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Soviet Force Generation Methods (S)

Imagery Analysis Report

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
Soviet Force Generation Methods (S)

Imagery Analysis Report

Comments or queries regarding this report are welcome. They may be directed to [redacted] [redacted] Tactical Forces Division, Imagery Exploitation Group, NPIC, on [redacted] [redacted]. The authors wish to thank [redacted] for his contributions to this report. (C)

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Preface

NPIC is engaged in a long-term and comprehensive analysis of the status, readiness, and force-generation capabilities of Soviet motorized rifle and tank divisions. The purpose of this analysis is, in part, to assist the Intelligence Community's efforts in monitoring and understanding the process of divisional mobilization and the Soviet capability to generate additional formations and units. (S/WN)


The following studies have been published so far: *Soviet Divisional Materiel Support Battalions (S)*, Z-14017/84, Mar 84; *Soviet "Second Table of Organization and Equipment" (Mobilization Base) Divisions (S)*, SC-628367/85, May 85; *Soviet Strategic Mobility: Potential Wartime Functions of Heavy-Lift Formations (S)*, Z-15009/85, Jun 85; and *Soviet Combat Maneuver Divisions: An Imagery Perspective*  Aug 86. (S/WN)

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This study continues the analysis and presents the results of an examination of two historical cases in which the Soviets created new combat units out of elements drawn from existing peacetime forces that had been deployed outside the Soviet Union and followed one of their published force generation methods. (S/WN)

In addition to the references cited in this report, a large number of other sources is available for studying force generation issues. A list of these sources is available from the authors. (U)

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Soviet Force Generation Methods (S)

Summary and Key Findings

All applicable satellite imagery acquired between

was used in the preparation of this report. (S/WN)

Soviet military thought describes four methods for expanding peacetime military forces to create new units. Illustrated in Figure 1, they may be described as duplication, expansion, second TO&E, and mobilization of civilian organizations. Elements of all four methods are probably used to create new units. The duplication and expansion methods are documented here. (S/WN)

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These methods differ in detail and purpose, but all have two common elements. First, they depend on existing active units for key personnel or key organizational elements to form the basis of new units. Second, these methods depend on the use of strategic reserves of both men and equipment for expanding these units to their full strength. (S/WN)

Three of the force generation methods have been evaluated on imagery, and one of them, second TO&E, has already been published. Elements of both the duplication and expansion methods have now also been studied, based upon a review of imagery and collateral intelligence acquired during two past Soviet military force deployments—the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. In both cases an existing active unit was divided into two or more subunits, each with the structure and core capabilities of the original unit. These units were subsequently expanded to the size of the original or parent unit with men and equipment drawn from reserves. (S/WN)

The expansion process was similar in both cases. Motorized rifle divisions were mobilized first and deployed across the Soviet border. These deployments made use of early deploying regiments (one regiment per division) for security along the border. These regiments later returned to garrison without their parent divisions to form the basis of the new division and were replaced by regiments from other divisions as the mobilization developed. (S/WN)



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


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
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The study indicates that the force generation of peacetime divisions in deployments is consonant with published Soviet writings and that these methods of force generation can now be distinguished from other activities. This study also develops a context within which future changes in ground force structure can be analyzed. (S/WN)

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
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Soviet Force Generation Methods (S)

Introduction

In generating new military units during deployments, the Soviets have repetitively demonstrated that the overall numbers and strengths of their forces have not been reduced. The units from which new units are drawn continue to retain their active status and the potential for further generation of new units. The Soviet force generation methods observed on imagery appear to follow Soviet writings (Appendix A). The implications of these are that imagery can reveal not only the obvious and major indicators associated with mobilization, but also the more subtle indicators that a new unit is being generated from an existing one. (S/WN)

Force generation is a process that could be rapid or could take months or years during a deployment to accomplish. When observed it has been evidenced by the following indicators.



