



**Director of
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
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


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
SYRIA-LEBANON: Waiting on Gemayel

The Syrians continue to give President Gemayel time to abrogate the Lebanese-Israeli agreement, but his domestic opponents are becoming impatient and military pressures on the Lebanese Army are increasing. 

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The Sunni commander of the Army's 3rd Brigade has told the US defense attache that he is under intense pressure to leave the Army. He says he will stay as long as he believes that the government is working for national reconciliation and a religiously balanced Army. If the government continues to vacillate, or if it enters into an open alliance with Israel or the Christian Lebanese Forces militia, his brigade and most Muslims will join the opposition. 

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Comment:  Assad is still likely to hope Gemayel will make a deal with Damascus and begin the process of national reconciliation. Assad could encourage Druze and Palestinian attacks on Suq al Gharb and then on the presidential palace at B'abda, but such a move would panic the Christians and all but eliminate the possibility of restoring political stability any time soon.

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Gemayel probably realizes that continued inaction on his part will eventually provoke additional Syrian-backed pressure on the Army. He almost certainly believes an attack on Suq al Gharb would cause the collapse of the 8th Brigade there and fragment the Army. He therefore is likely to move toward an accommodation with Damascus soon. 

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IRAN-IRAQ: Military Developments

The Iraqis claim their aircraft attacked tankers at Khark Island yesterday, and Iran appears ready to launch its offensive. [Redacted]

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Press reports from Baghdad state that an Iraqi military spokesman warned that the attacks on Khark Island will continue. Iranian press reports also state that Iraqi aircraft were active near Khark. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] the Iranians have sent more artillery and Revolutionary Guard units to an area north of Al Basrah and have activated two HAWK air defense missile sites on the southern front. Iraqi and Iranian forces are still fighting in the marshes north of Al Basrah. [Redacted]

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Iran's failure to score a major success so far has reduced pressure on Iraq to use chemical agents, according to the US Interests Section in Baghdad. The Iraqis seem satisfied with the performance of their troops. [Redacted]

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Comment: Baghdad is aware that Tehran is about to launch large-scale attacks at Al Basrah and along the central front. The Iraqis may hope that the raid on Khark Island will show Tehran that they are serious about expanding the war if Iran launches an offensive or continues its attacks on Iraqi towns. [Redacted]

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The activation of the HAWK sites, which could provide air defense for attacking Iranian troops, suggests the main Iranian offensive against Al Basrah is likely to begin this week. Despite Iranian attacks in the marshes, the Iraqis still control the main road to the city and are able to send reinforcements to meet the Iranian offensive. [Redacted]

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
USSR-PLO: Support for Arafat

Moscow is continuing discreetly to back Yasir Arafat as the PLO's legitimate leader, but it is unlikely to give him strong public backing against his Syrian-supported opponents in the organization for fear of antagonizing President Assad.



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


Comment: Moscow wants an independent, pro-Soviet PLO to help ensure against any decision by Syria to negotiate an Arab-Israeli peace settlement without the USSR's participation. Nevertheless, the Soviets almost certainly will remain reluctant to support Arafat too openly, in order not to alienate Assad—their only major ally in the Arab-Israeli dispute—or give the appearance of interfering in Palestinian affairs.



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Moscow views Arafat as its second-best ally in its effort to gain influence in the Middle East peace process, and it is probably concerned about the talks between Arafat and Hussein and their progress toward cooperation with Egypt. The Soviets want to prevent joint Jordanian-PLO participation in the Middle East peace plan prepared by the US and any coalition of moderate Arabs that further isolates Syria.



