



Director of
Central
Intelligence

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*Wednesday
18 January 1984*

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
USSR: INF Counterdeployments Announced

*The Soviet press states that missiles [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted] have been fielded in East Germany in response to INF
deployments. [redacted]*

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TASS, in a broadcast yesterday, reported on the visit of a *Red Star* correspondent to "the deployment area of operational-tactical missiles of enhanced ranges" in East Germany. According to the broadcast, the unit has been deployed on agreement with the East Germans "in the framework of one of the USSR's reply measures to the deployment of US Pershing and cruise missiles in Europe." [redacted]

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General Secretary Andropov announced in late November that preparations had been accelerated for deployment of "enhanced-range" operational-tactical missiles in East Germany and Czechoslovakia. "Enhanced-range" could apply to the 500-kilometer-range SS-23, or to a longer range version of the Scud. [redacted]

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[redacted] suggest, however, that Andropov's reference was to the 925-kilometer-range SS-12/22. [redacted]

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
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
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LEBANON-SYRIA: Prospects Fading for Security Plan

All parties appear to be pessimistic that the proposed security plan can be carried out, and Syria and its Lebanese allies may be preparing to repel a rumored Lebanese Army offensive along the Alayh ridgeline.




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Druze leader Walid Junblatt told the US Ambassador in Damascus yesterday that he would not drop his objections to the plan. Junblatt expressed complete distrust of President Gemayel's motives and ruled out the possibility of any accommodation with the government.




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Junblatt says that if the Army tries to carry out the security agreement unilaterally "we will have war." He adds that the other leaders of the National Salvation Front share his pessimistic view of the situation.



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


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Comment: Junblatt's self-confidence evidently has increased, following his trip to Moscow. He apparently believes there is no hope of reaching a political settlement with Gemayel and is prepared for a new round of fighting. Although Junblatt's objections to the security plan are minor, his hardline position appears motivated by his intense dislike of Gemayel.



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
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**Estimated Number of
Armed Insurgents, by Faction**

Popular Liberation Forces	2,800 - 3,500
People's Revolutionary Army	3,000 - 3,500
Armed Forces of National Resistance	1,400 - 1,550
Communist Party's Armed Forces of National Liberation	1,160 - 1,325
Central America Workers' Revolutionary Party	700 - 850
Total	9,060 - 10,725

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EL SALVADOR: Insurgent Political Problems

Ideological and tactical differences within one of the largest of the five insurgent groups are threatening guerrilla unity. [Redacted]

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maverick factions of the Popular Liberation Forces reject the group's current leadership and advocacy of negotiations. Both factions support the protracted war strategy of former leader Carpio, who allegedly committed suicide last year in Managua. The top leadership of the guerrilla alliance reportedly is trying to mediate. [Redacted]

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The major faction calls itself the Revolutionary Workers' Movement. [Redacted] it has severed all ties with the parent organization and represents at least half the organization's membership. Moreover, the large labor federation that supported the Popular Liberation Forces reportedly now supports the new movement. [Redacted]

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The other dissident faction is the organization's combat and logistic unit in the San Salvador area. [Redacted] the faction wants to remain in the organization but insists that the leadership be changed to reflect Carpio's philosophy. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Comment: Since Carpio's death, the Popular Liberation Forces has been wracked by internal disputes and eclipsed by the military successes of a rival organization in the east. The seriousness of the factionalism has been reflected in recent public attacks by the dissidents against the organization's leadership. The new leadership of the Popular Liberation Forces has been joined by other guerrilla groups and by Cuba and Nicaragua in denouncing the dissidents. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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USSR: Pipeline Minister Becomes New Deputy Premier

Boris Shcherbina, the minister responsible for construction of the gas pipeline to Western Europe, was promoted to Deputy Premier last weekend. [Redacted]

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Shcherbina fills a vacancy left by a 77-year-old deputy premier who retired in mid-1983. The former deputy premier reportedly was blamed for a serious construction failure at an installation that produces components for atomic power plants. [Redacted]

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[Large Redacted Block]

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Comment: Despite continuing problems with the pipeline, the regime apparently sees its basic completion as a major achievement. General Secretary Andropov probably regards Shcherbina's new assignment as appropriate recognition for his executive skill in overcoming the difficulties that have beset this project. Shcherbina probably will oversee the State Committee for Construction and retain overall responsibility for major construction projects—such as the pipeline—undertaken by various ministries. [Redacted]

