlement.	25X1
	25X1
Comment: Iran may be planning attacks both north and east of Al Basrah. The Iranians probably hope to use the new bridge to move more forces into the marsh area for an offensive to the south to outflank Iraqi defenses. The attacks could come late this week, when Iran completes redeploying troops to the south.	25X1
	25X1
Khomeini's speech is another indication that large numbers of Iranians are weary of the high casualties and economic burdens of the war. Conservative senior ayatollahs who oppose Khomeini's policies may be willing to urge changes on Khomeini again if the dissatisfaction leads to protest demonstrations. Khomeini is in no danger of losing control, however, and he is unlikely to change his position.	25 <b>X</b> 1

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### **LEBANON: Reactions to Abrogation of Accord**

Reactions to the government's abrogation yesterday of the troop withdrawal accord with Israel have followed widely expected lines, and all sides appear to be weighing their next moves.	25 <b>X</b> 1
Opposition leaders now are expressing their willingness to attend reconcilation talks in Geneva. Israeli Prime Minister Shamir has denounced the move, stating that Israel will go its own way to guarantee the security of its northern border.	25 <b>X</b> 1
The command council of the Lebanese Forces Christian militia called for a unified Christian stand to resist all policies that Syria may try to impose on the government. According to press reports, however, the Christian Phalange Party politburo and central council met in joint session yesterday and reaffirmed confidence in President Gemayel.	25X1
Fighting continued yesterday along the Green Line in Beirut and in the Kharrub region south of the Damur River, despite the announcement of a cease-fire.	25X1
<b>Comment</b> : Christian hardliners will have to proceed cautiously. The Phalange supports Gemayel, and opposition on the part of the Lebanese Forces could isolate them from the rest of the Christian community.	25X1
Any move by the Lebanese Forces to challenge Gemayel would risk Syrian pressure on behalf of the President. Some members of the Lebanese Forces probably want to avoid the kind of direct confrontation with Syria that occurred in 1977 and the possibility of Syrian-instigated fighting aimed at destroying them.	25X1
The Army and opposition militias may be trying to prevent each other from preparing to occupy French positions along the Green Line in the event the French contingent of the Multinational Force withdraws. Christian militia forces in the Kharrub may have started the fighting there in order to demonstrate their independence from the government and their opposition to the cancellation of the accord.	25 <b>X</b> 1
Service and the desired and the desired and the decord.	20/(1

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PHILIPPINES: Status of Assassination Investigation		
The investigation of the assassination of Benigno Aqu moving closer to implicating Armed Forces Chief of Staff development that could have severe political consequenc President Marcos.	Ver, a	25X1
The Agrava Board heard testimony last week from the the accused alleging Ver is involved in a coverup of the aplot. Ver has offered to testify before the Board, perhaps this week, to refute the children's claim that their mother after having been taken to see him in January.	ssassination as early as	25 <b>X</b> 1
The US Embassy reports that a prominent opposition have information that links Ver to the incident but that he retaliation by Ver if he discloses it. The Board is widely eximplicate senior military officers in the assassination.	fears	25 <b>X</b> 1
<b>Comment</b> : Ver is willing to take any action he believe to protect his interests, including the elimination of witnes could implicate him. He may try to persuade Marcos to in Board's investigation.	sses who	25X1
If the Board is allowed to determine its own course, it implicate the military. This would reinforce the public's be was involved.		25 <b>X</b> 1
The assassination could become a key election issue ahead. If Ver interferes with the Board's proceedings, Ma be forced to make a tough decision. He would have to ch between sacrificing Ver or suffering even more severe po repercussions as a result of appearing to protect those re	rcos would oose litical	25X1
for killing Aquino.	•	

