



**Directorate of  
Intelligence**

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# **Terrorism Review**

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**July 1986**

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*DI TR 86-008  
July 1986*

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**Terrorism Review** [Redacted] 25X1

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*This review is published every month by the Directorate of Intelligence. Appropriate articles produced by other elements of the CIA as well as by other agencies of the US Intelligence Community will be considered for publication.* [Redacted] 25X1  
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**Terrorism Review** [Redacted]

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**Focus**

**Saudi Arabia: Prospects for Terrorism During the Hajj** [Redacted]

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Clashes between Saudi security forces and unruly pilgrims are likely during the monthlong observance of the Hajj—the annual Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca that begins in early August. Saudi security forces are particularly concerned about possible disturbances and terrorist incidents encouraged by Iran and Libya, the key troublemakers in recent years. Budget cutbacks have forced Riyadh to curtail security coverage of the Hajj, and, although officials probably will be able to contain most demonstrations, they may have greater difficulty preventing attacks by determined terrorists. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] This year, the Saudis expect nearly 1.5 million pilgrims to converge on the small city of Mecca during the Hajj season—a number that would be comparable to 15 million persons attending a convention in Washington, DC. [Redacted]

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**Making the Pilgrimage**

The pilgrimage to Mecca is one of the five pillars, or rites, of Islam prescribed by the Prophet Muhammad in the seventh century. It obliges every able-bodied Muslim to travel to the holy city at least once in his or her lifetime. Most pilgrims arrive by air, although a significant number from Iran, the Yemens, and other neighboring countries travel overland, and some poorer pilgrims still come from Africa and Asia by sea. According to the US Embassy, most Shia pilgrims travel first to Medina to visit the tomb of the Prophet and the graves of other venerated Muslims. Many Sunnis and virtually all Saudis consider this to be a form of saint worship, which is heretical, and we believe that such conflicting religious practices between the Sunni and Shia sects could lead to increased tension during the Hajj.

[Redacted]

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**More Trouble From Iran**

The 150,000 Iranian pilgrims—the largest national contingent—pose the most serious security threat. They have frequently disrupted the Hajj with unruly demonstrations, distribution of political propaganda banned in Saudi Arabia, and clashes with Iraqi pilgrims. A group of Iranian-inspired Lebanese Shia pilgrims carrying weapons and explosives was arrested in Taif during last year's Hajj. In 1984, Saudi security officials intercepted explosives flown into the kingdom from Tehran, and a Saudi national was later shot in Spain, probably in retaliation for the death of an Iranian during a scuffle with Iraqi pilgrims. [Redacted]

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Tehran is even more likely this year to encourage agitation by Iranian pilgrims against the Saudi regime. Iran's hostility toward Saudi Arabia has increased

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## Pilgrims at Grand Mosque in Mecca

### The Rites of Hajj


The Hajj season begins this year in early August and ends in mid-September. Pilgrims begin arriving several weeks before the actual start of the Hajj. Before they leave home or when they reach Saudi Arabia, they assume the Ihram, or sanctified state, by donning two seamless garments that usually are white. While in this state they must abstain from sexual activity, bathing, the spilling of blood, and other proscribed activities.

Activities directly related to the Hajj begin on 9 August when individual pilgrims go to Mecca to perform the seven circuits of the Ka'bah, the sacred stone located in the Grand Mosque, and the seven processions between the nearby mounds of al-Safa al-Marwa. Over the next four days the pilgrims will gather on the plain of Arafat for communal worship that involves emotional sermons delivered in Arabic. Most pilgrims cannot hear or understand the sermons; they often are driven to a

religious frenzy, capped at sunset by fireworks, military music, and, in the past, a great deal of shooting into the air.

The crowd then goes to Mina where each pilgrim must throw seven small stones at the pile of rocks where Satan is said to have appeared to Abraham and was driven away by stoning. This ends the Hajj proper, but various ceremonies follow, including the sacrifice of thousands of animals on the holiday of Id al-Adha, celebrated this year on 16-17 August.

After the sacrifice it is customary for the pilgrim to have his head shaved, discard his garments, and return to a secular condition. A few days later caravans of pilgrims leave Mecca for Medina to visit the tomb of the Prophet before being returned to Jiddah for departure.



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because Tehran believes Riyadh is attempting to undermine Iran's economy and war effort with oil production policies that have drastically reduced Iran's oil revenues. The failure of the June OPEC meeting to satisfy Iranian demands for a sharp reduction in production has only heightened Tehran's perception that Saudi policies threaten vital Iranian interests. Iranian propaganda since the OPEC meeting has become more strident and explicit in threatening retaliation against the Saudis. [redacted]

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Previous Libyan attempts to disrupt the pilgrimage have been stymied by Saudi security officials, and Riyadh will closely monitor the approximately 5,000 to 10,000 Libyans who will make the Hajj this year. [redacted]

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**Saudi Security Preparations**

Riyadh has already implemented many of the security precautions it follows every year to prepare for the influx of pilgrims. Security is being tightened at all ports of entry, and the National Guard will deploy four battalions with individual small arms and wheeled support vehicles to Mecca beginning on 1 August. The Guard will be augmented by units from the police and the Army with overall command held by the Ministry of Interior. [redacted]

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Despite the increased risk of terrorism, however, [redacted] Riyadh may be scaling back its usually elaborate level of security operations because of budget constraints. [redacted] the Ministry of

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Interior is reducing substantially the number of security personnel who are automatically transferred to Mecca and Medina during the Hajj and is cutting back training for special security units to cut manpower costs. [redacted]

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**Outlook**

In our judgment, some demonstrations are likely during the Hajj this year. Riyadh will deal harshly with disruptive pilgrims and has already warned Iran and Libya that troublemakers will be arrested and deported. The Saudis probably would receive widespread support from other Arab governments and from pilgrims who strongly oppose efforts to politicize the event. [redacted]

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Recent tensions with Iran and past Libyan proclivity to use the Hajj to target opposition figures also increase the likelihood of terrorism, which will be more difficult to prevent. Saudi security forces can contain limited demonstrations, but Riyadh probably could not forestall a determined, sophisticated terrorist attempt, and the large crowds generated by the Hajj could lead to a substantial loss of life in any attack. Of equal concern, the concentration of security forces around the holy cities will leave other targets popular with terrorists—government buildings in Riyadh or oil installations in the Eastern Province—more vulnerable. [redacted]

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**Highlights** 

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**Key Indicators****Spain****Bomb Intended for El Al Flight Explodes Prematurely**

On 26 June, a suitcase bomb exploded at the El Al check-in counter at Madrid airport during an inspection. Thirteen persons were injured, three seriously. The bomb was a crude device consisting of potassium chloride, sugar, and phosphorus, rigged to go off when the plane was in flight. Police traced the suitcase to a Palestinian with links to the anti-Arafat Abu Musa group.

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The Abu Musa group generally operates in the Middle East, but has conducted some operations outside the area, including a 1984 car bombing outside the Israeli Embassy in Nicosia. This recent attempt may foreshadow a more active terrorist role for the group, reportedly including plans for attacks against US facilities or other targets in Europe and possibly within the United States.

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**France****Bank Robberies Presage New Wave of Violence**

The leftist group Action Directe (AD) may be preparing for a new terrorist campaign. Two recent bank robberies that netted the group over \$15 million suggest that the group may be building up its cash reserves for a major terrorist operation. The likely target would depend on which AD element was responsible for the robberies. The "nationalist" wing generally has attacked Jewish and French targets, while the smaller "internationalist" wing has a more anti-US, anti-NATO orientation. The 10 July bombing of police headquarters in Paris that left one person dead and dozens injured may be more than a prelude to a new AD campaign.

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**Guatemala****Insurgents Targeting Oil Facilities**

On 8 May, leftist guerrillas of the Guatemalan Rebel Armed Forces entered an oil exploration camp seeking food and other supplies. A US-owned supply helicopter that arrived during the occupation was seized and destroyed. The guerrillas have experienced setbacks recently and are likely to step up raids on foreign companies, especially US-owned oil exploration firms, to secure badly needed supplies.

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**Philippines****Libya Targeting US Facilities?**

Libyans are paying Muslim separatists and criminal groups to carry out attacks against US facilities in retaliation for the US airstrikes against Libya. Two Libyan nationals, carrying fake Saudi passports, reportedly arrived recently in Cebu to conduct an unspecified terrorist operation against personnel or property of the US Embassy in Manila or the Consulate in Cebu.

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A group of Libyans is said to be financing Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) separatists to carry out an anti-US attack. The Libyans reportedly have asked the MNLF to occasionally lob a mortar round into US facilities so that the Philippines would be declared an unsafe area for US citizens, an action they hope would lead to a US military pullout. This operation is also said to be planned for August or September. [redacted]

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**Significant Developments**

**United Kingdom-  
Jordan**

**Counterterrorist Training for the Military**

Britain's Ministry of Defense reportedly plans to conduct a series of small, low-profile special forces exercises with the Jordanian armed forces beginning in Jordan in July. The exercises are part of an effort to expand bilateral tactical cooperation. [redacted]

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[redacted] The Defense Ministry also would like to expand its interservice relationship with the Jordanian military by making more soldiers available for foreign training in the United Kingdom. Growing financial constraints, however, are likely to restrict the size and scope of overseas exercises and unit exchanges. [redacted]

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**Belgium**

**CCC Members End Hunger Strike**

On 20 June, four leading members of the Communist Combatant Cells (CCC) ended a hunger strike they had begun on 29 April. The four, who have been awaiting trial since their arrest last December, had demanded to be treated as political prisoners and to be allowed to communicate with each other. Prison officials did not meet the prisoners' major demands, but, by agreeing to provide radios in the cells and allowing the prisoners to receive censored mail and nonfamily visitors, brought the strike to an end. [redacted]

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Officials had feared that the strike would inspire sympathetic acts of terrorism in Belgium as occurred during the hunger strike by the West German Red Army Faction in early 1985. No attacks took place as the strike lengthened, however, and there is no evidence that any members of the group still at large are capable of any significant attacks. [redacted]

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**Spain**

**Basques Obtain New Terrorist Devices**

Spanish authorities are concerned about the recent acquisition by the Basque separatist organization Fatherland and Liberty Military Wing (ETA-M) of new terrorist weapons that could lead to more lethal attacks. [redacted]

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There is no indication that ETA will change its targets or increase the number of its attacks because of the new weapons. Because the new devices may present technical challenges in setting them up or firing them, they are unlikely to greatly enhance the group's already formidable ability to attack Spanish Government and military targets. [redacted]

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**ETA-PM Announces Return to Armed Struggle**

The Political-Military Wing of the Spanish Basque separatist group Fatherland and Liberty (ETA-PM), after two years of inactivity, has announced its intention to return to the "armed struggle." In a communique to Basque news services, the group stated that military action is necessary in all Basque struggles, including political struggles, and that it should not be subordinated to a negotiating strategy. Basque politicians reportedly believe the communique is an ETA-PM attempt to gain acceptance from the stronger, more militant Military Wing of the organization, ETA-M.

Spanish authorities have not considered the group a serious threat for the last two years; the exile of its leaders by the French Government in 1984 seriously crippled its operational capabilities. It is doubtful that the few remaining members of ETA-PM can carry out any of the recently stated objectives. [redacted]

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**West Germany****Red Army Faction Resurfaces in Car Attack**

The Red Army Faction (RAF) claimed responsibility for the assassination on 9 July of Siemens executive Karl-Heinz Beckurts near his home in a Munich suburb. Beckurts and his chauffeur were killed by a bomb detonated by remote control as their automobile passed by. Beckurts is the fourth West German businessman killed by the RAF since 1977 and the first assassination by the group since Ernst

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Zimmermann was shot in February 1985 at his Munich home. The attack on Beckurts displayed greater sophistication than in the similar, but unsuccessful, effort against Gen. Alexander Haig in 1979. Reports by witnesses indicate the attackers may have used several vehicles and CB radios to coordinate the timing of the attack. [redacted]

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**Italy**

**Hijackers in Achille Lauro Case Convicted**

On 10 July, a Genoa court convicted 11 Palestinians in connection with the hijacking of the cruise ship Achille Lauro last October that led to the murder of US citizen Leon Klinghoffer. The court handed down sentences ranging from life imprisonment to six-year jail terms, although it failed to give Klinghoffer's murderer a life sentence. The major results of the trial that began 18 June are as follows:


- Muhammad Abbas (Abu Abbas), leader of the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) who planned the operation, was sentenced to life imprisonment in absentia along with two of his top lieutenants.
- Yusef Magid al-Molki, one of the four hijackers and the self-confessed murderer of Klinghoffer, received a 30-year sentence.
- Two other hijackers received terms of 24 and 15 years.
- The fourth hijacker was under age at the time of the hijacking and will be tried later in a juvenile court.

