



**Directorate of
Intelligence**

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Narcotics Review



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February 1986

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*DI NR 86-001
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Narcotics Review [Redacted]

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1	Colombia: San Andres Island Ripe for Expanded Drug Activity		25X1
	[Redacted]		25X1

San Andres Island has the potential to play a more vital role in the Caribbean drug trade. The island's location and the increasing amount of maritime container cargo flowing through the port make San Andres an attractive alternative to traditional staging areas. [Redacted]

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5	Nepal: From Shangri-La to Trafficker's Delight		25X1
	[Redacted]		25X1

Heroin abuse and trafficking in Nepal are growing at alarming rates. Although the government now recognizes the severity of its drug problem, high-level corruption and ineptitude prevent effective action. [Redacted]

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9	Haiti: Drug Trafficking Infrastructure		25X1
	[Redacted]		25X1

Haiti is proving an attractive alternative for drug traffickers seeking to avoid enforcement pressure along traditional trafficking routes in the Caribbean. Most of the drugs are carried by ship, although commercial and private aircraft are also used. A lack of resources and trained personnel is likely to preclude significant improvements in enforcement by the Haitian Government. [Redacted]

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15	Pakistan: Narcotics and Tribal Politics		25X1
	[Redacted]		25X1

The military operation mounted by the Zia government in December against unruly border tribes is not likely to have any long-term effect on the narcotics trade. The operation allowed President Zia to provide a public display of his leadership before the national elections and demonstrate a commitment to resist efforts by Kabul to strengthen its influence among Pakistan's border tribes. [Redacted]

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Iran: Playing to an International Audience [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Iran achieved a public relations coup by playing host to the UN Subcommittee on Illicit Drug Traffic and Related Matters in the Near and Middle East last September. Iran emerged from the meeting in the guise of a champion of regional cooperation, but its proposals are more likely intended to allow the government to manipulate narcotics information. [Redacted]

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Worldwide Narcotics Highlights [Redacted]

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A summary of key developments from 1 December 1985 to 1 February 1986. [Redacted]

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This review is published bimonthly by the Directorate of Intelligence and examines international, regional, and functional issues related to the worldwide drug problem. Appropriate articles produced by other elements of the CIA as well as other US Government agencies will be considered for publication. [Redacted]

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**Colombia: San Andres Island
Ripe for Expanded
Drug Activity** [Redacted]

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Isla de San Andres (San Andres Island), located 200 kilometers (km) east of Nicaragua and about 600 km northwest of Colombia, is an ideal locale to facilitate the movement of Colombian drugs to the United States:

- The island is far removed from the focus of Colombian antidrug enforcement on the mainland, ensuring a relatively risk-free environment for trafficking operations.
- Proximity to the heavily used trafficking routes in the western Caribbean makes the island a convenient transshipment point and refueling and repair stop for ships and aircraft carrying illicit drugs.
- Numerous hidden inlets can provide cover for the transfer of narcotics from a mothership to a smaller boat.
- The island's airport and maritime port facilities offer traffickers the availability of commercial craft for smuggling purposes. [Redacted]

Current Level of Activity

[Redacted]

[Redacted] Reporting in 1981 from the US Embassy in Bogota cited the emergence of the island as a distribution center for Colombian narcotics. In 1985, Colombian traffickers stepped up their use of San Andres as a transshipment area, [Redacted] probably as a response to intensified enforcement efforts in northeastern Colombia. Thus far, we have no credible evidence to suggest the role of San Andres has expanded beyond that of an intermediate drug distribution point. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Smuggling Techniques

[Redacted] drugs enter and leave San Andres in a variety of ways en route to the United States, Mexico, and Europe. [Redacted]

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By Mothership. According to the US Embassy, Colombian motherships—typically a mixed lot of fishing vessels and small coastal freighters—sail to San Andres's waters where their cargo is transferred to smaller craft, called lighters, for transport to the island. According to Coast Guard sources, as recently as December 1985 a vessel was observed offloading marijuana in the vicinity of San Andres Island, near Roncador Bank. [Redacted]

[Redacted] the San Andres Archipelago is a preferred location for smuggling activities involving pairs of motherships. In this operation, the objective is to avoid interdiction while transporting multiton loads of illicit narcotics through the narrow, constantly patrolled passages between Mexico, Cuba, and Hispaniola. The first mothership, which may have been identified as a smuggling vessel in a Colombian port, takes on its contraband and sails to San Andres waters. Instead of being met by smaller boats, it delivers its shipment to a second mothership. The second mothership, never close enough to Colombia to attract the attention of enforcement officials, carries the drugs safely through the Caribbean straits to the next stop. [Redacted]

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By Aircraft. Drug trafficking aboard commercial aircraft is facilitated by Colombian airline service to San Andres International Airport—a small but modern facility capable of handling about 25 flights a day. Colombian-based Avianca operates flight 68 weekly between Santa Marta and Miami, which stops at San Andres. US Customs seizure statistics show frequent use of Avianca flights for drug smuggling. In May 1985, US Customs made two seizures of cocaine hidden aboard flight 68. Private aircraft on smuggling missions have used the island as a stopover point,

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
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Narcotics Trafficking Routes From Colombia



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[redacted] Traffickers have arranged for aircraft to fly to the island to be refueled and modified in preparation for smuggling operations. [redacted]

the Archipelago—700 personnel, spotter and tactical aircraft, and several patrol boats—is primarily engaged in the protection of Colombian national interests. The San Andres police force focuses its attention on the protection of the tourist industry, and lacks a formal antidrug unit. [redacted]

By Air and Sea. Cocaine smugglers have employed a combination of air and sea transportation. [redacted]

[redacted] drugs wrapped in waterproof packages are dropped from aircraft overflying the island and are then loaded onto merchant ships and pleasure craft for the journey north. In addition, [redacted]

[redacted]

Colombian freighters carrying cocaine and staging out of Colombia's Pacific coast travel to Costa Rica, where they meet with small fishing boats and transfer their cargo. The fishing boats reportedly transport the cocaine to Puntarenas, Costa Rica. At this point it is likely that the narcotics are moved by air to US destinations with San Andres a logical transshipment and refueling location. [redacted]

Potential for Increased Activity

We believe that traffickers are likely to increase their use of traditional smuggling methods around San Andres as interdiction in busier Caribbean drug routes improves. The most common technique of smuggling to the area—aboard motherships—will be facilitated by recent efforts by traffickers to obtain more ships of non-Colombian registry to haul drugs. Such countermeasures complicate interdiction by increasing the number and type of vessels to be monitored. [redacted]

By Maritime Cargo Container. [redacted]

[redacted] San Andres may already be a heavily used staging area for containerized narcotics trafficking. US Customs officials citing *Journal of Commerce* statistics report that, between September 1983 and December 1984, 3,912 containers were imported to the United States from Colombian ports; 3,591 of them were empty containers being returned to US ports. Customs officials suspect that illegal narcotics were smuggled in some portion of these containers because such containers are not routinely inspected. Significantly, San Andres was the port of origin for 1,048 of the empty containers. Moreover, two of the three shipping lines calling at San Andres are suspected of being involved in narcotics trafficking, and there have been several reports of altered containers at the island's port. A fourth US shipping line, owned and operated by an alleged narcotics dealer, is preparing to begin servicing San Andres from the Miami River area. [redacted]

The most rapid expansion, however, will probably be in the smuggling of narcotics using maritime cargo containers. Maritime transportation of containerized cargo offers several advantages to smugglers:

- The large number of containers entering US ports and the extensive repositioning and transshipping of containerized cargo complicates the screening of such cargo for illegal items.
- The physical dimensions of a container—standard sizes of 8 by 8 by 20 feet and 8 by 8 by 40 feet—provide a large storage area for concealing illegal goods, requiring fewer smuggling attempts and allowing larger shipments. Containers are easily modified to provide hidden compartments for contraband.
- A relatively unsophisticated port handling facility can service ships with containerized freight. [redacted]

Colombia's Enforcement Posture

Drug control is a low priority in the San Andres Archipelago, and the Colombian Government does not conduct a coordinated and comprehensive antinarcotics effort there. Reporting from the US Embassy in Bogota indicates that the Colombians are particularly sensitive to violations of sovereignty in the Caribbean. The rather sizable military presence in

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US Government statistics indicate that the Colombian drug industry is increasing its use of maritime containers. From 1982-84, according to US Customs, seizures involving container alterations were up—totaling over 5,700 kilograms of cocaine in Panama City, Panama, Puerto Limon, Costa Rica, and Barranquilla, Colombia. The San Andres container-handling facility—a secured area consisting of two 12-bay rectangular warehouses, six support buildings, and a gantry crane—is sufficient to handle the volume of container cargo flowing through the island’s port. Moreover, we judge that, even if large quantities of narcotics are not currently being transported in maritime containers from San Andres, the large number of empty containers shipped from the island may be impossible to resist. [redacted]

The Colombian Government is aware of the growing use of legitimate export shipments to traffic narcotics. The US Embassy reported in March 1985 that there was a consensus among Colombian businessmen and Customs authorities that a crackdown on general cargo and container smuggling was needed to prevent a disruption in the export trade. Discussions between US and Colombian Customs officials have resulted in more conscientious screening of export shipments, but US Customs officials believe a more far-reaching and sustained effort is needed. [redacted]

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Outlook

[redacted]

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[redacted] Despite recent success in the marijuana eradication campaign in northeastern Colombia, the government still faces a costly undertaking to achieve a more permanent reduction in marijuana cultivation. In addition, according to US Embassy officials, a more effective drug interdiction effort within Colombia is needed, which will also require a greater amount of resources.