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FRANCE-CHAD-LIBYA: French Views on Military Presence

Recent statements by French officials indicate Paris may be resigned to an extended military presence in Chad. [Redacted]

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The French Ambassador in N'Djamena told a US Embassy official last week that France is determined to resist Libyan pressures on Chad, and he strongly implied that a French troop presence there would be necessary for years. Senior French officers in Chad recently told a US defense attache that their orders are to engage any clear thrust from north of the 16th parallel. The Ambassador and the officers noted, however, that President Habre is vulnerable to infiltration of Libyan-backed dissidents. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Meanwhile, the French Ambassadors to Qatar and Togo have told their US counterparts that Paris recently warned French missions of possible Libyan terrorist attacks against French diplomats. French embassies in West Africa have been told to tighten security. [Redacted]

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Comment: The Ambassador to Chad has been consistently more pessimistic about a negotiated settlement than Foreign Minister Cheysson, who continues to push for a diplomatic opening. The Ambassador's views, however, are likely to parallel thinking in President Mitterrand's office and the Defense Ministry. His remarks probably were intended in part to encourage increased US material and financial support for Habre. [Redacted]

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There is no confirmation of the reported Libyan threat to French diplomatic personnel. Nonetheless, French concerns on this score are consistent with other indications that Cheysson's talks with Qadhafi went poorly and that the French may be expecting new Libyan efforts to weaken their resolve in Chad. [Redacted]

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Deactivated SS-5 Sites



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USSR: Deactivation of SS-5 Force

The Soviets evidently have deactivated the last of their SS-5 IRBM launchers. [Redacted]

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The SS-5 was first fielded in 1961. It was a single-warhead, liquid-propellant missile with a range of 4,100 kilometers. By 1965, missiles from 101 launchers could hit most theater targets in Western Europe and Asia. [Redacted]

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Some SS-5s were deactivated in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The Soviets dismantled them more rapidly after 1977, when SS-20s were introduced. [Redacted]

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Comment: Andropov last October asserted that all the SS-5 sites had been deactivated, but evidence of this has been ambiguous. Although skeleton crews are still at some launch sites and some abandoned equipment is still in place, none of these sites are likely to have been only temporarily deactivated. [Redacted]

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Deactivation of the system leaves the USSR with 378 launchers for the three-warhead SS-20, plus about 220 SS-4 medium-range single-warhead ballistic missiles. As the Soviets build more SS-20 bases, they probably will eventually resume deactivation of the SS-4 force, phasing the system out by 1987 or 1988. [Redacted]

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SPAIN: Basque Election Results

The results of the election on Sunday for the Basque regional parliament demonstrate declining popular support for ETA terrorism, but the failure of the governing Basque Nationalist Party to win a parliamentary majority will hamper cooperation with Madrid.

[Redacted]

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The moderate Nationalists gained effective control of the new assembly by winning 32 of its 75 seats. The Socialist Party pushed the terrorist-linked party, Herri Batasuna, out of second place. The Socialists won 25 percent of the vote and 19 seats—10 more than in the previous election.

[Redacted]

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Herri Batasuna's percentage of the vote dropped from 16 percent to 14 percent, but it kept its 11 seats. The party's leadership has stated that it will continue to boycott parliament.

[Redacted]

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Comment: To govern effectively, the Nationalists will need the backing of other political parties. As a result, they will be more worried than ever about losing support both to more radical parties and to the Socialists.

[Redacted]

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This could force the Nationalists into frequent disputes with Madrid over counterterrorism policy and issues relating to Basque autonomy. The problems will be aggravated if, as seems likely, rightwing antiterrorist groups with suspected links to the central government continue to retaliate against ETA murders.

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NICARAGUA: Labor Strife

The Sandinistas have settled a strike at the country's largest sugar refinery, but they are instigating another labor crisis to discredit an opposition business leader. [redacted]

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Managua agreed to the demands of some 5,000 field workers and authorized a 50-percent wage increase to end the wildcat strike. The strikers had ignored their Sandinista union leaders and appealed to an independent union to represent them. The union refused, fearing government reprisals and agreed only to facilitate talks. [redacted]

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Nevertheless, state security agents detained several of the independent union leaders and threatened at least one with death if he did not sever his connection with a union confederation opposed to the government. Although the leaders want to leave their posts, confederation officials are urging them to stay until replacements can be trained. [redacted]

