




Director of  
Central  
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# National Intelligence Daily

Thursday  
9 February 1984

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
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
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
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**LEBANON: Uneasy Truce**

*Druze leader Junblatt protested US naval bombardment yesterday, but there has been limited reaction from other opposition groups and from Syria.* 


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Junblatt claimed that the shelling resulted in the deaths of 30 people in one Druze village, and he threatened that such actions could drive him to "terrorism." He told the US Ambassador in Damascus that he would be ordering Druze batteries to open fire on US forces. According to the US defense attache in Beirut, the shelling raised morale among Army officers and Christian civilians of East Beirut.



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The reaction in Damascus thus far has been limited to an official military statement condemning the action and claiming that Syrian forces had suffered no casualties.




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Key Sunni and Shia religious leaders issued a joint statement yesterday urging all parties to support the cease-fire in Beirut. Druze and Shia leaders previously had called for a cease-fire and for the protection of all foreign nationals.



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Sunni leaders refused yesterday to go along with Junblatt's call for the resignation of President Gemayel, according to the US Embassy in Damascus. They reportedly want to stop the fighting in Beirut and strongly desire a political settlement without more violence.



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**Comment:** The Sunnis probably would agree to let Gemayel remain president if he appointed a Muslim-dominated cabinet that abrogated the accord of 17 May and ensured that the government and the Army did not exclusively serve Christian interests. The Sunnis benefit from the present confessional distribution of key positions in the government and do not want to see the arrangement altered. The Druze and Shias, however, control the military situation in West Beirut and seem determined to force Gemayel's resignation.



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**Status of Multinational Force**

The Italian Government has decided to redeploy its troops aboard ships gradually over several months, according to the US Embassy. The Italians remain committed to safeguarding the Palestinian refugee camps, however, and Defense Minister Spadolini has

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suggested that some UN forces from southern Lebanon be moved to Beirut to protect the camps. The local Italian commander told the press yesterday that his troops would continue to patrol their area until new orders are received from Rome. [Redacted]

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The French have not yet made a decision about withdrawing their troops, according to Defense Minister Hernu. [Redacted]

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**Comment:** The Italians are anxious to safeguard their own forces, but they believe they have a moral responsibility to make alternative security arrangements for the camps. They are likely to renew their call for consultations with the other MNF contributors. [Redacted]

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The French probably are inclined to pursue their own interests, which they have said are independent of those of the other MNF countries. French forces may remain in their current positions while Paris pushes for a UN presence in Beirut. [Redacted]

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**Soviet Reactions to US Moves**

Soviet media have noted the US announcement of the withdrawal of the Marines from Beirut, but they have focused on the broader rules of engagement for US forces. Moscow claims that Washington is preparing for a "sharp escalation" of US "military interference" in Lebanon. [Redacted]

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**Comment:** Although Moscow has been pushing for the withdrawal of the Multinational Force, it may defer authoritative comment until the fighting in the Beirut area subsides. [Redacted]

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**ROMANIA-US: Foreign Minister's Visit**

*Foreign Minister Andrei, who begins talks in Washington tomorrow, will be upbeat about bilateral relations.* [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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**Comment:** Andrei will try to improve relations with the US, which he claims already are the best in a decade. He probably will urge more high-level consultations, possibly including a visit to Washington by Ceausescu this year. He almost certainly will argue for an end to INF deployments in Western Europe and the reopening of INF negotiations. [Redacted]

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The Romanians fear that East-West tensions over INF will increase Soviet pressure on them for greater conformity. Gromyko may have tried to bring Bucharest more into line, but, if he did so, he probably failed. [Redacted]

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Ceausescu also is facing serious domestic pressures. Food and energy shortages are likely to become more severe as a result of a drought last year that damaged crops and reduced hydroelectric generation. Ceausescu has responded with measures to force farmers and holders of private plots to increase sales to the state and a 50-percent cut in private energy consumption. [Redacted]

