



**Directorate of  
Intelligence**

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# **Indications of Political Instability in Key Countries**



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**November 1985**

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November 1985*

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# Indications of Political Instability in Key Countries



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**November 1985**

This quarterly was produced by and coordinated  
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suggestions are welcome



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**Preface**

This quarterly publication is designed to provide timely warning of significant instability in countries of key importance to US interests. The quarterly, which in this issue includes data from 1 August to 31 October, examines events and processes that could lead to major regime or policy changes. Although there are instances where the paper provides short-term warnings of coups or collapse, it is primarily designed to address the potential for instability during the next two years through the consistent application of 85 indicators. Those countries for which indicators have changed significantly or which are otherwise of special interest are treated in detail in the text.

The quarterly includes three parts:

- Part 1 includes an overview of developments during the quarter, a chart summarizing the status of key indicators, a brief narrative assessment of each country, and country-specific tables tracing political and economic changes during the past two years. We assess 30 countries that we have identified as particularly salient to US interests because they are strategic choke points, major oil producers or debtors, key US friends or allies, geographically close to the United States, or especially influential in the Third World.
- Part 2 presents a more detailed assessment of select countries in which there have been developments of interest. Included in each assessment are subsections listing indicators to be watched with reference to the scenarios that we believe are most likely to unfold and alternative scenarios.
- Part 3 provides a reference list of the 85 indicators.



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### Indications of Political Instability in Key Countries

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#### Summary: Levels of Concern

Among the 30 countries covered, we are most concerned about the short-term prospects for *Sudan*, where the situation has failed to stabilize following the ouster of President Nimeiri last April. The risk of a coup by radical officers is high. Analysts also see a substantial chance for instability over the short term for the *Philippines*, because of Marcos's health and his regime's ineffectiveness against the growing Communist guerrilla threat; *Iran*, where popular unrest and factionalism within the regime are growing; and, in *Guatemala*, where a financial crisis is likely to make the transition to civilian rule precarious.

Looking ahead over the next two years, we envision significant prospects for regime-threatening instability in:

- *El Salvador*, where the rebels remain a potent force, and economic problems are breeding political difficulties for the Duarte government.
- *Honduras*, because political infighting will complicate the functioning of the next elected government.
- *Panama*, where the increasingly unpopular Defense Forces have made a mockery of the purported return to democracy.
- *Peru*, because of the desperate economic circumstances and the guerrilla threat.
- *Chile*, where anti-Pinochet sentiment is solidifying.
- *Iraq*, where the war is beginning to dishearten the public.
- *Nigeria*, because economic conditions are likely to revive levels of discontent that drove past regimes from office.
- *South Korea*, where opposition to President Chun is becoming more vigorous.

We believe that several countries on our list are under stress but are not at present producing levels of instability that threaten the government. For example, despite the violence in South Africa, the ruling white minority remains relatively unaffected and secure. Also, *Argentina*, *Brazil*, and *Mexico* are under severe economic strain, but we expect these governments to remain intact. *Spain* and *Greece* continue to register as the most stable among the countries we have examined.

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## Part 1. Developments and Trends

The six categories of indicators used in the following charts are drawn from the 85 indicators presented in Part 3. The *social change/conflict* indicators examine developments such as labor or religious unrest that could undermine the regime's legitimacy and ability to rule effectively. The *economic factors* link various dimensions of economic performance to potential instability. *Opposition activities* assess whether the opposition can mobilize effective antiregime activity or carry out acts that undermine public security. The *military attitudes/activities* category addresses the military's degree of dissatisfaction with regime policies, involvement in coup plotting, and behavior relevant to the political process. The *external factors* category looks at foreign influences that could affect internal stability. Finally, the *regime capabilities/actions* category focuses on what the government is doing that could lessen popular support, otherwise undermine its authority, and affect its ability to govern efficiently.

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## Status of Key Indicators

Developments in  
Third Quarter, 1985

## Legend

- Not of concern
- Low concern
- Moderate concern
- Substantial concern
- Serious concern
- ▲ Concern has increased since last quarter
- ▼ Concern has decreased since last quarter

		Social change/conflict	Economic factors	Opposition activities	Military attitudes/ activities	External factors	Regime activities/ capabilities	Concern for policy or irregular regime change during next six months	Concern for policy or irregular regime change six months to two years
Latin America	Mexico			○ ▼	○	○	○		
	El Salvador		● ▲	●				▲	●
	Guatemala	▲	●					● ▲	● ▲
	Honduras	○							● ▲
	Panama	▲		○	▲	○	○ ▲	▲	● ▲
	Colombia	○					○		▲
	Venezuela	○		○	○	○	○		▼
	Peru		●	●		▲			●
	Brazil	○		○		○	○	○	
	Argentina			○		○	○		
	Chile								●
Europe	Spain	○		○	○	○	○	○	○
	Greece	○		○	○	○	○	○	○
	Turkey	○		○	○				
Near East and South Asia	Morocco			○	○	○	○		
	Egypt			○	○	○	○		
	Sudan	●	●	●	●		●	●	●
	Saudi Arabia	○		○	○	○	○	○	
	Iraq			▼	○		○	▲	● ▼
	Iran	▼	●			▲	○	▲	●
	Pakistan		○ ▲	○	○ ▲	▲	○	▲	
	India	●	○	○		▲	●	▼	●
Africa	Nigeria	●	●	▲	●	▲	●	▼	▲
	Somalia	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	
	Kenya			○	○	○	○		
	Zaire				○		○		
	South Africa				○		○		
East Asia	Philippines					○	● ▲	●	
	Indonesia		○	○	○	○	○	○	
	South Korea		▲			○			● ▲

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**Mexico:**  
**Selected Political and Economic Indicators**

**Outlook**

Opposition efforts to capitalize on the government's uncoordinated response to the September earthquakes have so far garnered only modest gains. The economic situation continues to erode support for the current administration—though less so for the well-entrenched political system. While the government still plans to meet its financial commitments, many Mexicans are opposed to meeting foreign debt responsibilities at the cost of a falling standard of living. Quake damage and international sympathy over the tragedy, however, have prompted more leniency from foreign lenders.

*Prospects for major regime or policy change*

*During next six months*

*During next six months to two years*

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<b>Indicators</b>	<b>Legend</b>	○ Not of concern ○ Low concern ○ Moderate concern	● Substantial concern ● Serious concern
-------------------	---------------	---	--

		1983				1984			1985				
		IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III
Social change/conflict	Ethnic/religious discontent	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Demonstrations, riots, strikes		○										
Economic factors	General deterioration	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
	Decreased access to foreign funds			○	○								
	Capital flight									●	●		
	Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls	●	●	●									
	Food/energy shortages		●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Opposition activities	Organizational capabilities	○	○										○
	Opposition conspiracy/planning	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Terrorism and sabotage	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Insurgent armed attacks	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Public support												○
Military attitudes/activities	Threat to corporate military interests/dignity		○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits		○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Discontent over government action/policies		○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Reports/rumors of coup plotting	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
External factors	External support for government	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	External support for opposition	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Threat of military conflict		New category					○	○	○			
Regime actions/capabilities	Repression/brutality	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Security capabilities	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Political disunity/loss of confidence			○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Loss of legitimacy												○

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**El Salvador:  
Selected Political and Economic Indicators**

**Outlook**

President Duarte is under increasing pressure to be tougher with the insurgents following stepped up guerrilla activity, and we expect him to adopt military recommendations for new counterinsurgency initiatives. The armed forces' capture of rebel leaders and other successes are hurting the guerrillas, who may respond with further political abductions to bargain for prisoner exchanges. The government's failure to halt inflation and stimulate economic growth is likely to lead to political dissent, especially from the business and labor sectors.

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*Prospects for major regime or policy change*

*During next six months*

● *During next six months to two years*

**Indicators**

**Legend**

○ *Not of concern*

○ *Low concern*

○ *Moderate concern*

● *Substantial concern*

● *Serious concern*

		1983	1984				1985		
		IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III
Social change/conflict	Ethnic/religious discontent								
	Demonstrations, riots, strikes		●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Economic factors	General deterioration	●	●						
	Decreased access to foreign funds								
	Capital flight								
	Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls								●
	Food/energy shortages	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
	Inflation								●
Opposition activities	Organizational capabilities	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
	Opposition conspiracy/planning	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
	Terrorism and sabotage	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
	Insurgent armed attacks	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
	Public support								
Military attitudes/activities	Threat to corporate military interests/dignity		●	●					
	Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits								
	Discontent over government action/policies		●	●					
	Reports/rumors of coup plotting	●	●	●					
External factors	External support for government	●	●	●	●	●			
	External support for opposition	●	●	●	●	●	●		
	Threat of military conflict		New category						
Regime actions/capabilities	Repression/brutality	●	●	●					
	Security capabilities	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
	Political disunity/loss of confidence								
	Loss of legitimacy								

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**Guatemala:  
Selected Political and Economic Indicators**

**Outlook**

The presidential and congressional elections set for this month and possible runoff on 8 December appear on track despite efforts by right and left extremists to derail the return to civilian government. The military regime's erratic stopgap approach to the economic slide means the new administration—to be inaugurated in January—will inherit daunting economic problems. The new president, moreover, will face a politically fragmented legislature, a skeptical military, and high public dissatisfaction over the rising cost of living.

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*Prospects for major regime or policy change*

- During next six months
- During next six months to two years

<b>Indicators</b>	<i>Legend</i>	○ Not of concern ○ Low concern ○ Moderate concern	● Substantial concern ● Serious concern
-------------------	---------------	---	--

		1983				1984			1985				
		IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III
Social change/conflict	Ethnic/religious discontent	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Demonstrations, riots, strikes	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	●
Economic factors	General deterioration												
	Decreased access to foreign funds												
	Capital flight												●
	Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Food/energy shortages	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Inflation		○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Opposition activities	Organizational capabilities	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Opposition conspiracy/planning												
	Terrorism and sabotage												
	Insurgent armed attacks												
	Public support	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Military attitudes/activities	Threat to corporate military interests/dignity		○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits		○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Discontent over government action/policies												
	Reports/rumors of coup plotting												
External factors	External support for government												
	External support for opposition												
	Threat of military conflict									○	○	○	
Regime actions/capabilities	Repression/brutality	●											
	Security capabilities	○	○	○	○	○							
	Political disunity/loss of confidence												
	Loss of legitimacy		●										

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**Honduras:  
Selected Political and Economic Indicators**
**Outlook**

We see a better-than-even chance that the military will fulfill its promise of honest elections on 24 November. Maneuvering by politicians, including outgoing President Suazo, to block the process is, however, likely to intensify in coming weeks, jeopardizing the first regular electoral transition in decades. Political infighting and worsening economic conditions bode ill for the stability of the government to be inaugurated in January.