This report examines elements of two methods of Soviet force generation described in a June 1966 article by a former Soviet officer who had been an instructor at the Frunze Academy.² These methods involve separating a unit from its parent unit and expanding it until it has reached the level of the parent unit from which it was drawn. These methods are two of four described by the Soviets. (U)

One method, the use of State assets to form new units, would probably occur only during general mobilization. (A glossary and an explanation of some pertinent Soviet terms is presented in Appendix B.) (S/WN)

Russian and Soviet methods of forming new units and replacing combat losses during wartime have evolved since at least World War I. The creation and deployment of new or additional units result from the

traditional Russian emphasis placed on strategic reserves and force generation capabilities. The key element in each of these methods is the detachment of a subordinate unit from a larger unit. The detached unit then becomes the basis for a new unit similar to the parent unit. These four methods are summarized below.^{3,4} (U)

Method 1—Duplication: An active military unit or formation, upon mobilization, divides into two or more independent units, which are then expanded and brought up to wartime strength. As an example, a regiment can divide and then be reconstituted into two regiments. This usually occurs within independent regiments and brigades. (U)

Method 2—Second TO&E: A military unit, in shifting from peacetime to wartime status, retains its basic organization and loses part of its peacetime complement as cadre to form another unit or formation. The new unit or formation then expands to wartime strength. This process is referred to by the Soviets as activating the *Second Table of Organization & Equipment (TO&E)* unit or formation. (S/WN)

Method 3—Expansion: An active unit or formation may expand into the next higher level unit or formation. For example, a regiment expands to become a division, or a battalion expands to become a regiment. The filling out of such units is accomplished by the callup of reservists or transfers of active personnel. This method is used for the mobilization of all types of ground forces, special troops, and rear service units and formations. (U)

Method 4—New Formations: Units are formed from existing state organizations, such as from specialists in organizations such as the Committee for State Security (KGB), Ministry of Communications, and Ministry of Internal Affairs. Personnel activated then continue their previous specialties as members of new military units or formations. This method is probably

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
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Figure 1. Soviet Methods of Force Generation (Expanding military units from peacetime to wartime strength)



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employed only in time of war or other major mobilization and has not yet been observed on imagery.^{2,5} (U)

Methods 1 and 3, the duplication and expansion methods, are documented here. (U)

Case Studies

Two case studies are documented here, involving three Soviet motorized rifle divisions imaged during events culminating in the deployment of the divisions beyond Soviet borders. The analysis revealed that, following the deployment, new divisions were formed in their place. (S/WN)

The first case study describes the procedures used to form a new motorized rifle division in the Odessa Military District following the 1968 Czechoslovakian invasion. The units involved were the 48th Motorized Rifle Division (MRD), housed in garrisons in Bolgrad and Kagul, and a motorized rifle regiment from the 86th Guards MRD in Kishinev.⁶


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The second case study examines a more recent example in the Central Asian Military District, following mobilization for the Afghanistan invasion in late 1979. This activity led to the formation of a new, unidentified motorized rifle division at Dushanbe that occupies garrisons and other facilities vacated by the 201st MRD by at least January 1980⁷ (Figure 2). (S/WN)

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Figure 2. Soviet Installations Involved in Formation of New Units During the Czechoslovakian and Afghan Invasions



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Figure 3. Activities Leading to a New Motorized Rifle Division, Odessa Military District, 1968–1986

Unit	Garrison	1968	1969	1970
48th Motorized Rifle Division	Bolgrad Headquarters AB Division-AB AL-1	May • Ammunition loading • Mobilization begins Aug • One MRR deploys to Romanian border • MRD (less one MRR) deploys to Czechoslovakia Oct • One MRR returns to Bolgrad	Jun • New barracks/administration building under construction Oct • New facilities under construction • First evidence of airborne unit (98th GABD) in garrison (moved from Far East MD)	Jan ←
	(one tank regiment, two motorized rifle regiments)			25X1
	Kagul Army Barracks AL-1, Reserve Equipment Storage	May • Ammunition loading • Mobilization begins		Jan ←No imagery→ Dec available
	(one motorized rifle regiment)			25X1
86th GMRD	Kishinev Army Barracks West AL-2	Aug • MRR deploys to Czechoslovakia with 48th MRD	Sep • New barracks under construction • Airborne unit (98th GABD) in garrison	Jan →Permanent home of 98th GABD (one regiment)
	(one motorized rifle regiment)			25X1

