



Director of  
Central  
Intelligence

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# National Intelligence Daily

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4 January 1984

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
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
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**LEBANON: Security Proposals**

*President Gemayel's proposal yesterday for a redeployment of three of the four Multinational Force contingents, to enable the Lebanese Army to expand its control over all areas not occupied by foreign forces, may be opposed by Syria and by Lebanese elements.*



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Gemayel is proposing a two-phase redeployment in which the French and Italians would first expand their areas of responsibility in Beirut. In the second phase, the Italians would expand their control to the coastal road between Beirut and Tripoli, and the French would take responsibility for the Beirut-Damascus Highway as far east as Shtawrah. The US would police the coastal highway between Beirut and the Awwali River. 

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Contacts of the US Embassy report that Druze leader Walid Junblatt has accepted the terms of a new security plan sponsored by the Saudis calling for the withdrawal of the Lebanese Forces Christian militia from the Shuf and Kharrub regions. The Lebanese Government's Internal Security Force would be deployed among Sunni villages in the areas evacuated, and Lebanese Army units would be moved to Sidon. The government also is to open the road to the southern suburbs, and arrangements are being made for elements of the Italian contingent to take up observer positions.



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**Comment:** President Gemayel's reasons for proposing the redeployment of the Multinational Force are not clear. He probably realizes the French and Italians are likely to reject his proposals. 

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If the security arrangement materializes, it could ease a major source of tension—the fighting between Lebanese Forces and Druze militias south of Ad Damur. The deployment of Lebanese Army units to Sidon would strengthen the government's political position among southerners who have been demanding a government presence there. There are no indications, however, that this plan has been accepted by the Syrians, the Shia, or the Lebanese Forces. 

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**USSR: Possible Approaches to Arms Negotiations**

*A senior Foreign Ministry official reportedly said in mid-December that, for the USSR, the MBFR talks are "over," but he indicated that Moscow has some other approaches to arms control under consideration.* [redacted]

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[redacted] the official told a colleague that some of Moscow's allies would not be pleased at the decision to stop the MBFR talks and that he acknowledged the negotiations had been important to Moscow, despite the lack of progress. He explained, however, that there appeared to be "no political will" in the West to reach an MBFR agreement, and for the USSR, "the talks are over." The official also said he expected little to be achieved at the Conference on Disarmament in Europe, which opens this month.

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[redacted]

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The official said, on the other hand, the European situation demands "urgent decisions" and "concrete results" in the near future. He said there is discussion in Moscow of the possibility of merging the START and INF talks and of replacing the MBFR talks with new arms negotiations between the Warsaw Pact and NATO in conjunction with a revived proposal for a political treaty between the alliances. He added that Foreign Minister Gromyko supports the latter plan and has delegated members of his staff to study its feasibility.

[redacted]

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**Comment:** The official's remarks underscore the dilemma confronting Soviet arms control policy. On the one hand, the Soviets are reluctant to resume talks at least until they have proceeded further with counterdeployments in response to INF and have determined whether the US negotiating position will be affected by anti-INF sentiment in Western Europe and by political developments within the US. On the other, they realize that the longer talks are disrupted, the less their chances of limiting NATO deployments.

[redacted]

[redacted]

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If Gromyko indeed wants to propose a new multilateral arms control forum, he could be preparing to do so at the CDE conference. Recent Soviet comments indicate, however, that the USSR sees no prospect for significant progress over START and INF issues in the near future.

[redacted]

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[redacted]

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
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**NIGERIA: Initial Moves by the Military**

*The country is returning to normal as Head of State Buhari's regime consolidates its position.* 


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The Supreme Military Council has expanded its membership to 19 and has cut the number of federal ministries from 35 to 22. The Council met yesterday to consider nominees for cabinet ministers and military governors. Meanwhile, senior civil servants have assumed administrative responsibility for the ministries. 


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Economic life is returning to normal, although scattered reports indicate some traders in the markets have closed their shops rather than obey military demands that they lower prices. The US Embassy reports that food supplies appear to be adequate. 


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Press reports indicate that the new government yesterday made an initial payment on part of its rescheduled debt. In addition, the government publicly reaffirmed its intention not to leave OPEC or to reduce the price of its oil unilaterally. 