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ARGENTINA: Debt Negotiating Strategy		
The government apparently believes that foreig banks will have to disburse new loans this month to losses on their books, whether or not Argentina sig with the IMF.	o avoid showing	25X1
US banks face the prospect of having up to hal portfolios fall into a nonperforming status on 31 M overdue interest payments.		25X1
		25 <b>X</b> 1
President Alfonsin and Minister of Economy Go stated that they will not accept an IMF program the a recession, and negotiations with the Fund show r completed before the end of March.	at might cause	25 <b>X</b> 1
<b>Comment</b> : Argentina probably does not have einternational reserves to pay its overdue debts with new loans, but Grinspun is unlikely to rush into an agreement. The government probably is counting of time to gain more lenient terms from the IMF.	hout obtaining unpopular IMF	25 <b>X</b> 1
Alternatively it may hope that the consortium of spurred by US members—will find a way to disbur without a letter of intent. As a result of Grinspun's bankers are likely to take a harder line during debt	se new loans tactics, however, rescheduling talks	25X1
later this year for some \$20 billion due to be repaid	d in 1984.	25X1

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TUNISIA: Possible Cabinet Changes	
Continued unrest since the bread riots in Jai President Bourguiba to consider key cabinet shi	
placating the populace.	
The US Embassy reports the government al	so may be backing
away from the phased 20-percent increase in th	e price of bread it
announced after the riots. Instead, it is now con symbolic increase of 5 to 10 percent.	sidering a single
,	
Over the past three weeks, strikes by bank, communications workers as well as teachers an	
employees have disrupted city services.	d other public
Comment: The riots in January have unleas	had the frustration of
workers who are angry with the government's p	
addressing labor demands. Union leaders, who	supported the
government during the riots, have begun to lose They are unlikely to reassert discipline unless th	
to costly wage increases.	o government agrees

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ΓURKEY: Selling State Enterprises		
A new law allowing the government to sell inefficient senterprises to private firms carries some potential political Prime Minister Ozal.		25X1
Ozal wants to funnel the proceeds into development pelieves will help eventually to reduce Turkey's high unentate. Opposition leaders on the left and the right of the graduate of the period of the period of the measure.	nployment	25 <b>X</b> 1
<b>Comment</b> : The new legislation is consistent with other Dzal to make the economy more responsive to market for ikely to please organizations, such as the World Bank, wong advocated reforming the state-owned firms. The firm for nearly half of Turkey's industrial production and are was a key structural problem for the economy.	rces. It is hich have ns account	25X1
The law could become the most controversial part of economic program and an issue in the local elections late nonth. It is a dramatic departure from the tradition of he nvolvement in the economy.	er this	25X1
Ozal could suffer politically if private investors who bu ire workers. Layoffs would anger the labor unions, which asking for large wage increases and will soon be allowed	are already	25X1
Ozal may have difficulty selling some of the firms, par hose that are overstaffed and poorly managed. To the excucessful, he will have cash for badly needed work on earlier projects.	ktent he is	25 <b>X</b> 1

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The only other source of funds for these projects is foreign borrowing. If international lenders are asked to increase their already substantial exposure in Turkey, they could prove reluctant.

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USSR-SYRIA: High-Level Soviet To Visit	
The Soviets and Syrians have announced that Politburo member Aliyev will go to Syria during the first half of this month. He was	
originally scheduled to go in February, but he postponed his visit when Andropov died. Aliyev will be the highest ranking Soviet to visit	
Damascus since Foreign Minister Gromyko traveled there in 1980. His	
talks will be the first at a senior level since November, when Foreign Minister Khaddam visited Moscow.	
Comment: Moscow probably hopes Aliyev's visit will be	
interpreted widely as reflecting the USSR's ability to play a major role in the Middle East. The Soviets presumably want to discuss how best	
to capitalize on the recent events in Lebanon. In view of President	
Assad's past reluctance to keep the Soviets informed about his strategy there, however, Aliyev's main task may be to gather	
information rather than give advice. He is likely to be especially	
interested in gauging the regime's stability after the recent infighting among Assad's key lieutenants.	

