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
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Vulnerabilities of Third World Marxist-Leninist Regimes

25X1

October 1986



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**Vulnerabilities of Third World
Marxist-Leninist Regimes**

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Preface

This quarterly monitors key pressures and vulnerabilities of seven self-proclaimed Third World Marxist-Leninist regimes opposed by insurgencies: Nicaragua, Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, South Yemen, and Cambodia. The publication applies sets of indicators on a regular basis that track a regime's economic/social pressures, political opposition activity, military/security problems, and external pressures. It also monitors the military and political performance and capabilities of the insurgency efforts. Analysts have made their evaluations of a country's vulnerability to regime or major policy change within the next year. This issue covers the period from 1 August through 31 October 1986. Articles in this issue focus on insurgent political opportunities to exploit regime pressures and vulnerabilities.

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Key Pressures and Vulnerabilities

Legend

- Evident high
- ◐ Evident low
- Negligible/not evident
- No information
- ▲ Increase from last quarter^a
- ▼ Decrease from last quarter^a

		Nicaragua	Angola	Afghanistan	Ethiopia	Mozambique	South Yemen	Cambodia
Political Vulnerabilities	Economic/social pressures	◐	◐	◐ ▲	◐	● ▲	● ▲	●
	Elite factionalism	○	◐	● ▲	○	◐	● ▲	◐
	Opposition activities (excludes insurgency)	◐ ▲	○	◐ ▲	○	○	○	○
	Military discontent	○	○	◐ ▲	◐	● ▲	● ▲	●
	Insurgent political performance/capabilities	◐	●	◐	●	◐	◐	◐
Security Vulnerabilities	Shortfalls in Soviet or Bloc military support	○	○	○	○	◐	● ▼	○
	Insurgent military performance/capabilities	◐ ▲	●	◐ ▲	◐	● ▲	◐ ▲	◐ ▲
	Deficiencies in government capabilities	○	◐	●	○	● ▲	●	◐
External Pressures	International pressures for policy change	◐	◐	◐	○	●	●	◐ ▲
	Differences with Soviet Bloc	○	◐	◐ ▲	◐	◐	◐	◐ ▲
Prospects for change in regime within next year. ^b		○	○	○	○	◐ ▲	●	○
Prospects for major policy shifts within next year. ^b		○	○	○	○	● ▲	◐	○

^a Indicates any incremental change from the previous quarter, including change within the same overall level of Evident High or Evident Low.

^b The following probabilities are assigned:

- 70 percent or higher
- ◐ 30-70 percent
- 0-30 percent

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Vulnerabilities of Third World Marxist-Leninist Regimes

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Summary

Developments and Outlook

During August-October 1986, the regimes in *Afghanistan*, *South Yemen*, *Mozambique*, and *Nicaragua* came under increased socioeconomic, political, and military pressures. In Kabul party factionalism intensified both between the rival Khalqi and Parchami factions and within the Parchami faction itself, particularly among supporters of former party chief Babrak Karmal and current leader Najibullah. Moreover, Babrak's removal last May, Soviet efforts to persuade party hardliners to allow nonparty figures and credible exiles to join the government, and reinvigorated efforts to push the Afghan Armed Forces to assume more of the war burden are contributing to rising tension between elites in Moscow and Kabul, in our judgment. The insurgents seized the initiative during August and September, attacking urban areas—including destruction of a large surface-to-air missile support facility in the capital—and extending their activity into the northern provinces.

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Divisions within the 10-month-old *South Yemeni* regime also grew, with rival leaders and their personal militias engaged in often violent confrontations. the regime is concerned that the threat from former leader Ali Nasir's supporters exiled in North Yemen will grow. The exiles began limited operations this quarter and small teams have infiltrated into the South. Moscow is dissatisfied with the current leadership in Aden, but we believe it is not willing to risk a repeat of the January bloodbath and jeopardize its relations on the peninsula to try to force a solution to the infighting. As the record of past events indicates, however, Moscow may not exert sufficient influence in Aden to prevent a change in regime alignment that would favor more hardline factions if internal and external security pressures mount.

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Mozambique's new head of state, former Foreign Minister Chissano, faces daunting security and economic problems. While we do not expect any immediate policy shifts from the Machel loyalist, policy continuity and the fragile consensus between hardliners and moderates will be difficult to maintain if insurgent pressure mounts during the rainy season, which begins in November. A sudden insurgent offensive in late September overran all Mozambican districts bordering on Malawi, and attacks on the important Beira transportation corridor ended a two-year lull. Insurgent leaders have vowed publicly to step up operations against the successor government and have ruled out negotiations. The new government will

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require the support of key military elements, and this support will be tied directly to the security situation. If the government appears adrift and insurgent pressure continues unchecked, we believe the possibility of a military coup or emergence of pro-Soviet hardliners in the government will increase. [redacted]

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In *Nicaragua* Moscow is providing increasing amounts of economic aid to make up for the regime's continued economic shortfalls and provide a consumer safety net. Opposition activity increased slightly during the quarter as the government, reeling from international criticism of its crackdown on dissidents in July, took a more conciliatory posture toward major opposition figures. Rebels operating inside Nicaragua stepped up ambushes on government targets and increased aerial resupply efforts, enabling renewed activity on the long-dormant southern front. We expect the Sandinistas to toughen their stance on internal opponents as US military aid begins to flow. Managua almost certainly will appeal to the Soviets for more advanced antiaircraft weapons to hamper rebel resupply.

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In *Angola* and *Ethiopia* there was little change in the political-military situation from the previous quarter. Backed by unprecedented levels of Soviet Bloc arms shipments and extensive resupply efforts, Luanda continued its incremental buildup of troops and equipment at forward government bases near UNITA-controlled territory. [redacted] the government is concerned about UNITA's public relations campaign in the West and is undertaking its own foreign propaganda initiative to undercut UNITA and improve its image in the United States. Rumors of coup plotting by senior military officers surfaced once again in Addis Ababa, but we see no evidence of any concrete plan of action and judge that Mengistu's efficient security apparatus is capable of keeping military disgruntlement in check. [redacted]

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External pressures on the *Cambodian* regime—and its supporters in Hanoi—to consider settlement negotiations increased slightly this quarter. The most noteworthy developments were Gorbachev's public suggestion at Vladivostok that Vietnam and China discuss Cambodia and the Soviet's agreement to discuss Cambodia during the ninth round of Sino-Soviet consultations in October. Communist Democratic Kampuchea forces—the Khmer Rouge—continued their active interior campaign, while the number of non-Communist forces in the country decreased over the quarter, in our assessment. [redacted]

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For its part, Moscow continued to militarily support its Marxist clients opposed by anti-Marxist insurgencies, albeit at differing levels:

- *Nicaragua, Afghanistan, and Cambodia* continued to receive large amounts of arms. The second direct arms shipment to Nicaragua [] []—including MI-17 and MI-25 helicopters—arrived in October; we expect that total military deliveries to Managua for the year will double last year's tonnage levels. 25X1
- Although we have difficulty tracking the flow, we estimate that transfers to *Afghanistan* are running at last year's level at least.
- *South Yemen* took delivery of several MIG-21 fighters from overhaul in the USSR, the first such equipment replacement since last January's coup.
- Deliveries to *Angola* dropped sharply, following a spring surge when deliveries almost equaled the total for 1985.
- The level of transfers to *Mozambique* so far this year is running well below peak levels of 1984 and at only one-third last year's level. [] 25X1

At the same time, in our judgment, Moscow faces several potential conflicts between continued support of Marxist clients and its broader regional interests:

- In *South Yemen* military operations by the exiles, or other major outbreaks of violence, are likely to provoke a strong Soviet response and could jeopardize Moscow's efforts on the peninsula to establish and improve relations.
- Moscow's efforts to broaden the social base of the *Afghan* Government and its withdrawal of nonessential troops risks opposition from the party elite in Kabul and intensified party infighting.
- Gorbachev's new interest in better relations with Asian countries implicitly requires that Hanoi moderate its stance on Cambodia—at least diplomatically—and act in greater consonance with Soviet regional objectives.
- Moscow's reluctance to support Mozambique in its hour of need risks criticism from other Third World clients that Soviet commitment to the ultimate security of its friends is weak. [] 25X1

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Perspective

Insurgent Political Opportunities

Our country indicators and briefs point up the socioeconomic pressures and internal political problems faced by many Third World Marxist-Leninist regimes. In our view, these weaknesses present opportunities for exploitation by insurgent organizations or domestic opposition groups that over time can cost the government loss of support. Analysis of modern insurgency efforts shows that political mobilization in the form of propaganda, recruitment, front organization, and international activity is a critical component—along with guerrilla warfare—of an insurgency's success in weakening government control and legitimacy and ultimately forcing its collapse.

