



Director
Central
Intelligence

Secret

25X1

African Famine: Short-Term Prospects, Problems, and Opportunities

**Special National Intelligence Estimate
Memorandum to Holders**

Secret

*SNIE 70-84
November 1985*

Copy **440**

Page Denied

SECRET

25X1

**MEMORANDUM TO HOLDERS
OF SNIE 70-84:**

**AFRICAN FAMINE:
SHORT-TERM PROSPECTS,
PROBLEMS, AND OPPORTUNITIES**

Information available as of 31 October 1985 was used in the preparation of this Memorandum, which was approved by the National Foreign Intelligence Board on that date.

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the Estimate:

The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and the Treasury.

Also Participating:

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army


The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps

SECRET

SECRET



25X1

CONTENTS

| | <i>Page</i> |
|---|-------------|
| SCOPE NOTE | 1 |
| KEY JUDGMENTS | 3 |
| DISCUSSION | 7 |
| Constraints on Delivery of Emergency Assistance..... | 7 |
| Donor Country Constraints..... | 7 |
| Recipient Country Constraints | 8 |
| Positive Factors Affecting Outlook..... | 10 |
| Food Outlook—1986 | 10 |
| Role of the Soviet Union | 13 |
| Implications for the United States and the West | 13 |
| ANNEX A: The Refugee Crisis..... | 15 |




25X1


SECRET



25X1

SCOPE NOTE

A Special National Intelligence Estimate published in December 1984 (SNIE 70-84, *African Famine: Short-Term Prospects, Problems, and Opportunities*) assessed the magnitude of the critical food situation throughout Africa and analyzed pressures and demands arising from the famine that were likely to face the United States and other Western donor nations during 1985. This Memorandum to Holders focuses on the results of the 1985 relief effort and the outlook for 1986, assessing the likely changes in the food situation, the number of people at risk, external assistance required, and the constraints to effective help. A number of key countries—Ethiopia, Sudan, Chad, Niger, Mali, and Mozambique—receive particular attention. 




25X1

25X1

SECRET

25X1

Figure 1
Countries of Sub-Saharan Africa With Food Emergencies



706242 10-85

25X1

SECRET

25X1

KEY JUDGMENTS

Despite the break in the drought this year, Africa will still need substantial amounts of emergency assistance in 1986. The United States will again be expected to provide the bulk of the relief aid. On the eve of a cycle of African harvests, famine and related illnesses still threaten as many as 24 million people in six of the seven countries identified in SNIE 70-84 last December as seriously affected by drought and famine.¹ Although the at-risk population will decline—possibly as much as 50 percent—as a result of good rains and expected improved harvests in several countries, we believe that the affected population will still require emergency relief and developmental aid throughout 1986:

- Adequate rainfall in most countries of the Sahel and the Horn of Africa this spring permitted planting, but low seed stocks, loss of draft animals, dislocation, and the malnourished and weakened condition of farmers reduced the acreage planted; below-normal harvests still are expected in many countries.
- Where good harvests occur, such as in Sudan, there will be pockets of severe hunger resulting from regional deficit rainfall, shortage or absence of planting materials, limited cash income, infrastructural defects, and in some countries government policies that impede effective food distribution.
- African agriculture will continue to be affected by problems of disease, pests, poor soil, ineffective farming techniques, and misguided government policies that prevent adequate food production even in nondrought years. 25X1

Relief efforts will continue to be impeded by:

- Inefficient or counterproductive host-government policies. Many African countries lack the trained personnel to manage food relief efforts or suffer from pervasive public and private corruption. Some governments place more importance on placating their urban constituencies than on feeding often remote and politically less important rural populations.
- Insurgencies and civil wars that prevent government and relief agencies from reaching many of the drought-stricken areas. 25X1

¹ SNIE 70-84 estimated that 14-20 million people were at risk as a result of the African food crisis, most of them in Ethiopia, Chad, Mali, Niger, Kenya, Sudan, and Mozambique. Subsequent information has resulted in an increase in the estimate of the at-risk population 25X1

SECRET

25X1

These insurgency problems are particularly acute in Ethiopia, Sudan, Chad, Angola, Uganda, and Mozambique.