[redacted]

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Discussions are under way between the US and Colombian authorities concerning the installation of a radar system on San Andres, but it is not likely to improve the narcotics control effort. According to the US Embassy, Bogota has requested a sophisticated radar system from the United States, along with technical support and training. Although a radar system would provide a capability for tracking ships and aircraft suspected of carrying illegal drugs, the primary purpose of the system would be to track vessels suspected of carrying arms. [redacted]

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**Nepal: From Shangri-La to
Trafficker's Delight** [redacted]

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Evolution of the Drug Trade

Marijuana has been an accepted part of Nepal's heritage for centuries. A traditional source of income for villagers in the mountain regions, marijuana and hashish were frequently used as a medicine and in religious rites and smoked by Nepalese at all levels of society. The Western hippies that streamed into Nepal in the 1960s and 1970s to take advantage of lax drug laws and low prices caused dramatic changes in the local drug scene. A thriving marijuana trade developed, opium and heroin—most of it coming from Burma, Thailand, Pakistan, and India—became available to service the foreign market. The Nepalese inevitably became involved in the trade, and Kathmandu now is confronting a rampant drug abuse and trafficking problem far beyond the meager means of the government to control. [redacted]

contraband, such as gold and foreign currency, and we believe the same system is now used to smuggle heroin. Most of the heroin enters Nepal from Pakistan, Burma, and India and is moved to markets in the United States and Europe. Although we have little information on the identities of these rings, they are apparently transshipping sizable amounts of heroin through Nepal. Nepalese have been arrested in increasing numbers in the United States and other consumer countries. [redacted]

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Drug Abuse on the Rise

No reliable data are available on drug abuse in Nepal, but the US Embassy believes addicts may number from 12,000 to 18,000 of Nepal's 17 million inhabitants, up from less than 500 addicts in the late 1970s. The Embassy estimates that some 12,000 addicts reside in Kathmandu alone, a city of only 400,000. According to social workers involved in treating drug abusers, as many as 10,000 of Kathmandu's addicts are hooked on heroin. Once confined to the lower socioeconomic classes, drug addiction has become a middle- and upper-class affliction; [redacted]

The Nepalese heroin rings recruit couriers who are members of the licit trade or travel industries—employees of trekking companies, carpet shops, travel agencies, and hotels. The most prominent offenders are Sherpas, often employed as guides by trekking companies. [redacted] Sherpas are turning to narcotics to supplement reduced incomes from the highly competitive trekking industry. [redacted]

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[redacted] authorities estimate 8 percent of university students use hard drugs. The number of female addicts is also rising. [redacted]

[redacted] Rug merchants are also turning to drug trafficking to supplement their incomes. [redacted]

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Nepal's emergence as a drug transshipment center stems partly from the rise in the number of direct international flights to Kathmandu. These flights provide reliable links to the sources of supply and the ultimate marketplace. [redacted]


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Trafficking Trends

Although it was the catalyst, marijuana was soon supplanted by more profitable heroin. Nepalese entered the heroin trade as carriers for international networks but have recently developed their own sophisticated organizations. Nepalese have for years been involved in smuggling many kinds of

Nepal




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Reluctance To Confront the Drug Problem

Until 1985, the Nepalese Government officially denied the country had a drug problem. Nepal refused to sign international narcotics control accords, maintaining that the large number of foreigners using drugs in Kathmandu was the only problem and that Nepalese society was not affected. The only antinarcotics legislation enacted during this period—The Narcotics Drug Control Act of 1974—authorized prison terms of three to 14 years and fines of up to \$5,500 but was rarely enforced. Under this law Nepalese and foreigners caught trafficking were given minimal fines, some as low as \$1.30.



The government was particularly reluctant to take any action against the marijuana trade, fearing serious disturbances would occur in mountain villages dependent on growing marijuana as a cash crop,


The government believed that suppressing marijuana in these villages would cause greater numbers of people to migrate to the Tarai region, a lowland area near the border of India where the soil is more fertile and arable. Secessionist tendencies and discontent with the monarchy are particularly strong in the Tarai, and officials fear that an influx of disaffected farmers would exacerbate this problem.

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
International Drug Conference in September 1985, it proved to be more confusing than helpful. [redacted] 25X1
[redacted] topics presented by Nepalese 25X1
representatives at the conference were the glorification of Hinduism, a survey of smoking habits in small villages, and poetry by the Kubla Khan. The only appropriate topic was an article concerning health education. [redacted] 25X1

The government has also been unable to mount a strong effort against trafficking, lacking both the resources and the expertise. A small narcotics investigation squad was formed in July 1985 and is currently the only investigative force in the country to focus on narcotics. [redacted] 25X1
two of the new unit's investigative officers were sent to the United States in October 1985 to study advanced narcotics control techniques, but they were chosen on the basis of their friendship with the director of the new investigation unit. [redacted] 25X1

Government Ineptitude

In early 1985 the government began to face up to the burgeoning narcotics problem. By order of the King, the Home Affairs Ministry publicly announced that Nepal had a drug addiction crisis. A frightening rise in the number of addicts, increased pressure from the United States, and public outrage [redacted]

[redacted] The US Embassy reports that Customs officials, who could intercept drugs passing through Kathmandu, still focus on gold seizures for which they receive monetary bonuses. We believe the only significant move by Nepal came in early January 1986 when, according to Embassy officials, Kathmandu approached Washington with a request for basic narcotics identification kits. [redacted] 25X1



The Role of Private Groups 25X1
Nepalese citizens are dissatisfied with the government's inept performance on the narcotics 25X1

On the basis of its performance since the King's declaration, the Nepalese Government may have one of the most inefficient and uncoordinated drug programs on record. No government ministry wants to deal with the abuse problem, and there is currently only one official drug treatment facility in the country. Responsibility for the growing problem was first given to the Drug Control Section of the Home Affairs Ministry, which in turn passed it on to the Health Ministry (claiming it was a health-related problem) and the government-sponsored National Nepal Youth Organization (since most of the addicts were young people). No facilitating or strengthening legislation has been passed, and, although the Nepal Youth Organization sponsored the 7th Annual

When drug abuse became more prevalent among middle- and upper-class youth, more influential voices began demanding that something be done. As concerned individuals came to the conclusion that the government either could not or would not take any significant action, several groups started their own drug awareness programs and opened rehabilitation facilities. A group of businessmen in Boudhanath, a Kathmandu suburb, set up a private drug addiction center in mid-November 1985. They volunteer their own time and use no professional staff

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or medical help. Unfortunately, their record of success is poor. Another group, the Kupandole Youth Society founded in early November 1985, is attempting to respond to the needs of youth and plans to print posters against drug abuse to be spread across the country. They also plan to make contact with important political leaders to heighten their awareness of the situation. Finally, there is the Godavari School Alumni Association, a group of alumni from the Godavari School, a prestigious institution founded and operated by Jesuit fathers in Nepal. They recently decided to sponsor a drug education campaign using videotapes on drug abuse, and they are receiving funding from the World Health Organization through the Queen's social services coordination committee. [redacted]

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Outlook

Such nascent antinarcotics movements, with private citizens willing to take matters into their own hands, suggest that people no longer see drug abuse as a problem to which Nepalese society is immune. With growing public awareness it is likely that pressure on the government to take firmer action will increase. We doubt effective action will be forthcoming, largely out of reluctance to embarrass powerful officials in the current regime. [redacted]

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[redacted] The issue of government corruption, we believe, is likely to become an opposition rallying point as the country prepares for national elections this spring. In our judgment, King Birendra fears the loss of valuable support for his leadership if he promotes an investigation of national corruption before renewing his regime's mandate at the polls in April. We do not expect narcotics trafficking and abuse in themselves to pose a threat to the regime, but fallout from the growing narcotics problem—the increasing number of addicts in the kingdom, the sudden influx of narcodollars, the mounting numbers of Nepalese involved in international crime—will add to the many domestic issues that collectively challenge the government today and in the foreseeable future.