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The roundup of prominent civilian politicians is continuing and former President Shagari reportedly is in custody in Lagos. The regime is stressing the need for "accountability" and for dealing harshly and swiftly with corrupt politicians. 


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**Comment:** The government's new economic team is not yet in place and the military leaders do not yet have a grasp of the magnitude of the economic crisis. In the short term the military is likely to continue stopgap efforts that may gain some political support but will do little to begin turning the economy around. 

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Government decrees to lower prices, particularly if accompanied by military force, could encourage widespread hoarding and cause shops to close. A vigorous anticorruption drive probably will enjoy broad initial support, but a sustained, forceful sweep could make ethnic and regional tensions worse. 

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[Redacted]

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**USSR-JAPAN: Soviets Standing Firm**

*Premier Tikhonov's uncompromising statements on bilateral relations appearing in Pravda this week suggest that Moscow does not expect the recent Japanese elections to affect Tokyo's foreign policy.*

[Redacted]

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Tikhonov, answering questions from the Japanese press, accused the government of Prime Minister Nakasone of taking its cue from the US in "dismantling the entire system of Soviet-Japanese relations" established during the postwar period. He reiterated interest in improving ties with Japan and repeated the Soviet position on INF deployments in Europe but rejected any blame for the current stalemate on either point. [Redacted]

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Meanwhile, a TASS dispatch from Tokyo on Sunday strongly criticized Nakasone's first major policy statement since the Japanese elections in mid-December, in which he reaffirmed the importance of US-Japanese relations. Soviet media coverage of the elections portrayed the setback dealt to Nakasone's Liberal Democratic Party as evidence of popular opposition to Tokyo's pro-US policies but predicted that those policies would not change. [Redacted]

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**Comment:** The Tikhonov interview suggests the Soviets expect no real change in policy and have concluded they have little to gain from demonstrating flexibility, at least at present. They continue to blame Tokyo for the recent downturn in trade and other contacts, while underlining their resolve to stand firm on the Northern Territories and other issues troubling relations. [Redacted]

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Moscow apparently believes that its best course is to keep hammering away on the dangers of Japan's security ties with the US, with the hope that Japanese public opinion will eventually force changes in Tokyo's foreign policy. Tokyo believes it is up to the Soviets to take the first step. [Redacted]

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**TUNISIA: Bread Riots**

*Widespread civil disorders provoked by rising bread prices may cause some political problems for Prime Minister Mzali but are unlikely to have a significant impact on Tunisian economic policies.*

[Redacted]

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Bread prices have doubled as the result of a government decision put in effect on Sunday to remove subsidies on wheat. The move is part of a broader effort to improve Tunisia's balance of payments and stimulate the economy. Mzali had announced in a well-publicized speech to the National Assembly last week that the government would provide compensation to low-income Tunisians to help offset the price increases.

[Redacted]

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Press reports indicate that up to 27 people died and many more have been injured during violent protests in a number of cities. The violence, supported by university students, has forced President Bourguiba to declare a state of emergency, impose a nationwide curfew, and order military intervention to help quell the disturbances.

[Redacted]

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Senior officials yesterday, during talks with the US Embassy, blamed Tunisians inspired by Libya for the rioting. The officials urged Washington to rush planned military assistance to deter further Libyan meddling.

[Redacted]

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**Comment:** The intensity of the disturbances highlights the failure of government efforts to sell its program to the poorer Tunisians that would be most affected and reflects the general frustration many young Tunisians feel over the lack of employment opportunities. The riots will cast doubts within political circles on the leadership abilities of Mzali, who, over the past year, has won approval from Bourguiba for his choices for appointments to important economic portfolios.

[Redacted]

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The swift intervention by Army units indicates the government is prepared to act decisively to restore order, as it did during widespread labor riots in 1978. The protests may force some compromises on the issue of price increases, but they are unlikely to dissuade Bourguiba and his advisers from their broader commitment to reduce government expenditures for economic and social programs.