The prosecution appealed the sentences on 11 July; the defense has said it also plans to appeal. [redacted]

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The trial had sparked a flurry of threats against Italian interests, but no serious terrorist incidents. The Abu Abbas faction of the Palestine Liberation Front recently repeated threats to target Italian interests both inside and outside of Italy if the hijackers were not released. The group claimed responsibility for the bombing on 19 June of the Italian Chamber of Commerce in Athens and an attempted bombing of the Italian Consulate there the same day. [redacted]

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**Red Brigades Members Sentenced; New Trial Begins**

A Naples court on 3 June sentenced 15 Red Brigades members, including leader Barbara Balzarani and Brigades ideologist and Naples column leader Giovanni Senzani, to life in prison for murder, assault, and kidnaping. The trial, which began in February, involved nine homicides, two shootings, a kidnaping, and an attack on an Army barracks. In addition to the life sentences, 48 other persons were sentenced to jail terms of from four months to 28 years, and 17 others were acquitted. [redacted]

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On 6 June, another 174 defendants accused of membership in the Red Brigades went on trial for crimes committed between 1977 and 1982, including the assassination of former Premier Aldo Moro. The most notable defendants include founding father Renato Curcio, Senzani, and Balzarani. Thirty-two members of the Red Brigades were convicted of complicity in the Moro kidnaping and murder in a trial held in 1982. [ ]

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**Greece****Libyan Diplomatic Staff Reduced**

The Greek press reported on 7 July that the Libyan diplomatic mission in Athens would be reduced by about one-third through the departure of 15 to 20 Libyan diplomats. The reason for the reduction remains unclear. Tripoli may have recalled its personnel as part of a recent general cutback in Libyan People's Bureau staffs in several West European countries for "economic reasons." However, other reporting suggests that Athens is taking the initiative for the cutback, probably to avoid being "odd man out" to a European Community agreement on measures against Libya. The Greek Government reportedly is reluctant to take credit for the expulsion of the Libyan diplomats because of Prime Minister Papandreu's relationship with Qadhafi, Greece's economic ties to Libya, and its fear of retribution. [ ]

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**Palestinian Official Assassinated in Athens**

Two men assassinated Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) Central Committee member Khalid Nazal on 9 June as he walked along an Athens street. Press reports indicate one gunman shot Nazal four times at close range and then escaped with an accomplice on a motorcycle. Nazal had entered Greece three days earlier on an Algerian tourist passport; he was to meet another PLO member at an Athens hotel. [ ]

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DFLP leader Nayif Hawatmah sent a message to Greek Prime Minister Papandreu urging a full inquiry. The DFLP claimed Israeli intelligence agents were responsible for Nazal's death and vowed revenge. No group has claimed responsibility for the murder. [ ]

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**Turkey-Libya****Libyans Sentenced for Bombing Attempt**

An Ankara court on 6 June convicted two Libyans of illegal possession of explosives in the 18 April attempt to bomb the US officers' club in Ankara. Each defendant received a five-year sentence and a fine. The court acquitted the pair of charges they conspired to kill more than one person, and ruled that Turkey could not try three Libyan People's Bureau members implicated in the incident because they had diplomatic immunity. [ ]

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**East Germany****Libyan People's Bureau Involvement in Murder of Libyan Citizen**

Muhammad Ashur, a Libyan citizen who was found dead in East Berlin in May, reportedly was murdered by an official of the Libyan People's Bureau there. The East German Government has told the official to leave the country within a reasonable time. The East Germans reportedly are concerned about a possible terrorist attack if they have to issue an expulsion order. [ ]

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**Malta**

**Pro-Libyan Conference Denounced US "Terrorism"**

On 5-6 July, some 60 to 70 people representing leftwing peace groups from Spain, Italy, Greece, Cyprus, Britain, and the United States held a symposium on "Problems of Peace in the Mediterranean" in Malta. The meeting was sponsored by Libya and the "Maltese Peace Lab." A communique issued by the conference denounced military alliances affecting peace in the Mediterranean, and condemned US "state terrorism" and the economic boycott against Libya. [redacted]

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The conference received little support from the Maltese Government. President Bonnici, scheduled to inaugurate the symposium, did not show up, and local press gave little coverage to the event. [redacted]

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**Syria**

**Bomb Blast Rocks Damascus**

On 3 June, a large explosion occurred in a shopping area in downtown Damascus, partially gutting a Gulf Arab Tourism and Travel Organization office and several small shops. Witnesses stated that many people were killed or wounded. [redacted]

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This incident follows the pattern of bombings in mid-1985, during which commercial areas in Damascus were targeted for maximum visibility. While there have been no claims of responsibility in these bombings, likely perpetrators include the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, the Lebanese Forces, and pro-Arafat Palestinians. The Lebanese Forces, a Christian militia group, has the greatest incentive to conduct indiscriminate terrorism in Syria because Damascus is believed to be responsible for a number of car bomb explosions in East Beirut over the past year. [redacted]

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**Lebanon**

**LARF Blows Up Italian Military Attache's Car**

On 6 June, a bomb destroyed a diplomatic vehicle belonging to the Italian military attache in Beirut. The "Group for the Defense of Arab and Middle Eastern Prisoners in Europe" claimed credit for the act in an Arabic-language communique sent to an international press service on 9 June. That name is believed to be a cover for the Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction (LARF), a Marxist organization of Lebanese Christians that has killed US personnel in Europe. LARF previously had threatened reprisals if its leader, George Abdallah, and other imprisoned members were not released from Italian and French jails. [redacted]

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**Kuwait**

**Iran Resuming Terrorism in the Gulf?**

Iranian-backed terrorists probably were responsible for four sophisticated bombs that exploded near Kuwait's crude oil tank farms 20 kilometers south of Kuwait City and a fifth at an oil well north of the capital on 17 June. Iran may have decided to resume terrorism directed at Kuwait in retaliation for Kuwait's support for Saudi oil policies and aid to Iraq. The bombs damaged the manifolds (devices that direct oil from the oilfields through the tank farms to loading berths), leading Kuwaiti officials to believe that insiders—probably employees of the Kuwait Oil Company—were responsible. There are numerous Iranian sympathizers in Kuwait among both native Shias and foreign workers, some of whom almost certainly are employed at the oil facilities. [redacted]

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**Terrorists Arrested for 1985 Attacks**

In early July, Kuwait announced the arrest of suspects in the assassination attempts on the Amir and a prominent journalist and in the bombings of two popular seaside cafes last year. According to press reports, the detainees include four members of the Iranian-backed Shia Dawa Party who are suspected in the attack on the ruler and the cafe bombings, and a member of the Abu Nidal Group who was allegedly involved in the attempt to kill Ahmad al-Jarallah, the editor of the newspaper *Al-Siyasah*. The US Embassy says that Kuwait is also seeking extradition of another member of Abu Nidal from an Arab state. [redacted]

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The announcement of the arrests, which reportedly took place four days after terrorists bombed several oil installations in June, and the government's intention to prosecute the suspects are probably intended to deflect public criticism of the government's apparent inability to protect Kuwait's economic and strategic installations. Abu Nidal and radical Shia groups supported by Tehran will probably plan additional terrorist operations against Kuwait to free the most recent detainees as well as the 17 Shia terrorists convicted of the 1983 bombing of the US and French Embassies and Kuwaiti installations. [redacted]

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**Qatar****Bombing Campaign in Qatar Unsolved**

Qatari officials apparently have no suspects in a rash of bombing attempts that occurred in June. Two of the eight crude bombs found actually exploded, but only one left at a supermarket frequented by foreign workers and Western diplomats resulted in damage. The other devices—two at US Embassy facilities, two at the British Embassy, and others at the West German, French, and South Korean Embassies—failed to detonate. The devices reportedly are similar in construction and probably were made locally. [redacted]

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The fact that the bombs appear to have been made locally explains Qatar's reluctance to discuss details of its investigations and the withdrawal of an early request for US assistance. No group has claimed responsibility for the attacks, and Qatari officials probably suspect disgruntled students or members of Qatar's large foreign worker community. Young Qataris who are members of a small but highly vocal anti-Western Sunni fundamentalist organization also may be culpable. Qatar's small security forces are poorly trained to handle terrorist incidents and bomb disposal, and some security personnel are foreigners who may be unreliable. The last known foreign involvement in terrorism in Qatar occurred three years ago when several policemen acted as agents for a terrorist plan against the Gulf Cooperation Council Summit. [redacted]

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**Costa Rica****Threat From New Terrorist Group**

A newly formed terrorist cell with ties to Nicaragua and Salvadoran guerrillas may pose problems for Costa Rica's weak security forces. A militant leftist associated with the radical New Republic Movement reportedly formed the cell, which has some 20 members. It plans to conduct kidnappings and robberies to fund its activities, and also intends to form a political wing to seek support from

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farmers, labor unions, and student groups. [redacted]  
[redacted]

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**Panama**

**Opening of Possible Libyan Front Company**

Tripoli reportedly is planning to open a special office in Panama under the guise of a Libyan commercial venture to continue meetings with Caribbean radical leftists. The new office will play a key role in coordinating the activities of the Libyan People's Bureaus in Suriname and Panama City but would be separate from them.

[redacted]

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**Peru**

**Terrorist Group May Be Changing Tactics**

Leftist terrorists of the Revolutionary Movement Tupac Amaru attacked a police messhall in downtown Lima on the evening of 9 June and attempted to set fire to the building. One police officer was killed in the attack and another injured. This may signal a change in tactics by the group, which, in the past, has avoided killing, has attacked targets in the early morning hours, and has engaged primarily in symbolic attacks. [redacted]

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**Argentina**

**Surveillance of US Businesses**

Dissident members of the leftist Revolutionary Workers' Party/Revolutionary Army of the People (PRT/ERP) reportedly are surveilling US businesses operating in Argentina for possible terrorist attacks. The PRT/ERP suffered serious losses during the Argentine security forces' brutal countersubversive campaign of the 1970s and has not engaged in anti-US terrorism for several years. Any attacks probably would be planned by dissident elements of the PRT/ERP who are dissatisfied with the group's leadership and lack of progress. [redacted]

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**Indonesia**

**JRA Member Sought in Rocket Attack**

Jakarta police reportedly confirmed that a member of the Japanese Red Army (JRA) may have been involved in the 14 May car bomb and rocket attacks against the US, Japanese, and Canadian Embassies. Fingerprints found in a hotel room from which homemade projectiles were launched were identified as those of Tsutomu Shirosaki, a convicted JRA terrorist. His fingerprints were also found on a car rental application. Police are also seeking another unidentified Japanese and an unidentified Indonesian. [redacted]

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Shortly after the attacks, unidentified males telephoned several news agencies in Japan and Western Europe to claim that the "Anti-Imperialist International Brigade" was responsible. The lack of a claim in the name of the JRA may indicate that members of the organization may have lent their expertise to another group for this attack. This is the first indication of JRA involvement in a terrorist attack since a 1977 hijacking that sprang Shirosaki from prison in Japan. [redacted]

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**Philippines**

**American Missionary Kidnaped**

An American missionary, Brian Lawrence, was kidnaped on 12 July from his residence in Mindanao Province. His abductors are believed to be members of a Marcos loyalist group led by former Lanao del Sur Governor Ali Dimaporo. That group was responsible for the abduction in June of a French priest. In that incident, the kidnapers reportedly thought the priest was an American cleric. Dimaporo's group is attempting to embarrass the Aquino government and may have been involved in kidnaping ten Filipino nuns the same weekend. [redacted]

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**South Africa's ANC  
Targeting Civilians** [redacted]

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Recent bombings suggest that the African National Congress (ANC) is continuing its shift toward attacks on civilians despite the potential hazards of South African retaliation and Western condemnation. Such attacks will harden Pretoria's resolve not to negotiate with the group. [redacted]

at security vehicles, the evidence leaves little doubt that the ANC is targeting civilians in an attempt to terrorize residents in rural areas. [redacted]

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The ANC has not claimed credit for many recent attacks and has denied responsibility for the bombing in Johannesburg on 1 July. Nevertheless, the use of Soviet limpet mines and landmines in most of the attacks, the sophistication of operations such as the car bombing in Durban on 14 June, and the absence of other effective guerrilla groups in South Africa strongly suggest that virtually all of these acts were the work of the ANC. [redacted]

