



**Directorate of
Intelligence**

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Indications of Instability in Soviet-Supported Third World Regimes



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June 1986

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**Indications of Instability
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Preface

This quarterly is designed to provide warning of political change in 14 Third World countries that are closely associated with the USSR. The publication applies a set of indicators on a regular basis to monitor a variety of pressures on the leaderships of these regimes as well as regime capabilities to respond to these pressures. Analysts have made their evaluations of a country's vulnerability to instability, irregular leadership change, or major policy shift based on events during February-May 1986.

The 14 countries included in this book represent a range of regime types and ties to the USSR. At one end of a continuum lie totalitarian systems that exert near-total control over society and politics; at the other end lie personalist, authoritarian regimes that are imperfectly in control of the society and potential political opponents. These 14 countries can be viewed along a second continuum that measures the extent of their dependency, ties, and mutual interests with the Soviet Union. By developing indicators that capture these varied dimensions, we have sought to lay the groundwork for studying the complex interplay of factors that affect a Third World country's domestic stability and superpower relations. The goal, over time, is to be able to define the most important variables and interrelationships in explaining political, social, and economic dynamics within a country, pressure for change in that political system, and the role of key international actors.

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Summary Indicators

February-May 1986

- Legend ^a
- Very high
 - High
 - ◐ Moderate
 - Low
 - Negligible
 - ▲ Increase from last quarter
 - ▼ Decrease from last quarter

		Instability/Irregular Leadership Change			Insurgency (if applicable)			Relations With the Soviet Union		
		Pressure during:	Prospects for within:		Threat to regime or current policies	Prospects for success in achieving goals		Tension during:	Prospects for major deterioration within:	
		Feb-May 1986	1 year	2-3 years	Feb-May 1986	1 year	2-3 years	Feb-May 1986	1 year	2-3 years
Marxist-Leninist Regimes	Afghanistan	◐	○ ▼	◐	●	○	◐	◐	◐	◐
	South Yemen	● ▲	■ ▲	◐	○ ▼	· ▼	· ▼	●	○	○
	Ethiopia	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Angola	◐	○	◐	●	○	◐	◐	○	◐
	Mozambique	●	◐	■	●	◐	●	◐	○	◐
	Nicaragua	○	○	◐	○	○	○	◐	·	○
Middle East Clients	Syria	○ ▲	○	◐				·	·	·
	Iraq	○	◐	● ▲	○	○	◐	○	○	○
	Libya	◐	◐	●				◐	○	○
Communist Regimes	Cuba	·	·	·				○	○	○
	North Korea	·	·	○				○	○	○
	Vietnam	·	·	○ ▲	·	·	·	·	○	○
	Cambodia	○	·	○	○	·	○	·	○	○
	Laos	·	·	·	○	·	·	·	·	·

^a For the prospects judgments, the following probabilities were assigned:
 Very high=90 percent or higher probability
 High=65-90 percent probability
 Moderate=35-65 percent probability
 Low=10-35 percent probability
 Negligible/none=0-10 percent probability

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**Indications of Instability
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Summary

Developments and Trends

During February to May 1986—the time period covered in this publication—the leadership in *South Yemen* and *Mozambique* faced substantial pressure on a number of fronts—ethnic/regional tensions, economic deterioration, perceived threats of border hostilities, increasing factionalism among the elite, and a deteriorating security situation. In *South Yemen* we rate the prospects for open conflict and an irregular change in leadership very high in the coming months. The new regime has failed to consolidate its position, to gain foreign support, or to resolve serious contentious issues within the ruling elite. We judge that the outcome of any conflict would be highly uncertain because of the fragmented nature of the leadership and the armed forces, the questionable capability of former President Hasani's exiled forces, and the degree of Soviet involvement. While we believe that there are substantial strains in the current South Yemen-USSR relationship, over the longer term Moscow is determined to keep Aden in the Soviet fold and will work behind the scenes to bring about a more stable and acceptable regime, in our view.

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We judge that prospects for an insurgent military victory or a sudden regime change in *Mozambique* are less than even over the next year. In our opinion, the government's deteriorating military position, however, may lead Machel to cool relations with the West in an effort to acquire a significant increase in Soviet military aid. If, as we expect, substantial new Soviet military assistance is not forthcoming, we judge the longer term prospects for a victory by the insurgents or an irregular leadership change to be high.

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Libyan leader Qadhafi appears to be in control and has approached Moscow for increased military assistance. The US retaliatory strike in April weakened his political standing among the military and the populace, in our judgment, by humiliating the Libyan Armed Forces and stimulating West European governments to cooperate with Washington in isolating Qadhafi. These developments strengthen a climate that was already conducive to coup plotting. Prospects for Qadhafi's political survival depend largely on the ability of his elaborate security apparatus to keep the Army in check. revolutionary committees inserted into the armed forces remain loyal and serve effectively as watchdogs against discontent. If the security apparatus breaks down and Qadhafi is removed, a period of instability is likely, as competitors vie for power.

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The Government in *Angola* is uncertain about its best military strategy, [redacted] Government forces, but-tressed by increased Soviet military deliveries, were positioned in late May for a repeat of last year's offensive against UNITA. [redacted]

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[redacted] ambitions of launching a massive offensive against UNITA's southeastern stronghold have been tempered by fears of South African intervention and worries about high levels of UNITA activity in the north. On balance, increased fighting is likely, but the military situation and prospects for insurgent success will not shift dramatically in the near term, in our judgment. [redacted]

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We judge that the effectiveness of the *Afghan* regime may improve in the short term, following the replacement in early May of Babrak Karmal by the even more pro-Soviet ex-intelligence chief Najibullah. Insurgents, however, have continued to demonstrate an effective capability against Afghan army forces, moving quantities of supplies from Pakistan, despite intensified Soviet-Afghan military operations. [redacted]

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We believe that tension in Soviet-client relationships was notable only in the case of *South Yemen* during the past four months. [redacted]

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[redacted] we believe that Aden is unhappy with what it perceives as a lack of substantial Soviet materiel and economic assistance. For their part, the Soviets appear frustrated with continued factional infighting in Aden and probably have strong doubts about the regime's continued viability, according to our Embassy in North Yemen. [redacted]

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Generally, we believe Moscow enjoyed good or improving relations with the other regimes during this period:

- After initial protests by students and supporters of Babrak Karmal, Afghanistan's new leader appears to be controlling dissidents and consolidating his power base.
- Strains in Ethiopian-Soviet relations that developed in the wake of the South Yemen coup have been papered over; Moscow recently lowered the price it charges Addis Ababa for oil.
- Libyan and Syrian delegations visited Moscow seeking closer defense ties and new military equipment in an attempt to deter US or Israeli hostile actions.
- Iraq, according to Embassy reports, received Moscow's agreement to reschedule a portion of its debt and to provide additional credits for civilian imports.
- Cuba and Vietnam received new economic pledges from Moscow. [redacted]

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Part 1. Perspective**Gorbachev's Third World Policy Dilemma**

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The Soviet Communist Party congress in February and the new party program appear to highlight Moscow's desire to hold down the cost of its Third World involvements. In his congress address, Gorbachev soft-pedaled Moscow's internationalist obligations and merely expressed "profound sympathy" for Third World aspirations. The CPSU program adopted at the congress stressed that the construction of socialism by Third World states must occur "mainly through their own efforts." Gorbachev's address to the congress, as well as the party program, underscored the centrality of the US factor in Soviet foreign policy priorities, particularly as they relate to arms control and related security issues.

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Recent Soviet military and economic assistance commitments to key Third World clients, however, suggest that Moscow's support for a core group of key Third World friends will remain strong, and, in some cases, even increase. Record levels of military deliveries to Luanda, new economic aid pledges to Vietnam and Cuba, and continuing military and economic aid to Nicaragua attest to the Soviet Union's intention to backstop its important clients, and to fend off the challenges by Washington.

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Gorbachev thus faces a basic contradiction in his desire to hold down the cost of Moscow's Third World involvements while holding onto, and consolidating, Third World gains achieved in the 1970s. Moreover, his effort to institute major economic reform and reach some arms control modus vivendi with Washington will be hampered to the degree that Third World involvement diverts Soviet economic resources and increases the potential for US-Soviet confrontation.

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The presence of such unpredictable variables as Libyan leader Qadhafi adds to Gorbachev's problems. Private Soviet comments made after the US airstrike on Tripoli in mid-April suggest that Moscow does not want events in Libya to undercut its efforts to engage Washington in a dialogue; still, the USSR felt compelled to take some action to demonstrate that US assertiveness against Soviet interests will affect other aspects of the bilateral relationship. Postponement of the Shultz-Shevardnadze summit

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preparatory talks was a low-cost gesture, but it nonetheless established a linkage between US behavior in the Third World and US-Soviet relations. Moscow rejected such linkage when Washington sought to impose it on Moscow during the 1970s. [redacted]

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Gorbachev himself described the attack as “a link in the chain of provocative actions,” while Foreign Minister Shevardnadze asserted there was an “organic link” between the attack on Tripoli and US nuclear testing in Nevada. The Soviet media commented on other parts of this “chain” of events: US naval operations in the Black Sea, press reports that Stinger anti-aircraft missiles would be sent to guerrillas in Angola and Afghanistan, continued US nuclear testing despite Moscow’s continuing testing ban, and the US-imposed reduction of the Soviet UN staff. [redacted]

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Moscow’s perception of pressure from the United States and the Soviets’ felt need to respond—such as in the Libyan episode—underscore how difficult it will be for Gorbachev to isolate Third World problems from his broader policy agenda. Statements by various Soviet leaders are critical of Gorbachev’s strategy of engaging a US administration that is aggressively challenging the Soviet position across the board in the Third World. To quiet critics, Gorbachev may decide to bolster Soviet support for besieged clients. He might also work more assertively against US interests in those Third World regions of sensitivity to Washington. [redacted]

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Part 2. Country Indicators and Briefs

The indicators have been grouped into three categories to guide the analyst in reaching a judgment about the extent of:

- Pressure for instability or irregular leadership change.
- Insurgent threat to regime or current policies.
- Tension in relations with the USSR.

Each of the indicators is keyed to a set of questions that appears in the appendix.

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In reaching their bottom-line judgments—which in the following charts are highlighted with gray tones—analysts were asked to undertake a two-step process. The first step involved an assessment of the actual level of activity or presence of the indicator in their country during the relevant time period; these assessments are presented in the following individual country charts.

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In a second step, analysts were asked to evaluate the importance of the event or activity described by the instability indicator in judging pressure for instability or irregular leadership change in their country. The chart in the appendix presents these evaluations.

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In evaluating the impact of indicators of discord with the USSR on the overall Soviet-client relationship, analysts were asked to evaluate the strength of their country's ties to and dependency on the USSR; these assessments are tabulated in the lower half of the charts entitled "Relations With the Soviet Union."

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Afghanistan

Instability Indicators

			Level or magnitude	
			Nov 1985-Jan 1986	Feb-May 1986
Legend ■ Very high ● High ◐ Moderate ○ Low · Negligible/none	Socioeconomic factors	Ethnic/regional/religious tensions	●	●
		Population flows/elite emigration	■	■
		Food, energy, consumer goods shortages	◐	○
		Foreign exchange shortages	○	○
	External factors	Regional/border hostilities	■	■
		Political/diplomatic differences with Soviet Bloc	◐	○
		Western efforts to promote policy change	○	○
		Shortfalls in economic aid	○	○
		Shortfalls in military aid	○	○
	Opposition activities	Strength/appeal of opposition groups	■	■
		Protests, strikes, rallies	·	◐
		Reports/rumors of military coup plotting	●	●
		Terrorism and sabotage	■	■
	Regime political vulnerabilities	Loss of legitimacy or confidence	■	■
		Factionalism within ruling party or elite	●	■
		Inefficacy of political/social control	■	■
		Excessive repression/brutality	■	■
		Popular grievances over material welfare	●	●
	Military/security vulnerabilities	Deficiencies of internal security forces	●	●
		Discipline/training problems within military	●	●
Factionalism within military		■	■	
Officers discontent with government actions		●	●	
Pressures for instability or irregular leadership change ^a			◐	◐
Prospects for instability or irregular leadership change within next year			◐	○
Prospects for instability or irregular leadership change within next 2-3 years			◐	◐

Insurgency Scorecard

The insurgency effort	Political performance and capabilities	◐	◐
	Leadership confidence/unity	○	○
	Military capabilities	●	◐
	Rural control	●	●
	Urban activities	◐	◐
	Foreign military support	●	■
	Foreign political support	●	●
The counterinsurgency effort	Political performance and capabilities	○	○
	Leadership confidence/unity	○	○
	Military capabilities	○	○
	Rural control	○	○
	Urban control	◐	◐
	Foreign military support	■	■
	Foreign political support	●	●
Insurgent threat to regime or current policies ^b		●	●
Prospects for success in achieving goals within next year		○	○
Prospects for success in achieving goals within next 2-3 years		◐	◐

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Moscow's new puppet, ex-intelligence chief Najibullah faces a formidable challenge in developing the Afghan army to allow for a reduced Soviet role, improving party discipline and performance, and suppressing the insurgency. Najibullah has held a series of highly visible meetings with key military, party, and tribal groups in what we believe is an effort to energize political institutions, dampen factionalism, and project an appearance of control. [redacted]

[redacted] however, his appointment has brought to the surface divisions within the dominant Parchami wing of the party. Opposition to Babrak Karmal's ouster as Secretary General forced Najibullah into a nominal triumvirate with Babrak as President of the Revolutionary Council and Prime Minister Soltan Ali Keshtmand. Students at Kabul University and local high schools staged widespread demonstrations in support of Karmal upon the announcement of his ouster.

[redacted]

We believe that tension between Karmal and Moscow centered on levels of Soviet military support and Soviet negotiating posture at the Geneva talks on Soviet troop withdrawal. While we judge that the pro-Soviet Najibullah will attempt to meet Soviet demands, it is unclear at this point whether he will be successful and whether, as a result, he will enjoy smoother relations with Moscow. The insurgents suffered the destruction of a major base camp and heavy casualties during a three-week Afghan/Soviet assault in April. They have since reoccupied the base, however, with the withdrawal of the Afghan army. [redacted]

See "Country Essay" in the next section for a more detailed discussion. [redacted]

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Relations With the Soviet Union

Feb-May 1986

Legend	Indicators of discord			
X Present		Dissatisfaction with Soviet or surrogate interference in local affairs	X	
		Popular opposition to Soviet or surrogate presence	X	
		Disagreement over Soviet military support or relations	X	
		Dissatisfaction with Soviet economic aid or relations		
		Disagreement with Soviet third country action or foreign policy stance		
		Differences over party structure/role/relations		
		Improved relations by either party with China or the West		
		Diplomatic rebuffs	X	
Legend ● Strong ◐ Moderate ○ Weak . Negligible/none	Ties and dependency	Party ties with USSR or surrogate	●	
		Government-to-government relations	●	
		Client military dependency	●	
		Client economic dependency	●	
		Soviet/surrogate military access to client bases/ports	●	
		Mutual foreign policy support	●	
		Soviet/surrogate geopolitical interest	●	
		Tension in overall relationship with Soviet Union		◐
		Prospects for major deterioration within next year		◐
		Prospects for major deterioration within next 2-3 years		◐

^aIncludes a judgment about the relative importance of individual indicators in assessing pressures on the regime and prospects for instability/leadership change. See appendix for details.

^bIncludes judgment about each side's effectiveness in using it's capabilities to the detriment of the other. See appendix for details.

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South Yemen

Instability Indicators

			Level or magnitude	
			Nov 1985-Jan 1986	Feb-May 1986
Legend ■ Very high ● High ◐ Moderate ○ Low · Negligible/none	Socioeconomic factors	Ethnic/regional/religious tensions	●	■
		Population flows/elite emigration	◐	◐
		Food, energy, consumer goods shortages	◐	●
		Foreign exchange shortages	●	■
	External factors	Regional/border hostilities	●	■
		Political/diplomatic differences with Soviet Bloc	◐	●
		Western efforts to promote policy change	◐	○
		Shortfalls in economic aid	●	●
		Shortfalls in military aid	◐	■
	Opposition activities	Strength/appeal of opposition groups	◐	●
		Protests, strikes, rallies	○	◐
		Reports/rumors of military coup plotting	◐	●
		Terrorism and sabotage	◐	◐
	Regime political vulnerabilities	Loss of legitimacy or confidence	●	■
		Factionalism within ruling party or elite	●	■
		Inefficacy of political/social control	◐	◐
		Excessive repression/brutality	◐	■
		Popular grievances over material welfare	◐	●
	Military/security vulnerabilities	Deficiencies of internal security forces	◐	●
		Discipline/training problems within military	■	■
Factionalism within military		●	●	
Officers discontent with government actions		◐	●	
Pressures for instability or irregular leadership change ^a		◐	●	
Prospects for instability or irregular leadership change within next year		◐	■	
Prospects for instability or irregular leadership change within next 2-3 years		◐	◐	

Insurgency Scorecard

The insurgency effort	Political performance and capabilities	◐	·
	Leadership confidence/unity	●	○
	Military capabilities	◐	·
	Rural control	○	·
	Urban activities	■	·
	Foreign military support	◐	○
	Foreign political support	◐	◐
The counterinsurgency effort	Political performance and capabilities	◐	◐
	Leadership confidence/unity	◐	·
	Military capabilities	○	·
	Rural control	◐	◐
	Urban control	○	○
	Foreign military support	◐	·
Insurgent threat to regime or current policies ^b		◐	○
Prospects for success in achieving goals within next year		○	·
Prospects for success in achieving goals within next 2-3 years		○	·

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Since seizing power in January, the current regime has so far failed to consolidate its position and gain support either at home or abroad. The security situation remains unstable, and there is little popular confidence in the regime, according to Embassy reporting from North Yemen. Embassy [] reporting indicates that the collective leadership is deeply divided by competing ambitions and internal squabbling; it appears paralyzed without a dominant leader able to manipulate a stable, broadly based coalition. Continuing sources of contention include: dealing with former South Yemeni President Hasani and his supporters who—according to our Embassy in North Yemen—are receiving military training in North Yemen, the deteriorating economic situation, and Aden's inability to obtain foreign diplomatic and financial support. []

A critical unknown is the role of the Soviet Union in the leadership struggle. There are indications, however, of strong tensions in the relationship. Aden is unhappy with what it perceives as a lack of substantial Soviet materiel and economic assistance, according to a source of our Embassy in Sanaa who recently visited South Yemen. [] the Soviets are frustrated with the Aden leadership's unceasing factional infighting and probably have strong doubts about its continued viability. Given Moscow's strong will to keep South Yemen in the Soviet fold, we judge that it will continue to work behind the scenes to bring about a more stable and acceptable regime in Aden. []

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In our judgment, growing hostility between the competing factions in the Aden leadership coupled with mounting security and economic problems may soon lead to the resumption of open conflict. If fighting breaks out in Aden, the outcome would be highly uncertain because of the fragmented nature of the regime and the armed forces. In addition, Hasani's exiled forces would be likely to intervene. Their ability to affect the outcome of hostilities in Aden is questionable, however, because they lack decisive leadership and adequate foreign military support, according to Embassy reports. []

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Relations With the Soviet Union

Feb-May 1986

Legend	Indicators of discord		
X Present		Dissatisfaction with Soviet or surrogate interference in local affairs	X
		Popular opposition to Soviet or surrogate presence	
		Disagreement over Soviet military support or relations	X
		Dissatisfaction with Soviet economic aid or relations	X
		Disagreement with Soviet third country action or foreign policy stance	
		Differences over party structure/role/relations	X
		Improved relations by either party with China or the West	
		Diplomatic rebuffs	X
Legend	Ties and dependency	Party ties with USSR or surrogate	O
		Government-to-government relations	◐
		Client military dependency	●
		Client economic dependency	●
		Soviet/surrogate military access to client bases/ports	●
		Mutual foreign policy support	●
		Soviet/surrogate geopolitical interest	●
		Tension in overall relationship with Soviet Union	●
		Prospects for major deterioration within next year	O
		Prospects for major deterioration within next 2-3 years	O

^aIncludes a judgment about the relative importance of individual indicators in assessing pressures on the regime and prospects for instability/leadership change. See appendix for details.

^bIncludes judgment about each side's effectiveness in using its capabilities to the detriment of the other. See appendix for details.

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Ethiopia

Instability Indicators

			Level or magnitude	
			Nov 1985-Jan 1986	Feb-May 1986
Legend	■	Very high		
	●	High		
	◐	Moderate		
	○	Low		
	·	Negligible/none		
Socioeconomic factors	Ethnic/regional/religious tensions		■	■
	Population flows/elite emigration		○	◐
	Food, energy, consumer goods shortages		●	●
	Foreign exchange shortages		○	○
External factors	Regional/border hostilities		·	·
	Political/diplomatic differences with Soviet Bloc		◐	○
	Western efforts to promote policy change		◐	◐
	Shortfalls in economic aid		○	○
	Shortfalls in military aid		○	○
Opposition activities	Strength/appeal of opposition groups		◐	◐
	Protests, strikes, rallies		○	○
	Reports/rumors of military coup plotting		○	○
	Terrorism and sabotage		·	·
Regime political vulnerabilities	Loss of legitimacy or confidence		·	·
	Factionalism within ruling party or elite		○	○
	Inefficacy of political/social control		○	○
	Excessive repression/brutality		◐	◐
	Popular grievances over material welfare		○	○
Military/security vulnerabilities	Deficiencies of internal security forces		○	○
	Discipline/training problems within military		◐	○
	Factionalism within military		○	○
	Officers discontent with government actions		○	○
Pressures for instability or irregular leadership change ^a			○	○
Prospects for instability or irregular leadership change within next year			○	○
Prospects for instability or irregular leadership change within next 2-3 years			○	○

Insurgency Scorecard

		EPLF ● ◐ TPLF		EPLF ● ◐ TPLF	
The insurgency effort	Political performance and capabilities	●	◐	●	◐
	Leadership confidence/unity	◐	◐	◐	◐
	Military capabilities	◐	◐	◐	◐
	Rural control	◐	◐	◐	◐
	Urban activities	○	○	○	○
	Foreign military support	○	○	○	○
	Foreign political support	○	○	○	○
The counterinsurgency effort	Political performance and capabilities	●		●	
	Leadership confidence/unity	●		●	
	Military capabilities	◐		◐	
	Rural control	◐		◐	
	Urban control	◐		◐	
	Foreign military support	●		●	
	Foreign political support	●		●	
Insurgent threat to regime or current policies ^b		○		○	
Prospects for success in achieving goals within next year		○		○	
Prospects for success in achieving goals within next 2-3 years		○		○	

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Chairman Mengistu continued to expand the party's influence, according to the US Embassy, with newly trained cadres assuming watchdog roles in government ministries and political structures. Party cadre play a leading role in famine relief operations and government villagization and resettlement programs; Mengistu uses these programs to increase control over an independent-minded peasantry and push toward the collectivization of agriculture. The Embassy reports that in September Mengistu intends to announce a new constitution that will establish a "people's democracy" and legalize the present order. [redacted]

Tigrean offensive, however, has inflicted heavy government casualties and may disrupt Addis Ababa's plans for an offensive in Eritrea Province, according to the US Embassy. Reliable Embassy reporting indicates the regime may need to shift troops from Eritrea to reverse Tigrean gains—a move that might lead to new attacks by the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF), in our view. Mengistu reportedly believes the autonomy clauses in his proposed constitution will help end the insurgencies. [redacted]

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Ethiopia told the EC this spring that it would initiate limited agricultural reforms in exchange for additional development assistance, according to Embassy reporting. We believe that Addis Ababa probably consented to the changes because of continued declines in agricultural productivity and living standards and the refusal of major donors to commit funds to agricultural projects without policy reform. In addition, Moscow reportedly has encouraged Chairman Mengistu to improve agricultural performance before proceeding fully with collectivization. We believe the Ethiopian leadership probably views these reforms as a temporary measure and will pursue collectivization further as soon as the current crisis eases. [redacted]

The strains in Ethiopian-Soviet relations that developed in the wake of the South Yemen coup appear to have been papered over in recent months. Both sides seem anxious to avoid further bilateral tensions, and Moscow recently lowered the price it charges Addis Ababa for oil. Mengistu, nonetheless, has resisted Soviet pressure to recognize the new Aden regime and continues to lend political support to deposed President Hasani. In addition, he has allowed Hasani, members of his Politburo, and several hundred followers to stay in Ethiopia. In our view, Mengistu probably calculates that token political support for Hasani will not disrupt Ethiopia's relations with the USSR. We believe Mengistu sought increased military aid during his February visit to Moscow, [redacted]

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The Tigrean People's Liberation Front (TPLF) stepped up its military activity in mid-April, although it has been unable to seize and hold major towns or to resist determined government counterattacks. The

Relations With the Soviet Union

Feb-May 1986

Legend	Indicators of discord		
X Present		Dissatisfaction with Soviet or surrogate interference in local affairs	
		Popular opposition to Soviet or surrogate presence	X
		Disagreement over Soviet military support or relations	X
		Dissatisfaction with Soviet economic aid or relations	
		Disagreement with Soviet third country action or foreign policy stance	X
		Differences over party structure/role/relations	
		Improved relations by either party with China or the West	
Legend ● Strong ◐ Moderate ○ Weak · Negligible/none	Ties and dependency	Party ties with USSR or surrogate	●
		Government-to-government relations	◐
		Client military dependency	●
		Client economic dependency	◐
		Soviet/surrogate military access to client bases/ports	●
		Mutual foreign policy support	●
		Soviet/surrogate geopolitical interest	●
		Tension in overall relationship with Soviet Union	○
		Prospects for major deterioration within next year	○
		Prospects for major deterioration within next 2-3 years	○

^aIncludes a judgment about the relative importance of individual indicators in assessing pressures on the regime and prospects for instability/leadership change. See appendix for details.

^bIncludes judgment about each side's effectiveness in using its capabilities to the detriment of the other. See appendix for details.

Secret

Angola

Instability Indicators

			Level or magnitude	
			Nov 1985-Jan 1986	Feb-May 1986
Legend ■ Very high ● High ◐ Moderate ○ Low · Negligible/none	Socioeconomic factors	Ethnic/regional/religious tensions	●	●
		Population flows/elite emigration	◐	◐
		Food, energy, consumer goods shortages	◐	●
		Foreign exchange shortages	○	●
	External factors	Regional/border hostilities	○	○
		Political/diplomatic differences with Soviet Bloc	◐	○
		Western efforts to promote policy change	◐	◐
		Shortfalls in economic aid	○	◐
		Shortfalls in military aid	○	○
	Opposition activities	Strength/appeal of opposition groups	○	◐
		Protests, strikes, rallies	○	○
		Reports/rumors of military coup plotting	○	○
		Terrorism and sabotage	●	●
	Regime political vulnerabilities	Loss of legitimacy or confidence	○	○
		Factionalism within ruling party or elite	◐	◐
		Inefficacy of political/social control	◐	◐
		Excessive repression/brutality	◐	◐
		Popular grievances over material welfare	●	●
	Military/security vulnerabilities	Deficiencies of internal security forces	●	●
		Discipline/training problems within military	○	○
Factionalism within military		◐	◐	
Officers discontent with government actions		○	○	
Pressures for instability or irregular leadership change ^a		●	●	
Prospects for instability or irregular leadership change within next year		○	○	
Prospects for instability or irregular leadership change within next 2-3 years		◐	◐	

Insurgency Scorecard

The insurgency effort	Political performance and capabilities	●	●
	Leadership confidence/unity	●	●
	Military capabilities	●	●
	Rural control	●	●
	Urban activities	○	◐
	Foreign military support	◐	●
	Foreign political support	○	◐
The counterinsurgency effort	Political performance and capabilities	◐	◐
	Leadership confidence/unity	◐	◐
	Military capabilities	◐	◐
	Rural control	◐	◐
	Urban control	○	○
	Foreign military support	●	●
	Foreign political support	●	●
Insurgent threat to regime or current policies ^b		●	●
Prospects for success in achieving goals within next year		○	○
Prospects for success in achieving goals within next 2-3 years		◐	◐

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Secret

Secret

According to a variety of diplomatic observers in Luanda, the Angolan Government is uncertain about its military options. Ambitions of launching a massive offensive against UNITA's southeastern stronghold have been tempered by fears of a major South African intervention on UNITA's behalf and worries about continued UNITA activities in the northern part of the country. [redacted]

[redacted] government forces—buttressed by increased Soviet military deliveries—remain positioned for a repeat of last year's major offensive into the UNITA stronghold. With continued Soviet and Cuban support, Luanda probably will not relax military pressure on the insurgents and is likely to launch another offensive against UNITA this summer. For its part, UNITA, [redacted] is more confident of its prospects. Since late last year, the insurgents have sustained a high level of guerrilla activity in northern and eastern Angola and are buoyed by US support. On balance, increased fighting is likely, but the military situation probably will not shift dramatically in the near term and a continued standoff appears likely. [redacted]

The drastic fall in the price of oil—which provides 90 percent of Angola's foreign exchange—has shaken Angola's development plans and heretofore solid creditworthiness, causing the regime to seek debt relief and to worry about how it will pay for needed arms. Food shortages are likely to become even more severe in the months ahead, and industrial output will continue to fall as imports and the

nonmilitary budget are cut. According to diplomatic sources, the government's performance and popular appeal have not improved appreciably despite a major reshuffling of government ministries and restructuring of the party. [redacted]

Reporting from diplomatic observers in Luanda suggests that the combined pressures have increased the dependence of the regime on the Soviets and the Cubans. According to diplomatic reporting, senior Angolan, Cuban, and Soviet policy-level officials held a major strategy session in Moscow in February, and President dos Santos in May completed a highly publicized state visit to the Soviet Union. Preliminary readings of the visit from press accounts suggest dos Santos got promises of continued arms aid and possibly some concessions on Angola's substantial debt while hewing more closely to the Soviet line on the impossibility of a US-brokered regional settlement. Over the past few months, the quantity of Soviet arms deliveries to Angola has reached record levels, probably in large part to support the expected offensive. [redacted]

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Relations With the Soviet Union

Feb-May 1986

Legend	Indicators of discord		
X Present		Dissatisfaction with Soviet or surrogate interference in local affairs	
		Popular opposition to Soviet or surrogate presence	X
		Disagreement over Soviet military support or relations	X
		Dissatisfaction with Soviet economic aid or relations	X
		Disagreement with Soviet third country action or foreign policy stance	
		Differences over party structure/role/relations	X
		Improved relations by either party with China or the West	
	Diplomatic rebuffs		
Legend	Ties and dependency		
● Strong ◐ Moderate ○ Weak · Negligible/none		Party ties with USSR or surrogate	●
		Government-to-government relations	●
		Client military dependency	●
		Client economic dependency	○
		Soviet/surrogate military access to client bases/ports	●
		Mutual foreign policy support	●
		Soviet/surrogate geopolitical interest	◐
	Tension in overall relationship with Soviet Union	◐	
	Prospects for major deterioration within next year	○	
	Prospects for major deterioration within next 2-3 years	◐	

^aIncludes a judgment about the relative importance of individual indicators in assessing pressures on the regime and prospects for instability/leadership change. See appendix for details.

^bIncludes judgment about each side's effectiveness in using its capabilities to the detriment of the other. See appendix for details.

Secret

Secret

Mozambique

Instability Indicators

			Level or magnitude	
			Nov 1985-Jan 1986	Feb-May 1986
Legend ■ Very high ● High ◐ Moderate ○ Low · Negligible/none	Socioeconomic factors	Ethnic/regional/religious tensions	■	■
		Population flows/elite emigration	●	●
		Food, energy, consumer goods shortages	●	●
		Foreign exchange shortages	●	●
	External factors	Regional/border hostilities	●	■
		Political/diplomatic differences with Soviet Bloc	◐	◐
		Western efforts to promote policy change	○	○
		Shortfalls in economic aid	■	■
		Shortfalls in military aid	◐	●
	Opposition activities	Strength/appeal of opposition groups	●	●
		Protests, strikes, rallies	○	◐
		Reports/rumors of military coup plotting	●	●
		Terrorism and sabotage	■	■
	Regime political vulnerabilities	Loss of legitimacy or confidence	◐	◐
		Factionalism within ruling party or elite	○	◐
		Inefficacy of political/social control	●	●
		Excessive repression/brutality	○	○
		Popular grievances over material welfare	■	■
	Military/security vulnerabilities	Deficiencies of internal security forces	◐	◐
		Discipline/training problems within military	●	●
Factionalism within military		○	◐	
Officers discontent with government actions		●	●	
Pressures for instability or irregular leadership change ^a		●	●	
Prospects for instability or irregular leadership change within next year		◐	◐	
Prospects for instability or irregular leadership change within next 2-3 years		■	■	

Insurgency Scorecard

The insurgency effort	Political performance and capabilities	◐	◐
	Leadership confidence/unity	◐	◐
	Military capabilities	■	■
	Rural control	●	●
	Urban activities	◐	◐
	Foreign military support	◐	◐
	Foreign political support	·	·
The counterinsurgency effort	Political performance and capabilities	◐	◐
	Leadership confidence/unity	○	◐
	Military capabilities	·	○
	Rural control	○	○
	Urban control	●	●
	Foreign military support	○	○
	Foreign political support	●	●
Insurgent threat to regime or current policies ^b		●	●
Prospects for success in achieving goals within next year		◐	◐
Prospects for success in achieving goals within next 2-3 years		●	●

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Secret

US Embassy and [redacted] that the Mozambican insurgents have recovered from last fall's Zimbabwean-led offensive, and, in our judgment, probably will gain firm control of their traditional heartland in rural central Mozambique during the coming year. Zimbabwean forces have reverted to a more defensive posture but could disrupt the rebels again if ordered to resume large counter guerrilla operations in Mozambique. According to Embassy reports, Zimbabwean commanders are frustrated and concerned about costs and probably will do little more than guard two transportation corridors that Zimbabwe uses. The Mozambican Army remains demoralized and inept, but it will benefit from shorter supply lines and some tribal support to continue to hold large areas of the northeast and south as well as the major cities. US Embassy reporting indicates that Mozambique's economic slide continued to aggravate food shortages and to swell refugee camps. Grain marketing over the crop year just begun is expected to total only one-tenth of requirements, and, in our judgment, Maputo will be unable to make principal and interest payments on its foreign debt owed mainly to Western creditors. [redacted]

Maputo has responded with efforts to strengthen government and Army discipline and performance and to seek both exploratory talks with the rebels and more military aid from the Soviets, according to the press. An extended and, we judge, probably contentious Politburo meeting in late February criticized the government and the military and announced measures to enhance party supervision. [redacted]

[redacted] Sketchy press and US Embassy reporting leads us to believe that government officials have begun secret contacts with the rebels, but reconciliation is unlikely as long as neither side is willing to drop preconditions currently unacceptable to the other. [redacted]

Press statements suggest that Machel received assurances of continued Soviet military support during a visit to Moscow in March, but apparently less than he sought. Perhaps to placate the Soviets, he placed two Marxist hardliners in party posts overseeing the economy in April, but Machel also named moderates to head the economic ministries and apparently intends to continue economic reforms and cooperation with the West for now. Nonetheless, we believe that the government's deteriorating military position may lead Machel to cool relations with the West and to adopt a more confrontational stance toward South Africa in an effort to acquire a significant increase in Soviet military aid. We judge the prospects for an insurgent military victory or irregular leadership change as less than even over the next year. If, as we expect, substantial new Soviet military assistance is not forthcoming, we judge longer term prospects for regime change as high. [redacted]

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Relations With the Soviet Union

Legend		Indicators of discord	Feb-May 1986	
X Present		Dissatisfaction with Soviet or surrogate interference in local affairs	X	
		Popular opposition to Soviet or surrogate presence		
		Disagreement over Soviet military support or relations	X	
		Dissatisfaction with Soviet economic aid or relations	X	
		Disagreement with Soviet third country action or foreign policy stance		
		Differences over party structure/role/relations	X	
		Improved relations by either party with China or the West		
		Diplomatic rebuffs	X	
● Strong ◐ Moderate ○ Weak · Negligible/none	Ties and dependency	Party ties with USSR or surrogate	◐	
		Government-to-government relations	◐	
		Client military dependency	●	
		Client economic dependency	◐	
		Soviet/surrogate military access to client bases/ports	◐	
		Mutual foreign policy support	◐	
		Soviet/surrogate geopolitical interest	○	
		Tension in overall relationship with Soviet Union		●
		Prospects for major deterioration within next year		○
		Prospects for major deterioration within next 2-3 years		●

^aIncludes a judgment about the relative importance of individual indicators in assessing pressures on the regime and prospects for instability/leadership change. See appendix for details.

^bIncludes judgment about each side's effectiveness in using its capabilities to the detriment of the other. See appendix for details.

Secret

Nicaragua

Instability Indicators

			Level or magnitude	
			Nov 1985-Jan 1986	Feb-May 1986
Legend ■ Very high ● High ◐ Moderate ○ Low · Negligible/none	Socioeconomic factors	Ethnic/regional/religious tensions	◐	●
		Population flows/elite emigration	◐	●
		Food, energy, consumer goods shortages	●	●
		Foreign exchange shortages	◐	◐
	External factors	Regional/border hostilities	·	○
		Political/diplomatic differences with Soviet Bloc	·	·
		Western efforts to promote policy change	◐	◐
		Shortfalls in economic aid	◐	◐
		Shortfalls in military aid	○	○
	Opposition activities	Strength/appeal of opposition groups	○	○
		Protests, strikes, rallies	○	◐
		Reports/rumors of military coup plotting	·	·
		Terrorism and sabotage	·	·
	Regime political vulnerabilities	Loss of legitimacy or confidence	·	·
		Factionalism within ruling party or elite	○	○
		Inefficacy of political/social control	○	○
		Excessive repression/brutality	○	○
		Popular grievances over material welfare	○	○
	Military/security vulnerabilities	Deficiencies of internal security forces	○	○
		Discipline/training problems within military	◐	◐
Factionalism within military		○	○	
Officers discontent with government actions		·	·	
Pressures for instability or irregular leadership change ^a		○	○	
Prospects for instability or irregular leadership change within next year		○	○	
Prospects for instability or irregular leadership change within next 2-3 years		◐	◐	

Insurgency Scorecard

The insurgency effort	Political performance and capabilities	○	○
	Leadership confidence/unity	○	○
	Military capabilities	◐	◐
	Rural control	○	○
	Urban activities	·	·
	Foreign military support	◐	◐
	Foreign political support	○	○
	The counterinsurgency effort	Political performance and capabilities	◐
Leadership confidence/unity		●	●
Military capabilities		◐	◐
Rural control		◐	◐
Urban control		●	●
Foreign military support		◐	●
Foreign political support		●	●
Insurgent threat to regime or current policies ^b		○	○
Prospects for success in achieving goals within next year		○	○
Prospects for success in achieving goals within next 2-3 years		◐	◐

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Secret

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Although the Sandinistas continue to face challenges from the insurgency, a declining economy, and eroding popular support, we judge prospects for regime change to be low in the near term. Ongoing insurgent efforts to achieve greater unity, formulate a more effective political strategy, and establish better links to the internal opposition could, however, lead to more pressure on the regime. Insurgent performance in the field improved over the past several months, and we estimate that the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN), the main insurgent group, now has some 10,000 troops inside Nicaragua. Rebel groups on the east coast and in the south, where field commanders formerly loyal to rebel leader Eden Pastora forged an alliance with the FDN, also increased their activities. For its part, the regime's Air Force has been increasingly effective in ferrying troops, providing fire support, evacuating casualties, and supplying units in the field. Sandinista security forces also continue to harass civilian supporters of the insurgents, according to US Embassy reports. [redacted]

On the economic front, Nicaragua's recent harvest was the worst this decade, and increased Soviet Bloc help will not offset a further decline in agricultural export earnings this year. Government officials say that the December-March coffee harvest was one-third below last year, and the nearly completed cotton harvest also is likely to be down by about a third. In addition to emergency shipments of rice, the

USSR in the last six months committed \$115 million for agricultural development projects, but these will take at least two years to begin to pay off. [redacted]

Although some domestic opponents, after months of political inactivity, took advantage of May Day celebrations to sharply criticize and demonstrate against the regime, government controls and internal bickering have kept them in check. Unions and political parties from the opposition coalition held several separate rallies on May Day in competition with the Sandinistas' celebrations. The US Embassy reports that some 2,000 to 3,000 participants joined in a march sponsored by an independent labor federation carrying placards and shouting antiregime slogans. The Embassy reported, however, that the demonstrations failed to spark any public reaction. Although the regime tolerated the May Day events, we believe it will probably invoke existing emergency laws against public gatherings if further rallies are attempted. Meanwhile, US Embassy reports indicate that some 10,000 Miskito Indians fled into Honduras earlier this year, in part to escape regime human rights violations. [redacted]

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Relations With the Soviet Union

Feb-May 1986

Legend	Indicators of discord		
X Present	Dissatisfaction with Soviet or surrogate interference in local affairs		
	Popular opposition to Soviet or surrogate presence		
	Disagreement over Soviet military support or relations		
	Dissatisfaction with Soviet economic aid or relations		
	Disagreement with Soviet third country action or foreign policy stance		
	Differences over party structure/role/relations		
	Improved relations by either party with China or the West		
Legend	Diplomatic rebuffs		
	Ties and dependency		
	● Strong	Party ties with USSR or surrogate	●
	○ Moderate	Government-to-government relations	●
	○ Weak	Client military dependency	●
	• Negligible/none	Client economic dependency	●
		Soviet/surrogate military access to client bases/ports	•
		Mutual foreign policy support	●
		Soviet/surrogate geopolitical interest	●
		Tension in overall relationship with Soviet Union	◐
	Prospects for major deterioration within next year	○	
	Prospects for major deterioration within next 2-3 years	◐	

^aIncludes a judgment about the relative importance of individual indicators in assessing pressures on the regime and prospects for instability/leadership change. See appendix for details.

^bIncludes judgment about each side's effectiveness in using its capabilities to the detriment of the other. See appendix for details.

Secret

Secret

Syria

Instability Indicators

			Level or magnitude	
			Nov 1985-Jan 1986	Feb-May 1986
Legend ■ Very high ● High ◐ Moderate ○ Low · Negligible/none	Socioeconomic factors	Ethnic/regional/religious tensions	○	◐
		Population flows/elite emigration	·	·
		Food, energy, consumer goods shortages	·	◐
		Foreign exchange shortages	◐	●
	External factors	Regional/border hostilities	·	◐
		Political/diplomatic differences with Soviet Bloc	·	·
		Western efforts to promote policy change	○	○
		Shortfalls in economic aid	·	●
		Shortfalls in military aid	·	·
	Opposition activities	Strength/appeal of opposition groups	·	·
		Protests, strikes, rallies	·	·
		Reports/rumors of military coup plotting	·	·
		Terrorism and sabotage	·	●
	Regime political vulnerabilities	Loss of legitimacy or confidence	·	·
		Factionalism within ruling party or elite	·	·
		Inefficacy of political/social control	·	·
		Excessive repression/brutality	○	◐
		Popular grievances over material welfare	○	○
	Military/security vulnerabilities	Deficiencies of internal security forces	·	●
		Discipline/training problems within military	·	·
Factionalism within military		◐	○	
Officers discontent with government actions		·	·	
Pressures for instability or irregular leadership change^a		·	○	
Prospects for instability or irregular leadership change within next year		○	○	
Prospects for instability or irregular leadership change within next 2-3 years		◐	◐	

Insurgency Scorecard

The insurgency effort	Political performance and capabilities		
	Leadership confidence/unity		
	Military capabilities		
	Rural control		
	Urban activities		
	Foreign military support		
	Foreign political support		
	The counterinsurgency effort	Political performance and capabilities	
Leadership confidence/unity			
Military capabilities			
Rural control			
Urban control			
Foreign military support			
Foreign political support			
Insurgent threat to regime or current policies^b			
Prospects for success in achieving goals within next year			
Prospects for success in achieving goals within next 2-3 years			

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Secret

The past few months have been tumultuous for the Syrian Government, marked by domestic bombings, continued economic deterioration, and heightened tensions with Israel. The spate of bombings and attempted bombings that hit northern Syria and Damascus in March and April are unprecedented in recent years. More than a dozen incidents were reported, with one bombing resulting in over 140 killed. While the bombings have officially been ascribed to Iraq for political convenience, Syrian high officials reportedly believe they were the work of Lebanese Phalange elements in retaliation for similar bombings carried out by Syrian-backed groups in the Lebanese Christian enclave. [redacted]

Syrian security has increased internal surveillance and rounded up the usual suspects, including Christians, Palestinians, and Muslim Brotherhood elements. The crackdown undoubtedly has created ill-will among some groups, but so far there has been no popular backlash against the regime. If evidence implicating the Muslim Brotherhood is found—and so far it has not been—it would be the first indication of activity by the group since its suppression in 1982. While there is no indication that Assad is losing control, the fact that Assad's ubiquitous security apparatus proved permeable could offer hope to regime opponents who have been biding their time. [redacted]

Assad continues to grapple with the worst economic crisis since he came to power 16 years ago. Skyrocketing inflation and shortages of housing, food, and consumer goods place persistent popular pressure

on the regime, while aid from moderate Arab states is declining. According to the Embassy, Assad anticipates an increase in oil revenue in the not-too-distant future, and, we believe, therefore, he is not likely to carry through with meaningful economic reform—including curtailment of expensive, but popular, bread subsidies. [redacted]

Publicity over Syrian involvement in the April El Al bombing attempt and fears of possible military retaliation have soured relations with the West. [redacted] Damascus has asked Moscow for new equipment and renewed guarantees of military support. Moscow was almost certainly embarrassed by the failure of the SA-5 missile system during US strikes on Libya, and [redacted] it has probably upgraded the SA-5 missile system in Syria to prevent similar failures in the future. High-level Syrian-Soviet talks held in Moscow in late May stressed reconciliation between Syria and Iraq, improving Syrian-PLO relations, and the possibility of Israeli attacks against Syrian forces in Lebanon, according to press reports. Damascus probably believes that close ties to the Soviet Union increase its ability to deter Israeli or US military attacks on Syria. [redacted]

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Relations With the Soviet Union

Feb-May 1986

Legend	Indicators of discord		
X Present	Dissatisfaction with Soviet or surrogate interference in local affairs		
	Popular opposition to Soviet or surrogate presence		
	Disagreement over Soviet military support or relations		
	Dissatisfaction with Soviet economic aid or relations		
	Disagreement with Soviet third country action or foreign policy stance		
	Differences over party structure/role/relations		
	Improved relations by either party with China or the West		
	Diplomatic rebuffs		
Legend ● Strong ◐ Moderate ○ Weak · Negligible/none	Ties and dependency		
	Party ties with USSR or surrogate		◐
	Government-to-government relations		◐
	Client military dependency		●
	Client economic dependency		○
	Soviet/surrogate military access to client bases/ports		◐
	Mutual foreign policy support		◐
	Soviet/surrogate geopolitical interest		●
	Tension in overall relationship with Soviet Union		·
	Prospects for major deterioration within next year		·
Prospects for major deterioration within next 2-3 years		·	

^aIncludes a judgment about the relative importance of individual indicators in assessing pressures on the regime and prospects for instability/leadership change. See appendix for details.

^bIncludes judgment about each side's effectiveness in using its capabilities to the detriment of the other. See appendix for details.

Secret

Iraq

Instability Indicators

			Level or magnitude	
			Nov 1985-Jan 1986	Feb-May 1986
Legend ■ Very high ● High ◐ Moderate ○ Low · Negligible/none	Socioeconomic factors	Ethnic/regional/religious tensions	●	●
		Population flows/elite emigration	○	○
		Food, energy, consumer goods shortages	○	◐
		Foreign exchange shortages	◐	●
	External factors	Regional/border hostilities	●	●
		Political/diplomatic differences with Soviet Bloc	○	○
		Western efforts to promote policy change	○	○
		Shortfalls in economic aid	○	●
		Shortfalls in military aid	○	○
	Opposition activities	Strength/appeal of opposition groups	◐	◐
		Protests, strikes, rallies	○	◐
		Reports/rumors of military coup plotting	○	○
		Terrorism and sabotage	◐	◐
	Regime political vulnerabilities	Loss of legitimacy or confidence	·	·
		Factionalism within ruling party or elite	○	·
		Inefficacy of political/social control	○	○
		Excessive repression/brutality	◐	◐
		Popular grievances over material welfare	○	○
	Military/security vulnerabilities	Deficiencies of internal security forces	◐	○
		Discipline/training problems within military	◐	◐
Factionalism within military		○	○	
Officers discontent with government actions		○	○	
Pressures for instability or irregular leadership change ^a		○	○	
Prospects for instability or irregular leadership change within next year		◐	◐	
Prospects for instability or irregular leadership change within next 2-3 years		◐	●	

Insurgency Scorecard

The insurgency effort	Political performance and capabilities	◐	◐
	Leadership confidence/unity	◐	◐
	Military capabilities	◐	◐
	Rural control	●	◐
	Urban activities	○	●
	Foreign military support	◐	◐
	Foreign political support	○	○
The counterinsurgency effort	Political performance and capabilities	◐	◐
	Leadership confidence/unity	●	●
	Military capabilities	◐	◐
	Rural control	◐	◐
	Urban control	●	●
	Foreign military support	●	◐
	Foreign political support	●	●
Insurgent threat to regime or current policies ^b		○	○
Prospects for success in achieving goals within next year		○	○
Prospects for success in achieving goals within next 2-3 years		◐	◐

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Iran's capture of Al Faw on the west bank of the Shatt al Arab in February together with continued economic deterioration have further weakened civilian morale, in our judgment. According to the US Embassy in Baghdad, there is popular disgruntlement, largely reflecting frustration over the protracted war. Discontent is not organized, however. In addition, senior commanders have complained about Saddam's handling of the war, [] but the security services' tight surveillance of the armed services makes any coup plotting difficult, in our view. The growing unhappiness with Saddam, nonetheless, increases the chances of an assassination. For their part, Kurdish insurgents resumed attacks against urban centers this spring, stirring the usual antigovernment feelings and protests among the local Kurdish population. Baghdad, however, has committed additional troops to the Kurdish areas, and this has temporarily checked the rebels' operations, according to the Embassy. []

The sharp decline in world oil prices has severely weakened Iraq's financial position, forcing Baghdad to announce new austerity measures and delay payments on its foreign debt. The defaults on short-term debt have begun to affect Baghdad's ability to finance civilian imports, a key factor in maintaining wartime morale. While the USSR and France—Iraq's largest arms suppliers—are not likely to restrict critical military supplies, financial aid from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait probably will not be enough to completely offset current payment problems and will eventually prompt even greater spending cuts. According to Embassy reports, Moscow has agreed to reschedule a portion of Iraq's debt and to provide additional credits for civilian imports. []

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Relations With the Soviet Union

Feb-May 1986

Legend	Indicators of discord		
✕ Present		Dissatisfaction with Soviet or surrogate interference in local affairs	
		Popular opposition to Soviet or surrogate presence	
		Disagreement over Soviet military support or relations	✕
		Dissatisfaction with Soviet economic aid or relations	
		Disagreement with Soviet third country action or foreign policy stance	
		Differences over party structure/role/relations	
		Improved relations by either party with China or the West	✕
		Diplomatic rebuffs	
● Strong	Ties and dependency	Party ties with USSR or surrogate	◐
◐ Moderate		Government-to-government relations	●
○ Weak		Client military dependency	●
• Negligible: none		Client economic dependency	◐
		Soviet/surrogate military access to client bases/ports	○
		Mutual foreign policy support	◐
		Soviet/surrogate geopolitical interest	●
		Tension in overall relationship with Soviet Union	○
		Prospects for major deterioration within next year	○
		Prospects for major deterioration within next 2-3 years	○

^aIncludes a judgment about the relative importance of individual indicators in assessing pressures on the regime and prospects for instability/leadership change. See appendix for details.

^bIncludes judgment about each side's effectiveness in using its capabilities to the detriment of the other. See appendix for details.

Secret

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Libya

Instability Indicators

			Level or magnitude	
			Nov 1985-Jan 1986	Feb-May 1986
Legend ■ Very high ● High ◐ Moderate ○ Low · Negligible/none	Socioeconomic factors	Ethnic/regional/religious tensions	●	●
		Population flows/elite emigration	●	●
		Food, energy, consumer goods shortages	■	■
		Foreign exchange shortages	◐	●
	External factors	Regional/border hostilities	○	○
		Political/diplomatic differences with Soviet Bloc	◐	◐
		Western efforts to promote policy change	●	■
		Shortfalls in economic aid	○	○
		Shortfalls in military aid	◐	◐
	Opposition activities	Strength/appeal of opposition groups	○	○
		Protests, strikes, rallies	○	○
		Reports/rumors of military coup plotting	◐	◐
		Terrorism and sabotage	○	○
	Regime political vulnerabilities	Loss of legitimacy or confidence	◐	●
		Factionalism within ruling party or elite	●	●
		Inefficacy of political/social control	○	○
		Excessive repression/brutality	◐	◐
	Military/security vulnerabilities	Popular grievances over material welfare	■	■
		Deficiencies of internal security forces	◐	◐
		Discipline/training problems within military	○	◐
Factionalism within military		●	●	
	Officers discontent with government actions	■	■	
	Pressures for instability or irregular leadership change ^a	◐	◐	
	Prospects for instability or irregular leadership change within next year	◐	◐	
	Prospects for instability or irregular leadership change within next 2-3 years	●	●	

Insurgency Scorecard

The insurgency effort	Political performance and capabilities		
	Leadership confidence/unity		
	Military capabilities		
	Rural control		
	Urban activities		
	Foreign military support		
	Foreign political support		
The counterinsurgency effort	Political performance and capabilities		
	Leadership confidence/unity		
	Military capabilities		
	Rural control		
	Urban control		
	Foreign military support		
	Foreign political support		
	Insurgent threat to regime or current policies ^b		
	Prospects for success in achieving goals within next year		
	Prospects for success in achieving goals within next 2-3 years		

Libyan leader Qadhafi remains in charge, but the US airstrike has damaged his ability to rally the public and the military, in our view. Libya's political climate was already highly coup prone before the attack, in our judgment, and a precipitating event, such as Western military or economic retaliation for another Libyan-sponsored terrorist activity, could provoke conspirators to act. For the time being, however, we believe that Qadhafi's pervasive security forces remain loyal and have effectively neutralized the capability of the regular Army to mount a coup. Economic difficulties—generated largely by the US freeze on Libyan assets last January and the fall in oil prices—also continue to contribute to Qadhafi's domestic problems. In the aftermath of the US strikes, [redacted] tensions were raised between Tripoli and Moscow over what Qadhafi considered inadequate Soviet support. The visit by Libya's number-two man Jallud to Moscow in late May, however, may signal closer ties. We judge that the extensive involvement of Defense Minister Sokolov in the talks and the announcement of a Soviet military visit to Tripoli this month strongly suggest that Moscow offered the Libyans additional military assistance. Moscow apparently turned down a Libyan request for a friendship treaty and publicly reprimanded Tripoli for overtly promoting terrorism. [redacted]

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See "Country Essays" in the next section for more detail and alternative future scenarios. [redacted]

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Relations With the Soviet Union

Feb-May 1986

Legend	Indicators of discord			
X Present		Dissatisfaction with Soviet or surrogate interference in local affairs		
		Popular opposition to Soviet or surrogate presence		
		Disagreement over Soviet military support or relations	*	
		Dissatisfaction with Soviet economic aid or relations	*	
		Disagreement with Soviet third country action or foreign policy stance	*	
		Differences over party structure/role/relations		
		Improved relations by either party with China or the West		
		Diplomatic rebuffs	*	
Legend ● Strong ◐ Moderate ○ Weak · Negligible/none	Ties and dependency	Party ties with USSR or surrogate	()	
		Government-to-government relations	●	
		Client military dependency	●	
		Client economic dependency	()	
		Soviet/surrogate military access to client bases/ports	()	
		Mutual foreign policy support	◐	
		Soviet/surrogate geopolitical interest	●	
		Tension in overall relationship with Soviet Union		◐
		Prospects for major deterioration within next year		○
		Prospects for major deterioration within next 2-3 years		○

^aIncludes a judgment about the relative importance of individual indicators in assessing pressures on the regime and prospects for instability/leadership change. See appendix for details.

^bIncludes judgment about each side's effectiveness in using its capabilities to the detriment of the other. See appendix for details.

Cuba

Instability Indicators

			Level or magnitude	
			Nov 1985-Jan 1986	Feb-May 1986
Legend ■ Very high ● High ◐ Moderate ○ Low · Negligible/none	Socioeconomic factors	Ethnic/regional/religious tensions	·	·
		Population flows/elite emigration	·	·
		Food, energy, consumer goods shortages	○	○
		Foreign exchange shortages	○	◐
	External factors	Regional/border hostilities	·	·
		Political/diplomatic differences with Soviet Bloc	○	○
		Western efforts to promote policy change	○	◐
		Shortfalls in economic aid	○	○
	Opposition activities	Shortfalls in military aid	·	·
		Strength/appeal of opposition groups	·	·
		Protests, strikes, rallies	·	·
		Reports/rumors of military coup plotting	·	·
	Regime political vulnerabilities	Terrorism and sabotage	·	·
		Loss of legitimacy or confidence	·	·
		Factionalism within ruling party or elite	·	·
		Inefficacy of political/social control	·	·
		Excessive repression/brutality	·	·
	Military/security vulnerabilities	Popular grievances over material welfare	○	○
		Deficiencies of internal security forces	·	·
		Discipline/training problems within military	·	·
Factionalism within military		·	·	
		Officers discontent with government actions	·	·
		Pressures for instability or irregular leadership change ^a	·	·
		Prospects for instability or irregular leadership change within next year	·	·
		Prospects for instability or irregular leadership change within next 2-3 years	·	·

Insurgency Scorecard

The insurgency effort	Political performance and capabilities		
	Leadership confidence/unity		
	Military capabilities		
	Rural control		
	Urban activities		
	Foreign military support		
	Foreign political support		
The counterinsurgency effort	Political performance and capabilities		
	Leadership confidence/unity		
	Military capabilities		
	Rural control		
	Urban control		
	Foreign military support		
	Foreign political support		
Insurgent threat to regime or current policies ^b			
Prospects for success in achieving goals within next year			
Prospects for success in achieving goals within next 2-3 years			

Economic difficulties continued to mount during the past few months, largely because of reduced hard currency earnings from sugar and oil. In April Havana threatened to suspend debt repayments owed to Western banks and governments and asked Western creditors to reschedule debts falling due in 1986 and 1987; Havana has since backed off its threat to suspend interest payments. There is some evidence that disillusionment with the regime over economic issues is on the rise. Castro has sharply criticized worker apathy, and official Cuban statistics show street crime is rising. Moreover, we believe that Castro's decision in late May to abolish the farmers' free markets will increase disenchantment among consumers. Havana is responding to its economic difficulties and public dissatisfaction over economic matters with greater regimentation of government, party, and society, and the use of the alleged threat from the United States to justify ever-greater sacrifices on the part of the population. Tougher stances on hard currency assistance by both Western creditors and Moscow may lead Castro to delay or even to renounce some hard currency debt. [redacted]

Castro's acquiescence to Gorbachev's call for improved Third World economic performance has provided the catalyst for a warming trend in Soviet-Cuban relations. Paralleling Gorbachev's call for economic reforms at the 27th CPSU Congress, Castro devoted much of his speech at the Third Cuban Communist Party Congress in February to criticism of economic shortcomings, stressing the need to meet export commitments to CEMA, adopt new technologies, improve

productivity, and continue austerity. Moscow, for its part, sent its second-ranked Politburo member Ligachev to the Havana congress where he told the Cubans they could depend on the Soviet Union to fulfill its commitments to Cuba. [redacted]

Despite the mutual protestations of solidarity, there are signs that frictions in the relationship—particularly over economic aid—still persist. The Cuban media trumpeted Cuban-Soviet economic agreements signed in early April that call for a 50-percent increase in Soviet development credits over the span of Cuba's 1986-90 economic plan. Development credits account for only about 10 percent of Moscow's economic aid to Cuba, however, and no details were released on the value of the much larger Soviet trade subsidies or on the future of the oil agreement that allows Cuba to sell the Soviet oil it conserves. [redacted]

In his speech at the Soviet CPSU Congress, the Cuban leader made an impassioned plea for Soviet economic assistance to the Third World. In our opinion, his comments suggested concern that Moscow's focus on strategic issues could negatively affect its long-term economic commitment to Cuba and Soviet Third World allies. Given the mutual benefits of the Soviet-Cuban relationship, we believe that economic frictions will not fundamentally alter the strong alliance between the USSR and Cuba over the next few years. [redacted]

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Relations With the Soviet Union

		Feb-May 1986	
Legend	Indicators of discord	Dissatisfaction with Soviet or surrogate interference in local affairs	
X Present		Popular opposition to Soviet or surrogate presence	
		Disagreement over Soviet military support or relations	
		Dissatisfaction with Soviet economic aid or relations	
		Disagreement with Soviet third country action or foreign policy stance	X
		Differences over party structure/role/relations	
		Improved relations by either party with China or the West	
		Diplomatic rebuffs	
Legend	Ties and dependency	Party ties with USSR or surrogate	●
● Strong ◐ Moderate ○ Weak · Negligible/none		Government-to-government relations	●
		Client military dependency	●
		Client economic dependency	●
		Soviet/surrogate military access to client bases/ports	●
		Mutual foreign policy support	●
		Soviet/surrogate geopolitical interest	◐
		Tension in overall relationship with Soviet Union	○
	Prospects for major deterioration within next year	○	
	Prospects for major deterioration within next 2-3 years	○	

^aIncludes a judgment about the relative importance of individual indicators in assessing pressures on the regime and prospects for instability/leadership change. See appendix for details.

^bIncludes judgment about each side's effectiveness in using its capabilities to the detriment of the other. See appendix for details.

North Korea

Instability Indicators

			Level or magnitude	
			Nov 1985-Jan 1986	Feb-May 1986
Legend ■ Very high ● High ◐ Moderate ○ Low · Negligible/none	Socioeconomic factors	Ethnic/regional/religious tensions	·	·
		Population flows/elite emigration	·	·
		Food, energy, consumer goods shortages	○	○
		Foreign exchange shortages	○	○
	External factors	Regional/border hostilities	·	·
		Political/diplomatic differences with Soviet Bloc	·	·
		Western efforts to promote policy change	·	·
		Shortfalls in economic aid	○	○
	Opposition activities	Shortfalls in military aid	·	·
		Strength/appeal of opposition groups	·	·
		Protests, strikes, rallies	·	·
		Reports/rumors of military coup plotting	·	·
	Regime political vulnerabilities	Terrorism and sabotage	·	·
		Loss of legitimacy or confidence	○	○
		Factionalism within ruling party or elite	·	·
		Inefficacy of political/social control	·	·
		Excessive repression/brutality	○	○
	Military/security vulnerabilities	Popular grievances over material welfare	·	·
		Deficiencies of internal security forces	·	·
		Discipline/training problems within military	·	·
Factionalism within military		○	○	
		Officers discontent with government actions	·	·
		Pressures for instability or irregular leadership change^a	·	·
		Prospects for instability or irregular leadership change within next year	·	·
		Prospects for instability or irregular leadership change within next 2-3 years	○	○

Insurgency Scorecard

The insurgency effort	Political performance and capabilities		
	Leadership confidence/unity		
	Military capabilities		
	Rural control		
	Urban activities		
	Foreign military support		
	Foreign political support		
The counterinsurgency effort	Political performance and capabilities		
	Leadership confidence/unity		
	Military capabilities		
	Rural control		
	Urban control		
	Foreign military support		
	Foreign political support		
Insurgent threat to regime or current policies^b			
Prospects for success in achieving goals within next year			
Prospects for success in achieving goals within next 2-3 years			

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Secret

Secret

In mid-May, a high-ranking Politburo member publicly stated for the first time that Kim Chong-il would succeed his father, Kim Il-song, who is 74. This announcement may herald a new phase in Kim Chong-il's increasing consolidation of power. [redacted]

The younger Kim, [redacted] recognizes the country's economic difficulties. Although we lack firm economic data [redacted], we perceive increasing efforts by the regime to grapple with the many bottlenecks that impede economic growth. Cabinet changes in early February were the third since October and centered on economic management. Fuel shortages continue to affect all sectors, including the military, according to our Embassy in South Korea. P'yongyang has continued to seek Western contracts for equipment and technology but suffers from a legacy of an abysmal repayment record during a similar turn to the West in the mid-1970s. [redacted]

Soviet-North Korean relations continued their two-year warming trend with the signing of a military trade and technical agreement in February. There is evidence of some discord in the relationship, however. Moscow has not publicly blessed P'yongyang's dynastic succession, and, despite widespread public and diplomatic speculation, Kim Chong-il did not accompany the North Korean delegation to the February 1986 Soviet Communist Party congress. According to

press [redacted] reporting, the North Koreans also are disappointed with lukewarm Soviet support for their demand to cohost the Olympic Games. We believe Kim Chong-il, nonetheless, recognizes his country's reliance on sophisticated Soviet weaponry and its importance for maintaining the North's military edge. We expect Kim Chong-il will visit the Soviet Union in the near future, perhaps as early as July, when the 25th anniversary of the Treaty of Friendship will be celebrated in Moscow. [redacted]

^a Assessments of instability indicators are based on limited information, but we believe that in most cases there is negligible antiregime activity in this particularly repressive state. [redacted]

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Relations With the Soviet Union

Feb-May 1986

Legend	Indicators of discord			
X Present		Dissatisfaction with Soviet or surrogate interference in local affairs		
		Popular opposition to Soviet or surrogate presence		
		Disagreement over Soviet military support or relations		
		Dissatisfaction with Soviet economic aid or relations		
		Disagreement with Soviet third country action or foreign policy stance	X	
		Differences over party structure/role/relations		
		Improved relations by either party with China or the West		
		Diplomatic rebuffs	X	
● Strong ◐ Moderate ○ Weak · Negligible/none	Ties and dependency	Party ties with USSR or surrogate	◐	
		Government-to-government relations	◐	
		Client military dependency	◐	
		Client economic dependency	◐	
		Soviet/surrogate military access to client bases/ports	○	
		Mutual foreign policy support	◐	
		Soviet/surrogate geopolitical interest	◐	
		Tension in overall relationship with Soviet Union		○
		Prospects for major deterioration within next year		○
		Prospects for major deterioration within next 2-3 years		○

^aIncludes a judgment about the relative importance of individual indicators in assessing pressures on the regime and prospects for instability/leadership change. See appendix for details.

^bIncludes judgment about each side's effectiveness in using its capabilities to the detriment of the other. See appendix for details.

Secret

Secret

Vietnam

Instability Indicators

			Level or magnitude	
			Nov 1985-Jan 1986	Feb-May 1986
Legend ■ Very high ● High ◐ Moderate ○ Low · Negligible/none	Socioeconomic factors	Ethnic/regional/religious tensions	◐	◐
		Population flows/elite emigration	○	○
		Food, energy, consumer goods shortages	◐	◐
		Foreign exchange shortages	◐	◐
	External factors	Regional/border hostilities	◐	◐
		Political/diplomatic differences with Soviet Bloc	·	·
		Western efforts to promote policy change	○	○
		Shortfalls in economic aid	○	○
		Shortfalls in military aid	·	·
	Opposition activities	Strength/appeal of opposition groups	·	·
		Protests, strikes, rallies	·	·
		Reports/rumors of military coup plotting	·	·
		Terrorism and sabotage	·	·
	Regime political vulnerabilities	Loss of legitimacy or confidence	◐	◐
		Factionalism within ruling party or elite	·	○
		Inefficiency of political/social control	·	·
		Excessive repression/brutality	·	·
		Popular grievances over material welfare	◐	◐
	Military/security vulnerabilities	Deficiencies of internal security forces	·	·
		Discipline/training problems within military	·	·
Factionalism within military		·	·	
Officers discontent with government actions		·	·	
Pressures for instability or irregular leadership change ^a		·	·	
Prospects for instability or irregular leadership change within next year		·	·	
Prospects for instability or irregular leadership change within next 2-3 years		·	○	

Insurgency Scorecard

The insurgency effort	Political performance and capabilities	·	·
	Leadership confidence/unity	·	·
	Military capabilities	·	·
	Rural control	·	·
	Urban activities	·	·
	Foreign military support	·	·
	Foreign political support	·	·
The counterinsurgency effort	Political performance and capabilities	·	·
	Leadership confidence/unity	·	·
	Military capabilities	·	·
	Rural control	·	·
	Urban control	·	·
	Foreign military support	·	·
	Foreign political support	·	·
Insurgent threat to regime or current policies ^b		·	·
Prospects for success in achieving goals within next year		·	·
Prospects for success in achieving goals within next 2-3 years		·	·

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Secret

Health problems among Vietnam's aging leaders have spurred wide-spread rumors of changes in the top leadership. [redacted] changes may be ratified at the party congress this fall. [redacted] uncertainty about the fluidity of the succession process. We expect the leading candidates will be Politburo members, and the succession will be orderly. We believe that a new leadership in Hanoi is not likely to be more forthcoming with ASEAN on Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] we detected no discernible change in the internal security situation. A foreign journalist, however, reported open criticism of the leadership by citizens of Hanoi, ranging from pedicab drivers to minor government officials and party cadres. China continues to pressure Vietnam in the border area with periodic ground attacks and daily artillery shellings. [redacted]

There has been evidence in recent months, however, of a bitter debate within the regime over the direction of economic policy. "Reformers" gained the upper hand near the end of last year and attempted to revive Vietnam's moribund economy by eliminating some egalitarian payment-in-kind subsidies for civil servants and cadres, instituting a merit pay system, and realigning prices to reflect market forces. The regime also hastily enacted a drastic monetary reform that contained many loopholes and resulted in soaring inflation. In the past few months, the regime has backtracked and reintroduced rationing of several consumer necessities, published strong criticisms of the economic disruption caused by the reforms, and fired Vice-Chairman of the Council of Ministers Tran Phuong for the failures of the monetary reforms. [redacted]

[redacted]

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Relations With the Soviet Union

Feb-May 1986

Legend	Indicators of discord	
X Present	Dissatisfaction with Soviet or surrogate interference in local affairs	
	Popular opposition to Soviet or surrogate presence	
	Disagreement over Soviet military support or relations	
	Dissatisfaction with Soviet economic aid or relations	
	Disagreement with Soviet third country action or foreign policy stance	
	Differences over party structure/role/relations	
	Improved relations by either party with China or the West	
	Diplomatic rebuffs	
Legend	Ties and dependency	
● Strong	Party ties with USSR or surrogate	●
● Moderate	Government-to-government relations	●
○ Weak	Client military dependency	●
· Negligible/none	Client economic dependency	●
	Soviet/surrogate military access to client bases/ports	●
	Mutual foreign policy support	●
	Soviet/surrogate geopolitical interest	●
	Tension in overall relationship with Soviet Union	·
	Prospects for major deterioration within next year	○
	Prospects for major deterioration within next 2-3 years	○

^aIncludes a judgment about the relative importance of individual indicators in assessing pressures on the regime and prospects for instability/leadership change. See appendix for details.

^bIncludes judgment about each side's effectiveness in using its capabilities to the detriment of the other. See appendix for details.

Secret

Cambodia

Instability Indicators

			Level or magnitude	
			Nov 1985-Jan 1986	Feb-May 1986
Legend ■ Very high ● High ◐ Moderate ○ Low · Negligible/none	Socioeconomic factors	Ethnic/regional/religious tensions	●	●
		Population flows/elite emigration	●	●
		Food, energy, consumer goods shortages	◐	◐
		Foreign exchange shortages	◐	◐
	External factors	Regional/border hostilities	·	·
		Political/diplomatic differences with Soviet Bloc	○	○
		Western efforts to promote policy change	·	·
		Shortfalls in economic aid	○	○
		Shortfalls in military aid	○	○
	Opposition activities	Strength/appeal of opposition groups	○	◐
		Protests, strikes, rallies	○	○
		Reports/rumors of military coup plotting	○	○
		Terrorism and sabotage	●	●
	Regime political vulnerabilities	Loss of legitimacy or confidence	·	·
		Factionalism within ruling party or elite	○	○
		Inefficacy of political/social control	●	●
		Excessive repression/brutality	◐	◐
		Popular grievances over material welfare	·	·
	Military/security vulnerabilities	Deficiencies of internal security forces	●	●
		Discipline/training problems within military	◐	◐
Factionalism within military		○	○	
Officers discontent with government actions		○	○	
Pressures for instability or irregular leadership change^a			○	○
Prospects for instability or irregular leadership change within next year			·	·
Prospects for instability or irregular leadership change within next 2-3 years			○	○

Insurgency Scorecard

The insurgency effort	Political performance and capabilities	◐	◐	
	Leadership confidence/unity	◐	◐	
	Military capabilities	◐	◐	
	Rural control	◐	◐	
	Urban activities	◐	◐	
	Foreign military support	◐	◐	
	Foreign political support	◐	◐	
The counterinsurgency effort	Political performance and capabilities	◐	◐	
	Leadership confidence/unity	◐	◐	
	Military capabilities	◐	◐	
	Rural control	◐	◐	
	Urban control	○	○	
	Foreign military support	●	●	
	Foreign political support	●	●	
Insurgent threat to regime or current policies^b			○	○
Prospects for success in achieving goals within next year			·	·
Prospects for success in achieving goals within next 2-3 years			○	○

309304A 6-86

Secret

Communist Democratic Kampuchea resistance forces—the Khmer Rouge—continue to be active throughout the interior, attacking local government offices, Vietnamese and People's Republic of Kampuchea military positions, and major transportation routes, [redacted]

[redacted] They also launched small-scale attacks against major population centers, including several provincial capitals and targets on the outskirts of the capital city of Phnom Penh. Non-Communist resistance forces stepped up their operations, infiltrating several thousand troops. Most are operating in the border region, but several hundred have moved deep into the interior, [redacted]

[redacted] Communist resistance forces should be able to sustain their current level of activity throughout the May-November rainy season. The non-Communists, however, will continue to be inhibited by supply, leadership, and sporadic discipline and morale problems and will play a minor role on the battlefield, in our judgment. [redacted]

In our view, the continuing higher level of insurgent activity poses no immediate threat to Vietnam's dominant military position in Cambodia, and Hanoi does not appear overly concerned with the deteriorating security situation that is, in part, a byproduct, of its current military strategy. [redacted] Hanoi is keeping most of its forces along the Thai-Cambodian border to block infiltration, and disrupt guerrilla operations there. It also continues to supervise the construction of barriers along the border designed to further restrict guerrilla movement. As construction projects are completed, we expect Vietnam to redeploy some units to the interior to improve

security. In the meantime, however, Vietnamese forces available for internal security are stretched thin, thereby facilitating resistance operations in the provinces. [redacted]

The Vietnamese-installed Heng Samrin regime continues to face economic shortages and a serious lack of qualified cadre with which to build government and party institutions. Moscow largely bankrolls Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia, and, given Gorbachev's pledge of increased military aid to Vietnam, we expect current levels of support to continue. [redacted]

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Relations With the Soviet Union

Feb-May 1986

Legend	Indicators of discord		
X Present		Dissatisfaction with Soviet or surrogate interference in local affairs	
		Popular opposition to Soviet or surrogate presence	
		Disagreement over Soviet military support or relations	
		Dissatisfaction with Soviet economic aid or relations	
		Disagreement with Soviet third country action or foreign policy stance	
		Differences over party structure/role/relations	
		Improved relations by either party with China or the West	
		Diplomatic rebuffs	
● Strong ◐ Moderate ○ Weak · Negligible/none	Ties and dependency	Party ties with USSR or surrogate	◐
		Government-to-government relations	◐
		Client military dependency	●
		Client economic dependency	◐
		Soviet/surrogate military access to client bases/ports	◐
		Mutual foreign policy support	●
		Soviet/surrogate geopolitical interest	◐
		Tension in overall relationship with Soviet Union	·
		Prospects for major deterioration within next year	○
		Prospects for major deterioration within next 2-3 years	○

^aIncludes a judgment about the relative importance of individual indicators in assessing pressures on the regime and prospects for instability/leadership change. See appendix for details.

^bIncludes judgment about each side's effectiveness in using its capabilities to the detriment of the other. See appendix for details.

Secret

Laos

Instability Indicators

			Level or magnitude	
			Nov 1985-Jan 1986	Feb-May 1986
Legend ■ Very high ● High ◐ Moderate ○ Low · Negligible/none	Socioeconomic factors	Ethnic/regional/religious tensions	◐	◐
		Population flows/elite emigration	●	◐
		Food, energy, consumer goods shortages	○	◐
		Foreign exchange shortages	◐	◐
	External factors	Regional/border hostilities	◐	◐
		Political/diplomatic differences with Soviet Bloc	·	·
		Western efforts to promote policy change	·	·
		Shortfalls in economic aid	·	·
		Shortfalls in military aid	·	·
	Opposition activities	Strength/appeal of opposition groups	·	·
		Protests, strikes, rallies	·	·
		Reports/rumors of military coup plotting	·	·
		Terrorism and sabotage	○	○
	Regime political vulnerabilities	Loss of legitimacy or confidence	·	·
		Factionalism within ruling party or elite	○	○
		Inefficacy of political/social control	◐	◐
		Excessive repression/brutality	·	·
	Military/security vulnerabilities	Popular grievances over material welfare	◐	◐
		Deficiencies of internal security forces	◐	◐
		Discipline/training problems within military	·	·
Factionalism within military		·	·	
	Officers discontent with government actions	·	·	
	Pressures for instability or irregular leadership change ^a	·	·	
	Prospects for instability or irregular leadership change within next year	·	·	
	Prospects for instability or irregular leadership change within next 2-3 years	·	·	

Insurgency Scorecard

The insurgency effort	Political performance and capabilities	○	○
	Leadership confidence/unity	○	○
	Military capabilities	·	·
	Rural control	·	·
	Urban activities	·	·
	Foreign military support	○	○
	Foreign political support	·	·
The counterinsurgency effort	Political performance and capabilities	○	○
	Leadership confidence/unity	●	●
	Military capabilities	◐	◐
	Rural control	○	○
	Urban control	○	○
	Foreign military support	●	●
	Foreign political support	●	●
	Insurgent threat to regime or current policies ^b	○	○
	Prospects for success in achieving goals within next year	·	·
	Prospects for success in achieving goals within next 2-3 years	·	·

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Vietnamese military support and the lack of a viable opposition ensure that the Lao People's Democratic Republic will remain in power for the foreseeable future. US diplomats reported slight increases in resistance activity in isolated areas—largely because of the government's inability to police its long border with Thailand—but the military capability of the resistance remains weak. Limited information indicates that they are unable to garner the support of a generally indifferent populace. [redacted]

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Poor economic conditions continued to undermine public morale in Vientiane, according to the US Embassy. Prices for staple goods rose sharply this spring, and rice and poultry were in short supply. The government has been trying to increase its control over the small private sector by pressuring private merchants in the capital to join a joint state-private trading company. If economic conditions continue to deteriorate, we expect increased refugee flows to Thailand. [redacted]

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^a Assessments are based on limited information, particularly with regard to indicators of military/security vulnerabilities. [redacted]

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Relations With the Soviet Union

Feb-May 1986

Legend	Indicators of discord		
X Present		Dissatisfaction with Soviet or surrogate interference in local affairs	
		Popular opposition to Soviet or surrogate presence	
		Disagreement over Soviet military support or relations	
		Dissatisfaction with Soviet economic aid or relations	
		Disagreement with Soviet third country action or foreign policy stance	
		Differences over party structure/role/relations	
		Improved relations by either party with China or the West	
		Diplomatic rebuffs	
Legend ● Strong ◐ Moderate ○ Weak · Negligible/none	Ties and dependency	Party ties with USSR or surrogate	●
		Government-to-government relations	●
		Client military dependency	●
		Client economic dependency	◐
		Soviet/surrogate military access to client bases/ports	●
		Mutual foreign policy support	●
		Soviet/surrogate geopolitical interest	●
		Tension in overall relationship with Soviet Union	·
		Prospects for major deterioration within next year	·
		Prospects for major deterioration within next 2-3 years	·

^aIncludes a judgment about the relative importance of individual indicators in assessing pressures on the regime and prospects for instability/leadership change. See appendix for details.

^bIncludes judgment about each side's effectiveness in using it's capabilities to the detriment of the other. See appendix for details.

Part 3. Country Essays

Afghanistan: Najibullah's Challenge Ahead

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- The replacement on 4 May of Babrak Karmal as General Secretary of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) by the even more pro-Soviet, ex-intelligence chief Najibullah will almost certainly strengthen Moscow's influence. Nonetheless, we believe Najibullah probably will not make any immediate headway against the insurgency nor in improving the performance of the party, which is plagued with divisions.



Najibullah

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- Stepped-up Afghan ground and air border violations, subversive activities using dissident Pakistani tribesmen, and bombings in Pakistani cities have been aimed at forcing a shift in Pakistan's Afghanistan policy.

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- Although increased Soviet-Afghan military pressure in Afghanistan's eastern provinces is part of a determined effort to cut off insurgent supplies and infiltration from Pakistan, the terrain favors the insurgents, who continue to move men and large quantities of supplies through the many mountain passes.

service (KHAD) into a more efficient tool of Soviet policy and for organizing regime support among Pashtun border tribes in an effort to build legitimacy for the Kabul regime. The Soviets almost certainly hope that Najibullah can reinvigorate the undermanned, demoralized, and generally ineffective Afghan Armed Forces and allow the Soviets to reduce their role in the war. They presumably also want Najibullah to improve the discipline and performance of the PDPA. His appointment, however, has brought to the surface divisions within the dominant Parchami wing of the party, and, in our view, his reputation for ruthlessness against the rival Khalqi faction is bound to arouse opposition to his appointment in the military, where the Khalqis dominate.

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- In keeping with Kabul's efforts to assume a larger role in the war, several largely Afghan army operations were conducted over the past several months with limited Soviet support; only one resulted in a significant success.

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A New Puppet for Moscow

We judge that the Soviets probably selected the KGB-trained Najibullah because he has proved an effective and pragmatic administrator. Prior to becoming party chief last November, he was responsible for building the Afghan intelligence

We expect that Najibullah's domestic agenda will center on broadening the base of the regime; last month he held a series of highly visible meetings with the regime-supported Islamic clergy, tribal chiefs, and representatives from the Hazara, Uzbek, and Turkmen ethnic groups in an attempt to build popular

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Recent Border Fighting

support for the government. We believe Najibullah will use his Pashtun origins and good tribal connections in heightened efforts to subvert border tribes and blunt insurgent activity. [redacted]

Insurgency Developments

Fighting in the past quarter year has generally focused on areas closer to the Pakistani border; in May there were almost daily air violations. Soviet and Afghan Government offensives in Nangarhar and Paktia Provinces demonstrated a new determination to prevent insurgent resupply and infiltration from Pakistan. We judge that efforts were largely unsuccessful and that it is probably impossible to seal the Pakistani border with the manpower available. [redacted]

The three-week Afghan/Soviet assault in April, which resulted in the overrunning of Zhawar Killi, a major insurgent base camp in southern Paktia Province, is being portrayed by the regime as a major Afghan army victory over the insurgents. Although the camp was destroyed and the insurgents suffered

heavy casualties, insurgents have reoccupied the destroyed base and surrounding areas after the Afghan army withdrawal. Regime and Soviet forces also took heavy casualties. [redacted]

Several predominant Afghan operations in eastern Afghanistan preceded the assault on Zhawar Killi but were much less successful. In our opinion, Afghan forces continue to demonstrate a weak capability for holding territory in insurgent-dominated areas; earlier this year Afghan forces were ousted from newly established outposts in the Nazian Valley. [redacted]

We believe that the border incidents plus continued Afghan Government support of dissident Pakistani tribes and bombings in Pakistani cities have increased domestic pressure for Islamabad to reexamine its Afghan policy. Resistance leaders fear that Pakistan will accept a Communist government in Afghanistan as part of an overall peace settlement. We believe that insurgent forces are probably stockpiling arms and ammunition inside Afghanistan as a precaution against an unacceptable political solution between Pakistan and Afghanistan at the Geneva peace negotiations on a Soviet troop withdrawal. In the event of a negotiated settlement that is rejected by insurgents, we believe that the insurgents would be able to continue their fight at a lesser intensity with the movement of small arms ammunition across the border. [redacted]

Key Indicators to Watch

Most Likely Scenario: The regime's ability to reduce its dependency on Soviet troops does not improve significantly; the insurgents step up activity; factionalism builds and Najibullah's power base frays.

- Predominant Afghan operations are launched against insurgent targets but fail to reduce insurgent activity.
- Pakistanis remain sympathetic to insurgent views, despite Kabul's increased use of dissident Pakistani tribesmen on the border and more bombings in Pakistan.

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- Najibullah's ruthlessness toward dissenters aggravates factionalism; further splits occur within the Parchami wings of the PDPA and opposition from the Khalqi faction builds.
- Najibullah's efforts to increase popular support for the regime's economic and social policies meet with continued resistance.

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Alternative Scenario: Najibullah improves the capability and performance of both the PDPA and the Afghan Armed Forces; Najibullah consolidates his power.

- Najibullah purges the rival Khalqi faction of the PDPA, or Moscow forces an accommodation between rival factions.
- Najibullah improves the prestige, recruitment rate, and efficacy of the Afghan Armed Forces, which mount large operations with some success and slowly pacify and garrison additional areas.
- Najibullah gains the cooperation of border tribes in exchange for regime favors; insurgent infiltration of men and supplies becomes increasingly difficult.
- Border fighting and increased bombings of Pakistani territory create domestic problems for Islamabad.
- Najibullah obtains the support of key military, party, and tribal leaders, and the party operates more effectively at the local level.

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Libya: Qadhafi
After the Airstrike [redacted]

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- We judge that the US retaliatory strike last April weakened Qadhafi's political standing by humiliating the Libyan Armed Forces and stimulating closer cooperation between Washington and West European governments on isolating his regime. [redacted]
- Despite Qadhafi's dissatisfaction with Soviet support during the crisis, his narrowing room to maneuver on the domestic and international scene has prompted renewed attempts to draw closer to Moscow. We believe that Qadhafi may even be willing to offer the Soviets increased access to Libyan air and naval facilities in exchange for more sophisticated weaponry than Moscow has so far been willing to provide. [redacted]
- We judge that the chances are slightly better than even that Qadhafi's elaborate security precautions will continue to ensure his political survival over the next six months. In our judgment, the environment is highly coup prone, however, and a precipitating event, such as another poor Libyan military performance, could provoke conspirators to act. [redacted]

procession in Tripoli for those killed in the US strike attracted only several thousand marchers out of a local population of about 900,000, according to press reports. [redacted]

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Washington's humiliation of the Libyan military, which was caught offguard by the US attack and proved unable to protect Qadhafi even at his best defended residence, strengthens the political climate in Libya that was already conducive to plotting. Qadhafi has emphasized military strength as a means of expanding his international influence and protecting his regime since coming to power in 1969. In support of these objectives, he has acquired large quantities of arms from several countries, including about \$15 billion from the Soviet Union, his principal supplier. In our view, the US strike has deflated Libyan pretensions of military prowess and discredited claims of exceptional military performance in defending Libyan-claimed waters in the Gulf of Sidra. [redacted] the Libyan military failure has increased criticism among Libyans of Qadhafi's large weapons expenditures and provocative foreign policies. [redacted]

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Impact of US-Libyan Tensions

Domestic reactions to the clash between US and Libyan forces in the Gulf of Sidra last March and the following month's retaliatory US airstrike confirm the extent to which Qadhafi's political position has eroded in recent years. Reported incidents of insubordination or outright mutiny by individual military units during the US-Libyan confrontation demonstrated Qadhafi's diminished authority among the Armed Forces. At the same time, frequent emotional expressions of support for Qadhafi and stage-managed demonstrations by his minority of hardcore loyalists have not generated extensive public support. [redacted]

[redacted] Qadhafi may make senior officers scapegoats for the poor Libyan showing against US forces. Such a crackdown, in our view, probably would aggravate existing antiregime sentiment in the officer corps. Many officers oppose Qadhafi's aggressive foreign ventures and resent their loss of influence to zealots in the revolutionary committees supportive of his radical policies. [redacted] [redacted] Qadhafi's curtailment of officers' privileges—part of an attempt to conserve increasingly scarce government financial resources—has also contributed to dissatisfaction. [redacted]

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
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[redacted] The US strike prompted most Libyans—apparently including even some regime supporters—to flee the larger cities in anticipation of another attack rather than rally around Qadhafi. The funeral

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Cartoon in Libyan press, January 1986

(1) The Jamahiriya (Libya)

(2) Guns of Challenge

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We judge that Qadhafi's failure to attract significant foreign support for his anti-US posture—particularly among Arab states—is eroding popular support. Recent expulsions of Libyans involved in terrorist activities by West European governments and limits on the official Libyan presence contradict Qadhafi's claims of widespread international support and US international isolation, as well as his denials of terrorist involvement. In our view, Qadhafi's failure to convene an extraordinary Arab League summit have undermined his attempts to persuade Libyans of US blame for the confrontation. In response, Qadhafi has heralded the benefits of self-reliance and labeled unsupportive West European and Arab states as "lackeys" of the United States. [redacted]

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
have been the root cause of Qadhafi's declining domestic fortunes. [redacted] widespread unhappiness with the deteriorating standard of living. Improved living conditions during the 1970s—considered by most Libyans as one of the principal fruits of Qadhafi's revolution—have been replaced by declines in medical care and education and shortages of food, water, and electricity. [redacted]

Qadhafi Counters


Qadhafi has responded to increased foreign and domestic isolation and his country's military failures by renewing approaches to the Soviet Union. During a visit to Moscow by Libya's number-two leader, Jallud,

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The US freeze on Libyan assets last January, which deprived Tripoli of about \$750 million in foreign exchange, and the fall in oil prices are further aggravating Libyan economic difficulties, which we believe



Qadhafi's tent after the bombing



Consumer shortages

late last month, we believe the Soviets promised Tripoli additional military assistance, given the extensive involvement of Defense Minister Sokolov in the talks and the announcement of a Soviet military visit in June. [redacted]

Moscow apparently turned down a Libyan request for a friendship treaty and Gorbachev publicly reprimanded Tripoli for overtly promoting terrorism. We doubt that Moscow will extend the kind of explicit security guarantees Qadhafi is seeking, but may agree to replace damaged equipment or conduct joint Soviet-Libyan naval exercises. For his part, Qadhafi probably will offer the Soviets increased use of Libyan air and naval facilities—as he has threatened to do during past confrontations with the United States—in exchange for the facade of a Soviet-Libyan defense commitment. [redacted]

Qadhafi's new approach to Moscow is being accompanied by domestic political initiatives designed to stave off potential threats. [redacted]

Qadhafi has given a more prominent role to several members of the popular and more pragmatic group of senior officers who supported him during the 1970s. He probably hopes that identifying these officers more closely with his regime will ensure the support of the Armed Forces in any military action with the United States and deter potential coup plotters. [redacted]

[redacted] Qadhafi may have shifted several radicals from senior positions in the internal security service. Meanwhile, Qadhafi is blaming food shortages on mismanagement and hoarding by local "fat

cats." Increased food imports during recent weeks apparently are timed to coincide with Ramadan, the Muslim holy month. In addition, policy pronouncements include new references to Islam—an apparent attempt to appeal to popular Islamic sentiments. [redacted]

Despite these measures, Qadhafi ultimately relies on an efficient and pervasive security apparatus to maintain power. He has neutralized the regular Armed Forces by gradually replacing them with a part-time citizen army; by infiltrating revolutionary ideologues into their ranks to act as watchdogs for antiregime activity; by periodically rotating military officers to prevent them from developing a loyal following; and by dispersing Army units to prevent the consolidation of a potentially threatening force. [redacted]

[redacted] he has assigned five separate military, paramilitary, and popular control organizations specific security missions, probably including monitoring each other's activities, in our opinion. [redacted]

[redacted] such controls have quashed numerous coup plots and largely stifled open expressions of discontent. They have not, however, precluded sporadic clandestine distribution of antiregime literature or incidents of antiregime sabotage. [redacted]

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Key Indicators To Watch

Most Likely Scenario: The chances are slightly better than even that Qadhafi's elaborate security precautions will ensure his political survival over the next six months.

- Open expressions of antiregime sentiment remain minimal.
- Disaffected military officers focus—as they have in the past—on securing their position in the post-Qadhafi period instead of actively plotting to remove him.
- Dissidents in exile fail to strengthen their popular standing or to undertake even limited covert operations inside Libya.
- The Libyan military improves its performance in countering another challenge by US forces or in defending Libyan territory by neighboring aggressors.
- Qadhafi continues to attract a sufficient number of Western technicians to maintain oil production at current levels.
- Increased Soviet political and military support generates a new sense of confidence among Libyan military officers.

Alternative Scenarios: Plotters succeed in penetrating the security apparatus and killing Qadhafi, but are too weak to consolidate authority quickly; a period of instability ensues.

- Morale and efficiency of the internal security forces break down.
- Political infighting breaks out among members of Qadhafi's inner circle, including members of his tribe, over his unwillingness to compromise his radical policies or in jockeying for position in anticipation of Qadhafi's removal.
- Exiled Libyan dissidents increase significantly their antiregime activity as the result of increased foreign support and an expanded network of contacts inside Libya.
- Qadhafi initiates another aggressive foreign venture or terrorist attack that provokes retaliation.

- Military units headed by would-be plotters gain access to currently restricted ammunition supplies.

- Qadhafi is removed, armed conflict breaks out, or surviving senior officers establish a military council as a facade for behind-the-scenes political maneuvering.

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There is the lesser possibility that Qadhafi will shore up his domestic position by making significant adjustments to unpopular domestic and foreign policies.

- Qadhafi delegates increased authority to senior military officers at the expense of the revolutionary committees.
- Qadhafi withdraws Libyan forces from Chad and curtails Libyan military support for Iran, his two most contentious foreign policy issues.
- Qadhafi sustains currently higher levels of food imports.
- Oil prices increase, permitting Qadhafi to favor consumer economic priorities.

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Appendix: Methodology Notes**Instability Indicators**

Analysts were asked to use the following questions as a guide in assessing the level of activity/magnitude of the instability indicators that appear in the country charts. They also indicated the importance they attach to individual indicators in monitoring and assessing threats to the regime. The chart following the questions tabulates these ratings of importance. These two steps formed the basis for judgments on pressures and prospects for instability/irregular leadership change.

Socioeconomic Factors**Ethnic/Regional/Religious Tensions**

Was there disagreement or conflict among ethnic/regional/religious groups or evidence of growing mistrust and dislike? Did religious or ethnic leaders criticize the government? Were they active in anti-government activities? On the other hand, was there any evidence of cooperation or reconciliation? Did leaders participate in a dialogue with the government or indicate a willingness to resolve differences in a cooperative manner?

Did the government implement policies detrimental to the status of any group; for example, did it increase religious intolerance or suppress the use of a minority language or culture? On the other hand, did the government take any action that attempted to alleviate ethnic/regional/religious tensions; for example, did it move to improve the social status of minority groups?

Population Flows/Elite Emigration

Was there rural-urban migration or an influx of refugees? Did the government carry out forced collectivization or relocation programs that involved movement of large numbers of people?

Did expatriates necessary for their expertise or members of the country's intelligentsia flee the country?

Food, Energy, Consumer Goods Shortages

Did economic deterioration, natural disaster, or commodity sales abroad affect the government's ability to meet consumer needs? Did the government undertake rationing or new fiscal measures that may have diminished store supplies?

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Foreign Exchange Shortages

Did international economic shocks adversely affect foreign exchange receipts and force the government to undertake austerity measures? Did the government fail to make foreign debt repayments on time? Was the government unable to line up foreign financing needs or obtain debt relief from creditors? Did a foreign payments crunch impair trade flows?

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External Factors**Regional/Border Hostilities**

Did the government come under threat of incursions or subversion by neighboring foreign elements? Did the government provide a greater share of resources to border or regional hostilities?

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Political/Diplomatic Differences With the Soviet Bloc

Was Soviet or Cuban criticism of the regime evident? Were there major policy differences or instances of diplomatic rebuffs by either party?

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Western Efforts To Promote Policy Change

Did Western governments attempt to directly influence regime policy? Did foreign government diplomatic or financial support for opposition groups increase?

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Shortfalls in Economic Aid

Were government requests for increased foreign economic aid refused or ignored? Did the gap between the government's perceived needs and actual aid levels widen? Did government officials complain privately or publicly about the level of economic support?

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Shortfalls in Military Aid

Did the military fail to acquire suitable weapons, transport, or support equipment to meet perceived defense needs? Did government officials complain privately or publicly about the level of external military support? Did the support provided by the Soviet Union or its surrogates—including equipment, training, and advisers—meet defense needs? Did personnel complain of inadequate supplies and provisions?

Opposition Activities**Strength/Appeal of Opposition Groups**

Did influential nongovernmental organizations—churches, unions, schools—or political opposition groups gain supporters? Did the insurgents gain supporters? Did coordination/contact among opposition groups increase either overtly or through an underground press or informal communications network? Did the opposition improve its leadership capability?

Did opposition groups attract foreign financial or political support? Did officials from foreign embassies meet with opposition leaders? Did foreign nongovernmental agencies send humanitarian, logistic, or financial support to opposition groups?

Protests, Strikes, Rallies

Did citizens refuse to cooperate with government regulations—for example, hiding draft-age men or agricultural surpluses? Were there antigovernment strikes and demonstrations? Were participants from different segments of the population?

Reports/Rumors of Military Coup Plotting

Were there meetings of dissident military officers or development of concrete opposition plans? Were there reports of coup plotting and did the plotters include commanders of key forces?

Did coup plotters meet with representatives of the former regime? With key opponents of the regime? With dissident elite members? Did coup plotters solicit or receive external support?

