




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National Intelligence Daily

Saturday
18 February 1984

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
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
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


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LEBANON: Preparations for Partition

Most Christians expect the government to collapse soon, and they are preparing plans to establish a Christian ministate. 


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Comment: The development of a partition mentality reflects a widespread belief among Christians that opposition forces will soon succeed in bringing down the government. Most Christians doubt that the Saudi initiative or any other national reconciliation plan will succeed. They fear that the Army will soon have to abandon its remaining positions on the Alayh ridge. 

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Christians are afraid that a Muslim-dominated government would not protect them. As a result, most believe their safety would only be guaranteed in a Christian ministate encompassing East Beirut and the Christian heartland north of the capital. 

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USSR: SS-20 Construction Renewed in the West

Construction has begun on a new SS-20 base in the western USSR, the first since November, when Andropov announced the end of the moratorium. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Comment: The resumption of SS-20 construction in the west at this time is part of the USSR's response to INF deployments. The Soviets probably were planning to build more SS-20 bases when Brezhnev announced in March 1982 a moratorium on SS-20 deployment opposite NATO in an attempt to forestall US deployments of Pershing IIs and ground-launched cruise missiles. [Redacted]

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After Brezhnev's announcement, the Soviets did not initiate new base construction in the west. They did, however, complete work on four bases in the region that were under construction when the moratorium was announced. [Redacted]

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The base at Krolevets probably will not be operational until late this year or early 1985. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] In the absence of arms control constraints, the Soviets probably will continue construction in both the western and the eastern USSR. If they continue past rates of base construction and deployment practices, they could have between 315 and 378 launchers opposite NATO and 216 to 270 launchers in the east by 1987. [Redacted]

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Iran-Iraq Military Developments



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[Redacted]

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IRAN-IRAQ: Iranian Attack Continues

Fighting continues south of Mehran and Iraq is planning air attacks against Iranian civilian and economic targets. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] Iranian forces had not crossed the border as of yesterday. Tehran claims to have retaken 150 square kilometers of Iraqi-occupied Iranian territory. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] the Iraqis contained the attack near the border and had reinforced their positions with an armored brigade. [Redacted]

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Iranian aircraft yesterday raided the Iraqi town of Ali al-Gharbi, about 65 kilometers southeast of the battle area, according to press reports from both sides. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Baghdad has announced that its forces will continue to observe a seven-day unilateral suspension of attacks on Iranian urban areas, which expires on Monday. [Redacted] that there is extensive popular support in Iraq for intensifying the conflict. A military spokesman quoted on Baghdad radio today said bombing of Iranian targets will resume after the moratorium. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Comment: The Iranians appear to control much of the ridgeline on the border, which probably was their immediate objective. Baghdad's measured response suggests Iraq is confident that this is not the offensive they are expecting and that lightly reinforced Iraqi forces in the area can contain it. The Iranians are likely to pause to resupply their forces before continuing the attack. [Redacted]

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CHINA-VIETNAM: Border Tensions

Armed clashes are taking place along the Chinese-Vietnamese border on the anniversary of their 16-day war in 1979. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted] Only a few

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minor skirmishes reportedly occurred on the Guangzhou Military Region front. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted] Vietnamese press

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reports had portrayed the border area as the calmest it has been in five years. Beijing, however, disputed this claim and accused Vietnam of 35 border provocations during the New Year holiday. [Redacted]

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Comment: The fighting is unlikely to result in a new border war. China has 16 combat divisions near the border and can conduct artillery barrages and small unit assaults, as it did last April. There are no indications, however, of a major redeployment of forces needed for a major ground assault like the attack in 1979. [Redacted]

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Beijing uses tensions along the border as part of its effort to maintain military, economic, and political pressure on Hanoi to withdraw its forces from Kampuchea. Chinese Foreign Minister Wu is scheduled to visit Malaysia and Thailand next week, in part to reaffirm China's support for the Kampuchean resistance coalition. [Redacted]

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Vietnam has not yet begun large-scale dry season operations against resistance forces in Kampuchea. An increase in border tension with China reminds Hanoi that provocative actions in Kampuchea that threaten Thailand could elicit Chinese reprisals. The increased tension also counters Vietnamese propaganda suggesting that reduced border problems might improve chances for resumption of bilateral talks. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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BELGIUM: More Problems for INF

Belgian efforts to move forward on INF are again bogged down in regional squabbling. [Redacted]