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Haiti: Drug Trafficking Infrastructure [redacted]

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Interdiction efforts by law enforcement agencies have made the traditional trafficking routes—through the Yucatan Channel or through Jamaica and The Bahamas—more hazardous for drug smugglers. Haiti's location makes it a convenient alternate transshipping zone. It lies approximately 960 kilometers (km) south of Florida and less than 160 km east of Jamaica, providing a refueling point for aircraft that allows illicit drugs to be flown deep into the United States. Located on the Windward Passage, Haiti is also on the key maritime access route to the Panama Canal and South America through the Caribbean Sea. [redacted]

As a result, drug trafficking is heavy from Ile a Vache, Haiti, to Isla Beata, Dominican Republic.

[redacted] Ile a Vache is the focal point and possibly serves as a staging area. Suspect drug trafficking vessels have been observed anchored, being repaired, or being replenished in the small coves and inlets in the area. [redacted]

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Interdiction efforts combined with intensified law enforcement efforts in Colombia and Jamaica have made Haiti an important base of operations and a transshipment point for marijuana and cocaine. [redacted]

[redacted] the over 900 kilograms of cocaine seized in Haiti during the first half of 1985 was only a fraction of the total moving through there that year. [redacted]

[redacted]

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Maritime Transshipment Areas

Most of the trafficking through Haiti is conducted by commercial and private ships, including freighters, fishing vessels, sailing ships, and luxury yachts. The Windward Passage is a convenient maritime route for moving illicit drugs from Colombia and Jamaica to The Bahamas and finally to the United States. Ships sailing in the Passage and surrounding international waters have traditionally used Haitian waters to escape interdiction. [redacted]

[redacted] the entire Haitian coastline with its numerous small harbors and coves is used for refueling and transshipment. [redacted]

The major maritime trafficking areas in central Haiti consist of the capital city of Port-au-Prince, Ile de la Gonave, and the port of Gonaives. Port-au-Prince, Haiti's major commercial port, is well developed and has container-handling facilities available. [redacted] the port is widely used by drug traffickers. [redacted] marijuana moving within the country usually moves through Port-au-Prince. [redacted]

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[redacted] According to Embassy sources, vessel activity has increased at the port of Gonaives, evidently as the result of a US interdiction operation in late 1984 and the Haitian interdiction efforts in Port-de-Paix. [redacted]

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The southern peninsula is especially attractive to smugglers because the small Haitian Navy does not effectively patrol it. [redacted] the Haitian Government apparently has no interest in the area and the US Coast Guard has no authority.


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
[redacted] [redacted] at Port-au-Prince have discovered that a majority of the aircraft are suspected of narcotics-related activities.

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
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The prime maritime trafficking areas in northwestern Haiti are Cap-Hatien and Port-de-Paix. Cap Hatien, Haiti's second-largest port, has container facilities available and handles both private and commercial vessels.



In 1985 the Haitian authorities began to intensify security efforts against drug trafficking at Port-au-Prince Airport. New measures included: doublechecking all flight plans; searching small aircraft for hidden compartments; increasing the number of uniformed and plainclothes agents; and close inspection of all arriving Colombians. Traffickers have already tried to circumvent these efforts by attempting to bribe Haitian military and police officers stationed at the airfield.

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Aircraft


[redacted] Haiti has become an important refueling point for suspect aircraft traveling between South America and North America. A 1984 photographic survey of Haiti revealed 22 private and commercial airfields, 14 of which are usable with the remainder appearing abandoned or unusable. Haiti has three major airfields—Port-au-Prince and Bowen Military Base, both located near Port-au-Prince, and Cap-Hatien airfield. Traffickers apparently make use of airfields, both private and commercial.

Traffickers can also avoid Port-au-Prince airfield and use other commercial airfields. The government lacks the means to patrol these more isolated airfields and the officials stationed there are poorly paid and highly susceptible to bribery. Cap-Hatien and Port-de-Paix are the most prominent of these isolated airfields.

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
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The Port-au-Prince Airport has been the most widely used airfield for drug trafficking.



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Commercial airlines are also used for trafficking illicit drugs. Those airlines that have direct flights from Colombia and Jamaica to Haiti and on to the United States are most popular. [redacted]

[redacted]

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[redacted] the use of commercial airlines for trafficking should not be overlooked or underestimated. In December 1982 a Colombian trafficking organization sent cocaine via the Port-au-Prince airfield, where the drugs were transferred from a commercial aircraft to a private aircraft and then flown to The Bahamas and the United States. [redacted]

[redacted]

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The Francisco Burgos-Martinex organization allegedly ships cocaine and marijuana from Colombia to Puerto Rico using DC-3 aircraft based in Port-au-Prince. [redacted]

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Trafficking Organizations

Until 1982 we had little evidence that any trafficking organization was based in Haiti, although international trafficking organizations based in Colombia or Jamaica use it as a transshipment point.

[redacted]

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[redacted]

[redacted] Franz Bennett, known Haitian trafficker and a member of an international trafficking organization, who used his fuel concession at Port-au-Prince Airport to refuel aircraft smuggling cocaine and marijuana from Colombia to the United States. After Bennett's arrest, the Haitian Police Narcotics Bureau arrested several of his associates, reportedly breaking up the organization. [redacted]

Interdiction Efforts and Capabilities

A bilateral agreement between Haiti and the United States has heightened interdiction efforts in the area since 1981. Under the agreement, the United States provides petroleum products, performs routine maintenance for the Haitian Navy, and trains Haitians in the maintenance of naval vessels and in interdiction strategy. The United States is also creating a parts warehouse complete with an inventory control system. Fuel facilities being built with US help along the southern peninsula will enable the Haitian Navy to better patrol this key smuggling area. [redacted]

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By 1984, evidence that well-organized smuggling rings are based in Haiti was beginning to surface. [redacted]

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The Haitian Government provides the US Coast Guard with the locations and descriptions of suspect vessels and the direction in which they are traveling.

The US Coast Guard gave the Haitian Navy an Inter-American Intelligence Network telex to facilitate reporting these suspect vessels in Haitian waters, but it has not been used because of lack of operation and maintenance skills. The Haitian Government has further proposed placing Haitian civilians as liaison officials on US Coast Guard vessels while in Haitian territory. This proposal, if enacted, would help to legitimize US Coast Guard presence and actions in Haitian waters. [redacted]

Haiti's antinarcotics efforts have been hampered by inadequate equipment, personnel, and training. The primary responsibility for narcotics interdiction rests with the Haitian Police Narcotics Bureau, although other agencies are involved, including the Navy, the Air Corps, and the Customs Bureau. In theory, the Bureau coordinates all interdiction efforts within the various agencies, but in fact politically motivated divisions within the military prevent coordination among antinarcotics agencies. As a result, US Embassy officials have become de facto liaison officers between the various agencies. The Police Narcotics Bureau lacks trained personnel and funds. Basic training for new officers consists of a one-week course, and, occasionally, higher level officers receive US-style training in records management and in the operations and management of an office. Police investigative methods are unsystematic and incomplete, and, because the Bureau is based in Port-au-Prince, it lacks regional expertise necessary for effective law enforcement. [redacted]

The military is in little better shape. The Haitian Navy is small and inadequate. It has few long-range vessels, and the small, short-range vessels are aging and unsuitable for ocean patrol. The lack of refueling facilities on the long southern coast prevents the Navy from effectively patrolling that area. Therefore, it mainly patrols the northwestern coast and currently averages approximately 100 hours of patrols per month. The Haitian Air Corps, although it has narcotics responsibilities, has not been active. This may, in part, be due to a lack of any radar system in Haiti, which would enable the Air Corps to detect suspicious aircraft patterns. [redacted]

[redacted]

The Customs Bureau, like the other agencies, is understaffed and poorly trained. Customs agents receive less training than their Police Narcotics Bureau counterparts. The agency has been trying to develop effective methods of controlling airfields and harbors, but the efforts are hampered by a lack of funds and skills. Enforcement is further hampered by the easy access to illegal entry points where customs agents are not stationed. [redacted]