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Social, economic, ethnic, and religious tensions run high in these regimes, and despite the institution of a central party apparatus, political factionalism or opposition is prevalent. Moreover, in many cases government responses have exacerbated these problems and created new ones for the leadership. For example, government economic centralization and mismanagement not only has been a major factor in consumer shortages, in our judgment, but also has spawned corruption, a system of unequal privileges and access to goods, and dependency on the Soviet Bloc, whose capacity to meet longer term development needs is poor.

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A regime becomes vulnerable to its problems when those affected come to blame the government and have been offered a vehicle and incentives to withdraw their support. Insurgent political mobilization efforts should aim to exploit issues relevant to the audience and, at the same time, present an appealing alternative program or ideology:

- On economic issues, Managua is vulnerable to loss of support from many groups, in our judgment, including farmers, peasants opposed to collectivization, nongovernment urban consumers, industrial workers, and government bureaucrats. In addition, the regime is under international criticism from the Catholic Church and Western nations for its repressive tactics, and has recently taken a more conciliatory posture toward

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internal dissidents in an effort to defuse the criticism. These pressures and constraints on further elimination of regime opponents provide the opportunity for the insurgents or opposition parties to publicize religious, censorship, and human rights injustices.

- In Angola, UNITA's attacks on economic targets have exacerbated the regime's economic problems. To win greater support from government-controlled areas and cities, however, UNITA must effectively exploit the government's inept economic policies, including the near collapse of the fishing industry, declining agricultural exports, and the siphoning off of substantial foreign exchange earnings by the Soviets and Cubans. In addition, exploitation of frictions between Angolans and Cubans at several different levels and divisions within the ruling party over race and education could undercut support for the government and help UNITA create an urban support network.
- In Afghanistan, traditional resistance to foreign domination and control by any central government as well as religious/secular themes could be exploited to mobilize active armed support for the insurgents and help deter Soviet efforts to co-opt or pacify the rural population. In Kabul, factionalization exists along several lines—including rural versus urban splits in the party, disagreement over Soviet policies and influence, and supporters and opponents of party chief Najibullah—and present opportunities for insurgent groups to win urban informants and recruits.

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A strong political organization and appealing political platform are essential vehicles for the channeling of popular disaffection against the regime. If the insurgency has articulated a nationalist ideology or character as well as legitimate political goals, the insurgents will more easily win both domestic and foreign supporters as they exploit government weaknesses and champion popular concerns. Many successful insurgencies since 1945—including the Sandinista and Cuban efforts—developed a political platform and shadow government that were decisive factors in winning external material support and international recognition or inducing the withdrawal of international support for the regime.

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Country Indicators and Briefs

Interpreting the Indicators

The indicators have been grouped into two sets to monitor change in pressures on the regime and the progress of the insurgency efforts. Analysts have developed country-specific indicators of socioeconomic pressures, political conflict and opposition activity, security problems, and external pressures. Similarly, they have developed indicators tailored to the insurgencies in their countries that are designed to measure the progress of the insurgency relative to its particular level of sophistication. The lists include indicators currently in evidence as well as those not now evident but that would be of significant importance if they surfaced. Analysts have marked any incremental changes from the previous quarter, even if the change occurred within the same overall level of evident high or evident low. Thus an increase or decrease from the previous quarter does not necessarily represent movement from one level to another.

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Nicaragua: Trends and Outlook

Moscow is helping to make up for Managua's economic shortfalls and is increasing its military assistance substantially over 1985 levels. Several emergency grain shipments have eased food shortages, [redacted] and there are reliable indications that Moscow has provided hard currency support as well. The Soviets increased shipments of additional MI-8 and MI-17 helicopters that will more than double the size of the Sandinista Air Force by the end of the year. We expect that total military deliveries for 1986 will probably double last year's tonnage levels. [redacted]

Managua, reeling from international criticism of its crackdown on dissidents last July, took a more conciliatory posture toward major opposition figures this quarter but continued to harass less visible lower echelon dissidents. The government and the Catholic Church renewed their long-stalled dialogue in September, which the regime

portrayed as evidence of its flexibility. The government also agreed to meet with opposition parties in the National Assembly who oppose the heavily proregime draft constitution. At the same time, the regime detained a mid-level political opposition leader, and in September it blocked another antiregime priest from reentering the country. [redacted]

During the next quarter, we expect that food shortages will recede somewhat as food crops are harvested and Soviet Bloc donations arrive. We judge that the Sandinistas may decide to toughen their stance on internal opponents as US military aid begins to flow. Soviet aid will probably keep pace with Managua's needs [redacted]

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Indicators			Aug-Oct 1986
Legend ● Evident high ◐ Evident low ○ Negligible/ not evident • No information ▲ Increase from last quarter ▼ Decrease from last quarter	Economic/Social Pressures	Urban consumer goods shortages	● ▼
		Unemployment	●
		Rural food shortages	◐ ▼
		Discontent with agrarian programs	◐
		Government intimidation	●
		Public reaction to harassment of church	◐ ▼
		Negative reaction to military conscription	◐ ▼
		Urban protests	○
		Factionalism within Directorate	○
		Anti-regime church activity	◐
	Political Conflict/ Opposition Activity	Activity by opposition parties	◐ ▲
		Labor demands/strikes	○
		Student opposition	○
		Factionalism/coalition building within military	○
		Reports/rumors of coup plotting	○
		Military/Security Problems	Deficiencies in: assimilating/maintaining equipment
	logistics		◐
	police or militia performance		○
	Draft evasions/desertions/low morale		●
	Civilian casualties or property damage		● ▲
Insurgent performance/capability	◐		
External Factors	Shortfalls in Soviet or Cuban military support	○	
	Shortfalls in Soviet economic support	○	
	Shortfalls in Western economic support	◐ ▲	
	Diplomatic pressure from regional states	◐	
	Prospects for regime change within next year ^a	○	
Prospects for major policy shifts within next year ^a	○		

^a The following probabilities are assigned:

- 70 percent or higher
- ◐ 30-70 percent
- 0-30 percent

[redacted]

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
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Insurgency/Counterinsurgency Developments

- While rebels in the northwest withdrew to Honduran camps to await arrival of US military aid, those remaining inside Nicaragua stepped up ambushes on truck convoys and military jeeps and inflicted considerable casualties. Aerial resupply increased, allowing renewed activity on the long-dormant southern front.
- The decline in activity in the northwest enabled the Sandinistas to concentrate forces on the rebel buildup in central Nicaragua, move back to the Honduran border in force, and mount operations against Indian rebels in the northeast.

- In an attempt to diminish tensions among competing factions and among political and military leaders, the rebel high command created a council of regional commanders to advise them on military and political matters.

In coming months, fighting will intensify as US aid reaches the rebels. We expect the insurgents to concentrate on reinfiltrating into Nicaragua and establishing a reliable resupply network. Insurgent resolve is likely to be tested by improving Sandinista air defenses. In our judgment, Managua almost certainly will turn to the Soviets for more advanced antiaircraft weapons to hamper rebel resupply.