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Defense Minister Vreven told US diplomats this week that no decision on INF construction contracts will be made until a split is resolved between Flemish and Walloon cabinet members over the proposed purchase of jeeps for the Army. [Redacted]

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Comment: A compromise over the jeep contract is probable. Prime Minister Martens's dominant Flemish Social Christians do not want a government crisis now, and there is no good alternative to the current Social Christian-Liberal coalition. [Redacted]

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The government recently has been forced to sidestep many communal questions, however, and the accumulation of divisive issues increases the odds against the government's survival. Many Belgians appear to believe that a new election—probably coinciding with the election of the European Parliament in June—is needed to renew the government's mandate. [Redacted]

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Martens's INF strategy calls for continued discreet preparations for basing and a final decision on deployment after an election early next year. The longer Brussels delays, however, the greater the risk that INF will become enmeshed in parochial Belgian issues. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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FRANCE-LEBANON: Hard Line on UN Force

A senior official in the French Foreign Ministry says Paris believes that French, Soviet, and Syrian ideas concerning a UN force for Beirut have to be negotiated simultaneously and without preconditions. The French regard Soviet demands to constrain the movements of the US and French fleets as unreasonable and unacceptable. They believe, moreover, that Moscow's demand for a pledge of future nonintervention makes no sense, saying that all parties agree in principle to this proposal. [Redacted]

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Comment: Paris may want to counter a possible impression that it is amenable to the Soviet and Syrian preconditions. It may believe that the French UN Ambassador's speech on Wednesday, which implied a willingness to consider the withdrawal of warships, made France appear too ready to compromise. [Redacted]

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USSR: Impending Session of Supreme Soviet

Academy of Sciences Vice President Velikhov told the US Embassy in Moscow on Thursday that the Supreme Soviet will meet within a month after the completion of the current elections to that body on 4 March. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] the session is to be held within two weeks following the elections rather than in late May or June, as was rumored before Andropov's death. The last two times a new Supreme Soviet was convened, in 1974 and in 1979, it met within about six weeks. [Redacted]

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Comment: The leadership may see representational advantages in convening the Supreme Soviet soon to designate a state president. After Brezhnev's death, politicking among the leadership led to a delay of more than six months before Andropov was named president. Agreement may already have been reached on General Secretary Chernenko or someone else—possibly Foreign Minister Gromyko. If the issue is not yet decided, there could be considerable maneuvering before the Supreme Soviet session to determine who will assume the post. [Redacted]

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CHAD: Military and Political Activity

[Redacted] as many as 1,200 Chadian dissidents last week moved south from Faya-Largeau to positions just north of the 16th parallel. Government officials in N'Djamena indicate that Libya continues to send arms and supplies from the occupied north to dissidents in the south and east.

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[Redacted]

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The US Embassy in Brazzaville reports that the French Ambassador also is encouraging dissidents to reconcile with President Habre.

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Comment: The threat of rebel attacks in the north and Libya's apparent attempts to resupply southern dissidents indicate Tripoli intends to maintain pressure on Habre. The President has reached an accommodation with some southern rebels, but the Libyan resupply effort may encourage others to increase acts of sabotage against the government. Habre's moves to open a dialogue with dissident leaders are likely to reflect his concern that an increase in fighting could quickly erode his control in the south. Reconciliation efforts by Paris probably are aimed at a diplomatic settlement in hopes of avoiding military conflict with Tripoli.

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YUGOSLAVIA: Military Involvement in Politics

[Redacted] the "threatening attitudes" of Yugoslav generals have induced civilian leaders to be more wary of opposing them on high-priority military programs. The military played a role late last year in forcing the resignation of Finance Minister Florijancic, who unsuccessfully disputed the Army's budget requests for 1984. Florijancic later clashed with Prime Minister Planinc on another issue, and she forced his removal from office. Defense Minister Admiral Mamula has since warned that funds for arms modernization cannot be reduced.

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Comment: Florijancic was the only leader to fall during the military's unprecedented push for a broad purge of officials who obstruct the government's stabilization program. Although the military hierarchy has since stayed on the political sidelines, the generals probably will again put pressure on the regime for more decisive action on economic stabilization at the next plenum late this month.

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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HUNGARY-USSR: Differences Over Western Visits

The Soviets last month were unhappy with the Hungarians' refusal to cancel or delay visits by Western leaders who have accepted INF deployments [Redacted] They believe that the Hungarians are placing their own national interests ahead of those of the Warsaw Pact. The Czechoslovaks have publicly criticized British Prime Minister Thatcher's visit this month to Budapest, and a senior Czechoslovak official has told the US Ambassador that Thatcher's trip was an anti-Soviet act. Budapest has scheduled visits by Italian Prime Minister Craxi in April and West German Chancellor Kohl later in the spring. [Redacted]

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Comment: The Hungarians will be alert for further action by Moscow on this issue as a sign of the new Soviet regime's attitude toward their increasingly active foreign policy. Although the Hungarians want relations with the new leadership to begin positively, they will be reluctant to back off from their dialogue with the West.

[Redacted]

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USSR-POLAND: Criticism of Defense Efforts

Soviet Marshal and Warsaw Pact Commander in Chief Kulikov reportedly criticized Polish defense efforts during meetings with Premier Jaruzelski and Defense Minister Siwicki early this month. Neutral and nonaligned military attaches in Warsaw say Kulikov told Jaruzelski that Polish military modernization was proceeding too slowly and that he demanded more money be spent on the military.

[Redacted]

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Comment: Kulikov's comments and criticisms are consistent with his statements during past visits to Poland and do not indicate a substantial increase in Soviet demands. As a result of Poland's economic difficulties, the Soviets have little choice but to continue to tolerate the situation. [Redacted] Kulikov is disliked by many non-Soviet Warsaw Pact officers because of his contemptuous treatment of them, even though he commands respect for his intellect and dynamism. There are indications that Kulikov's manner was a factor in his replacement by Marshal Ogarkov as chief of the Soviet General Staff [Redacted]

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ROMANIA: Foreign Minister in Trouble

[Redacted] Foreign Minister Andrei [Redacted] could be in political difficulty for failing, during recent talks in Ottawa and Washington, to arrange visits to Canada and the US this spring for President Ceausescu. Andrei did not accompany Ceausescu to Andropov's funeral, as he did to Brezhnev's. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] Andrei may have been saved temporarily because Ceausescu needs expert advice during the transition in Moscow. [Redacted]

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Comment: Andrei is the strongest advocate of closer relations with the West and, as Ceausescu's top foreign policy adviser, has played a major role in developing them. His departure probably would mean reduced emphasis on Romania's ties with the West. Andrei has survived other rumors of his impending political demise, however, and his colleagues have exploited them to urge the US to support Romanian proposals. Moreover, the Soviets dislike Andrei, and he may have been excluded from the funeral delegation primarily to indicate Bucharest's desire for less acrimonious relations with the new regime in Moscow. [Redacted]

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
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INTERNATIONAL: Terrorist Watch

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


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— The Iraqi Kurdish Democratic Party announced on Monday that the two Swiss and Italian technicians kidnaped in Iraq earlier this month will be released if Baghdad agrees to free jailed party members and to end its summary executions of Kurdish prisoners. Baghdad is unlikely to comply with these demands. 

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Europe



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— Some Italian authorities believe the claim of responsibility made by a Red Brigades-related group for the killing of Sinai MNF administrator Hunt in Rome. They cite similarities between the attack and previous operations of the Brigades. The Armed Lebanese Revolutionary Brigades also has claimed credit for Hunt's death, however, and the involvement of Middle Eastern terrorists cannot be ruled out. 

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Special Analysis


MIDDLE EAST: The Next Steps After Lebanon

Syrian President Assad appears increasingly confident he can block US initiatives on the peace process. Jordanian King Hussein is likely to move cautiously in the face of Syrian pressure, and Israel will reject the argument that Jordan has to be strengthened militarily before it can risk steps toward peace. The moderate Arab states deplore Assad's aggressive tactics, but they are intimidated by them and are unlikely to go beyond quiet efforts to promote moderation in Damascus. 


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Assad's sense of victory in Lebanon almost certainly is tempered by the difficulty of avoiding its partition into a Christian minstate allied with Israel and a radical Muslim state potentially supported by Iran and hostile to Syria. He can claim to have stood up to the US and Israel, but he has few positive results to show for nearly eight years of politically unpopular military involvement in Lebanon. The warring Lebanese factions are no closer to resolving their differences than when Syria first intervened. 