Against a backdrop of the worst domestic unrest in South Africa's modern history and challenges presented by the state of emergency, the ANC leadership apparently has decided that the attacks on government targets alone are not sufficient. Alternatively, but less likely in our view, the leadership's decision last year to grant greater operational autonomy to guerrillas inside South Africa may inadvertently have paved the way for renegade bombings. [redacted]

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**Changing Pattern**

Until last year, the ANC generally tried to avoid causing civilian casualties during the attacks on government targets; exceptions usually were unintentional or were justified as retaliation for South African raids against ANC targets in neighboring states. ANC spokesmen claimed, for example, that the car bombing of the South African Air Force headquarters in May 1983, in which 19 persons died and 219 were injured, was in response to a South African attack on ANC guerrillas in Lesotho six months earlier. [redacted]

**Outlook**

The trend toward increasingly bloody ANC attacks and South African cross-border strikes will continue. [redacted]

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Following a major ANC conference in Zambia in June 1985, ANC President Oliver Tambo said the group would continue to strike at government targets but would be less concerned about civilian casualties. This decision reflected the growing influence of restless, militant, rank-and-file youths opposed to what they saw as inaction by the ANC's relatively moderate "old guard" leadership. [redacted]

[redacted] Now that the group has proved its willingness and capability to strike at civilian targets in urban areas, it might decide to use false bomb threats to disrupt major business centers and sow even more uncertainty among whites. [redacted]

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Most ANC bombings since late last year have been directed against civilian rather than government targets. Although some ANC spokesmen have told journalists the spate of landmine attacks has been aimed

The ANC's new tactics risk unprecedented reprisals by Pretoria. Even in exile, the group remains highly vulnerable. South Africa's leading expert on the ANC—a former police intelligence officer—boasted recently in the press that an all-out six-week effort by Pretoria would wipe out the ANC. Some of South African President Botha's most influential security

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**South Africa: Sample of Recent Terrorist Attacks Against Civilian Targets <sup>a</sup>**

- 15 May Landmine exploded near eastern Transvaal farm; two guerrillas planting device killed as well as black worker.*
- 23 May Massive bomb discovered and defused in downtown Durban before evening rush hour.*  
*Predawn bomb blast in Durban supermarket; no injuries.*
- 25 May Two blacks killed and eight injured in eastern Transvaal when van hit landmine.*
- 26 May Tractor detonated landmine in eastern Transvaal; driver injured.*
- 10 June Two black farmworkers and white youth injured in three landmine blasts in eastern Transvaal.*
- 14 June Car bombing in Durban at crowded beachfront walkway killed three (two whites, one Indian) and injured 70.*
- 21 June Bomb exploded outside Durban cinema; no injuries.*
- 23 June One black injured during attack on supermarket in black homeland by blacks armed with AK-47s and RPG-7 rockets.*
- 24 June Bomb in Johannesburg restaurant injured 18 of various races; second bomb at nearby hotel injured one black.*
- 26 June Truck detonated landmine on road north of Pretoria; black driver uninjured.*
- 28 June Bomb exploded in eastern Cape Province shopping mall, injuring two (at least one white).*
- 1 July Bomb at Johannesburg bus stop injured seven, including five whites.*
- 4 July Bomb at Pretoria shopping center injured 19 persons, including nine whites.*

<sup>a</sup> List excludes attacks against government targets during this period.

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advisers probably agree with this assessment and are counseling him that a tougher policy is needed. [redacted]

[redacted]

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Indiscriminate ANC attacks are almost certainly steeling Botha's resolve not to negotiate with the group. Pretoria is likely to intensify its recent efforts to "educate" the West on the ANC's Communist ties and to portray it as a hardcore terrorist group in the hope that Scandinavian countries—particularly Sweden—will halt their substantial financial support to the group. [redacted]

[redacted]

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


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**Abu Nidal and  
Its Two Patrons:  
The Technical Evidence** [redacted]

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The Abu Nidal terrorist group—long believed to be the most independent of the radical Palestinian groups—may, in fact, be more willing to undertake attacks on behalf of its state sponsors, Libya and Syria, than previously believed. [redacted]




[redacted] Libya and Syria, on the other hand, gain the services of a capable, ruthless terrorist group with a strong record of success, and, at the same time, maintain their ability to deny direct involvement in specific terrorist attacks. [redacted]

This view of the group's operations also helps explain anomalies in recent Abu Nidal activities. For example, the group has been unusually quiet thus far in 1986—only one claimed attack so far this year compared to nine during the same period in 1985. Syrian President Assad may have ordered the group to stand down after the attempted bombing of the El Al plane in London because he was badly embarrassed by allegations of Syrian involvement and did not want a high profile on terrorism. This speculative analysis also provides a motivation for the hijacking of an Egyptair flight last November. Whereas Abu Nidal had not attacked Egyptian interests in more than six years, Cairo represents a high-priority target for Libya, and the hijacking may have been a Libyan-instigated operation. [redacted]

**Libyan-Supplied Weapons**

We have known since mid-1985 that Libya and Abu Nidal had forged closer ties, [redacted]

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[redacted] Libya has much to gain from strengthening its association with the Abu Nidal Group, especially now that many of its terrorist operatives have been expelled from Western Europe after the US bombing raid. Abu Nidal, for its part, may be willing to accept an assignment in exchange for Libyan financial and military aid. [redacted]

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
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**Abu Nidal and Syria: The Ties That Bind?**

Despite its deepening relationship with Libya, Syria remains Abu Nidal's principal patron. We have long had evidence that Syria provides extensive assistance to the group, including training, documentation, and safehaven, [redacted]

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[redacted] The unprecedented anti-Jordanian campaign that Abu Nidal launched in late 1984—mostly in Western Europe—coincided with other Syrian efforts to deter Jordan from reaching rapprochement with PLO leader Arafat. It probably is not coincidental that Abu Nidal's anti-Jordanian attacks have ceased since key Syrian policy goals of undermining Arafat and preventing Jordanian-PLO cooperation have succeeded. [redacted]

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
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**Prospects**

Extensive aid from two key patron states has enhanced Abu Nidal's ability to carry out attacks throughout Western Europe with sophisticated weapons—a range of activity unmatched by any other Middle Eastern group—but it may have proscribed somewhat the group's freedom of action. And, for analysts of the terrorist scene, it has become much more difficult to determine whether it was Syria or Libya—or neither—behind an Abu Nidal operation.



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President Assad is concerned that Syria could become the target of a US or Israeli military strike, and he does not want one to occur because of Qadhafi's terrorist antics. While it is conceivable that Tripoli and Damascus used Abu Nidal to launch coordinated operations, it is more likely that Abu Nidal is in the position of having to reconcile the wishes of two separate—and sometimes competitive—patrons.



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**Kuwait:  
Government Responds to  
Oil Facility Sabotage** [redacted]

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The bombings of Kuwaiti oil installations have reduced popular confidence in the government's ability to provide adequate security. The incidents were probably the work of Iranian-backed terrorists in support of Tehran's demands that its Arab neighbors cut oil production and end aid to Iraq. Kuwait has no suspects under arrest, and the likelihood that terrorists will try another operation—possibly against a vulnerable water desalination plant—is high. [redacted]

Kuwaiti security officials reportedly have made no arrests so far, even though the press claims that as many as 20 suspects are being detained. A previously unknown group calling itself the "Unified Arab Revolution" claimed responsibility for the attacks on 19 June. [redacted]

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**Iranian Strategy for Terror**

The Kuwaiti public has been critical of the regime's inability to protect Kuwait's most important revenue source—its oil industry. The US Embassy reports that the reaction has been more intense than after the bombing of the US and French Embassies and other facilities in December 1983 or after the killing of a dozen Kuwaitis when two popular seaside cafes were bombed a year ago. Critics demanded the resignation of the Oil Minister, a continuing target of parliamentary attack, and the Interior Minister—both members of the ruling family. National Assembly members charged the government was withholding details of criminal activity and external political pressure to protect its security investigations. Angry over the mounting criticism of the regime, the Cabinet resigned in late June and the Amir dissolved the National Assembly. He also suspended parts of the Constitution and placed restrictions on the press to allow the ruling Sabah family to deal firmly with contentious economic and security issues without being subjected to public or parliamentary criticism. [redacted]

Kuwait's suspicion of Iran probably is justified. [redacted] Iran has assets in Kuwait, particularly among the native Shia and foreign worker communities. Some are probably members of the outlawed Dawa Party and work in the government, including the Oil and Defense Ministries, or in the oil industry, and would be able to pass sensitive information that Iran could use in industrial sabotage. If Tehran was involved, the bombings probably are part of a broader strategy to coerce Persian Gulf oil producers into cutting their production; the attacks may have been deliberately timed to take place shortly before the OPEC meeting that opened on 19 July. [redacted]

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Tehran began its pressure campaign in April with strikes on Saudi shipping, and in June attacked two tankers in the territorial waters of the United Arab Emirates. Iran is likely to intensify military and terrorist attacks in the Gulf if Saudi Arabia and Kuwait refuse its demands. [redacted]

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**Kuwait's Response**

**Damage From the Explosions**

The explosions caused extensive damage to key components of Kuwait's oil installations. The US Embassy reports that exports and refinery operations have returned to near normal, but that production capacity has been reduced from 2 million barrels per day (b/d) to 1.15 million b/d. Kuwaiti officials believe that the five nearly simultaneous explosions at the Al-Ahmadi complex were carefully planned and coordinated by people with prior access to the sites, and the officials are convinced the attack had Iranian backing. [redacted]

Kuwait will not want to appear cowed by Iranian pressure, although it is likely to cooperate with any OPEC decision on production quotas. The government will hope to answer domestic criticism by strengthening security at the oil complex and port facilities, and by making a show of rounding up the usual suspects, especially from the Iranian and Kuwaiti Shia communities. [redacted]

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The government probably can do little, however, to improve security at other prime targets for terrorists. Kuwait's desalination plants supply more than 90 percent of the country's potable water. Terrorists familiar with the layout of a plant could easily penetrate the facility and severely disrupt water supplies to a major city for an extended time. The Kuwaiti military, which is responsible for security at the oil facilities, is spread thin by Iranian occupation of nearby Al Faw, and the civilian security services are understaffed and lack training in counterterrorism.

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**Iran-Lebanon:  
Bargaining for Hostages** [redacted]

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The willingness of France and Cyprus to negotiate the release of several of their hostages in June is likely to encourage Lebanese-based terrorists to use kidnaping to gain political concessions. Most of the 16 Western hostages remaining in Lebanon are thought to be held by pro-Iranian factions that now may be willing to bargain for their release. The fate of the five Americans, however, is probably still dependent on the release of the 17 Dawa prisoners being held in Kuwait, and we believe it unlikely that Kuwait will agree to a deal. [redacted]

The two Cypriot hostages released on 21 June probably were freed after the Cypriot Government promised to release a Hizballah prisoner held in Nicosia. The Palestine Liberation Organization apparently played an intermediary role in the negotiations, probably in the hope that any agreement between Hizballah and Cyprus could be extended to include the release of the three Fatah prisoners held in Nicosia for the murder of three Israelis in Larnaca last September. [redacted]

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**The Trend Toward Negotiation**

France began negotiating with Iran for the release of its hostages in Lebanon last year, and the deportation of Iranian dissident leader Masud Rajavi from France on 7 June was an important step in those negotiations. Iranian officials have claimed publicly that they have no influence with factions holding the Frenchmen, but the release of two of the hostages soon after Rajavi's departure was probably arranged at Iran's behest to demonstrate good will and gain further concessions. Several issues must still be addressed if Paris and Tehran are to continue to improve relations: anti-Khomeini activity by Iranian exiles living in France, repayment of a \$1 billion Iranian loan, French support for Iraq, and the question of the gunmen convicted of the attempted assassination of former Iranian Prime Minister Bakhtiar. Paris may already have agreed to repay the loan and further restrict the activities of Iranian dissidents, but the release of the Bakhtiar assailants would be difficult to reconcile with recent tough antiterrorist posturing by President Mitterrand and Prime Minister Chirac. [redacted]

**Status of Americans**

[redacted] Unreliable media reports—mostly from sources seeking to discredit the Muslim factions in Lebanon—regularly claim that the Americans will be killed, but only Peter Kilburn's murder on 17 April has been confirmed. Press reports in early April claimed French, American, Lebanese, and Palestinian prisoners were being held in the Shaykh Abdallah Barracks in Syrian-controlled eastern Lebanon and that some of the hostages were ill and being treated by Iranian doctors. [redacted]

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A caller claiming to represent Islamic Jihad—an umbrella term used by the Iranian-backed group that claims to hold the American hostages—repeated the demand for the release of 17 Shia prisoners convicted in Kuwait for the 1983 bombings of the US and French Embassies and Kuwaiti installations. The Kuwaitis will probably continue to reject this demand. [redacted]