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*Prospects for major regime or policy change*

- *During next six months*  
● *During next six months to two years*

<b>Indicators</b>	<b>Legend</b>	○ <i>Not of concern</i> ○ <i>Low concern</i> ○ <i>Moderate concern</i>	● <i>Substantial concern</i> ● <i>Serious concern</i>
-------------------	---------------	--	--

		1983		1984			1985		
		IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III
Social change/conflict	Ethnic/religious discontent	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Demonstrations, riots, strikes	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Economic factors	General deterioration								
	Decreased access to foreign funds								
	Capital flight								
	Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls	○	○				○	○	○
	Food/energy shortages	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Inflation		○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Opposition activities	Organizational capabilities								
	Opposition conspiracy/planning								
	Terrorism and sabotage								
	Insurgent armed attacks		○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Public support	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	
Military attitudes/activities	Threat to corporate military interests/dignity		○				○	○	○
	Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits		○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Discontent over government action/policies		○						
	Reports/rumors of coup plotting	○	○	○	○				
External factors	External support for government	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	External support for opposition								
	Threat of military conflict	New category							
Regime actions/capabilities	Repression/brutality	○	○	○	○	○		○	○
	Security capabilities	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Political disunity/loss of confidence	○	○	○					
	Loss of legitimacy	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

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**Panama <sup>a</sup>:**  
**Selected Political and Economic Indicators**

**Outlook**

The forced resignation of President Barletta in late September underscores the central role of the Defense Forces in politics. New President Delvalle is unlikely to complete Barletta's term because he does not enjoy the confidence of Defense Chief Noriega. Noriega himself may be vulnerable to plotting within the military if public unrest mounts.

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<sup>a</sup> See Part 2 for detailed discussion.

*Prospects for major regime or policy change*

○ During next six months

● During next six months to two years

<b>Indicators</b>	<b>Legend</b>	○ Not of concern	● Substantial concern
		○ Low concern	● Serious concern
		○ Moderate concern	

		1983	1984				1985		
		IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III
Social change/conflict	Ethnic/religious discontent	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Demonstrations, riots, strikes	○	○	○	○	○	○		
Economic factors	General deterioration								
	Decreased access to foreign funds	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	
	Capital flight		○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls	○	○	○	○		○	○	○
	Food/energy shortages	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Inflation		○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Opposition activities	Organizational capabilities	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Opposition conspiracy/planning	○	○	○			○	○	
	Terrorism and sabotage	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Insurgent armed attacks	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Public support	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Military attitudes/activities	Threat to corporate military interests/dignity			○	○	○	○	○	
	Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits		○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Discontent over government action/policies		○	○	○	○	○	○	●
	Reports/rumors of coup plotting	○		○	○	○	○	○	
External factors	External support for government	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	External support for opposition	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Threat of military conflict		New category				○	○	○
Regime actions/capabilities	Repression/brutality	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Security capabilities	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Political disunity/loss of confidence	○	○	○	○	○	○		
	Loss of legitimacy	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	

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**Colombia:  
Selected Political and Economic Indicators**

**Outlook**

Mounting guerrilla violence has all but killed prospects for a government-insurgent negotiated settlement. The M-19, the most active insurgent movement, is pushing for unity with other groups, and the military—already hampered by materiel shortages—will be increasingly strained if the guerrillas agree to joint operations. Both Colombian and US officials are under threat from narcotraffickers as well as from the rebels.

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*Prospects for major regime or policy change*

*During next six months*  
*During next six months to two years*

**Indicators**

**Legend**

- *Not of concern*
- *Substantial concern*
- *Low concern*
- *Serious concern*
- *Moderate concern*

		1983				1984				1985			
		IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III
Social change/conflict	Ethnic/religious discontent	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Demonstrations, riots, strikes	○			○	○							
Economic factors	General deterioration												
	Decreased access to foreign funds												
	Capital flight												
	Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls	○	○	○									○
	Food/energy shortages	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Inflation		○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Opposition activities	Organizational capabilities												
	Opposition conspiracy/planning												
	Terrorism and sabotage												
	Insurgent armed attacks												
	Public support	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Military attitudes/activities	Threat to corporate military interests/dignity		○	○	○								
	Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits		○	○	○	○							
	Discontent over government action/policies												
	Reports/rumors of coup plotting	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
External factors	External support for government	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	External support for opposition												
	Threat of military conflict		New category					○	○	○			
Regime actions/capabilities	Repression/brutality	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Security capabilities	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Political disunity/loss of confidence	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Loss of legitimacy	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

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**Venezuela:**  
**Selected Political and Economic Indicators**

**Outlook**

Labor, a key political element, is growing impatient with the slow rate of economic recovery. But, despite the persistent recession, President Lusinchi enjoys substantial support for his austerity and debt-rescheduling programs, and he remains personally popular.



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**Prospects for major regime or policy change**

During next six months

During next six months to two years

<b>Indicators</b>	<b>Legend</b>	○ Not of concern	◐ Low concern	◑ Moderate concern	◒ Substantial concern	● Serious concern
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		1983	1984				1985		
		IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III
Social change/conflict	Ethnic/religious discontent	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Demonstrations, riots, strikes	○	○	○	○		○	○	○
Economic factors	General deterioration					○	○	○	
	Decreased access to foreign funds					○	○	○	○
	Capital flight						○	○	○
	Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls								○
	Food/energy shortages	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Inflation						○	○	○
Opposition activities	Organizational capabilities	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Opposition conspiracy/planning	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Terrorism and sabotage	○	○	○	○			○	○
	Insurgent armed attacks	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Public support	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Military attitudes/activities	Threat to corporate military interests/dignity		○	○	○	○		○	○
	Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits		○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Discontent over government action/policies		○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Reports/rumors of coup plotting	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
External factors	External support for government	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	External support for opposition	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Threat of military conflict		New category				○	○	○
Regime actions/capabilities	Repression/brutality	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Security capabilities	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Political disunity/loss of confidence		○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Loss of legitimacy		○	○	○	○	○	○	○



25X1

Secret

**Peru:**  
**Selected Political and Economic Indicators**

**Outlook**

President Garcia faces an uphill battle against Peru's many problems, but his bold moves to curb official corruption and drug trafficking have solidified his enormous popularity. His cashiering of officers accused of human rights abuses even won grudging approval from the far-left opposition. The armed forces, while currently chastened and weakened by internal divisions, remain a potential threat to the government. Garcia's foreign policy, notably his stance on the debt issue, will give him problems with creditor nations, whose support he needs to revitalize Peru's stagnant economy.

25X1

*Prospects for major regime or policy change*

○ During next six months

● During next six months to two years

**Indicators**

**Legend**

○ Not of concern  
○ Low concern  
○ Moderate concern

● Substantial concern  
● Serious concern

		1983					1984			1985		
		IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	I	II	III
Social change/conflict	Ethnic/religious discontent		○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Demonstrations, riots, strikes		●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Economic factors	General deterioration		●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
	Decreased access to foreign funds		●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
	Capital flight		●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
	Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls									●		
	Food/energy shortages											
Opposition activities	Inflation											
	Organizational capabilities											
	Opposition conspiracy/planning											○
	Terrorism and sabotage	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
	Insurgent armed attacks	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Military attitudes/activities	Public support											○
	Threat to corporate military interests/dignity		○	○								●
	Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits											
	Discontent over government action/policies		●	●								●
External factors	Reports/rumors of coup plotting											
	External support for government	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	External support for opposition	○	○	○								○
Regime actions/capabilities	Threat of military conflict		New category					○	○	○		
	Repression/brutality				●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
	Security capabilities											
	Political disunity/loss of confidence		●	●	●	●	●	●	●	○	○	○
	Loss of legitimacy		●	●	●	●	●	●	○	○	○	○

307074 10-85

25X1

Secret



Secret

**Brazil:**  
**Selected Political and Economic Indicators**

**Outlook**

More assertive leadership has boosted President Sarney's standing in the polls to new levels. His shakeup of Brasilia's economic team is ending policy drift, improving prospects for economic recovery, and strengthening domestic confidence in the government. His moves, however, are likely to aggravate already high inflation and to strain relations with international creditors.

25X1

*Prospects for major regime or policy change*

- During next six months
- During next six months to two years

**Indicators**                      *Legend*

Not of concern                       Substantial concern  
 Low concern                               Serious concern  
 Moderate concern

		1983	1984				1985		
		IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III
Social change/conflict	Ethnic/religious discontent	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
	Demonstrations, riots, strikes			<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>		
Economic factors	General deterioration	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>						
	Decreased access to foreign funds	<input checked="" type="radio"/>							
	Capital flight								
	Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>					
	Food/energy shortages				<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>			
	Inflation		<input checked="" type="radio"/>		<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>
Opposition activities	Organizational capabilities	<input type="radio"/>			<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
	Opposition conspiracy/planning	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
	Terrorism and sabotage	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
	Insurgent armed attacks	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
	Public support				<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Military attitudes/activities	Threat to corporate military interests/dignity			<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	
	Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits		<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
	Discontent over government action/policies		<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
	Reports/rumors of coup plotting	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>			<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
External factors	External support for government	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
	External support for opposition	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
	Threat of military conflict		New category				<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Regime actions/capabilities	Repression/brutality	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
	Security capabilities	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
	Political disunity/loss of confidence	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>						
	Loss of legitimacy							<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

307075 10-85

25X1

Secret

Secret

**Argentina:  
Selected Political and Economic Indicators**
**Outlook**

President Alfonsin's popularity is at a record high, and the opposition Peronists have been unable to reverse their political decline. If Alfonsin follows through with needed budget and public-sector industry cutbacks, however, he will meet vigorous opposition from organized labor, which is already adopting a more confrontational attitude. In late October, Alfonsin declared a state of siege to combat discontent within the military and related terrorist incidents, but this will not affect stability.