The Haitian Government has attempted to improve its law enforcement personnel. Many police, naval, and customs officers have attended US-sponsored training courses. These courses, taught by DEA and the US Coast Guard, include methods of search and seizure, narcotics recognition, inspection procedures, management skills, and ship maintenance and repair. Those who have attended these courses teach their fellow Haitian officers at local seminars. [redacted]

The government has instituted more severe drug laws. In 1982 the crimes of using and trafficking narcotics became distinguishable and their penalties differentiated. The penalty for using narcotics is three to five years and/or a \$50,000 to \$400,000 fine; the penalty for trafficking narcotics is five to 20 years and/or a \$100,000 to \$2 million fine. Few arrests result in conviction, however. It is common for police to hold the arrestees for an indeterminate period and then release them without the benefit of judicial proceedings. Nonresident foreigners are deported in lieu of any judicial proceedings. [redacted]

[redacted]

Data on the number of convictions from those cases that reach the courts are unavailable, but the sentences handed down tend to be lenient. The average sentence served is four months; the average fine ranges from several hundred to several thousand dollars. The Haitian Government has been attempting to reform its judicial system, hoping to improve police-judicial cooperation and judicial procedures. [redacted]

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Besides obtaining better training for narcotics police and creating harsher drug laws, the government has made other efforts toward interdiction. It increased security at Port-au-Prince Airport, but this effort may be undercut by the easy availability of other airfields and the susceptibility of officials to corruption.

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Pakistan: Narcotics and Tribal Politics

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A military operation mounted last December against several unruly border tribes in the Pakistani-Afghan border region was widely touted in the Pakistani press as a crackdown against illicit drug trafficking, although we judge that the operation also served important political purposes for President Zia-ul-Haq. The use of more than 3,000 Army personnel to destroy the homes of tribal leaders and establish control over the main tribal villages provided a highly visible demonstration to Western aid donor nations that Zia is attempting to reduce narcotics trafficking in Pakistan. It also demonstrated Islamabad's commitment to resist efforts by the Soviet-backed regime in Kabul to strengthen its influence among Pakistan's border tribes and proved the government's ability to project force into the traditionally independent border regions. Finally, the operation provided a public display of Zia's leadership on the eve of national elections.

Islamabad's crackdown against tribes along its Western border and in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) in December disrupted some tribal drug traffickers and forced others to move their bases into Afghanistan. The effort probably will not decrease the overall amount of drugs produced, processed, or trafficked through the area, however, because the tribal growers and producers apparently had moved much of their activity across the border into Afghanistan prior to the December operations. The advent of the new civilian government on 1 January, in our view, will also make future antinarcotics operations against the border tribes more difficult.

Tribal Traditions and Narcotics

The central government has always had trouble exercising its authority in the western border regions of the country, making it exceedingly difficult to obtain local compliance with Islamabad's antinarcotics programs. Many of Islamabad's problems in maintaining control in the NWFP and the semiautonomous tribal areas south of the Khyber

Pass can be traced to the colonial-style administration Pakistan inherited from the British. Responsibility for civil administration in the main tribal areas stretching from the NWFP south to Baluchistan is shared between Islamabad and representatives of the major tribes. Even under the centralized martial law regime, Zia had difficulty extending effective control in the area. Many tribal areas remain nearly autonomous, much as they did under the British. Pitched battles between officials of the local military governor, federal administrators of tribal areas, and armed tribesmen have been increasingly common over the last 18 months.

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The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 disrupted existing drug-producing and -trafficking arrangements in the entire Golden Crescent area and exacerbated the already strained relations between the border tribes and Islamabad. Nearly 3 million Afghan refugees fled into Pakistan to escape the war; many of them had been involved in opium growing. The war, as well as shifts in Iranian narcotics production and trafficking in the early 1980s, contributed to changes in trafficking patterns that resulted in routing much of the South-West Asian opiate traffic through the Pakistani border regions, then south through Baluchistan and west into Iran.

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The war has not disrupted the hold that the Shinwari, Afridi, and other tribes of the Pushtun (Pathan) ethnic group who control much of the territory along the Afghan border have traditionally maintained over narcotics production and processing in the area. The opium trade offers substantial economic return to tribal groups, and it adapts easily to wartime conditions. drug growing and processing had replaced food production in many of the small valleys between Kabul and the Pakistani border.

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Major Narcotics Trafficking Route of the Afridi and Shinwari Tribes



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Afghan refugees based in camps in Pakistan can still return home to grow and harvest opium. Although leaders of many Afghan insurgent groups are reluctant to allow narcotics production in areas under their control, [redacted]

[redacted] the insurgents have to accept that, until they are able to establish firmer control in contested areas, farmers are forced to turn to drug growing to guarantee an adequate income. Poppy is a lucrative crop, and [redacted] combat operations in Afghanistan rarely destroy poppyfields. [redacted]

Islamabad Moves Against the Tribes

Pakistan responded to international calls in the early 1980s to limit the flow of illicit narcotics by allowing concerned foreign agencies to begin a relatively successful rural development program to induce Pakistani farmers not to grow opium. These programs, however, have not been initiated in tribal-administered regions for a number of security and political reasons. A combination of falling opium prices in local markets beginning in 1979, a system of subsidies for compliance with government regulations and penalties for continued growing, and poor weather led to a reduction in Pakistan's production of opium from a high of more than 700 metric tons in 1979 to a low of an estimated 45 metric tons in 1984, according to Embassy reports. In 1985, however, production increased to an estimated 60 to 70 tons as a result of expanded cultivation in the tribal areas along the Afghan border. [redacted]

Under international pressure to undertake additional efforts to control the flow of contraband drugs to the West, Islamabad began a program of political and military actions against Pushtun drug traffickers in the Khyber area in 1985. Embassy sources in Islamabad indicate that the local representative of Zia's martial law regime, North-West Frontier Province Governor Fazle Haq, also saw operations against the traffickers as a way to enhance his political standing. Haq, who has been governor for nearly six years, hopes to be offered a diplomatic post for his success in containing the province's narcotics problems, according to an Embassy source. [redacted]

Events Leading to December's Khyber Operations

1982	November	Islamabad sends Army to destroy tribal heroin laboratories in Landi Kotal near the Khyber Pass.	25X1
1983	Early	Members of the Pakistan Shinwari tribe relocate in Afghanistan at Kabul's invitation and quickly reestablish their heroin-processing operations.	25X1
1984	June	[redacted] report seeing many heroin laboratories in the Afghan provinces bordering Pakistan.	25X1 25X1 25X1
1985	March	Islamabad sponsors meeting of tribal leaders (jirga) to announce government crackdown on narcotics. Leader of Kukikhel clan of the Afridi tribe, Wali Khan, stages militant antigovernment demonstrations in NWFP tribal areas.	
	April	Afridi jirga rejects leadership of Wali Khan, supports government antinarcotics program.	
	September	Wali Khan supporters denounce Islamabad and Washington and praise the Soviet Union for its "support of traditional tribal prerogatives."	
	November	Islamabad convenes all-tribal jirga in NWFP, issues ultimatum to tribes involved in narcotics to surrender before December.	
	2 December	Beginning of military operations in NWFP and Khyber region. Government forces mount five-day search and sweep operation in NWFP.	
	4 December	Jirga called by Afridi leadership to denounce Wali Khan. Two hundred government troops of the Afridi tribe defect to join Wali Khan.	25X1
	7 December	Government forces attack narcotics traffickers' strongholds in Khyber Pass, numerous fatalities on both sides.	
	13 December	Governor of NWFP tells tribal jirga Wali Khan is an outlaw drug dealer, encourages others to surrender, promises leniency.	
	15 December	Majority of NWFP heroin laboratories surrender to government, Wali Khan flees to Kabul.	
	24 December	Zia announces end of operation; 100 houses destroyed, 25 laboratories smashed.	25X1
	30 December	Zia lifts martial law; elected civilian government takes over.	
		[redacted]	25X1

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Government attempts to control drug trafficking in the tribal areas culminated in the December military operations against trafficker strongholds in the Khyber Pass region. The target was Wali Khan Kukikhel, a prominent Pushtun leader of the Afridi clan and a major trafficker who had accepted Kabul's patronage. Haq's political detractors—who include the military governors of the provinces bordering the tribal zone—have charged that he overstepped his authority in destroying more than 100 homes in Afridi villages. His critics charge, further, that Haq misused the Pakistani military to rouse tribal tensions in the region to inflate the crisis, hoping to prove the need for military intervention. Concerns were also raised about the security implications. [redacted]