- Inadequate infrastructures and transportation networks. Poor ground transportation and inefficient port operations persist in several of the food-poor countries despite donor efforts to provide trucks, repair roads and bridges, upgrade rail lines, and enhance port equipment. Such improvements that have been made are highly contingent on continued donor support. Expensive airlift and airdrop operations were necessary to reach some hard-hit areas this year, and may again be needed. [redacted]

25X1

Inadequate coordination of the relief effort both at the international level and within countries still plagues the efficient delivery of relief goods. Although UN agencies and donor countries have achieved a high degree of cooperation relative to similar emergencies in the past, congestion and gaps in the internationally managed food and nonfood supply lines still occur. Jurisdictional problems among UN agencies— such as disputes as to which agency will organize a trucking fleet in Ethiopia—impede expeditious relief distribution within countries. [redacted]

25X1

Charges of corruption and ineptitude have increased tensions between donors and host governments. To alleviate misunderstandings, and take advantage of expertise, the United States and other Western donors have turned over some distribution and monitoring chores to international and private voluntary organizations. Relations between these entities and recipient governments are often better than those of donor countries, but even these organizations are subject to significant constraints, such as the inability to travel to impacted areas and monitor deliveries. [redacted]

25X1

25X1


Ethiopia continues to subordinate its humanitarian needs to its political priorities, greatly complicating donors' relief efforts. Difficult relations between Western donors and the Mengistu regime persist, even after a year of intense relief efforts and the donation of nearly 1 million metric tons of food and millions of dollars of nonfood aid. The regime is suspicious of Western donors, especially of the United States, and has sought to gain control of the relief operation by limiting the number of Western relief workers and denying them free passage to all parts of the country. The regime's emphasis on the collectivization of agriculture and the institution of state farms has reduced support for peasant farmers and has impeded efforts to develop food self-sufficiency. In the past year, Ethiopia's coercive resettlement program received higher priority for transportation and government food distribution than did emergency feeding efforts for rural areas. Finally, the civil war in the northern provinces has impeded implementation of donor feeding programs for the north. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

SECRET



25X1


Western donors work closely with the office of the UN Assistant Secretary General in Addis Ababa to coordinate relief with the government. There has been marginal improvement in some transportation and access problems and in putting a stop to earlier abuses, such as the precipitate closing of feeding stations without regard for the welfare of beneficiaries. However, in the face of regime foot-dragging and suspicion, the United States and other Western donors will continue to have difficulty delivering humanitarian assistance in 1986.



25X1

25X1

The Soviet Union is unlikely to devote substantial resources to famine relief in 1986. Moscow's tightfisted relief policy has not changed appreciably during the past year. The Soviets insist they bear no responsibility for food shortages that are the result of Western exploitation. Negative publicity during the year, however, did spark some response to the crisis in Ethiopia, where Moscow supplied some transport assistance and small amounts of food. If the survival of a client regime were endangered, Moscow would probably provide far more by way of military and security aid than emergency food assistance, as has been the case in Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique.




25X1

25X1

The need of several African governments for continuing emergency food support will of course place continuing demands and pressures on the United States. Implications of this shortfall include the following:

- African states will again expect—and will exert pressure on—the United States to continue to provide the bulk of such foodstuffs. In addition, African governments will ask the United States and the West for increased and accelerated development aid to address fundamental food production problems.
- The United States and other Western donors may have difficulty mobilizing public opinion and legislative support for another major feeding effort. Given the fact that the drought has broken in large areas of Africa, Western public attention may focus more closely on African government malfeasance and nonfeasance as major causes for the continuing food shortfall.
- Despite US and Western pressures, African governments for the most part will continue to resist structural reforms needed to increase agricultural production. This will increase tensions in bilateral relations. Those few governments that do undertake reforms will expect significant rewards from the West in terms of increased assistance.
- The African refugee problem has not significantly abated and is likely to increase in 1986. This will cause new domestic tensions in states hosting large refugee populations. New demands on the United States and the West for increased refugee assistance can be expected.



25X1

25X1

SECRET

25X1

Agricultural reform is the most important prerequisite for increased food production over the long term. To feed their populations, African governments need to raise farm prices and strengthen market mechanisms, improve water conservation schemes, increase availability of farm inputs, and restructure economic priorities in favor of food producers and away from urban populations. Western donors and international organizations have been seeking such changes, but what small progress has been achieved was overwhelmed by the food emergency. Increased donor efforts to affect agricultural policy reform are likely to be undermined in the next few years by continuing emergency conditions. Unless progress is made, subsequent African food emergencies will be even more devastating and require even larger amounts of international assistance.

25X1

FOR 5-82
(c)

SECRET

25X1

DISCUSSION

1. On the eve of a cycle of African harvests, famine and related illnesses still threaten as many as 24 million people in six of the seven African countries identified last December as seriously affected by drought and famine in SNIE 70-84, *African Famine: Short-Term Prospects, Problems, and Opportunities*.

