



Director of  
Central  
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# National Intelligence Daily

*Wednesday*  
*25 January 1984*

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
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


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
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
**USSR-US: Andropov's Response to President's Speech**

*General Secretary Andropov—again using the format of answering questions from Pravda—responded yesterday to President Reagan's speech of 16 January by affirming that the USSR also is ready to engage in a dialogue, but he indicated no Soviet movement on the stalled INF and START talks.* 


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Andropov prefaced his remarks by asserting that the nuclear danger in Europe has increased and that the world situation has become "acute and dangerous" as a result of US actions. He then stated that the USSR believes in the utility of a dialogue but that it should be conducted on an equal footing and directed at achieving specific accords. The Soviet leader accused the US of seeking to negotiate from strength and of offering no new ideas or proposals. 


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As possible bases for improving East-West relations, Andropov repeated Soviet proposals that the US duplicate the USSR's pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, that NATO accept the Warsaw Pact proposal for a nonaggression pact, that efforts be made to prevent an arms race in outer space, that NATO accede to Soviet proposals at the MBFR talks, and that the US agree to a freeze on nuclear arms. In addition, as a condition for resuming talks on nuclear weapons in Europe, Andropov repeated the standard demand that the West display readiness to return to the situation existing before the start of US missile deployments. 


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**Comment:** Andropov's statement appears designed to avoid polemics and affirm a willingness to engage in a dialogue. It does not, however, offer any departure from previous Soviet positions. 

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The statement also is designed to present a constructive image regarding those negotiations in which the Soviets are willing to participate, while holding firm on their INF and START positions. The Soviets probably hope that West Europeans will now view the US as responsible for making the next move to improve East-West relations. 

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The use of the question-and-answer format has again enabled Andropov to act as the USSR's ultimate spokesman on policy without having to make a personal appearance. 

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**EGYPT-JORDAN-PLO: Diplomatic Activity**

*Egypt is trying to arrange an agreement between Jordan and the PLO, even though it is uncertain about its readmission to the Islamic Conference.* [Redacted]

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A senior adviser to President Mubarak told a US Embassy official that Cairo's effort is intended to facilitate early negotiations with Israel, in spite of the US election campaign and the PLO's preoccupation with its internal problems. The adviser said that King Hussein and PLO Chairman Arafat had agreed to Egyptian mediation and that an Egyptian-Jordanian-PLO meeting might take place this spring. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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The Egyptian adviser said Arafat would return to Cairo in March. According to the Embassy, Hussein concluded after a recent telephone conversation with Mubarak that the Egyptian President probably would visit Amman and Baghdad. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted] The adviser indicated Egypt would not accept any invitation from the Islamic Conference that would cast doubt on its commitment to the Camp David accords. [Redacted]

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**Comment:** Cairo will continue to promote a comprehensive Arab-Israeli settlement and assert its regional leadership, regardless of whether it rejoins the Islamic Conference. Arafat's meeting last month with Mubarak strengthened the confidence of Egyptian leaders in the peace process and their own role in it. [Redacted]

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Egypt is refusing to endorse past resolutions by the Islamic Conference—as required by the Casablanca summit—partly to avoid complicating its relations with the US and Israel. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] some face-saving formula for Cairo to rejoin the organization may yet be worked out. [Redacted]

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**WARSAW PACT: Military Exercise Announced**

*The Czechoslovak news agency on Friday announced that a major Warsaw Pact exercise involving Soviet, Czechoslovak, and Hungarian units will be held early next month.* [Redacted]

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The press release, [Redacted]

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[Redacted] states that the military exercise—Druzhiba-84—will take place in northwestern Czechoslovakia on 6-11 February. The announced objective of the maneuvers is “to test cooperation between commanders and units of allied armies in winter conditions.” [Redacted]

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The Druzhiba series has been held every winter since 1972, initially involving Soviet and Czechoslovak units. Hungarian units began to participate in 1982. [Redacted]

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The announcement did not specify troop figures. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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**Comment:** Because the announcement comes less than the 21 days before the event required by the Helsinki Accords and provides no troop figures, the exercise presumably will not meet the 25,000-troop notification level. The Czechoslovaks announced Druzhiba exercises in 1979 and 1982 as involving 25,000 troops or more, but announcements of exercises not meeting that threshold are optional.