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**Implications**

French and Cypriot success in negotiating the release of some of their hostages may encourage other governments to explore similar methods to free their own hostages. Although such negotiations may win release of some hostages, countries that indicate they are willing to negotiate could well increase the chances that more of their nationals will be kidnaped in the future. [redacted]

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France's negotiations for the release of its citizens have been helped by the general improvement in Iranian-French relations, but Paris is unlikely to cooperate further unless more hostages are released. A French official told the US Embassy in late June that the government continues to press for the release of the remaining hostages held in Lebanon, but believes that Iran must make the next move. [redacted]

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**Status of Westerners Kidnaped in Lebanon  
(as of 23 June 1986)**

Name/Occupation	Date/Place	Claimant Group	Status
William Buckley, US diplomat	16 March 1984, West Beirut	Claimed by Islamic Jihad	Reportedly murdered by captors, 4 October 1985
Peter Kilburn, US librarian	30 November 1984, West Beirut	Claimed by Islamic Jihad	Murdered with British hostages, 17 April 1986
Fr. Lawrence Jenco, US priest	8 January 1985, West Beirut	Claimed by Islamic Jihad	Released by captors, 26 July 1986
Terry Anderson, US journalist	16 March 1985, West Beirut	Claimed by Islamic Jihad	Probably held by Hizballah
David Jacobsen, US—AUB Director	28 May 1985, West Beirut	Claimed by Islamic Jihad	Probably held by Hizballah
Thomas Sutherland, US—AUB Dean	10 June 1985, West Beirut	Claimed by Islamic Jihad	Probably held by Hizballah
Alec Collett, British journalist	26 March 1985, Khaldah	Claimed by ROSM (Abu Nidal)	Videotape of probable murder, 23 April 1986
Philip Padfield, British—Director ILC	29 March 1986, West Beirut	Libya believed responsible	Murdered by captors, 17 April 1986
Leigh Douglas, British—AUB professor	29 March 1986, West Beirut	Libya believed responsible	Murdered by captors, 17 April 1986
John McCarthy, British TV journalist	17 April 1986, West Beirut	No claim	Unknown
Marcel Carton, French diplomat	22 March 1985, West Beirut	Islamic Jihad, Khaybar Brigades	Probably held by Hizballah
Marcel Fontaine, French diplomat	22 March 1985, West Beirut	Islamic Jihad, Khaybar Brigades	Probably held by Hizballah
Jean Paul Kaufmann, French journalist	22 May 1985, West Beirut	Claimed by Islamic Jihad	Probably held by Hizballah
Michel Seurat, French researcher	22 May 1985, West Beirut	Claimed by Islamic Jihad	Reportedly murdered by captors, 6 March 1986
Philippe Rochot, French TV journalist	8 March 1986, West Beirut	Organization of Revolutionary Justice	Released by captors, 20 June 1986
Georges Hansen, French TV journalist	8 March 1986, West Beirut	Organization of Revolutionary Justice	Released by captors, 20 June 1986
Aurel Cornea, French TV journalist	8 March 1986, West Beirut	Organization of Revolutionary Justice	Probably held by a faction of Hizballah
Jean-Louis Normandin, French TV journalist	8 March 1986, West Beirut	Organization of Revolutionary Justice	Probably held by a faction of Hizballah
Camille Sontag, French Peugeot representative	7 May 1986, West Beirut	Syria believed responsible	Unknown
Alberto Molinari, Italian businessman	11 September 1985, West Beirut	No claim	Unknown
Chae Sung Do, Korean diplomat	31 January 1986, West Beirut	Fighting Revolutionary Cells	Unknown
Brian Keenan, Irish—AUB teacher	11 April 1986, Beirut	No claim	Unknown
Kirkas Panayiotis, Cypriot—AUB student	28 April 1986, West Beirut	No claim	Released by captors, 21 June 1986
Stavros Yiannaki, Cypriot—AUB student	28 April 1986, West Beirut	No claim	Released by captors, 21 June 1986

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**Cyprus's Terrorism Policy:  
Rolling With the Punches** [redacted]

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Cyprus's strategic location makes it a convenient waystation for many terrorist groups who have used the island as a transit point to Western Europe and, increasingly, a battleground for their disputes. In response, Greek Cypriot authorities gradually have taken a tougher stance on terrorism, barring entry of known or suspected terrorists, and monitoring more closely the activity of individuals associated with terrorist groups. Nicosia's willingness to act decisively against known and suspected terrorists, however, is tempered by incidents such as the April kidnaping of two Cypriot students in Beirut, longstanding economic and commercial ties to its Mediterranean neighbors, and fear of losing international support for its position on the reunification of Cyprus. [redacted]

**Dimension of the Problem**

Cypriots are no strangers to terrorism. From the 1950s to the 1970s, the island was wracked by domestic violence, but such indigenous terrorist acts declined sharply with the dissolution of the National Organization of the Cypriot Struggle (EOKA-B) in 1978 (see inset). In the 1980s, however, international terrorist incidents in Cyprus have increased steadily from two per year in 1981 to 13 in 1985—a total of 26 incidents for the four-year period. Most of the terrorist activity on the island has been Middle Eastern related and appears to be mainly the result of interne-cine struggles between rival Middle Eastern groups, followed by attacks against British or US interests. All of the reported incidents have occurred in the Greek Cypriot-controlled side of the island where the principal cities, ports, and international transportation links are located. [redacted]

**Cypriot Counterterrorism Policy: A Mixed Record**

Cypriot authorities have officially condemned terrorism [redacted]

[redacted]

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***The National Organization of the  
Cypriot Struggle (EOKA)***

*EOKA was a Greek Cypriot guerrilla/terrorist group led by the late George Grivas that fought the British colonial authorities and demanded union with Greece. The group's targets included British military and civilian personnel, as well as members of the Turkish Cypriot community. The majority of its victims, however, were Greek Cypriots suspected of collaboration with the British colonial administration. Former members of EOKA are regarded by many Greek Cypriots as freedom fighters who were responsible for securing Cypriot independence in 1960, and many of them currently hold respectable positions in the island's business, professional, and political communities. After the emergence of a new EOKA organization, the older EOKA became known as EOKA-A* [redacted]

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*A new EOKA, known as EOKA-B, was formed in late 1971; it also advocated the political union of Greece and Cyprus. The group engaged in kidnapings and assassinations, and in July 1974 joined elements of the Greek military in a coup against the government of Archbishop Makarios. Several of its members were implicated in, but never tried for, the murder of US Ambassador Roger Davies, which occurred in August 1974 shortly after the Turkish invasion of Cyprus and during violent demonstrations against the United States. The group apparently disbanded of its own accord in 1978.* [redacted]

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**Secret*****Terrorist Incidents in Cyprus, 1985-86***

1985

31 January	<i>Nicosia: Arab youth with Syrian connections shoots and wounds Palestinian businessman. The youth reportedly had fallen out with Yasir Arafat.</i> [redacted]	25X1
7 February	<i>Beirut: Six gunmen hijack Cypriot plane and demand the release of two Lebanese jailed in Cyprus for hijacking a Romanian plane leased by Libya in 1983. The hijackers, who claimed membership in the "Black Brigades of Imam Musa Sadr," surrendered after Cypriot authorities agreed to consider their demand.</i> [redacted]	25X1
12 February	<i>Limassol: Police defuse bomb at offices of Cypriot company representing Israeli interests. No group claimed responsibility.</i> [redacted]	25X1
14 March	<i>Nicosia: Explosion damages Esso Oil Company's main offices. No one claimed responsibility, but police linked the bombing to the US veto of a UN Security Council resolution condemning Israeli actions in Lebanon.</i> [redacted]	25X1
21 March	<i>Nicosia/Athens/Rome: Grenade attacks at Jordanian Airlines offices injure five. The Black September Organization, a name used by the radical Palestinian Abu Nidal group, claimed responsibility.</i> [redacted]	25X1
2 April	<i>Nicosia: Arab Unionist Nationalist Organization claims shooting death of Libyan businessman. The group accused its victim of submitting information about Arab revolutionary movements to "hostile services."</i> [redacted]	25X1
12 June	<i>Beirut: Lone Palestinian hijacks Middle East Airlines flight en route to Cyprus. The hijacker surrendered to the pilot after being promised transport to Jordan.</i> [redacted]	25X1

[redacted]  
[redacted] Past Cypriot actions  
against terrorists include the following:

Air flight to Kuwait. The two were permitted to leave for Kuwait the following day, but the ammunition was confiscated. [redacted] 25X1  
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[redacted]

At the same time, Nicosia has generally downplayed terrorism as an issue in its diplomatic relations with its neighbors and has been willing to negotiate with terrorists as the need arises: 25X1

- In April 1986, Cypriot authorities deported two Libyans suspected of planning a terrorist action against US and/or UK interests in retaliation for the US airstrike against Libya.
- Airport security officials detained two persons, possibly Palestinian Arabs, on 19 June for attempting to smuggle guns and ammunition aboard a Cyprus

- In 1984, Cyprus deported two suspects in the killing of a Palestinian. According to rumors at the time, the pair was released at the urging of the Syrian Government and because a Cypriot purchase of Syrian rockets was reportedly imminent.

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17 July	<i>Nicosia: Bomb damages home of PLO charge d'affairs. The attack may have resulted from a dispute between Yasir Arafat and Palestinian dissident Abu Musa.</i> <input type="text"/>	25X1
25 September	<i>Larnaca: Two Palestinians and British citizen kill Israeli woman and seize two other Israelis on a yacht. Before surrendering, the terrorists killed the remaining two hostages. The three, probably affiliated with Yasir Arafat's PLO, were sentenced to life imprisonment by a Cypriot court.</i> <input type="text"/>	25X1
8 November	<i>Nicosia: Dual bomb attack damages Iraqi state airline office, kills manager. The pro-Syrian Eagles of the Revolution organization claimed the bombings in reprisal for Iraqi support of Yasir Arafat.</i> <input type="text"/>	25X1
17 December	<i>Larnaca: Airport police arrest Palestinian carrying weapons, grenades, and silencer, possibly for use in hijacking Swissair flight to Amman, Jordan. The weapons came through X-ray machines hidden in refilled wine bottles.</i> <input type="text"/>	25X1
26 December	<i>Nicosia: Bodyguards foil attempt by three men to place explosive device under car of PLO representative to Cyprus. An anonymous caller later claimed the Eagles of the Revolution organization had condemned the representative to death for representing the reactionary Palestinian right in Cyprus.</i> <input type="text"/>	25X1
1986	<i>To date, no terrorist incidents have occurred this year in Cyprus.</i> <input type="text"/>	25X1

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- In the spring of 1985, Cyprus freed two imprisoned Lebanese Shia terrorists, ostensibly on the grounds of illness. Their release had been demanded by the hijackers of a Cyprus Air flight from Beirut to Nicosia in February 1985. We suspect that Nicosia agreed to the hijackers' demands to end the incident.

kidnapers' demands reportedly included the release of terrorist Sami Nasr, imprisoned in Cyprus for attempting to hijack a Swissair plane in December 1985. We think it likely the government reached a deal with the kidnapers; Nasr may be released shortly.

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#### Constraints

Cypriot officials and press opinion generally seem to agree that Cyprus has enough problems without becoming a battleground for Arab groups, and that it needs to act decisively to keep terrorists out of Cyprus and deport those already there. By the same token, Nicosia believes that an outspoken and activist policy

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- Two Cypriot students kidnaped in Beirut in April were freed on 21 June after President Kyprianou's personal plea to their captors through PLO leader Yasir Arafat, who mediated the negotiations. The

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options in combating terrorism. The Greek Cypriot-controlled area enjoys international legitimacy, and its leaders do not want to alienate Middle Eastern neighbors, who tend to support Greek Cypriot positions on the settlement of the Cyprus question. The Greek Cypriots have therefore permitted a PLO office to function in Nicosia, in part to encourage Arab states' support for their position. [redacted]

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Cyprus's commercial ties to its Arab neighbors are an important consideration. Almost half of Cyprus's exports in 1984 went to Middle Eastern countries. Trade ties probably have restrained Cyprus from taking an aggressive public stand against Libya for its support of terrorism. [redacted]

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Finally, a large Arab population—approximately 20,000 persons—further complicates attempts to control terrorism. In recent years, Lebanese refugees and other Arab immigrants have boosted the Cypriot economy with their wealth and businesses, and gained social and political influence. Arab residents and businesses have reportedly provided logistic support for Middle Eastern terrorist groups. The large Arab population in Cyprus also enables would-be terrorists to blend into their surroundings and hampers government attempts to monitor them. [redacted]

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**Signs of Change**

Despite Cyprus's perceived need to protect its commercial and political equities, the government lately has become increasingly concerned with terrorism and has adopted some measures to control terrorism in the country. These measures include:

- *Increasing airport security.* In June 1985, a 15-man contingency force was stationed at Larnaca airport, more police immigration officers were assigned to better monitor foreigners' movements into and out of Cyprus, and plainclothes police were tasked with randomly checking people and baggage in the airport's lobby.