Although the at-risk population will decline—possibly as much as 50 percent—as a result of good rains and expected improved harvests in several countries, we believe that the affected population will still require emergency relief and developmental aid throughout 1986.² (See figure 1, page 2.) The affected populations in Ethiopia and Sudan have grown in the last 10 months, with 8-9 million persons at risk in each country. Fragile situations still exist in Niger, with 3.5 million persons at risk; in Mozambique, with 2 million; and in Chad and Mali, with 1 million each.³ Only Kenya, after a skillfully managed 18-month-long relief program, has food supplies at normal levels and an excellent crop forecast for this year.

2. The need for foreign food donations will remain high and could fluctuate significantly, depending on rain patterns and actual harvests; 1.3-2.7 million metric tons of food supplies will be required. Transport bottlenecks, weak and inadequate government infra-

² Estimates of the "at-risk" population are at best approximations. The figures used here are estimated by the United Nations or by US AID and are those most often used by international agencies and large donor countries. The need to have some reasonable basis on which to plan emergency relief forces the use of these estimates, but they are only indicators of the magnitude of the crisis and are not exact. Even in the best of circumstances, population figures are notoriously inconsistent and incomplete. Adequate data collection and processing do not exist in many countries, and they are often deliberately manipulated by local governments for political purposes. The estimation of subgroups—that proportion at risk of starvation—from a statistically imprecise national total population number, especially in areas where government involvement is weak, nonexistent, or where insurgencies are occurring, is particularly difficult.

³ In addition to the six countries mentioned above, in August 1985 the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) warned that the following countries are also affected by abnormal food shortages for which external assistance will be required: Angola, Botswana, Burkina, Cape Verde, The Gambia, Mauritania, Senegal, and Somalia. These food shortfalls reflect crop failures, interruption of imports, disruption of distribution, and/or an increased demand arising from population movements within the country or an influx of refugees.

structures, and political turmoil resulting from guerrilla insurgencies will continue to impede the flow of food to remote areas.

3. Africa's food crisis endures despite the massive international relief effort launched last year. Over 75 percent of all donor cereal food aid pledges were delivered to 19 Sub-Saharan nations by mid-1985. Since the UN donors' conference last March, \$1.5 billion has been raised or pledged by Western donors for the African emergency, including 6.7 million tons of food for emergency and developmental aid. Virtually all food aid is being provided by North America, Western Europe, Australia, and Japan. The United States is supplying approximately half, 3.1 million tons, of which 60 percent is for emergency food programs implemented directly with host-country governments or through private voluntary and international organizations.

Constraints on Delivery of Emergency Assistance

Donor Country Constraints

4. Donor countries and agencies have confronted a myriad of problems in delivering food supplies to affected areas. Difficult relations with recipient countries have on occasion impeded the delivery of food assistance. Relations between Ethiopia and Western donors—particularly the United States—are often adversarial, and US officials' insufficient access to Ethiopian authorities has at times affected the delivery of US emergency assistance.

5. Sudanese officials have been cooperative, but conditions for donors are difficult. Sudan's coup in April, coming in the critical pre-rainy-season period when large food shipments were entering the country, impeded donors' access to officials responsible for famine relief and slowed food pre-positioning and distribution to the west. The result is an inefficient and uncoordinated partnership between Western donors and the Sudanese transitional government.

6. Western assistance to some countries is also constrained by perceptions of malfeasance or nonfeasance in the administration of assistance by the recipients. Western publics and legislatures have more closely

SECRET

25X1

scrutinized the domestic policies of some recipient governments, which have been accused of corruption and human rights abuses. Such concerns, for example, gave rise to the Solarz Amendment in the United States requiring a Presidential determination that the Mengistu regime was not practicing a deliberate policy of starvation of portions of the population. In addition, famine-hit countries are almost all among the least developed countries and thus suffer from major economic problems aside from the food emergency, which create difficulties—such as nonrepayment of loans—with Western institutions and governments. These problems have in some cases triggered donor actions curtailing economic aid (such as the cutoff of IMF standby loans to Sudan) or limiting bilateral assistance (the Brooke Amendment).

7. After nearly a year of grappling with the crisis, donors continue to face difficult coordination problems both outside the countries and within them. International coordination is vested in UN agencies, led by the UN Office of Emergency Operations for Africa (OEOA), a new temporary office created by the UN Secretary General to manage this crisis. While the OEOA has been able to serve as a clearinghouse for some donor problems, UN agencies involved in the crisis are not subordinate to OEOA, creating jurisdictional disputes. The results are both congestion and gaps in the internationally managed food and nonfood supply lines.