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		Aug-Oct 1986	
Legend ● Evident high ◐ Evident low ○ Negligible/ not evident • No information ▲ Increase from last quarter ▼ Decrease from last quarter	Leadership/ Organizational Skills	Unity/coordination among faction leaders	◐
		Articulation of political program/ideology	◐
		Political organization with grassroots	○
		Nationalist appeal of insurgent leaders	○
	Military Performance	Presence in country	◐ ▼
		Attacks on government positions/military convoys	● ▲
		Attacks on economic targets	● ▲
		Ability to maintain multiple front operations	◐ ▲
		Use of small unit tactics	●
		Discipline among cadres	◐
		Diversification/performance of resupply efforts	◐
		Stocks of weapons/equipment	● ▼
		Collection/utilization of tactical intelligence	◐
Casualties/weapon losses after encounters		◐	
Popular Support	Recruitment and retention of personnel	•	
	Seizure of rural territory	○	
	Propaganda efforts	◐	
	Number of local informants and suppliers	◐	
	Civic action programs	◐	
External Support	Urban presence/recognition	○	
	Ties to opposition groups or parties	○	
	Foreign military support	● ▲	
	Recognition by foreign governments	○	
	Cooperation of neighboring states	●	

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We believe that Nicaragua's dismal economic situation may spur growing domestic criticism and provide fertile ground for antiregime sentiment, especially if battlefield losses mount as the insurgency heats up. Managua is relying on tighter regulations and repressive measures to retain political control, while increasing Soviet aid has created a marginal economic safety net that has thus far helped to contain popular discontent over economic policies. The situation, however, will be more susceptible to propaganda exploitation by the insurgents and other opposition forces.

Economic Tailspin

The Nicaraguan economy is a shambles. Economic activity is contracting for the fifth straight year, recent harvests have been the worst in memory, and inflation is roaring along at a 600-percent annual rate, according to official Nicaraguan estimates. Despite well-publicized emergency food shipments from the Soviet Bloc, consumer shortages were increasingly severe during the past quarter. According to the US Embassy, a number of staples—including beans, rice, and cooking oil—have been practically unavailable in recent months. A variety of sources indicate that many Nicaraguans have cut their diets to the basics and that some are going hungry.


Public discontent over economic shortages is underscored by unprecedented consumer disturbances, stepped-up criticism from opposition leaders, and charges of government economic mismanagement of food supplies in the government-controlled press. Since last June, the US Embassy has reported food-related disturbances in Managua, Leon, and San Juan del Sur. According to a variety of sources, the government is concerned that Nicaraguans are blaming government mismanagement and inappropriate policies for current shortages rather than external forces for the growing economic problems. During the past quarter, private-sector spokesmen stepped up verbal attacks on regime economic policies in regional and national meetings and in private publications. A collaborationist opposition party, with representation in the National Assembly, used the progovernment press to declare that Sandinista inefficiencies were wrecking the economy and that Nicaraguans could not survive on current rations. The statement also warned that corrective actions were needed because "the counterrevolution begins in the kitchen."

Regime Response

The regime has reacted to the economic decline with several stopgap measures that, in our view, have no chance of improving the economy's performance. The Sandinistas have tightened marketing regulations, assumed more direct control over wholesale and retail distribution, further restricted access to food rations, and are increasingly relying on Soviet Bloc food donations. Since mid-year, Managua has added 200 plainclothes inspectors to help monitor compliance with regulations in food markets. The Sandinistas also have revoked operating licenses for private perishable-food wholesalers, replacing them with a new state company, and have taken over the country's last privately owned supermarket. In August, the regime set aside two fully stocked supermarkets for the exclusive use of designated government employees, party officials, and their families; remaining supermarkets, which are reserved for dependents of other public employees, will be stocked with only half as many goods. Under this scheme, families of private-sector workers are forced to depend on black markets since their designated state stores are virtually empty, according to US Embassy reporting.

Nicaragua: Total Exports and Foreign Economic Aid, 1979-86

Million US \$



^a Estimated.

As the economic base deteriorates, the regime is counting on a steady expansion of Soviet Bloc grants and trade credits to maintain minimum consumption levels. While new Bloc food donations apparently will ease shortages for the near term and help keep the lid on popular discontent, we calculate that probable increases in economic support will not be enough to stem the decline in the economy. Little, if any, extra Soviet Bloc financial support will be extended to boost capital goods and raw material imports needed to restore factory output or increase farm production. In our judgment, Moscow increasingly will insist that the regime curb waste and inefficiency and rely more heavily on its own resources.

Political Implications

The economic plight, particularly if combined with increasing Sandinista battlefield losses, will continue to erode public confidence in the regime, and we believe there is almost no chance that economic performance will improve over the near term. Rather, we see a continued downward spiral as increased military pressure against the regime diverts already scarce managerial and budget resources to the war effort. Moreover, we believe that further economic centralization, repressive policies, and distributive inefficiencies are likely to be viewed by most Nicaraguans as callously unresponsive to the basic needs of the people.

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In our assessment, official corruption, if made public, could further erode the regime's image. Indications of growing graft probably would cause the average Nicaraguan to think that the Sandinistas were unable or unwilling to control the bureaucracy and deliver food and social services as promised. The US Embassy has noted several reports of official corruption in connection with Soviet Bloc food donations, including the export of grain donations for hard currency by government officials.

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The situation is susceptible to exploitation by the insurgents and other opposition forces, and various reports indicate that the Sandinistas are concerned about this prospect. While we believe that most Nicaraguans oppose a return to pre-Sandinista economic policies, many are not happy with the controls established by the government on all phases of economic activity. At the same time, a majority of Nicaraguans will, in our view, look for continuation of the positive aspects of land reform and extended health, education, and other social services in any alternate economic agenda put forth by regime opponents.

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Angola: Trends and Outlook

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President dos Santos made additional personnel changes this past quarter that further enhance his control over the party and place more blacks in key positions formerly dominated by the mulatto minority. Dos Santos removed the Air Force commander in September.

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Dos Santos, in our judgment, continues to strengthen his position since his successful emergence over party hardliners at the party Congress last December, although divisions, particularly over race and educational background, remain among the party elite.

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Foreign exchange shortages worsened this quarter as oil prices continued to decline, and Luanda is having difficulty meeting foreign payments to Western creditors. An increase in the volume of oil exports and Soviet loans are helping to forestall sharp cuts in military expenditures. Although observers in Luanda have reported the absence of consumer goods, we see no signs

of severe food shortages or food-related disturbances in urban areas. Press reports indicate, however, that food shortages are prevalent in central rural areas where insurgent activity has affected crop production and spurred the movement of refugees into the cities.

Luanda appears to have initiated a foreign policy strategy aimed at undercutting UNITA's support in the West and improving Angola's image in the United States. We believe that recent visits to Luanda by prominent US citizens, the hiring of US public relations firms, and overtures to US officials about reopening talks on Namibian independence are part of this strategy. In our judgment, this effort, together with increased attention on the battlefield to extensive logistic preparation, suggests that Luanda is focused on the longer haul and is playing for time. Luanda probably hopes that internal strife in South Africa, combined with a change of US administrations, will diminish external commitments to UNITA.

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Aug-Oct 1986

Indicators			Aug-Oct 1986	
Legend ● Evident high ◐ Evident low ○ Negligible/ not evident • No information ▲ Increase from last quarter ▼ Decrease from last quarter	Economic/Social Pressures	Foreign exchange shortages	◐ ▲	
		Disruption of major transport routes	●	
		Food, consumer goods shortages	●	
		Refugees/population dislocations	◐	
		Emigration of political elites	○	
		Urban protests	○	
	Political Conflict/ Opposition Activity	Factionalism within the ruling party and government	◐	
		Military discontent with government policies	•	
		Military discontent with pay, supply shortages	•	
		Reports/rumors of coup plotting	○	
		Military/Security Problems	Deficiencies in: protection of key economic targets	◐
			defense of cities/major garrisons	○
	conduct of offensive operations		◐	
	command and control		◐	
	arms/ammunition/equipment		○	
	training/discipline		•	
	External Factors	Desertions/mutinies	◐	
		Military casualties/defeats	◐	
		Insurgent performance/capability	●	
		Shortfalls in Cuban troop support	○	
Shortfalls in Soviet military support		○		
Shortfalls in Western investment/economic support		◐		
Differences with Moscow or Havana			◐	
Prospects for regime change within next year ^a			○	
Prospects for major policy shifts within next year ^a			○	

^a The following probabilities are assigned:

- 70 percent or higher
- ◐ 30-70 percent
- 0-30 percent

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
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Insurgency/Counterinsurgency Developments

- Backed by unprecedented levels of Soviet Bloc arms shipments and extensive Soviet resupply efforts, Luanda continued its incremental buildup of troops and equipment at forward government bases in the southeast. Luanda's counterinsurgency strategy—previously grandiose and ill planned—has shifted toward a more cautious, incremental approach with special attention to logistics.
- UNITA launched attacks at Cuito Cuanavale and Munhango in an effort to disrupt government preparations for attacks in the southeast. In the north the insurgents sustained activity against nonoil economic targets, and in the central contested areas they maintained operations against government forces.