25X1

*Prospects for major regime or policy change**During next six months**During next six months to two years***Indicators****Legend**

○ Not of concern  
○ Low concern  
○ Moderate concern

● Substantial concern  
● Serious concern

		1983				1984				1985			
		IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III
Social change/conflict	Ethnic/religious discontent	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Demonstrations, riots, strikes	○											
Economic factors	General deterioration												
	Decreased access to foreign funds	○							●	○	○		
	Capital flight												
	Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Food/energy shortages	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Opposition activities	Inflation		●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●		
	Organizational capabilities	○											○
	Opposition conspiracy/planning	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Terrorism and sabotage	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Insurgent armed attacks	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Military attitudes/activities	Public support	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Threat to corporate military interests/dignity		○	○	○								
	Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits		○	○								○	○
	Discontent over government action/policies											○	○
	Reports/rumors of coup plotting	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
External factors	External support for government	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	External support for opposition	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Threat of military conflict		New category						○	○	○		
Regime actions/capabilities	Repression/brutality	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Security capabilities	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Political disunity/loss of confidence	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Loss of legitimacy	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

25X1

Secret

Secret

**Chile<sup>a</sup>:**  
**Selected Political and Economic Indicators**

**Outlook**

The national accord for a return to democracy promulgated by leading moderate political parties in late August is attracting broad support and generating a shift in the political balance. Criticism of President Pinochet's hard line is mounting. If he continues to be inflexible, senior military officers may try to bypass him and deal directly with the opposition in negotiating an orderly transition to democracy. Meanwhile, the Communists are moving toward a state of active insurgency. [ ]

<sup>a</sup> See Part 2 for detailed discussion.

*Prospects for major regime or policy change*

*During next six months*

*During next six months to two years*

25X1

<b>Indicators</b>	<b>Legend</b>	○ Not of concern ○ Low concern ○ Moderate concern	● Substantial concern ⊛ Serious concern
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		1983					1984			1985			
		IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III
Social change/conflict	Ethnic/religious discontent	○	○	○	○								
	Demonstrations, riots, strikes												
Economic factors	General deterioration												
	Decreased access to foreign funds				⊛	○							
	Capital flight												
	Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Food/energy shortages		○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Inflation												
Opposition activities	Organizational capabilities												
	Opposition conspiracy/planning												
	Terrorism and sabotage	●	●	●									
	Insurgent armed attacks	○	○	○	○	○							
	Public support												
Military attitudes/activities	Threat to corporate military interests/dignity		○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits												
	Discontent over government action/policies				○								
	Reports/rumors of coup plotting	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
External factors	External support for government	●											
	External support for opposition												
	Threat of military conflict									○	○	○	
Regime actions/capabilities	Repression/brutality	●											
	Security capabilities												
	Political disunity/loss of confidence			○	○								
	Loss of legitimacy												

25X1

Secret

Secret

**Spain:**  
**Selected Political and Economic Indicators**

**Outlook**

Prime Minister Gonzalez continues publicly to stand by his commitment to hold a referendum on NATO membership by next spring despite broad opposition in opinion polls to his pro-Alliance stance. Leftists and trade unionists remain dissatisfied with high unemployment and Gonzalez's conservative economic policies, but the Prime Minister is still more popular than his principal political opponents.



25X1

*Prospects for major regime or policy change*

- During next six months
- During next six months to two years

**Indicators**

**Legend**

- Not of concern
- Low concern
- Moderate concern
- ◐ Substantial concern
- Serious concern

		1983	1984				1985		
		IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III
Social change/conflict	Ethnic/religious discontent	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Demonstrations, riots, strikes					○	○	○	○
Economic factors	General deterioration								
	Decreased access to foreign funds	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Capital flight	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Food/energy shortages	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Inflation		○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Opposition activities	Organizational capabilities	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Opposition conspiracy/planning	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Terrorism and sabotage								
	Insurgent armed attacks	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Public support	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Military attitudes/activities	Threat to corporate military interests/dignity		○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits		○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Discontent over government action/policies		○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Reports/rumors of coup plotting	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
External factors	External support for government	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	External support for opposition	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Threat of military conflict		New category				○	○	○
Regime actions/capabilities	Repression/brutality	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Security capabilities	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Political disunity/loss of confidence	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Loss of legitimacy	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

307078 10-85

25X1

Secret

Secret

**Greece :**  
**Selected Political and Economic Indicators**

**Outlook**

Defections from the conservative New Democracy Party, the key opposition group, have made Prime Minister Papandreou's position all the more secure. The worsening economy is likely to force the government to take some austerity measures, but labor—especially the large Communist unions—will offer strenuous resistance. The bleak economic outlook will also encourage Papandreou to improve relations with Western allies.

25X1

*Prospects for major regime or policy change*

- During next six months
- During next six months to two years

<i>Indicators</i>	<i>Legend</i>	<input type="radio"/> Not of concern	<input type="radio"/> Substantial concern
		Low concern	Serious concern
		Moderate concern	

		1983	1984				1985		
		IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III
Social change/conflict	Ethnic/religious discontent	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Demonstrations, riots, strikes	○	○					○	○
Economic factors	General deterioration								
	Decreased access to foreign funds								
	Capital flight								
	Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Food/energy shortages	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Inflation								
Opposition activities	Organizational capabilities	○	○	○	○				
	Opposition conspiracy/planning	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Terrorism and sabotage	○	○		○	○			
	Insurgent armed attacks	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Public support	○	○	○	○			○	○
Military attitudes/activities	Threat to corporate military interests/dignity		○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits			○	○	○	○	○	○
	Discontent over government action/policies		○	○	○	○			
	Reports/rumors of coup plotting	○		○	○	○		○	○
External factors	External support for government	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	External support for opposition	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Threat of military conflict		New category					○	○
Regime actions/capabilities	Repression/brutality	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Security capabilities	○	○						
	Political disunity/loss of confidence	○	○					○	○
	Loss of legitimacy	○	○	○	○	○		○	○

307079 1085

25X1

Secret

Secret

**Turkey:**  
**Selected Political and Economic Indicators**
**Outlook**

Although his health is precarious, Prime Minister Ozal remains secure despite continuing economic difficulties and the nascent coalescence of opposition parties on the left in preparation for parliamentary byelections next summer. External factors are potentially troublesome—tensions with Greece, public concern over Bulgarian abuse of its Turkish minority, and Kurdish terrorist activity in the southeastern border areas. The outcome of economic and defense negotiations with the United States also could affect the government's standing.

25X1

*Prospects for major regime or policy change**During next six months**During next six months to two years***Indicators****Legend**

○ *Not of concern*  
 ○ *Low concern*  
 ○ *Moderate concern*

◐ *Substantial concern*  
 ● *Serious concern*

		1983	1984				1985		
		IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III
Social change/conflict	Ethnic/religious discontent	○							
	Demonstrations, riots, strikes	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Economic factors	General deterioration	○	○	○					
	Decreased access to foreign funds	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Capital flight								
	Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls	○	○	○					
	Food/energy shortages	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Inflation								
Opposition activities	Organizational capabilities								
	Opposition conspiracy/planning								
	Terrorism and sabotage								
	Insurgent armed attacks	○	○	○					
	Public support	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Military attitudes/activities	Threat to corporate military interests/dignity		○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits		○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Discontent over government action/policies		○	○					
	Reports/rumors of coup plotting	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
External factors	External support for government	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	External support for opposition	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Threat of military conflict		New category						
Regime actions/capabilities	Repression/brutality	○	○	○	○	○			
	Security capabilities	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Political disunity/loss of confidence		○	○					
	Loss of legitimacy	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

25X1

Secret

Secret

**Morocco:**  
**Selected Political and Economic Indicators**

**Outlook**

A new IMF loan and debt rescheduling have significantly relieved Rabat's economic situation. Additional austerity measures will be needed to keep the economic program on track, and further deterioration of living standards may provoke labor unrest. The lean budget mandated by the economic reform package will block King Hassan's efforts to modernize the military and to provide jobs for the burgeoning mass of unemployed.

25X1

*Prospects for major regime or policy change**During next six months**During next six months to two years***Indicators****Legend**

○ *Not of concern*  
 ○ *Low concern*  
 ○ *Moderate concern*

● *Substantial concern*  
 ● *Serious concern*

		1983		1984			1985		
		IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III
Social change/conflict	Ethnic/religious discontent	○							
	Demonstrations, riots, strikes	○	●						
Economic factors	General deterioration								
	Decreased access to foreign funds								
	Capital flight		○	○	○	○			
	Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls								
	Food/energy shortages	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Inflation			○	○	○			
Opposition activities	Organizational capabilities	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Opposition conspiracy/planning	○							
	Terrorism and sabotage	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Insurgent armed attacks	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Public support	○							
Military attitudes/activities	Threat to corporate military interests/dignity		○	○	○	○			
	Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits								
	Discontent over government action/policies		○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Reports/rumors of coup plotting	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
External factors	External support for government	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	External support for opposition	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Threat of military conflict	New category							
Regime actions/capabilities	Repression/brutality	○							
	Security capabilities	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Political disunity/loss of confidence	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Loss of legitimacy	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

307081 10-85

25X1

Secret

**Egypt\*:**  
**Selected Political and Economic Indicators**

**Outlook**

The hijacking and follow-on US interception of the Egyptian plane carrying the terrorists have created difficulties for President Mubarak, who will probably continue to criticize the United States to divert attention from his role in the crisis. These events and a serious economic crunch in the months ahead may spur Muslim fundamentalists to foment unrest, but Mubarak is prepared to deal harshly with such groups.

25X1

<sup>a</sup> See Part 2 for detailed discussion.

*Prospects for major regime or policy change*

*During next six months*  
*During next six months to two years*

**Indicators**

**Legend**

- Not of concern
- Low concern
- Moderate concern
- ◐ Substantial concern
- Serious concern

		1983	1984				1985		
		IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III
Social change/conflict	Ethnic/religious discontent	○	○	○	○	○	○		
	Demonstrations, riots, strikes	○					○		
Economic factors	General deterioration								
	Decreased access to foreign funds	○						○	
	Capital flight		○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls		○	○					●
	Food/energy shortages	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Opposition activities	Inflation							○	
	Organizational capabilities						○	○	○
	Opposition conspiracy/planning					○	○		○
	Terrorism and sabotage	○	○	○	○				
	Insurgent armed attacks	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Military attitudes/activities	Public support							○	○
	Threat to corporate military interests/dignity			○	○	○	○	○	○
	Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits							○	○
	Discontent over government action/policies		○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Reports/rumors of coup plotting	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
External factors	External support for government	○						○	○
	External support for opposition	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Threat of military conflict		New category				○	○	○
Regime actions/capabilities	Repression/brutality	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Security capabilities	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Political disunity/loss of confidence		○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Loss of legitimacy	○		○	○	○	○	○	○

307082 10-85

25X1

Secret



Secret

**Sudan:**  
**Selected Political and Economic Indicators**

**Outlook**

The government could fall before elections to be held in April. The beleaguered Transitional Military Council is steadily losing its grip on power. The growing rebellion in the south is polarizing major interest groups, creating disputes within the government, and undercutting military support for the ruling coalition. Coup plotting runs rampant and risk of a radical takeover is high.