*Beginning formation of new MRD

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Both case studies include descriptions of the events that led to regeneration of new units, a chronology, and imagery examples of the activities observed. Some differences were detected in the two cases studied, in particular the length of time for the process to be completed. (S/WN)


Case Study 1: Odessa Military District

This case study describes the events that led to the formation of a new motorized rifle division in the Odessa Military District. Activity observed included the preparation for deployment, departure of units,

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	1971	1972	1973	1974	
Permanent home of 98th GABD (two regiments)		Apr • Old MRR vehicle storage area razed	May • Old MRR obstacle course razed		1986
pr • Seven new buildings under construction* ul • One tank battalion artillery regiment in garrison lov • Additional buildings under construction	Mar • New ammunition storage area under construction • Additional buildings under construction Jun ← Building construction continues	Sep Oct • New tank regiment, river-crossing unit, AAA regiment, HQ support unit in garrison	Jun • Engineer unit added; additional support equipment added Sep • Divisional artillery, antitank regiment arrive • New buildings complete; unidentified MRD HQ		1986
pr • Additional airborne units (98th GABD) in garrison ul • 14th Army HQ also here					1986

eventual return of units, and final relocation of the new division. (S/WN)

The 328th Motorized Rifle Regiment from the 48th MRD at Bolgrad departed garrison to participate in the 1968 Czechoslovakian invasion. The regiment later re-

turned to Bolgrad after the invasion and subsequently relocated to Kagul to form the basis of a new motorized rifle division (Figure 3).^{8,9} Other divisions in the Odessa Military District were also involved in this process and are included in the analysis. Two motorized rifle divisions were involved in this transition. (S/NF/WN)



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In June 1968, a convoy of trucks was being loaded with ammunition in the garrison at Bolgrad, and additional equipment had been pulled out of the vehicle storage buildings. In July, the 328th MRR mobilized and deployed to the Romanian border in preparation for the Soviet deployment to Czechoslovakia.⁸ (This regiment was probably deployed to conduct covering force operations, in which units garrisoned in border military districts are temporarily stationed near the borders to protect deployment of other units and formations in the military district.) In August the remainder of the 48th MRD began deploying to Czechoslovakia. Subsequently, the 328th MRR returned to Bolgrad in October 1968, two months after the invasion, and its equipment was placed in covered storage. No equipment was observed in the garrison when Bolgrad was imaged in December of 1968, and no changes were observed in the garrison until late 1969. The 328th MRR eventually relocated to Kagul in mid-August 1971. [redacted]

Another, but unidentified, motorized rifle regiment of the 48th MRD, also housed at Kagul Army Barracks ([redacted]) deployed to Czechoslovakia in August. Prior to its deployment, increased activity was observed in the vehicle park and in the local training area. (S/WN)

While the 48th MRD was deploying into Czechoslovakia in August 1968, it was still one motorized rifle regiment short of a full-strength division, since the 328th MRR remained on the Romanian border. Finally, in early September, a third motorized rifle regiment was called up from the 86th Guards MRD at Kishinev Army Barracks AL-2 ([redacted]) also in the Odessa Military District, to permanently join the 48th MRD as it deployed to Vysoke Myto, Czechoslovakia.¹⁰

[redacted]

In October 1969, the 98th Guards Airborne Division relocated from Belogorsk in the Far East Military District to Bolgrad and Kishinev, occupying garrisons vacated by the 48th MRD. This occupation indicated that the 48th MRD would not return to its original garrisons.⁶ [redacted]