Although the extensive military buildup this year could enable Angola to break precedent and initiate actions during the rainy season, we judge that a major government offensive against UNITA will probably wait until next year. We believe that Luanda will continue to increase its already substantial military buildup over the November-April rainy season, and it may seek to divide UNITA politically by holding out the prospect of direct negotiations and reconciliation.

Military Situation



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		Aug-Oct 1986	
Legend	Leadership/ Organizational Skills	Unity of leadership	●
		Broader ethnic representation in leadership	◐
Military Performance		Grassroots political structure (country wide)	◐
		Articulation of political program inside Angola	◐
		Attacks on oil facilities	○
		Attacks on non-oil economic/transport targets	●
		Attacks on major government positions	◐
		Activity outside southeastern strongholds	◐
		Urban activity	○
		Air-defense performance/capability	◐ ▲
		Anti-armor performance/capability	◐ ▲
		Recruitment	◐
Popular Support		Stocks of weapons/equipment	◐
		Logistics resupply capability	◐
		Consolidation/expansion of territorial control	◐
		Administrative and social services (country wide)	◐
External Support		Urban presence/propaganda efforts	○
		Cross ethnic support	◐
		South African support	●
		Western aid	◐ ▲
		Foreign recognition/political support	◐ ▲
		Insurgent propaganda efforts abroad	◐ ▲



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UNITA leader Savimbi's recent trip to Western Europe provided him international media exposure but failed to win him increased diplomatic recognition or significant material support. In our judgment, UNITA's prospects for winning increased foreign support depend largely on its ability to present itself as a legitimate black African liberation movement with justifiable political goals; its ties to South Africa are the largest obstacle to projecting this image. [redacted]

Savimbi's West European Initiative

Savimbi, bolstered by his successful visit to the United States last January, has launched a public relations campaign to gain increased support for UNITA in Western Europe. Savimbi recently addressed an informal gathering of conservative members of the European Parliament, met with senior French officials off the record, talked with conservative French businessmen, and held numerous interviews with the media. Press reports indicate that Savimbi stressed UNITA's willingness to begin a dialogue without preconditions with the dos Santos government. According to US Embassy reports, Savimbi was well received by conservative circles in Europe. [redacted]

At the same time, Savimbi was unable to meet with any European government officials on an official basis, and London and Bonn refused even on an unofficial basis. His off-the-record meetings with French officials created considerable debate within the government and drew protests from several domestic interest groups. In addition, the European Parliament narrowly passed a resolution branding UNITA as a terrorist organization and condemning US support. [redacted]

Disturbed by US aid to UNITA and the prospects of increased European support to the insurgents, Luanda has mounted an effort with the help of the USSR, Cuba, and the Frontline States to undermine Savimbi's campaign. Press reports indicate that Luanda vigorously protested the UNITA leader's visit to West European officials and threatened to reduce ties to any country whose officials met with Savimbi. Frontline States' ambassadors in Europe added protests of their own, and European Communist movements also condemned the visit. Luanda's strategy focuses on Savimbi's ties to South Africa, probably in the hopes of causing divisions between Washington and its European allies over support to UNITA. We believe that overtures to US officials about reopening talks on Namibian independence are also part of this public relations effort. [redacted]

Prospects

In our judgment, UNITA's prospects for winning increased foreign support depend largely on its ability to present itself as a legitimate black African liberation movement with justifiable political goals. Savimbi must convince people through sophisticated media use that (1) despite the aid he gets from South Africa, he is a black nationalist and not a puppet of Pretoria; (2) UNITA has broad ethnic support



Savimbi at the European Parliament [redacted]

within Angola and offers a viable political organization that is capable of running the country; and (3) the dos Santos government has little popular support, is unable to administer the country, and has failed to provide the people an economic livelihood. [redacted]

Savimbi's most difficult obstacle in projecting a more favorable image is his relationship with South Africa. These ties are particularly offensive to African states and provide easy ammunition for Luanda with other Third World countries. Angola's almost universal recognition in international organizations, its image of representing "anticolonial" interests because of its struggle against the Portuguese, and substantial commercial ties in Europe also work against UNITA's efforts to be recognized diplomatically. France, Britain, Portugal, and Belgium have business interests in Angola's lucrative oilfields as well as in diamonds and manufacturing. [redacted]

A major gain on the battlefield would bolster UNITA's argument that the insurgents cannot be defeated militarily. Increased use of Zairian territory would improve UNITA capabilities in the north and in the oil-rich exclave of Cabinda. So far, Zairian President Mobutu has kept a tight rein on UNITA activities, probably because he fears Angolan retaliation and increased regional isolation, in our view. [redacted]

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[REDACTED]

By focusing on the large Soviet and Cuban presence in Angola, Savimbi could attempt to wrestle the mantle of legitimacy from Luanda as the embodiment of "black nationalism" and "anti-colonialism." Moreover, exposure of the essential role of oil revenues in maintaining Cuban troops and paying for unprecedented levels of Soviet arms could increase public pressure on Western businessmen to reduce ties to Luanda, in our judgment. Such an effort might precipitate a withdrawal of a major oil company—an event that would have a significant psychological impact on Luanda and Western public opinion, in our judgment. [REDACTED]

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Afghanistan: Trends and Outlook

Factionalism within the ruling People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) has intensified over the past few months, according to the US Embassy in Kabul. Infighting is prevalent both between the rival Khalqi and Parchami factions of the PDPA and within the Parchami faction itself—among supporters of former party chief Babrak Karmal, current PDPA head Najibullah, and Prime Minister Keshtmand. the political conflict has sparked public protests, work slowdowns in several government ministries, and dissension in Afghan army units and security services.

Babrak's removal, Soviet efforts to persuade PDPA hardliners to allow nonparty figures and credible exiles to join the government, a new conscription drive, and reinvigorated efforts to push the Armed Forces to assume more of the war burden are contributing to rising

anti-Sovietism, even among elements of the Soviet-installed regime, in our judgment. a new political party created by Babrak supporters in August has called for the ouster of the Soviets.

For his part, Najibullah is moving steadily to consolidate his personal power base, on his way to easing Babrak out of his position as President of the Revolutionary Council—the rubberstamp legislature—and as a member of the Politburo. Babrak's photographs have disappeared from official government buildings, according to US Embassy sources in Kabul. We judge that approval of the constitution establishing a new legislature this fall will provide a means for Babrak to be exiled to Eastern Europe.

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Aug-Oct 1986

Indicators		Aug-Oct 1986	
Legend ● Evident high ◐ Evident low ○ Negligible/ not evident • No information ▲ Increase from last quarter ▼ Decrease from last quarter	Economic/Social Pressures	Food, consumer goods shortages	◐ ▲
		Forced relocations of population	○
		Restrictions on private sector activity	○
		Military conscription	● ▲
	Political Conflict/ Opposition Activity	Efforts to control or disrupt food supplies	◐ ▲
		Factionalism within ruling party	● ▲
		Tension between Kabul and Moscow	◐ ▲
		Government purges/dismissals	◐ ▲
		Slowdowns/strikes in government ministries	● ▲
		Urban protests	○
		Military/Security Problems	Afghan deficiencies in: defense of cities/major garrisons
	intelligence capability		◐
	small unit tactics		●
	logistics		● ▼
	discipline/command and control		●
	Factionalism within Armed Forces		●
	Armed Forces desertions		●
	Afghan military casualties		● ▲
	Soviet discipline/morale problems		●
	Soviet military casualties		◐ ▼
External Factors	Insurgent performance/capability	● ▲	
	Shortfalls in Soviet military aid	○	
	Shortfalls in Soviet economic support	◐	
	Diplomatic pressure on Moscow	◐	
	International material support for insurgents	●	
Major drawdown in Soviet forces within next year^a		○	
Change in government/leadership within next year^a		○	

^a The following probabilities are assigned:

- 70 percent or higher
- ◐ 30-70 percent
- 0-30 percent

[Redacted]

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Insurgency/Counterinsurgency Developments

The insurgents attacked urban areas and key lines of communication and extended their activity into the northern provinces during the quarter:


- The insurgents increased activity in Kabul, Herat, and Qandahar despite continuing Soviet and Afghan efforts to improve urban security. Their most spectacular act was the destruction in late August of a large surface-to-air-missile support facility and ammunition dump near the capital; the Soviets responded with a month-long pounding of the insurgent presence at Paghman, west of the city.



Soviet/Afghan violations of Pakistani airspace increased and bombing of insurgent positions in Pakistan were some of the most intense attacks to date. Soviet and Afghan efforts to control and disrupt food supplies contributed to increased costs and some shortages. Soviet withdrawal of six regiments followed an earlier troop augmentation, leaving Moscow's net combat capability relatively unchanged. We expect fighting to slow this winter as inclement weather makes insurgent resupply more difficult.



Rocket Attacks in Kabul 1983-86 by Quarter



* 1986 data available through September.

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			Aug-Oct 1986	
Legend	● Evident high		●	
	◐ Evident low		◐	
	○ Negligible/not evident		○	
Leadership/ Organizational Skills	Military Performance	Articulation of political/military program	◐	
		Unity of Afghan resistance	○	
		Cooperation among field commanders	◐	
	Popular Support	Political organization with grassroots	Attacks on government/military positions	● ▲
			Tactical initiative/ops sophistication	◐ ▲
			Air-defense performance/capability	◐ ▲
			Urban activity	● ▲
			Overall level combat activity	◐ ▲
			Insurgent morale and discipline	◐
			Insurgent casualties	● ▲
			Weapons/training	◐
			Intelligence capability	◐
			Logistical resupply	◐
			Establishment of secured bases	○
			Provision of rural food/supplies	◐
Provision of administrative/social services	◐			
External Support	Provision local security	Pakistani support	●	
		Support from other Islamic countries	◐	
		Western support	●	
		Chinese support	●	
		Supportive Pakistani posture at Geneva	● ▼	
	Resistance alliance propaganda efforts	◐		



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Factional divisions stemming from the leadership change in Kabul this spring continue to plague the ruling party and frustrate Moscow's attempts to consolidate Najibullah's position as party head. In addition, reinvigorated efforts to push "national reconciliation" with nonparty members and to "Afghanize" the war effort will continue to divide Moscow's and Kabul's ruling elite in the coming months, in our view. Greater exposure—both internally and internationally—of these fundamental differences between Moscow and Kabul could help fuel anti-Sovietism among the regime elite and weaken Moscow's efforts to portray the Kabul regime favorably to the international community. [redacted]

Sources of Tension

We believe intensified and unconcealed factionalism within the ruling People's Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) over Moscow's replacement of Babrak Karmal as party secretary general in May is probably causing Moscow to wonder whether it made a serious error. Factionalism between political supporters of Babrak, current party head Najibullah, and Prime Minister Keshtmand is deep and is prevalent within the military and government bureaucracy as well. Najibullah's reputation for ruthlessness, his history of anti-Khalqi behavior, and his hints that further purges will occur are sustaining party unrest and eroding regime legitimacy, in our view. At the same time, Babrak continues to provide a rallying point for those opposed to Najibullah; there were large demonstrations of support along Babrak's route to last month's Soviet withdrawal ceremonies, according to the US Embassy in Kabul. [redacted]

As long as Najibullah retains Soviet backing, we believe it is only a matter of time before he will be able to remove his principal rivals—Babrak Karmal and Prime Minister Keshtmand—completely from power and weaken the political strength of their supporters. Najibullah already has obtained the backing of important Khalqi leaders such as Interior Minister Gulabzoi and Defense Minister Nazar Mohammad—support that we believe will help him cement his control over the Armed Forces. He has appointed several of his supporters to the Politburo and roughly doubled the size of the Central Committee in a bid to stack it with people who would approve future leadership changes aimed at consolidating his power. [redacted]


However, Najibullah must still convince Moscow that it did not make a mistake in appointing him party chief and that he can establish a credible government. Even if he eliminates his main rivals, he will face a difficult task in trying to achieve Moscow's primary objectives of building a cohesive government and having the Afghan Armed Forces assume more of the war burden. Basic policy differences between Moscow and significant elements of the PDPA as well as Najibullah's unpopularity will continue to fuel regime infighting for some time, in our view. [redacted]

Moscow's longstanding—and unsuccessful—strategy for political consolidation of the regime centers on broadening the social base of the government by appointing nonparty members to some government posts. It also involves an effort to woo back credible figures in the Afghan resistance and exile communities. Both Najibullah and Babrak faced resistance from leftist party ideologues over how far this so-called broadening campaign should go. [redacted]

Afghanistan: Ethnic Composition of PDPA Central Committee^a

Original Committee


81 total members



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New Committee (as of July 1986)

147 total members



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^a Because of rounding, the sum of the components may not add to 100.

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[REDACTED]

Similarly, we believe Moscow's push to Afghanize the war is contributing to uneasiness within the party over Moscow's reliability as an ally. Another conscription drive this past quarter eliminated student deferments and is affecting the sons and daughters of party members. Most party officials realize that the poorly trained Afghan Armed Forces are not up to the task of operating independently, despite official press claims of numerous victories over the insurgent forces. Moreover, victories often come at the cost of high casualties, including among the Army's elite regiments. We believe that disgruntled elements in Kabul almost certainly view efforts to Afghanize the war at the expense of high casualties as a form of Soviet betrayal.

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[REDACTED]

Moscow's Dilemma

In our judgment, these divisions within the ruling party and between Moscow and Kabul complicate Moscow's diplomatic effort to portray its—and Kabul's—negotiating posture as more conciliatory and could fuel greater pressures for instability. For example, soon after Gorbachev announced the Soviet decision to withdraw six regiments from Afghanistan, Najibullah went out of his way to explain that the decision was undertaken with Kabul's consent and that Moscow had no intention of abandoning the regime. We believe that, if significant elements of the regime came to believe that the Soviets were serious about disengaging from Afghanistan, defections in the military, government, and party would probably occur. [REDACTED]

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At a minimum, we believe broader international and domestic exposure of these deep-seated differences and divisions—perhaps greater than at any time since the Communist coup in 1978—would contribute to rising anti-Sovietism among the elite and frustrate Moscow's efforts to build a reliable client state near its border. As Moscow considers the pros and cons of purging Najibullah's major opponents and continues to "buy" time on the Afghanistan issue in diplomatic circles, there is the risk that competition among factions will intensify even more and significantly weaken regime control.

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Ethiopia: Trends and Outlook

Rumors of coup plotting by senior military officers again surfaced in Addis Ababa—a periodic occurrence—but we judge that Mengistu's pervasive and efficient security apparatus remains capable of keeping them in check. []

Mengistu postponed promulgation of a Soviet-style constitution, the formation of a "People's Republic," and the end of military rule from his September target date until early next year. According to US Embassy reports, documentation, organization, and administration of the process is requiring more time than originally anticipated. Mengistu has allowed public debate over the proposed document, and, according to the US Embassy, public misgivings over certain provisions—such as the creation of a strong presidency—have surfaced. In our judgment, however, the regime is unlikely to make more than token adjustments to the final draft. []

According to US Embassy reporting, Mengistu hopes the new constitution will legitimize his broad government powers and that provisions allowing local autonomy for Ethiopia's ethnic groups will undercut support for the insurgencies. The Eritreans have rejected this offer, however, and we believe its appeal to the Tigreans will be limited. The document is expected to give the Workers Party prominence for remaking Ethiopian society along socialist lines. []

The regime pushed on with its large-scale rural control program of moving scattered peasants into new villages. "Villagization" affects the large Oromo ethnic group the most, but apathy, religious differences, and geographic dispersion have prevented Oromo resentment from coalescing. Mengistu kept his more ambitious resettlement program on hold during the past quarter in an attempt to remedy human rights abuses publicized by Western critics. We expect, however, that he will resume long-distance resettlement early next year. []



Indicators			Aug-Oct 1986	
Legend ● Evident high ○ Evident low ○ Negligible/ not evident • No information ▲ Increase from last quarter ▼ Decrease from last quarter	Economic/Social Pressures	Disruption major transport routes	●	
		Urban consumer goods shortages	●	
		Rural food shortages	●	
		Peasant rebellions/unrest	●	
		Government brutality	●	
		Government repression of religious activity	○	
		Factionalism within leadership	○	
		Factionalism within bureaucracy	•	
		Anti-regime church activity	○	
		Student opposition	○	
	Political Conflict/ Opposition Activity	Ideological/generational conflict within military	○	
		Factionalism among senior officers	●	
		Military discontent over loss of influence	●	
		Military criticism of Soviet presence/influence	●	
		Reports/rumors of coup plotting	●	
		Military/Security Problems	Deficiencies in: protection of key economic targets	○
			defense of cities/major garrisons	○
			police/security capabilities	●
			Draft evasions/desertions	○
			Military casualties/defeats	○
External Factors	Insurgent performances/capability	●		
	Shortfalls in Soviet or Cuban military support	○		
	Shortfalls in Soviet economic support	○		
	Shortfalls in Western economic support	○		
	Differences with Moscow or Havana	●		
Prospects for regime change within next year^a			○	
Prospects for major policy shifts within next year^a			○	

^a The following probabilities are assigned:

- 70 percent or higher
- 30-70 percent
- 0-30 percent



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
Insurgency/Counterinsurgency Developments

Military activity in northern Ethiopia was light during the past quarter:

- Marxist Eritrean rebels set off several bombs in Asmera, the provincial capital, and raided military targets near the airport before Ethiopian Revolution Day in September, but were unable to produce a "spectacular," such as the destruction of Soviet military aircraft, as they did at Asmera Airport in March 1984.
- In Tigray Province, neither side initiated major operations, although several small-scale clashes occurred.

We believe that the government probably will integrate new recruits just out of training camps into existing units, precluding any major government offensive operations over the next few months.

For their part, the Christian-based Marxist EPLF and TPLF rebel groups are likely to probe government defenses and to continue attacking targets of opportunity. The capabilities of smaller Muslim groups are unlikely to increase over the next few months despite an increase in assistance from Saudi Arabia in an attempt to pressure Mengistu to cease aiding southern Sudanese dissidents.



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Legend	Leadership/ Organizational Skills	Unity of leadership	Aug-Oct 1986		
			EPLF	TPLF	
● Evident high	Organizational Skills	Political organization and infrastructure	●	●	
● Evident low		Effective chain of command	●	●	
○ Negligible/ not evident		Articulation of political program/ideology	●	●	
• No information	Military Performance	Attacks on key economic targets	●	●	
▲ Increase from last quarter		Attacks on government/military positions	●	●	
▼ Decrease from last quarter		Interdiction of supply/transport routes	●	●	
		Expansion military action beyond home territory	○	○	
		Incidents of urban sabotage/terrorism	●	○	
		Recruitment	●	●	
		Stocks of weapons/equipment	●	●	
		Logistics resupply capability	●	●	
		Expansion of territorial control	○	○	
		Popular Support	Access to economic resources	●	●
			Contact with other opposition groups	●	●
			Propaganda efforts	●	●
			Urban networks/undergrounds	●	●
	External Support	Foreign military support	○	○	
		Foreign economic aid	○	○	
		Insurgent propaganda efforts abroad	●	○	

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According to US Embassy reporting [redacted] discontent with Mengistu exists below the surface at almost all levels of the military and particularly among senior officers. While it would be difficult to pull off a successful coup—and we see no evidence of any concrete plan of action—it is conceivable that selected commanders of key units, operating secretly, could succeed. The new military leaders probably would be less ideological than Mengistu and more receptive to Western aid and influence. A complete shift from the Soviet camp, however, would require firm assurances that the United States would provide speedy and effective military aid on concessional terms, in our judgment. [redacted]

Sources of Discontent

Rumors of coup plotting periodically sweep Addis Ababa and occasionally allege that key officers [redacted]

[redacted]—are among the plotters.

According to the US Embassy [redacted] military opposition centers primarily around two grievances that are long-standing and typical among xenophobic Ethiopian officers:

- Dissatisfaction with the degree of Soviet influence in Ethiopia, the large number of Soviet advisers assigned to the military, the inadequacies of Soviet military equipment, and the poor level of Soviet logistic support.
- Mengistu's insistence on a military solution to the northern Marxist insurgencies that has caused heavy casualties over the years with no appreciable change in the military balance. [redacted]

The growing influence of Marxist civilians in the government as Mengistu moves to promulgate the new constitution and the end of military rule could provide an additional motive for coup plotting. Some reports indicate isolated conflicts between military officers and party officials over respective areas of jurisdiction and responsibility. Civilian officials of the Ethiopian Workers Party have increased their power over the past year, according to the US Embassy, and have assumed the role of watchdog in all government ministries and political institutions. [redacted]

Regime Capabilities

Mengistu is aware of these grievances, in our judgment, and has taken several steps to defuse any threat. He has reduced offensive operations in Eritrea and Tigray Provinces since 1983 and has placed more emphasis on training, morale building, and defensive measures among his forces in the north. A network of Workers Party commissars within the military carries out political indoctrination and serves as Mengistu's "eyes and ears" in all units. Another check on military disloyalty is performed by the pervasive and efficient Ministry of Public and National Security developed by the Soviet Union and East Germany and commanded by officers who owe their positions to Mengistu. The commander of the "Palace Guard," charged with ensuring the Chairman's personal security, is also a longtime Mengistu loyalist. Finally, Mengistu's reputation for moving quickly against his opponents and not hesitating to execute troublemakers serves to keep dissidents in line [redacted]

In our judgment, Mengistu's opponents are racked by personal and professional rivalries and deep mutual suspicions that make it difficult for them to work together. In addition, we believe that mobilization of military opposition to the current regime is hampered



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Lt. Gen. TESFAYE Gebre-Kidan (left) . . . member, ruling military council since 1974 . . . Minister of Defense since 1980 . . . fourth in Politburo . . . advises Mengistu on technical military matters rather than policy . . . one of the more moderate members of the Politburo . . . privately expresses anti-Soviet views . . . graduate of Holleta Military Academy . . . received military training in the United States . . . armor specialist . . . mixed Amhara and Oromo ethnic background [redacted]

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Maj. Gen. Fanta Belay (right) . . . commander of the Air Force since 1977 . . . member, Central Committee, Ethiopian Workers Party . . . respected, popular officer . . . dissatisfied with quality of Soviet-provided aircraft . . . has received military training in the United States . . . M.A. degree from a US university . . . member of Eritrean ethnic group . . . about 50. [redacted]

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by Addis Ababa's foreign military aid requirements and the military's belief that only Moscow is willing to provide the large amount of assistance needed to protect Ethiopia's borders and territorial integrity. Mengistu's commanders are also at a loss to devise a political solution to the northern insurgencies that would be acceptable to all parties. [redacted]

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Coup Vulnerability

We believe that Mengistu will become more vulnerable to a military coup or assassination attempt if:

- The military situation in the north takes a turn for the worse.
- Soviet advisers expand direct influence over the military and government.
- Civilian ideologues threaten the prominent role of the military within the party. [redacted]

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[REDACTED]

We doubt, however, that a new junta would move immediately to distance itself from Moscow, because of its need for extensive external help against the intractable insurgencies. The new leadership would want the Soviet arms but fewer advisers, in our view. A more dramatic disruption of Soviet ties would require firm assurances that Western nations would provide speedy military aid on concessional terms. [REDACTED]