25X1

*Prospects for major regime or policy change*

- During next six months
- During next six months to two years

<b>Indicators</b>	<b>Legend</b>	○ Not of concern ● Low concern ● Moderate concern	▼ Substantial concern ● Serious concern
-------------------	---------------	---	--

		1983	1984				1985		
		IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III
Social change/conflict	Ethnic/religious discontent				●	●	●	●	●
	Demonstrations, riots, strikes						●	●	●
Economic factors	General deterioration					●	●	●	●
	Decreased access to foreign funds				●	●			●
	Capital flight								
	Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls						●	●	
	Food/energy shortages				●	●			
	Inflation						●	●	●
Opposition activities	Organizational capabilities				●	●	●	●	●
	Opposition conspiracy/planning					●	●	●	●
	Terrorism and sabotage								
	Insurgent armed attacks				●		●		●
	Public support						●		
Military attitudes/activities	Threat to corporate military interests/dignity							●	●
	Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits								
	Discontent over government action/policies						●	●	●
	Reports/rumors of coup plotting					●	●	●	●
External factors	External support for government								
	External support for opposition								
	Threat of military conflict								
Regime actions/capabilities	Repression/brutality								
	Security capabilities							●	●
	Political disunity/loss of confidence						●	●	●
	Loss of legitimacy						●		

307083 10-85

25X1

Secret

Secret

**Saudi Arabia:  
Selected Political and Economic Indicators**

**Outlook**

Saudi Arabia's departure from strict adherence to OPEC's pricing structure to increase revenues heightens the risk of a further fall in oil prices and the consequent political fallout. The Saudis are concerned about possible spillover of the Iran-Iraq war—they fear Iran will retaliate against them for Iraq's attacks on Khark Island. Also, the war could stir Shia sympathy for Iran and create unrest in the Eastern Province.

25X1

*Prospects for major regime or policy change*

- During next six months
- During next six months to two years

**Indicators**

**Legend**

- Not of concern
- Substantial concern
- Low concern
- Serious concern
- Moderate concern

		1983				1984				1985			
		IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III
Social change/conflict	Ethnic/religious discontent	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>										
	Demonstrations, riots, strikes	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Economic factors	General deterioration	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>									
	Decreased access to foreign funds	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
	Capital flight		<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
	Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
	Food/energy shortages	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Opposition activities	Inflation		<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
	Organizational capabilities	<input type="radio"/>		<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
	Opposition conspiracy/planning	<input type="radio"/>				<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
	Terrorism and sabotage	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>										
	Insurgent armed attacks	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Military attitudes/activities	Public support	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
	Threat to corporate military interests/dignity		<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
	Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits		<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>		<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>		<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
	Discontent over government action/policies		<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>		<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>		<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
External factors	Reports/rumors of coup plotting	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
	External support for government	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
	External support for opposition	<input type="radio"/>								<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Regime actions/capabilities	Threat of military conflict		New category							<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
	Repression/brutality	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>						
	Security capabilities	<input type="radio"/>								<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
	Political disunity/loss of confidence	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
	Loss of legitimacy	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

307084 1085

25X1

Secret

Secret

**Iraq:**  
**Selected Political and Economic Indicators**

**Outlook**

War weariness is beginning to take a toll on the home front, where we detect a dip in public morale despite military successes such as the damage inflicted on Iran's major oil facility. The Army is holding its own on the ground, and has contained the Kurdish revolt as well. Baghdad has begun pumping oil through its new pipeline to Saudi Arabia, and its financial position will remain manageable unless a big drop in oil prices occurs.

25X1

*Prospects for major regime or policy change*

- *During next six months*
- *During next six months to two years*

<b>Indicators</b>	<b>Legend</b>	○ <i>Not of concern</i> <i>Low concern</i> <i>Moderate concern</i>	● <i>Substantial concern</i> ● <i>Serious concern</i>
-------------------	---------------	--	--

		1983	1984			1985			
		IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III
Social change/conflict	Ethnic/religious discontent	●					●	●	●
	Demonstrations, riots, strikes	○					○	○	○
Economic factors	General deterioration	●	○	○	○	○	○		
	Decreased access to foreign funds	●							
	Capital flight		○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls	●	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Food/energy shortages							○	○
	Inflation		○	○	○				
Opposition activities	Organizational capabilities	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Opposition conspiracy/planning	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Terrorism and sabotage	○						●	
	Insurgent armed attacks	●	○	○			●	●	
	Public support		○	○	○	○	○	○	
Military attitudes/activities	Threat to corporate military interests/dignity		○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits		○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Discontent over government action/policies		○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Reports/rumors of coup plotting	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
External factors	External support for government	○		○	○	○	○	○	○
	External support for opposition	●					●	●	
	Threat of military conflict		New category				●	●	●
Regime actions/capabilities	Repression/brutality		○	○	○	○	○	●	●
	Security capabilities			○	○	○			
	Political disunity/loss of confidence	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Loss of legitimacy	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

307085 10-85

25X1

Secret

Secret

**Iran:  
Selected Political and Economic Indicators**

**Outlook**

Repeated Iraqi attacks on Khark Island are exacerbating Tehran's economic problems and adding to popular unrest. The reelection of President Khamenei to another four-year term was uneventful, but his retention of Prime Minister Musavi, a radical, spells increasing contention among regime factions already jockeying for primacy in a post-Khomeini era. The Ayatollah still appears to be guiding policy through trusted aides, although he is less often seen in public.



25X1

*Prospects for major regime or policy change*

- ☐ During next six months
- ☐ During next six months to two years

**Indicators**

**Legend**

- Not of concern
- Low concern
- Moderate concern
- ☐ Substantial concern
- Serious concern

		1983	1984				1985		
		IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III
Social change/conflict	Ethnic/religious discontent								
	Demonstrations, riots, strikes						●	●	
Economic factors	General deterioration								●
	Decreased access to foreign funds	○							●
	Capital flight						●	●	●
	Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls								
	Food/energy shortages								
Inflation									
Opposition activities	Organizational capabilities	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Opposition conspiracy/planning								
	Terrorism and sabotage								
	Insurgent armed attacks								
	Public support								
Military attitudes/activities	Threat to corporate military interests/dignity								
	Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits								
	Discontent over government action/policies								
	Reports/rumors of coup plotting								
External factors	External support for government	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	External support for opposition	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Threat of military conflict						●	●	●
Regime actions/capabilities	Repression/brutality								
	Security capabilities	○	○	○	○	○			
	Political disunity/loss of confidence								
	Loss of legitimacy	○	○	○					

307086 10/85

25X1

Secret

Secret

**Pakistan:**  
**Selected Political and Economic Indicators**

**Outlook**

In recent months the Zia regime weathered a foreign exchange crisis, an outbreak of sectarian unrest, and stepped up attempts by Afghanistan to stir trouble among the border tribes. Concern about a rise in opposition activity prompted Islamabad to place leading politician Benazir Bhutto under house arrest and make preemptive moves against other opposition figures. Military dissatisfaction with martial law apparently increased, portending a loss of support for Zia if he fails to install a civilian government soon.

25X1

*Prospects for major regime or policy change*

*During next six months*

*During next six months to two years*

**Indicators**

**Legend**

○ *Not of concern*  
 ● *Low concern*  
 ● *Moderate concern*

◐ *Substantial concern*  
 ● *Serious concern*

		1983	1984			1985			
		IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III
Social change/conflict	Ethnic/religious discontent	●	●			○			
	Demonstrations, riots, strikes	●			○	○		○	○
Economic factors	General deterioration							○	○
	Decreased access to foreign funds	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	
	Capital flight			○	○	○	○	○	○
	Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls	○		○	○	○	○	○	○
	Food/energy shortages	○	○	○	○	○	○		
	Inflation							○	○
Opposition activities	Organizational capabilities			○	○	○		○	○
	Opposition conspiracy/planning			○	○	○		○	○
	Terrorism and sabotage			○	○	○	○	○	○
	Insurgent armed attacks	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Public support			○	○	○		○	○
Military attitudes/activities	Threat to corporate military interests/dignity			○	○	○	○	○	
	Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits			○	○	○	○	○	○
	Discontent over government action/policies				○			○	○
	Reports/rumors of coup plotting	○	○		○	○	○	○	
External factors	External support for government	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	External support for opposition	○							
	Threat of military conflict		New category					○	
Regime actions/capabilities	Repression/brutality			○	○	○		○	○
	Security capabilities			○	○	○	○	○	○
	Political disunity/loss of confidence			○	○	○	○	○	○
	Loss of legitimacy			○	○	○	○	○	○

307087 10-85

25X1

Secret

India:

## Selected Political and Economic Indicators

**Outlook**

Prime Minister Gandhi's activist policies to settle regional issues as well as to improve relations with neighboring countries are paying off, but differences with Pakistan over nuclear policy and cross-border skirmishes underscore the potential for conflict. Elections in Punjab yielded a moderate state government, but Sikh radicals still pose a serious security problem. The threat of violence against Gandhi, other officials, and Indian facilities abroad remains high.