With the establishment of a new motorized rifle division in the Odessa Military District, and prior to its eventual formation, facility upgrades at Kagul were necessary to accommodate the new division. In May 1971, new buildings were under construction at Kagul. Elements subordinate to the 328th MRR-derived MRD were first identified in August 1971, when at least one tank battalion and a probable artillery regiment were present (Figure 4). The presence of the divisional equipment and the construction of new buildings were clear indicators that a new formation was forming at this installation. (S/WN)

No increase in equipment was observed at Kagul from late 1971 through mid-1972, although construction of new buildings continued. By March 1972 a new ammunition storage area was constructed in the local training area. (S/WN)

In October 1973, a significant change in the equipment composition was observed. Additional divisional elements included a tank regiment, an assault river-crossing unit, an antiaircraft artillery regiment, and a probable headquarters service and support (commandant) unit (Figure 5). The equipment for these units probably came from military district or central reserve storage depots. No additional equipment was deployed there until mid-to-late 1974. (S/WN)

By June 1974, the newly forming division was nearly complete, six years after its inception. An engineer battalion and additional divisional support equipment were present. In September, divisional artillery assets and an antitank regiment were added. It appeared that most divisional elements were present, including three tank battalions, and the barracks/administration buildings were in the late stages of construction. No significant changes occurred between late 1974 and early 1986, when a major reconfiguration of the installation, completed in mid-1986, was begun. All units were relocated within the garrison, but no new equipment was observed (Figure 6). (S/WN) (Text continued on page 13)

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Figure 7. Activities Leading to a New Motorized Rifle Division, Central Asian Military District, 1979-1984

	← 1979 →	← 1980 →	← 1981 →
Dushanbe Army Barracks NW AL-1 <input type="text"/>	Aug • Build-up of BMPs (August-November)	Jan • BMPs depart garrison May • Reservists to Termez • 118 BMPs in open storage	25X1
Dushanbe Army Barracks AL-2/HQ MRD <input type="text"/>		Jan • Tank regiment and motorized rifle regiment departed; little activity Apr • Tank regiment returned Jun • Motorized rifle regiment returned • Motorized rifle regiment departed	25X1
Kurgan Tyube Army Barracks AL-1 <input type="text"/>		Jan • Motorized rifle regiment out of garrison Mar • New motorized rifle regiment observed	25X1
Dushanbe Ammunition Depot DA-1 <input type="text"/>		Jun • Artillery regiment and antitank battalion observed	25X1
Kulyab SAM Support Facility <input type="text"/>		Jul • Motorized rifle regiment (new to garrison) observed	25X1
Dushanbe TA South TA-1 <input type="text"/>			25X1
Dushanbe SAM Support Facility <input type="text"/>			Jun • Extensive construction under way; facility no longer functions as SAM support facilit25X1

* No entries in 1982

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← 1983 *	← 1984 →
Jul • BMP motorized rifle regiment departs garrison	
	May • Tank regiment departed
Sep • Artillery units departed	
	Jul • Artillery regiment and antitank battalion observed
	Aug • Covered vehicle storage for about 300 vehicles • Armored vehicles observed

This new, unidentified motorized rifle division is probably retaining its low-strength-cadre status, since it still had not received any armored personnel carriers by March 1987. (S/WN)

Case Study 2: Central Asian Military District

This case study describes events before and after the Afghanistan invasion. These events resulted in the formation of a new division (Figure 7). Activity observed in Dushanbe included preparation for deployment, departure of units, and return of the same units (or arrival of similar units) to the garrisons. (S/WN)

In 1979 the motorized rifle regiments of the 201st MRD were located at Dushanbe Army Barracks Northwest AL-1 [Redacted] Dushanbe Army Barracks AL-2 [Redacted] and Kurgan Tyube Army Barracks AL-1 [Redacted] with a tank regiment also at Dushanbe AL-2. Prior to the Afghanistan invasion, all maneuver regiments of the division were assessed to be low-strength-cadre units, and little activity was observed at any of the garrisons. Typical is Dushanbe AL-1 (Figure 8). (S/WN)