8. Although there has been skirmishing over jurisdiction, UN agencies and international and private voluntary organizations have been valuable partners for Western donors. They provide the means to give aid without government-to-government agreements that could founder on policy and ideological differences between donor and recipient countries. The United States has found it effective, in some instances, to funnel its assistance through organizations whose relationship with the host government is often better than that of the US Government. This has been done in Mozambique through the UN World Food Program, in Angola through the International Committee of the Red Cross, and in Ethiopia, where the bulk of US relief aid is channeled through some of the more than 50 international and private voluntary organizations managing relief efforts there. Even these organizations, however, are subject to significant constraints, such as the inability to travel to impacted areas and monitor deliveries.

9. Some major coordination problems have developed within the recipient countries, usually as a result of bureaucratic inefficiencies there. Charges of cor-

ruption and ineptitude cloud working relations between donors and governments and complicate the relief effort. In Ethiopia, government intransigence is blamed for delays in moving goods out of the ports and warehouses. A plan for private voluntary organizations and donor countries to provide a trucking fleet managed by the UN to overcome serious transportation problems is the subject of controversy between various UN agencies, Addis Ababa, and donors—even though all agree it is necessary to enlarge the truck fleet and organize it for food deliveries. Nevertheless, one of the early lessons donors recognized during this crisis was the importance of keeping host-country top management informed and involved in the execution of relief programs. Despite less than optimal coordination, donors have insisted on host involvement and helped upgrade crisis management techniques in order to avert blatant obstructions and delays.

10. During the next year, donor countries may face an additional constraint if premature predictions that the food emergency has ended take the edge off the sense of urgency that has gripped the West. Although emergency aid will still be needed in Sudan, Ethiopia, Niger, Mozambique, Chad, Mali, and at least eight other African countries, the drama of starving people played out in the international media may be absent. Appeals to the public and governments are likely to receive a less enthusiastic response if it appears people are recovering and conditions are conducive to successful agricultural operations.

Recipient Country Constraints

11. International relief efforts have been made more difficult by conditions within the host countries:

— The governments of famine-stricken areas are often unable or unwilling to give relief efforts priority over other domestic concerns or to change government policies that impede food deliveries. Many African regimes, for example, depend upon the support of urban populations for their political survival, and are sometimes less interested in expediting shipments of food to rural, politically less important areas.

— Insurgencies and civil wars in Sudan, Ethiopia, Chad, Angola, Uganda, and Mozambique have further hampered relief and rehabilitation efforts, and there is little prospect for a reduction in insurgent activity in these countries. Governments that lack control of these areas are unable to distribute food to affected populations and cannot guarantee the welfare of relief workers

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

SECRET

25X1

who travel to contested regions. In addition, some African regimes want to manipulate relief efforts to gain the support of previously hostile population groups and thus restrict the insurgents' area of operations. The insurgents themselves sometimes cut transportation lines to prevent government reinforcements from reaching contested areas, thereby also impeding the delivery of needed supplies.

— Infrastructural deficiencies and bureaucratic inefficiencies affect all the impacted countries. Many African governments suffer from corrupt or undermanned bureaucracies or inadequately trained officials. Some landlocked countries have to depend on their neighbors' ports for delivery of goods, and their needs are sometimes assigned a lower priority at already overextended port facilities. Road and train networks are inadequate to support the increase necessary to distribute emergency food and developmental assistance.

12. Transportation and logistic bottlenecks have been major constraints on the timely distribution of food, particularly in landlocked Mali, Niger, and Chad. Mali's forced dependence on distant ports in Togo, Ivory Coast, and Senegal and its rudimentary internal transportation system slowed food deliveries, particularly in the drought-stricken northern and eastern regions. Administrative difficulties, due in large part to the small cadre of Malian managers available for relief activities, complicated donor efforts to program food arrivals and distribution efficiently. In Niger, incompetence, corruption, and poor planning plagued the food distribution system during the first half of 1985. As a result of donor pressure the government has markedly improved the system, and, although a smoother movement of food through ports in Benin and Nigeria has brought more food into the country, serious internal transport deficiencies and the paucity of expert managers to oversee programs still prevent quick distribution of goods. Transportation problems were even more serious in Chad. Because of bilateral tensions between Chad and Nigeria, Nigerian ports were frequently denied to food shipments bound for Chad, and donors were forced to use the port in Cameroon. International donors had to upgrade the port and railway, and build a bridge across the river on the border between Cameroon and Chad. While donor coordination with government officials has worked well in Chad, the deteriorating security situation in the east and south threatens food supply lines. While a year of donor effort has borne fruit in terms

of improved West African port performance, problems remain in ports of the Horn of Africa and Mozambique.