25X1

*Prospects for major regime or policy change**During next six months**During next six months to two years***Indicators****Legend**

○ Not of concern  
○ Low concern  
○ Moderate concern

● Substantial concern  
● Serious concern

		1983	1984				1985		
		IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III
Social change/conflict	Ethnic/religious discontent					●	●	●	●
	Demonstrations, riots, strikes								
Economic factors	General deterioration				○	○	○	○	○
	Decreased access to foreign funds				○	○	○	○	○
	Capital flight				○	○	○	○	○
	Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls				○	○	○	○	○
	Food/energy shortages				○	○	○	○	○
	Inflation				○	○	○	○	○
Opposition activities	Organizational capabilities				○	○	○	○	○
	Opposition conspiracy/planning						○	○	○
	Terrorism and sabotage							●	●
	Insurgent armed attacks				○	○	○	○	○
	Public support						○	○	○
Military attitudes/activities	Threat to corporate military interests/dignity				○	○	○	○	○
	Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits				○				
	Discontent over government action/policies								
	Reports/rumors of coup plotting				○	○	○	○	○
External factors	External support for government				○	○	○	○	○
	External support for opposition				○	○	○	○	○
	Threat of military conflict				New category				
Regime actions/capabilities	Repression/brutality				○	○	○	○	○
	Security capabilities								
	Political disunity/loss of confidence				○	○	○	○	○
	Loss of legitimacy				○	○	○	○	○

307088 10-85

25X1

Secret

Secret

**Nigeria:**  
**Selected Political and Economic Indicators**

**Outlook**

President Babangida has begun to solidify his position following August's bloodless military coup. Nevertheless, he faces widespread opposition to the IMF agreement he seeks to keep the economy afloat and a possible further decline in oil prices. Military backing for economic reform will be critical over the next few months and is not yet assured. The country faces years of painful austerity likely to provoke the same level of discontent that drove previous regimes from office.

25X1

*Prospects for major regime or policy change*

○ During next six months

● During next six months to two years

**Indicators**

**Legend**

○ Not of concern

○ Low concern

○ Moderate concern

● Substantial concern

● Serious concern

		1983	1984				1985		
		IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III
Social change/conflict	Ethnic/religious discontent					●	●	●	●
	Demonstrations, riots, strikes								
Economic factors	General deterioration		●	●	●	●	●	●	●
	Decreased access to foreign funds		●	●	●	●	●	●	●
	Capital flight								
	Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls								
	Food/energy shortages		●	●	●	●	●	●	●
	Inflation		●	●	●	●	●	●	
Opposition activities	Organizational capabilities		○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Opposition conspiracy/planning		○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Terrorism and sabotage		○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Insurgent armed attacks		○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Public support		○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Military attitudes/activities	Threat to corporate military interests/dignity		○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits			●	●	●	●	●	●
	Discontent over government action/policies		●	●	●	●	●	●	●
	Reports/rumors of coup plotting		●	●	●	●	●	●	●
External factors	External support for government		○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	External support for opposition		○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Threat of military conflict		New category				○	○	○
Regime actions/capabilities	Repression/brutality								
	Security capabilities								
	Political disunity/loss of confidence			●	●	●	●	●	●
	Loss of legitimacy			●	●	●	●	●	●

307089 1085

25X1

Secret

Secret

**Somalia:****Selected Political and Economic Indicators****Outlook**

President Siad's position is not immediately threatened because his opponents are divided, and he retains the loyalty of key military elements. Nevertheless, Siad is making little progress against growing political and economic problems. Dissident raids continue despite Libya's withdrawal of support, and Mogadishu's ties to Tripoli have yet to produce sizable economic benefits. Military dissatisfaction with the level of Western assistance continues to grow.

25X1

**Prospects for major regime or policy change**

- During next six months  
 During next six months to two years

**Indicators****Legend**

- Not of concern  
 Low concern  
 Moderate concern  
 Substantial concern  
 Serious concern

		1983				1984				1985			
		IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III
Social change/conflict	Ethnic/religious discontent												
	Demonstrations, riots, strikes	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Economic factors	General deterioration	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
	Decreased access to foreign funds	<input type="radio"/>								<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
	Capital flight		<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
	Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
	Food/energy shortages	<input type="radio"/>		<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Opposition activities	Inflation		<input type="radio"/>										
	Organizational capabilities	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
	Opposition conspiracy/planning												
	Terrorism and sabotage	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Military attitudes/activities	Insurgent armed attacks												
	Public support	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
	Threat to corporate military interests/dignity		<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
	Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits										<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
External factors	Discontent over government action/policies		<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
	Reports/rumors of coup plotting	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
	External support for government	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
	External support for opposition												
Regime actions/capabilities	Threat of military conflict		New category										
	Repression/brutality	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>							
	Security capabilities												
	Political disunity/loss of confidence	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
	Loss of legitimacy	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

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**Kenya:**  
**Selected Political and Economic Indicators**

**Outlook**

President Moi remains firmly in charge, but a few politicians are trying to form a viable group to oppose him, and some Army officers are unhappy with government corruption and politicization of the military. Kenya's ethnic rivalries and the growing impact of its 4.2-percent annual population growth—the highest in the world—provide a discouraging long-range outlook.

25X1

*Prospects for major regime or policy change**During next six months**During next six months to two years*

<b>Indicators</b>	<b>Legend</b>
	○ Not of concern
	○ Low concern
	○ Moderate concern
	⊛ Substantial concern
	⊛ Serious concern

		1983	1984				1985		
		IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III
Social change/conflict	Ethnic/religious discontent	○							
	Demonstrations, riots, strikes	○	○	○	○	○		○	○
Economic factors	General deterioration								
	Decreased access to foreign funds	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Capital flight		○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls	○	○		○	○	○	○	○
	Food/energy shortages	○	○	○				○	○
	Inflation		○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Opposition activities	Organizational capabilities	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Opposition conspiracy/planning	○	○		○	○	○	○	
	Terrorism and sabotage	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Insurgent armed attacks	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Public support	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Military attitudes/activities	Threat to corporate military interests/dignity		○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits			○	○	○	○	○	○
	Discontent over government action/policies			○	○		○	○	
	Reports/rumors of coup plotting	○		○	○	○	○	○	○
External factors	External support for government	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	External support for opposition	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Threat of military conflict		New category				○	○	○
Regime actions/capabilities	Repression/brutality	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Security capabilities	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Political disunity/loss of confidence	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Loss of legitimacy	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

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**Zaire:****Selected Political and Economic Indicators****Outlook**

President Mobutu's political supremacy remains unchallenged despite economic problems and externally aided subversion. Rebels are still active in the east, and we believe Libyan-trained dissidents were perpetrators of the attempted sabotage of an oil pipeline near Kinshasa in October. An upsurge in rebel and terrorist incidents may occur during November, when Mobutu celebrates his 20th year in power.

25X1

**Prospects for major regime or policy change**

During next six months

During next six months to two years

**Indicators****Legend**

○ Not of concern  
○ Low concern  
○ Moderate concern

● Substantial concern  
● Serious concern

		1983	1984				1985		
		IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III
Social change/conflict	Ethnic/religious discontent								
	Demonstrations, riots, strikes			○	○	○	○	○	○
Economic factors	General deterioration								
	Decreased access to foreign funds	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Capital flight	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls								○
	Food/energy shortages								○
Opposition activities	Inflation								
	Organizational capabilities								
	Opposition conspiracy/planning								
	Terrorism and sabotage	○		○					
	Insurgent armed attacks	○	○	○	○				
Military attitudes/activities	Public support								
	Threat to corporate military interests/dignity		○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits								
	Discontent over government action/policies		○	○	○	○	○	○	○
External factors	Reports/rumors of coup plotting		○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	External support for government	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	External support for opposition	○	○	○					
Regime actions/capabilities	Threat of military conflict		New category				○		
	Repression/brutality								
	Security capabilities	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Political disunity/loss of confidence	○						○	○
	Loss of legitimacy							○	○

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**South Africa <sup>a</sup>:**  
**Selected Political and Economic Indicators**

**Outlook**

Violence continues to spread and has recently spilled into white business and residential areas. Economic woes and over a year of unrest in nonwhite townships have sharpened racial tension but do not appear to have shaken white resolve to retain control. We expect President Botha to continue his policy of slow-paced reforms, even though the violence has increased black militancy and reduced the likelihood that the government's reform strategy will defuse black unrest.

<sup>a</sup> See Part 2 for detailed discussion.

25X1

*Prospects for major regime or policy change*

*During next six months*

*During next six months to two years*

**Indicators**

**Legend**

○ Not of concern  
○ Low concern  
○ Moderate concern

● Substantial concern  
● Serious concern

		1983				1984				1985			
		IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III
Social change/conflict	Ethnic/religious discontent												
	Demonstrations, riots, strikes	○	○	○				●	●	●	●	●	●
Economic factors	General deterioration			○									
	Decreased access to foreign funds	○	○	○	○	○	○						●
	Capital flight		○	○	○	○	○				○	○	
	Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls	○	○	○								○	○
	Food/energy shortages			○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Inflation												
Opposition activities	Organizational capabilities	○	○	○	○					○	○	○	○
	Opposition conspiracy/planning	○	○	○	○					○	○	○	○
	Terrorism and sabotage							○	○				
	Insurgent armed attacks	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Public support												
Military attitudes/activities	Threat to corporate military interests/dignity		○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits		○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Discontent over government action/policies		○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Reports/rumors of coup plotting	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
External factors	External support for government	○	○	○	○	○							
	External support for opposition	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Threat of military conflict										○	○	○
Regime actions/capabilities	Repression/brutality	○	○	○	○					●	●	●	●
	Security capabilities	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Political disunity/loss of confidence	○	○	○	○	○							
	Loss of legitimacy	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

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25X1

Secret

**Philippines:  
Selected Political and Economic Indicators**

**Outlook**

President Marcos appears to have abandoned his proposal for early presidential elections, deciding the political risks were too great. The next crisis point in the steadily deteriorating situation—unless Marcos's health declines again—will likely stem from General Ver's acquittal in the Aquino trial. Strong domestic and foreign criticism will develop if, as we expect, Ver is reinstated as Armed Forces Chief of Staff. Such a move will also heighten tensions between senior Ver loyalists and younger officers in the reform movement.



25X1

*Prospects for major regime or policy change*

- ☐ *During next six months*
- ☐ *During next six months to two years*

**Indicators**

**Legend**

- *Not of concern*
- ◐ *Low concern*
- ◑ *Moderate concern*
- ◒ *Substantial concern*
- *Serious concern*

		1983	1984				1985		
		IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III
Social change/conflict	Ethnic/religious discontent								
	Demonstrations, riots, strikes	●							
Economic factors	General deterioration	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
	Decreased access to foreign funds	●	●	●	●				
	Capital flight		○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
	Food/energy shortages		○					○	○
	Inflation		●	●	●	●		○	○
Opposition activities	Organizational capabilities								
	Opposition conspiracy/planning		○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Terrorism and sabotage	○	○						
	Insurgent armed attacks							●	●
	Public support	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Military attitudes/activities	Threat to corporate military interests/dignity		○	○	○				
	Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits								
	Discontent over government action/policies							●	●
	Reports/rumors of coup plotting			○	○	○	○	○	○
External factors	External support for government								
	External support for opposition	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Threat of military conflict		New category				○	○	○
Regime actions/capabilities	Repression/brutality	○	○	○	○	○	○		
	Security capabilities								
	Political disunity/loss of confidence			●					
	Loss of legitimacy	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●

307094 10-85

25X1

Secret

Secret

**Indonesia:****Selected Political and Economic Indicators****Outlook**

Despite the rash of terrorist incidents earlier this year, President Soeharto remains in control with the full support of the military. Trials of prominent dissidents have raised no significant public outcry against the regime. The country's slipping economic fortunes could, however, crystalize latent popular discontent with government policies.