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Following a US withdrawal from Lebanon, Assad would be even less likely to back away from his insistence that no settlement can succeed that does not recognize Syria's interests. Despite the fragmentation of the radical coalition—the "Steadfastness Front"—that opposed Egypt's separate peace with Israel, Assad is likely to calculate that Syria acting alone could block any similar peace. He probably believes that Jordan and other moderate states are unwilling to risk Syrian opposition and that the US is unlikely to become militarily involved to defend Jordan against Syrian intimidation. 

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Assad's strategy of holding out for a peace initiative based on a unified Arab position stems from his belief that Israel probably will not make substantial concessions as long as the Arabs negotiate from a position of weakness. In his view, Israel remains bent on territorial expansion. 

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The Syrian leader believes the Camp David accords and the US-Israeli agreement on strategic cooperation have reduced the chances for peace by strengthening the Israelis and dividing the Arab states. He evidently also believes that any further separate peace resolving the status of the West Bank would leave Damascus isolated and would eliminate any chance for Syria to regain the Golan Heights. 

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[Redacted]

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Pressure on Jordan and the PLO

Damascus has responded to the possibility of new talks between Hussein and PLO chief Arafat by mobilizing its resources against the initiative.

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Hussein already seems increasingly nervous about Syrian pressures, and some Jordanians claim that the Syrians are considering military intervention in Jordan. As a result, Hussein is likely to delay taking serious steps toward negotiations if he does not receive advanced US weapons to strengthen Jordan's capability to stand up to Syria.

[Redacted]

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Before entering negotiations, the King also is looking for explicit support from at least the other moderate states. He fears that, in light of Syria's belligerence, the Saudis will be more hesitant about giving him support.

[Redacted]

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Moderate Arab Reactions

Egyptian leaders believe their recent rapprochement with Arafat allows them to play an important role in beginning a new round of talks between Arafat and Hussein, although they probably would not participate directly. President Mubarak will seek opportunities to moderate Syria's behavior, and he seems to believe that, given a chance, he could persuade Assad to become more flexible.

[Redacted]

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Saudi Arabia is unwilling to contest Syria's aggressiveness in the region despite strong misgivings about Syrian policy objectives. The Saudis' decision last week to postpone again the Arab League summit meeting that was scheduled for Riyadh next month underscores their reluctance to confront the Syrians directly on key regional issues, as does their disinclination to push for Egypt's readmission to the Arab League. In the event Syria tried to undermine an agreement between Hussein and Arafat, Riyadh would do little more than lodge private protests with Damascus.

[Redacted]

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The Saudis probably calculate that a confrontation with Syria would hinder their efforts to arrange an accommodation between the Lebanese Government and Syrian-backed opposition elements. Riyadh worries that its opposition to Syria and its ties to the US leave

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it vulnerable to charges of weakening the Arab front against Israel. Recent terrorist attacks on Jordanian and United Arab Emirates diplomats have reawakened longstanding Saudi fears that Syria might sponsor a subversive campaign against Saudi interests abroad.

[Redacted]

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Israel's Strategy

Recent developments in Lebanon represent a major political setback for Prime Minister Shamir's government. Together with the reversal of the "strategic" gains of the war—the expulsion of the PLO and the eclipse of Syrian influence—they will reinforce domestic concerns about the futility of the war and needless loss of Israeli lives. Public disillusionment with the Lebanon issue will undercut support for hardline ministers who favor using force to bring about political change.

[Redacted]

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The Israelis have turned their attention in Lebanon to securing the buffer zone along the border by working out security arrangements with local Shia militias. Even this goal, however, may remain elusive. Despite mounting domestic pressure for an Israeli withdrawal, Tel Aviv would be prepared to keep its forces in southern Lebanon indefinitely if it were unable to work out arrangements to protect its vital security interests.

[Redacted]

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The perceived lack of US support for the accord with Lebanon probably has also damaged US credibility as a peace broker in Israeli eyes. As a result, Tel Aviv is likely to approach future peace talks with Arab states more cautiously and will probably be more demanding with respect to any US assurances as part of a settlement.

[Redacted]

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The Israelis welcome Jordanian participation in the peace process, but they are unlikely to offer concessions that would induce Amman to negotiate. In their talks with US officials they have rejected the argument that a stronger Jordan is more likely to begin talks with Israel.

[Redacted]

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In addition, the Israelis believe more military hardware for Jordan would not deter Syria and could be used at some point against their forces. In Tel Aviv's view, what is needed from Amman for broadened peace negotiations is a commitment by Hussein to the recognition of Israel and to a peace settlement.

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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