



Director of  
Central  
Intelligence

~~Top Secret~~

25X1

OCPAS/CTG

CY# 285

25X1

# National Intelligence Daily

*Saturday*  
*21 January 1984*

~~Top Secret~~

CPAS NID 84-017JX

21 January 1984

25X1

Copy 285

**Page Denied**

**Top Secret**



25X1

**Contents**

---

**Israel-Lebanon: Pressure for Another Pullback** ..... 1



25X1

**Eastern Europe-USSR: Concerns About Leadership** ..... 3



25X1

**El Salvador: Military Preparations** ..... 5



25X1

**Philippines: Opposition Issues Ultimatum** ..... 7

**Poland-US: Reaction to Relaxed Sanctions** ..... 8



25X1

**Nigeria-US: New Regime Seeking Support** ..... 9

**South Africa-Angola: Military and Political Developments** .... 10

**South Africa-Mozambique: Optimism on Talks** ..... 10

**Morocco: More Unrest** ..... 11

**North Korea-US-South Korea: P'yongyang's Motives** ..... 11



25X1

**Top Secret**



25X1


21 January 1984



25X1

Top Secret

25X1



25X1

Top Secret

21 January 1984

25X1

**Top Secret**



25X1

**ISRAEL-LEBANON: Pressure for Another Pullback**

*The Israeli military apparently favors at least a partial withdrawal from southern Lebanon, and government officials reportedly believe that Israel will have to pull back its forces if the US withdraws its contingent from Beirut.*



25X1

A respected Israeli journalist says Israeli military leaders are dissatisfied with mounting guerrilla attacks on their forces in the south and the lack of progress in negotiating an extension of Lebanese Army authority into the Kharrub region and then into Sidon.



25X1

The Israeli coordinator for Lebanese affairs, Uri Lubrani, recently said he believes the US will withdraw its contingent from Lebanon between May and July. According to Lubrani, Israeli public opinion will then force either a partial or a full Israeli withdrawal. He added that another spectacular terrorist attack against Israeli forces could lead to an earlier pullback.




25X1

Lubrani stressed that Israel is trying to arrange agreements leading to the resumption of Lebanese Government authority in those areas vacated. He believes, however, that ultimately Lebanon will be cantonized.



25X1

**Comment:** The Israeli military probably would prefer to leave Lebanon completely rather than just pull back. Another partial withdrawal would require substantial investment in new facilities and would not result in appreciably fewer casualties.



25X1

If the Lebanese Army still refuses to move outside the greater Beirut area by May, however, Tel Aviv will be likely to make its own security arrangements with the local population and move its forces at least to the Zahrani River. It also might try to carry out a partial disengagement from the Bekaa Valley.



25X1



**Top Secret**



21 January 1984

25X1

25X1

**Page Denied**

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied

**Top Secret**

25X1

**EASTERN EUROPE-USSR: Concerns About Leadership**

*East European officials appear concerned that General Secretary Andropov's illness has made the Soviet leadership indecisive, and some reportedly fear this has allowed military leaders to assume a more active role in foreign policy.* [redacted]

25X1

Polish officials claim that uncertainty over Andropov's health is affecting the USSR's behavior toward Eastern Europe. One says that the Soviets seem unsure how to manage bilateral relations and that progress on some issues has stalled. Another says the Soviets have not been exercising their usual direction of aid provided by CEMA to Third World countries. [redacted]

25X1

Hungarian party leader Kadar reportedly is uncertain about who is in charge in Moscow and about continued Soviet support of Hungary's innovative policies. An official in Budapest says some Hungarians believe that the Soviet military has moved into a power vacuum created by Andropov's illness and that it is playing a more direct role in formulating policy. [redacted]

25X1

A retired Polish official claims that greater involvement in decisionmaking by military leaders worries East Europeans, who prefer a more conciliatory approach to East-West problems. He hints that East German leader Honecker expressed similar concerns last fall in discussions with Polish leaders. [redacted]

25X1

**Comment:** Andropov's continued predominance in the Politburo is evident, despite his failure to appear in public. The Soviet General Staff traditionally has an influential voice in Politburo decisions where national security responsibilities are concerned, but there is no evidence from Soviet sources that Andropov's illness has increased their influence. The current deterioration in East-West relations probably results more from the shutdown of the South Korean airliner, INF deployments, and other events than from a shift of influence in the leadership. [redacted]