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Mild weather has reduced the impact of the restrictions on energy use. On the other hand, the crackdown on private farming and continuing pay cuts for workers who fail to meet unrealistic production quotas will increase social tensions. [Redacted]

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Ceausescu is increasingly being blamed for the country's problems, even by government officials. He evidently can contain the opposition for now, but the potential is growing for more public disturbances that could seriously weaken his authority. [Redacted]

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**USSR-CHINA-US: Soviet Remarks on Sino-US Ties**

*Unusually sympathetic remarks by Soviet officials about Beijing's policy toward the US suggest that the USSR will not let the recent warming in Sino-US ties interfere with its encouragement of better relations with China.* [Redacted]

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USA-Canada Institute staff member Lukin claimed in the institute's journal last month that the high-level contacts between the US and China last fall were not a dramatic new development. He described China as "socialist" and resistant to US attempts to form a strategic partnership against the USSR. According to Lukin, China wants "mutually advantageous cooperation" with the US, "just as with other countries." [Redacted]

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Igor Rogachev, the chief of the China Department at the Soviet Foreign Ministry, took a similar approach recently with US diplomats. He claimed that Premier Zhao's trip to Washington last month took place in a subdued atmosphere, in comparison with the visit by Deng Xiaoping in 1979. [Redacted]

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**Comment:** Most of Moscow's recent comments on Sino-US relations have been more critical of Beijing, reinforcing the impression that Lukin and Rogachev are moderate spokesmen among the USSR's divided China analysts. There long have been conflicting views in Moscow on this subject, and both officials may have exaggerated their positive attitude at this time to influence a policy debate. [Redacted]

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The Soviets see their relations with China as closely linked to Sino-US ties, and the warming between China and the US may have rekindled the debate among Soviet experts. Lukin complained privately last fall about his inability to publish on this topic. The ability of the moderates to express themselves in print again suggests that Moscow is confident its efforts to promote a gradual improvement in relations with Beijing are on course. [Redacted]

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**UK: Controversy Over Ban on Union**

*Prime Minister Thatcher continues to face embarrassment over the government's mishandling of a ban on union membership at its signals intelligence headquarters.* [Redacted]

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Some Conservatives have joined the Labor Party and the unions in criticizing the ban. Members of Parliament have attacked a reported decision by Thatcher that the current head of the Government Communications Headquarters not be permitted to testify before a select committee of the House of Commons. Former US and British officials also have contradicted the Prime Minister's claim that Washington did not urge the ban. [Redacted]

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Thatcher reportedly is especially displeased with Foreign Secretary Howe's inept handling of the matter. Howe had available a list of union disruptions at the headquarters to justify London's action, but he did not adduce it until after opposition to the ban had grown. [Redacted]

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The Prime Minister is to meet again with union leaders this week. She is under pressure to lift the ban on union membership and settle for a no-strike pledge and union agreement to stronger security procedures. [Redacted]

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**Comment:** Thatcher apparently made her decision without consulting other cabinet members or the unions and without gauging sentiment among Tory MPs. Her evident surprise at the strong reaction is likely to increase speculation that she is becoming less adept at sensing backbench sentiment. [Redacted]

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Many of those criticizing the government's position apparently believe that it was prompted by the US. The decision to block testimony in Parliament by the Director of GCHQ probably will encourage more speculation that he might discuss the US role in ways Thatcher would find embarrassing. [Redacted]

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Thatcher will be reluctant to back away from the ban, especially since some employees have agreed to leave the union. Nonetheless, she may agree to consider alternatives that would allow her to claim that security objectives have been met. [Redacted]

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
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### Status of South African Presence in Angola



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**SOUTH AFRICA-ANGOLA: Disengagement of Forces**

The status of the withdrawal of South African forces from southern Angola, which Pretoria said would begin on 31 January, remains unclear. [Redacted]