25X1

*Prospects for major regime or policy change*

- *During next six months*  
 ○ *During next six months to two years*

**Indicators****Legend**

- *Not of concern*                      ☹ *Substantial concern*  
 ○ *Low concern*                        ● *Serious concern*  
 ○ *Moderate concern*

		1983				1984				1985			
		IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III
Social change/conflict	Ethnic/religious discontent	○	○	○									
	Demonstrations, riots, strikes	○	○	○							○	○	
Economic factors	General deterioration	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	
	Decreased access to foreign funds	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	
	Capital flight		○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	
	Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	
	Food/energy shortages	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	
	Inflation		○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	
Opposition activities	Organizational capabilities	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	
	Opposition conspiracy/planning	○	○	○	○						○	○	
	Terrorism and sabotage	○	○	○	○						○	○	
	Insurgent armed attacks	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	
	Public support	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	
Military attitudes/activities	Threat to corporate military interests/dignity		○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	
	Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits				○	○	○	○	○			○	
	Discontent over government action/policies		○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	
	Reports/rumors of coup plotting	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	
External factors	External support for government	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	
	External support for opposition	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	
	Threat of military conflict									○	○	○	
Regime actions/capabilities	Repression/brutality												
	Security capabilities	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	
	Political disunity/loss of confidence	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	
	Loss of legitimacy	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	

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**South Korea:**

**Selected Political and Economic Indicators**

**Outlook**

Aggressive New Korea Democratic Party tactics to force the Chun government to discuss constitutional reforms may deadlock the current parliamentary session and set the stage for an extraparliamentary struggle next spring. An all-out test of strength, possibly involving the military, could be precipitated even sooner, however, if Chun tries to end student unrest by forcing stringent "campus stabilization" measures through the legislature or a major domestic crisis makes him suddenly more vulnerable.

25X1

*Prospects for major regime or policy change*

*○ During next six months*

*● During next six months to two years*

**Indicators**

**Legend**

○ Not of concern  
○ Low concern  
○ Moderate concern

● Substantial concern  
● Serious concern

		1983				1984			1985				
		IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III
Social change/conflict	Ethnic/religious discontent	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Demonstrations, riots, strikes					●	●	●	●				
Economic factors	General deterioration	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Decreased access to foreign funds	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Capital flight		○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Food/energy shortages	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Opposition activities	Inflation		○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Organizational capabilities	○	○	○	○								
	Opposition conspiracy/planning												
	Terrorism and sabotage	●											
	Insurgent armed attacks	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Military attitudes/activities	Public support	○	○	○	○	○							
	Threat to corporate military interests/dignity		○	○	○	○							
	Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits		○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Discontent over government action/policies		○	○	○	○							
	Reports/rumors of coup plotting	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
External factors	External support for government	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	External support for opposition												
	Threat of military conflict		New category					○	○	○			
Regime actions/capabilities	Repression/brutality	○	○	○	○								
	Security capabilities	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Political disunity/loss of confidence	○	○	○	○	○							
	Loss of legitimacy												

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## Part 2. Countries in Which There Have Been Developments of Interest

### South Africa

- Over 700 blacks have been killed in more than a year of unrest and thousands have been arrested since July, when Pretoria declared a state of emergency in 36 magisterial districts in Transvaal and eastern Cape provinces; meantime, the violence in black townships has intensified—nonwhite deaths have averaged 3.5 per day since July, more than twice that during the first half of the year—and has spread to the Durban and western Cape areas.

- In an unprecedented level of attacks on black collaborators, mobs have murdered at least 20 black councilors and police and attacked over 600 of their homes; in late September, several isolated incidents of black-white violence occurred, including a clash between black demonstrators and white passersby in downtown Johannesburg.

- Black activists have won support for boycotts of white-owned businesses, particularly in economically depressed Cape Province, and the economy has lost more working hours to strikes by blacks than in any previous year.
- The African National Congress (ANC) has played little role to date in the current township violence, but the bombings in September of businesses in Durban may presage a new wave of terrorism.
- On 12 September the government declared a four-month moratorium on foreign debt repayment, as South Africa's financial crisis has undermined any near-term prospects for substantial growth.

#### Comment

Despite the likely continuance of black unrest and international attention to events in South Africa, we believe that the highly nationalistic minority white



community, largely unaffected by the violence, remains determined to retain control and confident that it will do so. It recognizes that the limited state of emergency is far from a maximum security response, and most whites would approve a resort to a full-scale crackdown if necessary, an increasing possibility if the recent incidents of violence against whites mark an emerging trend in social unrest.

At the same time, a majority of whites appear to agree with Botha's "adapt or die" philosophy—that some concession to black powersharing must be made, but freely and not in response to international pressure or black violence. We expect Botha to pursue his own gradual reform agenda at his own pace with such moves as easing restrictions on the movement of blacks and experimenting with political formulations that expand black rights while retaining white control. These reform measures, however, are unlikely to defuse black unrest as the violence over the past year

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
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appears to have increased black militancy and intimidated moderate blacks who might have been receptive to government-announced reforms. [ ]

Although security forces might achieve some semblance of order in black townships during the next year, we see little prospect for any lengthy cooling of the unrest. The climate of protest is almost sure to prevail, shaped by high unemployment, poor living conditions, police excesses, lack of educational opportunity, and the intensifying frustration over black exclusion from the multiracial government—which includes Coloreds and Indians—that was established last year. The deep economic recession will likely be prolonged, given investor concerns over sanctions and debt difficulties. This will mean further hardship for the fast-growing black population. [ ]

The ANC appears to have been playing a catchup role in the unrest, but recently the group has taken steps toward a more radical position in an effort to shake white resolve and shore up its image. Acting President Tambo, abandoning a long-held position, said the ANC would not be as-careful to guard against white civilian casualties during its attacks. Despite this and other tough talk, the group is evidently not yet ready to risk a campaign of antiwhite terrorism, and ANC operations have not reflected a new direction. [ ]

We do not believe that the sustained unrest over the past year has brought South Africa to the verge of revolution. Movement toward black unity or growing fissures in the white community would propel South Africa in this direction, however. At present, we foresee no weakening of white resolve or loss of confidence within the regime over the next two years. Divisions in the black community and effective government security promise to leave the rights movement with no leader or vehicle to channel its dissent. We expect a continuation of sporadic, spontaneous violence that serves to compound black organizational disarray. Growing black militancy—underscored by the unprecedented attacks on collaborators and the collapse of Pretoria's black town council system designed to compensate urban blacks for their exclusion from Parliament—is centered among the young, leaving them alienated from community leaders and parents whose acceptance of the system they deplore. [ ]



Colored youth attacking army vehicle in western Cape. [ ]

#### Key Indicators To Watch

##### *Prospective Scenario: Sporadic Violence Continues, But the Government Retains Control and Continues Its Program of Limited Racial Reform*

- Sporadic violence continues, and security forces maintain a high profile in black townships; white areas remain largely unaffected.
- The government continues with plans to reform influx control laws, end forced removals, and extend property rights to blacks.
- The government makes further vague references to black participation at the highest government level but puts forward no concrete proposals acceptable to black activists.
- Black leaders refuse to meet with government officials, for fear of being labeled collaborators.
- The government stabilizes the rand and gradually restores international confidence in its economy.
- Black unions focus on economic issues and are harassed by the government when they stray into political topics. [ ]

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***Indicators That Would Suggest the Prospective Scenario Is Not Unfolding***

- Security forces are unable to reduce the level of violence, and it spills over into white areas.
- Attacks against collaborators increase, and the government is unable to recruit black police.
- A brutal security incident or the assassination of a key black leader unites the black community and sparks an unprecedented wave of violence that erodes white resolve.
- President Botha dies or resigns and is succeeded by a rightwing conservative who abandons the reform program.
- Black moderates such as Chief Buthelezi abandon hope for a negotiated settlement and support violence against the government.
- Black unions succeed in effecting a series of general strikes.
- The government proves unable to stem the outflow of capital or to reach accommodation with its creditors.
- Whites become increasingly critical of the government and its failure to contain violence or manage the affairs of state.

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
## Chile

- The Pinochet regime is facing growing pressure to speed up the transition to civilian rule.
- The national accord for a return to democracy, promulgated by the head of the Catholic Church and 11 leading parties in late August, has attracted wide support.
- Pinochet ordered early retirement for several military leaders who have criticized his policies and his intransigence toward the moderate opposition.
- A spreading scandal over death squad activities has eroded morale in the police, aggravated bickering among the security services, and provoked public outrage.

### Comment

The Pinochet regime, beset with increasing internal divisions, faces the most serious opposition challenge in years—a challenge that could, over the next year or so, seriously erode the President's power. The moderate opposition's flexible proposals—seen even by some within the military as reasonable—have developed a momentum that we judge will be extremely difficult to stop if he remains intransigent.

The still-fragile unity of the national accord sponsors—threatened by regime efforts to divide and discredit them—will probably be shored up by the endorsement it is winning from all sectors. Since late August, a broad spectrum of parties, numerous professional associations and interest groups, most of the media, and a growing list of key public figures—including many former regime officials—have spoken for the accord. A recently launched petition-signing campaign directed at the general public is contributing to the perception that Pinochet is becoming isolated as support for him dwindles. While promoters of the accord say that most of their points are negotiable, they insist on concrete liberalization measures soon, such as allowing parties to function and reinstat-



ing civil liberties. Cardinal Fresno, head of the Catholic Church, has told the US Embassy he will press the government to accept him as a mediator.