25X1

East European worries about growing East-West tensions centering on INF deployments are made worse by uncertainty about the situation in Moscow. An apparent lack of decisive Soviet leadership also could have important implications for policymaking by the East Europeans. Normally cautious leaders like Czechoslovakia's President Husak may be even less inclined to undertake new initiatives, while Romania's President Ceausescu and others may see an opportunity for more vigorous pursuit of separate national interests. [redacted]

25X1

**Top Secret**

25X1

**Page Denied**

Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied



**Top Secret**

[Redacted]

25X1

**EL SALVADOR: Military Preparations**

*The presidential election scheduled for late March is increasingly motivating both the government and the guerrillas to undertake military operations.* [Redacted]

25X1

Press reports indicate that the Army yesterday launched a major sweep of southern Usulután Department—long an insurgent base area and arms transshipment point. The US defense attache had reported before the sweep began that senior Army leaders were considering committing two immediate-reaction battalions to such an operation. According to the attache, however, most Army units currently are resting and refitting. [Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

The most significant of several scattered clashes during the week was a guerrilla probe against the railroad bridge across the Lempa River. To strengthen the security of another key transportation link to the east, the attache reports some 375 National Guard personnel have been stationed at the San Lorenzo Dam. [Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

**Comment:** The Army operation in Usulután probably initiates the next phase of the government's "national campaign," which began last summer in San Vicente. By dislodging the guerrillas from their base areas and following up with civic action programs, the government apparently hopes to encourage a large voter turnout, demonstrate its control over the countryside, and underscore its commitment to reforms. [Redacted]

25X1

The sabotage of the Cuscatlán Bridge on 1 January increasingly appears to have been the opening move in a rebel plan to isolate the east. Destruction of the railroad bridge or the seizure of the dam—in addition to giving the insurgents a psychological victory—would make it much more difficult for the government to reinforce the region during major attacks. [Redacted]

25X1

**Top Secret**

[Redacted]

25X1

**Page Denied**

**Top Secret**

[Redacted]

25X1

**PHILIPPINES: Opposition Issues Ultimatum**

*All major opposition groups earlier this week signed a statement demanding that President Marcos make major political reforms before 14 February or else face a boycott of the National Assembly elections scheduled for May.* [Redacted]

25X1

The statement was published in Manila's newspapers. It is a comprehensive list of demands aimed at limiting Marcos's presidential decreemaking powers, ensuring that the conduct of the elections is fair, and guaranteeing that the new Assembly will have actual legislative power. [Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

**Comment:** Despite earlier disagreements on a boycott, opposition groups are gambling that Marcos's need for their participation in the elections will overcome his reluctance to grant major political reforms. He has shown no indication thus far of meeting the opposition's new demands, however, and he probably will not do so before the deadline. As a result, political parties that otherwise plan to take part in the elections may be forced to join a boycott in order to retain their standing as members of the opposition. [Redacted]

25X1

As the deadline approaches, Marcos is likely to respond with minor concessions. [Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

A boycott would benefit the Communist Party of the Philippines. The party has been supporting the boycott movement through its own political front groups and through moderate opposition alliances it has penetrated. If a boycott occurs, it also will demonstrate the ineffectiveness of legal reform strategies advocated by the moderates and will intensify political polarization. [Redacted]

25X1

**Top Secret**

[Redacted]

25X1

**Top Secret**

[Redacted]

25X1

**POLAND-US: Reaction to Relaxed Sanctions**

*Polish commentators have dismissed as insignificant recent US steps to ease sanctions, and the regime probably will continue to work for the removal of all sanctions.* [Redacted]

25X1

The Polish news agency claimed yesterday that, despite the US moves, Washington continues an unfriendly and "illegitimate" policy and still seeks to complicate Poland's economic difficulties. It said that restoration of normal relations requires an end to economic and financial restrictions, and it demanded that the US compensate Poland for losses caused by the sanctions. [Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

**Comment:** The Poles are likely to use the latest US moves to bring additional pressure on the West Europeans. The authorities also will continue to show some moderation in domestic policies in order to improve their image in the West. The regime's hesitation about bringing 11 former Solidarity leaders to trial and its apparent willingness to consider seriously the church's proposal for private aid to agriculture probably reflect Warsaw's hope to restore more normal political and economic ties with the West. [Redacted]

25X1

**Top Secret**

[Redacted]


25X1

**Page Denied**

**Top Secret**




25X1



25X1


**NIGERIA-US: New Regime Seeking Support**

The newly appointed Foreign Minister, in his first meeting with US Embassy officials, asserted that Lagos is looking to Washington for support and needs help in achieving a foreign policy "triumph" to improve its domestic standing. The Embassy reports that most civilians in the cabinet, particularly those heading the key petroleum and finance ministries, lack experience and are not even leaders in their own fields. Meanwhile, the government announced that it has more than 460 former officials in custody, and it issued a decree enabling it to hold persons suspected of malfeasance for up to six months without trial. 