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South African infantry force, anti-aircraft guns, and three helicopters are still at Xangongo, where a pontoon ferry on the Cunene River was observed in operation last week. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] South African troops have left Cuvelai. A senior South African official reports that offensive operations in Angola have ceased but that reconnaissance patrols in Angola have been attacked by SWAPO forces on two occasions since 31 January. The official also says that tanks and other new equipment are being sent to bases in Namibia as a contingency. [Redacted]

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**Comment** [Redacted]

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month. The continued operation of the ferry at Xangongo indicates that reconnaissance units may be active on the west side of the Cunene River. [Redacted]

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**USSR-AFGHANISTAN-PAKISTAN: Growing Military Pressure**

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[Redacted] Last week the Soviet Ambassador publicly accused Pakistan of arming, training, and providing base camps for Afghan insurgents. He had warned in a press interview in December that Kabul and Moscow would take joint action if needed to end Islamabad's support for the resistance. [Redacted]

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**Comment:** The Soviets presumably are trying to intimidate Pakistan into restraining insurgent infiltration. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted] If Pakistan ignores the threats, the Soviets will have to consider whether military pressure along the border would prompt Islamabad to curtail infiltration or merely give President Zia additional domestic and international support. [Redacted]

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


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
**SOMALIA-ETHIOPIA: Tense Relations**

Somali President Siad apparently is trying to reduce the fallout from recent operations by Somali-backed, anti-Ethiopian dissidents. Two attacks by the Western Somali Liberation Front on the rail line between Djibouti and Addis Ababa in January provoked two retaliatory Ethiopian airstrikes on northwestern Somali border towns, inflicting heavy civilian casualties. Siad reportedly has ruled out retaliatory actions by the Somali military because of the overwhelming superiority of Ethiopian forces. Djiboutian President Gouled has complained to both Ethiopia and Somalia about the economic impact on Djibouti of the disruption in rail service, and he has asked the US to use its influence to prevent additional attacks. 

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**Comment:** Siad probably will direct the dissidents to attack less sensitive targets to avoid provoking further Ethiopian attacks and to head off criticism from Somalia's—and Djibouti's—Western backers. The Ogadeni tribes that form the Front's popular base provide important political backing to Siad, however, and he would be reluctant to place blanket restrictions on its activities. Moreover, the Front has at times resisted Mogadishu's efforts at control, despite its heavy dependence on the Somali military for funding, equipment, and training. 

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**CHINA: Offer To Store Spent Nuclear Fuel**

China's offer to provide long-term storage for spent fuel from nuclear power reactors appears cost-competitive and probably will be attractive to a number of countries. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] Spain, Switzerland, Austria, and West Germany are among the potential customers. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] the contracts Beijing is offering do not contain any restrictions on China's use of the spent fuel, which in effect would become Chinese property. [Redacted]

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**Comment:** The spent fuel cannot be transferred or altered without the approval of the US, Canadian, French, or Soviet Governments. These governments probably will require that the fuel continue to be under IAEA safeguards, and they will require explicit guarantees that China would not reprocess the fuel or use it for military purposes. In the past, Beijing has refused to provide such assurances. [Redacted]

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
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


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**MOZAMBIQUE: Need for Disaster Relief**


The US Embassy in Maputo, in assessing the damage caused by the typhoon that hit southern Africa late last month, reports that heavy flooding in southern Mozambique resulted in more than 100 deaths, the devastation of cattle herds, and the destruction of crops. Even if enough seed were available for rapid replanting, the Embassy estimates that at least \$20-25 million worth of food assistance would be required until the next harvest in April 1985. 

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**Comment:** The damage will aggravate catastrophic economic conditions in the south, where two years of severe drought has caused 100,000 people to starve to death and has made 300,000 others dependent on foreign disaster relief. This latest disaster probably will prompt President Machel to increase his efforts to seek political accommodation with South Africa and the West—the only sources of significant development and food assistance. 