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on terrorism could affect important political and economic interests. Thus, while Cypriot leaders privately approved the March US confrontation with Libya in the Gulf of Sidra and the April US raid on that country, they avoided siding openly with the United States. [redacted]

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The de facto division of Cyprus into a Turkish Cypriot self-declared "state" in the north and a Greek Cypriot-controlled area in the south decreases Nicosia's

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Police stand next to the shrouded body of Walid Adami, an Iraqi Airlines representative killed by a bomb attached to his car on 8 November 1985.

[Redacted]

- *Use of stop lists.* We believe Cypriot police have been circulating lists among immigration and customs officials to screen out suspected terrorists before they enter the country.
- *Monitoring foreigners.* According to the Cypriot press, security forces now are questioning foreigners, mostly Arabs, on their reasons for being in Cyprus and are ordering some to leave the country within three days.

[Redacted]

**Muddling Through**

The Government of Cyprus treads a fine line between political and economic necessities and a desire to adopt a more activist and less defensive policy toward international terrorism. Although Cyprus has initiated some steps to prevent terrorist activity on the island, in our view these actions are probably not enough to curb the problem. We doubt that, in the near term, Nicosia will radically change its policy of negotiating with terrorists as the need arises and of

dealing with terrorism on an ad hoc basis rather than formulating a consistent strategy for handling the problem. [Redacted]

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There are, however, several indicators that bear watching to detect changes in Nicosia's policy toward terrorism:

- Reaction to future incidents involving Cyprus.
- Public statements on terrorism by government leaders.

[Redacted]

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- Budgetary allocations for counterterrorist programs as well as augmentation and training of counterterrorist forces.
- Developments in commercial and political relations with states sponsoring terrorism.
- The government's stance on terrorist issues in international forums. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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**Cuba's Role in Latin American Insurgency and Terrorism** [redacted]

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**Cuban Goals and Policy**

Cuban President Fidel Castro has selectively supported a variety of radical leftists, insurgents, and terrorist groups in Latin America as part of his overall revolutionary program. Castro's ultimate goal is the replication of the Cuban revolutionary experience throughout Latin America. To achieve this, Cuba has developed a revolutionary strategy that seeks to:

- Create, from traditionally splintered radical groups, unified fronts committed to armed struggle.
- Obtain ideologically committed cadres in urban and rural guerrilla warfare.
- Encourage the use of terrorism as a revolutionary tactic when local conditions warrant. [redacted]

Castro views terrorism as a legitimate weapon in his efforts to promote the revolutionary conditions needed to destabilize a regime. During the 1950s, Castro's 26 July Movement bombed civilian targets and employed assassinations to provoke the Batista government to become repressive, to polarize Cuban society, and to attract recruits to armed struggle. Thus, Castro encourages rebel groups to use terrorism when he perceives that revolutionary conditions are ripe. [redacted]

**Policy Implementation and Support Apparatus**

The America Department of the Cuban Communist Party, headed by Manuel Pineiro Losada, is responsible for coordinating Cuban-sponsored subversive activity and spreading Cuban influence in Latin America. The America Department also serves as a link between terrorists and insurgent groups and the General Directorate of Intelligence (DGI). [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

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[redacted] Leaders of Communist parties or insurgent organizations work with Cuban Interior Ministry officials to select students and obtain slots for these courses. The training programs include courses on Marxist-Leninist ideology, communications and communications security, tradecraft, self-defense, and weapons training. Course instruction is provided by Cuban Army personnel and Ministry of Interior specialists, often assisted by Soviet advisers.

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[redacted]

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**High-Level Cuban Support**

**Chile.** Cuba's special interest in Chile dates back to the Allende years and has persisted during the Pinochet era. Following the overthrow of the Allende government in September 1973, Castro promised those Chileans who opposed the military takeover all the aid that Cuba could provide, and offered maintenance assistance for about 10 years without expecting in the near term that the radical left would engage in violence. Only recently has Castro acted to increase his support to Chilean terrorist groups, apparently viewing the time as propitious for an escalation of violence. [redacted]

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Of special interest to Cuba has been the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR). Havana has supported the MIR by providing substantial training since the 1970s, [redacted]

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[redacted]

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**The Soviet Factor**

*The USSR and Cuba share a broad range of goals in Latin America and are in general agreement as to policies concerning the use of subversion and terrorism. At present, the shared strategy focuses primarily on unifying leftist groups and strengthening regional cooperation among radicals in preparation for opportune revolutionary conditions.* [redacted]

*elsewhere. Unless Castro promotes armed revolution in countries such as Argentina or Peru, where Moscow has important economic and political stakes—a development we view as unlikely in the next few years—Moscow and Havana probably will continue to work along parallel tracks in the region.* [redacted]

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*Throughout the 1960s, the Soviet Union was suspicious of Cuba's policy of inciting armed violence, preferring to work through established Moscow-line Communist parties. Disagreement over this issue was a serious point of friction for several years. Cuba denounced the Soviet policy of "peaceful coexistence" as a fraud, arguing that it implicitly undercut the legitimacy of aiding "national liberation" struggles. At the 1966 Tricontinental Conference, Cuba sought to enlist North Vietnam and North Korea and create a more aggressive revolutionary internationalism. None of these Latin American insurgencies fomented by Havana, however, aroused much popular support, and they all failed.* [redacted]

*Despite this general confluence of goals, however, [redacted] the two countries occasionally work at cross-purposes. For example, Havana has maintained only formal ties to the Soviet-sponsored moderate elements of the Bolivian Communist Party (PCB), a result of the PCB's refusal to support the efforts of Guevara in the late 1960s.* [redacted]

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*At present, Moscow and Havana appear to favor a more active policy of subversion in Chile, while guarding against damaging their political objectives*

*The Soviets reportedly blame the Cubans for what they consider an undesirable development and are refusing to deal with the leftist splinter group. Havana, while officially agreeing with Moscow, is maintaining informal contact with the leftist group,* [redacted]

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[redacted]

*Colombia and Cuba have not improved significantly, despite signs of warming after President Belisario Betancur's inauguration in 1982. We believe President Betancur would encounter substantial political and military opposition if he tried to reestablish full diplomatic relations, chiefly because Havana has continued to provide extensive support to Colombian guerrillas. The new President, Virgilio Barco, is unlikely to be receptive to Cuban diplomatic overtures,*

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*Cuba also supports the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FPMR), a radical leftist terrorist group affiliated with the Chilean Communist Party (PCC) and responsible for the bulk of terrorist incidents to date. The precise relationship between Cuba and the FPMR remains unclear. Since the group first proclaimed its existence in December 1983, Cuba has provided training and material assistance.* [redacted]

[redacted]

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*Although a change in diplomatic relations is unlikely, we believe that Castro will increase the level of Cuban assistance to Colombian terrorist groups. Havana may*

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have attempted to revive the sagging fortunes of the M-19 and may have encouraged it to take the lead in uniting the various smaller terrorist groups into a larger guerrilla coalition. Cuba could attempt to establish contact with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the only group that has nominally honored the 1984 peace accords, and could encourage the group to violence. [redacted]

**Low-Level Cuban Support**

In addition to offering support to terrorists in Chile and Colombia, we believe Castro also will continue to provide low-level assistance to radical leftists in several other Latin American countries. In some of these countries—Argentina, Bolivia, and Uruguay—Cuba may seek to establish toeholds or bases or regional support to facilitate the funneling of assistance to subversive groups in the region. Elsewhere, such as the Caribbean, Cuba appears to be tempering its policy of revolutionary violence while encouraging political organizing, recruitment of new members, and exploiting labor unrest. Cuba will maintain its ties to radical leftists and former terrorists throughout Latin America, preserving for some future date the possible return to violence. [redacted]

**Ecuador.** Cuba's relationship with Alfaro Vive, Carajo! (AVC), the most prominent and active terrorist group in Ecuador, is difficult to assess. A number of AVC members have received guerrilla training in Cuba. We believe that this training, coupled with operational support from the Colombian M-19, has enabled the group to grow from a weak, ineffective organization to one that has been able to spring prisoners from jail and conduct raids on Ecuadorean police weapons arsenals. AVC's operations, although not entirely bloodless, have focused for the most part on efforts to gain maximum media publicity for its views while minimizing damage and casualties. [redacted]

[redacted] Although the AVC poses no serious threat to the stability of the Ecuadorean Government, it could become a more dangerous and lethal force if it continues to recruit new members and if the Ecuadorean security services fail to develop the capability to counter it. [redacted]

The Revolutionary Socialist Party of Ecuador (PSRE)—one of the most radical political parties in Ecuador—has advocated the use of terrorist tactics and has received Cuban support during the past year. After the PSRE rejoined the legally certified Socialist Party of Ecuador (PSE) in 1985, the PSE appears to be moving the mainline Socialist Party toward a more radical stance. Several former PSE leaders have been replaced with more hardline PSRE members, thereby opening the way for implementation of the PSRE's far more radical policies. [redacted]

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**Honduras.** Honduran territory has in the past been the target of Cuban destabilization efforts. In July 1983, about 100 Cuban-trained Honduran nationals reportedly were infiltrated from Nicaragua into eastern Honduras. About a year later, another group of Cuban-trained guerrillas entered Honduras. Both groups were annihilated by the Honduran Army. Since then, Havana has been cautious in its use of violence in Honduras. [redacted]

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The destabilization of Honduras clearly would enhance the position of the Salvadoran and Guatemalan insurgencies. Havana also probably sees in Honduras a chance to intimidate or destabilize the major base for anti-Sandinista insurgents fighting in Nicaragua. Although Havana clearly is not providing as much support to Honduran terrorist groups, as it has to the established Central American insurgencies, we believe Castro will attempt to bolster the divided Honduran left with financial and training assistance. Given the failure of insurgency attempts, Havana probably sees terrorists as its only mechanism in Honduras for pursuing its regional goals. [redacted]

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**Bolivia.** During the tenure of former President Siles, there was a great deal of Cuban activity in Bolivia. Since the election in August 1985 of Paz Estenssoro, however, both the Cubans and the Soviets have been kept at arm's length. Paz Estenssoro probably hopes to gain greater access to US aid by adhering to US-encouraged reforms. [redacted]

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[Redacted]

The Cubans reportedly have used Bolivia as a staging area for support to Chilean terrorist groups. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

*Uruguay.* [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] Cuba has for many years provided safehaven to former Tupamaros. Many of these have subsequently served with various Central American guerrilla groups. [Redacted] Cuba does not view the time as propitious for it to support a revolutionary strategy in Uruguay but may view the country as a possible staging and transit area for Cuban subversive activity in the region. [Redacted]

*Argentina.* The Cubans have a long history of association with terrorists in Argentina. The Cubans gave financial and logistic support to the Montoneros and the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP)—the two groups responsible for unleashing the wave of leftist terrorism that swept Argentina in the 1970s. Havana trained them in Cuba in urban and rural guerrilla warfare. These terrorist groups were virtually eliminated as a result of the Argentine military's brutal counterinsurgency campaign, and Castro allowed the remnants of their leadership to relocate in Havana. Since then, the radical left has remained extremely weak and factionalized, and Argentina has been free from leftist terrorism. [Redacted]

We do not foresee Castro encouraging any indigenous radical groups to pursue a path of terrorist violence because he would be reluctant to jeopardize his newly established relationship with the government of Raul Alfonsin. At present, Cuba probably is encouraging

the Montoneros to attempt to acquire a measure of political legitimacy. Cuba may at some future point begin to view the generally relaxed environment for leftists as conducive to a renewal of subversive support. In that event, Cuba might seek to take advantage of its links to the Montoneros to renew subversive operations. [Redacted]

Cuba may be using Argentina as a possible staging area to provide logistic support to Chilean radical leftists. As in the case of Bolivia, Cuba may be facilitating travel by, and logistic support to, the Chilean terrorist groups, and may be employing Montoneros in the supply network. [Redacted]

*Caribbean.* More than two years after its setback in Grenada, Cuba is struggling to recover its political influence in the Caribbean. Castro continues to support leftist political groups and to promote political coalitions among them, but he apparently views the strengthening of regional radicals as a long-term effort unlikely to have a near-term impact. Cuban policy is to offer Caribbean leftists political advice, organizational assistance, and limited financial aid as the basis for a foothold in the region. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

*Jamaica.* Jamaica is a good example of Cuba's current policy in the Caribbean. Castro is pressing Jamaican radicals to support former Prime Minister Michael Manley's party because Manley represents the best hope over the next few years for left-of-center forces to come to power. Cuba may be providing limited aid to radical groups to prepare for, and possibly encourage, a climate of instability. We believe that, for the most part, however, Cuba will continue to promote moderation and foster increased leftist political activity. [Redacted]

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**Cuban-Libyan Rivalry**

[redacted] Havana is particularly worried that Libya's increasingly close relations with Caribbean leftists may undermine Havana's more cautious strategy. Moreover, Havana is worried that the United States believes it is cooperating with Tripoli in supporting indiscriminate violence, and that Libya's meddling could provoke US retaliation against Cuba. [redacted]

Already, Libyan activities in the Caribbean have prompted warnings by Cuban officials to Caribbean leftists about the dangers of cooperating with Tripoli.