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By late 1979, a gradual buildup in the number of armored personnel carriers (BMPs) was observed at Dushanbe AL-1. By [Redacted] the divisional units in the area (two motorized rifle regiments and one tank regiment) had departed. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

The tank regiment from the 201st MRD that had been sent to Termez probably deployed into Afghanistan. On [Redacted] it returned to Dushanbe AL-

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By [Redacted] a BMP-equipped motorized rifle regiment was in open storage at Dushanbe AL-1, and by [Redacted] 118 BMPs were present (Figure 9). Ac-

[Redacted]

The motorized rifle regiment that had been at Dushanbe AL-2 was observed back in garrison on [Redacted] [Redacted] However, by [Redacted] the equipment was no long-

er present, and no activity was observed. On [Redacted] [Redacted] a motorized rifle regiment was observed for the first time at Kulyab SAM Support Facility [Redacted] [Redacted] probably the unit previously observed at Dushanbe AL-2. This unit probably relocated from Dushanbe to Kulyab for two reasons. First, the garrison at Kulyab could provide more space for future growth than the facility at Dushanbe AL-2. Second, the presence of a regiment at Kulyab distributes forces more effectively along the southern border of the Central Asian Military District. (S/WN)

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
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Kurgan Tyube AL-1 housed a motorized rifle regiment subordinate to the 201st MRD that probably deployed to Afghanistan when the 201st departed in December 1979. This could not be confirmed because no imagery of this facility was available during the period, but on [Redacted] no equipment was observed. By [Redacted] elements of a motorized rifle regiment, probably newly formed, were seen in open storage. The additional equipment consisted of a tank battalion, an artillery battalion, and some support elements. (S/WN)



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Imagery of [Redacted] revealed an artillery regiment and antitank battalion had arrived at Dushanbe Ammunition Depot DA-1 [Redacted]. These units

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departed the depot in July 1983 and relocated to Dushanbe Training Area South TA-1 [Redacted] by [Redacted] (S/WN)

The equipment, strength, and activity level of the new division in the Dushanbe area remained relatively static in the years following its regeneration, like its predecessor division in this area before the invasion. Thus, the 201st MRD, which deployed to Afghanistan, was replaced by a division of equal strength. The rapid formation of this new division ensured that no reduction of force strength occurred in this vulnerable border zone. (S/WN)

Since 1983, the new, unidentified MRD has undergone several changes. By July 1983 the BMP-equipped

regiment at Dushanbe AL-1 departed garrison. In May 1984 the tank regiment at Dushanbe AL-2 also departed garrison. These two regimental units remained located until [Redacted] when two tanks and 125 probable BMPs were observed at Dushanbe SAM Support Facility [Redacted] Extensive construction which had begun in 1981, was also observed at this facility. A review of imagery indicated that the garrison had not functioned as an active SAM support facility since 1981. [Redacted]

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Appendix A

Methods of Soviet Force Generation

Since before World War I, the Russian military has placed great emphasis on force generation capabilities. The methods for replacing military units and creating new ones are described in various documents, from which the following quoted material is taken. (S/WN)

*Handbook on USSR Military Forces*⁵

Units may be expanded from peacetime strength to full mobilization strength by one of four methods:

- A peacetime military unit or formation may retain its basic organization, lose part of its peacetime complement as cadre to other units, and expand to wartime strength.
- A peacetime unit or formation may expand into a next higher unit or formation.
- A unit may be formed at wartime strength by cadres detached from peacetime units and reservists.
- A peacetime military unit or formation may, on mobilization, be divided into several independent units, which are then brought up to wartime strength. (Service units also are formed by civilian's Peoples' Commissariats.) (U)

*Military Review*²

Four methods of mobilization for the Ground Forces are described:

- Method 1: The strength of peacetime units are brought up to a war footing by the callup of reservists. (U)
- Method 2: A unit is expanded and converted to the next higher level, such as expanding a division to a corps. The filling out of such units normally is

accomplished by the callup of reservists of group 2 (up to 45 years of age). This method temporarily depletes the operational capability of the converted regular unit by 70 percent because it takes time for the training and consolidation of the expanded unit. This method is normally used for mobilization of all Ground Forces units other than technical units. (U)

- Method 3: One battalion is detached from a full strength regiment, its place being taken by reservists. A new regiment is formed with the detached battalion as the nucleus and from the requisite personnel drawn from the reserves. This method is mainly used for engineer, artillery, armor, and signal units. (U)
- Method 4: This method is used to activate completely new units. Personnel are drawn from groups 2 and 3 (up to 50 years of age) of reservists. Officers are drawn mostly from the reserves; however, active service officers are assigned to the principal command (division, regiment, and battalion) and staff positions. (U)

While units organized under method 4 can be formed in large numbers in short order, it takes a long time for their training and consolidation. The Soviet experiences in World War II were that, even under favorable conditions, it took 6 to 8 months to get units of this type ready for combat. (U)

*Handbook on the Soviet Armed Forces*³

The Soviets use a number of methods to mobilize and expand units. First, a peacetime unit may retain its organization, release part of its personnel as cadre for new units, and expand to wartime strength. Second, a peacetime unit may expand and convert to the next higher level. Finally, new units may be formed directly from the reserves. (U)

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Appendix B**Glossary of Soviet Terms**

The sources for these terms can be found in the NPIC report entitled *Soviet "Second Table of Organization and Equipment" (Mobilization Base) Divisions*, cited in the Preface. (S)

Cadre. Loosely defined as the key group of officers and enlisted men necessary to establish and train a new military unit. (U)

Covering troops (forces). Covering troops (forces) are large units or formations of the border military districts deployed on favorable lines near state borders for repulsing invasions. They also provide favorable conditions for deploying forces of the first strategic echelon and for the conduct of these operations at the beginning of the war. The combat missions of these covering forces are usually carried out by an active defense of designated lines on important axes pending the approach of major forces. Covering troops (forces) are regiment- and division-sized units. (U)



Military district (voyenny okrug). The highest military-administrative level of military units, training institutions, military establishments of the various services, and local military registration-mobilization offices (military commissariats), disposed in a particular area. A military district is headed by the officer commanding the troops of the district; he takes measures in consultation with the military council, staff of the district, district directorates, and local authorities. (U)

Military unit number (voyskovaya chast, V/Ch). A designator for any military unit, and a corresponding number with which it is uniquely associated. The code designator conceals the real name of the unit or establishment. (U)

Mobilization deployment (moblizatsionnoye razvertvaniye). Transition of the armed forces from peacetime to wartime tables of organization and equipment. Mobilization deployment includes: bringing units up to strength with personnel, combat material, armament, and transport; providing troops (or naval or air force personnel) with all types of personal belongings, rations and provisions, fuels and lubricants; assigning permanent force personnel to activate new subunits, units, and formations; bringing naval vessels into commission from a state preservation (i.e., mothballing), and conscripting merchant vessels for naval duty; and, also, organizing the prompt departure of mobilized troops for their operational destinations. (U)

Second table of organization and equipment (TO&E) division (diviziya povtoromu shtatu) is the Soviet term for an inactive, unmanned division collocated with an active 'parent' division. A second TO&E division's equipment set is either prepositioned (collocated with an active division's equipment) or stored at military district reserve storage depots. The predesignated cadre (key personnel) for the second TO&E division occupy officer, noncommissioned officer, and specialist positions within the active division. Upon its activation (mobilization), a second TO&E division draws its cadre and equipment from its parent division and receives a division banner, a true unit designator, and a military unit (Voyskovaya chast or V/Ch) number. The newly activated division may also receive reservists and/or conscripts. The second TO&E division may either relocate, remain collocated with its parent division, or replace a relocated parent division. (S/WN)

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[REDACTED]

Top Secret