[redacted] Haq's actions caused other Afridi clans to rally to Wali Khan's support and led some to appeal to Kabul for support. By late December, however, most Afridi leaders had publicly repudiated Wali Khan, hoping to distance themselves from further punishment by Islamabad. According to press accounts, some local tribesmen further distanced themselves from those producing narcotics by denouncing Wali Khan and surrendering arms and drug-processing equipment to the Pakistani Government. [redacted]

We believe Haq had the blessing of President Zia to move against Wali Khan because Zia believed such an antinarcotics operation could achieve several political goals:

- Demonstrate to foreign aid donors—specifically the United States—that his regime was prepared to take a hard line on reducing the amount of Pakistani narcotics entering the West.
- Demonstrate Islamabad's ability to project central government authority in a traditionally unruly section of the country.
- Send a signal to uncommitted Pushtun tribes that Islamabad was serious about maintaining control in the contested border area and resisting Kabul's continued courting of Pakistan's tribes.
- Emphasize his leadership and authority on the eve of the transition to civilian rule. [redacted]

We judge that the impact of the campaign on tribal narcotics operations was mitigated because the major tribes involved in the trade—the Afridis and

Poppies, Opium, Smugglers in Pakistan's NWFP

Although opium poppies have been a traditional cash crop for many of the Pushtun tribes on both sides of the Pakistani-Afghan border, most of the raw opium produced in Pakistan prior to 1979 was trafficked through a series of middlemen across Afghanistan to consumers in Iran or international traffickers in Turkey. According to academic sources, the growing and harvesting of opium poppies and the marketing of opiates are traditional skills well integrated into the seminomadic tribal life of the region. [redacted]

Turkey's efforts to reduce narcotics trafficking in the late 1970s, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, and falling international prices for opiates in the early 1980s brought shifts in the traditional growing, processing, and trafficking patterns in the Golden Crescent. The disruption of conventional agriculture in the Pakistani-Afghan border area resulting from the anti-Kabul insurgency has made the economic benefits of growing and processing opium more attractive. Similarly, Soviet control of the roads linking Afghanistan and Iran has encouraged new trafficking routes for Afghan opiates into western Pakistan, then south through Baluchistan, and finally into southeastern Iran. [redacted]

Local Pushtun tribes in the Khyber region of the Pakistani-Afghan region dominate the processing and trafficking of opiates in the border. Large subclans of the Pushtun Afridi and Shinwari tribes over the last few years have taken control of the local infrastructure on both sides of the border. Afridi and Shinwari leaders dominate the smuggling apparatus to move the heroin through Pakistan to the world market or overland to transshipment points in Baluchistan and western Afghanistan for land shipment to consumers in Iran, the Middle East, and the West. [redacted]

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Shinwaris—had anticipated Islamabad's actions some time earlier and had moved much of their operations across the border. Wali Khan withdrew with his followers into Afghanistan in December after the Army destroyed his home village. We believe he has been given refuge with Afghan Afridi subclans, themselves involved in narcotics production and trafficking. Wali Khan has had close relations with the Kabul regime for several years, according to Embassy reports. The Shinwaris have moved most of their processing laboratories into a number of small valleys just across the border in areas controlled by members of Afghanistan's Shinwari tribesmen. A US journalist traveling through Nangarhar Province in Afghanistan in November was taken on a tour of active heroin laboratories. His guides told him local farmers were increasing their poppy crops because the Afghan Army does not target opium fields. [redacted]

View From Kabul

We believe that the Soviet-backed regime in Kabul supports the Afridis and related Afghan tribes regardless of their involvement in narcotics, in the hope that their activities will disrupt Pakistani security efforts in the border area. Wali Khan's son attended a Soviet-sponsored meeting of tribal leaders (*jirga*) in Kabul last summer, and his lieutenants maintain contact with Afghan Government officials. Other Afridi and Shinwari leaders, according to diplomatic reports, have aided Kabul in security operations in Afghanistan's border regions since at least the summer of 1984. Wali Khan has made statements against Pakistan and the United States on several occasions, and in late December issued a number of declarations through the Afghan press, vowing that the Afridis would resist Pakistani pressures to subdue "the traditional tribal life"—including narcotics trafficking. [redacted]

In our view, Kabul undoubtedly believed that much of the impetus behind the December military operation in Khyber was related to Pakistan's efforts to extend its control over the border region and that suppression of narcotics trafficking was secondary. The Soviet-backed regime in Kabul will continue to court Afridi and Shinwari leaders, we believe, hoping to enlist their aid against the anti-Kabul insurgents who use the same border areas to mount operations against the Afghan Communists. [redacted]

Outlook

We do not believe Islamabad's recent operations in the Khyber area will result in a major reduction in the total volume of narcotics moving out of the Golden Crescent. Not only have the major tribes involved in processing and trafficking opiates moved much of their infrastructure into Afghanistan, but diplomatic reports of late January also indicate local opium prices are rising and leading traffickers have been encouraging Pakistani farmers to resist Islamabad's antinarcotics efforts. [redacted]

As a result of the December operations, we believe new political alignments are beginning to develop in the Pakistani-Afghan border region, and that such tribal politics will continue to complicate narcotics control. Kabul and Islamabad will continue to vie for the allegiance of the semi-independent border tribes, whose leaders will demand higher stakes to guarantee their support. Inter- and intra-tribal tensions will continue as tribal groups on both sides of the border compete for shares of the lucrative narcotics trade. The presence of approximately 3 million Afghan refugees and the use of the border area by Afghan insurgents to launch attacks against Kabul will continue to complicate narcotics control efforts in the region. We believe the new civil administration in Islamabad faces a major challenge in attempting simultaneously to extend its control over the border tribes and not alienate tribal leaders who will look to Kabul for support against increased pressure from Islamabad. [redacted]

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Iran: Playing to an International Audience

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Iran regularly uses its participation in the United Nations Economic and Social Commission committee on narcotic drugs to publicize its own opium eradication campaign, criticize neighbors for laxity in drug enforcement, and lambaste the United States for implying that poppy continues to be cultivated under the current regime. Iran scored an international public relations coup in September when it hosted the 20th session of the Subcommittee on Illicit Drug Traffic and Related Matters in the Near and Middle East. Iran emerged from the meeting in the guise of a champion of regional cooperation in the war on drugs, but its proposals seem designed more to allow the Khomeini government to manipulate and control narcotics information in the region.

undoubtedly were delighted finally to play host to the group under carefully staged conditions in Tehran, far from poppy-growing areas.

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Iranian Proposals

At the meeting, the Iranians proposed projects that would further the regime's public relations and propaganda campaign on narcotics issues. Iran offered to take the lead in regional antidrug efforts by:

- Establishing a central regional laboratory for drug analysis to determine source countries of opium.
- Conducting an aerial survey of likely illicit poppy areas.

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Public Relations Coup

According to official pronouncements to international organizations, the world press, and domestic media, Iran claims to have eliminated opium cultivation shortly after the Islamic revolution. Responsibility for the country's massive drug abuse problem is laid at the feet of Afghanistan and Pakistan as narcotics source countries, with the United States depicted as stimulating the traffic from behind the scenes. The Iranian Government categorically and vehemently denies claims that Iran remains a major opium producer—as put forth in the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) report for 1984, for example.

The first proposal rests on the dubious assumption that it would be possible to identify “with a high degree of accuracy” the source country of seized opium by chemical analysis. Even if such analysis were possible, Iran today is poorly equipped to carry it out. Similarly, the Iranians have neither resources nor expertise to conduct an aerial survey of regional poppy-growing areas.

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Iranian representatives routinely invite their UN counterparts to “come and look” for the alleged cultivation in Iran as guests of the government. For the past two years, while meeting in Vienna, Iran has maintained that sessions of the drug trafficking subcommission would have more significance if they took place within the region “where problems associated with the illicit traffic could be observed and studied in their actual context.” The convening of the subcommission composed of Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, and Sweden in Tehran last year was the first time this offer was accepted. The Iranians

We judge that the Iranian initiatives proposed to the UN subcommission are calculated to enhance Tehran's control of drug information so it can be cast in terms favorable to the regime and unfavorable to its enemies. The Iranians maintain that all illicit drugs originate beyond their borders; we believe their offer to set up a laboratory to determine the country of origin of seized opium samples is a ploy to lend “scientific substantiation” to such claims. Similarly, any aerial survey conducted by the regime would undoubtedly “miss” the growing areas in Iran that are a small proportion of the country's total agricultural area—only an estimated 0.3 percent of cultivated land was planted in poppy even in the bumper opium year 1979. Alternatively, since the Iranians do not admit the possibility that any poppy is cultivated in Iran,

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their vaguely worded aerial survey proposal might be intended to provide this service for drug-producing neighbors. [redacted]

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Iranian Government reporting on narcotics has a history of distortion and bias. The Iranians told the subcommission they have spent 150 billion rials (US \$1.6 billion at the current official exchange rate) for drug suppression, treatment, and education over the past seven years—a figure we believe is vastly inflated. In an even more graphic example of Iranian distortion, the public prosecutor of the Court of the Islamic Revolution recently announced over Tehran radio that on 11 January 1986 the government had destroyed in excess of 8,000 metric tons of seized heroin. At the normal 10 to 1 conversion rate, such a quantity of heroin would have been refined from roughly 80,000 tons of opium. We estimate [redacted] that total world production of opium averages about 1,500 tons per year. Such exaggerations render Iranian narcotics data meaningless. By allowing Iran an uncritical forum for its propaganda campaign, the UN subcommission plays into the hands of the regime and helps further cloud the narcotics situation in Southwest Asia.

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Worldwide Narcotics Highlights

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South America

In December, *Colombian* President Betancur approved plans to spray 1,000 hectares of coca with the herbicide triclopyr. The decision comes after over a year of testing to determine the most effective chemicals and aerial application techniques. Spraying is to begin as soon as the chemicals arrive from the United States. If the herbicide proves effective against the hardy coca plant, the operation will mark a major advance toward eradicating Colombia's 13,000 hectares of coca. In recent years, Colombian authorities have been destroying coca by hand, an arduous and hazardous task for eradication teams who risk confrontations with guerrilla groups that are active throughout much of Colombia's coca-growing areas. The US Embassy reports that some 2,000 hectares were destroyed by hand in 1985 and predicts that a successful aerial spray operation could destroy 10,000 hectares in 1986. The destruction of Colombia's coca crop, however, will have little immediate effect on the US cocaine market. According to the Embassy, much of Colombia's coca is marketed locally as basuco—a cigarette laced with coca base—or low-quality cocaine. Colombia's international drug traffickers prefer to use better quality Bolivian or Peruvian coca in the cocaine they smuggle to the United States. Successful spraying in Colombia, however, could become an incentive for Bolivia and Peru to consider similar operations against their much larger coca crops.

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In a case that will measure *Colombia's* willingness to crack down on drug-related corruption in the judiciary, Judge Rafael Ortega Castro has been indicted for "betrayal of trust" in his investigation of the March 1984 Tranquilandia raid. Tranquilandia is the name given to the laboratory complex in the Llanos where several tons of cocaine were confiscated by the national police. Despite this record drug seizure, no major traffickers were arrested. A pilot has told US Embassy officials that the traffickers were forewarned of the raid and managed to escape the night before it occurred. About 100 laboratory guards and workers were arrested, but later released under orders from Judge Ortega. Because of these irregularities, the Supreme Tribunal in Florencia suspended Ortega in September and ordered the re-arrest of the 100 defendants—none of whom has been apprehended. According to the Embassy, judicial authorities want the maximum penalty imposed on Ortega so that his case will serve as a deterrent to other potentially corrupt judges.

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Interdiction operations off the north coast of *Colombia* are causing marijuana traffickers to withhold shipments. major traffickers, who have good intelligence on the size, location, and timing of interdiction operations, nearly ceased maritime shipments of marijuana from the north coast in early December 1985. US Coast Guard officials, citing lower levels of maritime smuggling compared to the same time last year, believe traffickers are waiting out interdiction operations scheduled to end in February. Large traffickers probably can absorb the costs involved in a temporary suspension of operations,

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but smaller traffickers with less financial cushion and fewer markets will be forced to attempt to evade interdiction units. We expect that most of the shipments seized during the current interdiction effort will continue to belong to small exporters. Meanwhile, large traffickers continue to make preparations to move marijuana north once interdiction operations end. US Coast Guard officials report that Colombian ports are full of vessels waiting to pick up marijuana from predetermined locations. [redacted] marijuana packaged for export is being stashed at sites in the mountains on the Peninsula de la Guajira. Once traffickers decide that routes are safe, this marijuana will probably be moved to the coast and loaded onto motherships bound for the United States. [redacted]

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A comprehensive narcotics bill continues to flounder in the *Bolivian* Congress, according to the US Embassy in La Paz. Draft legislation, prepared under Embassy auspices, was introduced at the end of October but has yet to make its way through various committees. The lengthy bill was designed to tighten laws on coca production and marketing first established in a May 1985 decree by the previous administration. The draft law also includes provisions for a new Ministry of Narcotics Affairs with authority over all government drug agencies. The Embassy reports, however, that the bill has only minimal support in Congress from lawmakers fearing that attempts to strengthen narcotics control laws are politically risky and possibly dangerous. Moreover, archaic debate rules are likely to stall the bill once it reaches the full Congress for consideration. Unless the bill regains its original momentum, and its detailed provisions are streamlined, chances of passage in the near future remain dim. [redacted]

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Movement of coca paste from the Yungas region along *Bolivia's* major river systems has recently increased, [redacted] Yungas coca farmers are transferring paste they produce to nearby rivers for transportation to the Puerto Sucre and Guayaramerin areas near the Brazilian frontier for export or refining. Corrupt police officials reportedly are taking bribes to allow coca paste to be transported from the growing areas to the headwaters of the Beni and Mamore river systems. [redacted] increased trafficking in the Yungas may be an effect of expanded police presence in the Chapare, *Bolivia's* largest coca-producing region where the government is trying to mount eradication and interdiction operations. [redacted]

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Peruvian authorities maintained pressure on drug traffickers during November and December with Condor III—an operation to disrupt the flow of coca base and paste from the Upper Huallaga Valley to cocaine-conversion laboratories in northern Peru and southern Colombia. As initially planned, the Guardia Civil—the agency responsible for controlling drug production and movement in Peru—was to support expanded coca eradication operations near Uchiza and cooperate with the Air Force in destroying airstrips used by drug traffickers in the Upper Huallaga. The coca eradication phase of the operation was postponed because of insufficient protection for the eradication teams, but the rest of the operation went smoothly, according to US Embassy reports. Operating under the cover of Air Force helicopters, Guardia Civil personnel reportedly set off dynamite charges that severely cratered 36 airstrips in the area. The operation was important

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because it struck a key trafficking center and demonstrated that police and military units could work together, but it probably set back trafficking only temporarily. In our judgment, authorities almost certainly were bribed to avoid destroying some airstrips during the operation, and we know from similar operations elsewhere that cratered airstrips can be repaired easily and put back into service quickly. Moreover, we have no evidence that processing centers in northern Peru or southern Colombia are experiencing a shortage of coca base or paste, and indeed believe large shipments of these drugs continue to arrive by air.

[redacted]

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The 6 December order by the Government of *Peru* lifting the State of Emergency in the Upper Huallaga Valley will have mixed effects on narcotics control in this important coca-producing area. Imposed in the summer of 1984 to quell growing violence attributed to Sendero Luminoso terrorists, the State of Emergency suspended nearly all constitutional guarantees and conferred full political control of the area on the armed forces. [redacted] the military commanders—who did not view themselves as drug enforcers—impeded narcotics control by not authorizing coca eradication operations and frequently diverting police resources to terrorism. Lifting the State of Emergency has returned narcotics control to civilian authorities, enabling the police to plan and execute their own coca eradication and interdiction operations. This should result in more consistent drug enforcement efforts in the valley. It has already given rise, however, to increased drug-related violence that may stymie these operations. The Embassy and media report that the mayor of Aucayacu, where a USAID coca substitution program is headquartered, was murdered by drug traffickers in early December, and, in Uchiza, rival trafficking organizations are waging a war that claimed 24 lives in January. The military remains stationed in the Upper Huallaga to support antiterrorism operations in neighboring areas and could be used to restore order if the violence becomes too much for the police to handle. [redacted]