[redacted]

In its attempt to counter growing Libyan influence, Havana has stressed to various leftist groups the drawbacks of cooperating with Libya, citing Tripoli's international reputation as a center for terrorism and arguing that increased links to Libya will prompt US countermeasures. Havana also has pointed out that it has maintained longstanding assistance to regional leftist groups over the years as part of its traditional Latin American revolutionary role. [redacted]

**French Departments.** Cuba has long viewed the French Caribbean as falling within its legitimate sphere of influence, and would be reluctant to lose any leverage to the Libyans who have become increasingly active in the region. Cuba has responded to Libyan inroads with warnings to local leftists about the risks of involvement with Qadhafi, and Havana probably will step up its offers of training scholarships, organizational assistance, and financial aid. [redacted]

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**Dominican Republic.** In the early 1980s, Cuba encouraged leftist radicals in the Dominican Republic to unite and prepare for armed actions. [redacted]

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Cuba also provided military instruction to members of small extremist splinter groups such as the Social Worker's Movement and the Socialist Party as well as to the pro-Moscow Dominican Communist Party and the Dominican Liberation Party. [redacted]

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[redacted] Cuba has encouraged some of these radical leftist groups—in particular, the Dominican Liberation Party—to engage in civil disturbances and strikes. Havana is maintaining or, in some cases, restoring contacts with opposition elements, ranging from moderate left to radical. Cuba believes that the economic and political situation will continue to deteriorate, placing the radical elements—and, by association, Cuba—in a favorable position. [redacted]

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**Cuban Support for Insurgents**

Throughout Latin America, many radical leftist groups seek at some point to become insurgent or guerrilla organizations and maintain both rural and urban fronts. Cuba has supported many of these groups in the past, and in some cases has maintained

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the relationship over the years. Cuba generally provides these groups with guerrilla and military training, rather than specific tactical or operational support. [redacted]

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Over the past two years, many of the insurgent groups in El Salvador and Guatemala have been on the defensive and have adopted the tactics of urban terrorism. Although Cuba has provided many of these insurgents with training in urban tactics—and most likely will continue to do so—we see little evidence of Cuban operational direction or sponsorship of specific urban terrorist acts. In fact, Cuba reportedly has encouraged some groups to focus their attacks against government and military targets, and not civilians. [redacted]

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**El Salvador.** Prior to 1979, Cuban support to Salvadoran radicals involved training small numbers of guerrillas, providing modest financial aid, and serving as a political conduit between Salvadoran extremists and leftists outside the hemisphere. During the Nicaraguan civil war, Cuba concentrated on support for the Sandinistas. After the fall of Somoza, Cuba began intense efforts to help pro-Cuban guerrillas come to power in El Salvador. In fact, Cuba played a critical role in bringing together the various fragmented elements of the Salvadoran left leading ultimately to the forging of the Farabundo Marti National Front (FMLN). [redacted]

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As Cuba saw the level of violence escalate, it increased the flow of weapons and financial support to the Salvadoran guerrillas. Larger numbers of Salvadoran guerrillas went to Cuba to receive political and military training and returned to El Salvador to augment the guerrilla ranks. Cuban training increased sharply in 1980 as Cuba concentrated on building a trained army capable of mounting major offensives. A typical three-month training program included courses in guerrilla tactics, marksmanship, and use of artillery. In addition, Cuba provided selected guerrillas more intensive training in specialized subjects such as underwater demolition. [redacted]

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Over the past few years, however, Cuba has been more cautious in its support for the Salvadoran insurgency and has attempted to temper Salvadoran zeal for dramatic terrorist attacks. Castro has concentrated his efforts on forging more effective unity among the guerrilla groups and on making clear that the struggle would be neither easy nor short. We suspect that Cuba will continue to exert a more moderate influence on the plans of the Salvadoran insurgents, especially if the groups continue to suffer both military and political losses, and will attempt to dissuade them from mounting indiscriminate terrorist attacks. [redacted]

**Guatemala.** Guatemala serves as an example of Cuban attempts to form a union of disparate guerrilla groups. In November 1980, the four major insurgent organizations signed an agreement to establish the National Revolutionary Union (URNG). Following the signing ceremony held in Managua, representatives traveled to Cuba and presented the document to Castro. Despite the show of unity, however, the Guatemalan groups have not become a cohesive organization and only occasionally engage in joint terrorist operations. [redacted]

At present, we believe the revolutionary groups seeking power in Guatemala are far from achieving their objectives. The successful counterinsurgency and civic programs and the progress of the democratization process have undercut their domestic support and give them little hope of success in the near future. The URNG seems to have little real power, serving only as a propaganda mechanism and political front. [redacted]

We believe Havana will maintain its political and military training programs, but it is not likely to encourage an increase in violent activity. Most probably, Cuba will stress the importance of negotiating and seeking to achieve a measure of political legitimacy. [redacted]

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**Outlook**

In our judgment, Castro will continue to selectively sponsor Latin American terrorist activity as part of his commitment to the revolutionary struggle, while being careful to not endanger his own regional interests or come into conflict with Moscow. Havana will carefully maintain deniability in order not to reverse the diplomatic and political inroads it has made in several countries in Latin America or preclude future diplomatic gains. [redacted]

Havana also recognizes, however, that its known ties to guerrilla groups can present opportunities for exercising leverage on Latin American regimes. As the price for restoration of diplomatic relations in the mid-1970s, for example, Havana pledged noninterference in Colombia's internal affairs—a promise it quickly reneged on. Uruguay hoped to make cessation of Cuban meddling in Uruguayan internal affairs a condition for its diplomatic recognition of Cuba. We believe Havana has been reluctant to support indigenous Uruguayan terrorist groups, such as the Tupamaros, for fear of jeopardizing the establishment of full diplomatic relations. Full relations were restored in October 1985, however, and Havana may now choose to pursue a more active relationship with Uruguayan opposition groups, encouraging political activity but not violence. [redacted]

Cuba probably will continue to place high priority on assistance to Chilean terrorists during the coming year. [redacted]

[redacted] As the moderate and center-left political parties view accommodation with President Pinochet as increasingly unlikely, they may become more tolerant of leftist violence and perhaps even offer support to radical leftists. [redacted]

In our view, Castro will continue to encourage the Chilean radical left to reach a rapprochement with the moderate opposition to lessen its political isolation and to strengthen prospects for the radical left to play a role in opposition efforts to oust Pinochet, as well as in a future, post-Pinochet period. Castro also will continue to stress that Chilean terrorist groups, especially the MIR, remain committed to armed struggle and political violence as part of their overall

strategy to maintain pressure on the Pinochet government. [redacted]

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[redacted] we expect Castro will seek to protect his longtime influence with the group even if that means countering Libyan support. [redacted]

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Havana probably will increase its support to Caribbean leftist groups, possibly in an attempt to mitigate any decline in influence resulting from the Libyan presence. Havana is increasingly concerned that Libya's courtship of Caribbean leftists could prompt a US response. [redacted]

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[redacted]

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Libya's growing involvement with leftists, both in the Caribbean and elsewhere in Latin America, may spur Castro to step up his support to various guerrilla groups, especially if these groups effectively use their ties to Tripoli as leverage in an attempt to gain greater financial support from Havana. Cuba could also make more effective use of what it has to offer—a logistic support base to Caribbean leftists that is far more useful than what Libya can offer the region, as well as increased provision of scholarships and training. [redacted]

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Although Havana's ideological animosity toward the United States may make targeting US installations and personnel tempting, we believe Castro fears retaliation and would be responsive to likely Soviet urgings that he avoid a confrontation with Washington. It is nevertheless important when making calculations on Castro's likely mode of behavior to remember the "wild card"—Castro's own ego needs and his propensity for emotional responses when suddenly confronted by actions he perceives as embarrassing to himself or hostile to his regime. [redacted]

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**The Terrorism Diary for August** 

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*Below is a compendium of August dates of known or conceivable significance to terrorists around the world. Our inclusion of a date or event should not by itself be construed to suggest that we expect or anticipate a commemorative terrorist event.*

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- 4 August 1984** *Burkina.* Another coup overthrows ruling military regime.
- 5 August 1960** *Burkina.* Independence Day.
- 5 August 1962** *The Bahamas, Grenada, Jamaica.* Emancipation Day (independence from United Kingdom).
- 6 August 1825** *Bolivia.* Independence Day.
- 6 August 1966** *United Arab Emirates.* Accession Day of Shaykh Zayed bin Sultan al-Nayhan, Emir of Abu Dhabi.
- 7 August 1960** *Ivory Coast.* Independence Day.
- 7 August 1985** *Ecuador.* Alfaro Vive, Carajo! kidnaps Guayaquil banker (later killed in rescue attempt).
- 8 August 1983** *Guatemala.* Coup by Gen. Oscar Mejia Victores overthrows President Rios Montt.
- 8 August 1985** *West Germany.* Red Army Faction and French Action Directe bomb Rhein Main Airport.
- 9 August 1965** *Singapore.* Independence Day (secession from Federation of Malaysia).
- 9 August 1971** *Northern Ireland.* Internment without trial introduced.
- 10 August 1809** *Ecuador.* Independence Day (national day).
- 11 August 1952** *Jordan.* Accession Day for King Hussein.
- 11 August 1960** *Chad.* Independence Day.
- 11 August 1983** *Ecuador.* Montoneros Alfaristas steal bust of Gen. Eloy Alfaro; recognized as founding date of Alfaro Vive, Carajo! (Alfaro Lives, Dammit!).
- 12 August 1689** *Northern Ireland.* Protestant commemorative marches mark day apprentice boys locked gates of Derry against James II's forces.
- 13 August 1927** *Cuba.* Fidel Castro's birthday.

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**13 August 1960** *Central African Republic.* Independence Day.

**13 August 1984** *Morocco, Libya.* Union established.

**14 August 1947** *Pakistan.* Independence Day.

**14 August 1971** *Bahrain.* Independence Day.

**15 August** *Muslim world. Id al-adha* (commemorates Abraham's willingness to sacrifice his son).

**15 August 1945** *North and South Korea.* Liberation Day.

**15 August 1947** *India.* Independence Day.

**15 August 1960** *Congo.* Independence Day (overthrow of Youlou regime).

**15 August 1975** *Bangladesh.* Military coup and assassination of Shaykh Mujibur Rahman.

**16 August 1960** *Cyprus.* Independence Day.

**17 August 1945** *Indonesia.* Independence Day (proclamation of republic).

**17 August 1960** *Gabon.* Independence Day.

**19 August 1968** *Czechoslovakia.* Invasion by Soviet and Warsaw Pact troops.

**19 August 1981** *United States, Libya.* US planes down two Libyan fighters over Gulf of Sidra.

**20 August 1953** *Morocco.* King's and People's Revolution.

**20 August 1960** *Senegal.* Independence Day (withdrawal from Mali Federation).

**23 August 1944** *Romania.* Liberation Day.

**25 August 1825** *Uruguay.* Independence Day.

**25 August 1944** *France.* Liberation Day.

**26 August 1945** *Hong Kong.* Liberation Day.

**26 August 1966** *Namibia.* Namibia Day (South-West Africa comes under UN control).

**27 August 1979** *Northern Ireland.* Assassination of Earl Mounbatten by Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA).

**27 August 1985** *Nigeria.* Buhari regime overthrown by coup.

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**28 August 1985**                    **Colombia.** M-19 guerrilla leader Ivan Marino Ospina killed by security forces.

**29 August 1944**                    **Czechoslovakia.** Slovak nationalist uprising.

**29 August 1969**                    **United States, Palestinians.** First hijacking of US airliner by Palestinians.

**31 August 1957**                    **Malaysia.** Freedom Day; Malaysia Day (independence from United Kingdom).

**31 August 1962**                    **Trinidad and Tobago.** Independence Day.

**31 August 1978**                    **Libya, Shia world.** Lebanese Shia cleric Imam Musa Sadr disappears in Libya.

**31 August 1980**                    **Poland.** Solidarity trade union founded.



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**Chronology of Terrorism—1986**  25X1

*Below are described noteworthy foreign and international events involving terrorists, or the use of terrorist tactics, which have occurred or come to light since our last issue. In some cases, the perpetrators and their motivations may not be known. Events and developments that have already been described elsewhere in this publication are not included.*

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**24 April** *Greece: Unidentified individuals throw molotov cocktails at Athens bookshop and Greek National Political Union.* Both bombs exploded, but caused little damage.

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**1 May** *West Germany: Police discover arms cache in Saarbruecken.* The materials found could be used to make approximately 40 kilograms of explosives.

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**3 May** *West Germany: "Autonomous Cells" claim responsibility for 25 April NATO pipeline firebombing in Vollersode.* The Autonomous Cells are believed to be a regional group belonging to the Red Army Faction periphery.

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**Early May** *Spain: Basque Fatherland and Liberty admits "dramatic error" in 2 May shooting of 72-year-old businessman in San Sebastian.* The ETA also claimed responsibility for a 3 May grenade attack against the Bilbao police station.

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**7 May** *Northern Ireland: Gunmen in Belfast kill Protestant woman, wound Catholic husband.* Police believe members of the Ulster Defense Force were responsible.

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*Lebanon: Three Lebanese men fail to kidnap Austrian Ambassador in Beirut.* Two other Austrian Embassy employees were injured in the incident. No group has claimed responsibility.

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**8 May** *Spain: Supreme Court President Antonio Hernandez Gil and his bodyguard escape assassination attempt in Madrid.* The Basque Fatherland and Liberty group claimed responsibility for the attack, in which remotely controlled rockets were fired at the judge's car.

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**9 May** *Austria: Bomb attack in South Tirol damages train station.* There has been no claim of responsibility.

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**Turkey: Picnicker finds briefcase containing bombs, pistols, and silencer in Istanbul park.** Press reports claim that the bombs and pistols resemble those seized in the April attempt to bomb the US officers' mess in Ankara. [ ]

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**15 May**

**Northern Ireland: Ex-member of Ulster Defense Regiment shot dead in Newry by Provisional Irish Republican Army.** He was killed while making deliveries to a shop. [ ]

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**West Germany: Bomb explodes in Hamburg bar, killing one customer and injuring bartender.** The bomb apparently was brought into the bar by the customer and exploded as he removed it from a plastic bag. No one has claimed responsibility for the incident. [ ]

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**Spain: Bomb explodes at Renault dealership in Eibar, destroying two cars.** The Basque Fatherland and Liberty group claimed responsibility for the attack. [ ]

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**Corsica: Explosion at vacation village near Ajaccio kills two and injures four.** The National Front for the Liberation of Corsica (FLNC) claimed responsibility, but said it had not intended to kill anyone in the attack. The following day, police arrested 25 FLNC members. [ ]

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**16 May**

**France: Four men using guns and explosives attack Interpol headquarters in St. Cloud.** The police guard on duty was injured. The terrorist group Action Directe claimed responsibility. [ ]

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**France: Suspected Basque terrorist expelled to Cape Verde to join seven other Basque militants deported since January 1984.** Jose Rementeria Barruetaben, also known as Patxi, was arrested in Biarritz on 11 March. He was expelled after the Spanish Government failed to produce the appropriate documents for his extradition. [ ]

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**Spain: Police defuse bomb found in Ford Motor Company showroom in Gijon.** Police suspect the Basque groups Fatherland and Liberty or Iraultza. [ ]

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**17 May**

**Northern Ireland: Three gunmen assassinate Protestant businessman on his way home from work in Belfast.** The Provisional Irish Republican Army claimed responsibility for the shooting and claimed that the victim was a senior member of the security forces. [ ]

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**Spain: Basque separatists machinegun French truck near San Sebastian.** Police suspect the separatist group Fatherland and Liberty. [ ]

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**Spain: Civil guard detains four members of Basque Fatherland and Liberty and discovers arms cache near detainee's house in Guipuzcoa Province.** Police believe the group was responsible for recent shooting at French trucks along Spanish highways. [ ]

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- Portugal: The Popular Forces of 25 April claim responsibility for mortar attack against NATO Iberlant facility in Lisbon.** A 60-millimeter mortar round fell short of its target and caused no injuries or damage. The attack took place one day before US Defense Secretary Weinberger's visit to Lisbon. [ ] 25X1
- Greece: Two unidentified persons throw molotov cocktail at Athens police station.** The explosion caused a fire and minor damage, but no injuries. [ ] 25X1
- 20 May**
- Northern Ireland: Provisional Irish Republican Army murders young Catholic man in Armagh.** The statement taking credit for the killing ordered other "common criminals" in the area to leave the country or "face severe action." The terrorists probably suspected him of being a police informer. [ ] 25X1
- West Germany: Business office of Hamburg Federal Railroad target of attempted arson attack.** The Revolutionary Cells probably were responsible. [ ] 25X1
- Spain: Three gunmen kill policeman in Bilbao and escape in stolen taxi.** Although no group claimed responsibility, police suspect the Basque separatist group Fatherland and Liberty. [ ] 25X1
- 21 May**
- Israel: Remote-controlled bomb damages two army vehicles north of Jerusalem.** According to an anonymous caller, the Palestine Liberation Organization's Force 17 commando group conducted the attack. [ ] 25X1
- Israel: Bomb explodes near Ashqelon, causing damage but no casualties.** One bomb went off in an area where Gaza Strip dayworkers assemble. [ ] 25X1
- 22 May**
- Canada: Four Canadian Sikhs attack member of Punjab state parliament at party during official visit to Montreal.** The victim was not injured. [ ] 25X1
- Northern Ireland: Landmine near Crossmaglen kills British Army major and two policemen.** The Provisional Irish Republican Army claimed responsibility for the attack. This was the group's most serious attack since the signing of the November 1985 Anglo-Irish agreement. [ ] 25X1
- Israel: Roadside bomb explodes in North Jerusalem as army vehicle passes by.** The bomb caused no casualties or damage. [ ] 25X1
- 22-23 May**
- West Germany: "Anarchistic Cells" carry out arson attack against Dyckerhoff and Widmann firm in Burghausen.** A German newspaper received a claim letter from the previously unknown group on 2 June. [ ] 25X1

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- 24 May** **Italy: Three members of the Red Brigades given life sentences for January 1983 murder of prison warden in Rome.** Francesco Donati, Carlo Garavaglia, and Barbara Fabrizi also received concurrent 30-year sentences for wounding the prison's doctor in the attack and for a raid on an Italian Air Force depot in August 1982.  25X1
- Greece: Unidentified individuals throw molotov cocktail at Socialist Party offices in Athens, causing little damage and no injuries.** There was no claim of responsibility.  25X1
- Greece: Athens bank target of bomb attack.** The homemade bomb caused no damage or injuries. No group claimed responsibility.  25X1
- 25 May** **Canada: Cabinet Minister from India's Punjab state seriously wounded in assassination attempt on Vancouver Island.** Police arrested four members of the International Sikh Youth Federation.  25X1
- Israel: The Palestine Liberation Organization's Force 17 commando group claims three bombings in the Tel Aviv area.** Two of the bombs went off in the town of Kfar Saba, while the third exploded at a soldier's hitchhiking station outside Ashkelon. One person was injured.  25X1
- 26-31 May** **West Germany: Suspected RAF periphery members carry out arson attack on US Army training facility in Reichersbeuren.** The fire caused approximately \$15,000 in damage.  25X1
- 28 May** **Northern Ireland: Bomb kills one British soldier, injures two others at Kilkeel gas station.** The victims were examining the device when it exploded. No group has claimed responsibility, but police suspect the Provisional Irish Republican Army.  25X1
- 30 May** **Canada: Sikh plot to bomb Air India 747 in New York thwarted.** Authorities arrested five Sikhs believed to be members of the radical Babbar Khalsa underground group in Canada on charges of conspiring to possess or fabricate explosives.  25X1
- Sri Lanka: Bomb destroys bottling plant in Colombo, killing 10 workers, injuring more than 50 others.** The bomb was hidden in a truck that brought empty bottles from the Vavuniya District. Police have arrested two Tamils in connection with the bombing.  25X1
- 31 May** **Spain: Explosion at civil guard barracks near San Sebastian causes extensive damage but no injuries.** The Basque group Fatherland and Liberty claimed responsibility for the attack.  25X1

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- Sri Lanka: Bomb explodes on Colombo-bound passenger train, killing 12 persons and injuring 50 others.** Police believe the bomb was timed to explode when the train reached the capital. A Tamil militant group, the Eelam Revolutionary Organization of Students, has claimed responsibility for the blast.  25X1
- Honduras: A bomb, discovered on a bus in a privately owned parking lot in San Pedro Sula, failed to detonate.** The police suspect the Honduran National Front of Armed Resistance (FARNH) was responsible.  25X1
- 2-3 June** **West Germany: Firebomb thrown at Frankfurt church causes minor damage.** A previously unknown organization called the "Revolutionary Agitation Group" claimed responsibility.  25X1
- 3 June** **Spain: Basque lawyer found dead in San Sebastian home.** The man had allegedly received death threats and extortion demands from the Basque Fatherland and Liberty group, but there was no claim of responsibility for the murder.  25X1
- Syria: Abu Musa, leader of Syrian-backed anti-Arafat Fatah dissident group, escapes assassination attempt in Damascus.** Someone reportedly threw grenades as he entered his home. No group has claimed responsibility.  25X1
- 4 June** **Spain: Police in Vizcaya break up so-called "legal commando group," arresting nine members and seizing weapons.** The group, said to be part of the Basque Fatherland and Liberty organization, operated in the Durango and Elorrio areas.  25X1
- Israel: Roadside bomb explodes near the town of Tubas in the Gaza Strip.** There were no casualties or damage.  25X1
- Sri Lanka: Unknown assailants attack Sinhalese refugee camp, killing 10 adults and six children.** Tamil separatist guerrillas probably were responsible.  25X1
- India: Three unidentified assailants kill two bank employees in robbery attempt in Sangrur District.** The assailants escaped on a motorcycle, and no one has claimed responsibility.  25X1
- 5 June** **Corsica: Two bombs damage beauty parlor in Calvi, slightly injuring one person.** The National Front for the Liberation of Corsica is suspected.  25X1
- Israel: Unidentified gunman wounds Israeli civilian in West Bank town of Nablus.** The shooting occurred on the 19th anniversary of the 1967 Middle East war, but no group claimed responsibility for the shooting.  25X1

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**Israel: Bomb explodes near police station in Afula.** The incident was the 10th bombing in that town this year.  25X1

**Israel: Bomb explodes in Jerusalem supermarket, wounding two women.** An anonymous caller claimed that Fatah's Force 17 was responsible.  25X1

**Israel: Bus firebombed near Jenin.** There were no injuries or claims of responsibility.  25X1

**India: Tamil politician escapes bomb explosion at seaside rally in Madras.** The device blew up about 300 yards from the speaker's platform, destroying a fishing boat. No one has claimed responsibility.  25X1

6 June

**West Germany: US Army motor pool in Frankfurt target of arson attack.** A firebomb device thrown over a fence caused no damage. The "Revolutionary Agitation Group" claimed responsibility.  25X1

**Sri Lanka: Two bombs explode in Colombo—one on empty train and another near Hindu temple, injuring two persons.** Authorities suspect Tamil separatists were responsible.  25X1

**India: Four Sikh extremists shoot at workers in grain market in Khudur Sahib village, killing two Hindus.** Two police officers were injured by the fleeing Sikhs.  25X1

**India: Two Sikh gunmen posing as doctors seriously wound a Hindu cloth merchant at his home in Punjab.** No group has claimed responsibility.  25X1

7 June

**Greece: Unidentified persons throw molotov cocktail at Athens church, causing minor damage and no injuries.** Police suspect the same group that set fire to the Socialist Party offices on 24 May.  25X1

**India: Six Sikh extremists fire indiscriminately into crowd of ice cream sellers as they collected their stock from the ice factory in Amritsar.** Three Sikhs and two Hindus were killed. No group has claimed responsibility.  25X1

**India: Unidentified gunmen kill Iranian student riding on motorcycle.** No one has claimed responsibility for the shooting.  25X1