25X1

**Comment:** The composition of the cabinet could reflect in part an attempt to install politically untainted people. Most of the better qualified Nigerians, however, probably were reluctant to become associated with a government whose prospects are uncertain. In any case, the paucity of experienced civilians in top posts will complicate the task of economic recovery. The number of former officials being detained apparently has declined, suggesting that the regime has finished its initial screening and will proceed with arraignments soon.

25X1



**Top Secret**



25X1

**Page Denied**

**Top Secret**  
[Redacted]

25X1

**SOUTH AFRICA-ANGOLA: Military and Political Developments**

[Redacted]

25X1

25X1

[Redacted] the US Embassy reports that Foreign Minister Botha on Thursday rejected the Angolan reply to Pretoria's offer of a cease-fire beginning on 31 January because Luanda linked it to a settlement on Namibia. The Embassy believes that Botha left open the option of a unilateral South African withdrawal. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

**Comment:** [Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted] South Africa's public rejection of Angola's counterproposal lays the groundwork for Pretoria to delay completing its withdrawal or possibly to retract its cease-fire offer. [Redacted]

25X1

**SOUTH AFRICA-MOZAMBIQUE: Optimism on Talks**

US diplomats report that South African and Mozambican officials are pleased with the working group discussions held earlier this week in Pretoria and Maputo. Although both sides indicate that the economic talks went well, results in this area depend on achieving agreement on the removal of African National Congress guerrillas from Mozambique and on verification procedures. South Africa wants to take two or three weeks to consider Mozambique's proposal for a nonaggression pact, but Maputo hopes to persuade Pretoria to act more quickly. Meanwhile, the Mozambican National Resistance is threatening to intensify attacks on economic targets in Mozambique unless it is included in the discussions. [Redacted]

25X1

**Comment:** Continued progress toward rapprochement hinges largely on resolving differences over South African support for the insurgents and the use of Mozambique for sanctuary by the African National Congress. Either insurgent group could launch attacks that would strengthen the position of suspicious hardliners in Pretoria and Maputo. Mozambican moderates apparently believe that delaying negotiations increases the risk that the talks might be disrupted. [Redacted]

25X1

**Top Secret**  
[Redacted]


25X1



Top Secret

25X1

### Unrest in Morocco



701238 1-84

Top Secret

25X1

21 January 1984

**Top Secret**  
[Redacted]

25X1

**MOROCCO: More Unrest**

Isolated incidents of violence—most caused by students—continue, and Army troops have intervened in some areas to restore order. The US defense attache in Rabat says regular Army units were airlifted yesterday to several towns in the north, and the US Consulate in Tangier reports that clashes between troops and demonstrators in Tetouan have resulted in substantial casualties. [Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

**Comment:** The use of the regular Army to maintain order indicates the regime's growing concern that the situation is getting out of hand. Incidents thus far do not appear to be coordinated, but there has been an increase in Islamic fundamentalist agitation. As long as incidents remain isolated, security forces probably can maintain control. If disorder spreads throughout the country, however, the government will face hard choices involving price rollbacks and the more extensive use of military force. [Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

**NORTH KOREA-US-SOUTH KOREA: P'yongyang's Motives**

The North Korean party newspaper yesterday published an authoritative article that underscores P'yongyang's intent to use its recent proposal for tripartite talks as a way to initiate direct discussions with the US on troop withdrawals. The North states that, before there is a dialogue between the two Koreas on reunification, a peace treaty ensuring the withdrawal of US troops has to be concluded with Washington. [Redacted]

25X1

**Comment:** P'yongyang almost certainly has no illusions that US withdrawals can be achieved any time soon, but it is trying to take the tactical initiative. South Korea will continue to resist talks that do not include China as well as the US. [Redacted]

25X1

**Top Secret**  
[Redacted]

25X1

**Page Denied**

**Top Secret**



25X1

**Top Secret**