13. *Ethiopia.* The competition between Ethiopia's political priorities and its humanitarian needs has led to misunderstandings and disputes between donors and the Mengistu regime and to impediments and delays in the delivery of emergency food. Addis Ababa has only grudgingly cooperated with donors despite nearly total dependence on foreign assistance for famine relief. The Mengistu regime is suspicious of all Western donors, especially the United States, and has sought to increase its control over international relief efforts by limiting the number of Western relief workers and denying them free passage to all parts of the country.

14. In addition to Addis Ababa's mistrust of Western donors, regime policies further undermine relief programs and perpetuate conditions detrimental to the at-risk population. Foremost among them are the collectivization of agriculture and the allocation of scarce resources to inefficient state farms and collectives, the coercive resettlement program that receives higher priority than emergency feeding efforts, and the focus on the civil war to the virtual exclusion of relief efforts in the contested northern provinces. During this crisis, Ethiopia has also used scarce foreign exchange to buy grain for its key urban and military constituencies and granted government rations to soldiers and their families, while leaving the famine-stricken rural population to donors' programs.

15. The insurgency in Ethiopia's northern provinces has often physically prevented the delivery of supplies to the region and disrupted agricultural projects. Ethiopian insurgent relief organizations—assisted by international relief organizations and with the acquiescence of Sudan—have arranged for cross-border food shipments from Sudan into the contested provinces. This supply route, however, has proved inadequate to provide for the great majority of the population at risk, and in any case has been interdicted by an ongoing government offensive.

16. *Sudan.* The Nimeiri regime in Sudan was slow to acknowledge publicly the growing food crisis, thereby dangerously delaying the start of international assistance. After the April coup that ended that regime, Sudan's new leadership publicly admitted the severity of the drought and famine, but it was unable to mobilize basic transport services or managerial expertise to speed assistance. Food deliveries to the 2.5 million Sudanese in the remote hard-hit western re-

SECRET

25X1

gions have required extraordinary donor efforts, including such expensive expedients as airlifts during this summer's rainy season when rudimentary truck routes and the single rail line were washed out before sufficient food supplies could be pre-positioned.

17. Donors are still financing a truck fleet and airlift to distribute food to western Sudan. The lack of government control outside Khartoum, moreover, has led to corruption and diversion of aid where local officials have been given the responsibility for food distribution. Bandits have preyed on relief convoys in the west. In southern Sudan, the second most critical area after the west, general lawlessness and the threat posed by the insurgency remain major deterrents restricting relief efforts. The insurgents in southern Sudan have cut much of the region off from relief supplies.

Positive Factors Affecting Outlook

18. In 1986, food assistance programs will be facilitated by certain positive factors that have developed from the past year's donor efforts:

- Donor coordination has been worked out in many countries.
- A network of experienced relief workers is already in place.
- Many potential transport bottlenecks have been identified, some have been eased, and other improvements are planned.
- There are increased donor efforts to develop early warning indicators and improve reporting.

Food Outlook—1986

19. Good rains fell in the worst drought areas throughout the rainy season and there is guarded optimism for the fall harvest in most countries. Even so, another 2.7 million metric tons of food assistance could be required in 1986. If the harvests prove good (see figure 2), this figure would of course be reduced. Food aid is necessary both to carry the Africans through the next few critical months to the harvest and to cover the expected 1986 shortfalls in at least 14 countries (see table, page 12).

20. Political factors as well as agricultural conditions will affect the 1986 outlook for most countries. Adequate rainfall in Ethiopia and improved prospects for agricultural production this fall are not expected to decrease substantially the number of people at risk of

starvation. Millions of peasants will be unable to capitalize on the better conditions because of a loss of draft animals and seed stocks. Thousands more are still displaced from their land or have returned too late to plant a crop. Furthermore, Addis Ababa's agricultural policies continue to favor collectivization and state farms over the peasant freeholder, and the Mengistu regime has refused for some time to negotiate policy changes recommended by the World Bank and the European Community. The intensity of the civil war and the specter of increased fighting in the heavily populated northern agricultural areas will also diminish prospects for agricultural recovery on the scale needed to feed the population adequately. Emergency food requirements will be less than the 1.3 million metric tons needed this year, but are still expected to reach 600,000 to 900,000 metric tons.

21. The Ethiopian food delivery system is plagued by bottlenecks that are likely to continue into 1986. Regime promises to enhance port operations have not materialized in a sustained way, and by late September food offtake at Aseb port was less than 1,500 metric tons a day, an unacceptable drop from the 3,000 metric tons a day moved last summer. While Addis Ababa has made substantial efforts recently to provide more overland transportation for food deliveries, its resources have fallen short, and the proposed UN truck fleet has run into organizational difficulties. Under these constraints, there could be as much as 153,000 metric tons of donated and commercial food still in the port at the end of this year even if in-country distribution is accelerated. Because of these logistic difficulties, donor food deliveries to Aseb may have to be cut back.