**Pakistan: Car bomb extensively damages Afghan building, kills five Afghans and injures more than 30 others in Qissa Khswani Bazaar in Peshawar.** The bombing occurred on the eve of 'Id al-Fitr, marking the end of the Islamic month of fasting. No one has claimed responsibility.  25X1

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- 8 June** *Northern Ireland: Police defuse 90-kilogram bomb inside hijacked van in Londonderry.* No warning was received and no group claimed responsibility. [ ] 25X1
- 9 June** *Spain: Civil guard assassinated in Mondragon.* The Basque Fatherland and Liberty group claimed responsibility on 14 June. [ ] 25X1
- 10 June** *France: Lyon court arraigns Action Directe cofounder, Andre Olivier.* He and two others were charged with voluntary homicide, illegal detention, and armed robbery in connection with October 1980 holdup of an armored car. They were arrested 28 March. [ ] 25X1
- Spain: Demonstrations in Bilbao follow 8 June death of imprisoned member of Basque Fatherland and Liberty.* Joseba Asensio died of an active tubercular infection while in the Herrera de la Mancha prison. Thirty demonstrators were injured. [ ] 25X1
- Japan: Unidentified terrorist throws molotov cocktail at Defense Facilities Administration Bureau in Okinawa's Naha City.* There was no property damage and no claim of responsibility. [ ] 25X1
- 11 June** *France: Police arrest five persons, including leader of Irish National Liberation Army, Sean Hughes, in Le Havre for smuggling arms and ammunition.* The weapons were shipped from the United States and intended for INLA use. [ ] 25X1
- Israel: Bomb explodes in the Tel Aviv suburb of Ramat Gan, slightly injuring one man.* No one has claimed responsibility. [ ] 25X1
- Sri Lanka: Tamil separatists blow up two buses in Trincomalee, killing 40 people and injuring 73 others.* Authorities immediately imposed a 12-hour curfew to prevent reprisal attacks. [ ] 25X1
- Sri Lanka: Bomb explodes outside movie theater in Colombo, killing three people and injuring 12 others.* Tamils are believed to be responsible.
- 12 June** *France: Two bombs explode at tourist information center and bookstore in Drauignan; another explodes at record shop in Frejus, injuring a bomb disposal expert.* The "Commandos of France" claimed responsibility for the attacks. [ ] 25X1
- Spain: Police arrest three ETA suspects in Bilbao.* The three were identified as Txema Zambrana, Josu Borau, and Inaki Sierra. [ ] 25X1
- India: All airports across the country put on alert for widow of one of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's assassins who is eluding police.* Last week she led a rampage through Amritsar's Golden Temple, resulting in the death of one guard and injury to 15 others. [ ] 25X1

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- India: Unidentified Sikh gunmen fatally kill caretaker of cemetery in Fatehgarh Churian, two Hindus at religious place in Amritsar, and two Hindus riding scooters in Maneharpur Riar.** The Hindus retaliated by lynching one Sikh, injuring two others, and ransacking the local government hospital and police station.  25X1
- Vietnam: Unidentified person throws grenade at Czechoslovak Embassy in Hanoi, causing no casualties and only minor damage.** The assailant was arrested by the police. No group has claimed responsibility for the attack.  25X1
- 13 June** **Spain: Madrid court sentences two Basque Fatherland and Liberty members to 33 years' imprisonment for November 1984 murder of a suspected member of the Antiterrorist Liberation Group (GAL).**  25X1
- 14 June** **Botswana: Four gunmen attack home in Gaborone, killing one person and injuring two.** The attack was directed toward members of the African National Congress. The Botswana Government has charged that the attack was the work of the South African Government.  25X1
- South Africa: Car bomb explodes outside Durban Hotel, killing three women and injuring 69 other persons.** Fifty cars, two hotels, and an apartment block were damaged in the incident. Although no group has claimed credit, police suspect the African National Congress.  25X1
- 15 June** **Corsica: Three explosions destroy government office building in Bastia, injuring four people.** The National Front for the Liberation of Corsica claimed responsibility.  25X1
- Israel: Bus firebombed outside Jerusalem.** The vehicle was damaged, but there were no injuries.  25X1
- Pakistan: Bomb blast derails Khyber Mail express train in Peshawar, killing one person and injuring eight others.** Authorities suspect Afghan secret police are behind the planting of bombs and the creating of disorder among Afghan refugees.  25X1
- 16 June** **Northern Ireland: Catholic businessman doing construction for security forces assassinated near South Armagh.** The Provisional IRA claimed responsibility for the murder.  25X1
- Netherlands: Shell station firebombed in Amsterdam, causing extensive damage.** No one claimed responsibility for the attack, but police suspect antiapartheid activists.  25X1

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- Chile: Two Santiago subway stations bombed, killing one person and injuring six others.** No group has claimed responsibility for the explosions.  25X1
- Pakistan: Bomb explodes near Firdaus Cinema in Peshawar, killing three policemen and injuring seven others.** The device went off as police were trying to disperse a crowd of onlookers. No one has claimed responsibility.  25X1
- Pakistan: Bomb rips through bazaar in Peshawar, killing three policemen and injuring 25 other people.** The police were examining a crate in the road at the time of the explosion. No one has claimed responsibility for the bombing.  25X1
- Pakistan: Bomb destroys two empty buses in North Waziristan, causing no casualties.** No group has claimed responsibility.  25X1
- Pakistan: Bomb damages wall of Miran Shah power station, but causes no injuries.** The main building was not affected, and no one has claimed responsibility.  25X1
- Philippines: Grenade explodes in Shoppers' Plaza department store in Zamboanga, injuring at least 11 persons.** This area is a hotbed of a 14-year-old Muslim separatist rebellion.  25X1
- 17 June**
- Spain: Three soldiers killed by automatic weapons fire in Madrid.** The Basque Fatherland and Liberty claimed responsibility for the attack.  25X1
- Colombia: 19th of April Movement crashes tow truck into Minister of Government Jamie Castro's motorcade in Bogota, hitting his bodyguard's car.** One policeman was killed and two bodyguards seriously injured in the incident.  25X1
- Pakistan: Rockets destroy electric power grid station in Baluchistan.** Power was cut off to about 150 small settlements and a number of tubewells. No group has claimed responsibility.  25X1
- 18 June**
- Northern Ireland: 230-kilogram bomb in stolen van explodes outside police station in Cloughmills, injuring six people.** No one claimed responsibility, but police suspect the Provisional IRA.  25X1
- Northern Ireland: Police defuse 170-kilogram bomb near South Armagh.** No group claimed responsibility.  25X1
- Pakistan: Explosion in explosives dump kills four persons, and injures four others in Diwar Village.** No claim of responsibility has been made.  25X1
- 19 June**
- France: Iparretarak member sentenced in Bayonne to four years' imprisonment for illegal possession of arms and explosives.**  25X1

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- Spain: Bomb explodes in Seville hotel, injuring one person.** Two other hotels were evacuated after receiving bomb threats. This was the ninth bomb in the Basque Fatherland and Liberty group's campaign to disrupt the tourist season. [ ] 25X1
- Greece: Bomb explodes at Italian Chamber of Commerce in Athens, injuring a passer-by; a second bomb was discovered outside the Italian Consulate and defused by police.** An Abu Abbas spokesman in Beirut called for the liberation of the defendants in the Achille Lauro trial that began on 18 June. [ ] 25X1
- Japan: Two crude incendiary projectiles launched at main gate of Japanese Ground Self-Defense Forces Naha Base in Okinawa.** The leftwing organization Kakurokoyo (Revolutionary Workers Association) claimed credit for the attack to protest Emperor Hirohito's planned visit to Okinawa. [ ] 25X1
- 20 June**
- Israel: Police arrest 20 suspected terrorists residing in North Jerusalem refugee camp.** The suspects are being blamed for several attacks in Jerusalem earlier this year, including a bus firebombing in April that wounded 10 passengers. [ ] 25X1
- India: Three unidentified Sikhs open fire with machineguns in market in Nakodar, wounding 12 shoppers.** The assailants escaped, and no group has claimed credit. [ ] 25X1
- India: Two unidentified gunmen attack office of Punjab Electricity Board in Amritsar, killing five Hindus.** No one has claimed responsibility. [ ] 25X1
- 21 June**
- South Africa: Three bomb blasts in Durban damage chemical plant, shops, and oil refinery.** There were no injuries. The explosions were caused by limpet mines similar to those frequently used by the African National Congress. [ ] 25X1
- 22 June**
- Northern Ireland: British bomb experts defuse 450-kilogram bomb at Ulster golf club.** No group claimed responsibility, but police suspect the Provisional Irish Republican Army. [ ] 25X1
- Israel: Bomb explodes outside post office in Ashdod, causing no injuries and little damage.** There have been no claims of responsibility. [ ] 25X1
- Pakistan: Bomb explodes outside police station in Peshawar, injuring 21 persons.** No one has claimed responsibility for the incident. [ ] 25X1
- 24 June**
- South Africa: Bomb explosion in Johannesburg damages restaurant.** Police suspect the African National Congress. [ ] 25X1
- South Africa: Bomb explodes in Holiday Inn in downtown Johannesburg, injuring one and damaging hotel's first floor canopy.** Authorities suspect the African National Congress. [ ] 25X1

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- 26 June** **Colombia: National Liberation Army claims responsibility for five bombings in Pereira.** Targets included military and business offices. There were no injuries but damage was extensive. [ ] 25X1
- 27 June** **South Africa: Bomb explodes in trash can at shopping center in Queenstown, injuring two persons and damaging several offices and five vehicles.** No group has claimed credit for the attack. [ ] 25X1
- South Africa: Police kill four African National Congress guerrillas at roadblock near Botswana border.** A fifth guerrilla escaped, leaving behind three Soviet-made automatic rifles, nine loaded magazines and three handgrenades. One police officer was slightly wounded. [ ] 25X1
- 28 June** **Ecuador: Police raid Alfaro Vive, Carajo! hideout in Cuenca, killing one terrorist and arresting three others.** Police also reportedly seized a large amount of weapons. [ ] 25X1
- 29 June** **Greece: Bomb damages Environmental Ministry offices in Athens.** A second bomb at another ministry office failed to explode. The terrorist group Revolutionary People's Struggle claimed responsibility. [ ] 25X1
- Philippines: Grenade explodes at entrance of bar in Zamboanga City, injuring at least ten persons.** Police suspect Muslim secessionist rebels. [ ] 25X1
- 30 June** **France: Libyan businessman killed in Paris.** A police investigation has been launched to determine whether the murder was politically motivated. [ ] 25X1
- 1 July** **South Africa: Bomb explodes in motorcycle shop in Johannesburg, shattering windows and injuring six adults and two children.** The African National Congress is suspected. [ ] 25X1
- 3 July** **Italy: Palestinian sentenced in Venice for possession of illegal weapons and explosives.** Omar Sa'dat Salem, who had been arrested in Verona in December 1985, received a 13-year term for possession; a lower court sentence of 14 years for weapons smuggling was overturned. The weapons cache included 20 kilograms of explosives, two Polish machine pistols, some other weapons, and radio equipment. [ ] 25X1
- 6 July** **Italy: Two Yugoslavs, one Italian arrested in Genoa trying to sell submachine-guns.** Police said the weapons, Swiss-made SG-57s, are more suited to terrorists or assassins than to ordinary criminals. [ ] 25X1

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7 July

**New Zealand: Wellington agrees to release French agents jailed for sinking Rainbow Warrior in 1985.** The agents will serve three years' confinement on a French island in the Pacific, and, in return, France agreed to apologize to New Zealand, to pay \$7 million in compensation, and to refrain from blocking New Zealand dairy exports to Europe. [redacted]

25X1

**Peru: Five Sendero Luminoso terrorists kill member of American Popular Revolutionary Alliance Party in southern city of Puno.** The victim was dean of the State University's agricultural school, and APRA's state secretary in 1983. [redacted]

25X1

**Bolivia: Bombs destroy Jesuit-run radio station in city of Tarija.** Five hooded individuals detonated two large bombs after assaulting a guard. No one claimed responsibility for the bombing. [redacted]

25X1

9 July

**Pakistan: Bomb derails train in Kohat, injuring one person.** It was the second attack in three weeks on a train in the North-West Frontier Province. No group claimed responsibility for either attack. [redacted]

25X1

10 July

**Sri Lanka: Unknown assailants hurl a bomb at Colombo's Hotel Empress 36 hours before Tamil separatist leaders arrive for peace talks.** Police said the bomb caused only minor injuries to four persons. The attackers have not been identified. [redacted]

25X1

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