Pinochet would be under only minor threat from this activity, except that his major constituency, the military, is being swayed by it. The US Embassy reports growing sentiment in the armed forces to return to the barracks. This mood was underscored in early October when the air force member of the junta publicly

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Chile: Cardinal Fresno and President Pinochet take each other's measure. [redacted]

welcomed the accord. Other signs of restiveness within the military are surfacing. An unprecedented number of field grade officers are said to be requesting early retirement to disassociate themselves from the regime and any civilian reprisals from a future civilian administration. Others are negotiating with opposition leaders for later employment in return for pressing now for a return to democracy. The spreading death squad scandal provides yet another divisive undercurrent. [redacted]

How these forces finally play out will depend on Pinochet himself. To date, he has shown no flexibility toward the moderate opposition's proposal for a negotiated transition. In typical fashion, he has responded to critics within the military by forcing resignations and demanding unswerving loyalty. At the same time, however, he is exhibiting concern that he may lose the initiative. He gives frequent press interviews to defend his policies and has ordered a survey of military attitudes toward the accord. These moves and his history of moderating when urged to do so by senior officers lead us to believe Pinochet will eventually agree to negotiating a speeded up transition. Should he continue to stonewall—insisting on no political change until 1989—we believe senior officers will try to bypass him and deal directly with the opposition in discussions brokered by the Cardinal. [redacted]

### Key Indicators To Watch

#### *Prospective Scenario: Pinochet Bows to Pressure and Agrees To Negotiate a Return to Civilian Rule*

- The sponsors of the national accord remain united and show flexibility regarding their proposals.
- Cardinal Fresno in early 1986 approaches Pinochet and other key officials, offering to act as mediator for talks with the opposition.
- Some senior officers praise Fresno and the accord and say the military should consider withdrawing from government.
- Officers meet privately with Pinochet to urge his flexibility.
- Moderate opposition groups refrain from collaborating with the Communists in protest actions, but civil disobedience becomes more common. [redacted]

#### *Indicators That Would Suggest the Prospective Scenario Is Not Unfolding*

- Pinochet persists in refusing to accept discussions on the accord or any changes in the 1980 Constitution.
- Junta members and senior officers clash with Pinochet and discontent spreads in the military.
- Moderate political leaders, still promoting an accord, are openly attacking Pinochet by mid-1986.
- Student and labor agitation intensifies, as does spontaneous violence in slums, sparking frequent clashes with security forces.
- Communist-instigated demonstrations draw wider support and some collaboration from moderate groups.
- The armed forces rally to Pinochet's call for support against growing agitation, but officers remain disgruntled with the President's harsh stance. [redacted]

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## Egypt

- The US interception of the Egyptian plane carrying hijackers in October has given rise to antiregime protests and has surprised and embarrassed President Mubarak.
- Mubarak has dealt firmly but cautiously with Islamic fundamentalists and has managed thus far to thwart their challenges to his regime. He may come under more pressure, however, because of the US interception.
- A new government headed by a professional economist was appointed in September to grapple with the deteriorating economic situation.
- The balance-of-payments position is expected to erode sharply this year, and the IMF is predicting large deficits through the rest of this decade.



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### Comment

We believe the deteriorating economic situation poses a major threat to long-term stability, but we anticipate no serious challenge to Mubarak over the next year or more. We judge the uproar over the hijacking affair will diminish soon. Nevertheless, another spectacular event, such as a new Israeli attack on an Arab target, soon would heighten further anti-Israeli and -US sentiments and could lead to widespread violence, fomented by leftists and Islamic fundamentalists. Such violence could threaten Mubarak's rule, or force him to make drastic policy changes.

In general, Mubarak's program of measured political liberalization has wide support, and we expect no interruption to his rule over the medium term, barring assassination. If this were to occur, the largely apolitical military would take the lead in approving a successor and ensuring a smooth transition.

To divert attention from his role in the hijacking crisis, Mubarak will probably continue to take anti-US positions for a while. There is some chance this will backfire if the public comes to believe the President does not command respect in Washington. The US Embassy says Egyptians from all walks of life share Mubarak's sense of humiliation, but we believe Cairo has too much invested in the United States to let the matter get out of hand; the affair, however, may leave Mubarak temporarily weakened.

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Mubarak has a good record domestically. His "safety-valve" democratization to ease the sectarian strife of Sadat's era has given Egypt the liveliest political environment in its modern history, complete with active parties, an independent judiciary, and a spirited opposition press. Mubarak contends with a vocal opposition—the New Wafd—in parliament as a result

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of last May's elections, but his own National Democratic Party holds an overwhelming majority. By giving the opposition a role, nevertheless, the President spreads the blame for unpopular policy decisions.

[redacted]

The degenerating economy may be the issue around which his disparate opposition might unite. The sudden appointment of a new government headed by an economist shows that Mubarak feels acutely vulnerable as Egypt experiences declining revenues from its major hard currency earners—expatriate worker remittances, oil sales, tourism, and Suez Canal tolls. The expulsion of several thousand expatriate workers from Libya further poses the potentially destabilizing problem of reabsorbing them into the domestic work force. Moreover, extensive food subsidies that the public has come to regard as a right add considerably to an already bloated budget.

[redacted]

Effective solutions entail political choices that the government is reluctant to make. Mubarak insists on introducing austerity measures gradually to forestall a replay of the 1977 bread riots. His greatest concern is that he will be forced to take politically suicidal steps when he can no longer rely on the largess of the United States and other creditors to shore up Egypt's weak financial position.


[redacted]

Official concerns about the economy are intensified by fears of Islamic resurgence. Religious figures' demands for application of Koranic law (Sharia) have had wide press play and have become a hot topic in intellectual circles. The depth of public support for Sharia is difficult to gauge, but attendance at mosques is up, alcohol consumption is down, and more women are wearing the veil.

[redacted]

Mubarak believes the fundamentalist problem is manageable—he has effectively cracked down on the extremist minority—and views economic progress as the key to controlling the Islamic militants. His big worry is that the economic decline will motivate the hard-pressed population to embrace fundamentalism as a weapon against the state. Given the extremists' political and philosophic disunity, however, the likelihood of their dominance is remote.

[redacted]



Mubarak is concerned about the future of US largess. [redacted]

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**Key Indicators To Watch**

**Prospective Scenario: Mubarak Remains in Power and Continues To Win Popular Support**

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- Mubarak's denunciations of US actions dampen public criticism of his relations with the United States.
- Mubarak makes some progress against economic problems but refuses to impose severe price increases.
- Islamic extremists gain additional support, but government security forces are able to control the movement.
- The military remains loyal and in the background.
- Relative press freedom and opposition activities provide a safety valve for popular discontent, but Mubarak retains a tight grip on the direction of policy.

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**Indicators That Would Suggest the Prospective Scenario Is Not Unfolding**

- Mubarak's support begins to erode seriously in the wake of the hijacking affair, providing a crystalizing element for Islamic fundamentalists.
- Antiregime sentiment or Islamic fundamentalism takes root in the military.
- A drastic curtailment of food subsidies sparks widespread rioting.
- Islamic extremists capitalize on discontent to challenge the regime and provoke a strenuous government crackdown.
- Opposition parties find grounds for sustained cooperation against the ruling party.

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
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## Panama

- During almost a year in office, President Barletta was unable to build a national consensus for austerity measures, and the World Bank's decision in August to withhold a \$60 million loan threatened to unravel Panama's financial rescue program.
- Defense Chief Noriega, believing Barletta did not protect the military from calls for an independent investigation of the murder of a longtime critic of Noriega, pressured the President to resign in late September, and First Vice President Delvalle assumed office.
- The murder scandal fanned antimilitary sentiment, but opposition groups were unable to seriously challenge Noriega.
- On assuming the presidency, Delvalle immediately backed away from his predecessor's austerity package and promised to enact more expansionary policies.
- In October, the military began intimidating journalists, warning them not to criticize the Defense Forces or comment further on the murder case.

### Comment

Recent developments in Panama made transparent the thin veneer of democratic government. The ouster of President Barletta—the third president to be removed in five years, but the first “elected” one—is less a sign of political instability than it is a confirmation of the central political role of the Defense Forces. More serious signals of developing instability are the worsening economic situation, public disgust with the military's arrogance, and divisions within the Defense Forces. But given Panama's low level of politicization, the dearth of attractive political leaders, and the



entrenchment of the military elite, matters would probably have to become significantly worse before a discernable threat to political stability appeared.

President Delvalle will serve as another figurehead—and probably not for long. He is in ill health, lacks the military's confidence, and has no political base—his party holds two of 67 seats in the legislature. He is likely to be pushed aside within months. Meanwhile, little progress will be made in addressing the country's long festering financial crisis because of public resistance to austerity and the military's unwillingness to bear the backlash of unpopular legislation. Delvalle's abandonment of Barletta's adjustment program leaves few prospects for funding from international or commercial banks. By year's end, the crunch will probably require further cuts in imports and result in lagging production, growing unemployment, higher inflation, and falling standards of living.

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Defense Chief Noriega gesturing to 1st Vice President Eric Arturo "Tuturo" Delvalle: "It's your turn, Tuturo!" [redacted]

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**Key Indicators To Watch**

**Prospective Scenario: Delvalle Provides No Leadership; Noriega Retains Power; the Economic Situation Deteriorates; Delvalle Is Ousted and an Interim Government Is Installed**

- Delvalle makes no effort to enact austerity measures.
- External funding continues to dry up.
- Protests remain at a manageable level and the Spadafora case fades in the media.
- Noriega solidifies his position by promoting friends and retiring or reassigning potential rivals.
- Speculation abounds on possible replacement for Delvalle.
- Noriega begins to criticize Delvalle's lack of leadership or suggests that new elections be held. [redacted]

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Political fallout from the murder of Hugo Spadafora, former vice minister of health and longtime critic of Noriega, following his detention by Defense Forces personnel in September has heightened tensions. The opposition, however, has been unable to transform widespread antimilitary sentiment into a challenge to Noriega. Attempts to organize protests have been ineffectual, largely because Noriega made clear that the military would retaliate. Most of the parties and interest groups have been co-opted by Noriega by one means or another. Exceptions are octogenarian Panamenista Party leader and three-time former President Arias and Church leader Archbishop McGrath, both of whom support a commission of inquiry and who are potentially powerful allies. Arias's advanced age and McGrath's measured approach, however, have allowed Noriega thus far to ignore both. [redacted]

**Indicators That Would Suggest the Prospective Scenario Is Not Unfolding**

- Strikes and demonstrations proliferate, resulting in clashes with the military.
- Arias and McGrath jointly condemn military actions.
- Noriega is persuaded that austerity measures can no longer be postponed.
- Delvalle announces a partial debt repudiation.
- Rumors of coup plotting surface within the Defense Forces. [redacted]

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Within the Defense Forces, however, the Spadafora affair has caused discontent because the scandal has damaged military prestige. If the scandal drags on, or if another political crisis occurs, some elements within the Defense Forces may use the occasion to conspire against Noriega. [redacted]

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### Part 3. Indicators of Political Instability

The following indicators were used in our examination of each of the countries treated in this publication. While these factors—especially if taken individually—may not be predictive of instability for any single, given country, they have been associated with political instability in the past. We will continue refining these indicators to make them more specific to each country and more predictive.

