



**Director of  
Central  
Intelligence**

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# **National Intelligence Daily**

*Wednesday  
29 February 1984*

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*29 February 1984*


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**LEBANON-SYRIA: Impending Political Talks**

*Press reports state that Lebanese President Gemayel is expected in Damascus today for talks aimed at ending the political deadlock, but infighting among his domestic opponents could encourage Gemayel to resist Syrian demands.* [Redacted]

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The US Embassy in Damascus reports that Foreign Minister Khaddam told US officials that Syria will do everything it can to advance the process of national reconciliation in Lebanon, provided Gemayel "buries" the Lebanese-Israeli accord of 17 May. Khaddam added that Syria prefers Gemayel to other candidates for the presidency. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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**Comment:** Gemayel thus far has balked at coming to terms with Damascus, because he fears Syrian demands will go beyond abrogation of the accord. He probably will delay officially announcing its repudiation until Damascus agrees to rein in the Shias and Druze who have been demanding his resignation. [Redacted]

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Reports of squabbling among Gemayel's opponents may strengthen his resolve to resist making major concessions to them. Moreover, additional deterioration of relations between the Shias and the Druze could threaten Syria's control over its Lebanese allies and jeopardize its ability to deliver on Khaddam's promise. [Redacted]

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A visit to Damascus by Gemayel probably would be a sign of his intention to form a government of national unity and call for a return to national reconciliation efforts in Geneva. Nevertheless, the President is likely to tie progress on political reform to Syria's willingness to offer guarantees for the Christian community. Gemayel is anxious to soften the reaction of Christian hardliners who otherwise might move against him or possibly assassinate him. [Redacted]

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
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**SYRIA: Tensions in the Regime**

*An open power struggle among President Assad's key lieutenants poses no immediate threat to the Syrian leader, but it raises the possibility of armed clashes between opposing factions of the military and security forces.* [Redacted]

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
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Security forces in Damascus now are on a high state of alert. US Embassy officers reported that soldiers in full combat gear took up positions on Monday in the capital where government offices and residences of the regime's leaders are located. There was no apparent trouble among rival security forces, however, and by yesterday the troop presence was slightly reduced. [Redacted]

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**Comment:** There is no indication that any move has been planned or taken against Assad. The heightened security in Damascus may be related to concerns in the government that pro-Arafat Palestinians or Syrian dissidents are planning terrorist operations there in conjunction with Arafat's talks in Jordan. [Redacted]

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**OMAN-US: Anxiety About Relations**

*Senior Omani officials appear increasingly nervous about the country's close military and political relationship with the US and would be reluctant to agree to a greater US military presence.* [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted] the US Embassy says Oman has recently toughened its position on maintenance arrangements for US war stocks stored there. [Redacted]

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Oman's chief foreign policy architect, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Alawi, repeatedly has expressed disappointment with aspects of Oman's security relationship with the US. He also has stressed to US officials that the US handling of the crisis in Lebanon and the withdrawal of the Marines have raised strong doubts among Omanis about the reliability of the US. Although pro-US and staunchly anti-Communist, Alawi believes Oman should have more balanced relations with the US and the USSR. [Redacted]

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**Comment:** Muscat's actions and statements suggest that it would deny a US request to move forces and additional supplies to Oman, unless Iranian action against the Strait of Hormuz seemed imminent. Over the longer run, Omani nationalists—who have an increasing voice in foreign and military policy—are moving toward the position of other moderates in the Persian Gulf, who prefer that US forces remain over the horizon until needed. [Redacted]

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**EAST GERMANY-WEST GERMANY: Status of Relations**

*East Berlin is making plain its interest in good relations with Bonn, but with a caution that suggests uncertainty about Moscow's policy.*

[Redacted]

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East Germany had slowed or suspended most bilateral negotiations—including some that could have brought it economic benefit—after Bonn confirmed its support for INF deployments last November.

[Redacted]

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In recent weeks, East Germany has allowed at least 50 people who took refuge in Western diplomatic missions to emigrate, accelerated release of emigration applicants, and resumed dismantling automatic shooting devices on the border.

[Redacted]

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At the same time, however, Western press reports state that East Berlin has moved to restrict contacts between its citizens and Westerners. The two sides also have not agreed on the release of relatives of East German Premier Stoph who are in the West German Embassy in Czechoslovakia. Bonn has declared an official news blackout on the case.