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## **Special Analysis**

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### **LEBANON: The Next Steps**

*President Gemayel has few political alternatives to help him stave off the collapse of his regime. Despite resistance from hardline Christians, he has no choice but to make concessions to Damascus and to his Muslim opponents. Opposition to his leadership, however, is increasing from all sides. In the rapidly deteriorating security situation, Gemayel could be forced to resign.* 


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Gemayel's only realistic choice is to select a prime minister acceptable to his Syrian-backed opponents and form a government of national unity with a mandate to undertake political reform. The first act of such a government probably would be the abrogation of the troop withdrawal accord with Israel. 


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At the same time, the President does not want to move closer to the Syrians. He fears that Damascus will insist on substantial revisions to the confessional arrangement reached in 1943 that established Christian hegemony in Lebanon. 


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At this point, however, the prospect of forming a government of national unity may have evaporated. Gemayel has equivocated for so long on the question of political concessions to his Muslim opponents that the growing violence may make it impossible for any Muslim to form a government under his presidency. 


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Gemayel may try to avoid pressures to alter Lebanon's confessional balance by seeking a deal with Syria that would make Damascus the guarantor of Christian preeminence in Lebanon. Syria might be prepared to accept this arrangement if enough concessions were made to its interests. Damascus almost certainly would insist on at least some political reforms, however, to retain credibility with its Lebanese allies. 

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Such a solution would approximate the circumstances in 1976. At that time, Syrian troops were invited into Lebanon by the Christian government of President Franjijah. 

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If Gemayel should refuse to seek Syrian protection, he might make a last-ditch effort to stay in office by invoking emergency powers and forming a multiconfessional military government. This strategy, however, would collapse if the Army disintegrated. 

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
**The Succession Problem**

If Gemayel chooses or is forced to resign, he has no obvious successor. Under the constitution, the prime minister and his cabinet exercise executive authority until the parliament is convened to elect a new president. 


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Before resigning, Gemayel would try to continue the tradition of a Christian head of state by naming a Maronite prime minister. In 1952 President Khoury named Maronite Army Commander Shihab as Prime Minister. 


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Domestic opponents have not seriously challenged the concept of a Maronite presidency. The Syrian-backed Lebanese National Salvation Front last week nominated former President Franjijah, a longtime Syrian ally, as its candidate to succeed Gemayel. Although Christian Phalange party members and Lebanese Forces militiamen would challenge Franjijah's candidacy, they probably are too weak to impose their own candidate. 

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If Gemayel were to designate a Maronite prime minister, that choice would be seen as the Christian candidate for the presidency. There are several possible civilian candidates who would be more acceptable to Christian hardliners than many of the traditional politicians who have been more closely identified with Syria. One is Michel Khoury, president of the Lebanese Central Bank and son of Lebanon's first president after independence. 

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Gemayel might turn to an Army officer, however, as was done in 1952. Army Commander Tannous probably wants the position, but he is likely to be unacceptable to the Shia and Druze because of Army actions in West and southern Beirut. General Faris, Gemayel's military adviser, is another possibility. 

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**The View From Damascus**

The Syrians now have the difficult task of maintaining pressure on Gemayel and the Army without provoking full-scale civil war or political collapse. President Assad will continue to press for abrogation of the agreement of 17 May and for political reforms giving Lebanese Muslims substantially greater power. He will stop short, however, of trying to eliminate Christian preeminence. 

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The Syrians do not want Muslim victories to result in the division of Lebanon into a Christian ministate dependent on Israel and a Muslim rump state that would be potentially fundamentalist or radical. Syria intervened militarily in Lebanon in 1976 to support the

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Christians and to stop the alliance of Lebanese leftists and Palestinians from achieving victory. In the current crisis, Damascus would be likely to act to prevent a complete political and military defeat for the Christians. [Redacted]

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In the near term, continuing Shia, Druze, and Sunni pressure on the government serves Assad's purpose in forcing Gemayel to compromise. Over the longer term, however, Damascus will have to rein in its allies. [Redacted]

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Syrian and Iranian interests ultimately will diverge. Shia radicals supported by Tehran could then begin opposing the Syrians. [Redacted]

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