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The Sandinistas also are accusing a prominent businessman, Enrique Bolanos, of trying to block formation of a proregime union at his cotton plant. The plant's manager has told US officials that two-thirds of the workers belong to an independent union and do not want to switch. He says the government used pressure tactics on the workers and brought in outsiders to demonstrate. [redacted]

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Comment: The walkout of sugar workers is the first major strike in Nicaragua since strikes were outlawed in 1981, and it indicates labor's frustration with frozen wages and rising prices. The Sandinistas may have caved in because they did not want to use repression against workers they claimed to represent. Nonetheless, the regime will face tough choices if labor actions spread. [redacted]

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The Sandinistas probably hope to intimidate Bolanos, who has been a leading opposition spokesman on election issues. The opposition will be likely to view the move as a major act of government bad faith at a time when the Sandinistas are claiming loosening of political restrictions. [redacted]

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
ETHIOPIA-SUDAN: Influx of Refugees

A massive influx of Ethiopian refugees into eastern Sudan over the past four months has caused local tensions there to reach the highest level in more than three years, according to the US Embassy. Ethiopians fleeing drought and heavy fighting are entering Sudan at the rate of at least 300 per day, and anti-Ethiopian sentiment has risen sharply, especially in Al Qadarif. Local officials blame the 40,000 new refugees for water shortages and soaring food prices. Islamic fundamentalists are preaching against the government's policy of giving the refugees sanctuary. 

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Comment: The heavy flow of refugees, which probably will continue for the next several months, will increase strains between Sudan and Ethiopia. In addition to trying to cope with a total of nearly 700,000 refugees, Khartoum is facing a growing Libyan- and Ethiopian-backed insurgency in the south. 

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USSR-CUBA: New Air Defense Equipment


[Redacted] the Soviets have delivered the Cone Dish antenna, which is used with a high-speed data link transmission system. The antenna was identified at the surface-to-air missile support facility at Managua, south of Havana. This data transmission system is used to support a variety of air defense systems, including the SA-2 and SA-3, that are deployed in Cuba. [Redacted]

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Comment: The delivery probably is the latest step in the USSR's three-year-old program to strengthen Cuba's air defenses. The new system will speed communications in the air defense network, which could improve tracking of the US SR-71 reconnaissance aircraft and other high-speed targets. It can be used to support SA-5s, but there is no site construction or other indication that the USSR is planning to deploy SA-5s in Cuba. [Redacted]

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LIBERIA: Preparing for Civilian Rule

Head of State Doe and four senior colleagues on the ruling council have released all junior members from their duties, ostensibly to permit them to prepare for retirement after the scheduled return to civilian rule in April 1985. Doe's draft constitution, which was made public Thursday and now faces a popular referendum next month, contains amendments to provide council members with financial security and legal immunity for their official actions. [Redacted]

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Comment: The amendments probably will mute opposition to the transition among junior officers and help ease Doe's anxieties over ensuring a peaceful turnover. Nonetheless, Doe is under pressure to run for the civilian presidency, and he is showing frustration over the problems involved in managing a deteriorating economy. As the time for returning to civilian rule approaches, he may become increasingly inclined to lash out at his domestic critics. He also may seek more US support. [Redacted]

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POLAND: Bureaucratic Infighting

[Redacted] Premier Jaruzelski is trying to remove from the civilian apparatus of the Communist Party individuals who he believes are obstructing his political and economic policies. [Redacted]

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Jaruzelski has had some success in removing a number of central party officials, but that he has failed to implement a broader purge of perhaps as many as 2,000 bureaucrats.