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A *Peru-Ecuador* antinarcotics operation in planning since the Foreign Ministers of the two countries met last October was canceled in late January, according to the US Embassy in Lima. The operation probably would have been similar to the ones conducted by Colombia and Peru and Colombia and Ecuador last summer. We suspect authorities were planning to share intelligence and equipment to strike drug-processing centers located between the Rio Putumayo and Rio Santiago along the Peruvian-Ecuadorean border and interdict drugs and processing chemicals smuggled through this area. According to the Embassy, the operation was canceled following publicity given it by Peruvian Interior Vice Minister Mantilla. Although Ecuador's President Febres-Cordero strongly supports a joint operation with Peru, he has reservations about holding paramilitary operations in this area. This stretch of the border has long been contested by Peru and Ecuador, and Febres-Cordero told the US Ambassador in Quito that a less sensitive area should be targeted. He also said Ecuador's military could have problems participating in an operation proposed by the police. The plan probably will be resurrected once the two countries work out their differences, but it almost certainly will avoid attacking important trafficking sites in areas that are politically sensitive to both countries. [redacted]

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The US Embassy reports that President Febres-Cordero plans to reassign enforcement responsibilities among *Ecuador's* narcotics agencies in an effort to improve drug control in 1986. Under the presidential plan, the National Directorate Against Narcotics (DINACTIE) will be stripped of its drug enforcement responsibilities and its long-time bureaucratic rival, the National Police, will be given the leading role in drug control. This decision apparently was made after evidence revealed that mismanagement and corruption persisted in DINACTIE even after President Febres-Cordero reshuffled its top leadership last summer and put the agency under his direct control. [redacted]

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[redacted] The National Police has a cleaner reputation than DINACTIE. It currently has some 500 men out of its total strength of 15,000 assigned to coca eradication and drug interdiction. Once it begins taking over the investigation of drug cases, however, its officers may find traffickers' bribes as difficult to resist as did the DINACTIE investigators before them. [redacted]

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Mexico

The recent decline in oil prices will almost certainly have an adverse impact upon narcotics control in Mexico. The annual revenue loss caused by lower prices may be as much as \$3.3 billion by some estimates. The chances for a needed increase in funding for antidrug programs are remote, and, in a worst case scenario, a cutback is possible. At the same time, anticipated cuts in social programs and a further erosion of employment opportunities in legitimate sectors of the economy are certain to preclude a shift by members of the drug industry into licit activities. Moreover, a greater number of subsistence farmers and other marginal elements of the economy will be attracted to the more lucrative drug trade, thus providing a plentiful supply of cheap labor for traffickers and growers. [redacted]

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The Mexican Government has taken a positive step toward better drug control. According to the US Embassy in Mexico City, the Mexican Government is scheduled to begin a US-funded aerial survey of poppy cultivation. Flights will stage out of Culiacan and Chilpancingo and will cover approximately 7,250 square kilometers in the key northern tristate growing area and some 5,440 square kilometers in the southern growing region. Information from the survey should provide reliable information on the number and locations of poppyfields, thus allowing more effective planning and execution of eradication missions. [redacted]

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As the Mexican Government continues to struggle with opium production, the marijuana and cocaine sectors of the drug trade continue to prosper:

- Reports of widespread marijuana cultivation continue to surface. [redacted] [redacted] marijuana is being grown in at least three locations in the south and central areas of the state of Chiapas. [redacted] [redacted] In December 1985, [redacted] some 70 hectares of marijuana were being cultivated near the town of Ciudad Obregon, in the state of Sonora. The marijuana was planted in plots surrounded by corn.

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[redacted] this is the first report of large-scale production in Chiapas. Colombia's major marijuana-growing area has recently been taken out of production by eradication, and we believe Mexico could compete with Colombia as the biggest source of marijuana entering the United States. [redacted] 25X1

- [redacted] cocaine traffickers are reportedly hiring private planes to transport cocaine from Colombia to Mexico. Once in Mexico, the cocaine is shipped by truck or car to the United States. As interdiction in the busier Caribbean straits improves, Mexico is likely to become a more frequently used cocaine transshipment point. [redacted] 25X1

Caribbean

Jamaica, a major marijuana exporter to the United States, made significant progress against the illicit crop in 1985. Analysis of aerial surveys flown in the spring and fall showed that 1985 cultivation was at about the same level as 1984. Prime Minister Seaga has stepped up the eradication and interdiction programs, however, and reduced the amount of marijuana harvested and exported from the 1985 crop to about 900 tons, down from an estimated 1,750 tons in 1984. Further progress in controlling Jamaica's marijuana production depends on how long the effectiveness of the eradication work force can be sustained and on the ability of Jamaican security forces to counter increasingly sophisticated air and maritime trafficking schemes. [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] 25X1

[redacted] **Costa Rican** narcotics traffickers are now involved in synthetic drug production. [redacted] 25X1
amphetamines and/or methaqualone tablets are manufactured in a clandestine lab in Costa Rica. [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] 25X1

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[redacted] the *Cayman Islands* are a major transition area for cocaine bound for the US market. [redacted]

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[redacted] The Cayman Islands are ideally located for drug transshipment from South America to the southeastern United States, but, until recently, have usually escaped US drug enforcement scrutiny. [redacted]

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Southeast Asia

In the continuing battle between rival trafficking groups, the Shan United Army (SUA) has reoccupied most of the territory near Loi Htwe on the *Thai-Burmese* border lost to the Thai Army during a raid last November. According to Embassy reporting, the SUA has mined the area around its strongholds to make it less accessible to the Thai Army or the Chinese Irregular Force (CIF), its main enemy in the current border conflict. Some officers in the Thai Army had hoped the CIF, which it supports in the current fighting, would take over the positions captured from the SUA. When the Thai pulled out, however, CIF hesitation allowed the SUA to retake its fortifications. We judge the CIF leadership believed it would be unable to hold the positions against an SUA counterattack. Although fighting has died down over the last several weeks, we expect the two sides to clash again when large opium caravans begin to move south before the rainy season. [redacted]

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A mobile heroin refinery was operating in the Sadao district of southern *Thailand* during November 1985, [redacted]

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[redacted] The refinery, allegedly protected by Malaysian Communists, was converting raw opium to heroin base. Laboratories have long been suspected to exist in southern Thailand, a traditional trafficking route for Golden Triangle opiates destined for Malaysian and European markets. Malaysian and Thai Communists operate along the border—much of which is not under either government's control. In addition, traffickers in the area have ready access to processing chemicals, notably acetic anhydride, which is smuggled illicitly into Malaysia in great quantity. Traffickers may be relocating their refining laboratories to the Thai-Malaysian border as a result of increased competition and enforcement in northern Thailand. [redacted]

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Burma and *Thailand* have completed their eradication operations for the 1985/86 opium season. The US-supported Burmese aerial eradication spray campaign began in late December in Kutkai and Hsenwi townships in the northern Shan State, areas in which the Burmese Communist Party operates. As of 22 January, the last day of spraying in the north, Burmese officials were claiming the operation had destroyed about 5,800 hectares of opium poppy. Burma had an estimated 71,000 hectares planted to poppy in the 1984/85 season. [redacted]

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[redacted] Spraying is to be continued farther south in the Shan State but, in our judgment, will have little impact because most of it has been harvested already. This year's program was regarded

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as a learning experience by the Burmese, and operations were restricted to areas outside the direct control of insurgent groups. If the Burmese Government remains committed to the program and expands operations east of the Salween River where cultivation is the most intense, it may be able to reduce the supplies of raw narcotics moving south to the refineries on the Thai-Burmese border. The Thai Army is in the final stages of its manual eradication campaign with a stated goal of 4,000 hectares; Thai farmers planted an estimated 9,600 hectares in poppy last season.

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Some officials fear that continued widespread eradication may drive some hill-tribe growers to relocate in Burma.

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Excellent weather and expanded planting in *Burma* will likely result in a bumper opium crop in the Golden Triangle this year, despite stepped-up eradication programs by the Thai and Burmese Governments.

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted] cultivation in Burma is up 10 to 15 percent over last year. Rising prices due to last year's drought and expected losses due to interdiction have spurred farmers to plant more poppy.

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The Thai Office of Narcotics Control Board currently estimates that cultivation in *Thailand* is about 30 percent lower as a result of last year's eradication program and the heavily publicized threats of eradication this year. During field observations in Thailand in January, the crop appeared unusually vigorous, and yields are likely to be high enough to outweigh the effect of reduced cultivation. Current eradication efforts will partly offset the higher yields in both countries but not enough to prevent this crop from being much larger than last year's drought-stricken one. In our judgment, if the harvests are not impeded by rain and if planting levels in Laos are on a par with last year, the opium crop in the Golden Triangle may exceed 950 tons.

