



**Director of  
Central  
Intelligence**

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# **National Intelligence Daily**

*Monday  
13 February 1984*

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**USSR: Succession Decision Delayed**

*The failure of the Central Committee to meet over the weekend to ratify a successor—more than 72 hours after General Secretary Andropov's death—may indicate protracted political infighting and bargaining.* 

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The US Embassy reported yesterday that a Politburo consensus to select Chernenko as general secretary was "expected." A Politburo meeting Sunday would formalize the decision—or might already have done so—and a Central Committee plenum would convene today to ratify the choice. An official announcement reportedly would come today. 


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Moscow television on Saturday showed Chernenko preceding the other Politburo members to stand before Andropov's bier, to offer condolences to the family, and to form an honor guard at the bier later in the day. 

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**Comment:** Chernenko's preeminence in the ceremonies on Saturday and the continued private references to Embassy officials to him—and no one else—as the probable choice seem to indicate that he has no serious competition for the top post. Two powerful Politburo members—Defense Minister Ustinov and Foreign Minister Gromyko—reportedly allied with Andropov in 1982 to prevent Chernenko from becoming general secretary. If Chernenko has been chosen for the post now, he probably has come to an accommodation with those two colleagues and, in effect, will share power with them.

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The failure to hold a plenum on Saturday, however, and the evident failure of the Politburo to reach a final decision yesterday, contrasts sharply with the brisk pace of events in November 1982, when a plenum ratified the Politburo's choice the day after Brezhnev's death was announced. If no decision comes today, the Politburo probably is deadlocked. 

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**CHINA-USSR: Attendance at Andropov's Funeral**

*Beijing's decision to send Vice Premier Wan Li to General Secretary Andropov's funeral is meant to probe the new Soviet leadership's attitude toward China.* [Redacted]

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Wan will be the highest-ranking Chinese official to visit Moscow since 1964. Chinese President Li Xiannian and National People's Congress Chairman Peng Zhen also sent a signed message of condolence that stressed the desire of both governments to improve relations. [Redacted]

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**Comment:** The Chinese delegation to the Andropov funeral is at a significantly higher protocol level than that to the Brezhnev funeral in 1982. At that time, China sent its foreign minister and cabled an unsigned note from state leaders. As in 1982, the Chinese are emphasizing the state-to-state, rather than party-to-party, nature of their delegation. [Redacted]

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Wan nonetheless is a Politburo member and has close ties to party leader Deng Xiaoping. Wan plays a significant role in China's foreign policy and represents the younger, reformist wing of the party. By sending Wan, who has not been involved in the Sino-Soviet disputes of the past, China's leaders may hope to set the stage for better relations with the new generation of Soviet leaders. [Redacted]

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The Chinese will watch the Soviet treatment of their delegation carefully. At the Brezhnev funeral, Andropov accorded Foreign Minister Huang special attention. Huang also met with Foreign Minister Gromyko for highly publicized talks on bilateral relations. The Chinese probably expect similar special attention at Andropov's funeral. [Redacted]

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Moscow almost certainly will view Wan's visit as yet another sign of favorable prospects for improved relations. This visit comes after the Chinese invitation to First Deputy Premier Arkhipov to visit Beijing in May. [Redacted]

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**USSR-EASTERN EUROPE: Concern About Balkan Cooperation**

*The USSR has mixed emotions about multilateral cooperation in the Balkans and will keep a close watch on the meeting on regional cooperation this week in Athens, involving diplomats from Greece, Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, and Yugoslavia.* [redacted]

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Moscow supports some aspects of regional cooperation, including a Balkan nuclear weapons-free zone, in hopes of improving its strategic position by encouraging Greece's independent stance toward NATO. The USSR welcomed Prime Minister Papandreou's efforts to delay INF deployments in other West European states, and it hopes he will follow through on promises to have US bases removed eventually from Greece. [redacted]

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The Soviets, however, have long distrusted other aspects of multilateral regional cooperation. They fear these could lead to exclusion of the USSR from important developments in the region. The Bulgarians have felt the need to reassure the Soviets about their participation by emphasizing the security aspects approved by Moscow and playing down cooperation on political, economic, and cultural matters. [redacted]

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**Comment:** The USSR worries that its allies' participation in meetings with NATO and nonaligned countries, especially in the absence of a Soviet supervisory presence, could encourage more independent positions not necessarily in accord with Moscow's interests. Romania is clearly their greatest problem in this regard. Bulgaria also has shown more assertiveness of its national interests in recent years, including a tendency toward increased cooperation with the West in the face of reported Soviet opposition. [redacted]

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The Soviets believe the meeting in Athens is off to a bad start as a result of Turkey's success in moving discussion of the Balkan nuclear weapons-free zone from the focal point of the session to the end of a comprehensive agenda on multilateral cooperation. The experts will first discuss cooperation in a number of economic, scientific, and cultural areas. Turkey, and to a lesser extent Yugoslavia, appears determined to keep future meetings from focusing predominantly on the nuclear weapons-free zone. [redacted]