[Redacted]

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**ECUADOR: Presidential Election**

*The presidential election on Sunday, which is likely to require a runoff, probably will be respected by the military—particularly if the conservative candidate remains in contention.* [Redacted]

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Frontrunner Leon Febres Cordero heads a coalition of five conservative parties, and he is followed in a field of nine candidates by center-leftist Rodrigo Borja. Recent polls indicate that both men are losing ground. If no candidate wins a majority, a runoff will be held in May between the two top contenders. [Redacted]

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Febres Cordero has advocated a free market approach and austerity measures in a campaign otherwise characterized by populist rhetoric and antigovernment diatribes. No candidate has presented a comprehensive economic program, and most support more government intervention and social spending. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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**Comment:** President Hurtado, who is ineligible for reelection, may have encouraged caution by interventionist-minded officers through his adept handling of coup plotting last year. Real or perceived fraud could prompt the military to consider stepping in, however, particularly if Febres Cordero is eliminated. [Redacted]

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A runoff between a conservative and a center-leftist would provide a clear-cut ideological choice but would help polarize the voters. This would make it more difficult to fashion a nonpartisan approach to the country's economic problems. [Redacted]

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**PORTUGAL: Abortion Issue**

*The current debate in the National Assembly on liberalizing abortion is likely to weaken the Socialist-Social Democratic coalition.*

[Redacted]

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The Assembly will vote on two bills, one introduced by the opposition Communists, the other by the Socialists. Although the Socialist proposal removes legal sanctions against abortion only in three special cases, the Social Democrats oppose it. The Communists say that, if their measure fails, they will support the Socialist bill.

[Redacted]

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The conservative opposition Center Democrats reject both bills and have hinted at presenting a censure motion against the government. The Catholic Church also has condemned both bills and is holding protest rallies.

[Redacted]

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**Comment:** Last November the coalition partners had agreed to put off dealing with this issue. Socialist Prime Minister Soares is caught between the strongly proabortion faction of his own party and his antiabortion coalition partner. He apparently is gambling that addressing the issue now is less likely to split the coalition than later, when public discontent over tight economic policies will have grown and the presidential election will be closer.

[Redacted]

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Soares may have underestimated the depth of antiabortion emotion among the Social Democrats. The government's handling of the issue could provoke a challenge to Deputy Prime Minister Mota Pinto's leadership of the Social Democrats at the party's congress in March.

[Redacted]

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To survive, Mota Pinto might be forced to pull his party out of the government. Even if the coalition remains intact, however, the divisions created over the issue will impair the government's overall effectiveness.

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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**USSR: Gromyko on Andropov's Health**

A senior Western foreign policy official reports that Foreign Minister Gromyko told the Yugoslav Foreign Secretary in Stockholm last week that General Secretary Andropov is recovering from a long-term kidney problem. Gromyko said that Andropov is in better shape than he was a few months ago but that he still is not in physical condition to move around. Although Gromyko emphasized that Andropov is back at work and active in decisionmaking, the Soviet leader is spending only a few hours a day at his desk and avoiding all ceremonial activities. [redacted]

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**Comment:** This is the first known discussion of Andropov's kidney problem by a top member of the leadership. Gromyko made his remarks on the same day that the chief editor of *Pravda* mentioned the kidney problem to a US television interviewer, and this timing suggests a high-level decision to be more forthcoming. The editor predicted that Andropov would show up in about two weeks, during preparations for elections to the Supreme Soviet, but Gromyko's remarks indicate that Andropov might not be able to appear by then. The elections are not until 4 March, however, and the General Secretary customarily makes a speech to his designated election district only a day or two before the voting. [redacted]

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**NATO: Compromise on CDE Policy**

NATO members have put aside remaining differences on proposed confidence and security building measures, clearing the way for the West to present its package this week in Stockholm. The UK and West Germany last Friday bowed to US pressure and dropped their demands that the measures include prior notification of non-European forces that transit through Europe. On Monday Turkey agreed to compromise language proposed by the US on the level of information to be exchanged on military forces. [redacted]

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**Comment:** The willingness of the Allies to defer to Washington on the transit issue almost certainly will end if the East demands that transiting forces be included in notification provisions. Moreover, Western delegates have not yet begun to formulate a response to the proposals advanced by Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and his East European counterparts last week, and deliberations will be difficult. Many NATO members and most neutral and nonaligned countries favor an agreement on nonuse of force and constraints on military activities—ideas advanced by the East that the US opposes. [redacted]


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**LEBANON: Druze Position on Security Plan**

Druze leader Walid Junblatt may have dropped his opposition to the proposed Lebanese security plan. In a meeting with US officials in Damascus on Monday, an aide to Junblatt said the Lebanese National Salvation Front was willing to resume talks on the plan with Lebanese Government representatives and officials of the Christian Lebanese Forces militia. The aide noted that Junblatt, as a goodwill gesture, had ordered an end to shelling by Druze forces so long as actions by the Lebanese Army do not reach the "intolerable" levels of last week.