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## **Dissident Activity**




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CHAD: Planned Government Operation		
The government is assembling about 2,000 troops	for a major	
clearing operation against 1,000 to 1,500 dissidents in		
The sweep will encompass much of Guera and Salama and logistic preparation	t Provinces parations and	0EV4
operational planning have been extensive. Dissident ac		25 <b>X</b> 1
and southern Chad has grown in the past several week		
increased the flow of rebels, arms, and funds to the we	eakly defended	OEV4
central region.		25 <b>X</b> 1
Comment: The sweep zone is the operating area o	of dissident	
chieftain Achiek Ibn Oumar, who the Libyans are sugge	esting as an	
alternative to both President Habre and dissident leade		
to head a new government in N'Djamena. The buildup forces in central Chad is important to Libyan efforts to		
pressure on Habre, and it may strengthen Achiek's sta		
dissident circles. Habre's sweep is intended to weaken		
prospects. Government troops should enjoy some militage against the dissidents, whose supply lines are long and		
against the dissidents, whose supply lines are long and	insecure.	25X1
EL SALVADOR: Strikes Continue		
Workers in the public sector have rejected the gove	ernment's offer	
of a 10-percent wage increase and more organizations		
unions that are on strike. According to the US Embass		
strike could develop, paralyzing the capital and other u		
Water workers are among those on strike, and water is in some sections of the capital and in other cities. To p		0EV4
sabotage, Army units are guarding water facilities.		25 <b>X</b> 1
<b>Comment:</b> The insurgents reportedly have been pl		
use leftist labor unions to disrupt the presidential elect the striking unions are unlikely to accept readily any ne		
offered by the government. To maintain public services		25 <b>X</b> 1
the crucial election period, the government may detain	strike	20/1
<u>leaders temporarily and place utilities under military co</u>	ontrol.	25 <b>X</b> 1

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#### **NIGERIA: Religious Rioting in the North**

The government is relying on Army troops to put down weeklong riots by Muslim fundamentalists in the capital of the state of Gongola. Many of the religious fanatics have escaped from the area, and neighboring states are taking measures to guard against the spread of disturbances. The US Embassy, citing press accounts, reports that the Army used artillery to quell the riots and that 1,000 people may have been killed. Followers of the minority Maitatsine sect were involved in similar disturbances in northern cities in 1980 and 1982 that resulted in the deaths of several thousand people.

25X1

**Comment**: General Buhari, who visited the scene of the riots, has responded firmly to the first direct test of his government's ability to maintain authority. The episode, however, has temporarily diverted the regime from its priority goals of economic recovery and curbing corruption. There are no reports of foreign meddling in the rioting. Buhari has sought to court the larger Muslim community, and he included a leading Muslim in a recent government delegation sent to Saudi Arabia to discuss oil and economic issues.

25X1

#### **JAMAICA: IMF Negotiations Resume**

The IMF last week agreed to resume negotiations with Jamaica for a standby loan after Kingston paid \$37 million in overdue debt to the Fund. Jamaican officials plan to cut capital and current expenditures by reducing or eliminating food subsidies and by dropping 4,500 workers from the government payroll. The Jamaicans also have been authorized to negotiate a more flexible foreign exchange-rate system, according to US Embassy sources. Meanwhile, the government received another economic setback last week when Reynolds Metals announced its decision to terminate its mining operations in Jamaica in favor of cheaper bauxite sources in Africa.

25X1

**Comment**: The IMF may insist on further cuts in recurrent expenditures, particularly in light of the loss of over \$25 million in government revenues that had been expected from Reynolds this year. The opposition will blame Prime Minister Seaga for the country's growing unemployment, which has been aggravated by budget cuts and the loss of 200 jobs from the Reynolds operation, and for rising inflation. Seaga is likely to intensify his search for alternative markets for Jamaican bauxite, including increased purchases by the US for its stockpiles.

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CANADA-US: Cruise Missile Testing Issue		
The antinuclear coalition yesterday asked a federal of the cruise missile tests scheduled for today, pending a run Supreme Court on the constitutionality of the cabinet's of permit them. The Federal Court has indicated it will respit to the request. In an effort to reduce criticism from peace Ottawa postponed announcing the date of the test until the minute.	uling by the lecision to ond quickly e groups,	25X1
Comment: The tests in northern Alberta almost certa touch off limited demonstrations across the country. The coalition appeared to have lost much support following a Appeals Court last December that stated the government constitutional power to permit the tests. Nonetheless, the of testing, the impending return of warmer weather, and for a federal election this year probably will give new importest activities. Polls show that an increasing number of Canadians, although still not a majority, support the testing to the control of the control	e antinuclear I ruling by an It had the E actual start Preparations Detus to	25X
Canadians—although still not a majority—support the te	esting.	25X
		25 <b>X</b> 1