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
[Redacted] the conservative provincial party apparatus has not been touched. Party bureaucrats, who are angry about the continuing influence of Jaruzelski's military appointees in the party, are said to be striking back by working to undermine the military's reputation and reduce its authority. [Redacted]

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Comment: The infighting, which probably will continue over an extended period, will increase tensions and further complicate the process of formulating and implementing policies. Bureaucratic obstruction by the party apparatus could lead Jaruzelski to rely even more on trusted subordinates and other institutions, especially the government. This could in turn create more tension. [Redacted]

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Interlocking Directorate of the Soviet Leadership

Party				Government	
Politburo	Age	Other Post	Secretariat	Council of Ministers	Presidium of Supreme Soviet
Full Member					
Chernenko	72		General Secretary		
Aliyev	60			First Deputy Chairman	
Gorbachev	52		Agriculture		
Grishin	69	Moscow party chief			Member
Gromyko	74			Minister of Foreign Affairs and First Deputy Chairman	
Kunayev	72	Kazakhstan party chief			Member
Romanov	61		Heavy Industry		Member
Shcherbitskiy	66	Ukraine party chief			Member
Solomentsev	70	Party Control Committee			
Tikhonov	78			Chairman	
Ustinov	75			Minister of Defense	
Vorotnikov	58	RSFSR Premier			
Candidate Member					
Chebrikov	60			KGB Chairman	
Demichev	66			Minister of Culture	
Dolgikh	59		Industry		
Kuznetsov	83				First Deputy Chairman
Ponomarev	69		Nonruling Parties		
Shevardnadze	56	Georgia party chief			
			Kapitonov-Light industry, consumer goods		
			Ligachev-Personnel		
			Rusakov-Ruling Communist parties		
			Ryzhkov-Economic management		
			Zimyanin-Propaganda, ideology		

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Special Analysis**USSR: The New Leadership**

The weight of evidence since Andropov's death suggests that General Secretary Chernenko rules over a divided leadership and will have obstacles to overcome if he is to consolidate his position. It is too early to assess how much strength Chernenko has or what his staying power will be. In the days ahead there are likely to be conflicting signals as the political situation sorts itself out. Several events in the next two months—the completion of the Supreme Soviet election campaign, a plenum of the Central Committee, a session of the Supreme Soviet, and the possible selection of a new chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet—will provide more solid indications of Chernenko's power.

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Some representatives of the key national security bureaucracies appear to have reservations about Chernenko's qualifications. A Soviet ambassador who is a member of the Central Committee conveyed his lack of enthusiasm for Chernenko. Another ambassador even suggested that Chernenko is unqualified for office because he lacks foreign policy experience.

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have also been cool to Chernenko. The initial treatment of the new General Secretary in the military press was noticeably faint in its praise of his qualifications.

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Such reservations are not unusual. The military, the Foreign Ministry, and the KGB provided the backbone of Andropov's support when he became General Secretary.

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Defense Minister Ustinov, in his article commemorating Soviet Army-Navy Day last week, made scant reference to Chernenko, and he attacked US policy despite Chernenko's avoidance of such rhetoric in his initial speech. In a subsequent speech to the military last Friday, however, Ustinov praised Chernenko and suggested that the General Secretary's statements were authoritative.

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The change in emphasis may derive from a decision by the Politburo at its regular meeting on Thursday. Soviet media indicated that Chernenko had addressed the meeting and had defined major policy issues.

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Some Soviet officials have claimed that Ustinov and Foreign Minister Gromyko preferred Chernenko to a younger leader who might interfere in their spheres of responsibility. While this is plausible, it does not necessarily signify their total support of the new leader. They will still probably resist any efforts by Chernenko to expand his control over their domains in foreign policy. []

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West German Chancellor Kohl and Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau noted that in their meetings with Chernenko, Gromyko showed an independence and outspokenness he had not displayed in Andropov's presence. Moreover, when Chernenko met with the East European party leaders, he was surrounded by Gromyko, Ustinov, and Premier Tikhonov, thereby conveying the impression of a collective leadership. []

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Supreme Soviet election speeches since Andropov's death also seem to point to varying degrees of enthusiasm for Chernenko. Officials closely associated with Andropov, including party secretary Ryzhkov and KGB chief Chebrikov, have been restrained in their comments about the new leader. []