22. The instability of the regime in Sudan and the impact of the country's profound economic problems on its infrastructure inhibit the efficient delivery of relief supplies even though the amount of food required in 1986 is projected to be considerably less than it was this year—400,000 metric tons against approximately 1 million metric tons in 1985. It will be difficult for the present regime, or any other government likely to be in power, to concentrate resources on famine relief and agricultural recovery.

23. Sudan was fortunate to have good rains in most of the country for the first time since 1981, and harvest prospects are good. As a consequence, the thrust of relief programs will be considerably different in 1986 from that in 1985. The problem will shift from one of a grain-deficit country requiring imported grains to that of a largely self-sufficient country whose problems of distribution and rural poverty will result

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1


25X1

B-A
FOES-82
(c)

SECRET

25X1

Figure 2
Area of Drought in Sub-Saharan Africa



Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative.

African Weather: Needed Rains Return

Agricultural weather conditions during this year's crop season have improved considerably in the severe drought and famine-ravaged countries of Sub-Saharan Africa. In contrast to last year, this year's precipitation levels and temperatures have been favorable for crops and grasslands in Mali, Niger, Chad, Ethiopia, and Sudan.

Above-normal spring rainfall throughout most of the Sahel and the Horn of Africa region produced sufficient moisture for a successful spring planting season. Rainfall amounts in many areas exceeded 100 percent of normal, benefiting grazing lands and replenishing irrigation supplies. Although some local flooding was experienced in Ethiopia, the precipitation was beneficial to both crops and pasturelands. Late spring rains remained adequate and near normal in most areas of Mali, Niger, Chad, and Sudan. By midsummer, local flooding interrupted transportation and caused some crop damage in Sudan, Chad, and Mali, but overall crop yields were probably improved.

Widespread rainfall continued over most of the Sahel and the Horn region into early September, extending the overall favorable outlook for a good harvest in early winter. Heavy rain produced flooding conditions in Sudan and Chad but improved dry areas in northern Ethiopia.

The precipitation and crop year in Mozambique differ from those of the Horn region and the Sahel. Near-adequate rainfall and mild temperatures pertained throughout the growing season. During the planting season of November-January, rains were heavy in the northwest, totaling nearly 350 mm in December and January—150 to 200 percent of normal—and causing local flooding. Southern areas were mostly dry during planting, but improved somewhat in January. Heavy rains caused some flooding in the extreme south in February. By the end of the rainy season in late March, crop conditions were fair to good. The 1985 crop was reported to be near the average of the past few years and significantly improved over last year.

706243 10-85

25X1

SECRET

25X1

Emergency Food Delivered in 1985 to African Countries Facing Abnormal Food Shortages and Projected Food Aid Needs in 1986 ^a

| Country | Population (thousands) | UN World Food Program ^b 1985 Food Delivery Tally | | US AID 1986 Projections (metric tons) | |
|------------|------------------------|---|-----------|---------------------------------------|--------------------------|
| | | Food Delivered (metric tons) | Crop year | Total Grain Requirement | Projected Food Aid Needs |
| Angola | 8,000 | 57,961 | Apr-Mar | 655,000 | 120,000 ^c |
| Botswana | 221 | 42,180 | Jul-Jun | 221,000 | 50,000 ^c |
| Burkina | 6,922 | 117,756 | Nov-Oct | 1,344,000 | 100,000 |
| Cape Verde | 300 | 63,055 | Jan-Dec | 79,700 | ^d |
| Chad | 4,300 | 190,358 | Nov-Oct | 630,000 | 60,000 |
| Ethiopia | 42,000 | 995,668 | Jan-Dec | 7,232,000 | 775,000 ^c |
| The Gambia | 736 | 0 | Nov-Oct | 125,200 | 8,330 |
| Mali | 8,000 | 238,840 | Nov-Oct | ^d | ^d |
| Mauritania | 2,000 | 147,359 | Nov-Oct | 288,000 | 50,000-150,000 |
| Mozambique | 11,500 | 346,953 | May-Apr | ^d | 400,000 ^c |
| Niger | 6,346 | 272,571 | Oct-Sep | 1,250,000 | 20,000-80,000 |
| Senegal | 6,603 | 105,079 | Nov-Oct | 1,357,000 | ^d |
| Somalia | 5,692 | 198,291 | Jan-Dec | 1,005,000 | 0 ^f |
| Sudan | 21,000 | 1,346,959 | Nov-Oct | 3,700,000 | 0-400,000 ^g |

^a Countries that face food supply problems during current crop years as designated in August 1985 by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).