[Redacted]

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**Comment:**

[Redacted]

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The East Germans presumably are getting rid of malcontents by encouraging emigration. The Kohl government will try to interpret it as another conciliatory move, in order to show the voters that intra-German relations have not suffered because of INF deployments. Failure to resolve the case of Stoph's relatives, however, could hinder the slow improvement in relations.

[Redacted]

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**USSR-VIETNAM: TU-16 Badgers Equipped With Missiles**

[Redacted] USSR has equipped its naval TU-16 Badger strike aircraft deployed in Vietnam with air-to-surface missiles. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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The Badgers were sent to Cam Ranh last November, and five strike, two tanker, one photoreconnaissance, and one ECM Badger aircraft currently are there. These aircraft joined the pair of Bear D naval reconnaissance and the two Bear F ASW aircraft that have been stationed continuously in Vietnam since 1979-80. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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**Comment:** Missile-equipped Badgers would give the Soviets their first airborne antishipping capability from Vietnam. The maximum range of Badger C's with two AS-5 antiship cruise missiles is about 1,200 nautical miles without refueling, enabling them to cover all of the South China Sea and to reach US naval and air bases in the Philippines. [Redacted]

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The Badgers also provide a greater capability to support a Soviet naval presence in the South China Sea and to conduct more intensive reconnaissance of Chinese and Western naval forces there. [Redacted]

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Last summer the Soviets began construction of what could be missile storage buildings at Cam Ranh. There are six separately secured quonset buildings and a large storage building at the airfield that could serve for missile storage. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted] The field and ground support facilities and equipment probably could support a full regiment of about 35 Badgers.

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


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### Jewish Emigration from the USSR, 1970-83

Visas issued (thousands)



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[REDACTED]

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**USSR: Status of Jewish Emigration**

*The plight of Soviet Jews has deteriorated in the past year, with little prospect for improvement in the near term.* [REDACTED]

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Only 1,300 Jews received emigration permission in 1983. This is half the total for 1982 and the lowest number of departures in over a decade. The Anti-Zionist Committee of the Soviet Public, a "private" group established in the USSR last April, has announced that emigration has come to a "natural end" because all family reunifications—the only justification allowed for emigration—have been completed. [REDACTED]

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Oppression of activist *refuseniks*—those Jews whose requests to emigrate have been denied—also continues. A prominent Ukrainian *refusenik* was imprisoned last June for his involvement in an illegal "university" that tutored Jewish students who had been expelled from universities when their parents had applied for emigration. In addition, *refuseniks* remain under pressure to avoid Western contacts. [REDACTED]

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Official propaganda also has been taking an increasingly anti-Semitic tone. The Anti-Zionist Committee has led a crude campaign that compares Zionists to Nazis and stresses the threat of subversion by "foreign Zionist agents." [REDACTED]

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**Comment:** The committee's announcement provides semiofficial confirmation that large-scale emigration has ended. The harsh anti-Semitic content of its propaganda is a transparent effort to discourage Jews from applying for permission to emigrate. [REDACTED]

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The new leadership might reverse this policy in a bid to improve relations with the US, but there are less disruptive ways to achieve such an objective. The Soviets, for example, could allow several well-known dissidents to leave the country. [REDACTED]

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
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**SRI LANKA: Terrorism and Communal Violence**

*A resurgence of Tamil terrorist attacks threatens President Jayewardene's attempts to resolve communal problems through negotiation.* [redacted]

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Terrorist incidents in the Tamil-dominated north within the past week have caused the death of one Sinhalese soldier and one terrorist, according to the US Embassy. Tamil separatists also have robbed several banks since January, making off with more than \$2 million. [redacted]

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To avoid public outcry over the death of the soldier and to forestall a repeat of the violence of last summer, the government-censored press reported only that the soldier had been accidentally shot during a search operation. Nonetheless, the Embassy reports tensions in the capital are increasing as roving bands of Sinhalese youths are threatening Tamils. [redacted]

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**Comment:** Jayewardene's all-party conference to resolve the country's ethnic divisions has been disrupted by the walkout of a dominant Sinhalese party and footdragging by minority representatives. After more than two months, the President's efforts to continue the talks are seen by minority and opposition party members as an attempt to create a forum for grievances rather than to resolve communal problems. [redacted]

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Jayewardene is anxious to prevent a new outbreak of widespread violence, which would damage the fragile economy and cast a shadow over his projected visit to Washington in June. The all-party conference, however, is unlikely to produce a reconciliation formula acceptable both to the President's chauvinistic Sinhalese constituency and to the Tamils. [redacted]

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
**USSR-IRAN-IRAQ: Soviet Concern**

The deputy chief of the Soviet party Central Committee's International Department said in a television broadcast on Saturday that the US is using the Iran-Iraq conflict as a pretext for increasing its military presence in the region. *Pravda* repeated the charge on Sunday, and the TASS report of the announced Iraqi bombing of Khark Island on Monday said the US naval presence in the Persian Gulf is growing. 

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
**Comment:** Moscow is likely to be concerned that US actions to keep open the Strait of Hormuz will increase US military power in the region and could result in US operations on Iranian territory. The Soviets may believe that any successful US military effort against Iran could persuade Arab states to rely more heavily on the US to counter the Iranian threat. They also may believe that such an effort would help remove current Arab doubts about the reliability of the US as an ally. Despite these expressions of concern, the Soviets have not increased their naval forces in the area. 

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


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**GUATEMALA: Army Operations in the North**

The military is increasing its troop strength in the north and accelerating operations there against a guerrilla stronghold. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] government forces, including an Army task force established last month, have destroyed seven insurgent camps in recent operations in the Peten region. The Army is organizing a small, quick-reaction battalion and a river patrol base for possible operations along the Mexican border. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

**Comment:** The 500 or so insurgents in the remote Peten region have avoided substantial losses during the past two years because the government has centered its counterinsurgency efforts in other more hotly contested areas. The guerrillas recently have carried out several attacks on economic targets and Army patrols, however, and now apparently will face a determined government effort to pacify the area. This military pressure is likely to prevent the insurgents from launching an offensive any time soon. [Redacted]

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**COSTA RICA-NICARAGUA: Strained Relations**

Costa Rica's recall of its Ambassador to Nicaragua after Sandinista troops crossed the border and fired on poorly armed Costa Rican security forces probably reflects strong public demands for a vigorous response. The US Embassy in San Jose reports the Costa Rican Security Council has decided to issue a protest note to Managua and to reinforce the border with civil guard units instructed to repel any attacks launched by the Sandinistas. In addition, a San Jose official told the Embassy that several ministers have discussed declaring the Nicaraguan Ambassador persona non grata. According to press reports, Managua claims its soldiers were pursuing anti-Sandinista insurgents taking refuge in Costa Rica. [Redacted]

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**Comment:** The Sandinista incursion appears to have been prompted by anti-Sandinista activity in the border area. To underscore its neutrality, San Jose probably will institute a new security crackdown against anti-Sandinista operations in the region. [Redacted]

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**WEST GERMANY: Extension of Territorial Waters**

A senior West German official believes Bonn has postponed a decision on the territorial waters of Helgolander Bay to avoid a serious dispute with the US during Chancellor Kohl's coming visit to Washington. Last October Bonn extended its territorial limit in the bay from 3 nautical miles to 16 nautical miles in an effort to prevent oilspills from tanker accidents. Following US objections, however, the West Germans decided to review the decision. The US argued that the decision would create a precedent for other extensions that might hamper the freedom of movement of Western naval forces and merchant marines. [redacted]

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**Comment:** The postponement indicates the West Germans may be leaning toward rejecting the US request. A decision paper prepared in January for Kohl stated that a simple retraction of the decision is out of the question because it would create a poor public image. Nonetheless, the paper made clear that reaffirming the decision probably would lead to a formal US legal protest and an order that US ships not observe the extension. [redacted]

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**EGYPT-USSR: Possible Exchange of Ambassadors**

Recent comments by President Mubarak suggest he may agree this spring to exchange ambassadors with the USSR. Relations were downgraded to the Chargé level in September 1981. Mubarak told a visitor that he has the matter under consideration but that he probably will not act for several months. Last week he noted to the US Chargé that it would be normal for Egypt to have full relations with both superpowers and that an exchange of ambassadors would not affect the content of its relationship with the USSR. [redacted]

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**Comment:** Mubarak has been close to resuming full relations several times, but he has been dissuaded by such events as the shootdown of the South Korean airliner. He may be considering the move again, because he sees a reduction in US influence in the Middle East and because he wants to strengthen Egypt's nonaligned credentials before he assumes a more active role in any Arab-Israeli peace process. With parliamentary elections scheduled for May, Mubarak also probably hopes to reduce domestic criticism that he is too subservient to the US. [redacted]

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### Recent Dissident Attacks



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**Special Analysis**

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**SUDAN: The Southern Insurgency**

*Recent terrorist attacks have underscored the threat to President Nimeiri's regime posed by the insurgency in the south. The dissidents already have forced the suspension of key projects intended to develop southern petroleum and water resources. The situation in the region has stirred serious unrest in the military and could jeopardize Nimeiri's hold on power. Only a political settlement between Khartoum and the south is likely to end the unrest, but Nimeiri will have to show more flexibility if one is to be achieved.*

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Southern troops who have deserted in opposition to the regime's new policies toward the south are primarily responsible for the recent surge in dissident attacks. Most of the largely Christian and animist southerners have been incensed by Nimeiri's decisions last year to divide the regional government, to reassign southern troops to the north, and to impose Islamic law.

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
Nimeiri characterizes the unrest as a local problem that is being exploited by hostile neighbors and that can be solved only with foreign military assistance. The official media highlight Libyan and Ethiopian plotting and play down developments in the south. Nimeiri's recent agreement to hold talks with Ethiopia probably is an effort to curtail a major source of assistance to dissidents.

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The US Embassy reports that Nimeiri recently has appeared withdrawn, a result both of illness and of depression over the problems in the south and the other political and economic challenges he faces. First Vice President Tayyib is handling much of the daily job of running the government as well as dealing with southern politicians in Khartoum.

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**Insurgent Capabilities**



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Insurgent mortar attacks on Army units have demonstrated a good grasp of military tactics. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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The dissidents have not captured any major garrisons, but their recent raids and kidnappings have demoralized the armed forces and drawn attention to north-south problems. In late April, when the rainy season begins to hamper the government's resupply efforts, the insurgents are likely to increase their attacks on larger towns. [Redacted]

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Pamphlets issued by southern rebel leaders have begun appearing in Khartoum. In one of them, John Garang, a military deserter who has become the most prominent dissident, demanded that Nimeiri restore a unitary regional government, end "integration" with Egypt, and terminate Islamic law. [Redacted]

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Garang's groups recently sent an open letter to foreign firms operating in the south. The letter declared the region a war zone and warned against any development of resources for the benefit of the north. [Redacted]

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**Nimeiri's Reconciliation Efforts**

Nimeiri has shown little enthusiasm in pursuing a political settlement. His strategy has been to undercut the rebels by co-opting traditional southern politicians. In the past three months, he has created a commission to reexamine the division of the south, released several imprisoned southern leaders, and delivered a major speech reassuring non-Muslims of their rights under Islamic law. [Redacted]

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The President's efforts have shown few results. Southern politicians complain that they have little direct access to Nimeiri and are forced to negotiate with government officials who are even less sensitive to their problems. Nimeiri recently told a US businessman that he has received no reply to letters he had sent to insurgent leaders through southern emissaries. [Redacted]

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The government has responded to the seriousness of the current situation by making new conciliatory gestures. Last week Tayyib met with southern politicians, promising to pass their views to Nimeiri. [Redacted]

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The southerners presented a carefully coordinated list of demands, including a general amnesty for dissidents and meetings between Nimeiri and key rebel leaders. Nimeiri has pledged to announce a new strategy for the south in a major Unity Day speech on Saturday. [redacted]

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**Outlook**

The insurgency almost certainly will spread unless the government makes greater efforts to negotiate a political settlement. Sudan's close ally, Egypt, is reluctant to support a military campaign in the south, and even rapprochement with Ethiopia would not guarantee that all aid to the dissidents would be cut off. Any attempt at a settlement would have to address such key southern concerns as a unified regional government, removal of corrupt southern governors, increased social services, cancellation of Islamic law, and sharing of profits from development projects. [redacted]

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Some southern politicians in Khartoum recently expressed optimism that an agreement can be reached as long as the dissidents are making limited demands aimed at improving conditions in the south. Nimeiri still is widely regarded as the only northern leader with the stature to resolve problems between the two regions. [redacted]

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If the insurgents' military position becomes stronger, however, their demands probably will become more radical. They might call for secession or for Nimeiri's removal. [redacted]

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Unless security in the south improves, the regime will continue to suffer broad economic and political consequences. The success of the dissidents in disrupting the operations of foreign firms in the south is setting back economic development and could jeopardize foreign aid. These economic factors, combined with the Army's frustration about containing the insurgency, has increased the chance of a military coup. [redacted]

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Nimeiri is a skilled political tactician, and he may manage to stay in power. In any event, he and the military probably will blame the US and Egypt for unwillingness to supply greater military support against the dissidents. Tayyib, who is visiting the US this week, almost certainly will ask for increased deliveries of US military equipment. [redacted]

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