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On the other hand, party secretaries Kapitonov, Zimyanin, and Ligachev have praised Chernenko's abilities—in some cases lavishly. Ligachev's praise is particularly noteworthy, because Andropov brought him into the leadership to supervise personnel appointments. This suggests that some of Andropov's proteges are covering themselves politically by lauding Chernenko. []

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Sources of Support

Chernenko's support appears to come mainly from the regional party leaders and government ministries—the two largest groups in the Central Committee. These were the groups most threatened by Andropov's anticorruption policy and plans to rejuvenate personnel. []

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The General Secretary underscored his appeal to these groups in his initial speech as party leader. He noted the contribution of regional party secretaries and pledged to reduce interference in the work of the economic managers. []

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Chernenko benefited from the continued presence in the Politburo of Brezhnev's cronies, Tikhonov and Kazakh party boss Kunayev. Politburo independents may also have joined the coalition if they believed the choice boiled down to selecting a younger, and presumably more aggressive leader who might clean house, like party

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secretary Gorbachev, or an older and more cautious figure, like Chernenko, who probably would be less inclined to interfere in their bailiwicks. []

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Chernenko's Prospects

The Soviets are already publicizing the trappings of Chernenko's authority. On Thursday the Chief of the General Staff at an Army-Navy Day function identified Chernenko as the chairman of the Defense Council, but this has not yet been reported by the Soviet press. An official account states that on the same day Chernenko also addressed a session of the Politburo, where he is said to have "defined" the major directions of economic policy. []

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The next two months should provide a better appreciation of Chernenko's degree of authority and his ability to push controversial policies, particularly on the sensitive issue of relations with the West. The Supreme Soviet election speeches of Ustinov and Gromyko, when compared with Chernenko's speech, will be especially important indicators of consensus among the senior leaders. []

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A Central Committee plenum this spring will be an even more important indicator of Chernenko's strength and of Gorbachev's reported role as unofficial second secretary. If the latter retains control of personnel appointments while acquiring responsibility for ideology, he would be in a strong position to influence policy and build his credentials as the next general secretary. []

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The appointment of a new chairman of the Supreme Soviet, which could be made at the session in March or April, also will provide evidence of Chernenko's actual power. He presumably would want to assume this position, but it could go to Gromyko or another senior leader. []

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Regardless of who gets the job, the coming months may see an increase in political maneuvering. Individuals could concentrate on advancing their own careers, with Chernenko clearly seen as an interim leader. This situation could cause some disarray in policymaking. []

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Such a period probably will provide inconclusive and contradictory signals about power relationships. Moreover, the signals could give a false impression. Those in the national security apparatus, particularly the Foreign Ministry and the KGB, who seem to have the most serious reservations about Chernenko are much more accessible to Western observers than those in the regional apparatus and government ministries, where his support is greater. []

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In any case, it seems unlikely that Chernenko will be able to embark on bold new policies in the immediate future. If the leadership is divided, it would find it easier to stick to the established course.

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DIA Comment

DIA believes that reports of institutional opposition to Chernenko within the leadership have been overstated. Defense Minister Ustinov's Army-Navy Day article and speech as well as the statements of other Soviet military VIPs were less strident in tone than last year's. This can be attributed to a Soviet perception of political advantages in returning to less confrontational rhetoric. Faint praise for Chernenko in some of the speeches does not equate to military opposition to the General Secretary. Chernenko has been in power only two weeks and has made only one major speech in that period. Although his references to the military in that address were limited, they were supportive. Some leadership elements probably preferred an older leader such as Chernenko, and individual jockeying for position will continue. However, there is no evidence of institutional opposition to Chernenko's consolidation of power. Senior leadership figures such as Ustinov and Gromyko will almost certainly oppose efforts to diminish their influence on policy, but the vast majority of reporting indicates Ustinov and Gromyko supported Chernenko in the succession and suggests they were two of Chernenko's key backers in his bid for the top party post.

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