^b The World Food Program figures refer to food delivered during the first nine months of the crop years in the individual countries. The WFP Report is dated 1 August 1985. US AID information is from field assessments of the developing food production situation for the current crop year 1985/86, except where noted. AID cautions that there are no "correct" estimates for African food production, and that all estimates are subject to change. The date of information is September 1985.

^c Estimates for Angola, Botswana, and Mozambique are from the FAO.

^d It is too early in the crop year to make projections, or, as in the case of Mozambique, the information is not available.

^e Exceptionally good weather from now until November-December could reduce the need to 483,000 metric tons. Bad weather until the harvest could raise it to 1,358,000 metric tons.

^f Somalia is expecting to receive about 125,000 metric tons in nonemergency food aid assistance.

^g Although Sudan is estimating a sorghum crop of 4,280,000 metric tons, there may be shortfalls due to poor internal distribution that will create emergency food needs beyond aggregate availabilities.

in large pockets of malnutrition and poor health. Current estimates put the at-risk population in 1986 at 2.5 million, down from this year's 8-9 million. Nearly all of the population in need will be in the western provinces, requiring the pre-positioning of grain in the west between December and the beginning of the rains in April. During the first half of the year, intensive donor efforts to keep roads open, truck fleets operating, and the single rail line to the west functioning met with only limited success. These same problems will confront donors next year. In addition, the continued insurgency in the south will make adequate food production there difficult and will seriously impede if not preclude delivery of relief supplies.

24. In other severely affected countries, the rains have also brought new optimism, but projected conditions are unfavorable for complete recovery. The food deficit in Mozambique's interior provinces is still acute. Although rain has come to some parts of the country, recovery has been impeded by the cumulative effects of four years of drought, more than three years of active insurgency, and widespread malnourishment and illness. The affected population for 1986 is estimated at 2.5 million people, approximately the same as this year. Conditions for 1986 in the Sahelian countries are problematical. In the course of the 17-year Sahelian drought, there have previously been as many as three consecutive years of good rains, always followed by several years of drought. The rains and

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

SECRET

25X1

anticipated good harvests this year, therefore, may provide only a brief breathing spell for Niger, Chad, and Mali. [redacted]

25. Even if there are good harvests, the paucity of trucks and inadequate roads in Sahelian countries will impede the distribution of food from surplus to deficit areas within the countries and the delivery of relief supplies to at-risk populations. With the return of the rains, many people who came to camps in urban areas are beginning to return to their homes in remote regions, although they will still be dependent on food aid. Widespread rural poverty will also inhibit the redistribution of surplus domestic food in the cash economy. Donated trucks and upgraded roads and bridges have eased the transportation problems somewhat, but there is little margin for error in the shaky transportation system. Management bottlenecks or a breakdown in the expanded distribution system could send the people back to the camps. [redacted]

coming year even as African countries continue to demand and need emergency food assistance. The cumulative effects of two years or more of malnutrition, disease, lack of water, and human dislocation are now being felt. Rehabilitation will require extensive programs to restore health and control disease, replenish water supplies, and restore land productivity. Donor problems will become even more complex if the continued provision of emergency food aid works as a disincentive to increased local food production. If food aid results in lower farm prices, for example, farmers will have little incentive to produce beyond the subsistence level, and the dependence on international food aid could deepen. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

Role of the Soviet Union

26. Moscow's approach to food problems in Africa has not changed appreciably in recent months. The Kremlin insists that the food emergency is the result of Western exploitation for which the USSR bears no responsibility, and the Soviets have provided little food and agricultural assistance to African states. The Soviets did respond to the negative publicity they received for their lack of response to the crisis in Ethiopia by supplying transport assistance and limited amounts of food, but aid levels remain well below those of the West. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

27. Constraints on Soviet food production, the USSR's shortage of hard currency, and its insistence that African famine is a Western problem make it highly unlikely that Moscow will devote substantial resources to famine relief. If the Soviets believe that famine poses an immediate threat to the survival of a client regime, they might step up food and logistic assistance, but they would probably provide far more by way of military and security aid to deal with any political problems famine might create for the client leadership. Moscow's tightfisted relief policy may lead to a loss of prestige in the eyes of some African governments, and Soviet clients under pressure might be inclined to move toward the West. Any such moves, however, will be limited because of the perception of most client regimes that continued security ties to the USSR are vital to their survival. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