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Assassins could also look to the West for help in consolidating power, but we judge that, in this more turbulent scenario, the Soviets and Marxists would have a greater influence over the composition and policies of any new regime. Such an event would usher in a period of instability, perhaps resembling the early years of the Ethiopian revolution. Marxists would probably participate in any coalition government, in our view, and the Soviets would have a say in selecting Mengistu's successor, given their current level of influence and Ethiopia's continuing need for arms. [REDACTED]

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Mozambique: Trends and Outlook

Mozambique's new head of state, former Foreign Minister Joaquim Chissano, faces daunting security and economic problems. A Machel loyalist, he initially is likely to continue Machel's basic policies as he tries to forge a unified government and maintain the fragile consensus between moderates and hardliners crafted by Machel. Policy continuity, however, will be difficult to maintain if insurgent pressure mounts during the rainy season, as we expect. The new government will require the support of key military elements, and this support will be tied directly to the security situation. If the government appears adrift and insurgent pressure continues unchecked, the possibility of a takeover by the military or the emergence of a pro-Soviet hardliner will increase, in our view. []

Moscow has reiterated its commitment to Maputo, but for the first time has indicated it may be interested in a political accommodation with the insurgents. A Soviet Foreign Ministry official told the US Embassy that Machel's death could facilitate negotiations between Maputo and RENAMO and that this might be a rational move given

the government's weak military position. Moscow appears unwilling to finance the massive arms transfers necessary to improve Maputo's security situation; Soviet arms deliveries have been substantially below the peak in 1984, although Moscow continues to provide about 800 military advisers. [] 25X1

Insurgent activity and South African economic retaliation for Maputo's support of South African guerrillas has further weakened Mozambique's economy. Attacks by RENAMO have disrupted rail, road, and port transportation, reduced farm output, nearly halted mine production, caused electric power outages, enlarged refugee populations, and led to major food shortages. In October, South Africa banned recruitment of Mozambican workers for employment in South Africa and ordered the repatriation of 60,000 Mozambican laborers, depriving Maputo of a critical source of foreign exchange. We judge that overall economic activity will continue to contract this year, following a 20-percent decline in GDP in 1985. [] 25X1

Indicators

			Aug-Oct 1986
Legend ● Evident high ○ Evident low ○ Negligible/ not evident • No information ▲ Increase from last quarter ▼ Decrease from last quarter	Economic/Social Pressures	Foreign exchange shortages	● ▲
		Disruption of major transport routes	● ▲
		Food, consumer goods shortages	● ▲
		Refugees/population dislocations	● ▲
		Military conscription	○
		Emigration of political elites	○
	Political Conflict/ Opposition Activity	Urban protests	○
		Factionalism within ruling party and government	○
		Military discontent with government policies	● ▲
		Military discontent with pay, supply shortages	●
		Reports/rumors of coup plotting	○ ▼
	Military/Security Problems	Deficiencies in: conduct of offensive operations	● ▲
		defense cities/major garrisons	○
		intelligence	○
		command and control	○
		arms/ammunition/equipment	●
		training/discipline	●
		Desertions/mutinies	● ▲
	External Factors	Military casualties/defeats	● ▲
		Insurgent performance/capability	● ▲
		Shortfalls in Zimbabwean troop support	○
		Shortfalls in Soviet military aid	○
		Shortfalls in Soviet economic support	○
		Shortfalls in Western economic support	○
	Differences with Moscow		○
Prospects for regime change within next year^a		● ▲	
Prospects for major policy shifts within next year^a		● ▲	

^a The following probabilities are assigned:

- 70 percent or higher
- 30-70 percent
- 0-30 percent


[]

Insurgency/Counterinsurgency Developments

- A sudden insurgent offensive in late September overran all Mozambican districts bordering on Malawi and seized several major towns, according to US Embassy [redacted] Government troops fled across the border to safety, while a counterattack by Zimbabwean forces in Mozambique stalled in the face of stiff resistance by RENAMO.
- The insurgents resumed sabotage of the important Beira transportation corridor—ending a virtual two-year lull following the signing of a nonaggression pact between South Africa and Mozambique in March 1984—and carried out several highly visible attacks near Maputo. South African support probably aided RENAMO's campaign.
- The government's forces are demoralized and unaggressive; we judge that use of Soviet-supplied AN-26 transport aircraft to bomb suspected guerrilla locations has had little effect on the insurgents, who are well concealed and able to disperse quickly. The Frontline States and the Soviet Bloc provided no increase in military aid this quarter. [redacted]

The guerrillas will almost certainly seek to consolidate gains on transportation routes and Maputo during the rainy season now beginning; RENAMO leaders have vowed publicly to step up operations. Various dissident exile groups formed a united front—CUNIMO—but RENAMO military commander Jacama has refused to deal with it. [redacted]

Insurgent Activity



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		Aug-Oct 1986		
Legend	● Evident high		▼	
	◐ Evident low		▲	
	○ Negligible/not evident			
Military Performance	• No information			
	▲ Increase from last quarter			
	▼ Decrease from last quarter			
	Leadership/Organizational Skills	Cohesion of in-country military council	●	▼
		Unity of dissidents in exile	◐	▲
		Cooperation between military council and exiles	◐	▼
		Grassroots political structure	◐	
		Articulation political program inside Mozambique	◐	▲
		Attacks on key economic/transport targets	●	▲
		Attacks on major government positions	◐	
		Activity outside central strongholds	●	▲
		Urban activity	◐	▼
	Recruitment	•		
	Stocks of weapons/equipment	●	▲	
	Consolidation/expansion of territorial control	●	▲	
Popular Support	Administration of central areas	●		
	Rural support in south and north	◐		
	Urban support	○		
External Support	South African support	●	▲	
	Western support	◐		
	Insurgent propaganda efforts abroad	◐		

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South Yemen: Trends and Outlook

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Divisions within the 10-month-old regime appear to be resurfacing with renewed intensity. Rival leaders and their personal militias increasingly manifest their political and tribal differences in violent confrontations. We believe that the regime's decision to postpone the party congress scheduled for October to next June is a tacit admission of its inability to stage such an event without its erupting into violence. In our view, the regime appears to be hanging together because of Soviet pressure and the perceived common threat of former leader Ali Nasir and his supporters exiled in North Yemen. Increased factionalism and a growing exile threat, however, could prompt a takeover bid by a more hardline faction. [redacted]

Moscow is dissatisfied with the current leadership in Aden, but we believe it is not willing to risk a repeat of the January bloodbath and jeopardize its relations on the peninsula to try to force a solution to the factional infighting. Moscow has been playing a mediating role but has not achieved a viable accommodation between rival political

factions. In the months ahead, we expect the Soviets will maneuver to increase their influence, as each of the factions looks to Moscow for support. The return this quarter of MIG-21 fighters from overhaul in the USSR may signal the beginning of deliveries to replace equipment lost in January's coup. [redacted]

The deteriorating economic and security situation is causing increasing numbers of the population to flee to North Yemen. Border tensions increased during the quarter, and the continued deployment of South Yemeni forces to the North Yemeni border indicates that Aden fears the threat from the exiles will grow, in our judgment. Sanaa and Aden have taken steps to prevent a military confrontation between North and South Yemeni forces over the presence and activities of the exiles, but we judge that the likelihood of a major incident remains high. [redacted]

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Indicators			Aug-Oct 1986
Legend ● Evident high ○ Evident low ○ Negligible/ not evident • No information ▲ Increase from last quarter ▼ Decrease from last quarter	Economic/Social Pressures	Foreign exchange shortages	● ▲
		Food, energy, consumer goods shortages	●
		Disruption basic services	●
		Regional/tribal tensions	●
		Military conscription	● ▲
	Political Conflict/ Opposition Activity	Harsh internal security measure	●
		Population flight/elite emigration	● ▲
		Urban unrest	○
		Factionalism within ruling elite	● ▲
		Assassinations or attempts against officials	●
		Popular criticism of government/party elite	● ▲
	Military/Security Problems	Factionalism among senior officers	●
		Military discontent with lack of influence/role	● ▲
		Rumors of military coup plotting	○
		Deficiencies in: police/security forces control	●
		defense of cities/strategic targets	●
		manpower	●
		arms/ammunition/equipment	●
	External Factors	Desertions/mutinies	● ▲
		Urban terrorism/sabotage	○ ▲
Exile guerrilla activity against government		○ ▲	
Regional/border hostilities		●	
Differences with Soviet Bloc		○	
Differences with Gulf states		○ ▼	
Shortfalls in economic aid			●
Shortfalls in Soviet military aid			● ▼
Prospects for instability or irregular leadership change within next year^a			●

^a The following probabilities are assigned:

- 70 percent or higher
- 30-70 percent
- 0-30 percent

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Insurgency/Counterinsurgency Developments

- The exiles began limited operations this quarter, with clashes and sabotage occurring primarily near the border areas. [redacted]
- [redacted] small exile teams have infiltrated into the South.
- The exile groups continue to gain recruits, including a senior South Yemeni Air Force commander. However, the exiles continue to lack decisive military leadership, in our judgment, and are divided over a common political and military agenda. Ali Nasir, although still popular as titular head, has lost credibility as a military leader capable of exerting effective control over the exiles, in our view.
- [redacted] South Yemen is increasingly concerned that the threat from the exiles will grow. Aden reportedly believes that the exiles' antiregime propaganda efforts are reaching sympathizers in the South, and it has deployed substantial forces near the North Yemeni border to block the infiltration of large exile groups. We judge that Aden will redouble its efforts to obtain additional Soviet military aid. [redacted]

Aden, in our view, is anxious to avoid a military confrontation with Sanaa over the exiles, but a major increase in exile operations would force Aden to consider cross-border attacks against exile sanctuaries in North Yemen. We expect that the Soviets would react to a major escalation of exile operations in an effort to prevent further disintegration of the situation and to protect their interests, [redacted]

Military Situation



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		Aug-Oct 1986		
Legend	● Evident high	● Evident high	▼	
	○ Evident low	○ Evident low		
● Negligible/not evident	○ Negligible/not evident	○ Negligible/not evident		
	• No information	• No information		
▲ Increase from last quarter	▲ Increase from last quarter	▲ Increase from last quarter		
	▼ Decrease from last quarter	▼ Decrease from last quarter		
Leadership/Organizational Skills	Leadership confidence/unity	●	▼	
	Nationalist appeal of leadership	●		
	Working organizational structure	●		
	Effective chain of command	●		
	Articulation of political program	○		
	Military Performance	Attacks on political targets attributed to exiles	●	▲
		Attacks on economic targets	●	
		Urban/rural terrorism	●	▲
		Presence of military exiles in South Yemen	●	▲
		New recruits	●	▲
Training of cadre		●	▲	
Popular Support	Availability weapons/equipment	●		
	Collection/utilization of intelligence	•		
	Local propaganda effort	●		
	Development of local informants network	•		
External Support	Local organizational efforts	•		
	Efforts to coopt South Yemeni military units	•		
	North Yemen support	●		
	Gulf States support	○	▼	
	Other foreign military support	●		
	Recognition by foreign governments	●		



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Cambodia: Trends and Outlook

Under Vietnamese guidance, Phnom Penh continued its efforts to build political and administrative institutions and to promote the growth of a pro-Vietnamese Communist party and mass organizations. Phnom Penh also lengthened conscription requirements and stepped up training of air force officers as part of its effort to build a military capable of taking over security duties from Vietnam.

External pressures on Phnom Penh—and its supporters in Hanoi—increased slightly this quarter, although we do not expect them to result in settlement negotiations any time soon. The most outstanding developments were Gorbachev's public suggestion at Vladivostok that Vietnam and China discuss Cambodia and the Soviets' agreement to discuss Cambodia during the ninth round of Sino-Soviet consultations in October. Although these Soviet gestures may have prompted

concern in Phnom Penh and Hanoi, we judge they do not signal diminishing Soviet support for the fledgling regime in Cambodia. More significant, China sent additional arms and cash to leaders of the resistance groups as promised last July and stepped up military pressure along its border with Vietnam in October. Finally, ASEAN's UN resolution condemning the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia passed by the largest margin ever, despite flagging enthusiasm among some ASEAN countries—primarily Indonesia and Malaysia—for diplomatic pressure against Phnom Penh.

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Indicators			Aug-Oct 1986	
Legend ● Evident high ◐ Evident low ○ Negligible/ not evident • No information ▲ Increase from last quarter ▼ Decrease from last quarter	Economic/Social Pressures	Food, consumer goods shortages	◐	
		Disruption major transport routes	◐	
		Military conscription	● ▲	
		Labor conscription	●	
		Influx Vietnamese civilians	◐	
		Urban protests	○	
		Peasant rebellions	○	
		Political Conflict/ Opposition Activity	Factionalism within Vietnamese ruling party	○
			Factionalism within PRK elite	◐
	Ethnic conflict within military		◐	
	Military discontent with Vietnamese presence		●	
	Reports/rumors of military coup plotting		○	
	Military/Security Problems		Deficiencies in: defense of cities/major garrisons	◐
		arms/ammunition/equipment	○	
		training/discipline	◐	
		local militia performance/capability	◐	
		Desertions/mutinies	◐	
		Casualties/defeats	○	
		Withdrawal of Vietnamese troops	○	
		Insurgent performances/capabilities	●	
External Factors	Shortfalls in Soviet military aid	○		
	Shortfalls in Bloc economic aid	◐		
	ASEAN consensus on Cambodian policy	●		
	Chinese military pressure	● ▲		
	Tension in Soviet-Vietnamese relations	◐ ▲		
	Foreign economic/diplomatic sanctions against Hanoi	● ▲		
Prospects for a negotiated settlement within next year^a			○	

^a The following probabilities are assigned:

- 70 percent or higher
- ◐ 30-70 percent
- 0-30 percent

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
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Insurgency/Counterinsurgency Developments

**Khmer Rouge Operating Area,
 August-September 1986**

- Communist Democratic Kampuchea (DK) forces—the Khmer Rouge—continued their active interior campaign with numerous raids against civilian and military targets. [] DK proselytizing activities are making some limited headway in bur-nishing its image and gaining new recruits.
- The number of non-Communist forces in the country has decreased over the past quarter, in our assessment. Supply shortages and lack of a well-developed internal support structure are impediments to sustaining operations.
- Hanoi has deployed the equivalent of one division since July from Vietnam to the Cambodian interior, where the DK has been active. The Vietnamese are also confiscating excess rice supplies and closing all but state-controlled rice mills to restrict resistance access to food supplies. []

During the next few months, we expect that Vietnam will take advantage of improving weather conditions to intensify sweep operations and step up barrier construction [] In our judgment, Hanoi's troop buildup in the interior and a likely increase in airstrikes against guerrilla positions will increase the pressure on the Khmer Rouge, which should, however, be able to sustain interior operations, including raids on population centers. []



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Legend	Leadership/ Organizational Skills	Unity of leadership	Aug-Oct 1986		
			Non-communist Forces	Khmer Rouge	
● Evident high		Grassroots political structure	○	●	
● Evident low		Effective chain of command	○	●	
○ Negligible/ not evident		Articulation of political programs	○	●	
• No information		National appeal of leadership	●	○	
▲ Increase from last quarter		Military Performance	Attacks on government facilities	●	● ▲
▼ Decrease from last quarter			Attacks on military positions	●	● ▲
			Attacks on economic targets	○	●
	Recruitment		●	●	
	Training of cadre		●	●	
	Presence in country		● ▼	● ▲	
	Seizure and control of territory		○	○	
	Popular Support	Availability weapons/equipment	●	●	
		Logistics resupply capability	○	●	
		Urban activity	○	●	
		Coordination of insurgent groups in field	●	●	
		Number of local informants and suppliers	●	●	
		Provision administrative/social services	○	● ▲	
		Urban presence/propaganda efforts	○	●	
	External Support	Chinese military aid	●	●	
		Other foreign military aid	●	○	
		Foreign political support	●	●	

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