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**Comment:** Junblatt's new position contrasts with his recent statements criticizing Gemayel and threatening a return to full-scale civil war. It probably reflects his desire to forestall a possible assault by the Army against Druze forces along the Alayh ridgeline. The Druze have been hurt by US naval gunfire in the past, and they probably fear that the US would become involved in any move by the Army. The more conciliatory attitude also may be the result of Syria's efforts to avert greater US military involvement.



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
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**Special Analysis**

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**CYPRUS: Prospects for Negotiations**

*Both the Greek and Turkish Cypriots have proposed plans in the past two weeks aimed toward a solution of the Cyprus problem. Each is offering a complex blend of previously held positions, many of which each knows will be unacceptable to the other, and currently there are no indications that compromise is possible on fundamental issues. Even so, there are hints of accommodations that might get the protagonists talking. Negotiations are likely to begin in earnest, however, only if a third party assumes the responsibility for organizing and directing them and if the two sides demonstrate the requisite political will.* [Redacted]

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The "goodwill" proposals announced by Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash on 2 January, and the somewhat more ambitious plan for a settlement proposed by Cypriot President Kyprianou during his trip to the US earlier this month, represent little change in mutually exclusive positions that have surfaced in one form or another since Cyprus gained independence in 1960. The two proposals reflect longstanding disagreements about the structure of a unified government, the amount of land to be controlled by each side, basic freedoms and human rights, economic issues, internal security, the presence of foreign troops, and even the nature of a federal state. Some 15 years of intercommunal talks, and a major initiative pushed by the US, Canada, and the UK in 1978, have failed to break the deadlock. [Redacted]

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The gulf between the two sides has widened since last November, when the Turkish Cypriots declared independence. The Greek Cypriots claim they will not negotiate or agree to a summit until UN Resolution 541, which, in part, demands a rollback of Turkish Cypriot independence, is fully implemented. The Turkish Cypriots insist they will not rescind the declaration of independence as a condition for talks. [Redacted]

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**Signs of Flexibility**

The outlook is not completely bleak. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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The Turkish Cypriots continue to insist that, now that they have asserted their independence, they are more willing to bargain. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Both sides, moreover, recently have hinted at flexibility on the status of Varosha and the Nicosia airport. These two particularly difficult issues may hold the key to serious talks about more far-reaching matters. [redacted]

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Agreement on Greek resettlement of Varosha—an area vacated by the Greeks and controlled by the Turks, but for the most part closed to settlement by Turkish Cypriots since 1974—is likely to hold the greatest potential for breakthrough. Accord probably could be reached without the Greek Cypriots having to recognize the Denktash state and without the Turkish Cypriots having to renounce independence. In addition, it now appears that the Turks would be willing to allow UN control of a section of Varosha to commence followed by the start of negotiations on the question of Greek Cypriot resettlement of the area. [redacted]

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Agreement is also possible, although perhaps less likely, on reopening Nicosia airport, which has been closed and occupied by the UN since 1974. As in the case of Varosha, a compromise on the airport would not have to impinge on the questions of sovereignty and independence. [redacted]

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If some progress could be made on these matters, it might then be possible to begin negotiations on the more fundamental questions. At that stage, the major sticking point would be whether the two sides could agree on the modalities of negotiating. [redacted]

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The Turkish side believes that the long-dormant intercommunal talks can and should be revived. According to the Greek side, however, the Turkish Cypriot declaration of independence required a change in approach that draws in the international community. There is no evidence that the two sides are ready to stop talking past each other on procedural questions. [redacted]

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### **Need for a Third Party**

If the impasse is to be broken at all, it will not be done without the direct intervention of a strong third party acceptable to both sides. The UN, the US, and the UK would be the most likely to win the necessary support. UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar is working to get talks started, but he is unlikely to succeed. [redacted]

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The UK would appear capable of playing an effective third party role. It has the most experience in the area and a permanent presence on the island. [redacted]

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As a first step toward a settlement, the UK has offered to convene talks with Greece and Turkey, the other two guarantors of Cypriot independence. Athens, however, thus far has blocked a guarantors'

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meeting. The Government of Cyprus has not rejected a direct British role, but it has shown little interest in London's proposal.



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