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[Large Redacted Block]

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East Asia

Previous unsuccessful *Australian* entreaties to UN officials to be designated a traditional producer—which would enable it to capture a larger percentage of the lucrative US narcotic raw material market—may prompt Australia to alter strategies and call for the elimination of the traditional producer status accorded to India and Turkey during the February CND meeting in Vienna. Currently, US manufacturers are required to purchase 80 percent of all their narcotic raw material from India and Turkey with the remaining 20 percent divided between Australia and other licit opium poppy-producing countries. Johnson & Johnson's affiliation with Australia's Tasmanian Alkaloid company in 1982, however, guaranteed Australian access to the lion's share of US business after India and Turkey. A declining world demand for concentrated poppy straw, because it does not contain thebaine and noscapine, manufacturer-preferred alkaloids found in opium, threatens Australia's market position. An Australian-initiated resolution to abolish traditional producer status would most likely receive support from Spain, France, Holland, Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Poland—all licit poppy-producing countries. Spain's poppy industry in particular—which possesses tremendous production capabilities—would be in a position to take advantage of an open market. The volatility of this issue and the potential political fall out—which Turkey's recent public campaign condemning the United States for failure to fulfill narcotics commitments exemplifies—suggests that it will be difficult to achieve a consensus in the short term. Withdrawal of US support for the traditional producer concept would most likely be viewed as favoring US business interests given previous US attempts to elicit support for American cultivation of bracteatum—a strain of poppy that is difficult to convert for illegal purposes.

[redacted]

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Southwest Asia

At a recent Interpol conference, President Zia of *Pakistan* spoke strongly in favor of the death sentence for drug traffickers. According to a report in the government-owned *Pakistan Times*, Zia also stressed the need for "stringent punishment" of drug traffickers in the United States, where the judicial system is "too lenient" and "jails are as comfortable as four-star hotels." Zia's comments reflect the perception among narcotics-producing countries that, in order for them to reduce illicit production, the West must reduce its drug consumption. They also reflect Zia's efforts to shift the burden of responsibility to others and direct attention away from Pakistan's own inadequate enforcement. A recent report by a Muslim organization took his government to task for failing to trace and punish the "big fish" involved in manufacturing and trafficking in Pakistan. This report also challenged the general inefficiency of the Pakistan Government's narcotics control agencies. [redacted]

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There has been a recent surge of official pronouncements against drug abuse in *Pakistan*:

- At the US-supported National Conference of Non-Government Organizations on the Prevention of Drug Abuse in early January, First Lady Begum Zia-ul-Haq called for sections of society to join with the government to fight drug abuse. An editorialist commenting on the conference proclaimed that "it is high time that an all-out *jihad* should be started against drug addiction that has been eating into the vitals of our society."

- At the 16th Conference of Islamic Foreign Ministers in early January, Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Sahabzada Yaqub Khan, announced that Pakistan had joined Malaysia and Saudi Arabia in evolving a decision that envisaged cooperation among Muslim countries to control the problems of narcotics abuse and trafficking.
- At the inauguration of the Third Interpol Conference of Heads of National Drug Control Services in the Gulf area in mid-January, President Mohammed Zia-ul-Haq said Pakistan's commitment for the eradication of drug abuse not only within the country but also outside its frontiers is total and unqualified. Zia suggested the formation of a cooperative council of the heads of national drug control services to adopt tactical measures against narcotics and to review the progress periodically. He also suggested an exchange of information through a centralized communications network to provide information about drug traffickers.

Zia and other Pakistani Government officials are probably sincere in wanting to cut down on increasing drug use in Pakistan, but have a limited ability to implement recent pronouncements. The government is constrained by widespread corruption and limited control in poppy-growing areas, all of which make it difficult for Pakistan to reduce domestic drug use. We believe Zia is also taking political advantage of the narcotics problem by associating himself with popular antidrug programs, an effort he knows will not be lost on Pakistan's Western supporters or his domestic audience. [redacted]

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The *Indian* Directorate of Revenue Intelligence made one of the largest narcotics seizures on record near Bombay in early January. In all, 4.6 metric tons of hashish and 604 kilograms of heroin were found concealed under haystacks. This seizure, as well as the seizure in early January of 2.95 tons of hashish at the Bombay docks, point to an increase in drug trafficking through Bombay. According to the *Times of India*, Ethiopians and Nigerians are acting as couriers to distribute the drugs. Nigeria has a significant Indian population. We believe that those Indians involved in drug trafficking establish ties to Nigerians to organize new networks to transport the drugs to the West. [redacted]

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Middle East

Opium poppy cultivation is increasing in the Al Biqa (Bekaa Valley) in *Lebanon*—traditionally a hashish-producing area—[redacted]
The increase in poppy acreage and the shift from hashish is attributed to opium's greater profits. [redacted]

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Europe

French authorities recently expressed concern that Guadeloupe, Martinique, and French Guiana were becoming important transit points for cocaine destined for Europe, according to US Embassy reporting. Their proximity to growing regions in South America and their political relationship with France make all three ideal transfer centers for cocaine traffickers bound for Europe. There are daily flights to the islands from Bogota, Caracas, Lima, and Quito, and, because the islands are

political departments of France, daily flights also provide direct connections to Paris. There are also daily flights to Frankfurt, Amsterdam, and London. French authorities—currently investigating major cocaine distribution networks—note that 11 seizures in Martinique and Guadeloupe in 1985 netted more than 20 kilograms of cocaine. [redacted]

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International police cooperation has enabled European authorities to crack two more international heroin trafficking networks. In both cases, the success of the efforts has been attributed to close cooperation by enforcement authorities:

- Narcotics agents staged simultaneous raids on 14 January in *France, Italy*, and the United States, arresting 17 suspected important heroin traffickers and financiers. The drug ring had been operating between Sicily, Marseille, and the US east coast. Among the six men taken into custody in Marseille was Mario Piazza, whose late father, Pietro, was a key figure in Marseille’s famous “French Connection” in the 1960s.
- Narcotics authorities in *West Germany, Spain*, and Thailand, collaborating with *Danish* and *Swiss* drug investigators, crushed a major heroin trafficking ring in December 1985 by arresting 23 Spaniards and recovering 7.5 kilograms of high-grade heroin. The heroin trading organization had been smuggling heroin from Thailand to Spain via West Germany for a long time, [redacted]
[redacted] Five of the suspected traffickers caught in Madrid were members of a gang led by Juan Jimenez who is reported to be head of one of the most notorious drug trafficking organizations in Europe. [redacted]

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The *United Kingdom*, in an effort to control the influx of cocaine, is assigning a customs official as British Regional Narcotics Coordinator to the Andean Region, according to US Embassy reporting. Based in Lima, the coordinator will be accredited to the Governments of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. Some other European countries already have representatives in South America in support of antinarcotics efforts. West Germany has narcotics liaison officers in Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, and Peru; France in Bolivia and Ecuador; and Denmark in Peru. [redacted]

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Africa

Sub-Saharan Africa’s escalating involvement in illicit narcotics activities is a topic of growing concern among high-level US and European officials:

- Heightened drug trafficking via Africa to European destinations—attributed to the relatively free movement of Africans throughout Europe and the lucrative nature of the smuggling business—poses the greatest threat to French drug enforcement efforts in the coming decade, [redacted]
[redacted] Another concern is the diversion of legal European-exported pharmaceuticals to Africa’s black market. French officials maintain that US training and resources are needed to combat the African drug trade, particularly in West Africa’s anglophone countries.

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- US offers to conduct regional narcotics training programs to control international narcotics transshipments through *Kenya* and the accompanying threat of drug abuse received the tentative endorsement of senior Kenyan Government officials. Kenyan enforcement officers—normally reluctant to admit a narcotics problem even exists—disagreed with the US emphasis on regional cooperation and training. Controlling cross-border movement of illicit drugs is often hampered by animosity and mistrust between neighboring countries, particularly *Somalia* and Kenya, and between Kenya's customs and police departments.
- UN recognition of Africa's mounting drug problems prompted a recent UN Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC) mission to *Senegal, Benin, Nigeria, Congo, Zaire, and Madagascar*. According to US officials in Vienna, the transshipment of cocaine, marijuana, and psychotropics—a continentwide phenomenon—is facilitated by the absence of border control and inefficient and often corrupt enforcement officers. Nigeria, in particular, supports a well-established drug operation and appears to have a significant drug abuse problem.

[redacted]

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The arrest of four *Mauritian* parliamentarians in the Netherlands for drug smuggling incited calls by the opposition for the resignation of the Jugnauth government. The incident exemplifies the difficulties of controlling Africa's escalating drug problem when political elites appear to be, at the very least, providing tacit approval for illicit drug activities. Although Prime Minister Jugnauth appears to have averted a political crisis, the fallout from the drug scandal places the opposition in a stronger position to call for an early general election. [redacted]

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