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[Redacted Block]

Andropov may intend to create this kind of tension throughout the bureaucracy. His policy of sacking executives for failure, of promoting ministers who succeed, and of executing officials found guilty of blatant corruption all contribute to this atmosphere. [Redacted]

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NETHERLANDS-US-LIBYA: Controversial Aircraft Sale

Dutch Prime Minister Lubbers, during his visit this week to Washington, probably will try to counter US objections to the sale of Fokker aircraft to Libya. [Redacted]

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Fokker has delivered two F-28 airliners to Tripoli and claims that it has a binding contract for delivery of a third. A representative of the firm told the US Embassy that discussions on additional sales have occurred. [Redacted]

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US-made components comprise 10 to 12 percent of the value of each aircraft, but Washington was not consulted on the deal. As a result, it has raised the possibility of sanctions against Fokker. [Redacted]

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A senior official in the Foreign Ministry told the US Embassy recently that the Libyan sale was all that enabled Fokker to meet its payroll for December and that the Netherlands Government would not let the firm go under. The official also commented that The Hague disagreed with efforts to isolate Libyan leader Qadhafi, and he noted that no international sanctions against Libya are in effect. [Redacted]

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Comment: The official may have exaggerated in asserting that Fokker's survival is threatened. Recent sales, such as those to Libya, have reduced an inventory problem that has seriously affected the profitability of the company. Nevertheless, the government probably is worried about the firm's current strained circumstances. [Redacted]

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Lubbers is likely to stress Fokker's importance to the economy of the Netherlands and repeat Dutch opposition to the "extraterritorial" application of US law. He probably will note that Fokker is a coproducer of the F-16 fighter and is a potential subcontractor under the just-concluded Patriot missile agreement. The Prime Minister may believe that US interest in these important NATO programs will limit the steps Washington would be willing to take against Fokker. [Redacted]

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USSR-IRAN: Further Deterioration in Relations

Moscow is becoming exasperated at the current trials of Iranian Communists in Tehran and at Iran's lack of response to Soviet attempts to reduce bilateral friction. [Redacted]


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TASS on Saturday condemned the Speaker of the Iranian Parliament for his disparaging remarks about the USSR's role in Afghanistan and criticized Iran for aiding Afghan insurgents. The commentary warns that such "insults" could damage Soviet-Iranian relations, particularly commercial contacts. [Redacted]

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Late last month an article in *Pravda* claimed that the recently opened trials of members of the Tudeh Party on charges of spying for the USSR are an effort to fan anti-Soviet hysteria. It admonished Iranian leaders that they would bear responsibility for the consequences if the trials were not halted. [Redacted]

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Tehran Radio yesterday reported that the Speaker of the Iranian Parliament turned aside a formal proposal from the Supreme Soviet for cooperative efforts to help halt the arms race. He criticized the Soviet delivery of missiles to Iraq and their use against Iranian cities. [Redacted]

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Comment: Relations with Iran have continued to deteriorate since last June, when Foreign Minister Gromyko publicly complained about Iran's anti-Soviet behavior. Since the beginning of the trials, the Soviets have increased their criticism of Iranian aid to Afghan insurgents, Iran's prosecution of the war with Iraq, and Tehran's conservative domestic policies. Nevertheless, they continue to avoid steps that could provoke a complete break or encourage Iran to reduce its hostility toward the US. [Redacted]

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
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Saudi Troop Buildup



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SAUDI ARABIA-NORTH YEMEN: Border Tensions

A substantial reinforcement by the Saudis along their undemarcated border with North Yemen has increased tensions in the area. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] since a border clash late last month, the Saudis have moved about 4,000 troops and several hundred armored vehicles to the border area near Najran.

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[Redacted]

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North Yemen has not sent additional forces to the border,

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[Redacted]

There are only about 500 troops at Buq'ah and about 1,000 at Sa'dah, [Redacted]

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President Salih does not want to provoke the Saudis further by reinforcing the area. About two-thirds of North Yemen's forces remain south of Sanaa, where they guard against a resurgence of guerrilla activity by the National Democratic Front. [Redacted]

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North Yemen's Foreign Minister discussed the problem in Riyadh with Saudi officials last week. King Fahd and Salih conferred on Sunday at the Islamic Conference in Casablanca. [Redacted]

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Comment: Saudi leaders almost certainly do not want a military confrontation with Sanaa. The Saudis have long suspected Yemeni intentions, and they probably have overreacted to the clash last month. Riyadh, on the other hand, may try to exploit its local military superiority and North Yemen's dependence on Saudi financial assistance to push Sanaa to make concessions on border demarcation. [Redacted]

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Discussions between Riyadh and Sanaa are unlikely to produce a quick resolution of the border problem. Salih will want to avoid more clashes with the Saudis, but he will not yield to their demands. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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UK: Labor Party's Problems

Labor leader Kinnock's efforts to rebuild the party as the only credible alternative to Prime Minister Thatcher's Tories may be dealt a blow if leftwing spokesman Benn regains a seat in Parliament. [Redacted]

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Benn lost his position in the general election in June. He has been selected as Labor's candidate for a byelection expected to be held in March in a normally safe Labor constituency. [Redacted]

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Comment: Kinnock probably owes his election last fall as party leader to Benn's absence as a contender. Although Kinnock generally sides with the party's left wing, he has tried to promote unity by making some concessions to moderates on domestic issues and on membership in the EC and by emphasizing attacks on Thatcher. He continues to support unilateral nuclear disarmament, but he has focused his criticism on "US-controlled" cruise missiles while reaffirming loyalty to NATO and advocating improvements in conventional forces. [Redacted]

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Opinion polls and the results of local council byelections indicate that Kinnock's strategy has recaptured some support for Labor. More important, the voters again appear to regard Labor, rather than the Social Democratic-Liberal Alliance, as the main opponent of the Tories. [Redacted]

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These gains, however, will be threatened by Benn's return to the limelight. Benn retains strong support among Labor activists, and, if he returns to Parliament, he is likely to outshine the less experienced Kinnock. [Redacted]

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Benn has said that he will not challenge Kinnock or moderate deputy leader Hattersley until after the next general election. Nonetheless, he will be a central figure in efforts to keep the party loyal to favored leftist policies, especially unilateral disarmament. [Redacted]

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Kinnock will now be forced to campaign for Benn. The loss of a safe seat would refute Kinnock's claims that he is making Labor an effective political force. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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SURINAME: Workers Move To Negotiate

Striking bauxite workers have established a six-member committee to negotiate with the government, according to the US Embassy and a Surinamese press report. This move follows a decision last Thursday by management of the Suralco plant to suspend its collective bargaining agreement with the labor union and possibly terminate some workers when the plant reopens. The Embassy reports some bank and insurance company workers are continuing to strike, and bus operators in the capital struck for several hours on Monday. Despite rumors of an imminent teachers' strike, most schools have remained open. [Redacted]

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Comment: The bauxite workers apparently are concerned that the protracted strike could result in the permanent shutdown of Suralco's operations or, at a minimum, in the loss of many jobs when the plant reopens. These concerns might cause them to scale down their demands and to concentrate on economic rather than political grievances. A teachers' walkout, however, could stiffen the resolve of the bauxite workers and might even precipitate a broader protest against the Bouterse regime. [Redacted]

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
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WEST GERMANY: Pressure on Defense Minister

Defense Minister Woerner today will explain to the Bundestag defense committee his reasons for forcing NATO Deputy Supreme Commander Kiessling into early retirement. General Kiessling was dismissed as a security risk.



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Important members of the Social Democratic opposition are calling for Woerner's resignation, and Christian Social Union Chairman Strauss has urged the government to provide an explanation.




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Comment: Woerner and other senior officials in the Defense Ministry ultimately could be forced to resign if their case against Kiessling is not conclusive. Woerner's position in the government reportedly had already been weakened by policy disagreements with Chancellor Kohl and Foreign Minister Genscher. Kohl probably would not be able to deny Strauss the Defense Ministry if Woerner resigned and Strauss demanded the position.



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INDIA: Increasing Violence in Border State

Local officials of the Congress Party, almost certainly with the support of the national leadership, have been fomenting riots in the sensitive border state of Jammu and Kashmir. The US Embassy reports several hundred persons were injured and up to nine killed in clashes with the police over the past three days. Chief Minister Farooq has publicly accused Prime Minister Gandhi of coordinating the demonstrations in the predominantly Muslim state as part of a campaign to topple his government. 

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Comment: Farooq has incurred Gandhi's displeasure by leading efforts to unite the opposition before national elections in the next year. Gandhi has tried to lay the groundwork for imposing direct national control over the state by charging Farooq with rigging the elections that brought him to power, failing to maintain law and order, and permitting secessionist movements allegedly supported by Pakistan. The Prime Minister, however, may stop short in her efforts to bring down Farooq. She probably fears that his ouster would set off protests by his Muslim supporters and further strain relations with Pakistan. 

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


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Latest South African Cross-Border Operation



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Special Analysis

SOUTH AFRICA-ANGOLA: Outlook for Cease-Fire

A lull in the fighting in southern Angola probably is in the offing. Last Friday South Africa announced the complete withdrawal of its conventional forces in Angola, following its largest cross-border operation since 1981. All but a few reconnaissance units are likely to withdraw south of the border in the next few days. Pretoria has indicated that it will begin observing a 30-day trial cease-fire on 31 January to facilitate Western efforts to break the stalemate in the negotiations on Namibia. At the same time, however, Pretoria will maintain the capability to react forcefully and quickly to any efforts by Angolan and SWAPO forces to move back into the salient that South African troops had occupied. A collapse of the cease-fire could result in greater Cuban involvement in the fighting.

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The operation that began 6 December involved more airstrikes than were flown during any previous incursion, including some against targets 250 kilometers inside Angola. Minister of Defense Malan claimed in an official press statement on 8 January that South African forces had captured a major SWAPO headquarters; killed a total of 432 Angolan, Cuban, and SWAPO troops; and destroyed 25 Soviet-manufactured tanks. Last Saturday British and South African journalists reported observing a convoy of captured Soviet-manufactured equipment being evacuated by South African forces.

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[Redacted]

Pretoria asserts its forces had been trying to preempt a planned SWAPO incursion into Namibia. South Africa also might have hoped to distract Angolan and Cuban forces from a counteroffensive against UNITA insurgents. A main objective, however, probably was to push Angolan, Cuban, and SWAPO forces farther north in preparation for the cease-fire.

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted] Pretoria's offer of a cease-fire may have been based on the assumption that a standdown would enable it to maintain a buffer zone north of the Namibia border.

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Angolan Resistance

Luanda offered stiffer resistance to the South African operations than on any occasion in the past two years. In early December one of several Angolan armored units that had recently deployed to the forward defense line engaged a South African force. Late in the month Angolan and Cuban surface-to-air missile units along the forward defense line fired on South African fighter-bombers for the first time. [redacted]

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South African reports claim that on 3 January two Cuban battalions joined a counterattack by Angolan and SWAPO forces against a South African unit. This was the first significant engagement between South African and Cuban forces since the Angolan civil war of 1975-76. According to Pretoria, a Soviet military officer coordinated this operation. [redacted]

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Although South African officials are publicly exuberant about their victory, heavy South African losses have prompted critical editorials in both the English and Afrikaans press. The government has admitted that 21 South African soldiers were killed or are missing, [redacted]

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The Cease-Fire

Neither side is likely to end all military activity during the trial cease-fire. South Africa will continue to conduct aerial reconnaissance to monitor Angolan forces, and Malan told the US Chargé on 11 January that ground reconnaissance patrols would operate north of the Namibian border. In press statements Malan has insisted that South Africa would renew operations in southern Angola "regardless of consequences" if Angola or SWAPO took advantage of the truce. [redacted]

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Angola also is likely to send reconnaissance patrols into the area vacated by the South African forces, and these forces could engage South African patrols. Both Angola and SWAPO, however, could profit from a respite from attacks. They probably will not give South Africa an excuse over the next few weeks for renegeing on its commitment to withdraw. [redacted]

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The cease-fire is unlikely to hold beyond the trial period—if that long—unless both sides are willing to tolerate minor military engagements. [redacted]

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
Cuban and Soviet Roles

The aggressive Cuban posture in the last round of fighting suggests that Havana may play an active role in any fighting that results from the collapse of the cease-fire. The Soviets probably intend to provide more military support to the Angolans, as the arrival of MIG-23 Flogger aircraft in Luanda earlier this month demonstrates.



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The discussions in Moscow last week among the Soviets, Cubans, and Angolans are the latest indication that the USSR and Cuba are taking the deteriorating security situation in Angola seriously. The Soviets, however, are likely to continue to allow Havana to take the lead in combat operations.



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