Terrorism and Sabotage

Were there destructive terrorist or sabotage incidents against the regime? Were there unexplained industrial or urban accidents?

Regime Political Vulnerabilities**Loss of Legitimacy or Confidence**

Were there any indications that the head of government may have to step down because of age, loss of public support, ill health, or Soviet displeasure with him? If so, did the political elite perceive a succession crisis and was there evidence of political jockeying by potential successors?

Did the Soviets display support for a rival head of government or party chief? Did they signal displeasure with the current leaders?

Did the ruler's style change in such a way that lessens his ability to rule? Is there evidence of increased disenchantment over government policies or acts on the part of powerful interest groups? Was the ruler increasingly isolated from advisers or party elite?

Did the public engage in antiregime activities? Did government programs, such as land reform, nationalization, rent control, cooperatives, or tax collection meet local opposition? Did the leader fail to use security forces effectively or take measures against dissidents or the opposition?

Factionalism Within Ruling Party or Elite

Within the ruling party, were there conflicts over ideology, control of the security forces, or other key policy issues? Did regime officials issue conflicting policy statements? Were personal animosities evident among the elite? Did any elite members defect from the government?

Inefficacy of Political/Social Control

Was the leadership of cell or block committees challenged? Do large segments of the population remain loyal to the deposed regime?

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Did officially sanctioned unions, media, schools, or churches retain or grow in autonomy and popularity? <input type="checkbox"/>	Did officers disobey orders? Were communications unable to keep field units in touch with headquarters? Were there changes in size or regularity of field exercises? Did senior officers move toward redefining the nature of the military threat? <input type="checkbox"/>	25X1
Did youths refuse to participate in indoctrination programs or donate time in service to the regime? Did students criticize foreign training programs? <input type="checkbox"/>	Did military intelligence perform badly? <input type="checkbox"/>	25X1
Did regime efforts to secularize society and consolidate power meet resistance from the populace or ethnic/regional/religious groups? <input type="checkbox"/>	Did Soviet or Cuban officials make pessimistic statements about the regime's capabilities, effectiveness, or tactics? <input type="checkbox"/>	25X1
On the other hand, did the ruling party increase its membership and local control? <input type="checkbox"/>	Factionalism Within the Military Were interforce rivalries or leadership splits present? Did they hamper security or impede coordination of plans or strategies? <input type="checkbox"/>	25X1
Excessive Repression/Brutality Did the government indiscriminately use force against the populace? Were reports of regime brutality widely known by the public? <input type="checkbox"/>	Were there reports that some of the high command held over from the old regime is still loyal to it? <input type="checkbox"/>	25X1
Popular Grievances Over Material Welfare Was the government unable or unwilling to undertake programs that would provide material benefits at the local level? Did people criticize government performance? <input type="checkbox"/>	Did officers express resentment against the regime's elite security force? Did they refuse to cooperate with it? <input type="checkbox"/>	25X1
Regime Military/Security Vulnerabilities	Officers' Discontent With Government Actions/Policies Did officers criticize government leadership or policies? Did they balk at orders from civilian officials or foreign military advisers? Did officers complain about a lack of headroom or pay? <input type="checkbox"/>	25X1
Deficiencies of Internal Security Forces Did government security forces fail to adequately protect the rural or urban populace? <input type="checkbox"/>		25X1
Did civilians display hostility against or express mistrust of local police forces? <input type="checkbox"/>		25X1
Did the government successfully recruit soldiers for service in internal control? Did the military assume more internal police functions? <input type="checkbox"/>		25X1
Was there evidence of weakening protection of the leadership? <input type="checkbox"/>		25X1
Discipline/Training Problems Within the Military Did soldiers refuse to go on patrol or to the frontlines? Did they complain of incompetent commanders? Were there incidents of insubordination? Were there defections, desertions, or a decline in the number or quality of recruits? <input type="checkbox"/>		25X1

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Importance of Individual Indicators in Assessing Pressure for Instability/Irregular Leadership Change.^a

Legend		Marxist-Leninist Regimes						Middle East Clients			Communist Regimes			
		Afghanistan	South Yemen	Ethiopia	Angola	Mozambique	Nicaragua	Syria	Iraq	Libya	Cuba	North Korea	Vietnam	Cambodia
Socioeconomic external factors	Ethnic/regional/religious tensions	●	■	●	●	■	●	●	○	·	·	●	●	●
	Population flows/elite emigration	●	●	○	●	●	○	○	·	○	·	·	○	○
	Food, energy, consumer goods shortages	·	●	○	●	●	○	○	●	○	·	○	○	○
	Foreign exchange shortages	○	●	○	●	○	○	○	■	●	○	·	○	·
	Regional border hostilities	●	●	●	■	■	○	●	■	○	·	·	●	●
Internal players	Differences with USSR or surrogates	●	■	●	■	■	●	○	○	·	·	·	■	■
	Opposition groups	■	●	●	■	■	●	○	●	●	·	·	·	■
	Public dissatisfaction	■	●	●	●	●	○	○	●	○	·	○	○	○
	Military	■	●	■	●	■	○	■	○	■	·	·	●	■
Regime vulnerabilities	Leadership rivals	●	■	○	●	●	○	·	●	■	·	·	■	·
	Lack of popular legitimacy	●	○	○	●	●	○	○	○	○	·	○	○	○
	Ruling party factionalism	●	■	○	●	●	○	○	○	○	·	·	●	·
	Weakened political/social control	●	○	●	●	●	○	○	○	○	·	·	·	○
	Indiscriminate use of force	●	●	○	●	●	○	○	○	○	·	·	·	○
	Failure to provide popular benefits	○	○	○	●	●	○	○	■	○	○	·	○	·
	Deficient security forces	●	●	●	●	■	○	○	○	■	·	·	·	●
	Problems with military discipline	●	●	●	●	■	○	○	○	○	·	·	·	○
	Factionalism within military	●	●	●	●	○	○	○	○	○	·	·	·	·
	Officers' grievances	○	●	●	●	○	○	○	○	■	·	·	·	·
Shortfalls in economic aid	·	●	●	●	●	○	○	○	■	·	○	·	·	
Shortfalls in military aid	○	●	●	●	●	○	○	○	○	·	·	○	○	

^aAnalysts were asked to indicate how important they believe the above factors or players are or could be over the next 2-3 years in monitoring and assessing threats to the current regime leadership.

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Insurgency Indicators

Analysts were asked to use the following questions as a guide in assessing the level of activity/magnitude of both the insurgency and counterinsurgency efforts. Judgments about the insurgency's threat to the regime or its policies were based on evaluations concerning its success in using its capabilities to the detriment or expense of the government during the relevant time period. Prospects for insurgent success in the future were based on broader judgments concerning the conflict's setting and origins, overall goals and strategy of each side, and which side is in the best position to sustain a drive toward its overall goal.

The Insurgency Effort

Political Performance and Capabilities

Did the insurgents capitalize on public grievances and effectively use propaganda, mobilize and organize local support, and provide material benefits to supporters?

Leadership Confidence/Unity

Did the insurgents develop more effective and unified leadership?

Military Capabilities

Did arms caches increase? Were weapons more sophisticated? Did the insurgents gain more recruits? Did training and discipline improve? Were casualties and equipment losses fewer after each encounter with government forces? Did the insurgents employ appropriate tactics and strategy?

Rural Control

Were they able to better secure "liberated" areas? Did insurgents gain control over more territory? Was sanctuary—either in a neighboring country or in a local area denied to the government—available to the insurgents?

Urban Activities

Did the insurgents increase attacks on government personnel and buildings, utilities, or symbolic targets in urban areas? Did they infiltrate the government, labor unions, or political parties? Did they increase their propaganda activities? Did they sponsor riots, strikes, or demonstrations?

25X1

Foreign Military Support

Did foreigners channel greater amounts and more sophisticated weapons, materiel, and military training to the insurgents?

25X1

Foreign Political Support

Did more foreign governments recognize the insurgents? Did foreigners provide more funds or political assistance? Did they promote insurgent efforts with their allies or in international forums?

25X1

The Counterinsurgency Effort

Political Performance and Capabilities

Did the government implement actions to deal with popular grievances? Were government coercive tactics effective in maintaining popular loyalty or at least indifference?

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Leadership Confidence/Unity

Was government leadership united and confident in its ability to maintain control and the initiative against the insurgency?

25X1

25X1

Military Capabilities

Did the government employ strategy, tactics, training, and weapons appropriate for counterinsurgency? Did the military leadership demonstrate competency? Did recruits increase and attrition rates stabilize or improve?

25X1

25X1

Rural Control

Did the military maintain control of secured areas, and increase extent of secured areas? Was it able to provide security for the population in these areas? Was the military able to deny sanctuary to the insurgents?

Prospects for Insurgent Success in Achieving Goals

Are insurgent goals and strategy appropriate to the conflict's setting and origins and to the counterinsurgency's overall strategy? Which are in the best position to sustain a drive toward their overall goal? Can the insurgents maintain the initiative over time?

25X1

Urban Control

Were government security forces able to maintain security of urban areas and economic targets and limit infiltration of insurgents? Did they improve their intelligence apparatus?

25X1

Foreign Military Support

Did foreigners channel greater amounts and more sophisticated weapons, materiel, military training, or combat troops to the government?

25X1

Foreign Political Support

Was the government able to maintain or improve its legitimacy among foreign governments? Did any previous supporters express reluctance to maintain their support of the regime? Did levels of foreign financial support, political training, military training, or technical assistance change?

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Overall Assessment of Insurgent Threat to Regime or Current Policies

Did the insurgents obtain the support or neutrality of critical segments of the population?

25X1

Did the insurgents limit the ability of the government and enhance their ability to provide services and material benefits?

25X1

Did the insurgent organization increase its domestic and international legitimacy at the expense of the government?

25X1

Did the insurgents affect the self-confidence or unity of government leaders and cadres?

25X1

Did they reduce and neutralize government coercive power while strengthening their coercive capabilities?

25X1

Relations With the Soviet Union

For each indicator of discord, analysts were asked to mark with an "X" those that were present in Soviet-client relations during the relevant time period.

Indicators of Discord

Client Dissatisfaction With Soviet or Surrogate Interference in Local Affairs

Were any Soviet, Cuban, or Vietnamese personnel expelled or replaced by client government? Did the client accuse the Soviets or their surrogates of anti-government activities, such as support of opposition groups, espionage, or subversive activities? Did client leadership reject Soviet domestic policy recommendations? Were there disagreements over domestic policy issues?

Popular Opposition to Soviet or Surrogate Presence or Influence in Client Country

Did Soviet personnel or leadership denigrate counterparts in client government? Did segments of the population—such as students or labor—voice discontent, refuse to participate in, or protest Soviet-sponsored programs, including training, scholarships, or relocation? Were there any incidents of public protest or resentment of Soviet personnel in client country? Were anti-Soviet editorials or literature evident?

Disagreement With Soviet Third-Country Action or Foreign Policy Stance

Did client express displeasure with Soviet action or policy vis-a-vis a third country or the Third World in general, for example, Soviet support of rival leadership in a third country, Soviet overtures to the West, or lack of Soviet support on North-South policy issues?

Differences Over Party Structure/Role/Relations

Did the client government purge or suppress the pro-Moscow faction of the party? Did the client government refuse to structure the party along Soviet requests? Was there disagreement on party direction, consolidation, or leadership?

Improved Relations by Either Party With China or the West

Did closer USSR-China or USSR-US relations aggravate the USSR-client relationship? Did client government seek trade, economic, or technology from the West or China? Did client support Chinese or the West in international forums? Were there any high-level visits or significant exchanges between client and the West or China?

Soviet or Client Diplomatic Rebuffs?

Did Soviet or client press or other reporting indicate diplomatic "snubs" of visiting officials? Was the client leadership angered at Soviet pronouncements they perceived to be insensitive or detrimental to their interests?

Disagreement Over Soviet Military Support or Relations

Did client purchase or seek arms elsewhere? Did client criticize Soviet supplies, equipment, or training? Did Soviets turn down client military aid requests? Was there any disagreement over the nature of Soviet or surrogate military commitment? Was there any disagreement over military strategy or client use of Soviet weapons? Did the client deny access to or refuse Soviet requests for military facilities or ports of call?

Client Dissatisfaction With Soviet Economic Aid or Relations

Did the Soviets turn down any client requests for loans or aid? Did they refuse to reschedule debts? Did client express unhappiness with levels or type of Soviet assistance or with Soviet-style economic planning? Did client seek assistance from the West? Did client resist Soviet requests/suggestions for new economic initiatives or reorganization?

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Ties and Dependency

For each category below, analysts were asked to evaluate the strength of the Soviet-client ties or dependent relations as strong, moderate, or weak.

Party Ties to USSR or Surrogate

Has the client country proclaimed the establishment of a Communist or vanguard party? Are there reciprocal party visits and agreements between Moscow and the client country?

Government-to-Government Relations

Are there reciprocal visits of high-level government officials? Has the Soviet Union extended a friendship treaty to the client? Are there significant information or cultural agreements? Does the client have student trainees in the USSR?

Client Military Dependency

Is the client dependent on the Soviet Union for the major share of its weapons arsenal? Or significant items? Are Soviet or surrogate troops and/or advisers present in client country?

Client Economic Dependency

Is the client a member of CEMA? Does the client have significant trade relations with the Soviet Bloc? Is the client dependent on the Soviet Union for the bulk of its aid? Has the client adopted a Soviet-styled economy? Do the client and the USSR have important financial or hard currency relations?

Soviet Military Access in Client Country

Does the Soviet Union have aircraft basing or naval rights in client country? Are there Soviet signal intelligence sites in client country?

Mutual Foreign Policy Support

Does each party support the other on issues of importance to the particular party? Is there strong mutuality of an anti-US policy posture?

Soviet Geopolitical Interest

In your judgment, what is the strength of the Soviet geopolitical/strategic interest in your country?

Summary Judgments

Given the strength/weakness of bilateral ties and current points of discord, would you judge tension in the overall relationship as strong, moderate, or weak? What are the prospects for a weakening of ties and dependencies in the future or a divergence in interests that might lead to a major deterioration or shift in the relationship?

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Secret

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