[Redacted]

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The regime undoubtedly is concerned [Redacted] that Libya plans to increase subversion in Tunisia soon. Nevertheless, Libyan involvement in the current disturbances probably is slight, and the approach to the US clearly reflects an element of opportunism.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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**EL SALVADOR: Attacks Embarrass High Command**

Salvadoran military officials have told the US defense attache that some 80 troops were killed or wounded and about 40 were captured in the recent attack on the 4th Brigade in and around El Paraiso. The officials say most of the damage resulted from the destruction of the brigade's ammunition depot. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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The attache has learned that the 12 to 15 recently recruited National Guardsmen deployed at the end of the Cuscatlan Bridge that was dynamited on Sunday were distracted by a firefight, enabling other guerrillas to attach explosives to the bridge and detonate them.

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[Redacted]

**Comment:** The attacks do not alter the current tactical stalemate, but they caught the Salvadoran armed forces by surprise and are embarrassing to the high command. Insurgent forces are likely to be emboldened by their successes. [Redacted]

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**SUDAN: Less Emphasis on Islamic Law**

President Nimeiri's Independence Day speech last Saturday suggests he plans to reverse course and gradually deemphasize the role of Islam in government. He stressed that his recently instituted Islamic reforms would be applied judiciously and would not supplant Sudan's constitution, its presidential system, or its sole political party.

[Redacted]

Nimeiri also intends to repeal a religiously inspired law that set harsh penalties for breaches of discipline in the armed forces. He reportedly has ordered that references to Islam be deleted from future legislation. [Redacted]

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
**Comment:** Nimeiri's speech will calm fears by many Sudanese that he was about to turn Sudan into a strict Islamic state. His moderate tone and the repeal of the armed forces act probably will reassure key constituencies in the military, the civil service, and the Sudanese Socialist Union. Since Nimeiri's return on 12 December from his recent visit to foreign capitals, there has been a noticeable absence of rhetoric extolling Islam, new religiously inspired regulations, and harsh Islamic punishments. [Redacted]

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
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**SOUTH AFRICA-ANGOLA: Ground and Air Operations**

A senior South African military officer says operations within Angola—now in the fourth week—are continuing, noting that infantry units have killed more than 50 SWAPO guerrillas.

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted] Meanwhile, Luanda announced yesterday that President dos Santos had informed the UN Secretary General that it would accept the South African offer of a 30-day truce beginning 31 January, provided South Africa promises to carry out the UN plan for Namibian independence without imposing "alien conditions."

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**Comment:** Although South Africa apparently is continuing its air and artillery strikes against Angolan garrisons, there is no evidence of large-scale infantry clashes. As long as the conflict remains at the present level, Luanda probably will not withdraw from its forward defense line or pull back its air defense equipment. There is as yet no evidence that Angola has informed South Africa of its conditional acceptance of the truce offer. In any event, the South Africans are unlikely to drop their insistence on linking Namibian independence to withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola.

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**BANGLADESH-USSR: Soviet Diplomats Expelled**

Bangladesh has expelled 15 Soviet diplomats in the past several days in retaliation for the Embassy's support for the country's leftist political parties. Moscow, in a formal protest, denies President Ershad's accusations and [Redacted] is threatening to undertake "appropriate reciprocal measures." A Soviet press commentator has accused the US of urging the expulsions.

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**Comment:** Ershad, who believes he has solid evidence of Soviet meddling, wants to limit foreign contacts with his opposition as he attempts to move to civilian rule. He is concerned about the size of the Soviet mission, the largest in the country even though relations between Bangladesh and the USSR have declined in recent years. Moscow may retaliate by expelling some Bangladeshi diplomats or by further reducing its modest economic and military assistance.