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USSR: Criticism of Economists		
Pravda recently published a decree—the first under of Secretary Chernenko's leadership—that criticizes the Institute in Moscow for superficial analysis of economic The Institute is instructed to focus its research on current and to prepare recommendations for economic experiment acceptable under the Soviet system.	titute of c problems. t problems	25X1
<b>Comment</b> : The decree almost certainly is intended a criticism of Soviet economists for not producing politicall ideologically, and bureaucratically satisfactory proposals plenum of the Central Committee last June, Chernenko deconomists for dragging their feet in preparing realistics. Publication of the decree underscores the leadership's in redirect economic research toward analyses that are polipractical and to introduce and evaluate economic experimproducing the draft plan for 1986-90.	y, . At the riticized olutions. tention to tically more	25 <b>X</b> 1
COSTA RICA: Foreign Exchange Crisis		
*	oo boo	
The imminent exhaustion of foreign exchange reserve prompted Costa Rica to suspend payments on debt owe governments and to request a meeting of the Paris Club reschedule about \$100 million in bilateral debt payments this year. San Jose is trying to secure some \$50 million in financing from foreign governments and commercial ban IMF and US begin disbursing aid in a few months. Comm	d to foreign to falling due n emergency ks until the	
bankers reportedly are reluctant to extend emergency fir because they believe it will merely defer the financial cris midyear.	nancing	25X1
<b>Comment:</b> San Jose's failure to devalue its currency	as much as	

the IMF had recommended last year is largely responsible for the crisis. A devaluation now probably would not cut imports much until May or June. If Costa Rica does not secure emergency financing, it also may fall behind on its commercial debt service.

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EACTEDN EUDODE: Drought Hito Winter Ornin Ornin		
EASTERN EUROPE: Drought Hits Winter Grain Crops		
The continuing drought in several East European sta	ites has	
worsened prospects for winter grain production, accordi	ng to reports	
from US Embassies. Winter grains normally account for a	almost half of	0EV4
total grain production in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Roma	ania, and	25 <b>X</b> 1
Bulgaria.		

winter grains

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entered dormancy last fall in poor condition, and the region will need abundant precipitation over the coming weeks to avert serious losses.

particularly in Romania. Decisions by some regimes to limit borrowing because of financial problems probably will limit imports. Efforts to

improve trade balances in Hungary and Bulgaria would be hindered

Production shortfalls would intensify food supply difficulties,

by a reduction in the amount of grain available for export.

Comment

# **Speech Schedule Reflects Leadership Ranking** (In descending order)

Date	Leader	Comment
2 March	Chernenko	Topmost slot, as expected.
1 March	Tikhonov	Traditional for Premier.
29 February	Gorbachev	Senior Secretary under Chernenko.
28 February	Ustinov	Defense Minister now outranks other Politburo members.
27 February	Gromyko	Preceded Ustinov in last election in 1979.
25 February	Grishin	Moscow party chief now precedes other regional chiefs.
25 February	Romanov	Secretary schedule shows he is not even close second in rank to Gorbachev.
24 February	Shcherbitskiy	Ukrainian party chief preceded Grishin in 1979.
24 February	Solomentsev	Heads party discipline unit high standing for new full member of Politburo.
24 February	Ponomarev	Secretary senior among candidate members of Politburo.
23 February	Kunayev	Kazakh party chief under Brezhnev, outranked other regional party chiefs.
23 February	Aliyev, Vorotnikov	Aliyev, First Deputy Premier, and Vorotnikov, RSFSR Premier, in proper rank as new full Politburo members.
9-21 February	Other candidate mem- bers of Politburo and secretaries	Spoke in roughly appropriate order of seniority.

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Special Analysis	
HOOP Winner of the Lead of the	
USSR: Views of the Leadership	
Recent ceremonial speeches by Soviet leaders in their respective election districts suggest that the Politburo has decided to underscore policy continuity while making an effort to build up General Secretary Chernenko's image. The speeches, however, contain signs of differing views. For example, variations in the remarks on foreign policy suggest that the Politburo is not entirely agreed on whether to resume high-level negotiations with the US. Chernenko and party secretary Gorbachev were the most positive on this point.	25X1
Chernenko, who spoke last, suggested that a drastic improvement in relations with the US might result if Washington took the initiative on any of several less contentious arms control issues, particularly chemical warfare. He also reformulated Moscow's conditions for resuming INF talks, appearing to disassociate himself somewhat from the demand that US missiles first be removed.	25X1
A TASS commentary over the weekend picked up on this point. It said removal of US missiles is necessary for INF talks "to be effective," implying withdrawal is not a precondition for resumption. Gorbachev, now the senior party secretary under Chernenko, affirmed the USSR's readiness to take advantage of "any real chance for honest talks."	25X1
Foreign Minister Gromyko and Defense Minister Ustinov appeared more skeptical. Gromyko expressed doubt about the value of negotiating with the US now and challenged the sincerity of recent US statements in favor of improving relations.	25X1
Gromyko suggested that such statements had more to do with US election year politics. Ustinov said US assertions of its readiness to talk while continuing with missile deployments are a "deception."	25X1
The speeches indicate that, while Chernenko is inclined toward improving the dialogue, he will have to proceed cautiously to avoid opposition from his colleagues. This probably was one reason for his suggestion in his speech that it would be better to seek agreement on less contentious issues, rather than to grapple with the principal.	
less contentious issues, rather than to grapple with the principal questions.	25 <b>X</b> 1

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Completing Priorities		
All speakers emphasized the need to improve the lot consumer, but there were hints that some Politburo menuneasy about Chernenko's predisposition to favor consumers about Chernenko's predisposition to favor consumer end provides and provided to the consumer sector. The current concerns were especially as a section of the consumer sector. The current concerns were especially as a section of the consumer sector. The current concerns were especially as a section of the consumer sector.	nbers were mers. He is cly the agreements ecially	25X
Politburo members Romanov, Gromyko, and Ustinov standard national goals of developing economic and defeatrength first and consumer welfare second. Soviet media speech by Chernenko to the Politburo on 23 February ne gave consumer welfare first priority.	ensive accounts of	25X
In his election speech last Friday, however, Chernenk noted that the international situation had compelled the divert resources into defense. He said that this had not be expense of social programs.	USSR to	25X1
Chernenko's Relations With His Colleagues		
Chernenko touched on all current foreign and domes ssues in his speech without explicitly challenging any of colleagues' concern. He said the progress made under A pe safeguarded now through "collectively developed guidendorsement of the discipline and anticorruption issues, a need for change in economic management, should allay suspicions of some of his colleagues that he might backt Andropov's programs.	his ndropov will delines.'' His as well as the the	25 <b>X</b> 1
Most of Chernenko's colleagues apparently have dec nis image as a capable leader in their published speeche with differing degrees of support. For example, Gorbache greath length, but focused on Chernenko's "theoretical" and said nothing about his leadership qualities.	s, although ev spoke at	25 <b>X</b> 1
Gorbachev was much more generous in his praise of 'precise understanding of urgent problems' and 'sensit demands of the time.' Gromyko was particularly cool, ar Premier Vorotnikov was notably perfunctory in his praise Chernenko.	ivity to the nd RSFSR	25 <b>X</b> 1
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Ustinov praised Chernenko more than adequately but stopped far short of Romanov and Moscow party chief Grishin, who were the most effusive. Soviet media indicate that the election meetings to which they spoke adopted resolutions that described the Politburo as "headed by" Chernenko—an honorific formulation that had been used sparingly under Brezhnev and Andropov. The meeting that	25.74
Premier Tikhonov addressed adopted the same resolutions.	25X1
Judging from the order in which the leaders spoke, the Politburo has sorted itself out into a hierarchy of status. The content of the speeches suggests that this is not an ordering by rank of Chernenko's strongest boosters but that it reflects power and protocol	
relationships worked out by the new leadership.	25X1

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