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**NICARAGUA: Military Construction Activity**

*The Sandinistas are making rapid progress on a major new airbase, and they continue to build facilities for their expanding armed forces.* [Redacted]

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[Redacted] The main runway of nearly 4,000 meters—the longest in Central America—remains in the early phases of construction, but the 2,300-meter parallel taxiway is nearing completion. Sixteen revetted hardstands to protect aircraft are in various stages of construction. [Redacted]

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The defense attache reports that work on La Rosita airfield in northern Zelaya Department resumed in January after being delayed by the rainy season. Cuban engineers reportedly also are helping with this facility. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] the Soviet-staffed hospital near Chinandega is being expanded, and work continues on a major new garrison outside Managua. Meanwhile, two basic training schools were inaugurated earlier this month in Matabalpa, according to Nicaraguan press reports. [Redacted]

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**Comment:** The airfield at Punta Huete apparently is designed as a major combat base, but, at the current pace, it probably will not be complete until 1985 or later. The taxiway, however, could support some limited operations by fighters. The Sandinistas probably have increased construction activity to take advantage of improved weather. [Redacted]

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The new installations and other improvements are necessary to support the growth of the Army. The active duty force has grown by an estimated 10,000 men over the past year to some 35,000. Another 65,000 men are in reserve and militia units. [Redacted]

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**NIGERIA: Critical IMF Talks**

A Nigerian economic team led by Finance Minister Onaolope will reopen negotiations this week in Washington with the International Monetary Fund on Lagos's request for a loan of up to \$2.5 billion. International bankers have linked the rescheduling of some \$2 billion in officially guaranteed, short-term debt and the extension of critical new financing to the outcome of the talks with the Fund. Discussions have been held up since the coup of 31 December while the regime of General Buhari has reviewed the last round of talks between the Fund and the ousted Shagari government. [Redacted]

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**Comment:** Buhari needs to arrange for enough financing to cover essential debt payments, food supplies, industrial raw materials, and spare parts. The question of devaluation is the major stumblingblock to an IMF agreement because Buhari fears that the resulting inflation could spark street riots. A final agreement is unlikely before April, by which time Buhari needs to demonstrate some political and economic accomplishments or risk domestic disillusionment with the coup.

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
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**ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA: Possibly Early Elections**

Prime Minister Bird's government plans to call for general elections in April if a new voter list and plans to redraw constituency boundaries can be completed by then. [Redacted]

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**Comment:** Although elections are not due until mid-1985, the moderate opposition United People's Movement has been steadily gaining strength. Nevertheless, the opposition is underfinanced and unprepared for elections, and the ruling Labor Party, which is better organized, is unlikely to lose its parliamentary majority. Elections in Antigua could initiate a trend in the eastern Caribbean, and other governments—such as Saint Christopher and Nevis and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines—may call for early elections this year to take advantage of similar weaknesses in opposition parties. [Redacted]

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**YUGOSLAVIA-ROMANIA-SPAIN: Comments on Party Split**

Yugoslavia and Romania are criticizing the new pro-Soviet Spanish Communist splinter party and, in varying degrees, Moscow's role in encouraging the split. Belgrade has expressed official regret over the break, which it says weakens the independence of the established Spanish Communist Party. The Yugoslav press charged that the development in Spain is part of a Soviet offensive against Eurocommunism, and it contrasted Moscow's actions with China's good relations with the main Spanish Communist Party. The Romanians also have expressed concern that the split will weaken the Spanish party and have defended the independence and equality of all Communist parties, but they have not directly accused the USSR of complicity. [Redacted]

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**Comment:** Both the Yugoslav and the Romanian regimes are sensitive to what they see as Soviet meddling in the affairs of other parties. They want to reinvigorate Eurocommunist parties, with which they often agree on international issues. Romania and Yugoslavia probably intend to encourage the Spanish Communists to retain their Eurocommunist line, despite their declining political fortunes. [Redacted]

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
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**JORDAN: Water Shortage**

Abnormally low rainfall in Jordan, coupled with the lower water flow into the Jordan Valley's East Ghor Canal, has already destroyed the winter cereal crop, according to government officials. If the shortage persists into spring, the US Embassy expects cereal production for the year to drop by as much as 50 percent and summer vegetable production by more than 90 percent, and farmers may be forced to sell or slaughter sheep and goats. The Jordan Valley Authority has contingency plans to ration water early next month and progressively to curtail crop production. Jordanian and Israeli officials have scheduled a meeting tomorrow to discuss the removal of a sandbar that has obstructed the intake of the East Ghor Canal for the past several months.




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**Comment:** Low rainfall over the entire Yarmuk-Jordan basin this year is more serious for Jordan than for Syria or Israel because of Jordan's small water storage capacity, its reliance on water flowing from Syria, and the lack thus far of water-sharing agreements with Israel. Although a crisis may be avoided for now, Jordan's long-term development plans for the Jordan Valley depend on reaching agreements with Syria and Israel for obtaining adequate amounts of water from the Yarmuk River.



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