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[Redacted]

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## **Special Analysis**

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### **USSR: Andropov's Political Gains**

*The results of the Central Committee plenum and the Supreme Soviet session indicate that General Secretary Andropov's prolonged physical disability has not yet halted his progress in consolidating power. Although Andropov was unable to attend the meetings, his influence was apparent in all of the personnel moves approved by the plenum and in his domination of media coverage of the events. Those promoted—Vorotnikov, Solomentsev, Chebrikov, and Ligachev—are either his proteges or supporters. As a result of the negative impact of Andropov's absence, the leadership took pains to give him extensive publicity. Soviet television devoted more time to his nomination as a candidate for the elections in March to the Supreme Soviet than to coverage of the meeting of the Supreme Soviet itself and implied that he will still be around for the elections.*

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This demonstration of political strength at a time of physical weakness suggests that:

- There are no other obvious contenders in the Politburo.
- Andropov's illness is not regarded by his colleagues as imminently life-threatening or permanently incapacitating, and it did not prevent him from working behind the scenes to ensure the promotion of his choices.
- The promotions had the strong backing of Andropov's key allies—particularly Defense Minister Ustinov—whose own interests were served by strengthening Andropov's position and who see no good alternative to his leadership.
- Despite the negative political impact of Andropov's illness, Party Secretary Chernenko and Premier Tikhonov, his chief opponents, were too weak to sway the Politburo on what probably was a test of the General Secretary's leadership.

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Andropov's prolonged absence almost certainly increased his allies' doubts about his staying power and the willingness of his opponents to maneuver against him. His allies—including Ustinov, party secretary Gorbachev, and Foreign Minister Gromyko—are likely to have supported the personnel moves with the succession in mind.

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They probably viewed Andropov's candidates as leaders they could work with comfortably when he leaves the scene, and they are likely to believe the moves will strengthen their own positions. In addition, all of the appointees have past party management connections with heavy or defense industry that Ustinov would find particularly appealing. [ ]

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### **Andropov's Speech**

Andropov's political gains may have been won at some cost. His speech, which was read to the Central Committee in his absence, contained no significant initiatives. This suggests that the price of his victory on the personnel changes may have been some agreement to temporize on policy. For example, Andropov's vague references to the prospect of major change in economic planning and management indicated that he is concentrating on getting his team in place rather than pushing on policy matters. [ ]

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The Soviet leader placed even stronger emphasis than he has in the past on the need to increase labor discipline and executive responsibility and to make better use of hidden reserves. This approach appears to have considerable support in the leadership. It probably had at least some impact on the improved economic performance this year—an upturn that may have reduced the sense of urgency for more fundamental changes. [ ]

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Andropov's speech and the subsequent discussion in the Supreme Soviet suggest that there will be little change in economic priorities or strategy. His emphasis on the need to eliminate waste indicates that the gains planned for consumer-oriented sectors would have to be achieved through increased efficiency. Moreover, the plan figures for this year do not point to a major change in resource allocation. [ ]

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The failure of Andropov to address foreign policy issues and his statement that "everything necessary" had been done to keep defense capacity at a "proper level" also probably indicate that the leadership wanted to allay public concern about the international situation and focus attention on domestic policy. [ ]

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### **Prospects**

The personnel changes strengthened the political position in the Politburo of Andropov and of Ustinov and his other allies. Andropov's ability to capitalize on his success will depend on whether he can resume a more active role. If so, his added political support may

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enable him to mount an assault on Chernenko and Tikhonov that could culminate in an effort to replace them at the plenum in the spring. [Redacted]

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Andropov needs to replace these adversaries to gain firmer control over policy implementation and the party and government bureaucracies. His ability to direct economic policy is constrained by Tikhonov's continued presence as Chairman of the Council of Ministers, which gives Tikhonov primary responsibility in that area. Chernenko, as the senior party secretary under Andropov and ideological chief, still constitutes a brake on the General Secretary's efforts to mobilize the party machinery for his purposes. [Redacted]

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Two of Andropov's allies, Vorotnikov and Gorbachev, are in a good position to replace Tikhonov and Chernenko, and Andropov may now have enough support to push for the change. If so, criticism of both Tikhonov and Chernenko may soon become more pointed. [Redacted]

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If Andropov fails to make the kind of recovery that he and his colleagues evidently anticipate or hope for, however, all bets will be off. Rivalries among his supporters—especially Gorbachev and Romanov—would then be likely to come to the fore as they maneuver in a succession process that almost certainly would prove far less orderly than the last. Increased signs of political jockeying by prospective heirs would be one of the surest signs that Andropov's days are thought to be numbered. [Redacted]

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