#### Social Change/Conflict Indicators

##### Demonstrations and Riots

1. Are demonstrations/riots increasing in frequency, scale, and scope?
2. Is the government taking a more permissive view of the demonstrations/riots? If so, does this account in part for the increase? Or is it having a calming effect?
3. Are government repression and opposition violence escalating?
4. Is the violence in demonstrations/riots indiscriminate? Is it being directed against the government, a scapegoat minority or religious community, or other group?
5. Are demonstrations starting to assume a general antiregime tone, or do they focus on one specific issue, a minority group, or a particular region?
6. Does a demonstration attract a larger crowd than originally predicted? Does a demonstration called by one opposition group attract the genuine—not manipulated—support of other groups not previously involved, such as labor groups in support of student marchers, and so forth?
7. Are the media:
  - Becoming more critical of the government or supportive of the demonstrators/rioters?
  - Ignoring government guidance in their reporting of the incidents?

8. Are there indications that elements of the political elite or the security forces are beginning to sympathize with the demonstrators/rioters?

9. Is the government making concessions to the demonstrators/rioters for the first time? If so, are these having a calming effect, or are they seen as a sign of weakness?

10. Are the demonstrators/rioters disrupting any area of the economy? If so, does the concerned sector blame the government or the demonstrators/rioters? Are the disruptions affecting the government's ability to provide goods and services, patronage, and so forth?

##### Strikes and Other Job Actions

11. Are strikes, slowdowns, sit-ins, and so forth, increasing in number, frequency, and location?
12. Do the strikers have political objectives apart from economic motivations? If so, are these directed against the government?
13. Are labor groups that oppose the government forging links with nonlabor opposition groups?
14. Are the strikes and other job actions drawing increasing support from the general public?
15. Is the government starting to meet the workers' demands despite sound economic reasons that it not do so? If so, have the concessions persuaded workers to return to work?
16. Are the strikes, and so forth, starting to hurt the economy?

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**Secret****Maintenance of National Unity**

17. Do increasingly large numbers of the public tend to sympathize with the demonstrators/rioters?

18. Is effective government control over some areas outside the capital being eroded? Are local officials increasingly unwilling or unable to implement directives or to perform services, such as tax collection, for the central government?

19. Is the government starting to carry out policies that change the political or social status of any group; for example, is it increasing religious intolerance, suppressing the use of a minority language or culture, and so forth? If so, are the policies compelling those affected to oppose the government in any way?

20. Is the middle or merchant class starting to withdraw its support for the government?

21. Are religious leaders increasingly critical of the state of the nation? If so:

- Are religious figures becoming active in antigovernment activities?
- Is the general public beginning to support these activities and agree with the criticisms?

**Economic Indicators**

22. Is the government losing its ability to generate revenues? If so, is it finding difficulty in providing public services or maintaining popular subsidies?

23. Is the government increasingly turning to money creation to finance its operations?

24. Is the general public blaming the government for the deteriorating economy?

25. Are sudden price rises or drops in food or energy supplies likely or increasing?

26. Is the international economic situation starting to depress the local economy? If so:

- Is only one sector affected, or is the populace hurting across the board?
- Do popular perceptions tend to blame pernicious international forces or countries?

27. Have remittances from expatriates assumed an important place in the economy?

28. Is the government's ability to obtain foreign aid and investment starting to decline?

29. Does the economy include a traditional sector, such as subsistence agriculture and barter, that remains isolated from the modern economic sector and that could provide a safety valve in times of crisis? If so, is this being eroded by overpopulation, landlessness, crop specialization, and so forth?

30. Do the country's reserves or the free market exchange rate reflect capital flight? If so, is the capital flight the result of economic reasons, such as lack of return on investments, or because of political fears?

31. Is the government unlikely to meet its debt service repayment obligations? If so, are the government's creditors willing to reschedule all or part of the debt?

32. Is the government starting to implement its own or IMF-imposed austerity measures? If so, can it withstand pressures from opposing domestic interests?

33. Are the government's economic policies benefiting only a small segment of the population, such as the elite and associated groups?

34. Conversely, are attempts to redress inequality through taxation, land reform, anticorruption drives, or other economic measures alienating important elements of the elite, such as the military or clergy?

**Opposition Group Indicators**

35. Are opposition groups coalescing against the government? Are they increasingly able to mobilize large numbers of people for antiregime activities?

36. If opposition groups are organized along class, ethnic, religious, or regional lines, are these factional forces and their attraction growing?

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37. Is any opposition group representing itself as the embodiment of the national identity?

38. Is a polarization of forces taking place, that is, are centrists and moderates increasingly compelled to choose among radical positions?

39. Is separatism a growing issue?

40. Is there an opposition leader whose charisma is increasingly recognized even by those who oppose him?

41. Are opposition parties increasingly claiming that the violent overthrow of the government is the only way to bring about change?

42. Are the intellectuals becoming alienated from the system? If so, does this lend strength to the opposition?

#### **Terrorism and Sabotage**

43. Are incidents increasing in frequency and intensity? If so, what has been the rate of increase in:

- The number of incidents?
- The number of cities or provinces in which incidents occur?

44. Are the terrorists or saboteurs being indiscriminate or selective in their targets? If selective, who are the targets—government supporters, the opposition, perceived traitors to one or another side, or others?

45. Is terrorism or sabotage starting to deter any part of the general public from supporting the government?

46. Is terrorism or sabotage starting to hurt the economy? If so:

- Is production declining in key areas such as energy?
- Is the government's ability to provide goods, services, and patronage being reduced?

#### **Military Attitudes/Activities Indicators**

47. Are there any signs of antiregime or coup plotting?

48. Are there indications that elements in the military and security services, particularly senior personnel, are becoming discontented over government actions or policies?

49. Are the corporate interests or dignity of the military being assaulted or threatened?

50. Are there elements in the military that are discontented over career loss, pay, or other benefits?

51. Are there signs of a split within or between military or police leaders?

52. Are the military or security services becoming less disciplined; are desertions and acts of disobedience, and so forth, increasing?

53. Are the security services being reorganized frequently or to an extent that affects their efficiency and morale?

54. Are expenditures for the military and security services a strain on the budget?

55. Is the government trying to upgrade the efficiency and morale of the military and police through such measures as:

- Better recruitment, pay, leave, and promotion policies?
- Increased training in dealing with civil disobedience?
- Better equipment?

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**Secret****External Factors Indicators**

56. Are foreign influence and aid being viewed negatively by the public and by influential power groups? If so, is this starting to hurt the regime?

57. Is the opposition receiving increased aid from radical foreign sources? Is the increased aid improving the recipients' capabilities, or is it evoking negative responses from any groups, indicating that they feel their interests are threatened?

58. Are neighboring countries or other external influences beginning to affect sectarian or regional groups in a way that is eroding loyalty to the government?

59. Is the government under threat of incursions or subversion by foreign elements?

60. Are other countries starting to pose a military threat? If so, does this enable the government to "wrap itself in the flag" and rally support it might otherwise have lost?

61. Is the public's mind being taken off deteriorating domestic conditions by the government's overseas adventures? Or, is the government's meddling abroad unpopular at home?

62. Is an influx of foreign refugees creating problems?

**Regime Capabilities and Actions Indicators****Repression of the Opposition**

63. Does the general public increasingly see the government as more responsible than opposition groups for perpetrating domestic violence?

64. Is the government increasing the use of repression to counter opposition activities? Is there more torture, imprisonment without trial, banning of political parties, press censorship, or school and university closings?

65. Are the regular police having difficulty putting down demonstrations or riots? If so, is the government increasingly using paramilitary police units, hired thugs, or military forces?

66. Are government officials talking about the possibility of declaring martial law or perpetuating it?

67. If the government uses massive force, does this disrupt opposition groups and make them less effective? What is its effect on the general public: is it seen as a necessary sign of firmness, or is it seen as brutal and repressive?

68. Are there indications that the public sees the government as inconsistent: for example, does the average citizen complain that he has "no way of knowing what he can do to stay out of trouble"?

**Government Leadership and the Ruling Elite**

69. Is conflict breaking out or increasing among groups that make up the ruling elite or between the ruling and supporting elite?

70. Are there indications that government leaders are doubting their major policies or their ability to rule?

71. Are there indications that the ruler may be considering stepping down because of age, ill health, a shift in public opinion, personal tragedy, and so forth? If so, is the political elite gearing up for an obvious succession crisis?

72. Is the ruler's style changing in such a way that lessens his ability to rule? Is he increasingly isolated in the "palace," becoming erratic, or losing his party's loyalty?

73. Is a weak coalition government leading to legislative paralysis?

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74. Has the ruler shown that he is prepared to use the security forces to suppress demonstrations, riots, strikes, and so forth? If so, is he prepared to take extremely tough measures before the situation gets out of hand?

75. Is the government introducing reforms? If so, is it doing so under pressure or on its own initiative, and is prepared to enforce them?

76. Are media criticism of and jokes about the ruler and the government becoming more direct and open?

**Government Bureaucracy**

77. Is the bureaucracy becoming less loyal to the government leadership because of divergent political views, distaste for the government's policies, and so forth?

78. Is effectiveness being eroded because the leadership is firing competent officials as scapegoats?

79. Has the government shown ineptitude in coping with natural disasters such as earthquakes, floods, crop failures, and so forth?

**The Education System**

80. Is the education system turning out too many graduates relative to employment opportunities?

81. Are students becoming restive because of government repression or because of restrictive policies in the educational area?

82. Are fundamentalists or other religious groups starting to set up schools in opposition to the public school system, or is enrollment increasing at such schools in existence?

**The Business Sector**

83. Is the business sector starting to be hurt by specific government policies? If so, are losses sufficiently serious to make businessmen increasingly critical of these policies?

84. Are conditions in the country generally deteriorating to such an extent that the business sector is expressing doubt about the government's ability to rule?

85. Is a substantial segment of the business sector starting to support the opposition? If so, is this support political, financial, or both?



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