29. It will be difficult for donors to determine when crisis conditions no longer exist and normal needs begin. Even under "normal" conditions, large proportions of the populations in affected countries will be malnourished, sick, and without land or employment opportunities, and African governments will expect aid to continue to combat these problems. The United States and other donors could find themselves being criticized for abandoning countries in need as emergency programs wind down. Relations between Ethiopia and the United States will be particularly tense during this period. The tenuous cooperation that was built on humanitarian concerns during the emergency will be threatened. [redacted]

30. Drought has been only one factor in the famine; reform of Africa's national agricultural policies remains the most important prerequisite for increased food production over the long term.⁴ Programs to introduce new plant varieties, fertilizers, and pesticides have been largely ineffective because of African governments' failure or inability to support farmers. Attempts by the United States and other Western donors to encourage agricultural, economic, and political reforms will be resisted by some African governments, who either view the reforms as politically risky or reject them as inconsistent with their own governing philosophies. Those African leaders willing to pursue reform will demand significant amounts of aid from the West. In any case, reforms of agricultural policies will take years to bear fruit, and will not have an impact on African food requirements in 1986. [redacted]

25X1

Implications for the United States and the West

28. The United States and other Western countries will be asked for stepped-up development aid in the

⁴ A more detailed account of the underlying causes of food problems in Africa overall is found in the Interagency Intelligence Assessment *Food Problems in Sub-Saharan Africa: Prospects for 1984 and Beyond*, 22 March 1984. [redacted]


25X1

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

Figure 3
Cross-Border Refugee Movement in the Horn of Africa



706244 (547322) 10-85

25X1

SECRET

25X1

ANNEX A

The Refugee Crisis

Refugees are an integral part of the African crisis. There are an estimated 3 million refugees continentwide, with some groups having fled their homelands decades ago. Forced across international borders by starvation and internal chaos in their home countries, these refugees burden the already depleted physical and human resources of the host country, rob the sending countries of vital workers, and raise tensions between sending and receiving countries.

The most severely affected drought-stricken countries have been particularly hard hit by refugee problems over the past several years. In the Horn countries alone there are approximately 1.7 million refugees, nearly half a million of them Ethiopian famine victims now in camps in Sudan, Somalia, and Djibouti. (See figure 3.) Thousands of Chadian refugees have fled to neighboring countries, approximately 40,000 to the Central African Republic and an estimated 80,000 to 120,000 to western Sudan. Chronic food shortages and persistent insurgent activity have pushed thousands of refugees out of Mozambique into all of its neighboring countries except Tanzania. Nomads from Niger and Mali have crossed southern borders into the coastal West African countries and north to Algeria in greater numbers than ever before. These movements follow age-old migratory paths and, while Algeria offers some assistance to those in its territory, little official notice has been taken of increased numbers in the coastal countries.

From the perspectives of the governments involved, refugee problems have created or intensified both domestic and international political strains. Domestically, the crisis has required governments, already under considerable economic duress, to allocate significant resources to emergency programs for refugees. For example, Sudan found it necessary to assign many of its small cadre of national development officials to coordinate refugee relief in order to comply with donors' requests to expand relief efforts to the 680,000

Ethiopian refugees and 120,000 Chadian refugees in the country. In addition to human resources, major parts of Sudan's transportation system have also been diverted from domestic operations to the handling of relief goods. While Sudan and the other major receiving countries have been hospitable to refugees so far, their continued presence in growing numbers is beginning to tax the good will of host governments, particularly as the refugees exacerbate local famine conditions and endemic tribal and ethnic tensions.

Beyond the domestic impact, government decisions on refugee relief are taken in the context of increased tensions with the sending countries. Nowhere is this more evident than in the Horn. Ethiopia has historically been at odds with its neighbors and the exodus of some 1 million Ethiopians over the past several years—400,000 in this year alone—has worsened these strains. Leaders in Sudan, Somalia, and Djibouti believe that the arrival of Ethiopian refugees—sparked not only by drought but also by the civil war—is intensifying their own internal problems and complicating their relations with Ethiopia.

Over the near term refugee numbers are likely to grow as a result of continuing serious food shortfalls, intensifying insurgencies, and civil war. As a consequence, the international community, including the United States, will be expected to increase aid levels to provide primary care and protection to refugees.

Over the longer term, donors will expect both sending and receiving countries to assume responsibility for planning comprehensive solutions for refugees—either repatriation or permanent resettlement—rather than depending solely on emergency aid. Either option will be politically and economically difficult and require international resource commitments over many years.

25X1

Page Denied

Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied